Lockheed Martin has unveiled the PAC-3 Edge, a new interceptor that would represent the top tier of the U.S. Army’s Patriot air defense missile family. The missile is being developed to deliver greater performance against advanced threats than the current PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE), as the Army advances a competition for its next-generation interceptor.

The company says PAC-3 Edge will offer improved performance against increasingly challenging aerial threats, including advanced ballistic and hypersonic missiles. The design builds on the PAC-3 MSE’s existing technology while incorporating a new seeker, an upgraded control system, and a more advanced solid rocket motor developed with Northrop Grumman.

In terms of appearance, PAC-3 Edge differs significantly from the PAC-3 MSE. It does away entirely with the mid-body strakes. The missile body also lacks the distinctive tapered section that separates the narrower forward section from the broader rear section on the MSE version.

Lockheed announced on October 9 that it had been selected to advance to the next phase of the Army’s Future Interceptor program. Company officials said testing is expected to begin in 2027, with initial deployment targeted for 2031.

The Army’s selection of Lockheed and another unnamed competitor marks a significant development in the service’s effort to improve the Patriot system’s ability to deal with more sophisticated threats. The Army previously abandoned its Lower-Tier Future Interceptor (LTFI) program in 2024, citing cost concerns, and instead emphasized incremental improvements to the existing PAC-3 MSE. The subsequent emergence of the Future Interceptor competition points to renewed interest in a more substantial leap in capability.

A More Capable Patriot Interceptor

PAC-3 Edge is intended to preserve the advantages of the existing PAC-3 family while improving the missile’s ability to engage targets at longer ranges and higher altitudes.

One of the central changes is a new seeker being developed by Lockheed Martin’s Strigo Product Center. The company says the technology will improve target detection and tracking, helping the interceptor deal with more demanding threats. The company has not disclosed the seeker’s technical details, but one possibility is a dual-mode or multimode configuration, combining different sensing methods to improve target acquisition and tracking in challenging conditions. Such an approach could help an interceptor maintain a reliable track against maneuvering targets and better distinguish real threats from decoys or other countermeasures.

Tim Cahill, president of Missiles and Fire Control (MFC) for Lockheed Martin, told TWZ that the same seeker technology that will be used in PAC-3 Edge will also find its way into future offensive and defensive systems going into the future. “So it isn’t just a one single seeker solution, but it will be a family of seekers that will operate across a number of regimes,” Cahill explained. “Frankly, I’d like to not tell everybody exactly what we’re doing, but it is clearly different from what is out there right now,” Cahill said, adding that hardware assemblies and components are now being tested in the lab, and that seekers have been flown on aircraft testbeds.

The missile will also use a three-pulse (as opposed to two-pulse) solid rocket motor designed by Northrop Grumman. Unlike a conventional motor that provides most of its thrust in a single sustained burn, a multi-pulse design can deliver thrust at different points during flight. That can help preserve energy for the terminal engagement, when an interceptor may need to maneuver aggressively to reach a target.

Lockheed says the combination of the new seeker, propulsion system, and control system improvements will provide greater maneuverability and improve performance at extended ranges and higher altitudes. To ensure greater agility, Jason Reynolds, vice president and general manager of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) at Lockheed Martin, explained that the new missile adds a greater number of more capable attitude control motors (ACMs), compared to the PAC-3 MSE. These small thrusters ring the missile’s forward body.

The new characteristics could be particularly important against maneuvering ballistic missile warheads and hypersonic weapons, which can pose difficult interception problems because of their speed, altitude and dynamic flight profiles. However, the company has yet to demonstrate PAC-3 Edge’s performance in flight testing.

The extent to which PAC-3 Edge could overlap with, or potentially augment, the capabilities of the Army’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system also remains unclear. THAAD is designed to intercept ballistic missiles at higher altitudes and longer ranges than Patriot, where midcourse window bleeds into the terminal intercept window. If PAC-3 Edge delivers a substantial improvement in engagement range and altitude over PAC-3 MSE, it could potentially provide at least some backfill for THAAD.

The announcement did not provide detailed performance figures for the new interceptor, including its maximum engagement range, speed, or specific target set. It also did not establish how much better the missile will perform than the PAC-3 MSE in operational conditions.

Addressing An Air Defense Force Under Pressure

The Army has a pressing need to improve its air and missile defense capabilities while expanding the number of interceptors available to its forces.

TWZ has been reporting on the strain facing the Patriot force and its interceptor supply for years. In July 2025, we reported on the Army’s plan to expand its Patriot air defense force by roughly a quarter, adding four battalions as the service sought to meet growing operational demands. More recently, we have detailed the challenges of replenishing interceptors after intensive combat operations, including the scale of U.S. missile and drone engagements in the Middle East, as well as transfers to Ukraine.

Related to this, the push for a more capable Patriot interceptor comes as the system faces increasingly sophisticated threats and adversaries that have learned from years of combat. Russia has improved its ballistic missile tactics to pierce the Patriot’s protective umbrella, while Iran has demonstrated ways to exploit gaps in layered missile defenses, including introducing extremely high-speed ballistic missiles and cluster warheads that open at high altitude.

PAC-3 MSE is currently the most advanced operational member of the PAC-3 family. It is designed primarily as a hit-to-kill interceptor, destroying targets through the force of direct impact, but it also incorporates a small explosive charge known as a “lethality enhancer,” as TWZ has previously detailed.

PAC-3 Edge is intended to push those capabilities further still. Lockheed says the new missile is being designed to work within the Army’s existing and future integrated air and missile defense architecture, including the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) and the M903 Patriot launcher. The company has also identified containerized launchers and HIMARS Flex among the systems with which it intends to integrate the interceptor.

Such compatibility could allow the service to retain much of its existing infrastructure while improving the performance of the weapons used within it.

The precise extent of that compatibility, however, will depend on development, testing, and integration work that remains ahead.

Production And Cost

Lockheed is developing PAC-3 Edge as the company and the Pentagon work to expand production of the existing PAC-3 MSE.

In January, Lockheed Martin announced a seven-year agreement with the Pentagon to more than triple annual PAC-3 MSE production capacity, initially targeting an increase from roughly 600 interceptors to 2,000 a year. The effort subsequently received a major funding boost in July, when the U.S. government awarded Lockheed a contract modification worth up to $53.86 billion, bringing the total multiyear contract value to $58.62 billion. Lockheed says the effort is intended to more than triple production by the end of 2030, while expanding its workforce and investing in manufacturing infrastructure and its supply chain.

Those efforts could provide a foundation for producing PAC-3 Edge if the missile completes development and enters service. Lockheed has said the new interceptor will be manufactured on its existing PAC-3 production line in Camden, Arkansas, with factory modernization expected to support the eventual transition.

The company has also highlighted substantial internal investment in the new missile and its seeker technology. That investment could reduce development risk and give Lockheed greater control over critical components, although the program’s final cost and production schedule remain important unknowns.

The broader challenge is not simply developing an interceptor with better performance. Advanced missiles can be expensive, and air defense forces must balance the capabilities of individual weapons against the number they can afford to procure and keep available. Sustained combat operations can rapidly consume interceptor inventories, making production rates and replacement costs central considerations.

Cahill says the company has also identified the opportunity to mix and match components between PAC-3 Edge and other missile offerings from Lockheed Martin. “We are getting increasingly modular, and increasingly we’re mixing and matching pieces and parts,” he said.

Ultimately, if it chooses PAC-3 Edge, the U.S. government will decide exactly how to handle production of the PAC-3 MSE and the new missiles. “We would expect the typical thing is you’ll feather them, so you would expect that over time MSEs would come down,” Cahill continued. “We’re still talking, seven, eight, nine, 10 years away. You would expect that the Edge production would go up, but there’s plenty of capacity in the factory to manage whatever surges are going to be needed there.”

At the same time, it should be noted that Lockheed Martin is also working on a lower-cost PAC-3 development, the PAC-3 Adapted Capability Effector (ACE). The company says that this interceptor will cost less than half as much as the PAC-3 MSE, meaning it would have a price tag of around $2.5 million. The company says that the PAC-3 ACE will preserve two-thirds of the capability the PAC-3 MSE had, and it has already generated considerable international interest.

Future Interceptor Competition

Lockheed has confirmed that it is one of two companies selected to continue in the Army’s Future Interceptor competition. The identity of the other competitor has not yet been disclosed, and the Army has not publicly provided a complete account of the competition’s requirements.

The effort follows the cancellation of the earlier Lower-Tier Future Interceptor (LTFI) program, which had involved Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. At the time, the Army opted to focus on upgrades to the PAC-3 MSE and on better integration of its existing air and missile defense systems.

Gen Lozano, PEO Missiles & Space, tells @JenJudson that they have cancelled the Lower Tier Future Interceptor program, which would have succeeded the PAC-3 MSE. Instead they will upgrade MSE, and want to move forward with THAAD integration into IBCS. #AUSA2024 pic.twitter.com/NZMPgDH4KP

— Colby Badhwar (@ColbyBadhwar) October 15, 2024

The renewed competition suggests that incremental upgrades alone may not be sufficient to address the Army’s longer-term requirements. The development of faster, more maneuverable missiles and other advanced aerial threats is driving demand for interceptors capable of operating across a wider engagement envelope.

For PAC-3 Edge, which is designed to address emerging threat requirements, the planned 2027 testing start and 2031 deployment target leave substantial development work to complete, including demonstrating the seeker’s performance, validating the propulsion system, and proving the missile’s ability to engage representative targets.

For now, the unveiling establishes the direction Lockheed wants to take the Patriot interceptor family. Whether PAC-3 Edge can deliver the promised increase in performance, while meeting the Army’s cost and production requirements, will become clearer as the program progresses. Regardless, from what is being experienced on the battlefield, a more capable, higher-reaching Patriot would be a very welcome addition to the Army’s Patriot family.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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Airbus and Kratos Defense & Security Solutions have completed the first flight of the U740 Valkyrie uncrewed combat aircraft, a Europeanized version of the XQ-58A Valkyrie, advancing their bid to deliver a combat-ready system to Germany by 2029. The flight comes as the German Air Force, or Luftwaffe, moves toward acquiring a new class of jet-powered combat drones, in what could become a major shift in the country’s traditionally limited armed-uncrewed-aircraft capabilities.

The ride of the Valkyrie
With the successful first flight of the Airbus U740 Valkyrie in Europe, we are one step closer to introducing an operational uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) to the German and other European Armed Forces.
The flight achieved all… pic.twitter.com/S2sFrtdmGA

— Airbus Defence (@AirbusDefence) October 12, 2026

The flight took place at an unnamed test facility in northern Europe, Airbus announced on October 12. The aircraft conducted a rocket-assisted takeoff, maneuvers at different altitudes, and flight at speeds of up to Mach 0.8. The test also included in-flight mission adjustments, with Airbus reporting that all objectives were met.

The next phase will introduce Airbus’ Multi-platform Autonomous Reconfigurable and Secure (MARS) mission system, which is intended to provide the aircraft’s European-controlled software and mission-management architecture. Airbus says MARS will support autonomous operations and coordination between multiple uncrewed aircraft while retaining human oversight of critical decisions.

The U740 is based on Kratos’ American-developed XQ-58A, an uncrewed aircraft designed as a relatively affordable combat platform. Airbus is adapting the aircraft with its MARS mission system and presenting the combination as a way to provide Germany with a sovereign European capability without waiting for an entirely new airframe to mature.

Published performance figures for the U740 include a maximum takeoff weight of around 3,000 kilograms (6,600 pounds). Airbus lists a range exceeding 5,000 kilometers (3,100 miles) and a service ceiling of 45,000 feet. It has an internal weapons bay and external payload stations beneath its wings.

One distinctive feature is the U740’s rocket-assisted launch capability, which reduces its dependence on conventional runways. The original Valkyrie design is primarily recovered by parachute, but newer versions can take off with rocket assistance and land on a runway, offering greater flexibility in how and where they operate. That could help the Luftwaffe disperse operations or launch aircraft from locations where established airfields are unavailable or under threat. The XQ-58 family has also shown some potential for scaling to different requirements, as detailed in these earlier reports on runway launch and recovery and further platform development. In particular, the U.S. Marine Corps has been exploring ways to expand the XQ-58’s flexibility, including further development of the Valkyrie to meet its own mission requirements.

If adopted, the rocket-assisted launch capability would provide an intriguing throwback to practical German studies during the Cold War, in which F-104G Starfighter fighter-bombers used the Zero-Length Launch (ZELL) system to take off from dispersed locations.

Airbus says the U740 will be able to operate autonomously or under the direction of crewed fighters such as the Eurofighter. The company sees it as a means of increasing the reach, firepower, and survivability of existing combat aircraft, with uncrewed platforms undertaking higher-risk missions.

With the MARS system, Airbus intends to give European customers control over mission applications, data, and key software functions, while enabling autonomous mission execution and coordination between aircraft. This is particularly relevant for Germany, which will likely want to integrate national weapons, sensors, and operational requirements without becoming dependent on a foreign-controlled mission architecture.

Since the underlying airframe is American, the degree of sovereignty Germany ultimately obtains will depend on the practical ability to control and modify software, integrate national systems, and support the aircraft throughout its service life.

The European flight is an important step for the Valkyrie program, but substantial work remains before it can be considered combat-ready. Mission-system integration, further testing, and the demonstration of effective cooperation with crewed aircraft will be central to meeting the companies’ 2029 target.

The effort is also unfolding as Germany develops its requirements for what has been described in press reports as a Jagdbomberdrohne, or fighter-bomber drone. The precise operational concept has yet to emerge publicly, including whether the Luftwaffe primarily wants an uncrewed aircraft to accompany crewed fighters or a platform capable of conducting independent long-range strike missions.

Germany has historically lagged behind several other major military powers in fielding armed uncrewed aircraft. Previous attempts to acquire larger reconnaissance drones encountered major technical and procurement difficulties, while political resistance to armed drones delayed the development of a strike capability for years.

The Luftwaffe’s current larger uncrewed aircraft fleet remains limited to five leased Israeli-made Heron TP medium-altitude, long-endurance drones. Germany is also participating in the Eurodrone program, while uncrewed systems were expected to form part of the wider Future Combat Air System (FCAS), before that Franco-German-led effort hit the buffers earlier this year.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and Germany’s subsequent military buildup have intensified pressure to address these gaps. Berlin has set a goal of being ready for war by 2029, and reports indicate that the Luftwaffe wants a new combat-drone capability on a similarly ambitious timeline.

As well as Airbus and Kratos, the emerging competition reportedly includes Anduril, General Atomics partnered with Germany’s INTEC, as well as Lockheed Martin. Boeing and Rheinmetall are meanwhile pitching the larger, Block 3 version of the Australian-developed MQ-28 Ghost Bat, while Helsing and Hensoldt are pursuing the homegrown CA-1 Europa.

The various proposals reflect a broader shift toward uncrewed aircraft that can deliver additional weapons, sensors, and electronic warfare capabilities without putting a pilot at risk. But Germany’s terminology raises an important question about the intended role.

A conventional collaborative combat aircraft, or CCA, would be designed to work alongside crewed fighters, extending their reach and providing additional combat mass. A platform intended to operate independently against targets deep inside enemy territory would place greater emphasis on range and survivability. These roles are not mutually exclusive, but the Luftwaffe’s final requirements will shape the aircraft it chooses.

Germany may not be looking for a single drone to do everything. One option might be a split high-low approach that could pair more capable, longer-range systems for deep-strike missions with cheaper, attritable collaborative combat aircraft that can fly alongside crewed fighters. At this point, it should also be noted that CCAs could also give older fourth-generation fighters a new lease on life, boosting their lethality and survivability by extending their sensor reach, adding weapons capacity, and allowing uncrewed aircraft to take on more dangerous tasks.

Meanwhile, Airbus is also working on its larger U760 Ravenstorm, intended for service in the early 2030s. The Ravenstorm gives Airbus a longer-term path toward a more advanced European-designed uncrewed combat aircraft as it pursues the nearer-term Valkyrie effort.

In the short term, the Luftwaffe will need to determine which capabilities must be available in an initial operational fleet and which can be introduced later. Even an aircraft based on an established design requires substantial integration, testing, training, and infrastructure before it can be employed effectively in combat.

Germany’s 2029 target leaves little time for a program that still has to integrate its mission system and demonstrate how the aircraft will be used operationally. That is a particular challenge for the Luftwaffe, which has little experience operating large uncrewed aircraft, let alone jet-powered systems intended for combat.

The European flight gives Airbus and Kratos a head start in testing the U740 for German requirements, but the next major milestone will be flying it with the MARS mission system. How quickly that work progresses will help determine whether the Valkyrie can meet the Luftwaffe’s timetable.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post European U740 Variant Of The XQ-58A Valkyrie Has Flown appeared first on TWZ.

Anduril has unveiled Steelfin, a family of surface-to-air interceptor missiles designed to share a common architecture and manufacturing process while being configured for different air and missile defense missions. The company says this approach will enable high-volume production at significantly lower cost than existing weapons, though it has not disclosed prices or detailed performance specifications.

The announcement comes as the U.S. military seeks to expand air defense inventories against an increasingly diverse range of threats, from inexpensive drones to cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and advanced maneuvering weapons, including hypersonic ones. Recent experiences from Ukraine and the Middle East make it abundantly clear that the challenge is not simply developing interceptors capable of defeating those targets but producing enough of them to sustain operations without exhausting stocks of more expensive weapons.

Using high-end interceptors against comparatively inexpensive threats can rapidly consume limited inventories, as it has in the Middle East, especially, even when engagements are necessary to protect personnel and critical infrastructure. A broader range of defensive weapons, matched to different threats and engagement requirements, could help ease that burden.

Anduril’s answer is a family of missiles built around a common two-stage design. The first stage consists of a booster, while the second is a terminal interceptor intended to share a baseline airframe, avionics, software, flight control system, and interfaces across variants. Different boosters and terminal-stage components would allow the company to tailor individual configurations to specific missions without developing an entirely new missile for each requirement. Both hit-to-kill and blast-fragmentation terminal-stage interceptors will be offered, Anduril says.

“It is an open system, so the ability to fly it with different rocket motors, different seekers, to be able to swap these components out, to be able to reconfigure the system for a range of different threats is a feature that we built into this,” explained Christian Brose, who serves as the president and chief strategy officer at Anduril. He was speaking to members of the media, including TWZ, ahead of the official unveiling of Steelfin.

The company says the family is intended to cover missions ranging from point defense and lower-tier integrated air and missile defense to upper-tier ballistic missile defense. It also identifies cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic missiles among the threats the broader family is designed to address. Overall, it is an extremely ambitious goal, and something that has not been attempted previously to this degree.

The announcement does not specify which variants would address individual threats or provide engagement envelopes and performance figures with which to assess those claims.

Brose did clarify that the different ranges that the various Steelfin variants will achieve will be based on the booster sizing. “Right now, we’re looking at integrating on 10-inch, 18-inch, and 21-inch boosters, but we’re also looking at quad pack and dual pack for the Mk 41 Vertical Launch System as well for different installations, which imply different range and altitudes.”

Anduril’s emphasis on commonality is also intended to address the industrial challenges associated with conventional interceptor production. Different missile programs traditionally require specialized tooling, manufacturing processes, suppliers, and facilities, limiting opportunities to shift production rapidly as operational requirements change.

Steelfin variants are intended to use shared production lines and equipment, with mission-specific boosters and terminal-stage components incorporated during final assembly. Anduril says this would allow manufacturing capacity to be redirected toward whichever variant is in greatest demand. The company is planning near-term production on the order of several thousand missiles annually, with capacity designed to expand or shift according to requirements.

That remains a production ambition, and Anduril has not provided a detailed production schedule or contracted quantities demonstrating how quickly it could reach that scale.

The company also says Steelfin is designed to be compatible with existing land- and sea-based launch infrastructure, including the M903A2 launcher used by newer PAC-3 series interceptors, the Mk 41 Vertical Launch System, and Typhon, as well as emerging containerized launchers. It cites compatibility with established fire-control systems, including AEGIS and the Army’s Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS).

When it comes to cost, Steve Milano, the lead for Air Dominance & Strike at Anduril, suggested that the “more exquisite version” of the Steelfin would sit somewhere above the PAC-3 MSE and below THAAD, but would accomplish “100 percent of the THAAD mission at a fraction of the cost.” In a different configuration, tailored for the PAC-3-type mission, Steelfin would accomplish 80 percent of that mission at less than 50 percent of the cost, Milano added.

While THAAD is aimed at taking out short, medium, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of flight, PAC-3 provides high-altitude, hit-to-kill air and missile defense against tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft.

Milano continued: “Looking at the lower end of the spectrum, as far as low-cost interceptors are concerned, I just saw an article on the [aircraft carrier USS Abraham] Lincoln coming back with all of the Shahed markings on the side, and I was contemplating the number of SM-2s that were fired against those assets. When I think of that cost exchange, the Steelfin enters into that market and provides greater than 80 percent of the capability of an SM-2 for a third of the cost.”

For reference, a single THAAD interceptor costs around $15.5 million. The unit price of each PAC-3 MSE interceptor now stands at approximately $5.3 million, according to the Army’s latest proposed budget for the 2027 Fiscal Year. Meanwhile, the price of a single SM-2 Block IIIC interceptor, the most advanced version of that missile currently in service, is around $2.5 million. 

Steelfin is entering a market in which the U.S. military is already pursuing several approaches to expanding its low-cost interceptor inventory.

In May, the U.S. Army sought industry proposals for a Patriot-compatible interceptor with a target unit cost below $1 million. The effort reflects the service’s desire for a less expensive weapon for appropriate engagements, preserving higher-end interceptors for targets that warrant their cost and capabilities. The Army’s solicitation also emphasizes component-level cost targets and competition among suppliers, including for rocket motors, seekers, and guidance systems.

Lockheed Martin has offered a separate industry response with its PAC-3 Adapted Capability Effector (ACE), a lower-cost interceptor intended to operate within the Patriot ecosystem. Unveiled in July, the weapon is intended to cost less than half as much as the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE), according to the company. The MSE’s unit price is approximately $5.3 million in the Army’s fiscal 2027 budget request, putting the ACE’s implied price at around $2.5 million if Lockheed’s comparison holds.

Its projected price would still be well above the Army’s separate sub-$1 million target, reflecting the different objectives and requirements behind the two efforts.

The Navy, meanwhile, is pursuing a potentially broader shift toward modular interceptor architectures. Its Naval Modular Missile initiative envisions a family of surface-to-air weapons built around a common Terminal Stage Interceptor, with different boosters and canisters producing configurations for different missions and platforms. The plans include variants intended to fit multiple missiles within a Mk 41 launcher cell, as well as a version designed for launch from Virginia class submarines equipped with the Virginia Payload Module.

The Navy’s longer-term vision is to replace its existing Standard Missile family with modular variants, although the effort remains in development. The concept highlights potential operational benefits beyond manufacturing: smaller interceptors could increase the number of weapons carried aboard ships, while other configurations could preserve longer-range capabilities. The Navy has also outlined an ambition to reach production of 1,000 missiles annually within five years of a contract award.

Both the Navy’s modular missile initiative and Steelfin reflect a push toward common architectures that can support multiple interceptor configurations without requiring an entirely new missile for every mission. Steelfin’s stated scope is particularly broad, with Anduril pitching the family for missions spanning point defense through lower-tier air and missile defense to upper-tier ballistic missile defense. That would cover much of the air and missile defense spectrum, although it does not extend to exoatmospheric midcourse interception. Whether the family can deliver that breadth of capability at the promised cost and scale remains to be demonstrated.

Anduril says it has been developing Steelfin for several years with investment from multiple customers and has completed ballistic testing using representative air vehicles. Flight testing of Steelfin variants is planned for 2027.

Already, Anduril says it is working closely with “a number of different customers to get into the field.” Brose continued: “We feel like this is going to be a critical component of the U.S. and allied inventories to complement the range of exquisite capabilities that all of us are familiar with and know by name.”

Steelfin underscores what is now a broader trend toward lower-cost interceptors that can be manufactured at scale, and plugged into existing ecosystems, often with at least a degree of modularity to tackle new and emerging target sets. Steelfin adds to Anduril’s proposal to combine that modularity with a common production system designed to support thousands of weapons annually.

Anduril has yet to develop or produce a surface-to-air missile, although its Roadrunner system gives it experience in the related field of countering aerial threats, including loitering munitions. The company’s ambitions for Steelfin are significant, and modular architectures are certainly attractive. After all, a common baseline should simplify production, reduce costs, and allow interceptors to be tailored to different missions. In practice, however, realizing those benefits has historically proved difficult, and fraught with compromises. Whether Anduril can avoid those pitfalls while delivering the promised combination of capability, affordability, and production scale remains an open question. If it can, Steelfin could put the company in a strong position in the future surface-to-air missile market.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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The U.S. Navy is preparing to sign a contract with Lockheed Martin to integrate the stealthy AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) onto the Air Force’s B-52 Stratofortress bombers, according to an October 7 government notice. The effort would add another long-range maritime strike option to the U.S. bomber force as the military looks to counter increasingly capable adversary naval forces, especially in the Indo-Pacific theater.

The planned contract comes months after the Air Force revealed that the stealthy B-2 bomber can also launch LRASM, a capability that had not previously been publicly disclosed. You can read more about that here.

The latest Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) notice says the command intends to enter into sole-source negotiations with Lockheed Martin and subsequently award a cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order covering LRASM integration on the B-52. The work would include missile software updates, associated testing, repairs to test assets, and failure review boards.

The notice does not provide a schedule for completing the integration or fielding the capability.

The B-52 is already capable of carrying large numbers of air-launched cruise missiles, including the AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) family. LRASM is derived from that family, sharing a similar general form factor while incorporating features specifically designed to find and attack ships in contested maritime environments.

The B-52 can carry up to 20 JASSMs, and the weapons have the same dimensions, but the government notice does not specify how many LRASMs the bomber would ultimately carry.

This is not the first time the B-52’s LRASM integration has been in the works.

As long ago as November 2019, Naval News reported that $10 million in Fiscal Year 2019 funding had been allocated to study integrating the missile onto the bomber, with Lockheed Martin and the Navy and Air Force expected to work on the effort. At the time, officials said the fielding timeline and the bomber’s eventual missile capacity had yet to be determined.

The U.S. Air Force’s Fiscal Year 2027 budget proposal further outlines plans to integrate the latest variants of LRASM and JASSM onto the B-52, including versions not yet cleared for use on the bomber. According to the document, the effort, which is intended to enable the deployment of next-generation stealthy cruise missiles against targets protected by sophisticated integrated air defense systems, will focus on engineering and manufacturing development, software updates, and weapons integration. Planned work in FY2027 includes incorporating the missiles’ operational flight programs into the B-52’s baseline bomber software, validating safe weapon separation from both wing-mounted stations and the internal carriage launcher, updating armament interfaces, and completing system-safety testing.

LRASM is designed to attack high-value surface vessels at long distances while reducing the exposure of the aircraft launching it. Its guidance combines GPS-assisted inertial navigation with onboard sensors and autonomous target-recognition capabilities intended to help it operate in heavily defended environments. Its imaging infrared seeker supports terminal target acquisition without relying on active radar emissions in that phase of flight. The missile operates with a high degree of autonomy, enabled by an integrated route-planning capability linked to its onboard electronic support measures (ESM) system. LRASM also has a datalink that allows it to get threat updates while in flight. It can also work cooperatively with other LRASMs during coordinated strikes. 

The missile’s precise operational range is not publicly disclosed. However, the baseline LRASM is reported to be able to strike targets at between 200 and 300 miles, in line with the AGM-158A JASSM. The forthcoming C-3 version is expected to have the same reach as the JASSM-ER, which is reported to be around 600 miles.

For the B-52, the addition of LRASM would provide a dedicated anti-ship weapon alongside its established land-attack arsenal. A bomber operating at a considerable distance from a hostile fleet could launch multiple missiles toward maritime targets, complicating an adversary’s air-defense and interception problem. The aircraft’s payload capacity could also allow it to contribute substantial missile volume to a coordinated strike.

The B-52 was previously adapted to carry AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, although the weapon is not listed among the bomber’s current publicly documented armament. Compared to the Harpoon, however, LRASM represents a quantum leap in capability, offering drastically greater range, a stealthy design, and the ability to react to threats and adapt in real time. Combined, these traits make for a far more survivable and lethal anti-ship capability.

The B-52 also has a demonstrated naval mine-laying capability through the Quickstrike family of aerial mines. This includes carrying 2,000-pound Quickstrike-ER mines fitted with GPS-aided, winged guidance kits, allowing them to glide to designated points in the water from more than 40 miles away. The system enables the bomber to seed minefields with greater precision while remaining farther from potentially defended waters, threatening enemy shipping routes, port access, and naval movements.

The B-52 effort comes against the backdrop of the Air Force’s newly acknowledged use of LRASM on the B-2, which adds a different dimension to the service’s anti-ship capabilities.

LRASM was also previously integrated on the B-1B, meaning that all three of the Air Force’s strategic bombers will eventually be able to employ it.

The renewed focus on bomber-launched anti-ship weapons reflects the challenges posed by modern naval forces, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. China’s expanding surface fleet, increasingly sophisticated air defenses, and layered anti-access/area-denial capabilities have made the ability to attack ships from a distance an important consideration for U.S. military planning.

LRASM is designed to help address those challenges by combining long-range flight with reduced observability and autonomous terminal targeting. Its onboard sensors and navigation capabilities are intended to help it identify and engage appropriate targets in environments where communications and external targeting support may be limited or contested.

Bomber integration also offers a way to increase the number of potential launch platforms without relying exclusively on tactical aircraft or surface combatants. A B-52 carrying a substantial missile load could contribute to a coordinated attack alongside B-1s, stealth bombers, naval aircraft, and other forces.

The B-52’s payload capacity would make it particularly useful for delivering larger quantities of weapons from outside the most heavily defended areas.

The planned B-52 integration also fits into a broader effort to expand LRASM’s availability across the U.S. military. Publicly discussed integration efforts have included the F-15E, F-15EX, F-16C/D, certain variants of the F-35, and the Navy’s P-8A Poseidon, in addition to established launch platforms, namely the Navy’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters and the B-1.

Meanwhile, the B-52 fleet is currently preparing for a slew of major upgrades. These include a critical radar overhaul alongside new engines, enhanced communications systems, and other improvements. The scope of these changes is significant enough that the aircraft will be redesignated from B-52H to B-52J. The bombers are also slated to further expand their weapons capabilities, including through the addition of the Long-Range Stand Off (LRSO) nuclear cruise missile. The upgraded B-52Js are expected to remain in service through at least 2050.

Even in its current configuration, the B-52 is particularly well suited to carrying the LRASM, given its substantial payload capacity and ability to launch weapons from standoff distances beyond the reach of enemy air defenses. Its upgraded networking capabilities will greatly enhance its effectiveness by allowing it to operate as part of a broader kill web, drawing on data from multiple platforms and sensors to support targeting over vast distances. In more dynamic operational environments, the bomber’s new radar can generate its own targeting information in real time. The B-2, B-1, and the B-52 all offer distinct levels of penetration and weapons-delivery capability, with the forthcoming B-21 able to push deeper into contested airspace; it will certainly employ LRASM too.

The integration of LRASM onto the B-52 could prove critical to generating the volume of sorties needed to counter China’s expanding naval fleet. With its substantial payload capacity and ability to launch missiles from standoff distances, the B-52 could deliver significant anti-ship firepower across the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific. These missions would likely involve very long-range sorties, making the bomber’s payload capacity, endurance and networking capabilities particularly valuable in sustaining operations against Chinese naval forces.

If the LRASM integration proceeds as planned, the result would be another addition to the U.S. military’s long-range anti-ship arsenal, giving the Air Force’s venerable B-52 a more explicit role in the growing emphasis on striking hostile fleets at a distance.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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The United States is stepping up its campaign to sell Portugal the F-35. Speaking in Lisbon today, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the United States would make Portugal a “very competitive” offer to replace its F-16 fleet. The development adds a high-level political push to an increasingly intense competition over the Portuguese Air Force’s next fighter.

Portuguese Foreign Minister Paulo Rangel said after meeting Rubio that Lisbon is seriously considering the American proposal, while emphasizing that other options remain under consideration.

“The Portuguese state will always decide in ‌accordance ⁠with the national interest,” Rangel said at a news conference after the meeting. “There is one point that is also clear: we are seriously considering the F-35 proposal, just as we are considering ⁠others.”

Portugal currently operates 25 modernized F-16AM/BMs, including 21 single-seat F-16AMs and four two-seat F-16BMs, from Monte Real Air Base, or BA5. The Portuguese Air Force, known as the Força Aérea Portuguesa (FAP), has not yet formally launched a replacement competition, but the aging fleet is increasingly becoming the focus of attention in Lisbon.

Portugal acquired a total of 45 F-16A/B Block 15 aircraft through the Peace Atlantis I and II programs.

The first 20 aircraft were delivered beginning in 1994. These were new-build F-16A/B Block 15OCU aircraft, comprising 17 single-seat F-16As and three two-seat F-16Bs, and were used to equip Esquadra 201 “Falcões.”

A second batch followed in 1999, when Portugal received 25 former U.S. Air Force Block 15OCU aircraft. Twenty-one were F-16As and four were F-16Bs, with several intended as attrition replacements or spares. These aircraft had accumulated roughly 3,000 flight hours and underwent an extensive modernization program to bring them to the F-16AM/BM configuration. This means the aircraft are broadly comparable to the U.S. Air Force’s F-16C/D Block 50/52 fleet. 

Esquadra 301 “Jaguares” finally became operational with its upgraded aircraft in 2005, while Esquadra 201 did not receive its upgraded F-16s until 2011.

Since then, the Portuguese Vipers have continued to receive incremental improvements. Their configuration has progressed through several mission-software standards, while the aircraft have been equipped with night-vision goggles, Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing Systems (JHMCS), and advanced targeting and weapons capabilities.

Among the more important additions are Northrop Grumman Litening II targeting pods, and the ability to employ weapons including GBU-12 Paveway II laser-guided bombs, GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), and GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II dual-mode weapons.

Twelve former Portuguese F-16s were transferred to Romania under a deal signed in 2013, with deliveries taking place in 2016 and 2017. Romania subsequently ordered five additional aircraft in 2019.

Structurally, the Portuguese F-16s could potentially remain in service into the mid-2040s. But maintaining their relevance against increasingly sophisticated air forces would require continued investment in avionics, sensors, communications, and self-protection systems.

The F-16AM/BM fleet continues to rely on the old AN/APG-66(V)2 pulse-Doppler radar. Replacing it with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar such as Northrop Grumman’s APG-83 would substantially improve detection and tracking performance, but would come at considerable cost.

Portugal faces a choice between continuing to invest in increasingly tired fourth-generation airframes or moving directly into the fifth generation.

Since the end of the Cold War, Portugal has become much more engaged in out-of-area operations and missions in support of NATO.

In the process, the Portuguese F-16 fleet has accumulated an impressive operational record.

The fighters have repeatedly deployed on NATO air-policing missions, including rotations to the Baltic States, Iceland, Romania, and Poland.

The F-35A would give Portugal a fifth-generation fighter built around low observability, sensor fusion, advanced electronic warfare, and networked operations.

The aircraft would also fit naturally into a NATO environment in which an increasing number of European air forces are adopting the F-35.

More than 900 F-35s are already in service or on order across Europe, according to previous comments by U.S. Ambassador to Portugal John Arrigo. Washington has repeatedly argued that joining that community would provide Portugal with a substantial interoperability advantage.

However, European competition includes the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, and Saab Gripen E, with Airbus preparing an especially aggressive campaign for the Typhoon.

Airbus has said it intends to submit an unsolicited Eurofighter proposal to Portugal in late October or early November. That package is expected to encompass not just the aircraft, but financing, industrial participation and broader military cooperation.

Selecting the American stealth fighter deepens Lisbon’s military relationship with Washington at a time when European governments are wrestling with fundamental questions about their dependence on U.S. military capabilities.

Across the continent, uncertainty over Washington’s stance on NATO is encouraging European allies to examine ways of reducing their reliance on American military technology, even as those same countries continue to increase defense spending and purchase U.S. equipment.

If Washington can combine the F-35’s capability advantages with an attractive acquisition and sustainment package, Portugal could find itself facing a difficult choice between the strategic benefits of joining Europe’s growing F-35 fleet and the industrial and political advantages of selecting a European fighter.

The final decision on the replacement of the F-16 will also determine what combat jet spearheads the Portuguese Air Force for the next several decades.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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As part of the largest U.K. Commando Force exercise in 15 years, British special operators conducted a submarine insertion off Scotland, making use of a German Navy Type 212A — a boat you can read about in detail here. The maneuvers are the first time since the war in Afghanistan that all of the Commando Force’s specialist elements have operated together. The submarine insertion, conducted at Cape Wrath on September 29, is part of Exercise Strike Warrior, a major NATO drill intended to rehearse allied crisis-response and warfighting operations across the North Atlantic and High North.

The U.K. Royal Navy-led Commando Force specializes in amphibious, littoral, and expeditionary operations. It brings together Royal Marines commandos with specialist elements including reconnaissance, intelligence, targeting, artillery, logistics, and medical capabilities. The force is increasingly focused on smaller, dispersed teams operating across contested littoral environments.

Including elements of the Commando Force, more than 2,000 personnel from the United Kingdom, United States, Germany, Netherlands, Canada, and Norway are currently participating in Strike Warrior, with eight warships and 19 aircraft involved in activity spanning Scotland, the Western Isles, the North-West Approaches, Galloway, the Borders and the North Sea.

The submarine insertion underscores the type of maritime special operations the British Commando Force is now increasingly training to conduct. Personnel from 148 (Meiktila) Commando Forward Observation Battery, Royal Artillery, boarded the unnamed German attack submarine off Scotland before being infiltrated toward the coast. The sub provided intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support as the force approached the target area, after which the commandos conducted a discreet small-boat insertion using inflatable raiding craft.

Once ashore, the commandos moved onto the cliffs and established an extemporized observation post. From there, they confirmed the simulated target and coordinated live naval surface fires against a simulated enemy position. Here, firepower was provided by the Portuguese Karel Doorman class frigate Dom Francisco de Almeida, presumably using its Oto Melara 76mm deck gun. Following the engagement, the team was extracted. The complete sequence incorporated submarine infiltration, small-boat insertion, covert reconnaissance and targeting, live naval gunfire, and withdrawal into a single mission profile.

The German submarine involved is particularly well suited to this kind of mission. Conventional diesel-electric attack submarines (SSK) lack the nuclear-powered endurance and sustained high speed of an SSN, but those characteristics are not necessarily what a short-range clandestine insertion mission requires. Modern SSKs such as Germany’s Type 212A are designed around extremely low acoustic signatures and can remain submerged for extended periods using air-independent propulsion, making them difficult to detect while operating in relatively shallow and constrained waters.

That combination is hugely valuable for special operations. An SSK can approach a coastline covertly, conduct ISR, release a small team and its boats, and withdraw without exposing a large surface vessel or maintaining the high-speed transit capability associated with a nuclear submarine. Its comparatively small size can also be advantageous when operating closer to shore, where depth, seabed conditions and the presence of coastal sensors can constrain larger submarines. Conventionally powered boats are also far cheaper to procure and operate and have smaller crews.

An SSN offers major advantages for longer-range deployments: far greater endurance, sustained speed, and the ability to carry and support larger payloads over intercontinental distances. These payloads can include dry deck shelters and swimmer delivery vehicles, allowing divers easy exit and entrance while the boat is submerged and at a standoff distance from the coast.

But for a mission whose essential requirement is to quietly loiter near a coast, put a small team ashore and leave, an SSK remains a highly relevant platform. Conventional submarines are particularly valuable to the kind of distributed littoral operations NATO is rehearsing in northern European waters.

The U.K. Royal Navy’s four Upholder class were its last diesel-electric submarines. They were withdrawn in 1994–95 and subsequently transferred to Canada. The Royal Navy today operates an all-nuclear submarine fleet.

The Upholders were also particularly suited to inshore operations, reconnaissance, and other missions demanding extreme quietness and maneuverability.

With this in mind, TWZ has, in the past, examined whether the U.S. Navy should complement its all-nuclear submarine fleet with advanced conventional boats. Sweden’s Gotland demonstrated the value of these kinds of boats when it was leased to the U.S. Navy for adversary training and proved exceptionally difficult for American ASW forces to detect.

Returning to the Cape Wrath drill, the 148 Battery operations officer involved explained that “This level of complexity and coordination of live assets has not been achieved by 148 for nearly 30 years.”

“We wanted to demonstrate to our partners across the United Kingdom Commando Force, wider U.K. Defense and NATO SOF community the type of missions we are prepared to execute against future threats,” the officer added.

Multinational integration is central to the exercise. Strike Warrior is testing the ability of the British Commando Force to plug into a much larger allied force in which submarines, surface combatants, aircraft, drones, and small specialist teams can contribute to different parts of the same operation.

Earlier in Strike Warrior, 148 Battery also directed fires from the Dutch Karel Doorman class frigate HNLMS Van Amstel and Royal Canadian Navy Halifax class frigate HMCS St. John’s after establishing observation posts. Those ships were operating as part of Standing NATO Maritime Group One.

The exercise also provides a snapshot of how Britain’s commandos have evolved since their intensive employment in Afghanistan. The Royal Marines’ Future Commando Force concept emphasizes smaller, more dispersed formations capable of operating in contested littoral environments, with greater reliance on maritime mobility, uncrewed systems, long-range fires, and allied capabilities.

Strike Warrior combines those elements, with the exercise including amphibious landings, boarding operations, intelligence and surveillance missions, maritime security, and anti-submarine warfare, alongside drone missions involving strikes and combat resupply. Other elements have practiced establishing protected medical facilities.

The geography of Strike Warrior is equally significant. The exercise extends across Scotland and its surrounding waters, including the Western Isles and out into the North Sea, placing the Commando Force in the maritime environment connecting the highly strategic North Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, and northern European approaches.

That region has become increasingly important to NATO planning because of the difficulty of monitoring and controlling such a large maritime battlespace. Submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, surface combatants, drones, and long-range weapons all have roles to play, while the geography provides numerous opportunities for small forces to operate from the coast and islands.

The United Kingdom has been repeatedly using the region and the wider High North as a training ground for this type of activity. Earlier this year, British commandos conducted a submarine insertion during Exercise Cold Response in Norway using the German Navy’s Type 212A submarine U-35. That also involved submarine infiltration, small-boat deployment, establishment of an observation post, and the direction of allied naval fires.

Strike Warrior expands that concept considerably and across a much larger battlespace, providing an opportunity to test not simply individual capabilities but the ability to combine them during a sustained NATO exercise.

The exercise began September 28 and concludes October 9.

For the British Commando Force, the significance extends beyond the dramatic imagery of troops emerging from a German submarine at Cape Wrath. After years in which British commandos were heavily committed to land-based counterinsurgency operations, the exercise is intended to put them firmly back in a maritime and high-end warfighting context.

This is the kind of operation that the U.K. Commando Force is now preparing to conduct alongside NATO partners in the increasingly contested waters of the North Atlantic and High North.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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Castelion has released what appears to be the first image of its relatively ‘cheap’ Blackbeard hypersonic missile being fired from a ground launcher, providing a new look at the containerized launch architecture now under development for the U.S. Army.

The photograph, posted by Castelion on X, shows a Blackbeard missile leaving a launcher mounted on a high-mobility truck chassis. While the missile itself is by now a familiar sight, the new image offers a first public glimpse of how Castelion intends to package and operate the ground-launched version of Blackbeard, known as Blackbeard GL.

Container-compatible Blackbeard. Built to move with the fight. pic.twitter.com/OzWbiChCPQ

— Castelion (@Castelion) October 8, 2026

The Army’s previously disclosed plans for the program call for an initial Blackbeard ground-launch demonstration using a modified Multiple Launch Rocket System Family of Munitions, or MFOM, pod, followed by the development of Blackbeard GL prototypes and a dedicated launcher pod. Ultimately, the service intends to conduct an MVP flight test using the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System’s (HIMARS) fire-control system.

Blackbeard for HIMARS. pic.twitter.com/uA9XgcGvsI

— Castelion (@Castelion) August 3, 2026

The Army’s Fiscal Year 2027 budget documentation indicates that this effort is moving toward increasingly representative hardware. Among the milestones listed for FY2027 is a live-fire launch of a “production representative” Blackbeard GL and launcher pod.

Castelion has already released extensive imagery of Blackbeard test vehicles, and the company formally unveiled the weapon’s current external configuration earlier this year. Those images showed a two-stage arrangement with a booster and an upper vehicle that has characteristics consistent with a hypersonic glide or maneuvering payload. Compared to the air-launched version, seen below, the ground-launch model lacks the cruciform tailfins at the rear of the lower stage, but otherwise appears similar.

The precise propulsion system and flight profile of the production weapon remain undisclosed. Little is known about its performance parameters, either. Castelion has previously hinted that the missile could strike targets at ranges of just under 500 miles, although its range would likely be reduced when launched from the ground, without the altitude and speed provided by an aircraft launch platform.

The launcher appears to use a relatively compact enclosed container, consistent with the Army’s stated interest in leveraging the existing MFOM ecosystem and, eventually, HIMARS. The photograph doesn’t establish how many Blackbeards could be carried by a single launcher, although, based on the dimensions, at least two and perhaps as many as four missiles appears a feasible load.

Exactly how closely the pictured launcher corresponds to the eventual production Blackbeard GL pod is also not yet clear. Castelion has previously stressed that its test hardware is deliberately designed to support rapid development cycles and should not necessarily be interpreted as representative of the final weapon system.

Castelion had previously shown Blackbeard-related test articles alongside palletized launch equipment, including launch hardware mounted on an Oshkosh MKR18 Logistics Vehicle System Replacement truck. The company has also said it was converting such a vehicle into a launcher for flight testing. That appears to be the vehicle shown in the new image, too.

The Army’s interest in Blackbeard GL is rooted in cost as much as performance.

The service has described the weapon as an affordable, mass-produced hypersonic precision-fire capability intended to engage time-sensitive moving and hardened targets. The stated objective has been to obtain roughly 80 percent of the capability of the Army’s planned Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) Increment 4 while achieving a substantially lower cost per round.

Existing U.S. hypersonic weapons such as the Army’s Dark Eagle Long Range Hypersonic Weapon use large, highly specialized launch equipment. Blackbeard is instead being developed around the idea that a hypersonic weapon can be sufficiently compact, inexpensive, and manufacturable to be treated more like a conventional tactical munition.

A containerized launcher compatible with an existing mobile fires ecosystem would reinforce that concept. It could allow the Army to introduce a new hypersonic effect without creating an entirely separate launcher, crew, transport, and reload architecture.

The ground-launched version is only one part of Castelion’s broader Blackbeard effort.

The company is also working with the Navy to integrate the weapon onto the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. In April, Castelion received a $105 million Navy contract supporting integration and the transition toward an early operational capability, while a subsequent $23.4 million order covered 50 early-operational-capability pre-production missiles and associated storage and shipping containers.

The Navy has since moved into additional procurement, underscoring Castelion’s effort to establish Blackbeard as a weapon that can be produced in the quantities required. Blackbeard could also find its way onto Navy ships and submarines, as well as ground-based launchers, as we have discussed in the past.

As for the Army, the next major milestone will be the planned production-representative Blackbeard GL and launcher-pod live-fire testing.

“Once Castelion achieves testing and validation, the Department will award a two-year multi-year procurement contract for a minimum of 500 Blackbeard missiles annually, with options to extend for up to five years,” the Pentagon announced in May of this year. “To further encourage Castelion’s self-funded facility expansion, the Department is actively seeking the necessary authorizations and appropriations to purchase over 12,000 Blackbeard missiles over five years.”

This reflects a broader and accelerating U.S. military push for lower-cost precision weapons that can be manufactured relatively simply and at scale, increasingly with help from non-traditional defense contractors. The goal is to build large stockpiles affordably before a major contingency, particularly a potential large-scale conflict with China in the Pacific, while ensuring production can keep pace with demand during a prolonged war.

For now, Castelion has demonstrated what the Army’s Blackbeard launch system actually looks like when it fires, at least in its initial form.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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The United Kingdom could be heading toward its most significant expansion of ground-based air defense in generations, under a plan announced by the Conservative Party. For now, however, with the Conservatives in opposition, the proposed £10 billion (about $13.3 billion) “Britannia Shield” exists only as a policy commitment rather than an approved government program. At the same time, it highlights the seriousness of U.K. military deficiencies in this area, as the threat from the air continues to grow.

The world is becoming more dangerous.

We will always do what is necessary to keep our country safe. pic.twitter.com/Z4EblxrGn7

— Conservatives (@Conservatives) October 6, 2026

Today the @Conservatives are announcing ‘Britannia Shield’ – our £10bn plan to protect the UK from drone & missile attack. This is only possible because @KemiBadenoch is willing to take tough decisions to fund 3% on Defence. pic.twitter.com/tLrF2KSOHw

— James Cartlidge MP (@jcartlidgemp) October 6, 2026

The proposal will move into the U.K. Ministry of Defense acquisition system if the party returns to government following the next general election and then follows through on the funding and procurement decisions required to turn the pledge into an operational capability. The party has proposed spreading the investment over a decade, with an initial capability intended to emerge during the first term of a future Conservative government and the wider network established after that.

Britannia Shield comes with the character of the air threat facing Europe having changed dramatically over the last decade. Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated the scale at which relatively inexpensive drones can be employed alongside cruise and ballistic missiles, while recent fighting in the Middle East has clearly shown the costs involved in maintaining a sophisticated, layered air defense system under sustained attack. At the same time, the threat is no longer confined to weapons fielded by major state militaries. Small, widely available drone technologies can be weaponized with relative ease by non-state actors, providing a cheap and potentially highly scalable means of attack.

For Britain, which has traditionally relied heavily on fighter aircraft, naval air defense, and the protection provided by geography and NATO, it is increasingly doubtful whether those capabilities provide enough coverage for the infrastructure that would be most important to keep functioning during a major conflict.

While a party press release refers to it directly, Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch has made efforts to distinguish Britannia Shield from a British version of Israel’s Iron Dome.

Iron Dome has become one of the best-known elements of Israel’s layered air defense network, having been developed primarily to deal with short-range rockets, artillery, and mortar rounds threatening populated areas. The system has evolved, however, and newer configurations can also engage threats including cruise missiles and drones. Importantly, Israel’s Iron Dome systems protect a country a twelfth of the size of United Kingdom and deal with only a portion of the potential threats in critical areas.

Mention should also be made of the U.S. Golden Dome missile defense initiative, which envisions integrating sensors, interceptors, and other defensive capabilities as part of an enormous architecture with a greater emphasis on protecting the U.S. against a range of aerial and missile threats, up to and including intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Talking to the BBC, Badenoch argued that Britain does not face the same kind of persistent rocket and missile threat as Israel and therefore does not require an equivalent level of coverage. Instead, the Conservative proposal is intended to combine improved radar, command and control, interceptor missiles, and counter-drone capabilities into an integrated network designed around the threats Britain is considered most likely to face.

Britain already has some of the components that such a system could leverage. Royal Navy Type 45 destroyers — when they are available — provide a highly capable long-range air-defense layer through Sea Viper missiles, while the Army’s Sky Sabre system uses CAMM missiles for shorter-range engagements. The RAF provides combat aircraft and airborne surveillance capabilities, and Britain is integrated into NATO’s wider air and missile defense architecture. The problem is that these capabilities were not designed to provide a dense, permanent defensive umbrella over critical infrastructure, and the ground-based component in particular remains relatively limited when compared with the scale of the potential target set. There is also the reality that these assets are required to defend locales far from the British Isles themselves.

The government’s own 2025 Strategic Defense Review acknowledged that changing threat environment, allocating up to £1 billion in new funding for homeland air and missile defense and calling for improvements to the United Kingdom’s wider integrated air and missile defense architecture. Britannia Shield would therefore be a much larger political commitment to expanding and integrating capabilities that already exist, while adding new layers intended to deal with the growing drone and missile threat.

The £10 billion figure provides little idea of the scope of capabilities. The scale of the proposed system will determine whether that additional money represents a major expansion or simply the beginning of a much larger requirement.

Gen. Sir Richard Barrons has previously estimated that an entry-level system of the kind outlined could cost around £80 billion over a decade, illustrating how quickly the cost can rise once the requirement expands from protecting selected sites to providing something approaching comprehensive national coverage.

2/ Estimates suggest north of £80bn for the full cost of a perfect system, so we almost certainly need to think differently than a “dome” solution. A layered air defence will include a number of elements, including the ability to deter and strike back at an adversary.

— Greg Bagwell (@gregbagwell) October 6, 2026

Badenoch’s description of the threat instead points toward a system in which Britain would identify the infrastructure and military facilities most important to national resilience and then build increasingly dense layers of protection around them. That would include major airbases, ports, energy infrastructure, communications facilities, and other critical nodes, rather than attempting to create a continuous defensive bubble over the entire country.

Such a system would also have to account for the fact that the location of the launch platform can be as critical as the weapon itself. Badenoch described a scenario in which an adversary could operate in the English Channel to launch drones or missiles against targets in Britain. The resulting reduction in warning time would place greater demands on sensors and command systems, but it would also mean that the defensive problem could begin well before an incoming weapon reached British airspace. Maritime surveillance, intelligence collection, fighter aircraft, and naval forces could all potentially contribute to detecting or disrupting a launch platform before it had the opportunity to fire.

That broader approach is particularly important because the economics of countering drones are fundamentally different from those associated with conventional air defense targets. A system that responds to inexpensive drones by firing a sophisticated interceptor costing hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars would rapidly become unsustainable during a large attack. Any serious British architecture would therefore need several layers, with electronic warfare, guns, low-cost interceptors, and other counter-drone systems, potentially including directed-energy weapons, dealing with the lower end of the threat wherever possible. Meanwhile, more expensive surface-to-air missiles would be preserved for cruise missiles, aircraft and other targets that cannot be economically engaged by cheaper means.

The recent situation at RAF Fairford adds another dimension to that problem. The United States recently withdrew a dozen B-1 bombers from the Gloucestershire base amid reported concerns about a possible Iran-backed attack, after U.S. officials said commanders had received new information about a potential plot. British authorities maintained that the base was safe, while British sources reportedly questioned whether Iran could reproduce the kind of complex operation carried out by Ukraine against Russian airfields in 2025. The episode nevertheless demonstrated the degree to which even a major military installation can become a concern when an adversary is believed to be looking for unconventional ways to reach it.

That brings Operation Spiderweb into the discussion, although there is no public evidence that Iran is preparing a comparable operation against Britain. Ukraine’s June 2025 attack was prepared over roughly 18 months and involved small drones being moved deep into Russia inside containers carried by trucks before being launched remotely against military airfields. The operation illustrated that once relatively cheap drones have been positioned close to their targets, the defender may have little opportunity to intercept them through traditional long-range air defense means. This is exactly a scenario we have been warning of for many years.

Today, Ukrainian intelligence reportedly launched 117 attack drones from trucks that had been placed near Russian air bases. I tasked several collects this morning via @umbraspace and my first images have already started processing. What a remarkable success in a well-executed… pic.twitter.com/LzXulw8jnK

— Chris Biggers (@CSBiggers) June 2, 2025

For Britannia Shield, that means protecting an airbase such as RAF Fairford cannot simply be a matter of installing missile batteries. Physical security, counter-intelligence, surveillance of access routes, low-level drone detection, electronic warfare and the ability to identify suspicious activity before an attack begins would all become part of the same defensive problem. Hardened infrastructure would also be essential, helping to protect aircraft, fuel, munitions, command facilities and other critical assets from attacks that penetrate the outer layers of the defense. The distinction is increasingly important as military aircraft themselves become more valuable and as relatively inexpensive unmanned systems demonstrate their ability to threaten aircraft on the ground without ever having to penetrate the surrounding air defense network.

The new British proposal also becomes more complicated because its intended coverage extends beyond the British mainland. Badenoch has specifically referred to defending installations in Cyprus and the Falkland Islands, which introduces a very different set of operational and logistical requirements. A network supporting critical infrastructure in Britain can draw on dense communications infrastructure, nearby industrial support and the wider NATO system, whereas a defensive capability at RAF Akrotiri or in the Falklands requires its own radar coverage, launchers, personnel, ammunition stocks, and sustainment arrangements. Extending the same architecture across those locations would therefore consume considerably more resources.

A similar problem exists with ammunition stocks. Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated that sophisticated air defenses can come under sustained pressure during large missile and drone attacks, while Western countries have struggled to replenish some categories of precision-guided weapons at anything approaching wartime consumption rates. A British system that looks impressive on paper but has only a small stockpile of interceptors would provide much less meaningful protection during a prolonged campaign, particularly if an adversary deliberately attempted to exhaust the defenses through repeated attacks using inexpensive drones.

Ukraine also offers lessons for how Britain could organize such a network. Mobile air defense teams, distributed sensors, acoustic detection systems, and digital applications that connect air defense operators with military units and civilian spotters have all become increasingly important in Ukraine, where defenders have had to detect and respond to large numbers of drones and missiles across a wide area. There are echoes here of the distributed air defense networks developed during World War II, when observers, radar operators, fighter controllers, and anti-aircraft units were linked together to provide early warning and direct defensive responses. As in 1940, Britain would need an air defense network that is distributed, mobile, and adaptable to new threats.

The most revealing details of Britannia Shield are yet to be provided. The number of defended sites, the types and numbers of radars, the number of launchers, the size of interceptor stocks, and the proportion of the budget devoted to counter-drone capabilities all remain unclear for now. The same applies to the money required for training, maintenance, software, communications, and replenishment across the life of the system.

There is also a straightforward political limitation to the proposal. The Conservatives have pledged to invest in Britannia Shield as part of a broader plan to increase defense spending, but that money is not currently sitting in a government procurement account waiting to be spent and defense budgets are increasingly stretched by other big-ticket programs. The Conservatives would first have to return to government, establish the program as a formal requirement, and then make the associated spending and procurement decisions. Even if those steps were taken quickly, the most capable elements of the system would take years to design, procure, integrate, and deploy.

Whether £10 billion would ultimately be sufficient depends on the mission the future government assigns to the system. If Britannia Shield were expected to provide nationwide protection against sustained attacks involving ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and large numbers of drones, the budget would fall far short, particularly once interceptor stocks and long-term sustainment are included. If it is designed as a layered network protecting a defined group of critical infrastructure sites and military bases, integrated with the RAF, Royal Navy, Army, and NATO systems already in place, the proposal becomes more realistic, but it wouldn’t address higher-end threats, like longer-range ballistic missiles.

That limitation is particularly significant when considering Russia, which remains the most serious military threat to the United Kingdom and its European allies. From what we know so far, Britannia Shield is heavily focused on drones and shorter-range missile threats, but Russia possesses a much broader strike arsenal that includes ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonic weapons. A British air defense program that concentrates primarily on the lower and middle tiers of the threat therefore leaves a significant gap at the upper end of the spectrum.

The United Kingdom is also not considering this problem in isolation. Across Europe, governments are increasingly pursuing multinational efforts to strengthen air and missile defenses, as the return of large-scale state-on-state warfare and the experience of the war in Ukraine have made the vulnerability of European infrastructure and military forces much more tangible. Nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, ballistic and cruise missile defense has once again become a central European security requirement. Britannia Shield would therefore need to be considered not only as a national counter-drone and air-defense program, but as part of a much broader European effort to rebuild layered air and missile defenses against the full range of modern threats.

The experience of Ukraine and the Middle East suggests that Britain is unlikely to solve this problem simply by buying more surface-to-air missiles. Increasingly, air warfare relies on complex networks that find the attacker, identify the weapon, choose the appropriate response, and undertake this all at a cost that can be sustained throughout a conflict. That network also has to extend beyond the airspace itself, because the threat may involve a launch platform approaching the coast, a drone operator operating near a military installation, or small drones already hidden inside the defender’s security perimeter.

With their proposed reorientation of Britain’s air defense priorities, the Conservatives have put a financial value and a recognizable name around a capability gap that has become increasingly difficult to ignore. If they return to government, there will be many tougher questions to address, including which sites should receive protection, how many layers are required, how much ammunition must be held in reserve, and how the system can be sustained on a wartime footing.

The recent concerns surrounding RAF Fairford, together with the lessons of Operation Spiderweb, underline why that question is becoming more complicated. The next serious attack on a British military installation may not arrive as a large formation of aircraft or a visible wave of missiles crossing the Channel. It could involve a mixture of long-range weapons, cheap drones, electronic warfare, and hybrid warfare activity taking place much closer to the target. A future Britannia Shield would have to be designed around that reality, and would come with a price tag to match.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Glaring Holes In UK Air Defense Take Center Stage In New “Britannia Shield” Proposal appeared first on TWZ.

The first-ever F-16 Block 72 has taken to the air, marking a major milestone for the program and for Morocco’s long-running effort to field what Lockheed Martin describes as the most advanced version of the Viper.

The first of the jets for the Royal Moroccan Air Force (RMAF), a two-seat F-16D, completed its maiden flight at Lockheed Martin’s facility in Greenville, South Carolina, the company announced today. The aircraft will now proceed through flight testing ahead of its delivery to Morocco.

Morocco’s first @LockheedMartin F-16 Block 72 aircraft has taken flight in Greenville, South Carolina. The milestone marks another step toward delivering the most advanced F-16 configuration to the Royal Moroccan Air Force.

— Lockheed Martin News (@LMNews) October 6, 2026

Interestingly, one of the photos of the jet published by Lockheed Martin shows the pilot in the front cockpit wearing a Digital Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (D-JHMCS). This advanced helmet is not often seen worn by F-16 pilots and it is not clear if it has been ordered by Morocco.

Regardless, Morocco was the first customer to select the Block 72 configuration when the U.S. government approved its purchase in March 2019.

At that time, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency said Morocco was seeking 25 F-16C/D Block 72 aircraft in a package estimated at $3.787 billion. The proposed aircraft were to be equipped with the AN/APG-83 Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR), an active electronically scanned array type, new mission computers, Link 16 Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems, modernized navigation systems, helmet-mounted cueing systems, and a range of air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons.

The distinction between the Block 70 and Block 72 is the engine. The Block 70 uses General Electric’s F110-GE-129, while the Block 72 uses Pratt & Whitney’s F100-PW-229, providing fractionally more power. The two configurations otherwise share the same major avionics and systems modernization package.

The F-16 began life as a Pratt & Whitney-powered fighter, with the F100 selected to power the original F-16A/B. But reliability and maintainability problems with early F100s prompted the U.S. Air Force to launch its Alternate Fighter Engine competition in the 1980s, leading General Electric to develop the F110 as an alternative. The resulting “Great Engine War” established two competing F-16 engine families, with Pratt & Whitney’s F100 and GE’s F110 ultimately becoming the principal powerplants for later F-16C/Ds. Although U.S. procurement eventually became heavily concentrated on the GE-powered F-16, Pratt & Whitney continued to supply F100-powered aircraft to international customers.

For Morocco, the choice of the Block 72 is based on ensuring as much fleet commonality as possible. The RMAF already operates F-16C/D Block 52+ aircraft powered by F100 engines, making the new aircraft a natural fit within its existing support infrastructure.

Morocco is also upgrading its existing F-16 fleet to the F-16V configuration, which is broadly similar to the new-build Block 70/72 standard.

That will eventually provide the RMAF with a larger fleet centered around a common, substantially modernized F-16 standard.

A separate notification in March 2019 covered the upgrade of Morocco’s existing 23 F-16C/D Block 52+ aircraft to the F-16V standard.

Morocco’s new and upgraded F-16s could also provide a significant boost to combined operations with its other international partners. In recent years, Moroccan F-16s participated in the campaign against ISIS, while the country has also deployed the aircraft on missions against Houthi rebels as part of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in Yemen. In 2015, a Moroccan F-16 crashed in Yemen. Although the Houthis claimed they had shot down the aircraft, Moroccan authorities attributed the loss to a technical malfunction.

Reported wreckage of #Morocco Air Force F-16 lost during #Yemen operations http://t.co/bZUOnFm0vp pic.twitter.com/x5H7CQ0puD

— Joseph Dempsey (@JosephHDempsey) May 11, 2015

Outside of combat operations, the RMAF also frequently takes part in exercises with its allies, including the African Lion series, the largest annual, multinational joint military exercise led by U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and partner nations.

Meanwhile, the new-build Moroccan aircraft also arrives at an interesting point in the F-16 program.

The Block 70/72 has attracted customers across Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere, with Bahrain, Bulgaria, Jordan, Peru, the Philippines, Slovakia, Taiwan, and Turkey also having selected the latest-generation Viper configuration. So far, only Block 70s have been ordered, although tbe Block 72 has been offered to some customers and potential customers. There is also apparent U.S. Air Force interest in a version of the Block 70 tailored for its specific needs and referred to by the manufacturer as the F-16G.

Morocco’s position as the Block 72 launch customer means the aircraft now flying is effectively the prototype-standard production aircraft for an export configuration that other countries can now buy.

The Moroccan F-16 program is also increasingly tied to a broader effort to develop the country’s military-industrial and sustainment infrastructure.

Lockheed Martin says it is working with Moroccan industry, including Maintenance Aero Maroc, on an upcoming MRO facility at Benslimane. The more than 86,000-square-foot facility is intended initially to support heavy maintenance and modernization of C-130 Hercules aircraft, with plans to expand into additional platforms, including the F-16.

That could eventually give Morocco a greater role in sustaining its own expanding fleet and potentially supporting other aircraft in the region.

The F-16 program itself is part of a much broader U.S.-Moroccan defense relationship that dates back more than five decades. The Royal Moroccan Armed Forces now operate a range of U.S.-supplied systems, while Morocco is also set to receive HIMARS and has expanded its rotary-wing capabilities with AH-64E Apache attack helicopters.

For the RMAF, however, the F-16 remains central to its combat-aircraft modernization and, once it arrives, it will be the spearhead of the country’s fighter fleet.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post First F-16 Block 72 Has Flown appeared first on TWZ.

Spain is moving ahead with plans to rebuild its airborne signals intelligence (SIGINT) capability, with the Airbus A321 — part of the highly successful A320 twin-engine airliner family — selected as the basis for three new SIGINT aircraft.

The choice is disclosed in the latest issue of Spain’s Revista de Aeronáutica y Astronáutica, the Ministry of Defense’s official publication. Airbus and Indra are currently working on the program’s conceptual design under the Santiago II initiative, which aims to deliver a crewed platform capable of collecting and processing intelligence across the electromagnetic spectrum.

The program is intended to restore a capability Spain lost when its last Boeing 707 SIGINT aircraft was retired in 2014. Equipped with Israeli SIGINT equipment, this 707 was designated TM.17-4 in Spanish service, and nicknamed Reina del Espectro (Queen of the Spectrum).

También del #47Grupo el #Boeing 707-351C (TM.17-4 / 47-04) "BRUJO". #BASanJavier @EjercitoAire @SpottersMurcia pic.twitter.com/RB3Dcpn7Qp

— Salvador Marín (@05derecha) April 17, 2020

It served in the 47th Mixed Air Force Group, alongside four Dassault Falcon 20s (designated TM.11 in Spain), that were used for navigation aid calibration, remote sensing, and electronic warfare training.

The new aircraft will have to undergo extensive modification, including the installation of antennas, receivers, signal-processing equipment, operator consoles, communications systems and associated electrical and cooling infrastructure.

Indra is expected to provide much of the mission-system architecture. The company’s AirSign concept, unveiled in 2023, incorporated COMINT and ELINT sensors alongside data fusion, real-time signal analysis, communications, and command-and-control functions.

While COMINT is concerned primarily with collecting intelligence from communications, ELINT focuses on non-communications electromagnetic emissions, including radar signals. Together, these capabilities provide a much fuller intelligence picture of not only what the enemy is doing in terms of their electronic emissions, but what they are planning, and their processes of operation.

Bizjets have become the platform of choice for many new intelligence aircraft, particularly where operators want a relatively low-cost, long-endurance platform with a smaller logistical footprint. Aircraft such as the Bombardier Global 6000/6500, Gulfstream G550, and Dassault Falcon 8X have been adapted for electronic intelligence and special-mission roles.

Spain’s decision to use the substantially larger A321 points instead toward the other end of the spectrum, providing significantly more room for antennas, processing hardware and crew, and allowing the aircraft to carry a much larger and more power-hungry mission system than the typical bizjet-based SIGINT platform.

At one time, the A321 was envisaged as the platform for NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, which provides the alliance with reconnaissance capabilities, including synthetic aperture radar. However, this capability was eventually fielded on NATO’s fleet of five RQ-4D Phoenix uncrewed aerial vehicles, specialized versions of the Global Hawk.

Elsewhere in Europe, Airbus launched a risk-assessment study for France’s future maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), also to be based on an A321 platform. Billed as a “flying frigate” by the company, the new MPA is intended to replace the French Navy’s Dassault Atlantique 2 fleet and emerges at a time when NATO nations are increasingly adopting the in-production Boeing P-8 Poseidon for their maritime patrol requirements.

Airbus does, however, have relevant experience in the conversion of airliners for military roles. The company’s A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aircraft are modified at Airbus’s Getafe facility, providing an existing industrial base for converting commercial-derived aircraft into specialized military platforms.

The Santiago II program is currently in its definition phase. Spain awarded Airbus and Indra a €16-million ($17.9-million), 18-month contract to study the platform and define the overall system. A subsequent phase will cover modification and integration of the three aircraft. The Spanish Ministry of Defense estimates the complete program at approximately €436 million ($489 million).

The program also has an industrial objective. Spanish authorities want domestic industry to acquire expertise and control over the integration of the SIGINT system, rather than simply purchasing a finished foreign intelligence aircraft.

The A321-based Santiago II fleet is intended to address the shortfall left by the retirement of the specially modified Boeing 707, providing a substantially more modern platform, and with more airframes for improved availability.

The three new aircraft will also complement Spain’s emerging uncrewed SIGINT capability. The Spanish Air and Space Force is introducing the L3Harris Scalable Open Architecture Reconnaissance (SOAR) system on its Predator B drones, giving the fleet ELINT and COMINT collection capabilities. The two systems are likely to fill different niches: the Predator B offers a relatively persistent, lower-cost uncrewed collection option, while the much larger A321 will provide substantially greater payload capacity, onboard processing, and crewed mission-management capabilities. Together, they will give Spain a layered airborne SIGINT architecture.

Spain’s decision also reflects a broader drive to invest in long-range SIGINT platforms capable of collecting, processing, and fusing vast amounts of electromagnetic data, as competition over the electromagnetic spectrum becomes increasingly central to modern warfare.

If the program remains on schedule, three heavily modified A321s will eventually provide Spain with a persistent airborne capability to detect, classify, locate, and analyze electromagnetic emitters in support of a host of operations. Especially when paired with the Predator B, the capability will likely be of considerable interest to other NATO partners in Europe, too.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Spain Picks Airbus A321 For New Electronic Intelligence Aircraft appeared first on TWZ.

Germany is moving ahead with plans to give its unusually large F125 frigates a medium-range air-defense capability, helping address one of the most conspicuous weaknesses of a four-ship class that has long attracted attention for having relatively little combat power for its size.

Diehl Defense and Germany’s Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) have signed a contract to adapt and develop the IRIS-T SLM surface-to-air missile system for operational use aboard the German Navy’s F125 frigates. Under the agreement, Diehl will build prototypes and conduct comprehensive test firings intended to validate the system’s integration and performance within the existing F125 architecture. Each frigate will be fitted with two new launchers, each capable of holding 16 missiles, for a total of 32.

“The aim is to make the system mission-capable on the German Navy’s F125 frigates,” Diehl said in today’s announcement. The company described the prototype construction and test-firing phase as necessary to ensure “the seamless integration and maximum performance” of IRIS-T SLM within the frigate’s existing architecture.

The program has moved notably quickly, reflecting the urgency of the requirement.

Germany began examining the feasibility of integrating IRIS-T SLM with the F125 in 2024, with BAAINBw and Diehl studying the technical risks and requirements of adapting the normally land-based system for shipboard use. That effort led to the development of a navalized demonstrator in 2025. In October of that year, the F125 frigate Baden-Württemberg took part in a German Navy Maritime Firing Exercise off Andøya, Norway, carrying an experimental anti-air warfare module based on IRIS-T SLM. Diehl says the module went from concept to firing in less than 10 months and met all established test and evaluation objectives.

The Bundeswehr subsequently reported that Baden-Württemberg fired three live IRIS-T SLM missiles during the exercise. The ship’s radar supplied target data to the missile system, demonstrating the basic integration between the F125’s sensors and the navalized air defense architecture.

The exercise established that the concept could work at sea; the contract signed now is intended to turn that demonstration into a qualified fleet capability.

The German parliament’s Budget Committee approved the adaptation effort on September 23, with the German Defense Ministry describing it as a means of expanding the F125’s self-defense capabilities in response to the current air threat. The ministry also pointed to IRIS-T SLM’s combat experience in Ukraine.

The effort needs to be seen in the context of why the F125 has been such a controversial warship in the first place.

As TWZ examined in 2017, the F125 is a roughly 7,200-ton, 490-foot warship with an unusually small core crew and a concept of operations centered on long-duration deployments, stabilization missions, crisis management, conflict prevention, and international intervention rather than high-end fleet combat. The class was designed to spend long periods away from Germany and operate with relatively modest manpower requirements.

But its armament does not remotely match the size and sophistication of the hull. As completed, the ships were equipped with eight RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, a 127mm gun, remotely operated guns and, for close-quarters air defense, two RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile launchers. The F125 has no medium- or long-range surface-to-air missile capability and no organic sonar or dedicated anti-submarine warfare weapon system.

At the same time, the TRS-4D/NR radar and other sensors can see far beyond the engagement envelope of the close-in air-defense weapons, but there is little the ship itself can do with that information against an aircraft or incoming missile at medium range.

Nearly a decade later, IRIS-T SLM is emerging as an answer to at least part of that problem.

Even with IRIS-T SLM, the F125 is well short of being an air warfare destroyer. It also still lacks an organic anti-submarine warfare capability or the kind of large vertical-launch missile battery found on Germany’s F124 frigates.

However, it does fill a gap between the F125’s original short-range defenses and the capabilities of other ships or aircraft operating around it.

IRIS-T SLM is designed as a medium-range surface-to-air system, with an engagement range of around 25 miles and an altitude envelope of approximately 65,000 feet. As shown in the 2025 demonstration, the F125’s radar can feed information directly into the missile system, exploiting the ship’s existing sensor capabilities.

Rather than rely heavily on escorts for protection against airborne threats outside the short range of RAM, an IRIS-T-equipped F125 could at least contribute to its own medium-range air defense. Recent operations in the Middle East have underscored the importance of this in contested maritime environments.

It also gives the ships a more useful role in a task group. The threat environment has changed substantially since the F125’s original concept was drafted. Cruise missiles, drones, loitering munitions, and increasingly sophisticated aircraft mean that even ships operating away from a major naval war can face threats well beyond the range of their existing close-in defenses.

In November 2024, Germany confirmed that the F125 frigate Baden-Württemberg, returning from an Indo-Pacific deployment, would avoid the Red Sea and sail around Africa because of the Houthi missile and drone threat. The German Defense Ministry explicitly cited the ship’s limited air defense capability and its inability to provide an effective air-defense umbrella for itself or its accompanying replenishment ship.

Ironically, the F125’s large hull, extensive electrical power, sophisticated radar, substantial aviation facilities, long endurance and relatively spacious mission areas were always supposed to provide room for a flexible approach to future missions. Yet the class’s original weight and integration constraints made adding major weapons difficult, a concern TWZ also highlighted in 2017.

IRIS-T SLM offers Germany a way to add a meaningful capability without undertaking the much more invasive redesign associated with installing a conventional vertical-launch system. The 2025 demonstration used an AAW module mounted on the ship’s deck rather than a conventional VLS installation, and today’s program is focused on adapting the system to the F125 architecture.

Once IRIS-T SLM is installed, the F125 will still be an unusual frigate. It is enormous by the standards of its mission, optimized for endurance, and lacks some of the weapons traditionally associated with a high-end surface combatant. But it will bring more to a contested fight.

The program should give the class a credible medium-range air-defense role, and provide Germany with a way to get considerably more utility out of four ships whose original design philosophy was always somewhat controversial.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Germany Is Finally Giving Its F125 Frigates Some More Teeth With IRIS-T SLM Surface-To-Air Missiles appeared first on TWZ.

After nearly seven years of waiting, Taiwan has received the first two aircraft from its long-delayed purchase of 66 new-build F-16C/D Block 70 fighters from the United States.

The two single-seat F-16Cs, serials 6727 and 6728, touched down at Chihhang Air Base near Taitung on October 2. They are the first factory-new fighter aircraft delivered to Taiwan in 25 years and mark the beginning of the aircraft acceptance and integration phase of the Republic of China Air Force’s (ROCAF) so-called Peace Phoenix Soaring project.

The two jets have also had an unusually eventful trip to Taiwan.

They began their journey to the island on August 17, flying from Lockheed Martin’s production facility in Greenville, South Carolina, to Hawaii. The aircraft were subsequently forced to remain there for more than a month after an unexpected issue prevented them from continuing across the Pacific as planned. The reasons for the delay have been the subject of considerable speculation, including weather and tanker availability.

The two jets finally departed Hawaii again on October 1, stopping in Guam before making the final leg to Taitung today.

Taiwanese Defense Minister Wellington Koo said today that more of the aircraft will arrive before the end of the year, although he did not provide a specific number.

Taiwan receives first 2 F-16V Block 70 fighter jets

Taiwan took delivery Friday of the first two of 66 F-16V Block 70 fighter jets purchased from the United States, with the aircraft landing at Chihhang Air Base in the eastern county of Taitung at around noon. pic.twitter.com/hbqdV6io26

— Focus Taiwan (CNA English News) (@Focus_Taiwan) October 2, 2026

The 66-aircraft purchase is worth approximately $8 billion. Taiwan originally expected deliveries to begin much sooner, but production-line adjustments, supply-chain problems, and software issues contributed to delays. COVID, too, had an impact on the production line.

The program’s delivery schedule has slipped repeatedly. Defense Minister Koo said in March, May, and again through his deputy in June that the first aircraft were expected to arrive by the end of September. That deadline passed without an F-16 reaching Taiwan.

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense acknowledged in late September that development and production of the aircraft’s new electronic warfare self-protection system had also been a factor.

The Block 70s are being equipped with L3Harris’ AN/ALQ-254(V)1 Viper Shield electronic warfare suite, and the system was not yet fully through its development and production process when the first aircraft were otherwise ready for delivery. L3Harris announced on September 3 that it had completed production of the first 35 Viper Shield systems, underscoring that the electronic warfare equipment was itself still moving into production as Taiwan’s fighters were approaching delivery.

Taiwan chose to acquire the AN/ALQ-254 rather than the AN/ALQ-257 electronic warfare system used on U.S. Air Force F-16s.

Lawmakers have questioned whether the system meets requirements associated with earlier work to modernize earlier F-16A/B Block 20 fighters to the F-16V standard. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Koo argued that those requirements applied to the earlier Block 20 upgrade rather than the new Block 70 purchase. Other international F-16 Block 70 operators are also using Viper Shield.

Taiwanese officials have defended the decision, citing the specific requirements of Taiwan’s F-16 fleet and associated procurement considerations. The system is intended to provide the new fighters with a modern electronic warfare and self-protection capability against increasingly sophisticated radar and missile threats.

There are also still questions about when the Viper Shield system itself will be fully ready.

Weapons deliveries have also not kept pace with the aircraft themselves.

Taiwan is receiving AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles as part of the F-16 package, with 200 ordered. The C-8 version incorporates upgrades from the U.S. Air Force’s Form, Fit, Function Refresh (F3R) effort, including new electronics and improved electronic-counter-countermeasures intended to make the missile more capable in a heavily contested electromagnetic environment. For Taiwan, the missile will provide the new F-16s with a modern beyond-visual-range air-to-air weapon that can be cued by the aircraft’s AN/APG-83 Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR), as well as other sources of targeting information through the F-16’s networked systems.

The AIM-120C-8 is particularly relevant as Taiwan fields more F-16s against China’s increasingly capable fighter fleet, which includes aircraft equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles such as the PL-15.

Taiwan’s F-16 Block 70s will also be armed with the AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), intended for attacks against enemy air defense systems. According to Roy Choo, a defense journalist and TWZ contributor, the first of the new AGM-88F (remanufactured from U.S. Air Force AGM-88B) missiles arrived in Taiwan back in 2022, for the F-16V fleet.

The major gap is the AGM-154C Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW). The precision glide weapon is intended to give Taiwan a longer-range strike capability against ground targets without requiring the launching aircraft to fly directly over heavily defended areas. According to the latest reporting from Taiwan, deliveries of the AGM-154C have been held up by delays on the U.S. production line and may not begin until 2027 or 2028 at the earliest. Existing stocks of these weapons were also heavily used in Operation Epic Fury.

The two aircraft now sitting at Chihhang are significant for another reason. Unlike Taiwan’s existing F-16V fleet, they are new-production aircraft rather than older fighters that have been upgraded.

Taiwan received 141 F-16A/B Block 20s that were upgraded to the F-16V configuration under a separate modernization program completed in 2023. The new Block 70s incorporate many of the same technologies — including the APG-83 — but are built from the ground up as new aircraft.

The Block 70s will also bring a significant new passive-sensing capability to Taiwan’s F-16 fleet. Under a $328.5-million U.S. Foreign Military Sales contract awarded to Lockheed Martin in February, Taiwan is receiving the company’s IRST21 Legion-ES infrared search and track system. Designed specifically for the F-16, the long-wave infrared sensor can passively detect and track airborne targets without emitting radar energy. That gives the aircraft another way to search for and track threats while reducing its own electromagnetic signature. The IRST21 also gives the F-16s a passive way to detect and track low-observable targets, potentially providing another means of finding Chinese stealth aircraft without relying solely on radar.

In 2019, Lockheed Martin displayed a model of a Block 70 F-16 with what appeared to be a podded IRST system on one of its chin stations at the biennial Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition in Taiwan:

The mysterious IRST pod at TADTE – https://t.co/avpx5djZMM pic.twitter.com/86lqxu6fN6

— Alert 5 (@alert5) August 16, 2019

The new fighters will therefore complement Taiwan’s upgraded F-16A/Bs while expanding the overall number of modern F-16s available to the ROCAF.

The timing matters.

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft operate around Taiwan on an increasingly routine basis, forcing the ROCAF to maintain a persistent air-defense posture. The additional F-16s will provide more aircraft for missions ranging from air defense and counter-air operations to maritime strike.

The F-16V fleet is also being tested for a more specialized intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance role. The ROCAF has recently been conducting flight and systems integration testing of the MS-110 advanced reconnaissance pod, part of its Phoenix Scout project. The service plans to acquire six pods to replace older reconnaissance equipment. Based on the DB-110 digital sensor architecture, the system combines visible-light and infrared imaging with long-range, day-and-night reconnaissance, and real-time image transmission, allowing imagery to be passed more rapidly to ground command and intelligence elements. Integrating the pod with the F-16 and associated ground systems will give Taiwan another means of monitoring activity around the island and its surrounding waters.

But Taiwan remains heavily outnumbered across the Taiwan Strait.

China is fielding an increasingly sophisticated combat aircraft fleet that includes the J-20 and J-35 stealth fighter, large numbers of advanced fourth-generation fighters, airborne early warning and other force-multiplier aircraft, and a growing variety of uncrewed systems.

And the F-16s will face the same fundamental problem as Taiwan’s other combat aircraft in a major conflict: staying operational.

China possesses extensive missile and air capabilities that could threaten Taiwan’s airbases, aircraft shelters, fuel supplies, command-and-control infrastructure, and other elements needed to keep fighters flying. You can read more about how the ROCAF would likely go to war with China in this previous in-depth feature.

Basing the new F-16s at Chihhang Air Base, operated by the 7th Tactical Fighter Wing, is significant, Choo told us.

“The basing of the aircraft at Chihhang allows the ROCAF to readily project air power south and eastwards, especially over the Bashi Channel, which is one avenue PLA can gain access to the Philippine Sea and beyond,” he explained. “Previously, ROCAF fighters from other bases maintain QRA detachments there”

The F-16 delivery today is only the beginning of a much larger effort to get all 66 aircraft into Taiwanese service.

According to the latest information from the ROCAF, 63 F-16C/D Block 70s remain in various stages of production and delivery in the United States, with some already moving through the handover process. The remaining aircraft will be delivered according to production, flight-test, and acceptance milestones before being ferried to Taiwan.

Once the full order is delivered, Taiwan will operate more than 200 F-16s when the new Block 70s are combined with its existing fleet.

That will give the ROCAF a considerably larger force of modern F-16s, with substantial commonality between the upgraded F-16V fleet and the new-production Block 70s.

The aircraft will still need to go through Taiwan’s acceptance procedures, while pilots and maintenance personnel complete the necessary conversion and training work. The new jets will then be progressively incorporated into the ROCAF’s operational units.

Remarkably, the arrival of the first Block 70 fighters today marks the first delivery of new fighters to Taiwan since 2001, when the last of the 150 F-16A/B Block 20s were delivered.

“The ROCAF’s surviving fleet of 139 F-16s, 53 Mirage 2000s, and 129 F-CK-1s was largely inducted in the 1990s, when Taiwan held the upper hand in the cross-Strait air-power balance,” Choo explained. “Even then, there remained a requirement for additional fighters, prompting the island’s first formal request to purchase 66 F-16C/Ds during the 2006 Monterey Talks.”

“By the late 2000s, these fighters were approaching the limits of their combat effectiveness as the PLA air fleet expanded in both size and capability. Fortunately, substantial upgrades began to be rolled out to the F-CK-1s and F-16s from the 2010s.”

In the wake of the 2019 acquisition of the F-16C/D Block 70s, questions arose over the aircraft’s asymmetric value as the Taiwan military increasingly focused on developing a plan for asymmetric capabilities in response to the PLA’s growing combat power.

“However, developments in recent years have underscored the continued importance of a capable fighter fleet not least for policing Taiwan’s airspace amid the PLA’s sustained gray-zone air operations around the island,” Choo added.

The timing of today’s arrival is also notable.

The aircraft reached Taiwan just days after U.S. President Donald Trump met Chinese President Xi Jinping in Washington. The delivery comes amid questions in Taipei about the future pace of U.S. arms transfers, after Trump said in May that a proposed $14-billion Taiwan arms package was being held in abeyance. He had approved an $11-billion package in December 2025.

Washington continues to say that its policy toward Taiwan has not changed.

Beijing, for its part, continues to oppose U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and regards the island as part of Chinese territory.

It has taken nearly seven years to get the first two F-16C/D Block 70s, to Taiwan. But their arrival marks the first step in a major modernization of the ROCAF’s F-16 fleet, adding new-production fighters with improved radar, electronic warfare, sensors, and weapons to a force that is already operating upgraded F-16Vs.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Taiwan’s First F-16 Block 70s Have Finally Arrived appeared first on TWZ.

Ukraine says it has used its domestically developed FP-7 tactical ballistic missile in combat for the first time, in what would mark another significant milestone in the country’s rapidly expanding indigenous long-range strike program.

President Volodymyr Zelensky announced today that Ukraine had conducted the first combat use of the FP-7, a ground-launched ballistic missile developed by Ukrainian defense company Fire Point. He also said production of the weapon would follow.

Ukrainian tactical ballistic missile. FP-7. First combat use. Thank you for the result. Next up: production. Glory to Ukraine! pic.twitter.com/IxdjVg51c1

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) October 1, 2026

The claim has not been independently verified, and Ukrainian authorities have not disclosed the target, location, number of missiles involved, or other details surrounding the reported strike. A video has been published showing what’s said to be a nighttime launch of the missile.

The FP-7 is one of several increasingly ambitious weapons being developed by Fire Point, a Ukrainian defense company that has expanded rapidly since Russia’s full-scale invasion. The company began with drones and has subsequently moved into long-range strike missiles and ballistic missile technology.

Fire Point CEO Iryna Terekh previously described the company’s development and manufacturing model in an interview with TWZ, detailing an effort to rapidly scale production while maintaining a dispersed industrial base inside Ukraine. The company’s better-known systems include the FP-1 and FP-2 long-range strike drones and the FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile.

According to Ukrainian and company-released information, the FP-7 has a range of approximately 250 kilometers (155 miles) and a warhead weighing around 150 kilograms (331 pounds). Other published figures have put its velocity at approximately 1,500 meters per second (around 3,350 miles per hour). Rather than striking targets deep in the Russian rear areas, the missile is optimized for use against objectives such as logistics hubs, air defense sites, and drone bases. This makes it more of a shorter-range complement to the U.S.-supplied Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) ballistic missile, rather than a direct replacement, although it comes without any restrictions on the kinds of targets that it can be used against.

Details from missile debris shown by Russia confirm Ukraine launched ATACMS at Voronezh region on November 18, marking the first use of U.S.-made missiles on Russian territory during Trump’s presidency. According to the Russian MoD, S-400 and Pantsir-S1 systems helped repel the… pic.twitter.com/8SeQCo9OEO

— NOELREPORTS (@NOELreports) November 19, 2025

At the same time, those specifications should likewise be treated as reported figures rather than independently verified performance data. Actual range, payload and accuracy can vary according to missile configuration and mission profile.

The FP-7’s development is particularly notable because Fire Point is also using the basic missile architecture as the foundation for a very different weapon.

Fire Point has developed the FP-7.X, an anti-ballistic missile interceptor derived from the surface-to-surface FP-7.

A video showing a test launch of an FP-7.X surface-to-air missile:

Держави програють війни на полі бою значно рідше, ніж вони програють їх у інститутах, лабораторіях та на виробництві за десять років до їх початку.

Коли країна роками недофінансовує інженерну освіту, скорочує дослідження, втрачає виробничі компетенції або звикає покладатися на… pic.twitter.com/Ti1Ayn4INf

— terekh (@iraterekh) June 3, 2026

Fire Point’s expectation is that commonality between the two systems can shorten development and provide manufacturing efficiencies by allowing the company to draw upon work already conducted on the FP-7’s propulsion, airframe, guidance, and production processes.

The FP-7.X forms part of Project Freyja, a European effort to develop a comparatively inexpensive and potentially more numerous ballistic-missile-defense interceptor. Fire Point has also discussed an eventual production rate of thousands of interceptors annually, although such targets represent company ambitions rather than demonstrated production capacity.

Fire Point has said it is working with European and Ukrainian partners on the system, including work on the interceptor’s seeker. The company has described an initial interceptor using a blast-fragmentation approach, with more sophisticated hit-to-kill capability envisioned for later versions.

Earlier this year, Diehl Defense confirmed that it plans to launch production of the Flamingo cruise missile in Germany. Previously, Diehl had signed a technology agreement with Fire Point but had not disclosed any details. Potentially, that could open a path to Fire Point’s ballistic and cruise missiles helping to meet the growing demand for long-range fires capabilities among NATO’s European members.

A video of the Flamingo cruise missile in action:

As it stands, the baseline FP-7 is only one element of Fire Point’s ballistic missile ambitions.

The company is also developing the larger FP-9, which Fire Point has described as having a planned range of approximately 850 kilometers (528 miles). The larger missile requires substantially more solid propellant and has driven the company to establish new industrial capabilities for manufacturing large solid-rocket motors.

As with the FP-7, the available FP-9 performance figures are based primarily on statements from Fire Point and Ukrainian sources and should not be treated as independently established specifications.

The development of these weapons reflects Ukraine’s broader effort to expand domestic production of long-range strike systems. Kyiv has relied heavily on Western-supplied weapons during the war while simultaneously attempting to establish an indigenous capacity for drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.

For Fire Point, that effort has produced an unusually broad portfolio in a relatively short period: long-range attack drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and, potentially, interceptors designed to defeat ballistic missiles.

The claimed combat debut would give Ukraine a fast, hard-to-intercept strike option for targets within the FP-7’s reported range, with its combination of kinetic energy and relatively heavy warhead making it particularly useful against hardened targets. If targeting and launch procedures can keep pace, its short flight time can also enable rapid-response strikes against more time-sensitive targets. More broadly, the FP-7 represents the culmination of years of Ukrainian efforts to close a major ballistic-missile gap with Russia and establish an indigenous capability.

The reported combat debut of the FP-7 also comes as the long-range strike campaign between Russia and Ukraine continues to intensify, with both sides increasingly seeking to hold targets deep behind the other’s front lines at risk. That dynamic will become particularly important as the two countries head into another winter, when strikes against energy, industrial, and military infrastructure ramp up significantly. At the same time, the FP-7’s reported range gives it a considerably more limited target set than Ukraine’s longer-range cruise missiles and drones, constraining where it can be employed and distinguishing it from systems designed for deep strikes hundreds of miles beyond the front.

Вітаємо FP7) pic.twitter.com/FxgCHVHMET

— Denys Shtilierman (@DenShtilierman) February 27, 2026

The significance of Zelensky’s announcement will ultimately depend heavily on whether the FP-7 can move from a claimed combat debut into sustained production and operational service.

Ukraine has not publicly disclosed the number of FP-7 missiles produced, current production rates, or when significant quantities could become available.

Using the FP-7 in combat for the first time would mark an important transition for Fire Point’s ballistic missile program, from development and testing toward operational employment. The company’s ability to manufacture the weapon at scale will become the next critical question.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Ukraine Claims First Combat Use Of FP-7 Ballistic Missile appeared first on TWZ.

A Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18F Super Hornet has been photographed carrying an inert AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM) during a major U.S. Navy test event in California. The development comes weeks after Australia announced that it would buy the new missile, with its Super Hornets being the first RAAF aircraft to receive it.

The photograph was released by the U.S. Navy and shows an RAAF F/A-18F assigned to No. 1 Squadron taking off from Naval Base Ventura County Point Mugu on September 11 during Gray Flag 2026. The loadout also includes a CATM-9X — the inert training variant of the AIM-9X — and a CATM-120, the inert training version of the AIM-120 AMRAAM, three external fuel tanks, an AN/ASQ-228 ATFLIR targeting pod, and a Tactical Combat Training System (TCTS) pod.

Gray Flag is the naval aviation test community’s flagship large-force test event, providing opportunities for large-scale integration of new capabilities across services, platforms, industry, and allied forces. Gray Flag 2026 was the largest edition of the exercise to date. According to the Navy, more than 3,000 personnel from over 150 organizations participated, flying more than 750 sorties and logging over 2,000 flight hours across hundreds of multi-domain test objectives.

Previous iterations of Gray Flag have been used to test new and still-developmental weapons in increasingly complex, operationally representative scenarios, including actual missile engagements against realistic targets. Making use of the sprawling Point Mugu Sea Range, the event has also become an important opportunity for working out how sensors, weapons, aircraft, and networks interact as part of larger kill chains and kill webs. A new, longer-range air-to-air missile is especially relevant when it comes to developing tactics, techniques, and procedures within a broader, networked air-combat architecture.

Beyond being the first apparent glimpse of an Australian JATM in any context, integration of the weapon onto Australia’s Super Hornet fleet has already progressed to the point of carrying the missile — in inert form — during a major U.S.-based test and integration exercise.

As TWZ reported in August, Australia is set to become the first country outside the United States to operate the AIM-260 following a roughly $480-million procurement through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. The Australian government said at the time that the missile would first be integrated onto the RAAF’s F/A-18F fleet, before being fielded on the F-35A and EA-18G Growler. Looking further ahead, the RAAF’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) could also emerge as a candidate for integration with JATM.

Australia’s announcement did not provide a delivery schedule or specify when JATM would enter Australian service.

The overall proportions and external configuration of the AIM-260 were revealed when an example appeared on a U.S. Navy F/A-18F in May of this year. That aircraft, operated by Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 31 (VX-31), provided the first publicly known photographic view of the highly classified missile.

The AIM-260’s exact specifications remain classified. It is intended to provide substantially greater range than the AIM-120 AMRAAM while retaining a broadly similar form factor. That compact configuration is important because the missile is designed not only for external carriage but also for internal carriage by aircraft such as the F-22 and F-35.

The weapon has been developed as a response to the increasingly long-range air-to-air threat posed by China’s PL-15 and other advanced missiles. Official range figures have not been released, although previous reporting has pointed to an intended range of at least 120 miles and potentially considerably more.

The Australian procurement therefore represents an important expansion of the JATM program beyond the U.S. fleet.

The timing of the Point Mugu photograph is particularly interesting. Gray Flag is specifically intended to bring together large numbers of aircraft, weapons, sensors, networks, and other systems for demanding integration and test activities. An Australian Super Hornet carrying JATM at such an event would be entirely in line with the purpose of the exercise.

It is not clear, however, what role the missile was playing. The photograph does not establish whether it was an Australian-owned operational weapon, a U.S. test asset, or a missile being used for a particular integration activity. Blue bands on the missile body confirm that it’s a training missile with an inert rocket motor and/or warhead.

Public evidence of an Australian aircraft carrying the AIM-260 is another important milestone in the weapon’s transition from a closely guarded U.S. development program toward allied service.

It also underscores the most interoperability aspect of the Australian acquisition. Canberra is buying into a U.S. long-range air-to-air weapon program at a time when the Royal Australian Air Force and U.S. forces are increasingly expected to operate together across the Indo-Pacific.

The exercise also comes as the U.S. moves to accelerate development and future production of the AIM-260. In September, the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin reached a framework agreement laying the groundwork for a future multiyear procurement deal, while the Air Force Test Center confirmed that the missile is already undergoing both ground and airborne testing. The agreement is intended to give Lockheed Martin and its suppliers the demand signal needed to expand production capacity, although the number of missiles, costs and delivery schedule remain undisclosed.

The development should also be seen in the context of broader U.S.-Australian cooperation on air-launched weapons. RAAF F/A-18Fs are also being integrated into the U.S.-Australian Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) effort under the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE), with Australia providing test infrastructure for the weapon’s flight-test program. You can read more about this program here.

The video below shows a hypersonic test conducted at Woomera in 2016 under the U.S.-Australian Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation (HiFIRE) program.

Australia said its F/A-18Fs would be the first RAAF aircraft to receive JATM, and an Australian Super Hornet has now been photographed carrying one during a major U.S. Navy test event. For the RAAF, getting JATM onto its frontline fighters is consequently an increasingly urgent requirement, giving its Super Hornets a credible long-range counter to the weapons they could face in a future high-end fight.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post AIM-260 JATM Missile Spotted On Australian Super Hornet appeared first on TWZ.

Ukraine’s F-16 fleet is facing growing pressure from the demands of the air war, with a shortage of air-to-air missiles now compounded by what appears to be a serious bottleneck in the critical maintenance system supporting the aging aircraft.

The Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday that more than half of Ukraine’s F-16s are currently in what a Western source described as “maintenance limbo.” The same source told the newspaper that, at the current rate of operations and maintenance, Ukraine could exhaust the remainder of its available aircraft by the end of the year.

The Ukrainian Air Force declined to provide the WSJ with figures on the status of the fleet. Open-source analysis suggests that Ukraine may have received around 40-50 F-16s so far. However, a proportion of these are held back for training elsewhere in Europe, while there have been five confirmed losses. Approximately 110 F-16s have now been promised by a coalition comprising Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway.

This is a growing issue, especially because right now F-16s are playing an important role in intercepts of jet powered Geran-4/5. https://t.co/ZtMFBSLAy1

— Michael Kofman (@KofmanMichael) September 30, 2026

The report follows TWZ’s recent reporting on a separate constraint affecting the F-16 force: Ukraine is struggling to maintain adequate stocks of air-to-air missiles for its fighters. AIM-9 Sidewinders and AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) have been heavily used against Russian cruise missiles and drones, and Ukrainian F-16 pilots have reportedly had to ration their missile shots. Aircraft have increasingly had to rely on their internal 20mm cannon when suitable missiles are not available. This is a far from ideal substitute, as you can read about here, but Kyiv is reportedly now negotiating for tens of thousands of additional rounds of 20mm ammunition.

The moment a Russian jet-powered "Shahed" drone is shot down by an F-16 fighter jet using its M61 Vulcan cannon. pic.twitter.com/gU72HJTXUa

— WarTranslated (@wartranslated) September 23, 2026

Ukrainian F-16s have apparently been carrying laser-guided 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) rockets, which should provide an extremely valuable, lower-cost option for engaging long-range drones and subsonic cruise missiles. The exact status of this weapon in Ukrainian hands is unclear, but there is so far limited evidence of extensive use by its F-16s, at least in the public domain.

All these problems are closely related because the same high operational tempo that is consuming Ukraine’s missile stocks is also putting additional hours on the already well-worn F-16 airframes.

The aircraft have become a critical important component of Ukraine’s air-defense effort, particularly as Russia has expanded its use of increasingly sophisticated one-way attack drones, as we wrote about only yesterday. WSJ reports that Russia has launched around 2,000 jet-powered drones against Ukraine this month, compared with approximately 350 in June. The newer, jet-powered drones can reportedly reach speeds of up to 375 miles per hour, making them more difficult for Ukraine’s interceptor drones to engage and increasing the importance of conventional fighters. At the same time, the stocks of effectors for ground-based air defense systems are being reduced, in some cases to a critical level, increasing the reliance on crewed fighters to take up the slack.

F-16s are well-suited to the counter-drone and counter-cruise missile mission, but using them extensively against large numbers of relatively inexpensive targets presents a difficult sustainment problem. In fact, the lower speed and altitude differential between the F-16 and a jet-powered drone, compared to a propeller-driven one, makes the higher-performance weapon an easier target for the crewed fighter in most scenarios.

However, every sortie adds flight hours to the aircraft, while each missile engagement draws from an inventory that Ukraine and its Western partners have to replenish. As the aircraft accumulate hours, they reach scheduled inspection and maintenance intervals, increasing demand on a maintenance network that is already supporting a fleet operating under wartime conditions.

The United States has established a substantial support arrangement for that purpose. In January, the Pentagon awarded Belgian company Sabena Aerospace Engineering a contract with a ceiling of approximately $235.5 million for intermediate- and depot-level maintenance of Ukrainian F-16 aircraft and engines, together with associated material-management support. The contract runs through January 2029, with approximately $69.7 million initially obligated.

Ukrainian Air Force F-16AM Fighting Falcon departing Belgium after receiving depot-level maintenance earlier this year. pic.twitter.com/Hy35iUZd8P

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) August 28, 2026

The contract provides an indication of the scale of the infrastructure required to keep the Ukrainian F-16 fleet operational. It also highlights why the reported turnaround times in Belgium are significant. A typical phase-inspection that would normally take approximately two to six weeks in the United States is reportedly taking as long as 40 weeks in Belgium.

A 40-week turnaround does not necessarily mean that an aircraft spends 40 weeks continuously undergoing a phase inspection. The overall period an aircraft is unavailable can also include waiting for parts, additional repairs, scheduling, and other work. It is unclear exactly how many Ukrainian F-16s are currently affected by these various factors.

At the same time, the reported turnaround times do point to a substantial capacity problem. Ukraine operates a relatively small F-16 fleet, so aircraft that remain unavailable for extended periods have a disproportionate effect on the number of fighters that can actually be generated for combat missions. Its mission spectrum also includes air-to-ground sorties, putting more demand on the hard-pressed F-16 fleet.

F-16 fighters are the best way to counter new Russian jet-powered drones.

Ukrainian F-16 aces have shot down about 2,500 drones of all types and about 650 cruise missiles.

Jet drones are exactly the kind of target F-16s shoot down very well, and it usually costs $25,000 or… pic.twitter.com/ajxYN9K0yK

— Slava (@Heroiam_Slava) September 30, 2026

The F-16s have finite airframe lives, require increasingly substantial inspections as they accumulate hours, and depend on a supply chain for engines, components and other parts. The missiles used to destroy the targets are another finite resource. It should also be recalled that the jets supplied to Ukraine are among the oldest still in operational service. Although upgraded to F-16AM/BM standard, the airframes have accumulated a lot of hours and fatigue.

There is an additional complication with the air-to-air missile inventory, too. AMRAAM is not used only by Ukrainian F-16s, but also employed by its NASAMS ground-based air-defense systems. Sidewinders, too, have both air-launched and surface-launched applications. The same broader Western supply chain therefore has to support both fighter operations and some of Ukraine’s surface-to-air missile systems. Stocks of both AMRAAM and Sidewinder have been eroded by Ukraine, as well as by combat actions in the Middle East.

Southern Ukraine, a Ukrainian NASAMS surface to air missile system intercepts a Russian drone with an (SL)AIM-120B AMRAAM. pic.twitter.com/LTeDDHaECp

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) May 22, 2025

At the same time, Ukraine is continuing to receive additional F-16s. Belgium has said it will transfer three more aircraft to Ukraine before the end of this year. More aircraft will increase the potential size of the force, but they will also add to the requirement for spare parts, engines, technicians and depot capacity.

“There is an important agreement ​with Belgium on the transfer of three F-16 ​fighter jets by the end of this year,” ⁠Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky wrote on X. “We will work to receive ​these aircraft through an accelerated procedure.”

There is an important agreement with Belgium on the transfer of three F-16 fighter jets by the end of this year. We will work to receive these aircraft through an accelerated procedure. We have already received urgent deliveries of F-16 ammunition from Belgium and other…

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) September 29, 2026

Zelensky said Ukraine had ​already received “urgent deliveries” of F-16 weapons from Belgium and Spain, among other countries.

The alternatives to the F-16 are also limited in the near term. Ukraine continues to operate the Soviet-era MiG-29 Fulcrum and a small number of Su-27 Flankers, but these aircraft are themselves aging and are also required for strike missions. In their favor, the Soviet types were designed around a different concept of operations, making them easier to maintain in the field, and Ukraine has its own support infrastructure to sustain them.

The French Mirage 2000-5F force provides another Western option, but deliveries have been relatively limited, and additional aircraft are arriving incrementally rather than in numbers that can quickly compensate for a major reduction in F-16 availability. The longer-term fighter replacement plan is more ambitious. Sweden has agreed to provide 16 Gripen C/D fighters, with the first aircraft expected in early 2027, while a separate agreement covers the purchase of 16 new Gripen E fighters whose deliveries are not scheduled to begin until early 2029.

French-delivered Dassault Mirage 2000-5F fighter jet in service of the Ukrainian Air Force during flight somewhere over Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/eBCjtx2Gjc

— Status-6 (@Archer83Able) May 17, 2026

That leaves the F-16 as the principal Western fighter capability available to Ukraine for the immediate future, increasing the significance of any prolonged disruption to its maintenance pipeline or its supply of air-to-air weapons. Ukraine needs enough aircraft to maintain a meaningful combat presence, enough missiles to arm them for the missions they are being asked to fly, and enough maintenance capacity to keep those aircraft available as their flight hours accumulate.

All this is becoming more important as Russia’s aerial campaign evolves. If the increase in faster jet-powered drones continues, Ukraine may have to devote still more fighter sorties to countering them at the very same time that a large portion of its existing F-16 fleet is reportedly unavailable and its stocks of air-to-air missiles are under serious pressure.

Contact the autjor: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Ukraine’s F-16 Fleet Is In A Readiness Crisis appeared first on TWZ.

An unusual shoulder-fired air defense missile seen in Russian use may be of Chinese or Iranian origin, raising questions about the movement of foreign weapons through the increasingly interconnected military supply networks linking Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran.

The man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) appeared in Russian television footage showing a mobile air defense group operating in the Rostov region, which borders Ukraine. The weapon was shown during an exercise said to have involved one of the elements of Russia’s 51st Air Defense Division. The footage was subsequently highlighted by the X account TheDeadDistrict.

ruSSian's have developed a new “Iva” MANPADS. In the footage, it is in service with one of the mobile fire groups of the 51st Air Defense Division in Rostov Oblast.

Although, no—it is most likely the Iranian Misagh-2 MANPADS.

Imagine, they don't even have enough production… pic.twitter.com/aYrOtSmG6h

— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱 (@TheDeadDistrict) September 28, 2026

The system does not closely resemble any of the Russian-made MANPADS families otherwise used by the country’s armed forces. Russian personnel seen with the weapon reportedly referred to it as “Iva,” although that designation by itself does not establish the weapon’s origin or model. The word Iva is Russian for willow (a type of tree), of which one particular species is named Verba — also the name of the Russian-made 9K333 MANPADS. This weapon looks very different to the example shown, but the connection is unlikely to be a coincidence.

A visual analysis of the newly observed launcher reveals comparisons with both the Iranian Misagh-3 and Chinese QW-series systems, particularly the QW-18/QW-18A and QW-19. In particular, a closer examination of the imagery highlights an additional box-like component toward the front of the launcher. That feature appears more consistent with photographs of Chinese QW-series systems rather than the Misagh.

There is also a scarcity of publicly available imagery of later Iranian variants to completely exclude an Iranian system. At the same time, the Misagh series itself is understood to be derived, or at least heavily influenced by Chinese designs.

Iranian basij with QW-18/Misagh-2 MANPADS pic.twitter.com/xfc0nMe4f8

— Yuri Lyamin (@imp_navigator) March 26, 2026

Another possibility is that the weapon is a Russian-produced version or derivative of a Chinese or Iranian design, rather than an imported system.

The possibility of foreign-made or foreign-designed equipment appearing in Russian service has to be viewed against the much broader transformation of Moscow’s military relationships since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Russia’s relationship with China has deepened substantially since the invasion, with Beijing becoming a critical source of machinery, electronics, and other components that Russia’s defense industry can no longer obtain as readily from Western suppliers. Moscow and Beijing had already declared a “no limits” partnership shortly before the invasion, and their military relationship has subsequently included exercises and expanding military-technical cooperation. U.S. officials have accused China of supplying Russia with components used in weapons production, including microelectronics. Beijing has rejected accusations that it is providing lethal military assistance to Russia.

Iran has also become an important military partner. Russia has used Iranian-designed Shahed-series attack drones extensively in Ukraine and has worked with Tehran on local production and adaptation of those systems. Moscow and Tehran formalized their relationship further with a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty in January 2025, which includes provisions for military-technical cooperation and joint exercises.

In return, Russia has supplied Iran with military technology and has cooperated with Tehran on sensitive weapons programs.

The possible Chinese connection takes on additional significance in light of a major reported procurement deal between China and Iran.

In July, Reuters reported that Iran was expected to receive the first shipment of a deal covering 300 to 400 Chinese-made MANPADS, with a reported value of $60 million to $70 million. The weapons identified by sources included the Chinese QW-12 and FN-16 systems.

Chinese missiles the United States fears… an unsleeping eye against drones and low‑flying aircraft

China’s QW‑12 and FN‑16 air‑defense systems intercept low‑altitude targets — including drones — forming a rapid defensive line against close‑range aerial threats. pic.twitter.com/kJZ6mnqmHg

— China Now (@ChinaNow24) August 23, 2026

The reported contract was signed with a Hong Kong-based company that sources described as an intermediary between the Iranian side and the Chinese supplier. Reuters said the initial deliveries were planned from Urumqi in western China, with the weapons then transiting through Pakistan before reaching Iran. Pakistan’s military publicly denied any involvement in such transfers, while China’s Foreign Ministry called the report “groundless.”

Reuters also reported that delivery schedules and quantities could still change.

More significantly for the Russian sighting, a European security source told Reuters that authorities were aware of several contracts under discussion involving the potential sale of QW-12, QW-18, and QW-19 MANPADS to Iran. A Middle Eastern security source separately claimed that Iran had been seeking QW-18 systems.

The operation was carried out using a MANPADS, likely the Chinese “QW-18” anti-aircraft missile or its Iranian copy, the “Misagh-3”. https://t.co/OnPgqHJmQ8 pic.twitter.com/BuKt1MoKp7

— OSINTWarfare (@OSINTWarfare) October 23, 2024

There is currently no evidence tying the launcher seen in Russian hands to the Iranian procurement from China.

At the same time, the possibility of an Iranian connection should not be ruled out, especially since Chinese-designed MANPADS have a documented history of appearing outside conventional state inventories.

Earlier TWZ reporting, drawing on research by the Small Arms Survey monitoring group, examined the illicit proliferation of Chinese-designed MANPADS and identified dozens of cases involving armed groups in multiple countries. That research included QW-series weapons and documented cases in which investigators linked Chinese-designed MANPADS to Iranian supply networks.

One particularly notable case involved the Jihan, a vessel intercepted in 2013 carrying weapons that investigators identified as including QW-18-pattern MANPADS. UN investigators, the U.S. government, and  Conflict Armament Research assessed Iran as the likely source of those weapons.

It is also worth noting that Chinese MANPADS have already appeared on the Ukrainian side of the war. In late 2025 and 2026, Ukrainian units were photographed with Chinese-made FN-6 and FN-16 systems, including an FN-6 associated with an air defense team reportedly engaging a Russian cruise missile. Exactly how the weapons reached Ukraine remains unclear, with possible third-party transfers or diverted shipments among the possible explanations.

A Chinese FN-6 MANPADS in service with the MFG of the 143rd JTC “Podillia.” It is reported that this MANPADS was used this morning to shoot down a ruSSian Kh-101 CM.
The FN-6 was developed in 2000 and supplied, among others, to Sudan, from where it likely found its way to Ukraine pic.twitter.com/9zA012ue3j

— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱 (@TheDeadDistrict) November 19, 2025

Reported as the downing of an Kh-101 cruise missile this morning using a Chinese FN-6 MANPADS. There is no public information confirming that this system has been supplied to or used by Ukraine, making this a notable development. pic.twitter.com/pUujFB81aH

— NOELREPORTS (@NOELreports) November 19, 2025

Incidents like these demonstrate that Chinese MANPADS can move through indirect supply networks, including networks associated with Tehran.

Regardless of how it arrived in Russia, the appearance of a foreign or foreign-derived MANPADS there is notable.

Mobile fire groups have become an increasingly visible component of Russia’s layered air defense effort, particularly as the war in Ukraine has placed enormous emphasis on countering low-altitude drones and other threats, including deep inside Russia.

A Russian CUAS mobile fire group shown with a Courier UGV for additional counter-drone targeting. https://t.co/7yTPPZ47f0 pic.twitter.com/bDu6MbZLEZ

— Samuel Bendett (@sambendett) September 2, 2026

MANPADS are well suited to this mission because they can be dispersed among small teams, rapidly repositioned, and deployed without the larger radar and vehicle infrastructure associated with conventional surface-to-air missile batteries. In particular, they can be deployed around military installations and other sensitive infrastructure.

A foreign system appearing in a Russian mobile fire group might be an imported weapon, an Iranian-produced derivative, a Chinese system acquired for evaluation, a captured weapon, or even a previously unidentified Russian configuration.

model, or even that it is a brand new Chinese-made variant (its possible that I just hadn't seen it, or seen it from these angles) but it is a notable new addition to Russia's MANPADS inventory.

— Matt Schroeder (@MSchroeder77) September 28, 2026

Another possibility is that the MANPADS is North Korean in origin. Russia’s military relationship with Pyongyang has expanded significantly, including the provision of increasingly advanced military equipment and technology. There is no known North Korean MANPADS matching the configuration seen here, however, and the possibility remains speculative. North Korean weapons have also frequently incorporated or closely followed Chinese designs, meaning a Chinese-looking configuration would not necessarily rule out a North Korean origin.

I was able to geolocate and thus confirm that the photo of North Korean M-1978/1989 Koksan 170mm SPGs was taken in Russia.

56.069386, 92.920244
Krasnoyarsk, central Russiahttps://t.co/BOaR44uLeS https://t.co/mC8solXVOv pic.twitter.com/LUHO2cllKZ

— Status-6 (@Archer83Able) November 14, 2024

Russia has dramatically expanded defense production since 2022, but its industry remains under heavy wartime demand and sanctions-related constraints. Western restrictions have complicated access to advanced electronics, machine tools and other components, while Russia has increasingly relied on domestic substitutes and foreign suppliers.

At the same time, Russia must replenish weapons consumed in Ukraine, meaning foreign supplies could supplement domestic production, fill specific gaps, or allow scarce industrial capacity to be directed elsewhere.

For Russia, even a limited number of additional shoulder-fired systems could therefore have practical value as Ukrainian long-range strike capabilities continue to expand.

For now, the exact model and provenance of the MANPADS in question remain unconfirmed, but the apparent Chinese or Iranian design characteristics are highly noteworthy. Further appearances of the system could provide the clues needed to determine what it is, where it came from, and whether this represents an isolated example or a more significant acquisition effort.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Mystery Shoulder-Fired Surface-To-Air Missile Appears In Russian Service appeared first on TWZ.

NATO member Latvia is moving toward acquiring Anduril Industries’ Barracuda family of long-range strike missiles, with Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs highlighting the effort during a visit to the U.S. defense technology company and a series of new defense-industry cooperation agreements involving Latvia. If the acquisition goes through, Latvia would be the first of the Baltic states to field a strike weapon in this category.

“It was great to visit Anduril to meet with Palmer Luckey and to witness signing of memoranda of cooperation with MOD of Latvia and Origin Robotics,” Rinkēvičs said in a post on X. “Looking forward to complete acquisition of Barracuda long-range missiles and [Latvian-U.S.] defense industry cooperation.”

It was great to visit @anduriltech to meet with @PalmerLuckey and to witness signing of memoranda of cooperation with MOD of Latvia and @OriginRobotics. Looking forward to complete acquisition of Baracuda longe range missiles and defense industry cooperation pic.twitter.com/JafnNy5RAe

— Edgars Rinkēvičs (@edgarsrinkevics) September 25, 2026

The statement does not specify the precise Barracuda variant involved, the number of missiles Latvia intends to acquire, the expected delivery schedule, or the value of the prospective purchase. We have reached out to Anduril for more details.

A likely candidate weapon is the Barracuda-500M, one member of Anduril’s family of autonomous, jet-powered cruise missiles, alongside the Barracuda-100M and -250M variants. Official descriptions put its range at more than 500 nautical miles, with a stated speed range of approximately 190 to 500 knots. The missile can be air-launched, for which it has received the official U.S. military designation AGM-189A. But with only a handful of utility biplanes and helicopters in its inventory, Latvia would acquire the surface-launched version, designated SLB-500M.

The announcement points to a potentially significant expansion of Latvia’s precision-strike capabilities as NATO’s eastern flank continues to build out longer-range conventional fires.

Latvia has already ordered the U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which will be fired from M142 HIMARS launchers. The system is expected to enter Latvian service in 2027 and has a maximum range of about 186 miles.

Latvia’s ATACMS capability will give the country a foundation for ground-launched precision fires, but the broader European trend is toward significantly greater reach.

Ground- and sea-launched cruise and ballistic missile systems capable of hitting targets at between 1,000 and 2,000 kilometers (620 and 1,242 miles) or more are an emerging target for several European NATO members. France, Germany, Poland, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom are pursuing combinations of indigenous development and foreign procurement to address this requirement.

Latvia’s neighbor Poland, for example, has been building a layered long-range strike architecture combining JASSM/JASSM-ER air-launched cruise missiles with HIMARS and ATACMS. Warsaw’s ambitions are extending toward ground-launched weapons with ranges potentially reaching 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles) and the country has previously expressed openness to hosting U.S.-owned nuclear weapons on its territory, too.

Latvian interest in Barracuda fits into the same larger transformation in European conventional strike capabilities.

For NATO’s Baltic members, the logic is particularly straightforward, with mobile, ground-launched weapons providing an additional means of striking military targets at depth without requiring control of the air over the launch area.

The potential Barracuda acquisition would represent another step in a broader European shift toward deep precision strike, a term increasingly used to describe conventional weapons capable of holding targets hundreds or thousands of miles away at risk.

Deep precision strike is widely acknowledged as an increasingly important European capability gap. European NATO members have historically relied heavily on air-launched cruise missiles and other aircraft-delivered weapons, while ground-launched long-range systems have been comparatively scarce.

The deterioration of the European security environment following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, together with the 2019 collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, are important factors behind renewed European interest in long-range conventional strike.

A key driver behind Europe’s push for longer-range conventional strike is the desire to build a credible deterrent capable of holding targets deep inside Russia at risk, potentially including Moscow. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign has demonstrated the strategic value of being able to impose costs at significant distances, while also underscoring the importance of having sufficient stocks of precision weapons. For NATO’s eastern flank, systems such as the ground-launched Barracuda could therefore provide not just another fires capability, but an additional means of imposing costs on an adversary without relying exclusively on airpower.

Importantly for Latvia, the emerging European approach is not limited to large air forces. NATO’s prospective deep-strike requirements are likely to place significant emphasis on mobile ground-launched systems because they can be dispersed and offer survivability advantages while avoiding the cost and vulnerability associated with relying exclusively on aircraft or ships as launch platforms.

That makes systems such as the surface-launched Barracuda particularly relevant to countries on NATO’s eastern flank.

Anduril has positioned Barracuda as part of an effort to address what it describes as a shortfall in affordable, producible long-range precision weapons. A prototype surface-launched Barracuda-500 successfully demonstrated its launcher, missile, and booster concept in testing in 2025. Anduril has emphasized that the family is intended to be more producible and affordable than many existing “exquisite” long-range weapons.

The emphasis on production capacity is notable in light of lessons emerging from the war in Ukraine, where both sides have demonstrated the importance of maintaining substantial stocks of precision weapons and relatively inexpensive one-way attack systems.

European governments are increasingly wrestling with the same issue. However, there is a fundamental tension between rapidly filling capability gaps through off-the-shelf purchases and developing indigenous European weapons that can strengthen the continent’s defense-industrial base, which is also a critical political consideration.

Latvia’s emerging relationship with Anduril appears to combine elements of both approaches, by acquiring an American-developed strike capability while simultaneously pursuing industrial cooperation with U.S. defense companies.

There is also a recent European precedent for combining Barracuda procurement with local industrial participation.

In July 2026, Anduril signed a strategic agreement with Polish national maintenance, repair and overhaul provider Wojskowe Zakłady Lotnicze Nr 2 (WZL-2) to establish production of the Barracuda-500M at WZL-2 facilities in Bydgoszcz, Poland. Polish state-owned defence group Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa said Poland was the first European country to sign such an agreement with Anduril.

Bezpieczeństwo zaczyna się od silnych sojuszy.

Dziś została podpisana umowa o współpracy @PGZ_pl i WZL-2 z firmą Anduril Industries, która umożliwi utworzenie w Polsce miejsc montażu i produkcji autonomicznych rakietowych pocisków manewrujących dalekiego zasięgu… pic.twitter.com/JnmM6lQZ7L

— Ministerstwo Aktywów Państwowych (@MAPGOVPL) July 6, 2026

Polish officials have also emphasized the missile’s intended low production cost relative to higher-end U.S. cruise missiles. The planned Polish program is expected to progressively increase Polish content and eventually incorporate broader European elements, including software solutions from Anduril.

Latvia has not publicly detailed whether any Barracuda-related production, assembly, or other industrial work would be conducted in the country.

However, Latvia’s Investment and Development Agency says the country’s defense-technology delegation in the United States is seeking opportunities involving joint development, testing, manufacturing, system integration and supply chains. Origin Robotics is among the Latvian companies participating in that effort.

The broader Latvian delegation includes companies working across unmanned and counter-unmanned systems, communications, electronics, sensors, software, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and manufacturing.

Exactly how Latvia intends to employ Barracuda, how many missiles it plans to acquire, and whether any portion of the system will eventually be produced or integrated in Latvia remain unclear from the president’s announcement.

For now, the development marks another indication that long-range precision fires are moving from a capability concentrated among Europe’s largest military powers toward a broader requirement across NATO’s highly strategic eastern flank.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Latvia To Order Anduril’s Barracuda Cruise Missile For Long-Range Strike Capability appeared first on TWZ.

Chinese authorities have reportedly taken possession of an F-35 cockpit canopy and weapons-bay door that were inexplicably diverted to Hong Kong while being shipped from Australia to the United States. The incident appears to have left physical components that incorporate aspects of the fighter’s low-observable design in the hands of a country that has spent years doing whatever it could to gain information on the aircraft and America’s stealth technology secrets in general.

So, what does all this mean? Let’s put it in perspective.

The parts in question were being shipped by UPS from Australia to the United States in late May, according to people familiar with the matter cited by Bloomberg. The components from a Royal Australian Air Force F-35A were being sent to the United States for inspection and possible repair or disposal.

F-35 sustainment procedures explicitly cover the movement of F-35 parts, including unserviceable components, through the program’s logistics network. The U.S. Air Force’s transportation guidance directs F-35 shipments outside the Defense Transportation System to follow approved Joint Program Office procedures. In other words, moving an unserviceable Australian F-35 component to the United States for inspection, repair, or disposition is consistent with the normal sustainment process.

What is highly unusual is where this particular shipment ended up. F-35 components moving through an established international logistics system apparently stopped in South Korea, and were then routed to Hong Kong. Chinese authorities subsequently took possession of the parts and have not returned them, according to the sources cited by Bloomberg.

“For security reasons, we can’t discuss the status of specific shipments or our shipping procedures,” Lockheed Martin told us in response to a request for clarification about the incident. The company added that it “follows all U.S. regulations established by the Department of War and regulated by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) regarding the shipment of aircraft components. Our teams handle every shipment with the utmost diligence and safeguards to ensure the integrity of the F-35 program and the security of our allied partners.”

The Pentagon’s F-35 Joint Program Office has acknowledged a “shipment issue” involving F-35 components and said U.S. authorities and industry partners are working to recover them and investigate what happened.

Lockheed Martin, UPS, and the Pentagon have not publicly provided a detailed account of how the shipment was diverted or what happened to the parts after they reached Hong Kong.

Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles also confirmed that Canberra was aware of the incident and was working with the United States and Lockheed Martin.

Marles has sought to play down the potential security implications of the components, saying his understanding was that the shipment did not contain sensitive equipment or sensitive parts. That does not by itself answer the more specific question of what could potentially be learned from these particular pieces of an F-35. After all, not every physical component of an F-35 is necessarily highly classified or capable of revealing meaningful information about the aircraft’s design. At the same time, a cockpit canopy and weapons-bay door involve structures, materials, interfaces, tolerances, and treatments that all have to work within the aircraft’s low-observable design. If radar-absorbing material or other specialized treatments remain on the components, that could potentially make them far more sensitive from a technological exploitation standpoint.

The condition of the parts is also unknown. We do not know how much of their coatings or other treatments remain intact, whether Chinese authorities have examined them, or what information could actually be extracted from them in their current state.

Above all else, there is little specific information in the public domain about what F-35-related technical information Chinese intelligence already has acquired over the years, what physical components or materials it may already possess, or what additional information could be gained through espionage, cyber operations, industrial access, observation of deployed aircraft, or other means.

Without these facts, it is impossible to gauge what damage could have been done by this loss. Still, viewed in a vacuum of those unknowns, simply having an F-35 canopy and weapons-bay door in Chinese possession represents a significant loss of control over sensitive physical hardware — there is no way around that reality — and the severity of that loss could be substantial depending on the physical state of the parts.

The circumstances are particularly sensitive because, as we mentioned in the opening of this article, China has pursued multiple avenues for acquiring information on the F-35 for many years, with publicly documented cases involving cyber operations, technical information, supply chains, and human expertise. Some aspects of China’s subsequent stealth aircraft designs have also prompted comparisons with U.S. aircraft, although claims that China simply ‘cloned’ entire aircraft are not supported by the available evidence.

China And The F-35: A History Of Espionage

In 2014, U.S. authorities charged Chinese businessman Su Bin with conspiring with two other Chinese hackers to break into the computer systems of U.S. defense contractors. Prosecutors alleged that the group targeted information on aircraft including the F-35 and F-22. The alleged hacking campaign ran from 2009 to 2013.

Su Bin later pleaded guilty and was sentenced to nearly four years in prison. The Justice Department’s 2026 case against former Air Force fighter pilot Gerald “Runner” Brown connects the two cases. Prosecutors allege that Brown used a co-conspirator to negotiate his work training Chinese military pilots with Su Bin.

Brown, a retired U.S. Air Force major who spent more than 24 years in the service, subsequently worked as a contract simulator instructor training U.S. military pilots on the A-10 and F-35. In February 2026, the Justice Department charged him with providing and conspiring to provide unauthorized defense services to Chinese military pilots.

CASE UPDATE from @NewYorkFBI: Former U.S. Air Force Pilot Arrested for Providing Defense Services to the Chinese Military https://t.co/JhwhJHS83v@FBILouisville @FBIIndianapolis and @FBILosAngeles provided assistance in this case. pic.twitter.com/3KElqci05y

— FBI (@FBI) February 25, 2026

According to the criminal complaint, Brown traveled to China in December 2023, where he allegedly began training People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) personnel. Prosecutors say he also answered questions about the U.S. Air Force for three hours on his first day in China. Brown has been charged, and the allegations have not been adjudicated. He is one of multiple former Western aviators alleged to have provided training services and/or intelligence to Beijing.

The Honeywell case provides yet another example, this time involving the defense industry’s supply of technical information.

In 2021, the State Department reached a $13-million administrative settlement with Honeywell over alleged violations of the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Honeywell had voluntarily disclosed alleged unauthorized exports and retransfers of ITAR-controlled technical data.

The case involved 71 engineering drawings containing dimensions, geometries and layouts for manufacturing castings and finished parts used across multiple aircraft, engines and military systems. The State Department said the unauthorized exports and retransfers involved Canada, Ireland, Mexico, China, and Taiwan.

Among the systems covered by the drawings were components associated with the F-35 and F-22. The case did not allege that Honeywell deliberately sought to provide China with sensitive military technology; rather, it concerned alleged violations of export-control requirements.

There has also been a physical supply-chain precedent.

In 2022, F-35 deliveries were temporarily halted after the Pentagon discovered that a magnet in the aircraft’s Honeywell-built turbomachine pumps —which provide critical power functions to the jet — contained a cobalt and samarium alloy produced in China. The material itself was not considered a security or flight-safety threat, but the discovery demonstrated how difficult it can be to maintain complete visibility over a global supply chain involving thousands of companies and multiple tiers of subcontractors.

Taken together, these cases demonstrate several different pathways through which China has appeared in the F-35 security story: cyber theft, unauthorized technical-data transfers, supply-chain exposure, and alleged exploitation of former Western military expertise.

The Hong Kong incident would add another major category: physical access to actual F-35 components.

These are only some of the publicly documented examples. There is no public way to know the full extent of information or physical material Chinese intelligence may have acquired over the years, but is very likely far larger in scope than what is available in the open source.

Chinese Access Concerns Have Shaped F-35 Export Policy

The security issues surrounding the F-35 are significant enough that concerns about China have affected not only how the United States protects F-35 technology, but where Washington is willing to export the aircraft in the first place.

The proposed sale of F-35s to the United Arab Emirates became deeply entangled in U.S. concerns about Abu Dhabi’s growing military and technology relationship with China.

Washington had approved a potential package involving 50 F-35As, but U.S. officials and lawmakers expressed concerns about Chinese intelligence activity and technology in the UAE. Among the broader concerns were Chinese telecommunications infrastructure and the possibility of Chinese military or intelligence access to facilities associated with advanced U.S. weapons. A Congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report later cited the potential presence of Chinese intelligence collection capabilities and military facilities in the UAE as risks to the proposed F-35 sale.

The issue has now resurfaced with Saudi Arabia.

The State Department recently approved a potential $24.3-billion sale to the Kingdom involving 48 F-35s and associated equipment. But U.S. intelligence agencies have reportedly warned that China’s military and technology relationship with Saudi Arabia could create opportunities for Beijing to obtain sensitive F-35 information.

According to reporting based on U.S. officials familiar with intelligence assessments, a Defense Intelligence Agency report raised concerns about Chinese military access to Saudi bases, Chinese technology in Saudi telecommunications infrastructure, and whether secure facilities could be maintained for F-35 operations. The assessments also questioned whether Saudi Arabia would limit contact between Chinese military and intelligence personnel and F-35-related sites.

What Could The Components Reveal?

As we noted earlier, there is no way to gauge the intelligence impact of the loss at this stage. The central unknown of what China already knows about the F-35, and what it may already have in its possession — especially related to these components — is the key variable here.

Regardless, an F-35 canopy and weapons-bay door can provide information that cannot otherwise be easily obtained and gives a different level of fidelity in terms of material exploitation than what construction data and blueprints alone could.

The F-35’s low observability is the product of an extremely complex combination of airframe shaping, construction materials, external coatings, manufacturing tolerances, speciality apertures, and more.

A canopy is a particularly demanding part of any stealth aircraft. It has to satisfy optical and structural requirements while also controlling radar reflections. The cockpit is historically a major source of radar reflectivity, including the pilot’s helmet. Therefore the canopy’s materials, construction, interfaces, and specialized treatments can be critical to the aircraft’s overall low-observable performance, and especially from the critical frontal aspect.

The F-35’s canopy has been an ongoing work in progress for many years. It has had chronic material issues, especially when it comes to delamination. Multiple iterations spread over two decades have recently resulted in a major improvement of the issue. The tight balancing act of keeping the canopy transparent enough, while controlling the F-35’s stealthy signature and having that mix of materials be robust enough to last for a reasonable amount of time has been a major investment for the program. If the canopy is of a later variation, that loss alone could be substantial and could help China with their own low-observable canopy development programs even if they already had original information on the F-35’s canopy original design dating back years.

The F-35’s canopy has been a notorious work in progress, specifically the low observable coating/delamination issue which has improved a lot in recent years with new materials and processes. So no, you do NOT want to lose that in to China! https://t.co/9V0jdRAiwA

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) September 19, 2026

The F-35’s weapons-bay door has its own sensitivity issues. It is effectively a major section of the aircraft’s outer shell, with its structure, edges, interfaces, tolerances and treatments all having to function without creating unacceptable radar signatures. Its construction and material attributes can be reasonably extrapolated for the rest of much of the F-35’s outer mold-line. Above all else, if the radar absorbent material remained intact on the door, that would signify a major loss when viewed without any understanding of what China already knows about the F-35’s radar absorbing surface treatments. Historically speaking, RAM technology is among America’s closely guarded material sciences secrets.

For the time being, Australian officials have said they do not understand the parts to be sensitive. The investigation will ultimately have to establish what the components actually contain and what could be learned from them.

The incident comes at a moment when China’s own stealth fighter efforts are undergoing an extraordinary expansion.

The PLAAF is now operating the J-20, China’s first operational fifth-generation stealth fighter, in increasingly large numbers. The smaller J-35 is also moving toward broader service, including a carrier role for the People’s Liberation Army Navy.

China has also moved into what Western observers generally describe as sixth-generation fighter development.

Two new tailless combat-aircraft designs emerged publicly in December 2024. One is the large Chengdu aircraft commonly referred to as the J-36, while the other is associated with Shenyang and is variously called the J-XDS or J-50. Both have continued flight testing and yielded several prototypes with individual refinements.

The exact capabilities and eventual operational roles of these aircraft remain uncertain. They are developmental designs, not established operational equivalents of the F-35 or other sixth-generation systems. However, China is clearly building an increasingly broad ecosystem of fifth- and next-generation low-observable combat aircraft, both crewed and uncrewed. In the latter category is a growing number of stealthy drones, including long-endurance types.

China didn’t likely need physical access to an F-35 canopy or weapons-bay door to develop the J-20, J-35, or its next-generation aircraft. But additional information about how a mature Western stealth aircraft handles materials, coatings, interfaces, manufacturing, and the integration of those elements can still have great potential value to an industry developing its own systems. This includes technologies intended to counter the U.S. combat aircraft and their low-observable characteristics.

The F-35 has been produced in large numbers, is operated by a growing coalition of countries, and has been subjected to years of testing and operational experience. Its low-observable design represents decades of accumulated U.S. research and industrial know-how. At the same time, the global scale of the program inevitably makes control over sensitive information more complicated. More aircraft, more maintainers, more industrial partners, and more international logistics mean more points at which information and physical hardware have to be controlled. Over time, a program of this size will see an erosion in its secrets, but a major loss can drastically accelerate what should be a more gradual and controlled decline in security.

The potential intelligence value of the components also has to be considered in the context of foreign material exploitation, or FME. Major military powers maintain dedicated capabilities to recover, examine and characterize foreign weapons, aircraft, sensors, materials and other equipment. The objective is not necessarily to reproduce an entire system. More important is determining how something is built, what materials and manufacturing techniques are used, how individual components perform, and where industrial strengths or limitations may lie.

That is why countries have historically gone to extraordinary lengths to recover even crashed or damaged pieces of sensitive military hardware. The bigger the prize, the more risk an intelligence service would be willing to take in order to realize a recovery.

The sensitivity surrounding the physical remnants of an F-35 is not new. When a Japan Air Self-Defense Force F-35A disappeared over the Pacific in 2019, the search quickly became more than a rescue operation. U.S. and Japanese forces mounted an extensive effort to locate the wreckage, with U.S. Navy P-8A aircraft and a destroyer joining the search. TWZ noted at the time that even scattered F-35 wreckage could expose valuable technological secrets, while the aircraft’s location on the seabed raised the prospect of an underwater espionage and recovery operation.

USFJ is supporting @MoDJapan_en search & rescue efforts for missing F-35A w/@US7thFleet P-8A aircraft & @air_fifth coord. @USForcesJapan continues to hope for the safe recovery of the pilot @JASDF_PAO pic.twitter.com/9E7x6QZxpY

— U.S. Forces Japan (@USForcesJapan) April 10, 2019

That concern has also been evident in subsequent F-35 recovery operations. In 2022, the U.S. Navy recovered an F-35C from roughly 12,400 feet in the South China Sea after a carrier landing accident, removing the possibility that the aircraft could be accessed by another country.

pic.twitter.com/JvQZErAAK0

— OedoSoldier (@OedoSoldier) January 27, 2022

Unanswered Security Questions

At this point, there is no public evidence that the Hong Kong diversion was a deliberate Chinese intelligence operation, although it is certainly possible. It is also unclear whether Chinese authorities have examined the F-35 parts or what level of new and useful information has been recovered from them.

If, as reported, Chinese authorities have taken possession of the parts and have not returned them, that would be an extraordinary development. If the diversion was genuinely the result of a shipping or logistics error, the outcome would itself be extraordinary. It would raise serious questions about the security controls surrounding the movement of F-35 hardware even without evidence of deliberate interference.

The timing is also notable. Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Washington this week for a state visit with President Donald Trump, with the two leaders meeting amid broader disputes involving technology, security, and the future of U.S.-China relations. Whether the F-35 shipment comes up directly in those discussions is not known, but it would be an obvious subject for U.S. and Chinese officials to address through diplomatic channels.

"Ladies and gentlemen, the President of the United States Donald J. Trump and First Lady Melania Trump, accompanied by the President of the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping and Madame Peng Liyuan." pic.twitter.com/hyPHOBC99Q

— Rapid Response 47 (@RapidResponse47) September 24, 2026

For now, however, the central question remains how the parts got there. Until that is answered, we won’t know if this was a simple logistics failure or a deliberate intelligence operation. And beyond that, what China already knew about the components it now may have in its possession — a question we may never truly get an answer to.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post F-35 Canopy And Weapons-Bay Door Loss To China: Separating Fact From Fiction appeared first on TWZ.

The last A-10 Thunderbolt II assigned to Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, left the installation on September 22. The departure marks the end of nearly five decades of Warthog operations, including tactics development and testing, at the Air Force’s most high-profile fighter base. It also reflects a broader shift in which close air support expertise and some associated missions are supposedly being distributed among the F-15, F-16, and F-35 communities, although the move is controversial, to say the least.

Nearly 70 airmen assigned to Nellis gathered along the flight line to salute the aircraft as it departed. The final takeoff closes a chapter that began in 1977, when the first A-10 arrived at the base, which subsequently became a major center for developing and refining the aircraft’s operational employment.

Over the decades, Nellis-based units worked on the A-10’s software, avionics, and precision weapons capabilities, while the U.S. Air Force Weapons School’s 66th Weapons Squadron trained more than 300 A-10 weapons officers through approximately 100 classes. Many of the tactics in the A-10’s playbook emanated from the base.

The A-10’s departure consequently represents more than the retirement of another aircraft from a Nellis ramp. It also marks the end of a dedicated training and institutional ecosystem that developed around an aircraft specifically designed for close air support.

Earlier this year, Jamie Hunter of TWZ visited the U.S. Air Force A-10 Weapons Instructor Course as it was in the process of closing down, as documented in these exclusive videos:

The Air Force is now attempting to carry at least some of that expertise into a force built around multirole fourth- and fifth-generation fighters.

“We are maintaining the culture of the A-10 by involving as many other fighter communities involved in the close air support mission,” Lt. Col. Ridge Flick, commander of the 66th Weapons Squadron, said. “We are also training F-15 Eagle, F-35 Lightning II and F-16 Fighting Falcon pilots to take on some roles we have had in combat search and rescue.”

The A-10 was developed specifically for close air support, with its design emphasizing survivability at relatively low altitude, weapons employment against ground targets, and the ability to persist in the vicinity of friendly forces. In contrast, the F-16C/D and F-15E/EX were developed primarily as multirole fighters, while the F-35 combines strike, air-to-air, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and networking capabilities with a low-observable design.

Rather than replacing the A-10 with a single successor, the Air Force is therefore distributing elements of its former mission set across several aircraft and communities. The service insists its close air-support capability is not being reduced as the Warthog fleet retires, but at the very least the transition does represent a significant change in how that capability is generated and employed.

Regardless, the USAF’s claim that the impact of losing the heart of the A-10’s braintrust will not dramatically impact key mission sets in a negative manner has been viewed with extreme skepticism by some. It’s not uncommon for subject matter experts to believe the close air support and ‘Sandy’ aircrew recovery mission braintrust that the Warthog community represents is a far bigger loss than the aircraft itself, and that the USAF is not prepared to preserve this critical expertise, regardless of the service’s stated intentions.

The end of A-10 operations at Nellis also put what may be the final nail in the A-10’s coffin, as reconstituting these operations would be very challenging and costly. All this points to the Warthog being on its final glide path to retirement, once and for all.

You can read all about this controversy in our past special feature linked here.

Beyond the redistribution of Nellis’s A-10 pilots, the transition is also affecting the maintainers who supported the base’s A-10 fleet. Airmen assigned to the 757th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron’s Thunder Aircraft Maintenance Unit are being reassigned to other squadrons and airframes, including the F-35 and F-16. The Air Force is consequently moving not only personnel, but also decades of experience maintaining an aging and structurally demanding aircraft into programs supporting newer fighters.

For Staff Sgt. Eva Kehn, a weapons load crew chief with the 757th AMXS, the end of the A-10 era has an especially personal dimension because of her family’s connection to the aircraft and to aviation.

“Working on the A-10 is meaningful to me because that is something that I share with my grandfather,” Kehn said. “I’m very excited to have that new chapter and bond over that again with my grandfather.”

Kehn is transferring to an F-35 unit at Nellis, where that connection will continue in a different form. Her grandfather is now a civilian F-35 instructor, giving the two an opportunity to remain professionally connected even as the A-10 disappears from the installation.

Master Sgt. Aaron Edmonds, an aircraft section chief with the 757th AMXS, is also moving on from the Warthog after spending the past five years maintaining the aircraft. Edmonds previously worked on the F-16 earlier in his career and will now return to the Viper community.

“It’s a bittersweet moment,” Edmonds said. “I enjoyed my time with the A-10, but I’m excited because this departure marks the closing of one chapter and the start of another.”

Edmonds said the experience gained on the A-10 should be carried into the next aircraft rather than left behind with the airframe. “The advice I would give airmen who are transitioning from one airframe to another is to be open-minded, willing to learn and carry on the great work ethic from your previous aircraft over to your new one,” he said.

With the A-10 no longer present at Nellis, at least some of the expertise attached to it is being incorporated into a fighter force in which other aircraft types can contribute to the close air support mission in very different ways. An F-35, for example, can use its sensors and networking capabilities to identify and share information about targets and the battlespace, and it can go where other fighters can’t. An F-15 can contribute heavier weapons and longer endurance, among other capabilities, depending on the mission. This is not exactly new, either, as all types of aircraft provided CAS during the Global War on Terror-era, although the masters of exactly how to do it and how to execute the critical airborne forward air control (FAC-A) mission existed in the A-10 community. Still, the resulting force will be considerably different from the one centered on the Warthog, even where the underlying requirement to support troops on the ground remains.

As noted, the A-10’s retirement now looks to be gathering pace, despite repeated efforts to keep the A-10 in service and recent employment in combat operations in the Middle East. The Pentagon has granted three Warthog squadrons a reprieve to continue operating through 2030. In July, a bipartisan group of Congressmen introduced a bill that, if passed and signed into law, would require the Air Force to keep flying the jets through Fiscal Year 2033. Still, the aircraft’s eventual fate appears increasingly clear, with growing numbers heading to the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group (AMARG) boneyard in Arizona for storage, including the last one from Nellis.

The ongoing retirement of the A-10 is bringing a fundamental change in how the Air Force organizes and executes the missions for which the Warthog became synonymous. Nellis will remain an important center for developing those capabilities, even though the aircraft around which that expertise was built is no longer part of the equation.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post The A-10 Era Is Over At Nellis AFB appeared first on TWZ.

Taiwan has provided the first public look at its new 105mm 8×8 mobile gun system in action, with the domestically developed vehicle engaging moving and stationary targets during a live-fire demonstration in southern Taiwan. The vehicle is being developed as Taiwan continues to modernize its ground forces in response to the growing capabilities and increasingly frequent military activity of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) around the island.

During the demonstration, held by the Republic of China Army (ROCA) at a training area in Tainan today, the vehicle reportedly engaged a moving target at approximately 0.75 miles and a stationary target at around 0.6 miles. It also fired against targets positioned 90 degrees to the side of the vehicle while operating on a gentle slope, demonstrating the gun system’s ability to engage targets while the vehicle is positioned on uneven terrain.

pic.twitter.com/dn6lHDbf5k

— 青年日報 Youth Daily News, ROC(Taiwan) (@YDN_NEWS) September 23, 2026

Eight wheels. Six-wheel steering. One 105mm gun.
Definitely not your average ride.#ROCArmedForces #MobileGunSystem#MadeInTaiwan pic.twitter.com/oaHsyMNtev

— 國防部 Ministry of National Defense, ROC(Taiwan) (@MoNDefense) September 23, 2026

The vehicle subsequently fired its 7.62mm coaxial machine gun simultaneously with its main gun as part of a scenario intended to demonstrate engagement of multiple targets, including simulated amphibious assault vehicles.

台灣105公厘獵豹輪型戰車實彈射擊https://t.co/cHaXthUCfA pic.twitter.com/aKBBzoVsKz

— 新‧二七部隊 軍事雜談 (New 27 Brigade) (@new27brigade) September 23, 2026

An apparent weapon malfunction was also recorded during the demonstration. One of the 105mm rounds initially failed to fire, according to reports. The crew waited approximately two minutes in accordance with safety procedures before reloading the weapon, after which the vehicle fired normally. Maj. Gen. Chen Chien-chung, head of Taiwan’s Arsenal 202, the Production and Manufacturing Center of the Armament Bureau, said an investigation would be conducted into the misfire.

The 155 mm infantry fighting vehicle showcased to media before entering production phase. pic.twitter.com/DBhs66aw5Q

— Taepodong (@stoa1984) September 23, 2026

Despite the incident, the demonstration provided an important look at a vehicle that Taiwan is developing specifically around the country’s geography and battlefield requirements, including a potential amphibious invasion by the Chinese PLA.

A new direct fire support variant of the Clouded Leopard 8×8 infantry fighting vehicle was first publicly displayed at the Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition in 2023. It passed initial combat readiness testing with the ROCA in October 2023, and it was authorized for mass production in April 2024.

The production configuration has undergone significant changes since then.

Its height has been reduced by approximately 12 inches, bringing the overall vehicle height to below 9 feet 10 inches. Its turning radius has also been reduced from 36 feet to 26 feet. The reduction in turning radius was achieved by providing steering to three pairs of wheels, rather than two pairs on the earlier configuration.

Those changes are especially relevant to Taiwan, where large sections of the island feature restrictive terrain, dense urban development, narrow roads, drainage channels, and other obstacles that can limit the movement of heavy armored vehicles.

Taiwanese officials specifically highlighted the system’s suitability for culverts and urban areas, as well as the challenging terrain of Hualien and Taitung on the island’s mountainous east coast.

The vehicle’s principal weapon is a 105mm gun. The weapon can fire the general-purpose ammunition already developed for tank guns, in addition to ammunition developed specifically for the new system. The ROCA displayed armor-piercing, anti-personnel, and training ammunition during the demonstration. The gun also offers useful ammunition commonality with Taiwan’s older, but still active M60A3 and CM11 tanks.

That compatibility potentially gives the vehicle access to an existing ammunition ecosystem while allowing Taiwan to develop specialized rounds for its particular requirements.

Against a PLA assault, the 105mm system would provide mobile direct firepower against amphibious vehicles, armored personnel carriers, fortifications, and other ground targets, complementing Taiwan’s heavier tanks and other anti-armor weapons. Its wheeled configuration also allows the vehicle to rapidly reposition along Taiwan’s road network, giving commanders a mobile source of direct firepower that could respond to amphibious landings and reinforce threatened sectors.

The system falls into the same broad category as other modern 8×8 mobile gun systems, including Italy’s Centauro family and Japan’s Type 16 Mobile Combat Vehicle.

Less successful was a mobile gun system version of the U.S. Army Stryker, also with a 105mm gun, but the service divested that in 2021 because of problems with its dated cannon and autoloader. The U.S. Army then received the M10 Booker Combat Vehicle. Armed with a 105mm main gun, the Booker is a tracked vehicle with a much higher degree of armor protection and off-road mobility, but this, too, was canceled in 2025, amid cost and weight increases.

A wheeled 105mm gun system can provide substantial direct-fire capability while offering advantages in road mobility and potentially lower logistical demands. It also lacks the combination of protection, cross-country mobility, and heavy armament associated with a tracked main battle tank.

For Taiwan, this kind of vehicle provides a comparatively compact armored platform able to move rapidly between positions and bring heavy direct firepower to areas where larger vehicles could face mobility constraints.

If fighting reaches Taiwan’s cities, the ROCA regularly trains for the challenges of urban warfare. The service has also demonstrated unusual measures to conceal and protect its armored vehicles, including disguising tanks and other vehicles as scrap piles or civilian construction equipment to complicate PLA targeting.

The vehicle’s development is also being influenced by the threat of battlefield drones. Taiwanese military officials say the system is expected to receive additional counter-drone capabilities before entering mass production. One planned modification is an anti-drone cage around the vehicle.

More ambitious changes could involve the installation of a larger-caliber automatic weapon. Reportedly, the vehicle could eventually receive another machine gun or larger-caliber automatic cannon, with the 30mm M230 chain gun identified as one possible option. The proposed weapon could use canister-type ammunition designed to disperse numerous fragments against small drones.

Adding dedicated counter-drone equipment to the mobile gun system would therefore give the vehicle another role beyond direct engagement of conventional ground targets.

The prominence of counter-drone measures in the planning of the vehicle also reflects the increasingly contested environment in which Taiwan’s armored forces would have to operate. In a conflict with China, armored units have to operate under the threat of persistent surveillance and attacks from a wide range of uncrewed systems, making concealment, mobility, dispersion, and organic counter-drone capabilities very important to any change of survival. Questioning just how long any armor would last in a full-on invasion scenario is absolutely relevant. As we have seen in Ukraine, the drone threat alone has sidelined even the most capable armor. At the same time, Taiwan is working toward its own drone-heavy battlefield doctrine, part of a broader plan to turn the island into a “hellscape” for any invading force.

Overall, the September 23 demonstration offered a useful glimpse into the thinking behind Taiwan’s indigenous armored vehicle program.

As part of a wider modernization of ROCA armor, the service has also received 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks, broadly equivalent to the M1A2 SEPv3 version — or System Enhancement Package version 3 — which you can read more about here.

With production of 178 series examples of the new vehicle scheduled to begin in 2027, Taiwan’s new 105mm mobile gun system is moving toward becoming a significant component of the island’s domestically produced armored fleet.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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