Housing Law 187, published this Wednesday in the Ordinary Official Gazette No. 86, expands property rights in Cuba and diversifies mechanisms for building, financing, and accessing housing, with measures aimed at protecting vulnerable individuals.

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The new regulation is part of the economic and social transformations approved in the country and will enter into force seven days after its publication. Its release coincides with the 66th anniversary of the Urban Reform Law—a pioneering measure in the sector—which aimed to transfer home ownership to the families living in them, prohibit evictions, and guarantee a home for every citizen.

At a press conference, Marvelis Velázquez Reyes, Director of Legal Housing Affairs at the Ministry of Construction, explained that individuals may own up to two homes. This provision extends to foreigners, who will have the same rights and responsibilities in this regard as Cuban citizens.

The official detailed that property owners may grant the use of their home free of charge via a loan agreement, transfer rooms or part of the built structure to an adjoining property owner, and transfer their residence to individuals or legal entities through donation, among other flexible options.

Administrative authorization is also no longer required to transfer—whether for a fee or free of charge—partial or total ownership of rooftop space for the purpose of expanding or constructing living areas, nor for the transfer of privately owned vacant lots.

📑🏘️🇨🇺| Nueva Ley de la Vivienda: más derechos y nuevas formas de gestión. 📌 Con esta normativa #Cuba cuenta con un marco jurídico integral que busca hacer efectivo el derecho a una vivienda adecuada.

Infórmese más aquí: https://t.co/lFERyUQyEw pic.twitter.com/jbedphlErt

— Adrián Fonseca Quesada (@AFCanalCaribe) October 14, 2026

The text reads, “New Housing Law: more rights and new management models. With this legislation, #Cuba has a comprehensive legal framework that seeks to make the right to adequate housing a reality.”

Key aspects of Law 187 include the elimination of housing confiscation due to emigration and the guarantee of inheritance rights. Furthermore, in purchase-and-sale agreements, the parties may agree on as many terms, clauses, and conditions as they wish, provided they do not violate legal provisions, social order, or the nature of the contract itself.

The regulations establish that the Municipal Administration Council may finance the cost—or a portion thereof—of housing built and allocated to vulnerable individuals unable to afford it. In this way, the law reinforces the protective approach toward sectors facing the greatest difficulty in accessing adequate housing.

Law 187 introduces real estate agencies and housing cooperatives as new, fully guaranteed management models. These modalities aim to diversify participation in the production, maintenance, and management of the housing stock, in line with the country’s economic transformations.

The regulation also reaffirms the State’s responsibility for developing construction programs designed to address the housing shortage. According to authorities, the law governs the production, quality, financing, distribution, access, use, maintenance, and transfer of housing.

The publication of Housing Law 187 is accompanied by General Regulations, as well as specific rules regarding horizontal property ownership and housing cooperatives.

🇨🇺 Cuba’s economy continues to navigate challenges while pursuing growth and development.

Despite external pressures and economic difficulties, the island is strengthening key sectors and pursuing new opportunities to boost production, investment, and social development.

📈… pic.twitter.com/n5bsOkG53V

— teleSUR English (@telesurenglish) October 8, 2026

EU ministers have reviewed reforms introduced by Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s administration but left the Article 7 proceedings against Hungary unresolved. The European Commission has acknowledged significant progress while warning that further changes are required to restore the rule of law.

The European Union has maintained its Article 7 proceedings against Hungary despite acknowledging significant improvements in the country’s rule-of-law situation since Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s government took office earlier this year.

Ministers meeting at the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg on Tuesday, 13 October, reviewed reforms introduced by the Hungarian administration and received an updated assessment from the European Commission.

The proceedings, initiated by the European Parliament in September 2018, remain open eight years after concerns over judicial independence, corruption, media freedom and democratic accountability first prompted action under the EU treaties.

No decision was announced to terminate the procedure following the latest meeting.

Brussels acknowledges progress

European Commissioner Michael McGrath said ahead of the discussions that Hungary had made substantial progress towards addressing the institutional problems inherited from the administration of former prime minister Viktor Orbán.

Speaking in Luxembourg, McGrath acknowledged improved cooperation between the Hungarian government and European institutions.

However, he also indicated that the reform process remained incomplete, noting that the new administration had been in office for only several months.

The Commission’s assessment reflects the changing relationship between Budapest and Brussels following Magyar’s election victory and the subsequent introduction of reforms intended to restore judicial and institutional independence.

As EU Today reported in June, the change of government created an opportunity to resolve long-standing disputes over the condition of Hungary’s democratic institutions and the suspension of European funding.

The latest Council discussions indicate that the EU is prepared to recognise reforms already undertaken without automatically treating them as sufficient to close the Article 7 procedure.

An eight-year institutional dispute

The European Parliament initiated the proceedings in 2018 after raising concerns over developments affecting Hungary’s constitutional system, judicial independence, corruption safeguards and civil society.

Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union provides mechanisms for responding when a member state is considered at risk of seriously breaching the Union’s fundamental values.

Under its preventive provisions, the Council can determine whether there is a clear risk of such a breach.

More severe measures, including the possible suspension of certain membership rights, require additional procedures and higher institutional thresholds.

Hungary’s case has remained within the preventive stage, with successive Council meetings examining the country’s legal and political developments.

The Council’s account of the 13 October meeting confirms that Hungarian representatives presented measures intended to address concerns raised by the European Parliament and member states during earlier proceedings.

The Commission also briefed ministers on its latest assessment.

The meeting did not produce a formal finding that the outstanding concerns had been fully resolved.

Magyar faces the consequences of Orbán’s legacy

Since assuming office, Magyar has sought to reverse elements of the institutional structure established during Orbán’s lengthy premiership.

The reforms have included measures concerning public administration, judicial accountability and the relationship between national institutions and European law.

The new government has also attempted to improve relations with Brussels after years of disputes that affected EU budget decisions, sanctions policy and cooperation over Ukraine.

EU Today has previously examined Magyar’s programme of institutional renewal and the political difficulties involved in changing institutions shaped by the previous administration.

Reforming legislation does not necessarily transform the institutions responsible for applying it.

Judicial appointments, regulatory structures, public procurement procedures and anti-corruption enforcement may all require additional measures before the effects of reform can be fully assessed.

The European Commission must therefore consider not only the laws adopted by the new government but also whether the institutions concerned operate independently and effectively.

EU funding remains a separate question

The Article 7 proceedings are closely associated with wider disputes over Hungary’s access to European funding, although the relevant legal mechanisms are different.

During Orbán’s administration, the Commission and Council used financial conditionality procedures to restrict access to certain EU resources because of concerns affecting the protection of the Union’s budget.

Magyar’s reforms have opened the possibility of reversing some of those restrictions.

As EU Today reported in September, the Commission moved towards releasing €4.2 billion following changes intended to address rule-of-law concerns.

The financial decisions involve compliance with conditions attached to EU funding and can proceed independently of the Article 7 mechanism.

Consequently, the release of money does not automatically establish that all the institutional problems identified in the original parliamentary proceedings have been resolved.

Likewise, the continuation of Article 7 does not necessarily prevent the Commission from recognising progress under separate funding arrangements.

Who can end the proceedings?

McGrath addressed the possibility of terminating the procedure during remarks before Tuesday’s meeting.

He explained that the Commission could provide its assessment but did not have unilateral authority to bring the Article 7 process to an end.

In his recorded statement in Luxembourg, the Commissioner pointed to the responsibilities of the European Parliament, which initiated the case, and the Council, which has conducted the subsequent examination.

The institutional arrangements mean that improved relations between the Commission and the Hungarian government cannot by themselves dispose of the proceedings.

The Council must consider the reforms and the remaining concerns within the framework established by the treaties.

Political agreement among member states will consequently be required to determine how the process develops.

A changed relationship with Brussels

The latest discussions take place against a substantially different political background from previous years.

Budapest has recently withdrawn objections to further steps in Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations following Ukrainian legislation addressing educational rights for Hungarian speakers and other national minorities.

The change has removed one obstacle to enlargement negotiations and reflects the government’s more cooperative approach towards other EU institutions.

Nevertheless, Hungary’s position on foreign policy and enlargement is distinct from the assessment of its domestic rule-of-law arrangements.

The Council’s examination remains focused on the institutional concerns that led to the procedure being initiated.

The Irish presidency’s summary of the October Council meeting confirms that ministers received an update rather than reaching a new formal determination.

The proceedings therefore remain open while the Commission and member states continue examining the measures introduced by Magyar’s administration.

The coming decisions will establish how European institutions respond when a new government undertakes reforms intended to reverse the conduct that originally led to action under Article 7.

For Hungary, the outcome will influence its relationship with Brussels well beyond the immediate debate over EU funding. For the Union, it will demonstrate how its rule-of-law procedures operate when political circumstances change and the member state concerned begins addressing previously identified institutional problems.

The European Commission is assessing changes to Google’s search engine and app-store practices after imposing two substantial fines in July. Regulators must now decide whether the company’s response satisfies EU competition requirements or leaves it exposed to further enforcement.

The European Commission is continuing discussions with Google over the company’s response to €890 million in penalties imposed under the Digital Markets Act, as Brussels examines whether changes to its search engine and app-store practices are sufficient to address infringements of European competition rules.

Commission spokesman Thomas Regnier confirmed on Wednesday, 14 October, that officials remained in dialogue with the American technology company. The Commission is assessing the measures Google has introduced, taking account of feedback from businesses affected by its services before reaching a conclusion on compliance.

The review follows two decisions adopted on 23 July, when the European Commission found Google in breach of the Digital Markets Act. A €460 million fine concerned preferential treatment for Google’s own services in search results, while a separate €430 million penalty addressed restrictions preventing app developers from freely directing customers towards alternative purchasing channels.

Search rankings remain under examination

The first infringement concerns Google’s treatment of competing online services offering hotel reservations, shopping comparisons, transport information and sports results.

Regulators concluded that Google had placed its own services in more prominent positions, sometimes providing them with enhanced visual features and search functions unavailable to competing businesses.

The Digital Markets Act prohibits designated gatekeepers from giving their own products preferential treatment when ranking services that compete with those offered by other companies.

Google has already modified its European search results in response to the Commission’s decision. The changes include revised presentations of commercial information and greater prominence for independent comparison services.

As EU Today reported following the introduction of the revised search format, Google has argued that the measures could make searches less convenient and increase dependence on intermediary websites.

The company maintains that direct information previously available through its search engine may become harder for consumers to obtain.

For competitors, however, the question is whether Google’s adjustments provide genuine commercial opportunities or merely alter the appearance of search results without changing the underlying distribution of traffic.

Google Play fees face scrutiny

The second case concerns the Google Play application marketplace, where developers have historically depended on Google’s infrastructure to distribute software and sell subscriptions.

Under the DMA, developers must be able to inform customers about alternative offers and direct them towards purchasing arrangements outside the platform, including their own websites.

The Commission found that Google’s restrictions and fees had limited that freedom.

Although the company may charge for certain services associated with acquiring customers, the Commission concluded that the level and duration of its steering-related charges exceeded what the legislation permits.

Google has since adjusted its external-offers arrangements. European officials are examining whether those changes provide developers with a commercially workable alternative to transactions processed through Google Play.

The issue has consequences for subscription services, digital publishers and software companies seeking to maintain direct relationships with their customers.

A formal ability to direct consumers elsewhere is of limited benefit if the financial conditions make such transactions uneconomic.

Enforcement enters a more demanding phase

The Digital Markets Act was designed to address market practices that conventional competition investigations often took years to resolve.

Rather than requiring regulators to establish a new infringement through lengthy proceedings in every instance, the legislation imposes specific obligations on companies designated as gatekeepers.

The Commission’s DMA enforcement framework allows regulators to examine whether those obligations are being followed and to impose financial penalties when they are breached.

Google’s July fines represented an important enforcement decision. The current review concerns the company’s subsequent conduct and the practical effects of its compliance measures.

The continuation of discussions does not itself establish a fresh infringement. Further penalties would require an additional regulatory determination.

Google also faces broader obligations concerning the sharing of search data with competing providers, an issue addressed in a separate Commission decision issued in July.

These obligations concern access to anonymised information about searches, rankings and user interactions that competing search engines may need to improve their own services.

Taken together, the measures represent a substantial intervention in how Google’s European business operates.

Transatlantic tensions complicate the dispute

The proceedings have acquired a political dimension because most of the largest companies affected by the DMA are American.

President Donald Trump has criticised European penalties against US technology companies and threatened trade measures in response to what his administration regards as discriminatory regulation.

Brussels maintains that the legislation applies according to market position and commercial conduct, regardless of nationality.

European regulators must nevertheless enforce their decisions in an environment where competition policy has become entangled with wider trade relations between the United States and the European Union.

Google’s financial exposure extends beyond the €890 million imposed in July. Continued non-compliance could lead to further regulatory proceedings, while changes to the company’s services may also affect advertising revenue and its relationships with commercial partners.

The immediate assessment will concentrate on whether competing search services receive fair treatment and whether application developers can direct customers towards alternative transactions without unjustified restrictions.

The Commission has not announced a date for its final assessment. Its decision will help establish how far Europe’s digital competition legislation can change the conduct of companies whose platforms occupy central positions in online commerce.

The EU is shying away from triggering rules that would shield people and companies working at or with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague from US sanctions, preferring instead months-long diplomatic outreach.

The European Commission on Wednesday (14 October) told reporters in Brussels that it was doing everything to seek “practical solutions”, while hoping that its diplomacy will help the court, which prosecutes people for war crimes, genocide, and other atrocities.

“We haven’t made any decisions yet. But we continue to discuss at every level,” said a commission spokesperson, when pressed on whether a little-known blocking statue, which would presumably damper the impact of the US sanctions, remains an option.

And an EU summit in Brussels on Thursday is expected to ask the US to reverse the decision, according to draft conclusions seen by EUobserver.

The EU’s little-known “blocking statute” would prevent EU companies and banks from complying with the sanctions. It was first used against US sanctions on Cuba, Iran and Libya.

The Trump administration had, last Friday, announced financial sanctions on the ICC as part of a larger assault to dismantle the court, after it issued arrest warrants for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, its former defence minister Yoav Gallant, and Hamas military commander Mohammed Deif.

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

Defense Minister Israel Katz has bragged that Israel was destroying “not one house at a time,” but “the entirety of those villages.”

Trump has attacked Iran twice, both times amid nuclear negotiations and alongside Israel. The war has made it more likely that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons, and has undermined the cause of nuclear nonproliferation across the Middle East and beyond.

From State v. Elavsky, decided yesterday by Minnesota Court of Appeals Judge Kevin Ross, joined by Judge Elise Larson:

Neil Elavsky expressed his opposition to a social cause that was the subject of an outdoor fundraising event by posting leaflets on the windshields of cars near the event, and he confronted a supporter of the cause after he saw her removing his posted leaflets. He rushed toward her, demanded she return the removed leaflets to him, and grabbed them from her hand when she refused.

After the woman claimed that Elavsky scratched her finger when he snatched the leaflets from her, the state charged him with fifth-degree assault (fear), fifth-degree assault (harm), and disorderly conduct. A jury acquitted him of assault (harm) but found him guilty on the other charges, and the district court convicted him of assault (fear). Because the record contains insufficient circumstantial evidence to prove that Elavsky intended to cause the woman fear of immediate bodily harm, we reverse the assault conviction ….

Up to 5,000 supporters, including the employees of business sponsors, of the National Alliance of Mental Illness (NAMI) gathered at Minnehaha Park in Minneapolis one morning in September 2023 to participate in a fundraising march. An altercation at the event resulted in the state charging Neil Elavsky with fifth-degree assault (fear), fifth-degree assault (harm), and disorderly conduct. At Elavsky's trial, the jury heard evidence of the following account.

Two NAMI supporters, whom we will call "June" and "Lynn," names we have randomly chosen in the interest of their privacy, were employees of a large health-insurance company and arrived early to set up a picnic area and booth to greet their participating coworkers and provide information about their employer. Elavsky, who opposes NAMI's cause, was also present at the event. Elavsky and a companion had previously protested NAMI by distributing windshield leaflets that criticized NAMI and urged readers not to donate to it.

Lynn, who "[does not] agree with what the flyers were stating" and had remembered Elavsky and his companion from their activity at prior NAMI events, had previously complained about the leaflets to NAMI's executive director. She saw Elavsky's companion at about noon distributing leaflets and asked him not to place a leaflet on her car. June saw Elavsky during the event, "shouting very, very loudly" with a "big, full, bold voice."

The event neared its end at about 2:00 p.m., and Lynn saw that her car had been tagged with a leaflet. She asked June to remove the leaflet from her car and from a different person's car. June did so, and she started walking toward a trash can. Elavsky approached June from behind saying, "Give me those" and "That's private property. Give me that back." He appeared to June to be "very agitated" and, according to her, spoke to her in the same "big, bold, boisterous" voice she had heard him using earlier.

June turned toward Elavsky, but she did not hand him the leaflets. Instead, she kept them in her hand at her side. She argued, "It's not private property. It's been distributed. It's public property." Elavsky "lurched" toward June, who recounted, "[A]ll of a sudden I felt his arms going around me, reaching for the flyers that he claimed were private property." At that point, the two were chest to chest, and June could feel Elavsky's breath on her face. She said, "[Elavsky] grabbed my hand and my arm … to grab those flyers out of my hand." She said that he "grabbed the two flyers that [she] had in [her] hand, out of [her] hand, and then he turned to walk away." She acknowledged that Elavsky never shoved, hit, or raised his arms toward her.

The prosecutor asked June at least five times how or what she felt during her encounter with Elavsky. She answered that she "really didn't have any feelings"; "[k]ind of more of a shock than anything else"; "not understanding why this gentleman is approaching me like this"; "angry"; "very violated." Even after the prosecutor clearly tried leading June to the answer he was fishing for, with, "[June], as far as being fearful, did you feel fear at that moment," June still did not say that she feared Elavsky would harm her during the incident….

The court held that there was insufficient evidence that Elavsky acted "with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm," which was required for the assault-by-fear charge (Elavsky hadn't contested his conviction on a disorderly conduct charge):

The state did not offer direct evidence that Elavsky had this specific intent, relying instead on circumstantial evidence. When an element of a conviction rests on circumstantial evidence, we … [consider] whether the reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances proved are, as a whole, not only consistent with the defendant's guilt but also "inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt." Without any deference to the verdict, if we conclude that the circumstances proved allow for a reasonable hypothesis inconsistent with guilt, the evidence is insufficient and we will reverse the conviction….

The state is correct that the circumstances proved reasonably support an inference that Elavsky intended to cause June fear of immediate bodily harm. We can infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions. Elavsky's angry demeanor, his leafletting and loud expressions of disagreement with NAMI's cause throughout the day, his lurching approach toward June while demanding that she return the leaflets to him, and his abrupt entry into her personal space to the point of chest-to-chest contact would together allow a reasonable person to infer that he might have specifically intended his actions to cause June to be immediately afraid that he would injure her.

That June did not testify that Elavsky's actions in fact caused her to fear immediate injury—despite multiple failed attempts by the prosecutor—is not a basis for us to conclude otherwise. This is because evidence that the victim felt fear is neither necessary nor sufficient to prove that the defendant intended to cause fear….

But we are likewise satisfied that the circumstances proved also support a reasonable inference other than guilt. Elavsky argues convincingly that one can reasonably infer from the same circumstances that he intended only to retrieve the leaflets from June and nothing more. Elavsky is a committed NAMI protester who distributed hundreds of leaflets on the day of the incident, just as he had in the past.

The uncontradicted testimony established that he had already been loud and angry in his protesting long before he saw June remove the leaflets. He demanded that June return what he described as his property and grabbed them from her after she disagreed about who owned them. June described his actions in reaching around her only as intended "to try to get the flyer[s]" from her.

Elavsky ended his encounter with June immediately after he got the leaflets back, turning promptly to walk away. June then moved in front of Elavsky, directly confronting him about her finger. All the circumstances considered as a whole support the alternative inference that Elavsky's only actual intent was to get the leaflets back from June. This is a reasonable inference of a hypothesis other than guilt.

Judge Lisa Beane dissented:

Elavsky was agitated and shouting when he approached June—a woman he did not know—and demanded that she give him two flyers she was holding in her hand that Elavsky claimed were rightfully his. When she did not immediately do so, Elavsky wrapped both his arms around her body so that their chests were touching, and she could feel his breath on her face. He grabbed her arm, and he forcibly took the flyers from her hand. Although June did not use the word "fear" to describe how Elavsky's conduct made her feel, she described feeling the need to defend herself against his aggressive behavior and feeling unnerved and disconcerted. Elavsky is physically larger than June in both height and weight.

These circumstances, I believe, foreclose the possibility that Elavsky did not intend to cause June fear—that is, they are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than guilt. Elavsky argues that the circumstances support "the reasonable inference that he exclusively intended to retrieve his flyers without causing fear." Elavsky clearly intended to retrieve the flyers, but the only rational inference from the means he chose to achieve that goal is that he intended to cause June fear of bodily harm.

As the majority notes, we can infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of their actions. The natural and probable consequence of an agitated, larger man approaching a smaller woman who is a stranger to him, addressing her in a "very loud" and "intimidating" voice, demanding that she do as he says, and then forcefully grabbing around her body with both arms is that the woman will experience fear of immediate bodily harm. Given Elavsky's actions, it is not reasonable to infer that he intended a different result.

Stated differently, the only reasonable inference regarding Elavsky's intent that can be drawn from the evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is the one the jury drew: that Elavsky acted with the purpose of causing, or with the belief that he would cause, June fear of bodily harm.

The majority responded:

The dissent acknowledges that the circumstances proved demonstrate that "Elavsky clearly intended to retrieve the flyers" but posits that causing June to fear bodily harm was "the means he chose to achieve that goal." We are confident instead that the circumstances proved as we have identified them, or as the dissent has listed them, do not eliminate the reasonable inference that retrieving the flyers was his exclusive objective. The dissent points out that "Elavsky was agitated and shouting when he approached" June. But the evidence showed that he was agitated and shouting both long before the confrontation began and after it ended, strongly suggesting that his agitation and shouting had a purpose wholly independent of causing fear.

The dissent highlights Elavsky's size relative to June's, but his size by itself says nothing about intent to cause fear and nothing in the record indicates that he intended to use his size in any particular way. The dissent especially emphasizes that Elavsky got physically close to June and forcefully and immediately removed the flyers from her—circumstances that most clearly show that he intended to retrieve the flyers from June by force, not that he intended to retrieve them by fear. Again, although one might reasonably infer that Elavsky wanted to cause June to fear bodily harm, we simply disagree with the dissent's conclusion that this is "the only rational inference." …

Erik I. Withall (St. Paul Assistant Public Defender) represents defendant.

The post Interesting Criminal Case on Proving Intent to Cause Fear, Stemming from Confrontation at Protest appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The Supreme Court’s decision to force Palestinian politician Sami Abu Shehadeh out of the upcoming Israeli elections is the latest sign that there is no place for Palestinian citizens of Israel in the ‘Jewish and democratic’ state.

After the Greens passed a motion declaring ‘Zionism is racism’, every establishment journalist is suddenly playing dumb about the most elementary of issues in international law

💾

The U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments today in an important case that asks how much judicial deference is owed to the U.S. Sentencing Commission's commentary on the federal sentencing guidelines when a judge is applying those guidelines during the sentencing of a federal criminal defendant. That may sound like a somewhat dry legal dispute, but the ramifications are big not only in the realm of criminal law, but also for the broader legal battle over statutory interpretation, the role of the courts, and the authority of those federal agencies that some critics have called "the administrative state."

The case is Beaird v. United States. Kendrick Jarrell Beaird was arrested for pointing a gun at someone and, because he had a prior felony record, was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm. Under the federal sentencing guidelines, Beaird faced an even higher sentence if the firearm "involved…is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine." His gun's magazine was capable of holding 17 rounds. Did that count as large capacity and thus trigger a higher sentence? The federal sentencing guidelines did not directly say, but the U.S. Sentencing Commission's commentary on the guidelines did: According to the commentary, a magazine capable of accepting "more than 15 rounds of ammunition" counts as large capacity.

Are the federal courts bound to follow the Sentencing Commission's commentary in a case like this and dutifully impose a steeper sentence? Or may the courts impose a lower sentence based on their own alternate view of the best reading of the text of the sentencing guidelines?

In Stinson v. United States (1993), the Supreme Court held that the commentary to the federal sentencing guidelines is entitled to major deference from the courts. "We decide that commentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative," the Court said, "unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline."

Among the questions at issue in today's oral arguments in Beaird is "whether Stinson v. United States still accurately state[s] the level of deference due to the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines." In other words, should there be cases in which a judge's alternate reading may trump the interpretation favored by the commission's commentary?

Those questions alone make this a notable case. But this particular dispute also arrives in the midst of a broader, ongoing battle over judicial deference to the authority of federal regulatory agencies. For instance, in Kisor v. Wilkie (2019), the Supreme Court narrowly upheld a precedent which said that a federal agency's interpretation of its own "ambiguous" rule is entitled to broad judicial deference unless the agency's interpretation is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations being interpreted."

Justice Elena Kagan's 5–4 majority opinion in Kisor v. Wilkie justified this holding on the grounds that the Court's deferential doctrine "enables the agency to fill out the regulatory scheme Congress has placed under its supervision."

Writing in dissent, Justice Neil Gorsuch faulted this approach for requiring judges "to accept an executive agency's interpretation of its own regulations even when that interpretation doesn't represent the best and fairest reading." That sort of deference, Gorsuch argued, "creates a 'systematic judicial bias in favor of the federal government, the most powerful of parties, and against everyone else.'"

This Kagan-Gorsuch clash of legal visions is likely to arise again in the Beaird case. Whether or not Kagan's pro-deference view will still command the majority, however, remains to be seen.

The post A New Supreme Court Case Tests the Limits of Judicial Deference to Federal Agencies appeared first on Reason Magazine.

“I’m okay.” That was the last message I sent my mother before an Israeli strike hit us, a group of seven journalists reporting in southern Lebanon.

Three years ago, on 13 October 2023, my colleague Dylan Collins and I headed to the southern border of Lebanon to cover the situation following cross-border shelling between Israeli forces and Hezbollah. We spent the morning filming UN peacekeeping force patrols along the blue line dividing Lebanon and Israel. The atmosphere was calm and nothing suggested that the day was about to change and upend our lives. We went to a coffee shop near a UN post where journalists from different outlets had gathered and there we met our friend and Reuters colleague Issam Abdallah. 

Around 4:50PM, we heard a bombardment in a nearby town so we moved to an exposed hill in Alma Al-Shaab, where Al-Jazeera journalists Carmen Joukhadar and Elie Brakhya were positioned. Together with colleagues from Reuters, we were a group of seven journalists, all wearing press vests, reporting next to a car marked “TV”. We were clearly identifiable as press and spent about an hour filming while an Israeli drone hovered above us. At 5:57 I finished filing my photos and sent a message to my mother to tell her I was okay. Seconds later, I found myself on the ground, bleeding and screaming for help. Dylan rushed over with a tourniquet, but before he even had the time to put it, another strike hit.

Everyone disappeared and I was left alone, unable to move and the heat of the flames creeping closer to my face. I was terrified of burning alive, so I started crawling away with the camera still hanging from my neck and its strap tightening around my neck with every move. Two weeks later, I woke up from an induced coma with one leg missing, the other severely damaged, and Issam dead. 

Not an isolated attack

What followed was as horrific and brutal as the attack itself and it didn’t stop there. What happened to us was not an isolated incident — for three years I watched journalists being killed in Lebanon and Gaza by Israeli forces in ways that felt painfully familiar. 

In October 2024, Israeli forces struck a compound in Hasbaya where journalists were staying and killed media workers Ghassan Najjar, Mohammed Reda and Wissam Kassem, while they slept.

Human Rights Watch found no evidence of military activity at the site and concluded that the strike was deliberate and should be investigated as war crime.

Then in April 2026, journalist Amal Khalil was killed in southern Lebanon after an Israeli strike hit the building where she had taken shelter with her colleague Zainab Faraj, leaving both women trapped under the rubble. Investigations found that Israeli forces repeatedly obstructed rescue efforts.

Since our attack, dozens of journalists have been killed in Lebanon, and nearly 200 journalists have been killed in Gaza by Israeli forces.

Many have been mired by Israel with the same false allegations that they were “terrorists.” The dead can’t defend themselves against such accusations, but I survived and I can speak about what happened to us. 

In June 2026 in an interview on France 2, Israel’s ambassador to France described the 13 October attack as a “mistake” saying that we were not targeted because we were journalists, but because Israeli forces had mistaken us for “terrorists.” The evidence tells a different story.

Five independent investigations by Agence France-Presse, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, Reuters, and UNIFIL found no indication of fighters or military activity at the site, and no cross-border exchange of fire for more than 40 minutes before we were struck with a 120mm tank shell. 

These investigations matter because they establish with certainty evidence beyond my own personal account.

What remains unanswered is who gave the order, who fired the double-tap strike, and why no one has been held accountable. These are basic questions that can be answered by Israel if they were sought by EU member states.

Three years on, Issam’s family and the survivors of this attack deserve to know: Who gave the order?

Evidence alone cannot deliver justice, someone must be willing to act on it. In the face of this attack, including the targeting of four of its own citizens on Lebanese soil, the Lebanese government has failed us. 

Neither Lebanon nor Israel are party to the Rome Statute, meaning that the International Criminal Court does not have jurisdiction to prosecute those responsible for the attack.

In 2024, Lebanon approved a special declaration that would have allowed the Court to investigate war crimes committed after 7 October 2023, only to later reverse its decision for political reasons.

And now, making our legal path even more complicated, in June 2026 Lebanon signed a new framework agreement with Israel whereby Clause 13 commits both sides to cease “all hostile and adverse actions in international and legal fora.”

EU urged to act

I have no hope left that we will ever get justice for what we lost, but I will not rest before I know the names and faces of those responsible. 

Our case is the most documented instance of Israeli forces targeting the press on record. The October 13 targeted attack was perpetrated by Israeli forces on a group of journalists clearly identifiable as press.

If we cannot get answers in the face of such overwhelming evidence, what does it mean for the hundreds of journalists killed by Israeli fire throughout the region for which there is no such evidence? 

This is where the European Union must act. The EU has repeatedly said that journalists must not be attacked and that violations of international law must be met with accountability. Today, we demand actions not just words and statements. The EU must demand that Israel provide a full account of the 13 October attack, including who ordered, authorized and carried out the strikes.

For me, this is not an abstract question of foreign policy. Issam was my friend. I survived that attack with one leg missing. I know what it means when the people responsible for an attack are allowed to remain unnamed and unaccountable.

I am asking the EU not simply to stand with journalists in words, but to stand with us in action.

The EU has political, diplomatic, and legal leverage. It should use it. If Israel refuses to fully explain what occurred and disclose those responsible for killing and maiming journalists who were visibly identifiable as press, EU member states should use every available mechanism to pursue accountability, including further targeted sanctions or suspending trade with Israel.

I refuse to believe that a military with advanced surveillance could have simply mistaken us for fighters and attacked us in a double-tap strike, a tactic repeatedly used by Israel in this war. But, if that’s truly what happened, then Israel must still answer for how such incompetence and failure was possible. 

For now, justice evades us, but the truth of who gave the order is within reach and we must demand it. 

He argued there was no evidence to suggest the result of the Brexit vote had been swayed as a result of the effort

• Andy Burnham promises ‘serious dialogue’ over UK’s relationship with EU

Zia Yusuf, Reform UK’s home affairs spokesperson, has said he does not agree with his colleague Suella Braverman’s assertion that black people cannot be English.

Asked about her views in an interview on Sky News, Yusuf said:

In my view Ashley Cole is the best English fullback in history, and I won’t take any other position. So in my view, Ashley Cole is English. I think the argument that he’s not English doesn’t hold water with me.

Nasser Hussain, who I grew up watching when I went to the cricket, the idea that those people aren’t English is an alien concept to me.

I would respectfully disagree with people, who make the opposite argument.

To say I’m English is to take a ‘laissez-faire, anything-goes’ attitude to ethnicity, citizenship and identity. It also denies me my Asian heritage. The liberals (many of them in today’s Conservative party) take this cosmopolitan approach to Englishness. They’re terrified of being called racist so they say that anyone, as long as they’re born here, can be English.

I take the conservative approach. Englishness is an ethnicity. There have been English people for centuries and we need to recognise this more if we are to start taking a more muscular approach to citizenship and nationality. And no, it’s not racist to say this.

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© Photograph: Jonathan Brady/Reuters

© Photograph: Jonathan Brady/Reuters

© Photograph: Jonathan Brady/Reuters

More than 70,000 killed; even more wounded; destruction without end: Ten Israeli soldiers told Der Spiegel about their feelings of revenge, orders to shoot and “collateral damage.”

On Tuesday, Argentine political leaders, workers, students, and social activists will march to the Congress in Buenos Aires to demand compliance with the University Financing Law and urge the Chamber of Deputies to reject Decree of Necessity and Urgency (DNU) 70/23. The gathering is scheduled to take place in front of Parliament, where demands regarding the Land Law and the Rental Law will also be voiced.

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The mobilization will bring together faculty, non-teaching staff, students, university officials, labor confederations, tenants’ organizations, Malvinas war veterans, and political leaders. Participants will call on the government to implement the University Financing Law and on the Chamber of Deputies to repeal DNU 70/23, which has already been rejected by the Senate.

The protest was decided upon weeks ago, following strikes and public teaching sessions organized by faculty and non-teaching staff unions. The organizations maintain that the law must guarantee the sustainability of national universities and demand that the Executive branch comply with existing regulations.

The Buenos Aires University (UBA) issued a message supporting the call to action: “Let us not normalize non-compliance with the law. Laws must be obeyed. Always.” The university called for participation in the fifth Federal University March to demand adherence to the law and to defend public higher education.

#Argentina | A federal court struck down President Javier Milei’s decree blocking the University Financing Law and ordered the government to immediately release funds for public universities.
The ruling follows more than a year of disputes over university funding.#Education… pic.twitter.com/SbD2Nswu3P

— teleSUR English (@telesurenglish) October 7, 2026

These demands were also voiced last week at the Palacio Pizzurno, the headquarters of the Secretariat of Education. There, student unions from the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area staged a sit-in and asked the Secretary of Education, Carlos Torrendell, to increase scholarships in accordance with the University Financing Law.

According to the statement regarding the event, the meeting lasted three minutes before authorities forcibly removed the students from the building. Later, the Ministry of Human Capital announced it would file a formal complaint regarding the incident. Buenos Aires Province Governor Axel Kicillof confirmed he would participate in the march.

During an event marking the 150th anniversary of the implementation of Law 988 on Common Education, he stated that the national government does not respect the law and maintained that its representatives would be “in the streets on the 15th, defending public universities.” Kicillof also noted that the 26 national universities located within the province are the responsibility of the federal government.

Meanwhile, students will march in groups organized by student unions or independently, just as they did during the four previous mobilizations. Some university faculties are preparing measures to support the protest. At the UBA’s Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, an assembly voted to occupy the building at Puan 480 from 7:00 PM on Tuesday until Thursday, the day of the mobilization.

Emergency Decree (DNU) 70/23 and the legislative debate

The march also aims to pressure the Chamber of Deputies to reject Emergency Decree (DNU) 70/23, signed by President Javier Milei. The lower house is scheduled to debate the decree, although achieving a quorum to hold the session remains uncertain.

The legislative debate was called after the Supreme Court overturned a ruling that had declared Article 154 of the decree—which concerned the repeal of the Land Law—unconstitutional. As of this writing, that law remains in effect. Nevertheless, the organizers are proceeding with the mobilization, maintaining that the protest should not depend on judicial decisions.

The La Plata Center for Malvinas War Veterans (Cecim), which had filed the legal challenge, confirmed it would be present at Plaza de los Dos Congresos, stating: “The homeland is not for sale. We are marching on the 15th regardless, because DNU 70 is a crime against the people.”

The two CTA labor confederations also announced their participation. The CTA Autónoma announced it would return to the streets to demand that the Chamber of Deputies repeal the decree and move forward with declaring it unconstitutional.

"El decreto 70/23 no es ni más ni menos una forma de LIQUIDAR SOBERANÍA NACIONAL, no hay forma de verlo desde otro lugar"

Hay que impedir que vendan el país entero, porque dejaron en claro que no les importa pic.twitter.com/je4wq44qQD

— 💛🇦🇷 🅟🅐🅜🅟🅐 🇦🇷💙 (@Pampa139) October 11, 2026

Emergency Decree (DNU) 70/23 repealed the Rental Law, which had mandated three-year contracts and six-monthly rent adjustments. Consequently, tenants’ organizations will join the march to demand the decree’s rejection. The group Organized Tenants (Inquilinos Agrupados) called for a gathering outside Congress, declaring: “Down with Decree 70. We will have a rental law.”

Peronist and leftist leaders also confirmed their participation. Gabriel Solano—a former Buenos Aires City legislator representing the Workers’ Party (Partido Obrero) within the Left and Workers’ Front-Unity (FIT-U)—called for intensified mobilization to reject the decree and secure an increase in the university budget.

The rally will thus bring together demands for higher education funding and opposition to the repeals enacted by the decree regarding land and rental regulations. The outcome of the debate on the decree will rest with the deputies, while protesters seek to voice their grievances outside Congress.

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Kyiv just cleared the important roadblock for Budapest, which stood between Kyiv and EU membership talks. Ukraine’s parliament has passed a bill on schooling in minority languages, meant to finally lift Hungary’s block on the country’s path toward EU membership, with 266 of the 450 lawmakers voting in favor, UNIAN reports.

Hungary has been the lone EU member blocking the opening of four of Ukraine’s negotiating clusters, stages of the membership process, over how Kyiv treats the Hungarian minority in Ukraine's Zakarpattia region. Roughly 80,000 ethnic Hungarians live in it, and Budapest had tied Ukraine’s entire EU course to their language rights.

Lawmakers have instructed the parliament’s speaker to sign the law without delay and send it to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

What the law changes in schools

The bill keeps Ukrainian as the main language of education, but guarantees classes in minority languages where they exist. Minorities may study in the official languages of EU member states alongside Ukrainian, and pupils may use their language in other forms of communication on school grounds.

A school can gain the status of a national-minority institution if more than half of its pupils study in that minority language, provided that language is an official EU language. Parents of at least two-thirds of a minority class can also ask the school to expand the list of subjects taught in Ukrainian.

The dispute dates back years

Ukraine’s 2017 education law and 2019 language law narrowed minority-language schooling and required more Ukrainian in secondary grades, which then-Hungarian leader Viktor Orban treated as an attack on the Hungarians of Zakarpattia, blocking Kyiv’s NATO and EU steps for years, EUalive reports. Kyiv’s position was that the laws applied to all minorities and excluded Russian.

Hungary’s newer government, in office since spring 2026, inherited the veto. Budapest lifted it on the first cluster, which the EU opened in June, Ukraine’s first since gaining candidate status in 2022, but made the rest conditional on this law.

With the bill passed, Hungary is set to allow the EU to open two more clusters, on the internal market and competitiveness, at a Council meeting in Luxembourg on 13 October. Kyiv aims to open all its clusters by year’s end.

Montenegro and Albania will hold separate accession conferences on 12 and 13 October as the European Commission introduces proposals for stronger safeguards against democratic backsliding, linking the next phase of EU enlargement to reforms within the Union itself.

Montenegro and Albania are preparing for another round of European Union accession negotiations this week, with meetings in Luxembourg scheduled to advance their membership bids as Brussels considers substantial changes to the conditions under which future countries will join the bloc.

Montenegro’s 29th accession conference will take place on Monday, 12 October, followed by Albania’s tenth conference on Tuesday. The meetings come less than a week after the European Commission presented a package of proposals intended to prepare the EU for enlargement while strengthening its ability to respond to breaches of democratic standards by newly admitted members.

For Montenegro, the immediate objective is to continue closing negotiating chapters after years of institutional and legal reforms. Albania’s meeting has a more precisely defined agenda: the provisional closure of Chapter 20, covering enterprise and industrial policy.

Both countries have made progress towards membership, but the Commission’s latest proposals indicate that the terms of accession could become more demanding as the EU considers admitting several new members.

Montenegro moves towards the final negotiating stage

Montenegro is widely regarded as the most advanced candidate among the Western Balkan countries.

Accession negotiations began in 2012, and all 33 negotiating chapters have been opened. Progress towards closure has accelerated as the government seeks to complete the process and secure an accession treaty.

At the end of 2025, Montenegro provisionally closed five chapters covering services, capital movements, company law, agriculture and fisheries.

As EU Today reported following that conference, the agreements brought the number of provisionally closed chapters to twelve at that stage, while the EU continued to emphasise the importance of judicial reform and sustained implementation.

Subsequent accession conferences have continued the negotiating process, with the 29th conference scheduled for 12 October.

The Commission has identified Montenegro as a country capable of concluding accession negotiations by the end of 2026, provided sufficient progress is maintained.

That objective does not mean membership would follow automatically. A completed negotiation must still lead to an accession treaty, which requires approval by all existing member states and ratification under their constitutional procedures.

Outstanding questions include the independence of the judiciary, enforcement of anti-corruption legislation and the capacity of state institutions to apply EU law consistently.

Albania advances in industrial policy negotiations

Albania’s accession process has also gained momentum, supported by renewed EU interest in incorporating the Western Balkans into European political and economic structures.

The conference scheduled for 13 October is expected to provisionally close Chapter 20, which covers enterprise and industrial policy.

The chapter concerns the legal and institutional environment in which businesses operate, including industrial competitiveness, entrepreneurship and policies supporting small and medium-sized enterprises.

Provisional closure would represent further progress in Albania’s alignment with EU legislation and policy, although it would not constitute a final agreement on accession.

As with Montenegro, the negotiating framework requires sustained progress on the fundamentals of membership, notably judicial independence, fundamental rights, corruption and organised crime.

Brussels prepares stronger safeguards

The latest accession conferences follow the European Commission’s proposals of 6 October, which address the institutional consequences of admitting new countries.

The Commission argues that enlargement can be accommodated within the existing treaties, but that the EU will need additional safeguards and improvements to decision-making.

Among the most consequential proposals is the possibility of suspending a new member state’s voting rights in the Council if it commits serious breaches of the Union’s fundamental values or the principle of sincere cooperation.

Such provisions would be incorporated into future accession arrangements, making some membership conditions enforceable after a country has joined.

The proposal reflects concerns that the EU’s existing mechanisms for responding to democratic backsliding can be slow and politically difficult to apply.

In June, EU Today reported on proposals advanced by five member states seeking stronger protections against governments that might undermine common decisions after accession.

The Commission’s October package develops that argument into a broader programme of institutional preparation.

Enlargement beyond the Western Balkans

The debate extends to Ukraine and Moldova, whose membership applications have acquired greater strategic importance following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The Commission is examining how candidate countries can progressively participate in EU policies and programmes before obtaining full membership.

These arrangements could include greater integration in energy, transport, defence and selected areas of the single market, subject to the implementation of relevant reforms.

Brussels is also considering transitional arrangements affecting agricultural support, financial transfers and sensitive sectors of the economy.

The political challenge is to provide candidate countries with credible membership prospects while reassuring existing members that enlargement will not weaken common decision-making or create unsustainable budget commitments.

For Montenegro and Albania, the October conferences therefore take place at a pivotal point in the accession process.

Both governments are moving through the technical stages of membership negotiations while the EU is still determining how its next enlargement will operate.

The outcome will depend not only on their progress towards meeting accession conditions, but also on whether the existing 27 member states can agree on the institutional changes required for a larger Union.

The EU’s annual rule of law report, tackling advancements in corruption and fundamental rights, shares overly optimistic improvement that is far from the reality on the ground, a civil liberties group revealed. 

Presented on a sweltering Friday in July, the EU commission’s 2026 rule of law report failed to avoid scrutiny, with NGO Civil Liberties Union for Europe (Liberties) observing a gap between professed achievements in member states and the reality of a significant lack of implementation of Brussels’ recommendations. 

“This year’s Report shows continued positive progress across many Member States. And that is precisely why our Rule of Law Report matters. It has become a reference point, helping to shape national debates and drive reforms across our Union,” EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen said back then in a statement.

But of all recommendations in the July report, Liberties’ Gap analysis report revealed that only four percent had been fully implemented, while 54 percent show limited to no progress.

“The Commission’s Rule of Law Report has the potential to be one of the EU’s strongest tools for preventing democratic backsliding,” said Kersty McCourt, Liberties’ rule of law expert. “But when recommendations are repeatedly issued without being implemented, and new threats are not identified early enough, the system loses its power”. 

The report, published on Monday (12 October) and shared in advance with EUobserver, found that almost all recommendations issued in 2026 were regurgitations of those given in previous years, with only seven new recommendations being introduced this year.

The commission’s annual report “fails to unpack why some problems remain so entrenched,” Liberties said. 

In its own study, the Berlin-based NGO suggested the reasons for slow movement to be bound from a lack of willingness from member states, a vacuum in the EU’s enforcement mechanisms, or issues becoming “so entrenched that progress is effectively impossible.”

This reduces the function of the report as a warning system for identifying early signs of democratic backsliding, since recommendations on emerging issues remain unaddressed and even if are formally adopted, often don’t translate into effective implementation.

Liberties observed this to be evident in the example of Nordic countries, which have grown to be exempt from scrutiny due to their traditionally strong reputations.

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

Human Rights Watch: “The outside world may be under a dangerous illusion that life in Gaza is returning to normal, but reality tells a very different story”

One year since the ceasefire agreement, more than 1,400 people have been killed by Israeli forces in Gaza, nearly two million still need shelter, not a single hospital is fully functioning, and 1.4 million face crisis-level hunger.