Spanish supermarket giant Mercadona has officially arrived in the Algarve, opening its first store in the region today (October 15) at Nova Vila Retail Park in Portimão. The much-anticipated opening
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Chip makers and tech investors such as Samsung and SoftBank plunge as potential interest rate hikes spook markets
An accelerating sell-off of AI-linked shares has hit global markets, as fears over rising inflation and future interest rate hikes spooked traders already wary of the heavily indebted sector.
South Korea’s benchmark Kospi 200 index, which is heavily skewed towards the companies that make memory chips, fell more than 8% overnight to a six-month closing low, triggering circuit breakers that brought trading to a halt at various points.
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© Photograph: Lee Jin-man/AP
© Photograph: Lee Jin-man/AP
© Photograph: Lee Jin-man/AP
Endless illegal immigration, unaffordable energy, draconian speech policing – we're being conditioned to accept outrageous things as normal, says Nick Rendell. Now add to that economic crashes.
The post This Shouldn’t Be Normal appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
European Union finance ministers have reached an agreement to expand centralised supervision of financial markets, but Germany has secured provisions allowing important parts of Deutsche Börse to remain under national oversight, substantially narrowing the European Commission’s original reform proposals.
The compromise, agreed at a meeting in Luxembourg on 9 October, would transfer responsibility for supervising selected trading venues, clearing houses and securities settlement institutions to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).
However, the agreement introduces exemptions and thresholds that reduce the number of institutions automatically subject to direct European supervision.
The result is a significant political compromise between governments seeking deeper financial integration and those reluctant to surrender oversight of nationally important market operators.
The most contentious element of the negotiations concerned Deutsche Börse, the German financial-market group that operates the Frankfurt stock exchange and provides trading, clearing and other financial infrastructure services.
Germany opposed arrangements that would place all major market operators under direct ESMA supervision, arguing that institutions with predominantly domestic activities should continue to be regulated nationally.
The agreed compromise refines the criteria for determining which trading venues qualify for centralised oversight.
These conditions allow certain Deutsche Börse operations to remain outside the new supervisory regime.
The exemption had already become a point of contention during negotiations among European governments.
As EU Today reported in June, Berlin had sought to protect Deutsche Börse from mandatory European supervision despite Germany’s broader support for integrating EU capital markets.
The October agreement formalises a narrower approach within the Council’s negotiating position, although the legislation remains subject to approval by the European Parliament.
The European Commission has repeatedly argued that fragmented national supervision weakens the EU’s ability to compete with financial markets in the United States.
Although the Union operates a single market, many financial institutions continue to face differing regulatory interpretations, procedures and supervisory relationships across member states.
These differences can increase operating costs and discourage financial businesses from expanding across borders.
The Market Integration and Supervision Package is intended to simplify those arrangements and strengthen common oversight of financial infrastructure with significant cross-border activity.
Under the Council’s position, ESMA would assume direct supervision of selected trading platforms and institutions involved in clearing and securities settlement.
Such institutions perform essential functions in financial markets, including managing transactions, transferring securities and controlling risks between counterparties.
Differences in supervisory arrangements can complicate the operation of financial services that increasingly function across national borders.
The Commission argues that greater consistency would allow European capital to move more efficiently between member states and provide businesses with improved access to investment.
The Commission’s original approach envisaged broader centralisation of supervisory responsibilities.
The Council agreement of 9 October introduces more restrictive criteria governing the institutions that would fall under ESMA’s direct authority.
In addition to the treatment of trading venues, ministers agreed that direct supervision of crypto-asset service providers should initially concentrate on businesses with the most significant cross-border operations.
The Council also supported changes to ESMA’s governance arrangements, including the creation of a full-time executive board.
The proposed board would strengthen the authority’s ability to make supervisory decisions independently of individual national regulators, while preserving mechanisms for cooperation with those authorities.
The compromise also introduces arrangements allowing national supervisors collectively to challenge certain decisions.
These provisions reflect concerns about concentrating regulatory powers within an institution that must oversee financial businesses operating under different national legal systems.
The supervision reforms form part of the EU’s broader Savings and Investments Union initiative.
European policymakers want to increase the availability of private capital for companies investing in technology, defence, infrastructure and industrial development.
The Union has substantial household savings, but much of that money remains in bank deposits or is invested outside the European economy.
Companies seeking capital for expansion may consequently face higher financing costs or more limited investment opportunities than comparable businesses operating in larger and more integrated markets.
The Commission’s Savings and Investments Union programme seeks to improve access to finance and make cross-border investment more attractive.
Financial-market supervision represents only one element of that programme.
Differences in taxation, insolvency law, national investment products and corporate governance requirements also influence where investors allocate their money.
Nevertheless, regulators regard consistent supervision as an important condition for reducing fragmentation.
The agreement reached by finance ministers does not conclude the legislative process.
The European Parliament must adopt its position before negotiations can determine the final provisions.
Parliamentary discussions could revisit the exemptions secured by Germany and the criteria determining which institutions fall under direct ESMA supervision.
The debate will expose differences over whether European financial integration should proceed through incremental reforms or a more substantial transfer of regulatory authority.
Governments supporting national exemptions argue that supervision should reflect the actual geographic scope of a company’s activities.
Supporters of broader European oversight contend that major trading businesses can influence financial markets beyond their home jurisdictions even when individual operations appear predominantly domestic.
The Deutsche Börse exemption has become a prominent example of the conflict between those positions.
Europe’s largest economies broadly support the objective of deeper capital markets, but remain divided over the institutional powers needed to achieve it.
The final legislation will determine whether the expanded responsibilities granted to ESMA are sufficient to reduce fragmentation or leave important parts of Europe’s financial infrastructure operating under substantially different national supervisory systems.
Portugal was among several European countries reportedly targeted in a cyberattack on supermarket refrigeration systems, although no known incidents have been reported in the country. According to CNN Portugal, cybersecurity
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On Friday, the United States temporarily lifted sanctions on Russia’s export of diesel in a bid to ease a global fuel shortage and curb soaring domestic prices, but analysts warn that limited supplies and damage to Russian refineries could possibly blunt the impact.
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Trump’s ‘Energy Ceasefire’ Claim Raise Tensions with Ukraine
U.S. President Donald Trump said that he had struck a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a phone call. On the same day, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a temporary general license, authorizing Russian diesel transactions until April 7, 2027.
Under the phased schedule, Russia would deliver 2.25 million barrels in October, 3.75 million in November and 7.5 million “immediately thereafter,” depending on the condition of Russian refineries. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak confirmed the volumes.
U.S. diesel averaged 6.28 dollars a gallon on Friday, according to the American Automobile Association, down from a record 6.53 dollars on Sept. 22, but still far above 3.68 dollars a year earlier, and up about 70 percent since the U.S.-Israel war with Iran began on Feb. 28.
A Pew Research Center survey released Oct. 8 found that 74 percent of Americans were “very concerned” about energy prices, and 84 percent of registered voters said the economy was “very important” to their vote in the Nov. 3 mid-term elections.
BREAKING: 🇷🇺🇺🇸🇺🇦 Zelenskyy indicated that Ukraine would attack Russian ships carrying diesel to the US.
— Megatron (@Megatron_ron) October 12, 2026
Zelenskyy indicated that Trump needs to strike a deal with him if he wants Ukraine to refrain from attacking the oil tankers transporting diesel to the US. pic.twitter.com/UbYb8fy0MX
On Saturday, the Russian government partially lifted its diesel export ban with immediate effect, allowing 500,000 tons to reach the global market, with Novak saying domestic supplies would not be affected.
However, analysts said that the U.S. relief on sanctions on Russian diesel is unlikely to help tame domestic diesel prices, which hover at close to record-high levels and threaten Republican control of Congress in the upcoming elections.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) says the world is short about 1.6 million barrels of diesel daily. Even if all 36 million barrels Russia promised arrived at once, they would plug the gap for only about three weeks. The October release alone is roughly 10 percent of what Russia exported in a typical month before Ukrainian drone strikes battered its refineries, according to analysts.
“It’s kind of shuffling deck chairs on the Titanic,” a report by The Seattle Times quoted Michael Lynch of the Energy Policy Research Foundation as saying. Russian diesel sent to the United States simply means that other buyers must look elsewhere. At best, he said, Americans might see “a tiny dip in prices locally in places like the New York-New Jersey area.”
“It’s clearly not a fix, but another stream to aid a very tight diesel market,” Jim Mitchell, director of oil trading analytics at consultancy Wood Mackenzie, was quoted as saying by Reuters.
“The biggest concern is the refiners being able to do it,” Ryan McKay, senior commodity strategist at TD Securities, a Canadian multinational investment bank and financial services provider, was quoted as saying by the Business Times.
𝐈𝐑𝐀𝐍 𝐓𝐀𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐒 𝐓𝐑𝐔𝐌𝐏: 𝐈𝐅 𝐇𝐎𝐑𝐌𝐔𝐙 𝐈𝐒 𝐑𝐄𝐀𝐋𝐋𝐘 𝐎𝐏𝐄𝐍, 𝐖𝐇𝐘 𝐃𝐈𝐃 𝐀𝐌𝐄𝐑𝐈𝐂𝐀 𝐁𝐄𝐆 𝐑𝐔𝐒𝐒𝐈𝐀 𝐅𝐎𝐑 𝐃𝐈𝐄𝐒𝐄𝐋?
— M.A. Rothman (@MichaelARothman) October 12, 2026
Iran is not backing down an inch in the Strait of Hormuz standoff, even as the Trump administration insists the chokepoint 𝐧𝐨… pic.twitter.com/WehahJzQJa
The November shipment amounts to roughly one day of U.S. consumption, noted Chris Kennedy, lead for Economic Statecraft at Bloomberg Economics. He questioned whether Moscow can deliver given refinery damage, logistics and legal hurdles, with the largest later tranches explicitly conditioned on the state of Russia’s refineries.
To make matters worse, Hurricane Isaias in the Gulf of Mexico has now shut down about 1.3 million barrels a day of U.S. oil production, which equals nearly 63 percent of total U.S. production in the gulf.
The Iran war also continues to disrupt flows through the Strait of Hormuz, which carried about 20 percent of global oil and fuel shipments before the war.
As part of an accelerated IEA emergency-stock release, Germany will release up to 15 million barrels of diesel, heating oil and crude, while France has committed 10 million barrels of diesel. Moreover, Italy says it has completed its 10 million-barrel commitment.
The Russian barrels address the shortage from the output side, while the stock releases address it from the inventory side. However, analysts say neither is large enough to repair the market on its own.
Patrick De Haan, head of petroleum analysis for GasBuddy, predicted that the deal could result in a short-term reduction of 10 to 20 cents for a gallon of diesel. However, he said, it would be “difficult to achieve” Trump’s import goals.
teleSUR/ JF
Source: Xinhua
France is coming under increasingly direct pressure from its eurozone partners to resolve the political dispute surrounding its 2027 budget, with European finance ministers warning that continued uncertainty threatens confidence in the country’s public finances.
The warning follows a sharp increase in French government borrowing costs. Yields on ten-year sovereign bonds have risen by nearly 80 basis points since September, reaching levels last recorded in 2002. Investors are demanding higher returns to finance a government whose debt continues to increase while its capacity to impose spending restraint remains constrained by parliamentary divisions.
At the Eurogroup’s October discussions, finance ministers and European Central Bank officials pressed Paris to demonstrate that it can adopt a credible budget and comply with its commitments under the EU’s fiscal framework.
France’s difficulties have implications beyond its domestic politics. As the eurozone’s second-largest economy, France occupies a position fundamentally different from smaller countries that experienced sovereign debt crises during the previous decade.
The French government expects to borrow approximately €340 billion in 2027, making continued access to financial markets at sustainable rates an essential element of its fiscal strategy.
That financing requirement reflects both the need to cover the annual deficit and to refinance existing debt as government securities mature.
France’s public debt is already approaching 120 per cent of gross domestic product. As EU Today previously reported, official projections indicated that the debt ratio could reach 121.7 per cent in 2027, up from 115.7 per cent at the end of 2025.
The latest increase in yields adds another complication. Higher interest costs do not affect the entire stock of debt immediately because much of it was issued at earlier rates. They do, however, increase the cost of new borrowing and refinancing, progressively reducing the money available for other government commitments.
France also faces a difficult political timetable. With the presidential election approaching in 2027, parties are reluctant to accept measures involving spending reductions, higher taxation or changes to public services.
Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu’s government has been attempting to reduce the deficit from an estimated 5.4 per cent of GDP in 2026 towards five per cent. Even that objective remains substantially above the EU’s three per cent reference value.
Economic Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis has emphasised the importance of predictable fiscal policy and credible deficit reduction.
France is already subject to the EU’s excessive deficit procedure, under which member states must demonstrate progress towards agreed fiscal objectives.
The reformed European fiscal framework permits certain deviations from expenditure commitments in exceptional circumstances, but it does not provide an unrestricted exemption from debt sustainability requirements.
Paris therefore faces a double constraint. It must convince domestic political forces to support a budget while demonstrating to Brussels that its spending plans are sufficiently credible.
The danger is not necessarily an immediate financing crisis. France retains a large, diversified economy, deep financial markets and substantial tax-raising capacity.
The more immediate risk is that prolonged political deadlock produces progressively higher borrowing costs, making future fiscal adjustments more expensive.
The European Central Bank has instruments designed to counter destabilising market conditions, but these are not intended to finance governments that are unwilling or unable to implement sustainable fiscal policies.
Bank of France Governor Emmanuel Moulin said on 7 October that France did not currently require ECB assistance. He argued that the solution lay in adopting a credible budget rather than expecting monetary intervention.
His position follows increasing speculation about whether the ECB could intervene if French bond yields continue rising.
Such intervention would raise difficult questions about the relationship between monetary policy and national fiscal responsibility. The ECB must consider financial stability across the entire eurozone, but it cannot remove the political obligations of individual governments.
France’s existing excessive deficit procedure also complicates its eligibility for certain forms of exceptional support.
France’s problems are developing at a particularly difficult moment for European public finances.
Governments are confronting higher defence commitments, expensive measures to protect households against energy inflation and demands for greater investment in industrial competitiveness.
Italy, another heavily indebted eurozone economy, is facing related pressures. The combination places additional importance on the credibility of the EU’s fiscal rules.
The political consequences within France are already visible. Marine Le Pen has presented a programme proposing €140 billion in spending reductions, while other parties have advanced sharply different approaches to taxation, debt and public expenditure.
Those competing programmes illustrate the difficulty of securing a parliamentary consensus capable of reassuring markets.
The approaching presidential election reduces the likelihood of a durable settlement before voters choose France’s next head of state.
Eurozone partners cannot resolve that impasse from Brussels or Frankfurt. They can insist on fiscal commitments and provide a framework for adjustment, but the political decisions remain with Paris.
France’s immediate challenge is to prevent its budget dispute from becoming a broader loss of confidence in the government’s capacity to manage its finances.
US President Donald Trump said on 9 October that he had agreed with Russian leader Vladimir Putin to bring Russian diesel to world markets to lower energy prices. However, energy analysts say the deal, which drew fury in Ukraine, is unlikely to lower diesel prices meaningfully, CNN reports.
Trump wrote on social media that Putin would “immediately supply” more than 300,000 tons of diesel, with another 500,000 tons in November. Together, those volumes would cover about a day and a half of US demand, according to the US Energy Information Administration.
Meanwhile, former head of the Center for Countering Disinformation Andrii Kovalenko says that US diesel consumption alone is about 16 million tons per month, and global consumption is roughly 120 million tons.
The US experts read the move as politics more than a market shift. Trump spoke in tons rather than barrels because the figure looks bigger to an ordinary observer, said Dan Pickering, founder of Pickering Energy Partners, calling it “more politics than a game changer.”
Former US officials question whether Putin holds the diesel Trump described, as Ukrainian strikes strain Russia’s refineries. A former senior State Department official says it hardly matters whether the fuel arrives, because Putin “has already achieved the result he wants,” with Trump believing he has a pre-election card that could move markets.
Even if the fuel flows, it would be a temporary measure. Gregory Brew of Eurasia Group says that he suspects Putin expects Ukraine to halt its strikes on Russian refineries in return, and that he cannot imagine Zelenskyy agreeing.
For Putin, the gain is plain, Kovalenko says: he pushes for sanctions relief and for no new US sanctions, all without any demand to end the war in Ukraine.
"Trump’s bet was more on the news itself, driving prices down somewhat, because, in reality, figures like these shouldn’t bring prices down," Kovalеnkо believes.
He adds that Trump will "make a big fuss about diesel ahead of the elections, nothing more," and that the average American is unlikely to feel any lasting effect.”
Earlier, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned that allowing Russia to sell petroleum products abroad without securing a lasting de-escalation agreement would help finance Moscow's war against Ukraine.
He criticized the decision, calling it "a birthday gift for Putin," per Axios.
The next day after the announcement, Russia launched six bombs on Zaporizhzhia, killing 17 people.
According to Trump’s announcement following the telephone conversation, Russia will immediately release more than 300,000 tonnes of diesel, followed by 500,000 tonnes in November and another million tonnes shortly afterwards. A further three million tonnes could become available once Russian refining capacity permits.
The announcement was accompanied by a temporary authorisation from the US Treasury allowing transactions involving Russian diesel until 7 April 2027. It represents a substantial departure from the administration’s recent sanctions policy, which had sought to restrict Russian energy revenues and strengthen Washington’s negotiating position over Ukraine.
The timing is politically significant. Trump faces congressional midterm elections on 3 November, while diesel prices have become a growing economic concern for American businesses and consumers. The agreement gives the White House an opportunity to present itself as addressing fuel costs, although its practical effect on prices remains uncertain.
Trump has linked the proposed Russian deliveries to his administration’s efforts to restore energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that the combined measures will produce a rapid reduction in diesel prices.
The disruption of maritime energy supplies following the confrontation with Iran has, however, created a problem considerably larger than the quantities Russia has initially promised.
The first two deliveries amount to approximately 800,000 tonnes. Even including the subsequent million tonnes, the announced volumes are modest relative to global consumption. Their arrival may provide temporary relief in individual markets, but there is little evidence that they could independently reverse the wider shortage.
Russia’s capacity to maintain larger exports is also uncertain.
Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries have disrupted production and contributed to restrictions on petroleum exports. Moscow has periodically imposed limits to protect domestic supplies, while damaged facilities require repairs before returning to normal operations.
The condition of those refineries is explicitly acknowledged in Trump’s announcement, which makes the proposed additional three million tonnes dependent on their recovery.
This introduces a further contradiction. Washington is seeking Russian diesel at precisely the moment Ukraine is attempting to reduce Moscow’s capacity to refine and export petroleum products.
The economic benefits of the agreement may consequently depend partly on developments in a military campaign that the United States has previously supported through intelligence cooperation with Kyiv.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded critically to the agreement, describing the relaxation of economic pressure as a concession to Putin that had not been accompanied by any meaningful Russian commitment to de-escalation.
In his response to the American decision, Zelenskyy argued that Moscow would exploit renewed export revenues to prolong its war rather than make concessions towards a settlement.
Ukraine has indicated that it remains prepared to consider reciprocal measures concerning attacks on energy infrastructure. Such arrangements would require Russia to stop striking Ukrainian facilities in exchange for restrictions on Ukrainian operations against Russian energy targets.
No comparable undertaking was announced as part of Friday’s diesel agreement.
This distinction is central to Kyiv’s objections. Sanctions relief has traditionally been regarded as leverage to obtain changes in Russian behaviour. In the present arrangement, Moscow stands to receive additional commercial opportunities without publicly agreeing to alter its military campaign.
The agreement also comes amid separate discussions concerning the international assets of Lukoil, Russia’s second-largest oil producer.
A recent account of negotiations involving American investors and Russian officials described proposals involving Lukoil’s overseas oilfields, refineries and distribution businesses.
The discussions have reportedly involved figures connected to Trump’s diplomatic efforts, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, alongside Russian representatives.
On Friday, another development complicated the proposed transaction when Carlyle withdrew from the competition to acquire Lukoil’s international assets, previously valued at approximately $22 billion.
The negotiations illustrate the extent to which potential commercial cooperation has entered the broader American-Russian relationship.
There is no verified evidence, however, that the diesel agreement was concluded to facilitate a particular acquisition or benefit individuals connected to Trump’s administration. The commercial negotiations and Friday’s sanctions decision remain separate developments unless further evidence establishes a direct connection.
The American decision creates an additional complication for European sanctions policy.
On 7th October, EU ambassadors agreed to expand sanctions against Russia’s military-industrial network, approving 1,646 additional designations, many directed at the production of ballistic missiles used against Ukraine.
Britain has also introduced further restrictions on Russian oil-related businesses, tankers and financial intermediaries, reinforcing its stated objective of limiting Moscow’s ability to finance the war.
The contrast with Washington’s diesel authorisation is substantial. While European governments are attempting to restrict Russian petroleum revenues, the United States is providing a temporary legal route for renewed sales.
The development also recalls the difficulties already examined by EU Today in its reporting on sanctions enforcement against Russia’s shadow fleet, where differences in national restrictions and their application have complicated efforts to control petroleum exports.
For Moscow, the significance of Friday’s agreement extends beyond the immediate revenue generated by diesel sales. It establishes that the United States is prepared to relax particular economic restrictions before securing a settlement over Ukraine.
Whether the arrangement ultimately lowers American fuel prices will depend on production, shipping and international market conditions. The diplomatic consequence is already apparent: Russia has obtained an opportunity to restore part of its international energy trade without accepting publicly announced conditions concerning its war against Ukraine.
For Kyiv and European governments, the question is whether this remains a narrowly defined response to an energy shortage or marks the beginning of a broader American policy of separating commercial relations with Moscow from negotiations over Ukraine.
The euro fell to a 17-month low against the US dollar on Monday as renewed pressure on French government debt raised concern over the fiscal position of the eurozone’s second-largest economy.
The single currency dropped as far as $1.116 during trading, its weakest level since May 2025, before recovering part of the fall. By late Monday it was trading at around $1.121, still lower on the day.
The move followed a sharp sell-off in French government bonds and a widening gap between French and German borrowing costs.
According to market data published on Monday, the spread between French government debt and equivalent German Bunds had approached 160 basis points on Friday, its widest level since the eurozone sovereign-debt crisis in 2011.
The gap subsequently narrowed, but the scale of the movement has drawn attention back to France’s public finances.
French debt is already close to 120 per cent of gross domestic product and is expected to continue rising.
Investors are now assessing whether Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu’s minority government can secure sufficient parliamentary support for measures intended to put the budget on a more sustainable path.
That challenge is becoming more difficult as France approaches its 2027 presidential election.
Spending cuts and tax increases are politically sensitive even under stable parliamentary conditions. Lecornu’s administration does not have an outright majority in the National Assembly, while opposition parties have challenged several elements of the government’s fiscal programme.
The French economy itself is providing little additional room.
Revised national accounts examined by EU Today showed that the economy failed to grow during the second quarter, while household purchasing power weakened and investment declined.
Slower growth makes deficit reduction harder because tax revenues tend to grow more slowly while welfare and debt-servicing costs remain high.
Bond markets have also changed the calculation.
For much of the period following the eurozone debt crisis, France was able to borrow at historically low rates. Higher interest rates now mean maturing debt has to be refinanced at greater cost.
France’s debt burden is therefore rising at the same time as the price of servicing it increases.
The euro’s fall on Monday shows that those concerns are no longer confined to the French bond market.
Currency traders are also assessing whether fiscal pressure in France could affect confidence in the wider euro area.
The comparison with the sovereign-debt crisis of 2010–12 should nevertheless be treated cautiously.
France remains one of Europe’s largest and most diversified economies, and the eurozone now has institutional mechanisms and European Central Bank instruments that did not exist at the beginning of the earlier crisis.
There is also no indication that France is unable to finance itself.
What markets are pricing is an increase in the risk attached to holding French debt and growing uncertainty over the country’s medium-term fiscal trajectory.
The euro has now fallen for four successive weeks against the dollar and has lost more than three per cent over that period.
US monetary policy is contributing to the movement. Persistent inflation indicators have supported the dollar even as expectations of an immediate Federal Reserve interest-rate increase have declined.
For Europe, however, Monday’s trading was dominated by France.
French fiscal policy has been a domestic political dispute for much of the past year. The widening bond spread and the euro’s fall show that it is increasingly becoming a eurozone market issue.
TOKYO – China gave global investors one of 2026’s biggest AI thrills. Yet the country that helped ignite excitement about artificial intelligence is home to one of the worst-performing major stock markets. While AI fever has propelled Seoul, Taipei and Tokyo higher, Chinese shares are stuck in reverse.
So what gives? Several forces, actually. Weak household demand, for one. Consumer spending continues to disappoint, weighing on the earnings potential of mainland internet companies, automakers, and retailers.
The post Why China is missing the big AI rally appeared first on Asia Times.
The global bond markets are a sensitive lot. And they’ve been having a particularly tricky time lately. Spooked by high inflation, high interest rates and high levels of government debt across the world, those markets have become less stable over the summer. The prices of government bonds – what governments sell to investors – have gone down. […]
The post Blame AI for global bond market tremors appeared first on Asia Times.
TOKYO — Anyone betting that inflation risks are fading should look at the US Treasury market. The sharp selloff in Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) suggests the world’s biggest bond market is growing less convinced that price pressures are contained. Investors are rethinking the inflation outlook, with implications for Federal Reserve policy, real rates and stock […]
The post Bond markets aren’t buying the inflation-is-tamed fairy tale appeared first on Asia Times.
Public records show that businesses associated with Tavira have undergone changes to their custody operations following regulatory intervention in Dubai and Monaco. Separately, Tavira Monaco is a defendant in English civil proceedings concerning shares provided as collateral for a stock-backed loan.
The civil allegations remain disputed, and the public judgments reviewed for this article do not establish that Tavira knowingly participated in fraud. Neither Tavira nor its founder, Eliot Goodfellow, is charged in the related United States criminal case.
Tavira was founded in London in 2005 as Tavira Securities. It has since expanded into areas including agency brokerage, asset management, corporate broking and custody.
The group has operated through regulated businesses in several jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, Monaco, Dubai, Australia and the United States.
Goodfellow remains Tavira Financial Limited’s controlling shareholder. Companies House records state that he owns at least 75 per cent of its shares and voting rights and has the right to appoint or remove directors.
Tavira Financial’s accounts for the year ending 31 March 2025 reported increased revenue alongside a wider annual loss. The accounts also referred to the closure of its contracts-for-difference business and restructuring of its custody activities as the group concentrated on agency brokerage, asset management and corporate broking.
Tavira Monaco is one of six defendants in English civil proceedings brought by Mexican businessman Ricardo Salinas Pliego and Corporacion RBS.
According to the claimants’ case, as summarised in a 2024 High Court judgment, Salinas transferred Grupo Elektra shares worth more than $400 million to two custodians, Weiser Global Capital Markets and Tavira Monaco. The shares were provided as security for loans under a stock-loan agreement concluded in July 2021.
The claimants allege that they entered the transaction after being led to believe that the lender was associated with the prominent American Astor family and that the shares would not be sold unless an event of default occurred.
They further allege that Vladimir Sklarov, who used the name “Gregory Mitchell” in connection with the transaction, caused the shares to be transferred and sold without their authority and used part of the proceeds to fund the loans themselves.
Financial Mail reported in June 2025, citing trading logs reviewed by Salinas’s team, that some of the disputed shares were sold through transactions involving Morgan Stanley, BBVA and Merrill Lynch. The report did not allege that those banks knew of or participated in the alleged fraud. Their appearance in a transaction chain does not, by itself, establish misconduct or knowledge of any underlying dispute.
These remain allegations in continuing civil litigation. In the interlocutory proceedings, the Sklarov defendants maintained that the transaction documents entitled them to trade the collateral and that Salinas’s advisers had been told this. The public decisions reviewed for this article do not amount to a final determination of Tavira Monaco’s liability.
The High Court granted freezing and proprietary injunctions in August 2024. An application by the Sklarov defendants to discharge those injunctions was rejected in October 2024. Later appellate proceedings concerned procedural and evidential issues rather than a final trial of the underlying claims. Tavira Monaco was not involved in the most recent appeal.
A US federal indictment filed on 30 April 2026 and unsealed in May charges Sklarov with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering.
The US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York alleges that Sklarov operated an entity presented as an established stock-backed lender associated with the Astor family. Prosecutors allege that he used aliases and false representations to obtain control of shares worth approximately $450 million.
Sklarov has not been convicted in that case. The charges are allegations, and he is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
The publicly available indictment charges Sklarov, not Tavira Financial, Tavira Monaco, Goodfellow, Morgan Stanley, BBVA or Merrill Lynch. The existence of the criminal case should therefore not be taken as establishing criminal conduct by any of those companies or individuals.
On 10 September 2024, the Dubai Financial Services Authority imposed restrictions on Tavira Financial Limited’s Dubai branch.
According to the DFSA public register, the firm was restricted from soliciting or conducting specified regulated financial-services business with new clients. It was also restricted from soliciting or onboarding new clients in connection with financial promotions.
The public register does not state the reason for the restrictions and does not connect them to the Salinas litigation.
Tavira’s accounts subsequently referred to a decision to close the Dubai branch’s custody operation and to restructure custody activities across the group. The DFSA register nevertheless continues to list Tavira Financial as an authorised firm, subject to the published restrictions.
Companies House records show that Goodfellow ceased to be a Tavira Financial director on 13 September 2024, three days after the restrictions were imposed. Neither the DFSA entry nor the Companies House filing gives a reason for his departure or establishes that it was connected to the restrictions or the Salinas proceedings.
Tavira Monaco has also been the subject of regulatory action.
On 12 February 2026, Monaco’s Commission de Contrôle des Activités Financières ordered the withdrawal of Tavira Monaco’s authorisation after upholding four regulatory breaches.
The published CCAF decision found that the company had failed to submit required accounts, activity reports and auditors’ reports within statutory deadlines. It also found that the company had not continuously maintained two people responsible for its strategic direction and management, had lacked a bank account in its own name with a Monaco credit institution since July 2023, and had lacked sufficient human and technical resources since 2023.
Tavira Monaco challenged the decision. On 21 May 2026, the President of Monaco’s Supreme Court suspended its execution. According to the CCAF’s current case notice, Tavira Monaco’s application to annul the decision remains pending.
The withdrawal decision should therefore not be described as presently effective without also reporting the suspension and continuing challenge.
The Dubai restrictions, restructuring of custody operations and Monaco proceedings raise legitimate questions about governance and operational controls. They do not, by themselves, prove any connection to the alleged misconduct in the Salinas transaction.
The English civil case raises separate, disputed questions about the instructions received by Tavira Monaco, the authority it understood the relevant parties to possess, the movement of the collateral and the custody records maintained during the transaction. Those matters remain for determination in the civil proceedings.
EU Reporter sent Tavira Financial, Tavira Monaco and Eliot Goodfellow a detailed summary of the matters in this article and asked for their responses concerning the civil allegations, regulatory decisions, custody restructuring and Goodfellow’s departure from the board. EU Reporter has received no replies from Tavira Financial, Tavira Monaco and Eliot Goodfellow
EU Reporter also asked Morgan Stanley, BBVA and Bank of America, the parent company of Merrill Lynch, whether they could confirm the reported transactions and whether they wished to comment. Morgan Stanley replied, saying “no comment”. The others, BBVA and Bank of America, the parent company of Merrill Lynch, have not replied at all.
NEW YORK: Oil prices climbed in early trading Wednesday, building on the previous session’s sharp gains, as overnight military exchanges between the United States and Iran escalated tensions in the Middle East and revived fears of supply disruptions through a critical global shipping chokepoint. Brent crude futures rose $1.03, or 1.1%, to $95.68 a barrel ... Read more
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KARACHI: Fitch Ratings has assigned a ‘B-‘ rating to Pakistan’s proposed U.S. dollar-denominated bond, with a Recovery Rating of ‘RR4,’ the ratings agency announced. Pakistan plans to use proceeds from the bond for general budgetary and sovereign financing purposes, according to Fitch. The bond rating is aligned with Pakistan’s Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating, while ... Read more
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Oil prices rose more than 2% Monday after the United States attacked an Iranian island in the Strait of Hormuz and drew retaliation from Tehran, as the six-month-old conflict between the two countries showed no signs of easing. Brent crude futures climbed $2.21, or 2.51%, to $90.31 a barrel as of 0436 GMT. U.S. West ... Read more
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CHICAGO: Corn and wheat futures have rallied to their highest prices in more than three years, though the factors driving the gains for each crop remain distinctly different. Wheat futures settled Friday at $7.84 per bushel, up 3.1% on the day, after hitting an intraday peak of $7.9025, the highest level since Feb. 14, 2023. ... Read more
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