Janeese Lewis George, a D.C. councilmember and the city's presumptive next mayor, has come out against pending legislation that would allow autonomous ride-share vehicles onto city streets, citing the technology's potential to eliminate the jobs of ride-share human drivers. 

"DC is facing a jobs crisis. Rushing the legalization of autonomous vehicles is irresponsible given the anticipated AI-related job displacement and disruptions that put countless workers at risk," she said on X yesterday.  

DC is facing a jobs crisis.

Rushing the legalization of autonomous vehicles is irresponsible given the anticipated AI-related job displacement and disruptions that put countless workers at risk.

— Janeese Lewis George (@Janeese4DC) October 15, 2026

In a follow-up post, she said that the D.C. Council should delay consideration of a pending bill that would allow Waymo, which is currently testing its technology with human safety operators on District streets, to offer autonomous rides to the public.  

Ever since Lewis George won a commanding victory in D.C.'s Democratic mayoral primary earlier this year, pundits and wonks have been trying to read the tea leaves on how the Democratic Socialist will govern. 

D.C.'s economy is currently in a rough spot. Unemployment is high. The housing market is down. Population growth is slowing.  

Lewis George's comments about Waymo suggest the mayor has a deeply mistaken view about the effects and benefits of technological innovation. Contrary to her contention, Waymo legalization is unlikely to exacerbate a "jobs crisis" for at least three reasons. 

The first reason she's wrong is that very few D.C. residents work full-time as ride-share drivers. On her Capital Commonsense Substack, Ashley Schapitl reports that, by Lewis George's own estimate, there are only 200 District residents who work full-time as ride-share drivers.

For comparison's sake, the District has a labor force of roughly 400,000 people. So even if Waymo displaced all human drivers in the District, it would be a statistical nonevent. 

Few headlines, for instance, reported that D.C.'s labor force shrank by 1,000 people between May and June. Neither did many outlets report that the labor force grew by roughly 600 people between July and August. 

Yet here the mayor is talking about a "jobs crisis" over what would be an even smaller change in the number of employed workers in the city. 

The second reason not to fear an exacerbated "jobs crisis" as a result of Waymo legalization is that autonomous vehicles (A.V.s) will not completely replace human rideshare drivers in the foreseeable future. 

In the cities where Waymo has been active for years, A.V.s are still responsible for a minority of rideshare rides. 

That's the case in Phoenix, where Waymo has been offering autonomous commercial service since 2020. In an article from April, Business Insider cites one study that put Waymo's market share at 16 percent of ride-share rides. 

In other words, 84 percent of ride-share rides are still being performed by humans a full six years after A.V.s came onto the scene. 

That isn't to say the impacts of A.V.s are necessarily positive for human drivers' earnings.

Another study by Gridwise from August 2025 found that A.V.s appeared to be marginally reducing drivers' hourly pay and number of trips per hour. That's evidence of the market for rides becoming more competitive, but it's not, as of yet, evidence of a job apocalypse. 

Network design matters too. In places like Los Angeles and San Francisco, Waymo is a standalone competitor to traditional ride-share companies like Uber and Lyft. In Austin and Phoenix, Waymo partners with Uber to offer rides on hybrid human-and-A.V. networks. 

A report by EnoTrans, funded by a grant from Lyft, found that the later cities' hybrid networks actually increased human drivers' trips per hour. Their pay-per-hour fell, albeit less steeply than in cities without hybrid networks. 

All of that is to say that while Waymo, as a competitor to human-operated ride-share services, shouldn't be expected to have a positive impact on drivers' earnings. It shouldn't be expected to have a catastrophic impact on them either. 

The third and final reason that Lewis George is wrong to think that Waymo will worsen a coming "jobs crisis" is that Waymo's employment impacts are not limited to its effect on competing human drivers. 

If Waymo earns any market share at all, it'll be because it's offering some travelers a better transportation option than the ones that currently exist. Increased ease of travel within the city would be expected to raise employment levels, not lower them. 

If Waymo makes it easier or cheaper for people to get from home to the office or from the office to their kids' school, they might be more willing to live in D.C. over Arlington or Silver Spring. If it's more convenient to get to the movies or dinner, residents will be more willing to patronize local businesses. 

None of that even touches on the economic and human benefits of Waymo's likely positive impact on road safety. 

The direct effects of Waymo on drivers' employment must be weighed against all the other economic activity that autonomous vehicles will facilitate. 

In the long run, the economic effects of autonomous vehicles may well be revolutionary. In the foreseeable future, they'll make the market for for-hire rides slightly more competitive. 

A reasonable assumption then is that Waymo will have a modest, but positive, impact on overall economic activity and employment in the District, even if it has a modest, but negative, impact on the small number of full-time ride-share drivers who live here. 

If the new mayor can't even tolerate that level of economic disruption, that does not portend good things for D.C.'s economy under a Lewis George administration. 

The post Presumptive D.C. Mayor Janeese Lewis George Demands Halt to Waymo Legalization To Protect Drivers' Jobs appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Temporary restrictions on aircraft arrivals and departures were imposed at 27 Russian airports, Deutsche Welle reported on 16 October, citing its own calculations based on reports from Russia’s Federal Air Transport Agency.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned airlines on 1 September that “Russian airspace is becoming completely unsafe.” Overnight, most of the airspace over European Russia was closed.

By morning, more than 200 flights had been canceled or delayed at Moscow airports, Deutsche Welle reported, citing figures compiled by a Russian Telegram channel.

The list included airports in the capital. All four Moscow airports temporarily suspended arrivals and departures, the Russian outlet Astra reported on 16 October. Russian authorities said they had shot down dozens of drones, while flights were delayed and diverted to alternate airfields, according to the report.

Massive drone attack on Russia: 644 UAVs in one night, 94 shot down near Moscow

The temporary airport shutdowns were likely a consequence of a massive drone attack on Russia. From 8:00 p.m. on 15 October to 8:00 a.m. on 16 October, Russian air defenses allegedly intercepted and destroyed 644 Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles across 26 Russian regions, occupied Crimea, and the Black Sea, according to Russia’s Defense Ministry.

According to the list of regions published by the Russian Defense Ministry, the drone attacks covered a vast area of Russia, from regions bordering Ukraine to the Moscow region, the Volga region, the country’s northwest and southern regions, as well as occupied Crimea and the Black Sea.

Russian air defenses shot down a total of 94 drones approaching Moscow over the evening of 15 October and overnight, according to calculations by the Russian outlet RBC Radio, citing statements by Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin.

In the Kaluga region, air defenses destroyed 27 drones over the evening and night, the regional governor reported. At 9:27 a.m., he updated the figures, saying another 48 UAVs had been shot down overnight, bringing the total to 75. According to preliminary information, there were no casualties or infrastructure damage.

In the Tula region, air defenses allegedly destroyed a total of 32 Ukrainian drones. There were no casualties, according to regional Governor Dmitry Milyaev in his Telegram channel.

In the Vladimir region in western Russia, authorities repelled drone attacks overnight. In the city of Vladimir, a drone attempted to attack a heating infrastructure facility, but the attack was stopped, Vladimir Region Governor Alexander Avdeyev reported. Minor damage was reported, but there was no information about casualties.

Ukraine has not yet commented on its involvement in the attacks.

The practical consequences of canceled Russian flights

Passengers on flight SU6312 from Kaliningrad to Moscow were unable to land in Moscow because of airspace closure, so the aircraft was diverted to Nizhny Novgorod, Terravia reported. After landing, passengers remained on board for about two hours before being allowed to disembark at 3:30 a.m. Instead of continuing their journey to Moscow by air, they were supposed to be transported by bus, with the trip expected to take about seven hours, the outlet reported.

Passengers were not provided with food or drinks, and one woman could not find a seat on the bus, so she purchased a ticket for an early-morning train herself.

Since the beginning of the year, all four Moscow airports have been completely shut down simultaneously at least 19 times, the Russian outlet Agentstvo reported. During the first 14 days of October, the restrictions lasted 101 hours and 38 minutes, compared with 46 hours and 33 minutes in September, according to the report.

• Musk described his plans for the Tesla Roadster during a 2019 exchange with YouTuber MKBHD.
• On Thursday, the Roadster did exactly as Musk promised nearly eight years ago, leaping into the air.
• While Musk missed his own deadline by years, the technology on display was just as he described it.

It's been a long time coming.

Almost eight years ago, in January 2019, Elon Musk shared plans on Twitter for Tesla's Roadster to lift off using cold-gas thrusters and ultra-high-pressure air. On Thursday, the much-anticipated Roadster did exactly that.

Musk's 2019 assertion came in response to a user sharing a GIF of the DeLorean from "Back to the Future" hovering in midair.

"The new Roadster will actually do something like this," he wrote. Tech YouTuber Marques Brownlee responded: "The thing is I feel like you’re not joking."

"I'm not," Musk said.

He then described a SpaceX-made cold-gas thruster system that uses high-pressure air stored in a composite pressure vessel.

At a SpaceX test site in Texas on Thursday, almost 8 years later, a Roadster climbed a curved ramp, dropped, rolled through the air and landed on its wheels. It used the same basic technology: cold-gas thrusters fed by high-pressure air stored in composite pressure vessels.

The 2019 exchange was not Musk’s first mention of thrusters. In June 2018, he said the Roadster would include roughly 10 of them and suggested they might allow the car to fly.

When another user proposed compressed-air cold-gas thrusters, Musk said that configuration made sense and described a pump to replenish the air.

Musk's account of the technology has proved more consistent than his production timetable. Tesla unveiled plans for the second-generation Roadster in 2017 and originally targeted production for 2020. After repeated delays, Musk said in the reveal that production will begin in 2028.

The Roadster is not Tesla’s only vehicle to miss an ambitious release target. When Musk unveiled the Cybertruck in 2019, he said Tesla expected production to begin in late 2021. The first customer deliveries took place two years later, in November 2023.

While Musk has missed plenty of deadlines, many of his more improbable technology plans have made it beyond the drawing board. In December 2020, he said SpaceX would try to catch a returning Super Heavy booster with its launch tower.

Nearly four years later, the tower’s mechanical "chopsticks" caught one for the first time.

Musk has a habit of promising the improbable well before it is ready, but eventually, the improbable part arrives.

A plan for a new military weapons “super range” test center in Montana announced by President Donald Trump Wednesday night seeks to address a growing concern about the need for more such facilities. As the U.S. races to develop autonomous capabilities, hypersonic munitions, laser and directed energy weapons and improved electronic warfare systems, a limiting factor has been the lack of suitable locations for testing.

While the U.S. military has a wide array of installations where it can test these systems, it’s still not enough. In addition to the massive increase in weapons development and the need for more realistic training, the changing nature of war is outstripping the capacity of existing facilities as future kill webs will extend thousands of miles, not hundreds. There are only so many places with enough space to try out these systems even to a limited degree without butting up against statutes and regulations while also avoiding interference with civilian air traffic and communications, all in an environment remote enough to avoid prying eyes. The need for more and bigger testing grounds is an issue TWZ has long raised.

In addition to the backdrop of the increase in a wide range of weapons testing, much of it aimed at China, Trump’s super range announcement was delivered as the Pentagon and services are specifically creating commands dedicated to autonomous weapons. On Tuesday, during the annual Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) conference in Washington, D.C., attended by TWZ, the acting Army Secretary unveiled one such new command, which we will discuss in greater detail later in this story.

“I’m pleased to inform ​you and announce that right here in Montana, the Department of War is ⁠going ⁠to establish a new ⁠”super range” ​for testing advanced weapons and technologies, technologies including potential autonomous weapons, space, and electronic ​warfare technology, supersonics and ⁠hypersonics,” Trump said during a campaign rally in Kalispell. “Montana will help ensure the American military always reigns supreme.”

Trump provided no additional details about where this new “super range” will be located, when it will come online, exactly which systems will be tested or how much it will cost.

Thursday morning, the office of U.S. Sen. Tim Sheehy noted that he has been “a strong advocate for building an advanced training range in Montana, securing $10 million for a feasibility study in the FY27 National Defense Authorization Act that passed the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year.”

“The 21st-century battlefield is being redefined by new weapons and evolving technical frontiers that require a novel approach to how America will resource its warfighting capabilities,” the senator said in a statement. “Contested spectrum, electronic warfare, hypersonics, space capabilities and enhanced targeting require a new class of testing and evaluation facilities for our military. The U.S. faces a clear choice: adapt and expand our development infrastructure to the realities of modern warfare, or risk falling behind adversaries who iterate faster.”

The Montana Republican highlighted the value of his state’s huge swaths of undeveloped land for this effort.

“By combining our state’s vast landscapes, innovative spirit, and proud tradition of military service, we are the Last Best Place to ensure America’s fighting men and women have the technological edge they need to dominate the battlefield and win the wars of tomorrow,” he explained.

Like Trump, Sheehy offered no specifics about exactly where in Montana the “super range” will be located, when it will come online or how much it will cost. We have reached out to the White House, Sheehy and the Pentagon for more details. The Pentagon deferred us to the White House, which referred us back to the Pentagon. We also contacted the office of U.S. Sen. Steve Daines and Gov. Greg Gianforte.

There are already a number of facilities in Montana conducting the kind of military weapons testing described by Trump. One that closely matches what would be needed from such a location is the Montana Spaceport & Test Range and the affiliated Limestone Hills Innovation & Test Campus. A public-private aerospace and defense initiative, it already conducts testing for next-generation space vehicles, hypersonic, supersonic and ballistic weapons, drones and counter-drone systems and electronic warfare equipment.

Another potential site could be an expansion of the Big Sky Autonomous Systems Range (BSASR). Located near Bozeman, it is “the Lobo Institute’s primary training and testing facility for U.S. and allied military, federal, and partner organizations.” Operated under the Lobo Tactical division, BSASR is “a 6,000-acre, fully fenced complex purpose-built for advanced unmanned aerial systems operations, full-spectrum live fire, mounted and dismounted mobility, and full mission profile exercises grounded in the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures from active conflict zones,” according to the Lobo Institute. “The range pairs realistic terrain with the regulatory, infrastructure, and instructor depth required to train against the operational realities of today’s and tomorrow’s battlefields — and it does so in a remote, controlled environment where units can push hard while keeping risk to acceptable levels.”

We have reached out to both facilities for more details.

The new super range could also leverage existing range space on the ground and in the air. There is also the large Hays Military Operations Area (MOA) which could be expanded for this new test range effort. MOAs are blocks of airspace designated for military training. Malmstrom Air Force Base and its ICBM fields could also potentially be utilized. Overall, it’s possible a number of existing range areas could be interconnected, both digitally and via airspace corridors, to create a larger complex, as well.

The Pentagon has long realized the need to increase the areas where it can test out these systems, especially to evaluate them under combat-like conditions.

“The current open-air range space should be increased and better integrated to support system-of-systems assessments of air, land, and sea combat systems with capability for emerging long-range fires, hypersonic missiles, EMS warfare, unmanned systems, nuclear effects, and directed energy (DE) weapons,” the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) stated in a report last year. “The DoW needs to invest in and coordinate expanding and connecting the airspace available to the open-air ranges enabling testing and training of advanced capabilities.”

The current facilities are inadequate, DOT&E further explained.

“Threat systems and our own capabilities far exceed the current available air space on the open-air ranges,” according to the report. “The ranges need support and assistance to coordinate additional airspace and corridors with the FAA and industry. Expanding and connecting range air space is necessary to facilitate testing and training critical long-range capabilities that our warfighters need and to replicate the threats they will face.”

In addition, the report states that “to test missiles with longer ranges and gather data to support simulation validation, including for hypersonic missiles, the DoW should invest in long-range, overland missile flight test corridors with land-based impact areas and mobile hypersonic-specific range instrumentation to produce the required lethality data against threat-representative targets for terminal area assessments.”

The Defense Department had largely been conducting the testing of hypersonic weapons — those that can reach speeds of Mach 5 and above — at sea given the need for the long ranges for evaluation. Still, even that was limited. The Pentagon restricted the number and location of hypersonic tests it carried out each year because of the aging fleet of ships it used as its primary data collection assets to track the capabilities while in flight.

Retired Block 20 and Block 30 RQ-4 Global Hawks belonging to the U.S. Air Force, reconfigured as RangeHawks under the SkyRange hypersonic weapon testing infrastructure program, would help address some of those restrictions. You can read more about that in our story here.

However, if testing moves to an overland phase, the need for expanded air corridors could grow increasingly critical. Last year, the Pentagon’s Test Resource Management Center (TRMC) identified three candidate locations to perform those tests, one over Alaska, another at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico and a third in Australia, Defense News reported at the time.

Hypersonic testing in Australia is already underway. Earlier this month, we broke the news that the U.S. Air Force’s scramjet-powered Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) had finally reached the flight test phase, with at least one “release” having been carried out so far over a range in Australia.

The military is also looking to expand where it can test electronic warfare systems to help ease the bottleneck at White Sands and a few other locations. Such testing is limited due to U.S. restrictions on jamming, which can interfere with civilian systems.

Before he resigned after tensions with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, former Army Secretary Dan Driscoll in June said the service had plans to set up at least two domestic ranges that mimic realistic conditions on Ukraine’s battlefields, where the electromagnetic spectrum is a highly contested domain. This spectrum would be even more heavily disputed in a fight with China.

“You can have a kind of electronic warfare and all of the contested environment created, and you can have drone manufacturers and counter-drone tool-builders engaging together,” Driscoll told reporters. “Then, we also want soldiers to be able to go there, so that they can strengthen their skills and work hand-in-hand with developers.”

Driscoll said there are already places in the U.S. where the Army can test safely, and separately, the service is looking at a global range outside the U.S. to do “much more aggressive testing,” including with hypersonics. When asked, Driscoll declined to say where these ranges would be until planning is farther along. 

“At least some of the current counter-drone training for soldiers, like one CBS News saw in April, does not include electronic jamming — in part because the U.S. restricts jamming domestically,” CBS reported.

In August, the Army opened premier test ranges for the use of private industry to conduct internal research and development. Additionally, the service co-hosted a Denied, Disrupted, Intermittent and Limited testing environment, at Camp Grayling in September, and there are three more scheduled for Fiscal Year 2027, an Army spokesperson told us.

Trump’s news about the “super range” was delivered as the Pentagon and the services are working to ramp up the development and production of a range of autonomous systems.

Last month, as we noted earlier in this story, the Pentagon announced plans for a new functional combatant command, very broadly akin to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) or U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM), but for operational activities involving autonomous and robotic capabilities. In addition, Hegseth also announced new initiatives to help further accelerate the fielding of uncrewed systems in the air, at sea, and on land, as well as to explore future warfighting challenges. All of this builds on previous and long-overdue efforts to prioritize the fielding of various tiers of drones, as well as artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies, across domains, but there are questions about how these new efforts will translate into tangible developments.

On Tuesday, acting Army Secretary Adam Telle announced the creation of the service’s Futures and Autonomous Systems Command (FASCOM).

“This is our way to make sure that we take all of the great work that’s been happening with the resources that we have today, and we centralize it,” Telle said. “We’re pushing autonomy down into our units, but when it comes to having and making sure that the left hand in the Army knows what the right hand of the Army is doing, this happens at FASCOM; then FASCOM feeds up into AutoWarCom.”

Telle added that FASCOM “will work with the other services to create scale for purchasing power and share best practices on autonomy.”

“It is too soon to speculate about anything related to FASCOM,” the Army told us. “Specifics on structure, command, mission, etc. will be announced at a future dates [and] will require the kind of additional testing facilities that a new Montana super range could provide.”

The use of highly cooperative autonomous weapons platforms that can swarm and operate collectively over large areas will also tax existing ranges beyond their capacity.

Details about the new range proposed by Trump are scant, and it remains to be seen whether it will live up to the hype or even be built. As we noted earlier in this piece, a feasibility study, which hasn’t even been funded yet, is still needed before major work can begin. However, if and when it does come online, a new Montana test range will be welcomed by a military in need of additional places to test out its latest capabilities.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post New Montana “Super Range” Complex Could Add Critical Weapons Testing Capacity appeared first on TWZ.

Ukraine’s six-wheeled Frodo ground robot fired on targets during a demonstration in Kharkiv Oblast for the Pomsta (Revenge) Border Guard Brigade, a border guard detachment posted on Facebook. Frodo made its public debut only on 30 September.

Ukraine had contracted more than 22,000 ground robots for 2026 by July, mostly logistics carriers, with combat models the smallest group, the Defense Ministry said. Frodo’s first reported mission was an evacuation. The demo shows its armed version to a fighting brigade, the kind of robot Ukraine has ordered least.

What the armed version carries

The platform completed its tasks at a training ground in near-combat conditions, said the 3rd Border Guard Detachment named after Hero of Ukraine Colonel Yevhenii Pikus. The Buria turret mounted on Frodo can fire either a Mk 19 automatic grenade launcher or a Browning M2 heavy machine gun. It engaged targets at up to 1.3 km (0.8 mile), the detachment said.

The 47-kg (104-lb) module has a ballistic calculator, stores up to 256 targets, aims in three seconds, and has a stated autonomous run time of up to 48 hours, the post said. Frodo is rated for up to 150 km (93 miles) on paved roads and 75–80 km (47–50 miles) over rough terrain, the post added. A Frontline Robotics Zoom reconnaissance drone flew reconnaissance during the test.

The developer, Frontline Robotics, describes its core philosophy as arriving fast, doing the job, and leaving very fast—hit and run, the detachment’s post said. Familiarizing the brigade’s soldiers with such systems aims first and foremost to preserve personnel’s lives and health, the detachment said.

A robot first reported as a medevac

Frontline Robotics told Militarnyi at the unveiling that Frodo had passed Defense Ministry codification and was built for logistics, evacuation, and strike missions. The robot reaches 40 km/h (25 mph) and carries up to 200 kg (441 lb) of payload, or 400 kg (882 lb) at most, the company said. A single soldier can swap its batteries.

The 92nd Assault Brigade used an early test unit to evacuate a wounded soldier, Frontline Robotics told Militarnyi. An operator, callsign Tango, named the robot’s speed and its ability to handle complex maneuvers as its main advantages, Militarnyi reported.

Mercedes-Benz chief executive Ola Källenius has warned that excluding British manufacturers from European industrial preference rules would damage automotive production on both sides of the Channel, increasing pressure on Brussels ahead of negotiations over its proposed Industrial Accelerator Act.

The head of Mercedes-Benz has warned that excluding British manufacturers from the European Union’s proposed industrial preference rules would damage the competitiveness of carmakers across Europe, challenging Brussels over legislation intended to protect European production from growing international competition.

Ola Källenius, chief executive of Mercedes-Benz and president of the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA), criticised the prospect of restricting British participation in the forthcoming “Made in Europe” framework during discussions in Brussels on Wednesday, 14 October.

His intervention comes as European governments negotiate the Industrial Accelerator Act, which would introduce European-content requirements affecting public procurement and certain forms of industrial support.

The proposed legislation is intended to strengthen manufacturing within the EU, but its treatment of production in neighbouring countries has become contentious, particularly in an automotive industry whose factories and suppliers operate across national borders.

European production extends beyond the EU

British manufacturing remains closely integrated with continental European automotive production despite the United Kingdom’s departure from the single market.

Components manufactured in Britain are incorporated into vehicles assembled in EU member states, while British factories depend on engines, batteries, electronics and other parts produced in continental Europe.

The value of this integrated manufacturing system depends on companies being able to source components across borders without unnecessary restrictions.

Källenius warned that excluding the UK from the proposed rules would weaken manufacturers operating on both sides of the Channel.

His position reflects industry concerns that a narrowly defined European-content regime could impose additional costs on companies already facing pressure from Chinese competition, slowing demand and substantial investment requirements.

As EU Today reported in September, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham has been pressing Brussels to recognise the UK as a trusted industrial partner under the emerging framework.

Germany has also supported a broader approach that would allow selected trading partners to qualify under European-content rules where reciprocal conditions are met.

France has favoured stronger preferences for production within the EU itself, reflecting differences among member states over how far European industrial policy should extend beyond the Union’s borders.

A dispute over industrial sovereignty

The Industrial Accelerator Act proposed by the European Commission is intended to strengthen Europe’s manufacturing base and support production in strategically important sectors.

Its provisions address public procurement and industrial incentives affecting products including vehicles, steel, aluminium and clean technologies.

The Commission wants European public spending to support local industrial capacity rather than reinforce dependence on imports from major international competitors.

China has become the principal focus of those concerns because of its expanding manufacturing capacity, particularly in electric vehicles and batteries.

However, measures designed to counter Chinese industrial competition could also affect established trading partners whose manufacturers form part of European supply chains.

The United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey occupy different legal positions in their economic relations with the EU, but all maintain important industrial connections with member states.

An approach that treats their production as equivalent to imports from countries with substantially different market conditions could require European companies to reorganise existing supplier relationships.

For manufacturers, replacing a supplier may involve more than simply ordering components from another factory. Production standards, technical certification, logistics and long-term investment arrangements can make changes expensive and difficult.

Industry demands regulatory certainty

Following an ACEA board meeting on Wednesday, European manufacturers called for faster progress on the wider automotive legislative package.

In its 14 October statement, ACEA urged EU institutions to advance negotiations so that the package could be finalised early next year.

The association argues that manufacturers require a predictable regulatory framework to plan investments in electric vehicles, production facilities and new technologies.

Källenius linked the industry’s transition towards zero-emission mobility with the need to preserve employment and strengthen economic security.

European manufacturers are simultaneously investing heavily in electrification while competing against Chinese companies with established battery supply chains and significant production capacity.

The resulting financial pressures are particularly serious for manufacturers that must develop new vehicle platforms while maintaining existing factories and dealer networks.

Additional restrictions on component sourcing could complicate those decisions at a time when companies are seeking to reduce costs.

Britain refuses to follow EU tariffs automatically

The dispute has acquired a further dimension following remarks by British Business Secretary Jonathan Reynolds.

Speaking on Wednesday, Reynolds indicated that Britain would not automatically follow the European Union in imposing tariffs on Chinese vehicles.

The UK government maintains that trade measures must be determined according to British economic interests rather than adopted simply to align with Brussels.

That position complicates London’s attempt to secure favourable treatment under European industrial rules.

EU policymakers have argued that closer alignment on trade defences could support Britain’s claim to be treated as a trusted partner.

British ministers, however, must consider whether restrictions on Chinese imports would benefit domestic manufacturers and consumers.

The disagreement will form part of the broader economic relationship being discussed ahead of the next UK–EU summit, scheduled for 20 November.

The wider implications for EU–UK relations

The automotive dispute follows earlier negotiations over British participation in European defence procurement and other industrial programmes.

In both cases, London wants access to initiatives designed to strengthen European production while remaining outside the EU’s institutional framework.

Brussels must determine how far preferential treatment can extend to non-member countries without undermining the objectives of its industrial policy.

The Commission’s proposals have already revealed disagreements between governments favouring a tightly defined European manufacturing base and those seeking to preserve wider commercial partnerships.

Källenius’s intervention strengthens the argument that industrial protection cannot be considered separately from the supply chains on which European manufacturers depend.

The final legislation will influence investment decisions, procurement arrangements and the position of British suppliers within the continental automotive industry.

The outcome will also provide an indication of how far the EU is prepared to accommodate its closest trading partners as it attempts to strengthen European manufacturing against growing competition from China.

Rafael USA and Leonardo DRS have presented a capability that would allow fighting vehicles equipped with legacy Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missile launchers to fire Rafael’s Spike LR2 anti-armor missiles. The effort builds on a demonstration dating back to 2021, with the companies now presenting a more mature adapter solution designed to integrate the Israeli-made missile into existing platforms.

Roman Palaria, Rafael’s vice president for marketing and business development in its land and naval division, discussed the system in an interview with TWZ at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention. He explained that the earlier demonstration, part of Project Convergence 2021, used a version of the adapter that had not yet reached its final configuration. Leonardo DRS, Rafael’s U.S. partner, subsequently developed the mechanical and electrical components needed to connect the Spike LR2 to the TOW launcher and the vehicle’s existing systems.

The approach is intended to avoid replacing the launcher or radically overhauling the vehicle’s gunner station. Instead, the adapter provides the mechanical interface for loading the Spike LR2 missile and the electrical connections needed to communicate with the vehicle. Additional electronic components are installed within the vehicle to support the missile’s functions.

“We’re doing minimum changes to the vehicle,” Palaria said, describing the goal of making the integration as seamless as possible for the operator.

The Bradley infantry fighting vehicle is a prominent potential application, although the companies say the capability could extend to other platforms that use TOW launchers. The Army has operated TOW-equipped vehicles for decades, creating a substantial installed base of launch systems that could potentially benefit from the approach. As for the Bradley, the Army effort to replace its TOW missiles has been a long one, but is yet to produce any real results.

After a missile is fired, its launch tube remains in the launcher and can be removed to accommodate another missile.

The central attraction of the system is the ability to combine existing launcher infrastructure with the Spike LR2’s unique engagement capabilities.

During Project Convergence 2021, two Spike missiles were fired from a TOW launcher, and both reportedly hit their intended targets. The adapter now being presented reflects subsequent development work by Leonardo DRS, including refinement of the mechanical interface and vehicle electrical integration.

The system is designed to preserve the vehicle’s existing TOW capability while adding the option to use Spike LR2. That would give commanders another missile option without necessarily requiring wholesale replacement of installed launcher equipment. The extent to which individual vehicles could use both missile types would depend on the completed integration and applicable qualification requirements.

The Spike LR2 offers capabilities that differ substantially from those of the legacy TOW missile. Palaria cited a maximum range of approximately 5.5 kilometers (3.4 miles) and highlighted the missile’s day/night imaging seeker, which provides video to the operator during flight. The longest-range TOW missile versions max out at around 4.5 kilometers (2.8 miles).

In contrast, Spike LR2’s imaging capability supports engagement of targets beyond the operator’s direct line of sight, as well as observation of the target area during the missile’s approach. Depending on the engagement, the operator can acquire a target through the missile’s seeker, adjust the engagement, or select a different target while the missile is in flight.

These features contrast with the traditional TOW’s semi-automatic command to line-of-sight (SACLOS) guidance, in which the gunner tracks the target through the launcher’s observation system and guides the missile throughout its flight. Spike LR2’s onboard imaging provides a different set of options for engagements in which direct observation is limited or target conditions change after launch. This can also include striking targets behind cover.

Palaria also described the LR2’s two warhead options. The first of these is a tandem-charge anti-tank warhead, which Rafael claims is able to penetrate any modern main battle tank. It consists of a precursor warhead and the main warhead, which are designed to penetrate the reactive armor, and the main armor, respectively.

The second option is a multi-purpose configuration. It has a programmable fuze, which allows the missile to be employed against different target types. Depending on the selected mode, the warhead can be configured for direct-impact or timed-detonation effects, for example, detonating above the ground for anti-personnel missions, or penetrating a building, in which case the first charge will make a hole in a wall, and then the second charge will go inside and explode after a short delay.

The adapter offers a potential route to adding new missile capabilities to existing Army vehicles while limiting changes to their launcher hardware and crew interface.

Operator training would obviously be necessary. Although the gunner would continue using the vehicle’s existing console and displays, Palaria acknowledged that Spike LR2 introduces additional functions, controls, and engagement procedures.

For the Army, the proposition is straightforward: retain a familiar launcher architecture while potentially adding a missile with greater reach, onboard imaging, and more flexible engagement options that exceed line-of-sight tracking. The adapter’s significance lies in making that combination possible without starting from a clean sheet.

Whether that capability becomes a fielded upgrade will depend on the Army’s requirements, testing, integration decisions, and procurement plans. But the widespread uptake of the Spike series of missiles around the globe, combined with the very large existing TOW missile operator base, means the adapter solution could well be of interest to customers outside the U.S. Army, too.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Bradley’s Old TOW Launchers Get New Teeth With Spike Missile Adapter appeared first on TWZ.

For more than a year, U.S. Army forces in Europe have been experimenting with new counter-drone capabilities, as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures to go with them, under the umbrella of what is dubbed Project Flytrap. In doing so, the service has also been gaining valuable new insights into how uncrewed systems can help shape the battlefield for friendly forces. It is particularly interesting to hear how the Army envisions using uncrewed platforms to open up new avenues for deceiving opponents.

Army Col. Timothy Price, head of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, discussed the use of uncrewed platforms for deception and other operational concepts that have emerged in the course of Project Flytrap during a talk yesterday. Price’s remarks came at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention, at which TWZ is in attendance. 2nd Cavalry Regiment, based in Germany, is a brigade-sized mechanized formation equipped primarily with variants of the Stryker 8×8 light armored vehicle.

Price, by way of introduction, described modern battlefields full of uncrewed platforms in the air and on the ground as presenting new twists on long-standing problem sets. More specifically, he started by describing the typical approach to getting past a minefield or similar obstacle using an established framework called SOSRA, which stands for Suppress, Obscure, Secure, Reduce, Assault.

“If we were going to breach a mined wire obstacle, the first step of SOSRA – suppress – would be the utilization of indirect fires, to get the enemy’s head down, and direct fire systems, so they would not maneuver on you, fix them in place, and you can make a decision about how you’re going to approach the problem,” the 2nd Cavalry Regiment commander explained. “The next step would be to obscure it. In the historical sense, obscurations used is [sic] smoke, to mask your movement to the point of breach, so the enemy doesn’t know what you’re doing. And then, of course, secure would be to establish frontside security, [and] allow your engineers to come up within this local security bubble. They’ll utilize some kind of line charge to open the breach, reduce it – that’s the ‘R’ – and then bring on a follow-on force of assault through.”

“We were brought up around the old traditional mined wire obstacles that we had to physically breach. This is no different,” he added. “It’s just a multi-domain environment. So it’s built up of a combination of electronic warfare, kinetic UAS [uncrewed aerial systems] threats, and then counter-UAS threats, and then the network that holds [that all] together that forms the obstacle, which a unit has to maneuver through in order to maintain the offensive.”

Within this environment, Col. Price described the suppression step of SOSRA as having a different kind of probing dimension, particularly to feel out an enemy’s uncrewed capabilities, as well as those in the electromagnetic spectrum. He also noted that brigade-sized formations like this no longer necessarily have all the required tools organizationally to ‘service’ that aspect of the mission. This is in part because what has to be suppressed, including ground control stations for enemy drones, might now be miles behind the front line.

So, “what we have to do is allow the enemy to turn on their systems. How do I suppress them to allow division, or higher, to put an effect on them for suppression? It probably looks like flying small, attritable UAS [sic] into their security area” in the rear, he said. This, in turn, “cause[s] the enemy to do one of two things, either … go from passive to active with their EW [electronic warfare] systems, or to turn on radars to actually figure out what they’re seeing, which then forms the signature which higher headquarters can use to target.”

Though Col. Price did not describe it as such, there is already something of a deception aspect to this step in fooling enemy emitters to switch on and expose themselves. This, as a general tactic, is also hardly new. Stimulating air defenses, in particular, is a key part of operations to gather intelligence on those capabilities, as well as to suppress and destroy them. Once you have categorized and geolocated an emitter, it is a logical step to then target it. The ultimate goal, with data being passed along a more deeply networked kill chain, is for the time it takes for fires to be brought to bear to be almost instantaneous.

Regardless, deception comes far more into play in the obscure step, according to the 2nd Cavalry Regiment commander.

“Obscuration is different, as well. So instead of trying to hide behind smoke as we maneuver through it, what is the deception plan, right? How am I trying to show the enemy a signature that says I’m going to breach over here when I’m actually going to breach here, right?” he asked rhetorically. “So, that’s probably the implementation of UGVs [uncrewed ground vehicles] with some kind of decoy emitter on top of them to pull the enemy’s eyes, resources, and time to a point that allows me to focus my assets and resources on the point of breach.”

The use of uncrewed platforms as decoys is also not new, and even more complex concepts have emerged within the U.S. military in the past. Uncrewed systems have also been developed for military and other purposes over the years that are designed to mimic something else entirely, including for purposes of deception. This includes masquerading as birds and other animals.

Back in 2019, TWZ was the first to report in detail on a Navy effort to develop and field an entire networked, cooperative electronic warfare ecosystem, at that time referred to as the Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature against Integrated Sensors, or NEMESIS. This was also a drone-heavy cross-domain concept intended to make many types of sensors over vast areas believe they were ‘seeing’ the same false fleets of aircraft and/or ships, and deceive and confuse the enemy on a grand scale. This, in turn, represented a massive leap in electronic warfare capabilities.

There is also overlap here with reported sightings of what are now commonly called unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP), and that used to be called unidentified flying objects (UFO). As we have reported on repeatedly over the years, while some UAP sightings remain unexplained, many more have turned out to be drones. Adversaries have been using uncrewed capabilities for intelligence gathering and deception purposes against American interests at home and abroad, likely in part by exploiting UAP stigma for cover. We have talked in the past about how drones will be used in more and more exotic ways to confuse opponents.

When it comes to UGVs, specifically, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, as well as units elsewhere across the U.S. Army, have been experimenting with various designs in recent years. The service has been trying for years to expand its operational use of UGVs, in general, but has faced repeated setbacks.

“It’s also spectral camouflage. So how are we controlling our heat and thermal signatures on our vehicles and our people?” Price continued. “It’s basic soldier discipline issues. It’s how we use our radios. It’s where we’re talking, where we’re not. But that’s what obscuration looks like.”

As a reminder, Project Flytrap’s primary focus has been on counter-drone capabilities, which come into play heavily during the secure stage.

“There’s multi-layered assets on top of that to allow that convergence for our success at the point of breach. I’m going to focus on our corner, our part of the battle, right?” he said. “So, I’m looking at active and passive electronic warfare systems – that can either, one, find [threats], let me know that I’ve got some kind of system flying or operating against me and, then, if it’s an active system, take some kind of effect to maybe cut a downlink and disrupt that system – all the way down to the individual soldier with a shotgun.”

As mentioned, the ‘obstacle’ to be ‘reduced’ at the end of this is not necessarily something as simple as a minefield surrounded by barbed wire anymore. Now it could be enemy one-way-attack drone capabilities preventing holding up an advance. Col. Price, in turn, described friendly kamikaze drones as part of the equation for breaching past those threats. Decoys and deception have a continued role to play in this phase.

“This is where, at the brigade level, we introduce one-way attack munitions to try to destroy the C2 [command and control] network that the enemy is using to operate this reconnaissance/strike complex” that is standing in the way, he explained. “There’s layers to it, right? Like they’ve got a close side to this that’s the local part of this reconnaissance/strike complex. They’ve probably got a theater level that the Corps [the U.S. Army’s command echelon above divisions] and higher is trying to target as we are forcing people to turn on systems to communicate. But at the regiment level, I’m looking at one-way attack munitions, focused on C2 nodes, headquarters, and ground control stations that [sic] I can disrupt their ability to put lethal effects on me as we begin to open the breach.”

The U.S. Army is in the process of fielding a variety of weaponized drones, including loitering munitions and designs capable of releasing grenades and other small bomblets.

During a question-and-answer session that followed his remarks, Col. Price was asked about whether lessons learned and other observations from Ukraine, and specifically that country’s recent Operation Vivaldi counteroffensive, had contributed to this evolving framework.

“In terms of Vivaldi, I’m not an expert, so I’m not going to make any kind of estimations on how that worked or why,” he said in response. “But I will say, if you look at the focus of that operation, you can probably make the assumption that there was convergence of efforts across the different headquarters to enable success. So that’s how I would relate to the two.”

“In order to be successful for a multi-domain breach, the tactical level requires my higher headquarters to be part of that solution to enable me with resources and capabilities that I don’t have in here at the brigade level,” he continued. “I would imagine it’s very similar in the other operational comparisons.”

Though certainly true, in broad strokes, this response in some ways underscores how the U.S. Army continues to lag behind global trends in the use of uncrewed systems, as now typified by the ongoing war in Ukraine. Army leaders have been open about this continued reality in the past, despite efforts to try to reverse it.

“We’re behind. I’ll just be candid. I think we know we’re behind,” Army Lt. Gen. Charles Costanza said during a panel discussion at AUSA last year, in response to a direct question at the panel from our Howard Altman. Costanza was talking about both the employment of drones and counter-drone capabilities, and highlighted work being done then under Project Flytrap, as you can read more about here.

Costanza was head of V Corps, a key component of the U.S. Army presence in Europe, at the time. He was removed from that post abruptly in August for reasons that remain unclear, but were reportedly tied to disputes between top Army leadership and Secretary Pete Hegseth. Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll resigned last month, amid reports of months of friction with Hegseth about various policies.

The Pentagon under Hegseth has launched a number of initiatives to accelerate the fielding of new uncrewed capabilities across the U.S. military, especially within smaller ground units. This now includes plans for a new Autonomous Warfare Command (AUTOWARCOM) unveiled last month.

For units like the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, new drone-centric concepts of operations are already taking shape. Beyond using them for surveillance and as one-way-attack munitions, there is also a clear focus emerging on employing expanding uncrewed capabilities to deceive opponents and prevent them from making the best use of their own resources.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Drones Are Creating New Opportunities For The U.S. Army To Deceive Its Enemies appeared first on TWZ.

Ukraine’s amphibious ground robot UNEX UGV can tow artillery guns, its project lead said in a video interview, Militarnyi reported on 13 October. The electric platform from ABRIS Design Group (ABRIS DG) also swims, climbs, and hauls cargo on its own deck.

The Defense Ministry’s robot tally, kept in its DELTA system, counts supply and evacuation runs. It logged 25,143 of them in August, a monthly figure that has climbed all year. In April, then-Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said the goal was for robots to handle all frontline logistics. A robot that brings a gun and its shells to a position adds artillery moves to that workload.

A gun behind, shells aboard

The robot can pull a gun or another wheeled vehicle of up to 10 metric tons (about 22,000 lb), the project lead said. Ammunition can ride aboard, so the gun and its rounds reach the position together. No crew has to go with them, he said, and the team has already demonstrated the setup. On its own deck, ABRIS DG says, the robot carries up to 1.7 tons (3,750 lb) on land and 1.25 tons (2,760 lb) on water.

ABRIS DG said US Army testers ran UNEX through scenarios that included towing Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs), which are armored US military trucks. The trials took place at the Army’s XTech competition in Vilseck, Germany, in March 2026. UNEX was picked as one of five winners, the company said.

Swims, climbs, backtracks

The robot can float for more than an hour. The team has already crossed the Desna River and narrow stretches of the Dnipro with it, the project lead said. Ultra-low-pressure tires spread its weight over soft ground and swamps. ABRIS DG says it climbs obstacles up to one meter (3.3 ft) high and drives out of water onto ice.

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Operators steer it via Starlink or radio. An escort drone can add an overhead view to the robot’s own cameras. If the link drops, the robot retraces its route to where the signal last held.

It runs on a Ukrainian-made 78 kWh battery. The project lead puts its work time at up to six hours and its range at up to 120 km (75 miles), with a top speed of 20 km/h (12 mph). Load and terrain cut into those figures, he added. With a generator now in development, a mission should stretch to about 12–14 hours, he said.

The robot is not built for the zero line, the project lead said. It works 20–30 km behind the front, at night, where armor would add little. Developers also plan demining and air defense versions. Ukraine’s Defense Ministry codified the robot and cleared it for use in its forces in April 2025.

General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) has offered the first official look at its proposal to replace the U.S. Army’s Bradley Fighting Vehicles, called the Wolf. The Wolf is one of two designs competing to become the Army’s future XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV). Just earlier today, we published a detailed update on the XM30 competition, including new information about both entrants and the Army’s testing plans, which you can find here.

GDLS is showing the one-eighth-scale model of Wolf, seen at the top of this story and made by a company called KiwiMill, at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention, at which TWZ is in attendance. Wolf is facing off head-to-head against a version of the Lynx from Germany’s Rheinmetall, supplied via the company’s U.S. subsidiary, American Rheinmetall.

It has already been established that Wolf is a further evolution of the GDLS’ Griffin III design, which was first shown publicly at AUSA back in 2018. Griffin III was derived from the ASCOD 2 infantry fighting vehicle, for which Spain was the launch customer, and which is now entering service in Latvia. The U.S. Army’s now-cancelled M10 Booker ‘light tank’ and the British Army’s much-troubled Ajax are also members of this broader family of armored vehicles.

The design of the Wolf, at least based on the model, is substantially different from the earlier Griffin III demonstrator.

Wolf’s turret has a broader, flatter, and overall more streamlined shape, which is in line with its remotely-operated design. There is just a single sensor turret on top, along with space for a forward-looking sensor suite to the left of the main 50mm cannon. What may be apertures for additional sensors or other systems are seen elsewhere along the front and sides of the turret. It also has more launchers for smoke grenades around the front edges compared to the Griffin III.

Compared to the Griffin III, the Wolf’s hull has also been much revised, including the elimination of a traditional driver’s hatch in front of the turret ring. The vehicle’s commander (who also acts as the gunner) and driver sit side-by-side deeper inside the hull. Up to six passengers can ride in a compartment further at the rear. For comparison, the Bradley has a crew of three, as well as the ability to carry six passengers.

The Wolf’s hull also features side skirts that were not found on the Griffin III demonstrator. A different style of tracks is also depicted on the model. The picture of the model that GDLS shared shows sensors facing outward from a position on the side of the hull toward the front, as well. This makes sense, as the design features a distributed camera system to offer a full 360-degree view of the outside to personnel riding within, the broad benefits of which you can read more about here.

“Because we have a reduced crew from the Bradley [which has a commander and gunner in turret] there has to be greater efficiency in how those soldiers execute their tasks,” Geoffrey Norman, GDLS’ director for U.S. Strategy & Growth, previously noted to TWZ. “The software and menu logic are very intuitive.”

Next-generation fire control, sensor, and networking/communications capabilities, as well as improved active and passive defenses, are key requirements for the XM30 program. Both Wolf and American Rheinmetall Lynx-based designs have built-in launchers for loitering munitions, with GDLS having chosen to integrate AeroVironment’s Switchblade 300 more specifically. What we have seen on the Wolf model so far does not appear to explicitly show this particular feature.

Wolf and Lynx both also feature hybrid-electric propulsion, which will bring various benefits, especially in terms of fuel economy and electrical power generation, compared to the diesel-engined Bradley. When it comes to the boost in on-board electrical power, “the emphasis from the Army has really been about having margin on the vehicle for future [system] requirements – directed energy, counter-UAS systems, or fill-in-the-blank,” GDLS’ Norman has also told us in the past.

As it stands now, both GDLS and American Rheinmetall have delivered prototypes of their respective designs to the Army, with initial testing having been conducted at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. Soldier touchpoints and field evaluations are now set to occur at Fort Hood in Texas between February and March of next year. You can read in more detail about both entrants in the XM30 competition and what is known about their features in our past reporting here.

In the meantime, we have now gotten clear views of both designs vying to become the Army’s XM30 replacement for the venerable Bradley.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post This Is Our First Look At The Wolf Armored Fighting Vehicle That Aims To Replace The Bradley appeared first on TWZ.

As General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) and American Rheinmetall display their wares at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual symposium this week, the contractors have delivered their XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV) prototypes to the Army for testing and soldier evaluation at two locations to meet a slightly altered test program. 

The XM30 program is the U.S. Army’s latest effort to replace its fleet of Bradley Fighting Vehicles. As TWZ noted in a recent article, the Army had planned to test a number of the eight prototypes that each competitor is required to provide during a regular rotation at the sprawling National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin in California next spring. 

According to both GDLS and American Rheinmetall, each will now deliver seven prototypes to the Army’s 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. There they will undergo a soldier touchpoint and field evaluations, which could wrap up in the February-March 2027 timeframe. No rotation to Fort Irwin is now envisaged. 

TWZ spoke with executives from both XM30 competitors and reached out to the Army ahead of AUSA. Geoffrey Norman, GDLS’ director for U.S. Strategy & Growth, said that three of its prototypes are already at Fort Hood undergoing safety checks before being put in soldiers’ hands for evaluation. The company’s offering is called Wolf, which evolved from its Griffin III, which in turn was derived from the ASCOD 2 infantry fighting vehicle. 

American Rheinmetall, a U.S. subsidiary of Germany’s Rheinmetall, has put forward a version of the extended Lynx family for the XM30 competition. The company has delivered one of its prototypes to Fort Hood, according to the company’s senior vice president of programs, Jim Schirmer. Another one is at the Army’s Joint Forces Training Center at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, where the company is doing its own internal testing. Its remaining vehicles are being assembled in Slidell, Louisiana.

Both companies delivered their very first XM30 prototypes to Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland in late August, along with an additional hull and turret each for ballistics testing. Over the last month-plus, the Army has gained preliminary experience with the MICVs at Aberdeen.

Early Feedback 

GDLS’ Wolf has already put its 50mm cannon into action on the live-fire range at Aberdeen, according to Norman. It has also been put through some portion of automotive functional testing, and Norman says GDLS is getting “good feedback” on both. He adds that the Wolf’s 32-speed SAPA transmission and composite rubber track (CRT) have been well received, with favorable comparisons to the ride-quality/comfort of the Bradley. 

Schirmer says that the Lynx has also received positive early feedback, particularly during a late September demonstration for congressional staffers and Army VIPs at Aberdeen. Passengers praised its two-man crew station layout, the roominess of its six-man squad compartment and its air conditioning system. 

Schirmer reflected on the value of greater environmental comfort for squad members who sweltered inside the Bradleys used in Iraq. He recalled that, “When it was 125 degrees outside in Iraq with additional solar loading, inside the Bradley the temperature got to 138 degrees. It actually felt refreshing to step out into the Iraqi air.”

Both prototypes are larger than the 40-ton Bradley with correspondingly heavier combat weights in the 50-ton region. Both feature an XM913 50mm automatic cannon as their main weapon, a welcome increase in firepower compared to the 25mm M242 on the Bradley.

Schirmer acknowledged that American Rheinmetall has found some small bugs in its first Lynx prototype at Aberdeen. “We spent a fair amount of time swapping hardware and making adjustments to make sure it was ready [for the VIP event].”

Crew Efficiency and Room for Growth 

Both competitors have emphasized the greater efficiency and capacity to add weapons systems and sensors to their MICVs compared with the Bradley. Each has a two-man crew as opposed to the Bradley’s three-man complement. XM30 commander-gunners operate from below the turret as opposed to in it with the Bradley. The new configuration puts a premium on crew situational awareness and task management. 

Wolf and Lynx feature side-by-side crew stations for the vehicles’ commander and driver, an aviation-style layout conducive to enhanced crew coordination. Both firms have placed considerable emphasis on intuitive user interfaces with multiple displays and menus with specifically designed symbology and text, as well as ergonomically optimized controls. In addition to higher resolution and longer range gunsight displays, each prototype offers its crew and the squad it carries a 360-degree outside view provided by cameras placed around the vehicle. 

“Because we have a reduced crew from the Bradley [which has a commander and gunner in turret] there has to be greater efficiency in how those soldiers execute their tasks. The software and menu logic are very intuitive,” Norman affirms. 

Left and right crew positions are identical, so functions can be performed by either crew member. In the Wolf, the driver sits to the left in most cases with the commander on the right. GDLS has drawn lessons from soldier touchpoints with early prototypes of the M1E3 Abrams tank (for which it is the prime contractor), which Norman says shares its graphical user interface with Wolf. 

The Lynx crew compartment features three configurable displays, with a large center display with a common operating picture/map with visual feeds from airborne uncrewed aerial systems (UAS). “You can shoot the gun from the left or right, you can drive the vehicle from the left or right,” Schirmer confirms. 

A camera for the Lynx commander’s independent weapons station atop the vehicle with its own sight and machine gun can be pulled up for view by the crew, which can toggle between it and the main weapons sight. Lynx operators have the ability to turn off certain information presentations in their displays for better focus on a particular task.  

The effort to improve efficiency for smaller armored vehicle crews was highlighted last week as GLDS announced that it has partnered with Primordial Labs to bring artificial intelligence (AI) voice control to its combat vehicles, ranging from the M1 to the XM30. American Rheinmetall has likewise developed its own AI assistant for Lynx crews, Schirmer confirms. He characterizes it as a “third crewman” helping two soldiers do the work of a trio. 

The video below shows Primordial Labs’ voice control technology being used to operate a quadcopter-type drone.

Cooling has become an issue for the Bradley, which, like all armored vehicles, essentially encloses its powerplant and electronics in a box with no airflow. Heat from the drivetrain creates a detectable thermal signature, particularly with the Bradley’s right-front exhaust exit. 

Both Lynx and Wolf feature hybrid-electric drivetrains with silent-watch capability, which can temporarily reduce their thermal signatures. Each features rear-exhaust exits, alleviating front-quarter heat plumes. 

According to Schirmer, the Lynx cooling stack (which sits adjacent to its powerplant forward in the hull) offers increased cooling for the engine and battery packs while improving the interior environment for heat-sensitive electronics. It facilitates systems growth and greater power consumption.  

Wolf has its engine cooling in the rear of the vehicle behind the track. Norman says GDLS specifically engineered its placement so cooling paths to the rear of the hull don’t impinge on passenger space inside. All Wolf systems are designed with a 10 percent growth margin, he adds. 

The hybrid drive systems and electronics that both XM30s use will have to resist the increasing threat from adversary directed energy. Electronic attack in the form of tactical electromagnetic pulse, laser targeting of external sensors/apertures, and weaponized electromagnetic interference constitutes a growing threat to weapons systems and basic mobility. 

Both contractors expect the Army to stringently test their prototypes’ electromagnetic vulnerability. “I think they’ll nail our vehicles with the best [electromagnetic attack] that adversaries have and if they identify any weaknesses, we will correct those,” Norman says. He points to Aberdeen’s large, sophisticated anechoic chamber as a place where both MICVs will eventually spend considerable time. 

American Rheinmetall has its own electromagnetic interference (EMI) requirements for vehicle sensors and communications, according to Schirmer. The Army also has an in-depth understanding of the threats and explicit EMI requirements, he says. “We’re pretty comfortable that our system meets those, but actual EMI testing will take place later in the test program.”

Expanded capacity for exportable power is another growth area for XM30. The prototypes’ hybrid powerplants feature large battery packs that can offer exportable power to potentially help the Army with its serious battlefield circulation of electricity (BCoE) problem. The ever-increasing array of soldier-worn electronic devices, electrically-powered small drones and sensors has created an electricity supply deficit as well as battery weight and availability issues. 

Wolf produces “a lot more power than it needs,” Norman asserts. As a result, upgrades to its alternators, starter-generators and high-voltage batteries won’t be needed in the foreseeable future. The exportable power emphasis is on the passengers, he explains. 

Wolf’s internal power distribution provides significant charging power to the squad compartment in the back, where each member can charge devices and get access to data. The charge-ports they use are cyber-hardened to prevent plug-in exploits. 

External exportable power is surprisingly not a priority for the MICVs, according to the contractors. Wolf can offload power via a standard NATO power port (as can Lynx) and other interfaces, Norman says, but “we’re not seeing XM30s in use-cases where they’re used to power command posts or other things. The emphasis from the Army has really been about having margin on the vehicle for future [system] requirements – directed energy, counter-UAS systems or fill-in-the-blank.” 

Counter UAS and Fill-in-the-Blank

A September report from the Congressional Research Service cited a potential XM30 oversight issue for Congress, contending that it is not clear if the MICV will have an organic counter-UAS capability. Given the obvious threat of aerial drones to armor as seen in Ukraine, the apparent lack of a requirement for integrated CUAS appears glaring. 

We reached out to the Army’s PAE Maneuver Ground and PM XM30 regarding CUAS for XM30 but received no response as of this writing. Both American Rheinmetall and GDLS believe the Army will undertake its own search and competitive testing to identify a CUAS system for XM30 that it will require the vendors to integrate at some future point.  

GDLS’ Norman calls CUAS “fundamental” to the viability of armored vehicles on the modern battlefield. He thinks the Army’s approach of making sure CUAS infrastructure (power/data/physical hookups) is in place on XM30 while evaluating potential systems on its own for rapid integration is wise. He adds that GDLS is working with “expert partners” in the CUAS space to be ready to add the capability. 

Intriguingly, American Rheinmetall’s Schirmer says that Lynx already has some counter-UAS capability, which he declined to disclose. 

Both XM30s have the ability to launch loitering munitions – Wolf will employ Aerovironment’s Switchblade 300 and Lynx will carry a version of Raytheon’s Coyote Block 3 – but their makers currently have no specific plans for other integrations, though each says it can adapt multiple systems. 

TWZ previously noted that the Army envisions XM30s acting as controllers for unmanned ground vehicles. GLDS’ Wolf has an in-house interface to control UGVs (and UAVs) from inside the vehicle, which was demonstrated to the Army over a year ago, according to Norman. Its open software architecture allows for integrating a different control suite if the Army desires. 

American Rheinmetall has “not attempted to control an unmanned ground vehicle yet, but the architecture is so similar it would really be just a software modification to get there,” Schirmer says. The company would likely use a mix of its own and UGV provider software.

The Lynx itself can be remotely operated via a tablet that a dismounted crew can employ. While outside the vehicle, soldiers can also remotely use the tablet to see what the vehicle is seeing or to pull up maps for planning, Schirmer explains. American Rheinmetall has yet to finalize and demonstrate the capability, but it appears an appropriate feature for a design that stretches back to the Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) program. 

Recent Army experimentation with small vehicle-toted UGVs on Bradley suggests a capability that could migrate to XM30. Wolf can accommodate “marsupial UGVs” like the Swambotics AI Fire Ants fitted on a 1st Cavalry Division M2A4 Bradley, but Norman points out that small UGV carriage is not part of the requirements for the first iteration of XM30. 

American Rheinmetall has not specifically planned for carrying UGVs on its MICV, but Schirmer asserts that if a Bradley can carry them, Lynx certainly can. Whether it may be able to recharge them during transit is a question that will depend on future Army desires, he says. 

Fit for Purpose 

Given threats from increasingly capable drones and guided anti-tank missiles, questions as to whether XM30 or other armored vehicles remain relevant on the modern battlefield have persisted for several years. 

Such concerns arguably drive the discussion of value-added capabilities for XM30 – from advanced sensors and networking/communications to the ability to deploy and control UGVs/UAVs and the potential BCoE benefits of the platforms. 

GDLS’ Norman refers to Wolf as “software with a vehicle around it”, noting that GLDS is “continually dropping new software” into its XM30 on a weekly basis to add capability.

However, American Rheinmetall’s Schirmer reminded us that the traditional armored transport mission is still the overarching role of XM30. 

“The purpose of [Lynx] is really to carry infantrymen around the battlefield…to move them faster than they can walk on foot, to protect them in transit from threats – drones, anti-tank guided missiles, from artillery fire – and to [provide] fires support.” 

The tension around XM30 survivability versus cost is reflected in the Army’s loose commitment to the new MICV program. Despite having muted fielding of an XM30 by 2029, Brig. Gen. Troy Denomy, Program Acquisition Executive of Maneuver Ground, told Breaking Defense that if no clear winner emerged from the upcoming test and evaluation, “then it may be worth not selecting at that point.” 

The ambiguity tees up the question of where a 50-ton armored vehicle fits into the potential Pacific fight that the U.S. military is focusing on. It’s a difficult question for the Army and for the XM30 contractors. 

American Rheinmetall’s Schirmer took a stab at answering. He points out that there are large islands and other landmasses in the Pacific (like the Korean Peninsula) where a MICV could be employed. However, he acknowledges that it is less likely to be used in an island campaign. 

“It still has a role, though it’s less obvious what that would look like than in Europe or the Middle East.”

With testing and evaluations set to ramp up at Aberdeen Proving Ground and Fort Hood, we may soon learn which XM30 prototype is the Army’s obvious choice.  

Contact the editor: Tyler@twz.com

The post Test Plans Change, Small Distinctions Emerge Between XM30 Bradley Replacement Prototypes  appeared first on TWZ.

The European Union has reached an agreement with China to restrict imports of Chinese hybrid vehicles to 350,000 annually, introducing a significant new barrier to the expansion of Chinese manufacturers in Europe’s automotive market.

The arrangement, confirmed on 12 October, follows months of negotiations between Brussels and Beijing and reflects growing concern about the competitive position of European carmakers.

The import ceiling could reduce Chinese hybrid vehicle sales in the EU by more than half compared with previously anticipated volumes, although the actual effect will depend on demand, product classifications and implementation.

The agreement comes as manufacturers gather for the Paris Motor Show, where the future of European vehicle production, Chinese competition and industrial policy have become central subjects.

China’s Commerce Ministry has presented the outcome as a negotiated arrangement intended to preserve trading relations, while the European side has emphasised the need to prevent rapidly increasing imports from undermining domestic production.

Chinese manufacturers confront a new European barrier

Chinese carmakers have expanded aggressively in overseas markets as domestic demand has weakened. Chinese passenger vehicle exports rose sharply in September, with manufacturers increasingly targeting Europe, Latin America and Asian markets.

Hybrid vehicles have become particularly important because they offer consumers lower fuel consumption without requiring the same degree of dependence on charging infrastructure as fully electric cars.

This has allowed Chinese brands to compete in market segments where European manufacturers retain substantial established production capacity.

The new quota limits the number of eligible Chinese hybrid vehicles permitted to enter the European market each year. According to details of the import restrictions, shipments exceeding the permitted volume would face restrictions at EU customs.

The mechanism differs from a conventional tariff because imports beyond the ceiling cannot simply enter the market by paying a higher duty. Manufacturers and importers will need to consider both delivery costs and the availability of import allocations.

European manufacturers seek protection

The measures arrive amid growing pressure on the European automotive industry, which faces high production costs, expensive energy, competition from Chinese manufacturers and the capital requirements of shifting towards electrified transport.

Companies operating in Germany, France, Italy and other established manufacturing centres must fund the development of new vehicles while maintaining existing factories and employment.

Chinese manufacturers benefit from extensive domestic production networks, considerable scale and access to battery manufacturing capacity.

European policymakers have questioned whether competition takes place under equivalent economic conditions, particularly where Chinese producers receive support from state-directed industrial policies.

Beijing rejects allegations that its export performance results principally from unfair state assistance, arguing that Chinese companies have achieved competitiveness through investment, innovation and efficiency.

The quota represents a departure from the assumption that European consumers will necessarily have unrestricted access to the lowest-priced imported vehicles.

Its economic effects will depend partly on whether European manufacturers can use the additional protection to improve productivity and develop more competitive models.

Will Chinese manufacturers move production into Europe?

Restrictions on imports do not necessarily reduce the presence of Chinese-owned companies in the European automotive industry.

Several manufacturers are already developing production capacity outside China, including within the European Union. BYD’s investment in Hungary is one example of how Chinese companies can pursue access to European consumers through local manufacturing rather than relying entirely on imported finished vehicles.

The new arrangements could strengthen the commercial incentive to expand such operations.

For European governments, Chinese investment presents a difficult calculation. New factories may create employment, increase industrial activity and preserve automotive supply chains, while also expanding the influence of Chinese manufacturers within Europe’s domestic market.

The economic consequences depend on how much research, component manufacturing, battery production and other high-value activity takes place locally.

A Chinese-owned assembly plant using predominantly imported components would provide different benefits from a fully developed European production network.

The British dimension

The debate is also drawing attention to the position of the United Kingdom, whose automotive industry remains closely integrated with European supply chains despite Brexit.

Executives from Stellantis and Renault have supported including Britain within proposed European industrial protection measures, reflecting the importance of UK manufacturing operations to their broader businesses.

Such an arrangement would raise questions about regulatory alignment, trade preferences and the conditions under which non-EU production could qualify for European industrial support.

British manufacturers also face the challenge of Chinese competition, and decisions taken in Brussels could influence investment strategies across the wider European automotive sector.

Protection versus competitiveness

The restrictions may offer European manufacturers additional time to adapt, but they do not eliminate the structural challenges confronting the industry.

Energy prices, labour costs, the availability of batteries and the affordability of new vehicles remain important factors in the competitiveness of European production.

Nor will the quota necessarily prevent Chinese firms from gaining market share through investment, partnerships or vehicles manufactured outside China.

The EU’s approach combines restrictions on imports with the possibility of continued Chinese industrial participation inside Europe.

The outcome will depend on whether European manufacturers use the reduced competitive pressure to strengthen their technological and manufacturing position, or whether the restrictions primarily accelerate the relocation of Chinese-owned production into the EU.

Beijing has rebuffed a European Union request to voluntarily cap hybrid car exports to the bloc, raising the prospect of new, steep EU tariffs on Chinese hybrids, which have so far escaped the duties on pure electric vehicles. China has refused to set quotas on its exports of hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) and plug-in hybrid […]

The post EU weighs safeguard tariffs as China refuses hybrid car limits appeared first on Asia Times.

Hydrogen-powered passenger cars have been left far behind by electric vehicles and hybrids, but the hydrogen truck market is growing and new technology developed for auto racing is keeping hopes for hydrogen cars alive. Toyota and its European partners are in the vanguard of these developments. On September 26 and 27, at the FIA World […]

The post Behind in EVs, Toyota powering ahead with hydrogen vehicles appeared first on Asia Times.

France and Germany are moving towards a possible compromise over the future of Europe’s automotive industry, linking negotiations over EU vehicle-emission rules with a separate dispute over how strongly European-made products should be favoured in subsidies and public procurement.

The negotiations bring together two issues that have divided Paris and Berlin: Germany’s demand for greater flexibility in rules governing combustion-engine vehicles and France’s campaign for stronger “Made in Europe” requirements in EU industrial policy.

Officials involved in the discussions believe a broader Franco-German agreement may now be possible, although differences remain over how European content should be defined and whether products made in countries with EU free-trade agreements should receive similar treatment.

The automotive dispute follows the Commission’s decision in December 2025 to propose significant changes to rules that had originally required a 100 per cent reduction in tailpipe CO₂ emissions from new cars from 2035.

Under the revised automotive package, manufacturers would instead face a 90 per cent tailpipe-emissions reduction requirement from 2035.

The remaining 10 per cent could be compensated through mechanisms linked to low-carbon steel produced in the EU and the use of e-fuels and biofuels.

EU Today reported before the Commission presented the package that pressure from Germany, Italy and European manufacturers was forcing Brussels to reconsider the original 2035 framework.

The subsequent proposal confirmed the shift.

In March, EU Today also examined the Commission’s decision to link low-carbon European steel directly to vehicle-emissions compliance, creating a connection between automotive climate rules and support for Europe’s heavy industry.

Germany has continued to argue for a technology-neutral approach.

Berlin wants legislation to leave scope for combustion engines operating on renewable or low-carbon fuels rather than treating battery-electric vehicles as the only route towards lower emissions.

That position is particularly important for Germany because of the scale of its automotive sector and the large industrial supply chain built around combustion-engine technology.

France’s priority is different.

Paris wants EU industrial policy to ensure that public subsidies and procurement increasingly support products manufactured inside Europe.

The argument centres on the Commission’s Industrial Accelerator Act, proposed in March as part of a wider strategy to strengthen European manufacturing.

The legislation introduces “Made in EU” and low-carbon requirements for public procurement and public support schemes covering strategic sectors including automotive manufacturing, steel, cement and aluminium.

The dispute is over what “European” should mean.

France favours a relatively strict definition focused principally on production inside the EU’s 27 member states.

Germany has advocated what Economy Minister Katherina Reiche has described as a “Made with Europe” approach, under which some products from close trading partners could qualify if those countries provide equivalent market access to European companies.

That could potentially include states such as Norway and Switzerland and partners including Canada.

Spain has been among countries seeking a middle position between the French and German approaches.

The issue matters because modern automotive supply chains do not stop at the EU’s external border.

Battery materials, semiconductors, electric motors and other components can pass through several countries before final assembly, while Britain and Turkey remain deeply integrated into European vehicle production.

The EU-UK relationship is particularly sensitive because stricter rules of origin for electric vehicles are due to apply from 2027.

EU Today previously reported that European and British manufacturers were seeking another delay to those rules because the regional battery supply chain had not developed as quickly as originally expected.

At the same time, the EU is attempting to reduce dependence on Chinese electric vehicles, batteries and critical inputs.

The Commission has committed €1.8 billion to a Battery Booster strategy intended to strengthen the European battery value chain.

European electric-vehicle demand is continuing to grow. A 16-market European survey examined by EU Today showed battery-electric cars taking more than a quarter of new registrations in July, although large differences remain between national markets.

Manufacturers must therefore make investment decisions while several important elements of the regulatory framework remain under negotiation.

Factory conversion, battery plants and new vehicle platforms require investments planned years in advance. The conditions applying after 2030 will directly affect where those investments are made.

A Franco-German understanding would not determine the final EU rules. The European Parliament, Commission and other member states remain part of both legislative negotiations.

It could, however, bridge two of the most important disputes: Germany’s demand for greater technological flexibility in the 2035 vehicle regime and France’s demand that public money be used more directly to support European production.

The negotiations now underway suggest Paris and Berlin are increasingly treating those questions as parts of the same industrial bargain.

Taking a break from fighting Russians in the Kostiantynivka sector of the eastern Donetsk region, the commander of a Ukrainian uncrewed ground vehicle (UGV) unit spoke with us about innovations in the use of these systems. One was the first deployment of a UGV specifically designed for amphibious operations to deliver supplies to frontline troops in areas impeded by water obstacles. Large areas of the front line are bisected by rivers and wetlands, and the country has many other small waterways and marsh areas. As we have frequently reported, the use of UGVs by both Ukraine and Russia has exploded as the ubiquity of aerial attack drones makes it far too dangerous for human battlefield movements.

In an exclusive interview with TWZ, the commander of the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade’s “Alter Ego” UGV unit, who goes by the call sign “Electric,” offered us unique insights into the challenges of developing amphibious UGVs and how they were deployed.

In the first of two parts, Electric talks about why Alter Ego developed amphibious UGVs – including modifying a Triton variant for this – and how the unit made them work. The second part features his insights into using heavy ‘bomber drones’ to drop UGVs behind enemy lines for kamikaze raids. In addition, a representative of Brave1, Ukraine’s weapons technology accelerator, spoke about developing these systems at scale.

Some of the questions and answers have been slightly edited for clarity.

Q: How did the need for amphibious UGVs for logistics operations first come up?

A: We had this idea for a long time, but recently one of the units of the Armed Forces asked for our help to solve this problem, so that the UGV could overcome water obstacles.

There was a crucial need for this kind of means at certain parts of the front, but the units that are located there didn’t have the capacity by themselves to solve this task. So our battalion was asked to solve this problem because we are one of the most experienced units in terms of UGVs.

Q: How long did it take to design and test the amphibious UGV, and what went into that process?

A: The whole process from development to battle deployment took less than three months.

Q: What did you have to do to make this work?

A: First of all, we looked at amphibious solutions that were on the market, not only in Ukraine, but in the world, and we took two separate approaches. One was taking one of the main UGVs that our unit is using on the ground, and we made it amphibious. And the other approach was that we took one of the solutions that was on the market that already had amphibious capabilities, and we solved several disadvantages that it had. And at the moment, we are using both.

Q: What did you have to do to make the UGV amphibious, and then what were some of the obstacles that had to be overcome to get this operational?

A: First of all, we have to explain that there are different solutions on the market that kind of work on the testing ground — like they can swim, they can drive on the ground, and in the vision of the manufacturer, they are working. But the fact is that these solutions are not ready for the reality on the front line, which is often very different from what is on the testing ground.

And the second point is that the unit has its own workshops where people work near the front line, and the experts, the engineers that work there, they have a very high level of competence to evaluate different solutions and select the one that has potential. And that’s what’s completely different between this unit and everyone else, like manufacturers and others who are working on these solutions, because they don’t understand what’s needed on the battlefield.

Q: So what did you have to change to make it work?

A: Regarding the amphibious one, basically the unit changed almost everything that that UGV had, starting from electronics, the software, the waterproofing, the communications – we basically changed everything. Regarding the one that we already used on the ground, we basically tried to retain what was allowing it to be an effective UGV on the ground, and we added waterproofing and specific mechanics, so that it can work in the water environment.

Q: You mentioned communications. What kind of communications did you add?

A: The communication means that was installed on the UGV by the manufacturer was not sufficient at all. Basically, it didn’t have enough quality for the battlefield situation. It was not working. But we already have our own communications that we were working on, and we have a lot of experience because we have been working for a long time in this UGV area. So we basically helped to install a sufficient level of communications on this UGV.

Q: So how does the amphibious UGV communicate with the controller? Does it use Starlink or some other satellite communications system for navigation?

A: This is satellite navigation, but not only. Satellite navigation is a part of this communication system.

Q: What are the other parts?

A: It’s better not to talk in detail about the other part of the communication system.

Q: There were probably a lot of different missions that could have been used for this first amphibious UGV logistics delivery. Why was this particular mission chosen?

A: The Alter Ego unit has so much experience in terms of UGVs, and not just experience of using UGVs, but the experience of being the first in the world. We had one of the first evacuation missions, we had one of the first strike missions using UGVs, the paratrooper UGV, and now the amphibious UGV. So basically, we have the systems to make it work for the first time when nobody knows how to conduct this mission.

Q: No, I mean why did this particular mission get chosen to be the first one?

A: There are certain places on the front line where we have water obstacles that prevent logistics from being done by UGV. At the moment, UGVs are carrying hundreds of tons of logistics, probably the most compared to any other means on the front line, but before this, these water obstacles would prevent UGVs from providing logistics for those parts of the front, and that need can’t be fully satisfied by UAVs or other means. That’s why we did this mission with the amphibious UGV, and now our task here is to scale this technology and provide this logistics system for other similar parts of the front where there are water obstacles.

Q: Tell me about where and when this mission took place and what it was like to watch it unfold.

A: So unfortunately, we can’t provide information about when and where this operation took place. But regarding how it went and what we felt, this was another big challenge, because this is something that wasn’t done before, and nobody thought this is real. So this was quite difficult, and to tell the truth, the mission didn’t succeed on the first try, actually, and it required a lot of effort in terms of planning, preparing, engineering, and basically it required 100% effort from everyone involved in that mission.

Q: How many times did it fail before, and what went wrong?

A: We had one failed attempt. The reason for failure was a certain technical problem. After that, we analyzed what went wrong, and we worked on solving those issues. Basically, it’s something that nobody had tried to do, it’s kind of hard to know what can go wrong before you actually try it. So the best way to find a solution like that is to try and then iterate on that attempt and make it better and better and better.

Also, I would like to add that although this was the first successful mission regarding an amphibious UGV, it’s not that there was no work on that before that. We were actively talking to and collecting the experience of everyone who was working on these kinds of missions before, and that was also a reason why this mission succeeded.

Q: How far did the amphibious UGV go for this mission?

A: So the UGV went 40 kilometers one way, and then it returned. So probably around 70 kilometers in total, and it carried food and other supplies.

Q: Did this UGV come under Russian fire on this mission?

A: Yes, and it survived.

Q: How does the UGV switch from water to land operations?

A: So the UGV has two separate control systems, one for water and one for land, and basically it switches to the one that is required at the moment. That’s how it can operate in both environments.

Q: Is that autonomous, or is that something that the controller at the base has to do as they watch the UGV on its mission?

A: At the moment, the operator fully controls the UGV manually. And basically, before, the operators of UGVs only knew how to move them on land, but now they also had to learn how to move them in the water. So not only was the technology itself developed, but we also had to prepare the operator and come up with tactics for this UGV.

Q: Did you use AI on this mission in any way, and if so, how?

A: We didn’t use AI.

Q: Have there been other missions using amphibious UGVs?

A: Yes.

Q: Can you say how many and what was delivered?

A: No.

Q: Is this designed only for logistics missions, or will it be used in the future for strike missions, either as a one-way attack system or as a platform for machine guns or other weapons?

A: We can use it in different ways in the future.

Q: Mud season is fast approaching, when much maneuvering becomes impossible or severely degraded because of how difficult it is to move in the thick, oozing slop. Will your amphibious UGVs work in the mud?

A: I think it can operate in the mud in the same way it operates in the water.

In the next segment of our interview, Electric talks about using bomber drones to deliver UGVs behind the lines, and a Brave1 representative talks about how the organization is working to develop these systems at scale for wider use.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Inside Ukraine’s First Combat Deployment Of Robotic Amphibious Vehicles appeared first on TWZ.

The New York Times and the rest of the legacy media are in mourning after President Trump axed Biden's pro-EV fuel economy standards. But real fuel efficiency shouldn't need a mandate, says Dr Tilak Doshi.

The post Legacy Media Weep as Trump Axes Biden’s Fuel Economy Diktat appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

Cape Canaveral Space Force Station is getting lasers that can zap drones intruding into its airspace. When installed, the new directed energy defense system will be part of a much larger effort to protect the spaceport against drone incursions, a spokesperson for Space Launch Delta 45 (SLD 45) told us.

The idea is to ensure the safety of launches and to keep prying eyes away from an installation full of secrets about America’s military and commercial space efforts. Companies like SpaceX, United Launch Alliance, Blue Origin and Relativity Space use the installation for space launches. The base defense modernization effort comes as the Cape Canaveral region is inundated with drone incursions. There were hundreds last year.

“As the world’s premier spaceport continues to support an unprecedented launch tempo for national security and commercial missions, securing critical launch infrastructure from low-altitude aerial threats remains a top operational priority,” the spokesperson explained. “The ongoing security modernization integrates detection, tracking, and defensive capabilities to include directed energy systems. These will provide security forces with real-time situational awareness and the necessary tools to safeguard personnel, launch complexes, and national security payloads.”

The spokesperson did not have a timeline for when the directed energy system will be operational. Florida Today was the first to report that lasers will make up this defensive system.

Col. Brian Chatman, who commands Space Launch Delta 45, told the publication that the facility is “bringing on a directed-energy system that can do a kinetic kill against UASs (Unmanned Aircraft Systems) that are coming into the area that are having nefarious intent.”

“The Air Force Research Laboratory [AFRL]-tested system has been proven to be able to safely bring down a drone,” Florida Today noted. “This directed-energy system uses lasers to shoot down any drone that flies into restricted areas.”

Chatman didn’t name the specific system to Florida Today and the SLD 45 spokesperson declined to say.

The following video shows one such AFRL-tested system that has been used in combat before.

For the spaceport, being able to use lasers is even more important than it is for other locations needing protection from drones. That’s because the traditional method of jamming radio frequencies to interfere with drone connections to controllers could damage spacecraft.

“If you start blasting a bunch of RF energy you run into potential challenges,” Chatman explained. “You don’t want that.”

There is good reason for Chatman to be concerned about drones. The spaceport has been subjected to many unauthorized incursions, the spokesperson told us. However, there were no statistics immediately available on how many or whether they occurred during launches. There were 500 unauthorized drone flights over the adjacent Port Canaveral in 2025, Port Canaveral CEO Capt. John Murray said.

In addition, on Sept. 18, a Chinese tourist pleaded guilty to a federal misdemeanor charge after flying a drone in restricted airspace above NASA’s Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in late July. KSC is located across the Banana River from the space station.

It is unclear if the new laser system will also protect the skies over KSC. The spokesperson did not immediately know and is checking into it.

That tourist, Xiaodong He, flew a drone that videotaped the installation, according to federal documents. The drone got within 1.56 miles of pad 39B, from where the next crewed lunar flight is expected to launch in 2028.

Encompassing about 25 square miles, Cape Canaveral Space Force Station is a large, unpopulated, open area with a long Atlantic Ocean shoreline. The station’s physical layout allows many vectors for drone incursions, and what’s housed there makes it a logical target for a nefarious actor.

The systems being prepared for launch and launched at the sprawling facility are extremely valuable and can take many years to build, costing billions. When they are out on the pad or being transported around, the rockets are massive tubes packed with high explosives that would cause a devastating secondary explosion if struck.

Even disrupting launches there due to a successful or even attempted attack could have major national security impacts.

The move to bring directed energy systems to protect the spaceport comes as the military is investing heavily in these systems to counter drones. Late last month, for instance, troops from the Joint Task Force-Southern Border (JTF-SB) employed an Army Multipurpose High Energy Laser (AMP-HEL) system during an operation dubbed Ardent Vanguard. The AMP-HEL was used “to engage and defeat three hostile UAS, determined to be such based on their use in direct support of activities posing a physical threat to U.S. military personnel and CBP [Customs and Border Protection] partners,” according to a media release at the time.

The shootdown was part of the U.S. government’s ongoing effort to counter drones being flown by Mexican drug cartels.

The military is seeking to expand its ability to counter drones with directed-energy weapons. In May, the Defense Department and Joint Interagency Task Force 401 selected five installations to participate in a directed-energy counter-unmanned aircraft systems pilot program required by the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act.

“This initiative will accelerate the fielding and evaluation of advanced directed energy capabilities to protect critical infrastructure, military installations and homeland missions,” the Pentagon explained. “The locations were deliberately selected to support rigorous testing and operational assessments across diverse environments and mission sets.”  

The Pentagon selected two “key southern border installations” for this program: Fort Huachuca, Arizona; and Fort Bliss, Texas. It also tabbed Naval Base Kitsap, Washington; Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota; and Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri.

Though the Pentagon is pressing forward with making directed energy a key part of counter-drone efforts, laser weapons have limitations. These include their short-term magazine depth being limited to how many successive shots they can fire before thermal loads require the system to cool down. Energy supply can also be a limiting factor. Additionally, laser systems don’t function as well in heavy cloud cover and other inclement weather.

“We can only shoot down with a laser what we can see,” Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Brig. Gen. Yaniv Rotem once said about the IDF’s Iron Beam laser defense system, which began downing enemy drones in combat last year.

You can see the Iron Beam’s first claimed kills in the following video.

At the same time, a laser weapon of this kind is very much a point-defense weapon, with its short range meaning that multiple systems will be needed to provide coverage of a significant area. In some situations, even a single, large military base like Cape Canaveral Space Force Station might require more than one to provide full defensive coverage.

In addition, there have been concerns about the safety of the systems and the authorities required to use them in the homeland.

These issues came to a head in February, when the U.S. military used AeroVironment’s LOCUST directed energy weapon to shoot down a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) drone over southwest Texas. The friendly fire incident spurred expanded airspace restrictions over the Fort Hancock area that lasted for four months. It also gave credence to the FAA’S concerns about the operational deployment of counter-drone laser weapons along the border. The same system was used to fire at suspected Mexican cartel drones flying across the southern border into Texas two weeks earlier, which resulted in a large airspace closure, general confusion and major headlines.

Safety concerns about using directed energy weapons, and especially kinetic ones, to take down drones in the U.S. have been a major factor in why they haven’t been previously used in this role. Almost two years ago, officials at U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), which has coordinating authority for counter-drone efforts in the U.S., said the use of such weapons was not yet on the table. The reason is that they can create dangerous or otherwise serious collateral effects that are less of a concern in a war zone.

That the U.S. Space Force is bringing in a laser system to protect some of the nation’s most important and secret military assets is a strong indication that these concerns are being overcome.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Laser Weapons Will Be Deployed At Cape Canaveral Spaceport To Take Down Drones appeared first on TWZ.