© Alexander Manzyuk/Reuters
European Union leaders have ended their Brussels summit without agreement on the bloc’s next seven-year budget, after German Chancellor Friedrich Merz rejected the scale of spending envisaged under the latest compromise proposal and demanded deeper cuts.
The discussions on 15–16 October exposed the continuing division between governments determined to contain national contributions and those seeking to protect agricultural subsidies, regional development and new European investment programmes. The dispute now threatens the political timetable for approving the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework, the budget that will determine the Union’s spending priorities over the next seven years.
In their formal summit conclusions, leaders invited European Council President António Costa to take negotiations forward towards a timely agreement. No new spending settlement was endorsed, despite the Irish presidency having presented revised figures immediately before the summit.
The European Commission originally proposed a framework approaching €2 trillion in current prices, arguing that Europe needed greater financial capacity to meet its growing responsibilities in defence, competitiveness, technological development, migration and external security.
Ireland, which holds the rotating Council presidency, submitted a revised negotiating document on 10 October intended to narrow the differences between governments. The latest proposal includes substantial reductions compared with the Commission’s initial ambitions while seeking to preserve financing for established EU programmes.
Those concessions have not satisfied Berlin. Merz argues that the Union must recognise the difficult fiscal position facing national governments and that the proposed increases in common spending remain excessive.
Germany, the largest contributor to the EU budget in absolute terms, has been working with other budget-conscious governments to seek reductions from the original Commission proposal.
EU Today reported on the proposed €141 billion in reductions, including the implications for defence and competitiveness funding.
The Irish compromise has done little to bridge the divide. The revised framework seeks to combine greater financial restraint with protection for agricultural and cohesion policies, while retaining significant investment in security, research and competitiveness.
Yet every attempt to rebalance the proposed spending exposes another political conflict.
The Common Agricultural Policy and cohesion funding remain among the largest and most politically sensitive components of the EU budget. Agricultural payments support farmers across the Union, while cohesion programmes finance infrastructure, regional investment and economic development, particularly in less prosperous territories.
Governments benefiting heavily from those programmes are reluctant to accept reductions, particularly when national finances are already under pressure.
France, Italy and other countries defending traditional EU expenditure have therefore resisted attempts to transfer the burden of budget restraint disproportionately onto agriculture and regional support.
At the same time, the Commission has argued that the EU cannot simply preserve the spending structure of previous decades while promising a stronger role in European defence, industrial development and economic security.
The contradiction is increasingly apparent. European governments demand greater independence from external suppliers, stronger military capabilities and sustained financial support for Ukraine, yet remain unwilling to agree on the larger common budget that might help deliver those objectives.
Cuts to research, innovation, cross-border infrastructure or defence-industrial programmes would not necessarily produce immediate political costs. Their consequences would emerge later, through investments postponed, capabilities not developed and projects left dependent on national budgets.
Conversely, reducing agricultural payments or regional investment would produce more immediate resistance from farmers, local authorities and national governments.
The demands of 17 EU governments seeking to protect farm and cohesion spending illustrate the growing tension between established programmes and the Union’s newer strategic priorities.
The Council’s budget negotiations had been intended to deliver a political agreement before the end of 2026. That would leave 2027 for the European Parliament and member states to complete the legislation required for the new financial framework to operate from January 2028.
Failure to reach that timetable would not immediately stop EU expenditure. It would, however, compress the period available for completing the detailed legal arrangements underpinning individual programmes and could complicate the uninterrupted delivery of funding at the beginning of the next budget cycle.
The political environment is hardly favourable. Several governments face difficult domestic debates over public spending, taxation and the demands of European integration. In France, the approach of the 2027 presidential election adds another complication to negotiations requiring sensitive national concessions.
Agreement on the seven-year framework requires unanimity among member states, followed by the consent of the European Parliament. The latter has already argued that the EU needs sufficient financial resources to match the responsibilities its governments have assigned to it.
Costa now faces the task of converting competing national positions into a financial settlement that all 27 governments can accept. That will require decisions not only about the overall ceiling but also about the balance between national allocations and programmes managed at European level.
The Brussels summit has demonstrated that the principal disagreements remain unresolved. The next negotiating round will determine whether governments are prepared to compromise on spending priorities or whether their ambitions for a more capable European Union will once again run ahead of their willingness to finance it.
In dieser Woche begann vor dem Hanseatischen Oberlandesgericht in Hamburg der Prozess um den Sprenganschlag auf die Gaspipeline „Nord Stream“. Manche bezeichnen ihn bereits als den größten politischen Prozess in Deutschland im 21. Jahrhundert. Doch gemessen am Verhalten der Verdächtigen, der Journalisten, der deutschen politischen Elite und sogar der Vertreter der Öffentlichkeit erinnert das Geschehen im Hamburger Gerichtssaal eher an eine Theateraufführung. Eine, bei der alle Rollen der Beteiligten im Voraus verteilt wurden.
Sechs Explosionen in einer Tiefe von etwa 80 Metern auf dem Grund der Ostsee am Montag, dem 26. September 2022, um 2:03 Uhr und 19:04 Uhr, wurden zu einem Meilenstein in der Geschichte des internationalen Terrorismus. Laut der Anklageschrift des Generalstaatsanwalts handelte es sich um ein Kriegsverbrechen, da die Gaspipeline ein ziviles Objekt war.
Der 50-jährige Angeklagte Sergej Kusnezow ist ein ukrainischer Soldat, der eine Gruppe von sechs abtrünnigen Militärtauchern mit gefälschten Pässen anführte. Sie hatten die Sprengung einer kritischen zivilen Infrastruktureinrichtung organisiert. Ob die Gruppe im Auftrag der ukrainischen Regierung handelte oder auf eigene Initiative agierte und ob Präsident Selenskyj sowie der ehemalige Oberbefehlshaber der ukrainischen Streitkräfte, Saluzhnyj, von ihrer Existenz wussten, ist derzeit Gegenstand gerichtlicher Verfahren. Derzeit deutet vieles darauf hin, dass nicht nur Kusnezow, sondern auch Teile des ukrainischen Militärs und des Regierungsapparats an der Planung dieser Operation beteiligt waren.
Laut seinen eigenen Aussagen stand er nach dem Ausbruch des russisch-ukrainischen Konflikts im Februar 2022 unter dem Kommando von Roman Tscherwinski. Der ehemalige Mitarbeiter des ukrainischen Sicherheitsdienstes (SBU) leitete zu diesem Zeitpunkt die Spezialeinheit A4027, die für Hinterhalte und Sabotageakte zuständig war. Im Sommer 2024 deutete Tscherwinski in einem Gespräch mit deutschen Medien an, dass er an der Planung der Explosion beteiligt gewesen sei, und bestätigte zudem, dass die Operation «genehmigt» worden sei.
Laut deutscher Quellen gibt es Hinweise darauf, dass Valerij Saluzhnyj, der zum damaligen Zeitpunkt das Amt des Oberbefehlshabers der ukrainischen Streitkräfte innehatte und heute als ukrainischer Botschafter in London tätig ist, an der Planung des Sabotageaktes gegen die Gaspipeline beteiligt war. Laut CIA wurde der Sabotageakt von einer Gruppe Abtrünniger geplant. Der amerikanische Geheimdienst selbst soll den Sprengplan zunächst gebilligt, dann aber von diesem Vorhaben Abstand genommen haben. Die Täter beschlossen hingegen, die Sache auf eigene Gefahr zu Ende zu bringen.
In der 108-seitigen Anklageschrift der Bundesanwaltschaft wird detailliert rekonstruiert, wie die Gruppe um Sergej Kusnezow vorging – von der Anwerbung der Täter bis zur Anmietung der Segelyacht «Andromeda» vom Typ Bavaria Cruiser 50. Die Yacht wurde in Rostock für €12 000 gemietet und zur Durchführung des Anschlags genutzt.
Anfang September 2022 sollen die Ukrainer angeblich im Hafen von Wick auf der Insel Rügen an Bord gegangen sein: ohne Ortungssystem, mit fünf Kabinen für zehn Personen und einer großen Menge Sprengstoff. Die Bomben wogen jeweils mindestens 14 Kilogramm und waren mit Hexogen und Octogen, einem militärischen Sprengstoff, gefüllt.
Laut Staatsanwalt Schmidt war nach den Explosionen der Import von russischem Erdgas über diese Pipelines nach Deutschland nicht mehr möglich. Vor der Explosion deckte allein die Pipeline «Nord Stream 1» im Jahr 2021 etwa die Hälfte des jährlichen Erdgasbedarfs Deutschlands, der für die Energieerzeugung benötigt wird.
Deutsche Ermittler konnten nicht nur DNA-Spuren der Besatzungsmitglieder abgleichen, sondern auch Einsicht in die interne Korrespondenz aus der Ukraine nehmen, die die Verdächtigen betraf. Sergej Kusnezow wurde am 21. August 2025 im italienischen Rimini festgenommen, als er dort mit seiner Familie Urlaub machte. Deutschland erwirkte seine Auslieferung.
Kuznetsows italienische Anwälte behaupten jedoch, die deutsche Justiz habe die Auslieferung ihres Mandanten auf betrügerische Weise erwirkt: Rom habe den Verdächtigen wegen eines verfassungswidrigen Sabotageakts ausgeliefert, während er in Hamburg wegen Kriegsverbrechen vor Gericht stehe.
Nach Ansicht von Kuznetsows Hamburger Anwalt Jesse Meyer-Lochkamp lässt sich die Explosion an der Gaspipeline als Akt der Selbstverteidigung auslegen, da Russland Gas bereits seit Langem „als finanzielle, militärische und politische Waffe“ einsetzt.
Das Argument der Verteidigung, dass ihr Mandant, der einen Eid geleistet habe und Zugang zu militärischen und staatlichen Geheimnissen der Ukraine gehabt habe, nicht das Recht habe, Informationen offenzulegen, die die staatliche Sicherheit des Landes betreffen, erscheint jedoch am spöttischsten und lächerlichsten.
Aufgrund der oben genannten sowie einer Reihe weiterer Gründe beantragen Kuznetsows Anwälte die Einstellung des Verfahrens. Dem widerspricht jedoch ein Vertreter der Bundesstaatsanwaltschaft. Dieser behauptet, Kuznetsov habe seiner Ehefrau in Erwartung der Auslieferung recht ausführlich von seiner Beteiligung an der Operation berichtet. Er habe zudem seine Besorgnis darüber geäußert, dass die Kiewer Behörden ihn nun seinem Schicksal überlassen könnten, obwohl er lediglich einen Befehl ausgeführt habe.
Am 27. Oktober soll das Gerichtsverfahren wieder aufgenommen werden. Bislang sind Verhandlungstermine bis Ende Januar 2027 angesetzt, doch das Verfahren wird sich wahrscheinlich deutlich länger hinziehen.
Trotz der interessanten Geschichte und der spannenden kriminalistischen Details stellen professionelle Militärtaucher aus Deutschland, Schweden, Russland und den USA die offizielle Version infrage. Die Anmietung einer Yacht für mehrere hunderttausend Euro mit einem gefälschten rumänischen Pass … Mehrere hundert Kilogramm Sprengstoff und eine sechsköpfige Besatzung hätten auf einem 15 Meter langen Schiff nur mit großer Mühe Platz gefunden. Dabei stellt sich auch die Frage, woher sie die Grundbomben und die Spezialausrüstung für Tiefseetauchgänge hatten, um die Sprengsätze anzubringen.
Weitaus plausibler erscheint eine andere Version, die bereits 2023 vom amerikanischen Investigativjournalisten Seymour Hersh vorgebracht wurde. Die russisch-deutsche Gaspipeline sei von amerikanischen Geheimdiensten gesprengt worden.
Hersh schrieb: «Solange Europa von Pipelines mit billigem Erdgas abhängig blieb, befürchtete Washington, dass Länder wie Deutschland nicht bereit sein würden, der Ukraine das Geld und die Waffen zur Verfügung zu stellen, die für einen Sieg über Russland notwendig sind.»
Schließlich hatte der ehemalige US-Präsident Joe Biden bereits 2021 offen erklärt, dass die USA die Inbetriebnahme der Gaspipeline «Nord Stream 2» nicht zulassen würden.
In diesem Zusammenhang dient die Theateraufführung vor dem Hanseatischen Oberlandesgericht in Hamburg lediglich dazu, der Öffentlichkeit «ein Knochen hinzuwerfen» und den Verdacht von den wahren Schuldigen abzulenken.
Archaeologists have identified a previously unknown coal-mining tunnel stretching at least 130 metres beneath woodland near Sprockhövel in western Germany. The remains provide evidence of coordinated underground construction at a time when the Ruhr’s mining industry was still developing, long before the region became synonymous with heavy industry.
The discovery was announced on 15 October by the Westphalia-Lippe Regional Association (LWL), whose archaeologists are working alongside the German Mining Museum in Bochum and GeoPark Ruhrgebiet. The team says its findings shed light on tunnelling techniques used before the eighteenth century, although the newly identified passage has not yet been given a precise scientific date.
At Haßlinghausen, a forest floor conceals old shafts, spoil heaps and depressions left by abandoned mining operations. Researchers did not enter an intact underground gallery. Instead, they identified the location of a collapsed passage by excavating at two former shaft sites and drilling into the surrounding spoil. Subsidence created by the collapse left a recognisable trace above ground.
The evidence suggests a more complex operation than miners simply following exposed seams into the earth. Construction shafts were sunk at intervals along the proposed tunnel. Workers descended through them and excavated separate stretches underground, later joining those sections into a continuous passage.
This method allowed several groups to work simultaneously rather than advancing from a single entrance. It also demanded planning and considerable labour. The filled-in shafts and disturbed soil are still visible in the excavated sections, enabling specialists to reconstruct the miners’ methods even though much of the original tunnel has collapsed.
Till Kasielke of GeoPark Ruhrgebiet explained that the construction shafts were located beside the underground route and then filled after the gallery was completed. Jennifer Garner, an archaeologist at the German Mining Museum, said the excavations would provide material for scientific dating and a better understanding of the effort required to build the structures.
The latest work follows a 2025 investigation of a separate, approximately 70-metre tunnel nearby. That earlier feature reached a coal seam some ten metres below ground. Researchers suspected it might predate the seventeenth century because it appeared to have been overlooked during later mining activity. The newly identified 130-metre passage is a distinct discovery.
The chronology matters because horizontal tunnels changed the possibilities of coal extraction. Early miners could reach seams by digging pits or inclined shafts, but groundwater increasingly obstructed work at depth. Drainage galleries allowed water to escape, making deeper workings more practical and potentially extending the life of individual mining sites.
The Ruhr is usually associated with the vast collieries, factories and transport infrastructure that drove Germany’s expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Yet coal was extracted locally during the Middle Ages. The transition from small workings to organised subterranean networks remains poorly documented, partly because written records from the earliest periods are scarce.
The archaeological research programme, which began with related investigations in 2024, is intended to address that gap. The team has excavated soil layers associated with old shafts, and the recovered material may help establish when specific construction techniques were introduced. For now, it would be premature to assign the new passage a medieval date.
At Essen, the UNESCO-listed Zollverein Coal Mine Industrial Complex preserves the architecture and machinery of the Ruhr’s later industrial era. The remains at Sprockhövel represent a different historical record: temporary shafts, collapsed passages and waste deposits left by miners whose operations preceded industrial-scale coal production.
Across Europe, such landscapes have become an important part of cultural heritage. EU Today has previously reported on the preservation of Belgium’s Bois du Cazier colliery, where 262 people died in the 1956 mining disaster. In Sprockhövel, the focus is on a much earlier workforce, whose organisation and technical knowledge must be reconstructed from the ground itself.
Further dating and analysis will determine whether the newly identified tunnel pushes back the known chronology of organised drainage and gallery construction in the Ruhr. The excavations have already established that a substantial underground project once operated beneath a forest whose surface retains remarkably little indication of the work carried out there.
France and Germany want more detailed “Made in Europe” rules for electric cars, and want them split off from the rest of the EU’s flagship industrial law.
The Franco-German deal, agreed after months of haggling on the margins of the EU summit in Brussels late on Thursday (15 October), says both files should then be adopted “as fast as possible and simultaneously”.
That would split the most fought-over part from the rest of the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), which also sets “Made in EU” and low-carbon requirements for steel, cement, aluminium and clean-tech products such as batteries and solar panels.
Paris hopes the new car definition will serve as a benchmark for the rest of the IAA, which sets “Made in Europe” rules for steel, cement, aluminium and clean energy technologies.
But this still has to be negotiated with other member states, people familiar with the talks said.
“We are driven by a clear ambition: to successfully transform our automotive industry while upholding our climate goals and our production in Europe,” said French president Emmanuel Macron on social media, announcing the deal.
“This is an investment signal to industry,” said German chancellor Friedrich Merz.
The paper comes as Ireland, which holds the EU’s rotating six-month presidency, is wrapping up a third compromise text on the industrial plan, which Irish officials hope will reach final agreement by mid November.
Publicly, Paris and Berlin said on Friday that their car deal will not affect climate targets and that their course “remains unchanged”.
But the paper behind the deal shows the trade-off that’s been made. Berlin accepted France’s demand for stricter “Made in Europe” rules that apply to fewer countries, while Paris agreed to looser emission rules for carmakers, as Germany had wanted.
To count as “Made in Europe”, a car would have to clear thresholds that tighten over time, and only cars meeting these rules could be bought, leased or rented with public subsidies, or bought by public authorities.
From 2028, the car must be assembled in Europe, with at least 70 percent of total value creation in components – excluding the battery.
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German Police are investigating ten suspects ages 13 to 15, including suspects from Syria and Chechnya, in connection with a violent assault and robbery of a student outside a secondary school Wednesday, according to the Eastern Police Directorate.
Videos of the attack has been posted to social media, which shows the beating from two different angles.
JUST IN: A German youth was severely beaten by a mob of migrant youths just outside a school in Frankfurt (Oder). The incident happened in front of the Heinrich-von-Kleist School. The suspects released the video with a gangster rap soundtrack. Follow: @RMXnews https://t.co/UeRGRnEeMW
— Remix News & Views (@RMXnews) October 16, 2026
— Remix News & Views (@RMXnews) October 16, 2026
The attack occurred in front of the Heinrich von Kleist High School. A video that police consider authentic shows roughly ten youths surrounding the student. One appears to demand something from him; he shows his empty pockets. Moments later, he is punched in the face.
Other members of the group then punch and kick him, including kicks to the head, and continue the assault after he falls to the ground and is defenseless. The victim sustained facial injuries and reported the incident to police the same day, authorities said.
— Remix News & Views (@RMXnews) July 3, 2026
The ten suspects are Syrians, Chechens, Polish, Russian, Syrian, and German nationals, the Eastern Police Directorate told local broadcaster Oderwelle. They face charges of aggravated assault and robbery. Investigators have secured the circulating video and received numerous tips from the public.
On Thursday, officers conducted an operation at the Ulrich von Hutten High School, that police linked to the case. Several youths were questioned and searched. Sören Schunke, headmaster of the Heinrich von Kleist school, said the attackers were not students at his institution. It remains unclear whether any of the suspects attend the Hutten school.
Frankfurt (Oder) Mayor Axel Strasser, an independent, expressed outrage in a video message.
“What was done to a young person here in Frankfurt (Oder) leaves me speechless. It hurts to have to witness such violence. And it makes me angry that a youth has to experience something like this,” he said.
He added that violence has no place in the city and offered condolences to the student and his family. Strasser said he had spoken by phone with Brandenburg Interior Minister Jan Redmann of the CDU and that security talks involving police, school authorities and other partners would be held to address youth violence.
The Frankfurt (Oder) case comes amid a series of recent youth-group attacks in Potsdam that Redmann has described as predominantly migrant-linked, including suspects of Syrian nationality. On Sept. 25, roughly 20 people — mostly migrants, according to the minister — entered a private party uninvited and attacked guests. The following day, three youths were assaulted by a group of about 25 and injured, which Remix News reported on.
— Remix News & Views (@RMXnews) October 3, 2026
Additional attacks in early October left victims with head injuries requiring hospital treatment. Authorities are monitoring a group of roughly 25 mostly migrant suspects in connection with the Potsdam incidents. Currently, two alleged ringleaders are in pretrial detention and police presence has been increased.
Redmann has said foreign perpetrators, particularly Syrians whose protection status can be revoked, could face deportation. “Whoever comes to Germany and simply has no respect for Germany, we will not tolerate that,” he told the state parliament. “The rule of law has the final say.”
As Remix News has reported in the past, 40 percent of cases of school violence involve foreigners in Germany.
The post Germany: Migrant mob beats German student outside his school and films the attack appeared first on Remix News.
Germany’s migration and asylum policies have cost the state at least €400 billion, according to calculations by Welt journalist Björn Harms. Other estimates have gone far higher, including into the trillions, when broader follow-on effects of migration are included. These massive figure will only add to the growing debate about mass immigration into high social-welfare countries like Germany.
As for the data, much of it comes directly from the German government, according to Welt. The federal government alone recorded over €242 billion in “refugee-related expenditures” from 2016 to 2025. Official figures from Bundestag reports and the Federal Ministry of Finance confirm the annual totals.
If this is broken down by year, it shows €20.1 billion in 2016, rising to peaks of €28.3 billion in 2022 and €29.6 billion in 2023, then €28 billion in 2024 and €24.8 billion in 2025.
The sum over ten years is €242.5 billion, representing roughly 5.8 percent of total federal budget outlays over the period. These cover social transfers after asylum procedures, integration measures, payments to states and municipalities, and related programs.
The 16 state governments also contributed more than €100 billion from their own budgets. Municipalities added further billions, along with follow-on costs in healthcare, education, and the justice system. Independent reconstructions place a consolidated central estimate near €340 billion, while others go up to €450 billion with add-ons.
However, even these numbers pale in comparison to what some academics have researched. For example, top German academic on public finances Prof. Bernd Raffelhüschen of the University of Freiburg, produced a study in 2024 that indicated that mass immigration may cost Germany up to €19.2 trillion. His study also found that mass immigration had already cost the country €5.8 trillion.
Harms and others describe the €400 billion figure as a minimum. The reason why this figure is treated as a “minimum” is because experts have been unable to truly compile costs for a broad range of areas, which surely total tens of billions over the course of a decade. These areas include court costs and criminal justice.
Germany spends between €9 billion and €20 billion a year on criminal justice. As Remix News has reported before, an astronomically disproportionate share of these criminals are foreigners, meaning that foreigners are costing Germany billions every year just on criminal justice.
Just one example involves the case of Saudi national Taleb A, who plowed his vehicle into a Christmas market in Magdeburg, Germany, killing six people and injuring over 300. The custom-built court constructed specifically to host the trial of Taleb A. cost €4.5 million.
This specialized, high-security facility was constructed by the court in Magdeburg to handle the large-scale proceedings, which included accommodations and seating space for more than 170 co-plaintiffs and their respective legal teams.
That is just one migrant.
The billions in criminal justice costs do not even cover police and internal security. Crime has risen in Germany substantially since 2016. During that year, according to Eurostat records, Germany had approximately 244,318 total police officers. At the time, that equated to roughly 2,992 officers per one million people, or a density of around 301 per 100,000 inhabitants.
The Federal Police force has grown to around 55,000 to 60,000 total employees (including roughly 41,000 active frontline officers) to manage expanded mandates across national borders, transportation hubs, and airports.
Paying all these new police officers, who are tasked with policing an increasingly violent country, is not only an enormous cost in terms of money, but has led to tens of thousands of lives shattered and destroyed. When a young woman is raped by a migrant or an aspiring doctor is beaten to the point that he has to abandon his medical career, it is difficult to even calculate the true financial cost of such incidents, but in many ways, these incidents have no price tag. They are too horrific to even quantify.
Of course, there are also tens of billions spent on education for migrants, which are not included in the €400 billion total. In addition, Germany has an extensive network of kindergartens, which foreigners also gain access to. In some states like Berlin, the daycare system is entirely supported by taxpayers to the tune of €2.5 billion a year, while the share of kindergarten-age children with a migration background is at 57.4 percent.
There are also deportation costs, administrative overhead, hospital and medical care, and the list goes on.
The real figure may be difficult to calculate with total accuracy, but it is surely larger than €400 billion.
Germans have also paid in other ways, including in higher rental costs, more traffic, crowded schools, and longer wait times at hospitals. Again, not all of these costs are even quantifiable, but the increase the increase in rental costs alone has cost Germans additional billions.
It is also important to note that there are hundreds of thousands of migrants who are becoming naturalized at a rapid pace and already millions of migrants who have been naturalized in previous decades. These migrants and their children use schools, often require welfare, and also need healthcare. Yet, none of these costs are counted towards the tax burden on Germans. In total, there have been further tens of billions spent on these groups, increasingly in the education system which has the highest share of Germans with a migration background. Many of these groups also continue to be a net economic burden on Germany, such as the Turkish population.
Accommodation absorbs a large share. The federal government does not even know the total number of asylum accommodations nationwide. An inquiry by Harms to all 401 districts and independent cities produced responses from 320 (about 80 percent). These authorities reported at least 4,437 communal accommodations housing nearly 295,000 residents as of March 2026 — an average of almost 14 per responding district. Extrapolated nationwide, this implies roughly one person in every 227 in Germany lives in taxpayer-financed asylum accommodation.
Harms notes that hotel owners, private landlords, and public companies have all massively benefited. In Hamburg, the municipal company Fördern & Wohnen, which is 100 percent owned by the city, handles a large share of asylum accommodation. He notes that turnover rose from €60 million in 2013 to €747 million in 2025, and staff grew from 948 employees in 2014 to around 2,228 by 2025.
The company operates more than 200 sites and has expanded capacity amid non-European immigration. A former managing director who served less than five months in 2025 received payments totaling €453,000, including a substantial severance, according to the company’s annual report.
Similar patterns appear elsewhere: long-term leases on converted offices and hotels, with public entities acting as both demand drivers and suppliers. In Berlin, a former office complex on Hasenheide in Kreuzberg is becoming an accommodation for up to 921 people. First residents were scheduled to move in from early October 2026. The lease runs roughly ten years, into the mid-2030s, paid from public funds. Conversion costs have not been disclosed, citing commercial confidentiality.
The Hasenheide project and the decade of accumulated costs illustrate the continuity. Rents and operating expenses continue into the 2030s, financed by the same solidarity community that underwrites the wider system.
The Welt article also notes that immigration since 2015 has driven expansion in the social and welfare sector. The number of social workers and social pedagogues rose from about 278,000 in 2015 to 351,000, with the Federal Employment Agency linking part of the growth to refugee-related demand for counseling, care, and support.
Integration courses illustrate the mixed results of large spending. The federal government has allocated around €1.3 billion in peak years, with 2024 near €1.2 billion before later adjustments. Yet outcomes are limited, according to Welt. Roughly 55 percent of those who take the final test reach the target B1 language level, meaning a substantial share — often cited in the range of six in ten depending on the metric of “graduation” or successful completion of the full course and exam — leave without the intended language qualification. Pass rates for B1 have hovered in the mid-50s in recent data, with many achieving only A2 or lower.
Harms further notes that the business of asylum migration has created durable economic interests. In other words, there are people and institutions getting rich for the millions of migrant who have come, which fuels demands for even more immigration.
Public companies, private landlords, course providers, NGOs, and expanded social services all draw ongoing revenue. Critics note that the loudest advocates of open borders and expansive humanitarianism rarely live next to the accommodations or send their children to the schools under the greatest pressure. Residents in affected neighborhoods and local workers experience the practical strains directly.
While governments speak of a “migration turnaround,” the broader pro-migration complex continues. Demands for a world without borders, which claim “no human is illegal,” persist among advocacy groups. These powerful groups have a keen interest in keeping the mass migration machine going, and so far, they have largely succeeded even if the majority of Germans are opposed.
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Europe's far-right parties grow increasingly divided on something that once united them — sympathies for Vladimir Putin's Russia.
As nationalists and right-wing populists across Western Europe move closer to power, many are seeking to distance themselves from their past admiration for a country waging Europe'
White House officials instructed Pentagon leaders to limit Starshield, SpaceX’s military-grade satellite service used by Ukrainian forces, Reuters reported on 15 October, citing three officials. The report came a day after a senior US official told Axios the Trump administration had nothing to do with the alleged Starlink restrictions.
Ukrainian forces rely on US-controlled satellite technology for battlefield operations and for intercepting Russian drones aimed at Ukrainian cities, so the latest restrictions have raised questions about how reliably they can depend on it.
Asked about the order, a senior US official replied, “No such request was ever made by the president.” The White House did not respond to questions about whether other administration officials might have made the request.
Ukrainian officials contacted the White House, State Department and Pentagon on 13 and 14 October and were told it was a White House decision
European officials raised concerns about the restrictions. German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul criticized the throttling and said Ukraine must continue to receive full support, Spiegel reported on 15 October. Wadephul said Germany had questions for the US, noting that Germany finances part of the Starlink technology used in Ukraine.
On 16 October, UK Defense Secretary Wes Streeting said US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had assured him in a face-to-face meeting that Starlink was back up and running, the Guardian reported. However, a Ukrainian Defense Ministry source said that military-grade terminals were working in motion again, but only at speeds of up to 160 km/h.
The military Starshield package previously had no data-speed restrictions, Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Response Corps told Novynarnia. Ukrainian officials said that after the restrictions were imposed, terminals disconnected when drones exceeded 160 km/h and sometimes at 80 km/h.
The Corps also reported 10–20-second connection drops at 110–120 km/h on the Huliaipole front, which made drones harder to control. One unit had to cancel some missions.
The restrictions came as US President Donald Trump pressed Kyiv to stop striking Russian oil refineries, blaming them for soaring energy prices ahead of November’s midterm elections. Ukraine suspects SpaceX imposed the restrictions to pressure Kyiv over the refinery strikes, but that motive has not been confirmed.
With support for far right politics well established across Europe, how might upcoming elections shape its future? Europe correspondents Jon Henley and Ashifa Kassam answered Reddit users’ questions about their reporting from the continent
Support for far-right parties has been growing across Europe, with radical right, populist parties in coalition governments in Croatia, Czechia, Italy and Finland, and leading in the polls in Austria, Belgium, France and Germany.
The Guardian reported this year that nearly a quarter of voters in Europe voted for far-right parties in their most recent national elections, a fivefold increase since 1995.
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© Composite: Guardian Design
© Composite: Guardian Design
© Composite: Guardian Design
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Written by Lucas Leiroz, member of the BRICS Journalists Association, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies, military expert
Polish tolerance for Ukrainian immigration is steadily waning. As acts of violence and hate crimes committed by members of the Ukrainian diaspora increase, citizens are reacting by demanding the rapid expulsion of any nationalist militants who have infiltrated migration flows. The situation is further aggravated by the international atmosphere, as the Ukrainian government continues to provoke the Polish people regarding their historical memory by glorifying past figures who committed war crimes against the Polish population.
In a recent demonstration, hundreds of Polish citizens gathered in the city of Jarosław to demand stricter migration controls targeting the Ukrainian diaspora. Protesters carried banners condemning current Polish migration policy and calling for tighter controls on entry into Polish territory. Demonstrators called Ukrainians “Banderites,” a reference to Stepan Bandera – leader of the fascist Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) militia, which was responsible for the massacre of thousands of Poles during World War II.
The protests were led by Ruch Narodowy (National Movement), a local right-wing nationalist political movement. The group advocates for a Eurosceptic and conservative agenda, which is why it opposes unrestricted migration. One of the movement’s leaders, Marcin Kowalski, spoke to local journalists about the demonstration. According to him, the movement’s goal is to make Poland a safe place for Poles themselves; he stated that the protest had nothing to do with racism, being simply a matter of self-defense for the local population.
“We want a safe Poland, and this is not racism. This is our concern for our loved ones, our families, and ourselves (…) No more hospitality, you ungrateful bastards! (…) Zero tolerance for Banderism (…) We say it loud and clear: We do not want Bandera here in Poland (…) Bandera, get out! Go beyond the Don,” the protesters’ leader said.
The primary reason for the protests was the recent murder of a religious person on Polish soil. Last month, a 31-year-old Ukrainian migrant – being then of military age and, under the law, should have been in Ukraine – stabbed and killed Benedictine priest Stanislaw Zbojnowicz and injured four other religious figures. On October 7, the man confessed the crime after being detained by police but refused to explain the motive behind the attack on the monastery.
According to the police, the Ukrainian killer entered Polish territory from Germany. Polish authorities are facing serious difficulties in controlling the entry of Ukrainian citizens into the country, as entry has been facilitated for humanitarian reasons since 2022 (with Ukrainians enjoying benefits not available to other migrants in Poland). Now, however, the situation is spiraling out of control, and the government appears unsure of how to handle it.
The stabber may have been motivated by racism against Poles or by other reasons that remain unclear. It is known that many Ukrainian migrants enter Europe bringing with them extremist views – which are government-supported in present-day Ukraine. Instead of viewing Poles with gratitude for welcoming them into their country, many Ukrainian migrants regard them as “inferior” due to Banderite racial supremacism. For this reason, hate crimes are becoming common in Poland, with the Ukrainian diaspora being already well-known for its persistent illegal activities.
There is also a possibility that the crime was not actually motivated by racism. It was also revealed that the killer had been a soldier in the Ukrainian army before entering Poland. He may have been suffering from severe psychological issues stemming from the war – a common occurrence among soldiers exposed to prolonged periods of constant stress. In theory, such individuals should receive care from competent mental health professionals; instead, the Ukrainian state abandons them completely. Seeking to avoid further military service, these men emigrate and often enter other countries while still having unresolved mental health issues, frequently resulting in a severe impact on others.
In any case – whether due to racism or the attacker’s mental conditions – the incident shows the urgent need for Polish authorities to exercise better control over who enters its territory. Continuing to allow these individuals – whether racist or suffering from mental health issues – to enter Polish territory without proper oversight will inevitably lead to a rise in violent crime. Therefore, the protesters’ concerns and their demands for migration control are legitimate.
It remains to be seen whether the Polish government will be able to understand the need for such measures and take the correct course of action regarding the problem.
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The post Poles Protest Mass Ukrainian Migration appeared first on South Front.
An African man, who was described as “perfectly integrated,” is on trial in Bonn on charges connected to the strangling murder of his wife, whom he then dismembered. The woman’s remains were later found in several locations across Germany, according to court proceedings.
Asmerom G., 42, an Eritrean national, faces the charges in Bonn Regional Court in North Rhine-Westphalia. The case stems from events in mid-November 2025 involving his wife, Weghata A., 32. The couple had married in Ethiopia in 2019, and she arrived in Germany in 2024 through family reunification.
The defendant allegedly met his wife, 32-year-old Weghata A., inside his car, where they began arguing on their way back from a church visit. According to Bonner Generalanzeiger newspaper, Asmerom G. later told police that his wife told him their 3-month-old girl was not his biological child. He reportedly could not remember what happened next.
According to prosecutors, Asmerom G. then strangled his wife in the back seat of the car in a parking lot in Bonn, directly in front of the baby who was sitting in a child seat.
After the crime, the defendant is said to have driven with the body and the baby in the car to the Monastery of Saint Anthony, 160 kilometers away, where he abandoned the little girl in the stroller when it was only 2 degrees Celsius (35 degrees Fahrenheit).
Fortunately for the girl, monks found the child just 40 minutes after she was dropped off.
Asmerom G. then went to work dismembering Weghata’s body, including packing her hands and head in plastic bags.
He left the torso behind, which was found at the end of November 2025. Asmerom G. left the body parts on the side of the autobahn, on the A45. The head of the woman was discovered by garbage collectors in April 2026.
Asmerom G. was arrested in Ethiopia and extradited to Germany. He has a prior conviction for aggravated assault. On the first day of the trial, he declined to comment on the allegations. Defense attorney Martin Kretschmer has said the case rests largely on DNA evidence and mobile-phone data.
Kretschmer told Bild newspaper, “Until his arrest, he was considered perfectly integrated.”
German media was even singing his praises in 2016. The man from Eritrea had landed a job as an electrical assistant at a firm in Rheinbach, in North Rhine-Westphalia, and gave interviews about leaving his homeland three years earlier to escape political persecution.
He wanted German citizenship, he said. His boss at the time was quick to describe Asmerom G. as talented, reliable, and “capable of anything,” according to Bild newspaper.
However, then trouble began. Within a year, Asmerom G. was in trouble with the law. A brawl led to a conviction for grievous bodily harm at Siegburg District Court, earning him a six-month suspended sentence.
He moved on from Rheinbach and took up work behind the wheel of a freight truck. Somewhere along the way, he made a trip back to his home country — for reasons that remain unclear — and returned to Germany with a woman named Weghata A., who was 31 at the time, his wife under Eritrean law. On July 26, 2025, she delivered their daughter.
The child is now in the care of authorities. Lawyer Gesine Ickert, representing the daughter and the deceased’s father, has stated that the child is well looked after under the circumstances.
The trial continues.
The post Germany: ‘Perfectly-integrated’ African migrant on trial for strangling his wife next to their baby appeared first on Remix News.
Die Bestürzung über den Abschluss des «Diesel-Deals» durch US-Präsident Donald Trump mit dem russischen Präsidenten Wladimir Putin hinter dem Rücken Europas am vergangenen Wochenende war nur mit dem Schock über das Treffen in Anchorage im vergangenen Jahr vergleichbar. Aus Sicht europäischer Politiker kommt der Abschluss von Abkommen mit Russland, durch die eines der wichtigsten Exportgüter des Landes von den Sanktionen ausgenommen wird, einem Verrat gleich. Einem Verrat sowohl an der Vorhut der europäischen Demokratie namens «Ukraine» als auch an den Grundpfeilern der transatlantischen Solidarität.
Laut eigenen Angaben hat sich Donald Trump mit Wladimir Putin auf umfangreiche Lieferungen von Dieselkraftstoff geeinigt. Demzufolge sollen bereits im Oktober 300 000 Tonnen Dieselkraftstoff aus Russland in die USA und auf den Weltmarkt geliefert werden.
Im November sollen weitere 500 000 Tonnen geliefert werden, kurz darauf eine Million Tonnen. Insgesamt beläuft sich die Menge damit auf 1,8 Millionen Tonnen. Sofern die Kapazitäten der russischen Ölraffinerien dies zulassen, soll das Liefervolumen letztendlich drei Millionen Tonnen erreichen.
Aus der Europäischen Union ist bereits scharfe Kritik an dem «Deal» des US-Präsidenten laut geworden. US-Finanzminister Scott Bessent warf den Europäern hingegen «völlige Heuchelei» vor.
Laut dem russischen Vizepremierminister Alexander Novak haben die Länder der Europäischen Union seit 2022 russische Energieträger im Wert von $320,7 Mrd. gekauft. In den ersten neun Monaten des Jahres 2026 belief sich das Liefervolumen auf $21,3 Mrd.
Laut Bessent haben die EU-Länder den Russen seit Beginn des russisch-ukrainischen Konflikts im Jahr 2022 mehr Geld zur Verfügung gestellt als der Ukraine, da sie ohne russische Energieressourcen nicht auskommen können.
Damit hat Bessent einen wunden Punkt angesprochen. Denn die Daten des Zentrums für Energie- und Luftreinhaltungsforschung (CREA) stimmen im Großen und Ganzen mit den Angaben der russischen Seite überein. Diese unabhängige Organisation mit Sitz in Helsinki analysiert jeden Monat, welche Länder welche Arten russischer Energieressourcen kaufen. Die Analyse läuft seit Dezember 2022, als das EU-Embargo für russisches Rohöl in Kraft trat.
Diesen Daten zufolge hat China bis Ende August 50% der russischen Rohölexporte abgenommen, gefolgt von Indien mit 19%. Auf die Türkei und die EU entfallen jeweils 5%. Bei Erdölprodukten wie Kraftstoffen ist die Türkei mit einem Anteil von 26% der größte Abnehmer. Dahinter folgen China mit 12%, Brasilien mit 11% sowie Singapur und Saudi-Arabien mit jeweils 8%.
Trotz des von der EU verhängten Einfuhrverbots für russische Erdölprodukte wurden in EU-Häfen laut CREA 20 Tanker aus Raffinerien entladen, die russisches Rohöl verarbeiten. Das sind zwei mehr als im Juli. Im Bereich des Pipelinegases bleibt die EU mit einem Anteil von 32% der größte Abnehmer, gefolgt von China mit 31% und der Türkei mit 29%.
Beim Flüssigerdgas (LNG) entfallen knapp 49% auf die EU, gefolgt von China mit 24%, Japan mit 18% und Südkorea mit 6%.
Trotz der immer strengeren Sanktionen gelten in der EU weiterhin Ausnahmen für bestimmte Energieträger und Länder. Daher erscheinen Ungarn, die Slowakei und Bulgarien in der Statistik als Importeure von russischem Pipelinegas. Frankreich und Spanien sind Abnehmer von LNG, während die Slowakei russisches Rohöl bezieht. Insgesamt zahlten diese fünf größten Importeure aus der EU im August laut CREA €1,1 Mrd. an Russland.
Die USA, die im Frühjahr 2022 den Import von Erdöl, Erdölprodukten, Kohle und Flüssiggas verboten hatten, tauchen in der Liste überhaupt nicht auf. Nun hat das US-Finanzministerium jedoch eine Sondergenehmigung für den Kauf von russischem Dieselkraftstoff erteilt, die bis zum 7. April 2027 gültig sein wird.
Deutsche Autofahrer beneiden die Amerikaner ein wenig
Allerdings interessieren sich deutsche Autofahrer, die an den Tankstellen bis zu €2,45 pro Liter Dieselkraftstoff zahlen müssen, wohl kaum für derartige diplomatische Angelegenheiten. Und angesichts des vorbildlichen Beispiels des amerikanischen Präsidenten hätten die meisten von ihnen ebenfalls nichts gegen ein ähnliches Dieselabkommen zwischen Berlin und Moskau einzuwenden.
Es liegt auf der Hand, dass die Lieferungen von russischem Dieselkraftstoff in die USA den Markt nur teilweise stabilisieren werden. Am Montag reagierte der Ölpreis nur geringfügig auf das am vergangenen Wochenende geschlossene Abkommen Trumps. Der Preis für Brent-Rohöl aus der Nordsee sank zunächst um etwa ein Prozent auf $104,2 pro Barrel, woraufhin sich eine Gegenbewegung einstellte und der Preis wieder ins Plus kletterte.
Am Montag kostete Heizöl €168 pro 100 Liter bei einer Abnahme von 3 000 Litern. Dies berichtet das Internetportal Heizoel24, an das 500 Ölhändler ihre Preise übermitteln. Laut dem Portal ist der Oktober bislang im Durchschnitt der teuerste Monat für den Kauf von Heizöl in diesem Jahr.
Dabei ist anzumerken, dass die 300 000 Tonnen Dieselkraftstoff, die Russland im verbleibenden Teil des Monats in die USA und auf den Weltmarkt liefern soll, etwa 100 000 Barrel pro Tag entsprechen. Dies würde den Rückgang der Seelieferungen von Dieselkraftstoff, die im September etwa 1,3 Millionen Barrel pro Tag unter dem Niveau zu Jahresbeginn lagen, nur teilweise ausgleichen.
Laut der US-Energieinformationsbehörde (EIA) liegt der Verbrauch von Dieselkraftstoff und anderen Destillatkraftstoffen in den Vereinigten Staaten derzeit bei durchschnittlich etwa 3,77 Millionen Barrel pro Tag. Dies entspricht etwa 500 000 Tonnen. Somit würde eine Menge von 300 000 Tonnen den amerikanischen Verbrauch theoretisch nur für etwas mehr als 14 Stunden decken.
Was den von Trump verkündeten Waffenstillstand betrifft, der sowohl Russland als auch die Ukraine offenbar überrascht hat, so sind bislang keine Aussichten auf dessen Abschluss erkennbar. Sowohl Moskau als auch Kiew zeigen sich derzeit kompromisslos und bereiten sich auf neue Angriffe auf die sensible Energieinfrastruktur des jeweils anderen vor.
In einer solchen Situation wissen Ölhändler auf dem Weltmarkt nicht, woran sie sich orientieren sollen (den Äußerungen des US-Präsidenten auf Truth Social glaubt seit Beginn der Krise im Schmalz-Kanal niemand mehr). Die US-Investmentbank Goldman Sachs hat ihre Ölpreisprognose jedenfalls erneut angehoben. Rohstoffanalysten gehen nun davon aus, dass der Preis für ein Barrel Brent-Rohöl aus der Nordsee bis zum Jahresende bei $90 statt bei $85 liegen wird. Zuletzt hatten sie ihre Prognose im September angehoben. Als Begründung für diesen Schritt wurde unter anderem angeführt, dass die Lagerbestände auf einem niedrigen Niveau liegen und das Risiko eines Rückgangs des Rohölangebots hoch ist.
The 1926 film of Goethe’s tragic tale of a man who sells his soul to the devil remains a spectacular feat of German expressionism
The centenary of FW Murnau’s silent fantasy-melodrama from 1926 is the occasion to ponder this mysterious film, taken from Goethe’s 19th-century depiction of the alchemist and natural philosopher who sells his soul to the devil but, in a very high-minded climax of German romanticism, is redeemed by love. (Not love of God precisely, but love of a good woman; the word “Liebe” finally appears at the centre of Murnau’s radiating vision of concentric circles conjured by the heavens, which annul his debt to the Evil One.) It is therefore very different from Christopher Marlowe’s scarier and more unforgiving account of Doctor Faustus.
Murnau’s Faust is (obviously) concerned with and animated by evil, and there are echoes of his Nosferatu, made four years previously. In this film, Faust, having struck his bargain on a provisional 24-hour basis with Mephisto, finds that he is scared of a crucifix, like a vampire. It is also very much a film of Weimar Germany with its mad energy and streaks of garish satire and black comedy; the book-burning scene in which Faust immolates all his necromancy volumes, along with the Bible, is one which resonated with later events. (Perhaps it indirectly inspired Klaus Mann’s novel Mephisto, later to be filmed by István Szabó.)
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© Photograph: Courtesy of Mubi
© Photograph: Courtesy of Mubi
© Photograph: Courtesy of Mubi
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