Neste Guerra Fria, José Milhazes e Nuno Rogeiro analisam a escalada nos bombardeamentos às cidades ucranianas, a resposta de Kiev, a misteriosa ausência dos satélites americanos e o aviso que Zelensky deixou à Europa caso Putin cumpra os seus objetivos: “Querem 25 milhões de ucranianos como refugiados?”, na visão de Rogeiro. Ouça aqui o programa em podcast
El diestro ha celebrado en la tarde de este domingo el décimo aniversario de su alternativa con un doble rabo
The administration of US President Donald Trump is considering the restoration of Russian natural gas supplies to Europe, including through Ukraine’s pipeline network, as part of a proposed settlement to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. The initiative would offer Moscow renewed energy revenues while potentially opening opportunities for American investors to participate in the trade.
According to a New York Times investigation published on 17 October, presidential envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have raised the proposal with Ukrainian and European officials, including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The White House has confirmed that economic incentives for Russia and Ukraine form part of its peace diplomacy, although no agreement on renewed gas transit has been announced.
The proposal would require Ukraine to reopen a transit route that ceased operating for Russian exports in January 2025, while European governments would be expected to resume purchases they have spent years reducing. American negotiators reportedly regard the prospect of renewed commercial revenues as an incentive for President Vladimir Putin to reach a settlement.
There is, however, a considerable difference between offering Russia a commercial opportunity after a verified peace agreement and restoring a source of revenue and political influence before Moscow has demonstrated any willingness to abandon its territorial objectives.
The reported initiative represents a reversal of Trump’s earlier position on European energy security.
During his first presidency, Trump repeatedly warned Germany that its dependence on Russian energy exposed it to political pressure from Moscow. Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2018, he accused Berlin of becoming dangerously dependent on Russian supplies. Members of the German delegation visibly smiled at his remarks.
The episode acquired renewed significance after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Germany had developed an extensive commercial relationship with Gazprom, while the Nord Stream pipelines were intended to facilitate Russian gas deliveries directly to Germany, bypassing traditional transit countries, including Ukraine.
Trump maintained his opposition to those energy relationships well into his second presidency. As EU Today reported in September 2025, he told European governments that continuing to purchase Russian energy amounted to financing the war against themselves.
Washington is now reportedly considering precisely the commercial relationship that Trump previously identified as a strategic danger.
The change cannot be explained solely by the objective of ending the war. It also coincides with discussions about a substantially different economic arrangement, in which American commercial interests could participate in infrastructure and transactions previously dominated by Russia and European energy companies.
On 8 October, Reuters disclosed negotiations involving Kushner and Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s investment envoy, concerning possible American investment in the Nord Stream pipelines.
The discussions included the prospect of US investors profiting from renewed Russian gas deliveries to Europe. Separate negotiations have involved assets belonging to the Russian energy company Lukoil.
The White House has denied that Nord Stream was a subject of recent discussions and has said any agreements must benefit American taxpayers and companies. There is no established evidence that Witkoff, Kushner or members of Trump’s family would personally profit from the proposed gas arrangements.
Nevertheless, the possibility of American participation changes the commercial equation. Russian gas returning to Europe through infrastructure involving US investors would no longer be exclusively a Russian-European business relationship.
That distinction matters financially, but it does not necessarily resolve the underlying security problem. American ownership of transit infrastructure would not eliminate Moscow’s ability to influence production, supply volumes or export decisions.
The European Union has already confronted the consequences of allowing an energy relationship to become a source of geopolitical leverage. Introducing American intermediaries would not, by itself, remove that vulnerability.
The proposal also conflicts with legislation already adopted by the European Union.
In January 2026, the Council formally approved a regulation phasing out Russian natural gas imports. The restrictions began taking effect in March, with the remaining long-term LNG imports scheduled to end in January 2027 and pipeline imports in autumn 2027.
Consequently, restoring substantial Russian supplies would require changes to existing EU policy or the use of legally available exceptions. Neither Washington nor Moscow can make that decision on Europe’s behalf.
Germany has already opposed the reported American initiative. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s security adviser, Günter Sautter, reportedly objected during discussions in Florida, while former economy minister Robert Habeck warned against recreating dependence on an unreliable supplier.
The economic attraction remains understandable. European industry faces substantial energy costs, and cheaper pipeline gas could offer relief to some consumers and manufacturers. Yet commercial prices do not account for the wider costs associated with supply disruption, strategic exposure and the potential use of energy exports as political leverage.
Europe’s decision to reduce Russian gas imports was therefore not simply a change of supplier. It was a response to the security implications of its previous energy model.
The initiative also intersects with divisions inside European politics, particularly in Germany.
Alternative for Germany (AfD) has repeatedly advocated restoring Russian energy imports, arguing that sanctions and expensive replacement supplies have damaged German industry. Sahra Wagenknecht’s left-wing BSW has advanced similar arguments concerning energy prices and relations with Moscow.
The overlap extends beyond energy policy. On 14 October, AfD and BSW representatives supported a motion in Saxony-Anhalt calling for an end to military assistance for Ukraine.
A US-backed proposal to restore Russian gas could give these parties an additional argument against the federal government’s existing approach. They would be able to point to Washington’s own negotiations when questioning the economic and strategic rationale for maintaining restrictions on Russian energy.
This does not establish that the Trump administration’s gas initiative is intended to strengthen particular European political movements. It does demonstrate how the same policy could serve several objectives simultaneously: commercial rapprochement with Russia, a negotiating incentive for Moscow and a change in the European debate over sanctions.
The central uncertainty concerns the relationship between renewed revenues and Russian military objectives.
Washington’s argument assumes that the prospect of substantial future gas income could persuade Putin to accept a settlement. Yet negotiations over commercial cooperation have so far produced no demonstrated change in Moscow’s fundamental territorial demands.
Meanwhile, Russia continues attacking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. On 18 October, Zelenskyy reported 76 Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy, oil and gas facilities during the preceding week, despite Trump’s announcement of an energy ceasefire that neither Kyiv nor Moscow had confirmed.
There is also an unresolved contradiction in Washington’s wider sanctions policy. Having previously demanded that Europe stop financing Russia through energy purchases, Trump has recently suspended additional American sanctions against Moscow while his representatives explore new economic arrangements.
For Ukraine, renewed transit could restore revenue lost when the previous gas agreement expired. For Russia, however, the potential benefits extend beyond immediate export earnings. Access to European markets would restore commercial relationships and a degree of political influence that Moscow lost after the invasion.
The distinction is fundamental. A peace settlement that permits carefully regulated economic cooperation after Russian withdrawal and enforceable security guarantees would be different from an agreement that restores Moscow’s commercial advantages in anticipation of concessions that have not yet been secured.
The question for European governments is therefore not merely whether Russian gas could once again become cheaper than alternative supplies. It is whether restoring that trade would leave Europe better protected against another confrontation with Moscow, or recreate the vulnerabilities that became apparent in 2022.
Washington’s proposed economic bargain cannot answer that question on Europe’s behalf.
Quando comparado ao mesmo mercado de trabalho registrado em 2023, houve crescimento de 8,6% no período.
As unidades da federação que mais empregam são Minas Gerais (62.631 postos de trabalho); Pará (27.047); e Bahia (9.147).
Além dos dados sobre empregos, o painel permite consultar informações sobre o perfil dos trabalhadores, remuneração média e as 21 substâncias relacionadas a essas atividades, entre elas, alumínio, ouro, ferro, cobre, terras-raras, nióbio, titânio e lítio.
A análise do mercado formal de trabalho da indústria extrativa mineral da plataforma foi realizada a partir dos microdados da Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (Rais) e do Novo Cadastro Geral de Empregados e Desempregados (Novo Caged), disponibilizados pelo Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego (MTE).
De acordo com os dados do portal, a participação masculina (100.765 empregos) equivale a 78% do total de empregos relacionados a minerais críticos e estratégicos (129.423). As mulheres ocupam os 22% restantes, 28.658 postos.
No gráfico de empregos, relacionados aos MCE, 51.714 são de mão de obra qualificada, o equivalente a 23% de todos os empregos.
Os trabalhadores com ensino superior somam 30.707, que representa 14%. Destes mais de 30 mil postos de trabalho, 19.060 são ocupados por homens e 11.647, por mulheres.
Quando considerados os empregos gerados por tipo de mineral, o extrativismo que mais emprega é do ferro (70.027 postos de trabalho). Seguido por metais preciosos que somam 21.313 empregos.
Em 2025, as remunerações médias dos trabalhadores de níveis de escolaridade fundamental, médio e superior foram respectivamente de R$ 3.218; R$ 4.142 e R$ 11.856.
O portal também mostra a distribuição territorial dos municípios produtores com um mapa geoespacial.
Entre os municípios com maior número de trabalhadores em atividades relacionadas aos MCE estão Parauapebas (PA), com 8.234 empregos; Nova Lima (MG), com 8.218; e Congonhas (MG), com 7.114.
Em Parauapebas, são 8.234 trabalhadores (71,4% do gênero masculino e 28,6% do gênero feminino), sendo 1.851 com nível superior.
Em Nova Lima, dos 8.218 empregados (63,3% do gênero masculino e 36,7% do gênero feminino), 4.776 tem nível superior.
Em Congonhas, são 7.114 trabalhadores (73,2% do gênero masculino e 26,8% gênero feminino), sendo 1.234 trabalhadores com nível superior.
Para contribuir com a transparência e a divulgação de informações sobre o desempenho da mineração no país, o site apresenta informações de exploração, valor investido e produção e comércio exterior.
De acordo com os indicadores, em 2025 o país tinha 1.012 áreas em produção que resultaram em R$ 250,4 bilhões ao país.
© MATTEO CORNER/EPA
© Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times
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