Brussels, 2o October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – Thailand has issued an official travel advisory urging its citizens to exercise caution when visiting Belgium following demonstrations and civil unrest across several European countries. The Thailand travel warning, announced on … Read more

Brussels, 2o October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – The Belgian military union ACMP-CGPM has backed Defence Minister Theo Francken’s proposal to establish a specialised police-military security force, supporting plans to strengthen Belgium’s response to violent unrest, organised crime and … Read more

A Belgian criminal organisation’s links with a Brazilian cocaine gang have been the focus of a major trial in Brussels, where smuggling links have been alleged between European players and the drug cartels of Latin America

In the early hours of 7 September, a convoy of heavily armed police swept through the sleeping streets of central Brussels towards the Haren district, on the city’s north-eastern outskirts. They made their way to 22 Avenue du Bourget, a militarised bunker-like complex that was the former headquarters of Nato.

The modernist complex, with its austere and functional architecture, was hastily built in 1967 and houses the Justitia courtroom, where Belgium’s federal trials are now held. It was here that the perpetrators and accomplices of the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks and the 2016 Brussels attacks were tried in 2022.

Unrest across eight countries reveals a growing working-class rejection of public spending cuts.

Across Europe, a widespread wave of public protests and labor strikes unfolded during September and October 2026. Demonstrations took place in major urban hubs across France, Belgium, Italy, Albania, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Germany.

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Madrid Protesters Unite to Defend Housing and Public Education

While individual mobilizations emerged from specific domestic triggers, the overarching unrest reflects a shared socioeconomic environment characterized by declining purchasing power, public budget austerity, rising energy prices, and real estate speculation.

The economic backdrop of late 2026 includes sustained structural pressure on working-class households. Energy market shifts driven by international conflicts significantly escalated fuel and electricity costs across the continent, directly inflating the cost of basic consumer goods.

In urban centers, market-driven housing policies and real estate deregulation led to steep increases in residential rents, outstripping wage growth and increasing housing insecurity for young workers and low-income families.

Mainstream institutional coverage frequently characterizes these events through a lens of isolated public order disturbances or temporary economic grievances.

Labor organizations, tenant unions, student groups, and neighborhood alliances have increasingly framed their demands around public resource protection, wage indexation, market regulation, and social welfare preservation.

Roots of the Uprising: Albania, Spain, and France

Albania: The Vjosa-Narta Resistance and Sazan Island Mobilizations

In Albania, mass demonstrations began in May 2026 following public controversy surrounding large-scale real estate and luxury tourism developments along ecologically sensitive coastal zones, related to the family of United States President Donald Trump.

Known as the Flamingo Revolution, the protests were initially triggered by foreign investment proposals backed by international private equity firms, including United States-based entities.

These proposals targeted protected areas in the Vjosa-Narta lagoon delta and Sazan Island, a former military territory off the coast of Vlorë.  

The movement escalated after an incident on May 30, 2026, when private security personnel physically removed local environmental activists at a development site in Zvërnec.

By June, demonstrations expanded from coastal municipalities into the capital, Tirana. Organized primarily by environmental groups, university student assemblies, and grassroots youth coalitions, the protesters demanded an immediate halt to coastal land privatization, the enforcement of environmental protections under European Union standards, and the resignation of Prime Minister Edi Rama.

On June 9, 2026, tens of thousands gathered in central Tirana. In response, Prime Minister Edi Rama publicly dismissed the critique regarding foreign capital involvement, stating in June that the international scrutiny was primarily driven by high-profile political names associated with the investment project rather than environmental policy.  

Throughout July and August 2026, daily civic actions maintained a continuous presence in Tirana, marking 100 consecutive days of anti-government demonstrations by September 8, 2026. By mid-September, the focus expanded as university and high school student assemblies joined the broader movement to protest rising living costs, tuition increases, and systemic public corruption.

Tensions culminated between October 13 and October 18, 2026, when thousands of demonstrators assembled outside the Ministry of Education and Prime Minister Rama’s offices. Clashes erupted between protesters and state security forces, leading to the deployment of tear gas and water cannons by law enforcement.

Official police reports confirmed over 160 detentions and nearly 400 individuals charged following widespread civil disobedience and public building blockades in central Tirana.

Spain: The Pensioner Eviction and the National Housing Crisis

In Spain, social unrest escalated rapidly on September 21, 2026, surrounding the national housing crisis. On September 23, 2026, police enforced the court-ordered eviction of María del Carmen “Maricarmen” Abascal, an 87-year-old resident in Madrid, following a legal dispute with property investors.

By September 30, 2026, housing collectives and the Madrid Tenants’ Union (Sindicato de Inquilinas e inquilinos de Madrid) established a continuous protest encampment in Madrid’s Puerta del Sol, which grew to over 1,200 tents.

Similar encampments emerged in Barcelona’s Plaça de Catalunya and Málaga’s Plaza de la Constitución. According to data from the Youth Council of Spain, average residential rent prices had reached €1,176 per month, absorbing roughly 98.7 percent of the average young worker’s salary following a decade of steady price increases.

Protesters demanded an immediate legal cap on rent prices, a total ban on short-term vacation rentals, the expropriation of residential housing units owned by private investment funds, and the passage of strict tenant protection laws.

The central government headed by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez presented two urgent decree-laws proposing a ban on evictions for vulnerable residents until 2030 and a two-year extension on existing leases.

However, on October 2, 2026, the Spanish Congress rejected the legislation following opposition votes from the People’s Party, Vox, and Together for Catalonia (Junts). Opposition spokesperson Cuca Gamarra argued that affordability could only be achieved through increased residential construction, while Junts spokesperson Míriam Nogueras stated the decree would create legal market uncertainty. In contrast, tenant union representatives called for nationwide general mobilizations to enforce housing rights.

France: Educational Strikes and Fuel Price Mobilizations

In France, a distinct wave of social unrest began on September 15, 2026, sparked by sharp increases in retail fuel costs. Driven by regional maritime supply disruptions and international market volatility, average diesel prices in France reached €2.37 per liter, nearing historical highs.

Initial blockades were established by transport workers, agricultural workers, and commercial fishermen who obstructed access to major fuel depots in Frontignan and port facilities in Nice and Sète.

This economic disruption coincided directly with public sector labor actions in secondary and higher education.

On September 18, 2026, teaching staff and suburban education workers across the Île-de-France region initiated strikes over class overcrowding, wage stagnation, and severe administrative budget reductions. Student assemblies subsequently blockaded high schools and university campuses in Paris, Lyon, and Marseille.

The movement saw a broad convergence of trade unions, including the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) and Solidaires, along with student organizations and former Gilets Jaunes (Yellow Vests) networks.

The protesters demanded the immediate indexation of wages to current inflation rates, increased state spending on education and healthcare, and emergency price caps on petroleum products.

In response to the growing disruptions, Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu announced on September 16, 2026, that the government would increase state fuel subsidies to the maximum allowable limit under European Union rules.

When protests continued into October, the government released 10 million barrels of strategic diesel reserves to stabilize market supply, while law enforcement authorities deployed heavy riot control measures, leading to thousands of detentions nationwide.

Escalation Across the Mediterranean: Greece and Portugal

Greece: Public Sector Strikes and Anti-Privatization Mobilizations

In Greece, social mobilizations accelerated on September 5 2026, driven by rising electricity tariffs, real estate inflation, and persistent wage stagnation.

The unrest gained momentum following coordinated labor actions organized by the All-Workers Militant Front (PAME) and supported by major public sector confederations, including the Civil Servants’ Confederation (ADEDY).

On September 28, 2026, nationwide strikes disrupted public transport, maritime ferry connections between the mainland and Aegean islands, and municipal services.

In Athens, over 45,000 demonstrators marched toward Syntagma Square in front of the Hellenic Parliament. Student assemblies from the National Technical University of Athens and the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens joined the marches, blocking central thoroughfares.

Protesters focused their demands on structural economic reforms, including:

•          The immediate restoration of collective bargaining rights dissolved under previous austerity frameworks.

•          Strict state price controls on essential consumer goods and electricity tariffs.

•          Increased public funding for higher education and healthcare infrastructure.

•          Direct wage indexation to compensate for post-2022 inflationary losses.

Addressing parliament in late September, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis defended the administration’s fiscal stance, stating that government policy must maintain strict fiscal discipline to ensure sovereign debt stability.

Portugal: The Housing Dignity Movement (Vida Justa)

In Portugal, demonstrations expanded across major urban centers during the first week of October 2026. Catalyzed by the civil movement Just Life (Vida Justa) alongside tenant rights group Door to Door (Porta a Porta) and university student unions, tens of thousands gathered in Lisbon, Porto, Coimbra, and Faro.

The central issue driving the protests was real estate speculation and the expansion of short-term tourist accommodations, which had led to significant residential displacement in urban neighborhoods.

According to national statistical reporting, residential property prices in Lisbon had increased by 12.4 percent year-over-year by mid-2026, while median national wages remained under €1,050 per month.

On October 3, 2026, demonstration columns marched along Avenida da Liberdade in Lisbon toward the Assembly of the Republic. Speakers at the rally called for immediate state intervention to secure affordable living conditions, demanding:

•          An immediate freeze on residential lease renewals and rent price caps indexed to local wage levels.

•          The mandatory revocation of tax incentives granted to non-resident foreign real estate investors.

•          Substantial state investment in public housing construction.

•          An increase in the national minimum wage to €1,000 per month to offset basic living expenses.

Government representatives pointed to existing tax relief programs for young buyers, but grassroots spokespersons rejected these measures as inadequate against systemic market speculation.

Convergence and Expansion: Germany, Italy, and Belgium

Germany: Heating Cost Protests and Urban Rent Freezes

In Germany, demonstrations gathered force across major industrial and urban regions in mid-October, led by trade union factions, tenant associations (Mieterverein), and progressive youth organizations.

The mobilizations were prompted by public sector wage negotiations and sharp increases in seasonal municipal heating and gas bills following regional energy supply realignments.

Protests took place in Berlin, Leipzig, Cologne, and Hamburg. Demonstrators assembled at the Brandenburger Tor in Berlin, calling for:

•          Federal legislative caps on natural gas and district heating charges.

•          A nationwide five-year freeze on residential rents in cities exceeding strict vacancy limits.

•          Higher public investment in municipal transport networks and social housing initiatives.

•          Wage increases for public sector employees above the annual core inflation rate.

Federal officials acknowledged the economic burden placed on households, but emphasized that national budgetary constraints limited further large-scale energy price subsidies.

Italy: The “Italia in Piazza” General Strike and Cost-of-Living Mobilization

In Italy, social tension culminated on October 17, 2026, in a coordinated general mobilization organized under the banner “Italy in the Square” (Italia in Piazza). The action was spearheaded by grassroots trade unions, including the Unione Sindacale di Base (USB) and COBAS, alongside student collectives and housing rights coalitions.

Demonstrations affected major urban centers, including Rome, Milan, Turin, and Naples. In Milan, an estimated 60,000 people marched through the city center, resulting in the temporary suspension of public transit lines and commercial activity.

Protesters cited declining real wages, cuts to basic social protection mechanisms, and rising utility prices as the primary drivers of the mobilization.

Key demands raised by Italian protest organizers included:

•          An immediate statutory minimum wage of €10 per hour.

•          The automatic reintroduction of wage indexation tied to inflation metrics (scala mobile).

•          Increased public funding for national healthcare (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale) and public transit systems.

•          A moratorium on residential evictions involving primary residences for low-income households.

Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni issued a statement from Rome, characterizing the disruptions as politically motivated actions designed to destabilize public order during delicate national budget negotiations.

Belgium: Public Service Strikes and Educational Budget Mobilizations

Simultaneously, on October 17, 2026, Belgium experienced significant public sector disruptions centered in Brussels and Liège. Organized by joint trade union fronts (FGTB/ABVV and CSC/ACV) in coordination with secondary and higher education student unions, the actions brought together public transport operators, municipal sanitation staff, and academic workers.

In Brussels, thousands of demonstrators gathered near the European Quarter, marching toward the federal parliament building. The movement focused on rising urban living costs and proposed structural spending cuts to secondary and university educational systems.

Protesters demanded:

• The full preservation and enforcement of Belgium’s automatic wage indexation system across all employment sectors.
• Increased federal budget allocations for public education, student housing, and public transit.
• Legislative action to curb commercial energy price speculation and residential real estate inflation.

Federal government spokespersons stated that maintaining current fiscal trajectories was necessary to adhere to European Union public debt standards, while indicating a willingness to continue sector-specific labor dialogue.

Institutional Reactions and State Repression vs. Protesters’ Demands

As demonstrations converged across the European continent through mid-October 2026, state authorities responded with a combination of security deployments, judicial actions, and public condemnations.

Government officials framed the widespread public disruptions as threats to political stability and fiscal order, while protest coalitions emphasized that state actions prioritized debt constraints and elite economic interests over the material needs of the population.

In France, the executive branch adopted an uncompromising stance. President Emmanuel Macron publicly criticized what he described as “unbridled violence” following the escalation of high school blockades, fuel port disruptions, and urban demonstrations.

Interior Ministry directives led to the widespread deployment of specialized CRS riot control units, water cannons, and tear gas in Paris, Lyon, Marseille, and Limoges.

Law enforcement agencies reported making between 1,800 and 2,400 detentions nationwide by mid-October, with human rights monitoring groups and legal collectives expressing concern over indiscriminate police tactics, pre-emptive arrests, and severe injuries sustained by secondary school students.

In Southern Europe, local administrations similarly sought to delegitimize the protest movements. In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government characterized the “Italia in Piazza” general strike as a politically motivated attempt by opposition factions to destabilize the nation during crucial state budget negotiations.

Police forces in Milan and Rome deployed water cannons and heavy cordons to clear key arterial roads and transit hubs blocked by union members and youth assemblies. In Albania, Prime Minister Edi Rama argued that persistent anti-government and student demonstrations—initially sparked by the “Flamingo Revolution” against coastal real estate privatization in Sazan and Vjosa-Narta—endangered the country’s economic integration and accession standing with the European Union.

Albanian authorities utilized water cannons and tear gas against university student blockades in Tirana, leading to dozens of detentions and criminal charges.

Across Spain and Portugal, state responses highlighted severe institutional divisions over economic reform. While Spanish local police enforced court-ordered evictions in Madrid and cleared public squares, parliamentary opposition parties blocked proposed national lease extensions and eviction bans.

In Portugal, government spokespersons maintained that market-based housing strategies and tax incentives for foreign buyers were necessary to attract capital, directly rejecting the Vida Justa movement’s demands for immediate rent controls and foreign investment caps.

From Localized Grievances to Pan-European Class Solidarity

What began as distinct domestic actions, resistance against speculative real estate projects on Albania’s protected coastline, outrage over elderly evictions and surging rents in Spain, and secondary school labor strikes over state underfunding in France, rapidly converged into a interconnected continental mobilization.

This convergence reflects shared structural drivers: the systematic erosion of real wages, the commodification of urban housing, the decline of essential public services under sustained fiscal austerity, and the compounding impact of energy inflation.

Across national borders, working-class households, student coalitions, and independent trade unions have consistently targeted the policy frameworks that prioritize fiscal deficit targets and private asset protection over public welfare and living standards.

The organizational strategy of the autumn 2026 movements highlights a shift in popular mobilization methods. By utilizing decentralized communications, student assemblies, neighborhood collectives, and grassroots trade union alliances, protest networks frequently bypassed established political parties.

This organizational horizontalism enabled rapid, cross-sector coordination—demonstrated by the simultaneous national strikes and urban blockades in France, Italy, Belgium, and Portugal on October 17, 2026.

As winter approaches, the continued alignment of labor unions, housing organizations, and youth movements suggests that Europe’s autumn of discontent may mark the beginning of a sustained, pan-European struggle for structural economic reform, market regulation, and social welfare preservation.

Sources: TeleSUR – Al Jazeera – Democracy Now – BBC – DW – France 24 – EFE – AFP – AP – The guardian – El País – El Mundo – La Radio del Sur – La República – RTVE – Xinhua – CGTN – Press TV – Anadolu Agency – RT – TRT World

Dutch-Belgian supermarket group Ahold Delhaize has confirmed that malicious activity was responsible for the cybersecurity incident that disrupted its operations across Europe and the United States, forcing the company to take websites, applications and other computer systems offline.

In an official statement issued on Monday, 19 October, the company announced that it had filed a formal complaint with Dutch police and was cooperating with national cybersecurity authorities. Although physical supermarkets have remained open, the disruption has affected online shopping, deliveries and some distribution operations.

The company said investigators had so far found no evidence that sensitive information belonging to customers, employees or business partners had been taken. However, its investigation remains open, and the identity and objectives of those responsible have not been publicly established.

Online services interrupted across several countries

The disruption began on 12 October, when Ahold Delhaize detected suspicious activity within its information technology infrastructure.

The group responded by taking a number of systems offline as a precaution, affecting most of its retail brands in Europe and the United States. The consequences varied considerably between businesses, with some experiencing prolonged interruption to digital services while others were able to restore operations more quickly.

Albert Heijn, the Netherlands’ largest supermarket chain, has been particularly affected. Its website and mobile application have returned online, but home grocery deliveries are not expected to resume until Friday, 23 October.

Orders scheduled before that date have been cancelled, while the company continues preparations for a gradual restoration of its online delivery service.

The incident also interrupted some supply and distribution arrangements, resulting in shortages on supermarket shelves in parts of the Netherlands and Belgium.

In Belgium, Delhaize has restored its online shopping operations. Certain promotional and personalised services were still experiencing difficulties, although the parent company confirmed that its Belgian e-commerce business was operational again.

Dutch retailers Etos and Gall & Gall have also restored their websites. Meanwhile, several American supermarket brands owned by Ahold Delhaize have continued to experience service interruptions.

The group said it expected additional online services in the United States to become available over the coming days.

Dutch authorities investigate

Ahold Delhaize said it notified the Netherlands’ National Cyber Security Centre within 24 hours of detecting the malicious activity.

The company has subsequently provided updates to the authorities and, on Monday, confirmed that a formal police report had been submitted.

Chief executive Frans Muller defended the decision to shut down digital systems, arguing that the investigation had demonstrated the necessity of taking preventive action.

The company has not identified the perpetrators, confirmed whether ransomware was involved or disclosed the technical method used to gain access to its infrastructure.

These distinctions are important because malicious activity does not necessarily establish that information was stolen or that attackers obtained control over every system subsequently taken offline.

The retailer has instead described a controlled restoration process intended to ensure that affected systems can be brought back into operation without exposing the business to further risks.

Ahold Delhaize operates thousands of supermarkets and related retail businesses, including Albert Heijn, Delhaize, Food Lion, Giant Food, Hannaford and Stop & Shop.

Its geographical reach means that a disruption originating within shared corporate infrastructure can affect several national markets, even where individual retail chains maintain separate commercial operations.

Cybersecurity becomes a supply-chain concern

The attack comes amid increasing scrutiny of the vulnerability of European food retailers to digital disruption.

Earlier this month, investigators in France began examining cyberattacks against refrigeration control systems used by hundreds of supermarkets.

Those incidents reportedly affected equipment at chains including Carrefour, Intermarché and Monoprix, with some retailers forced to discard products after refrigeration systems malfunctioned.

There is no established connection between the French incidents and the attack affecting Ahold Delhaize.

Nevertheless, both episodes illustrate the dependence of modern retail operations on interconnected digital systems supporting stock management, refrigeration, logistics, payments and customer services.

The consequences of a serious cyber incident can extend beyond the loss of access to websites. Interruptions to inventory systems, warehouse operations or communications with suppliers can affect the availability of physical products.

This creates particular difficulties for food retailers, where delays in transport and storage can result in the loss of perishable goods.

European regulatory implications

The incident also draws attention to the European Union’s NIS2 cybersecurity framework, which establishes stricter risk-management and incident-reporting obligations for organisations operating in designated sectors.

Food production, processing and distribution are among the activities covered by the directive, although its application to particular companies and operations depends on the relevant legal definitions and national implementing arrangements.

The legislation requires organisations within its scope to establish appropriate cybersecurity protections, address supply-chain risks and notify competent authorities of significant incidents.

Separately, the General Data Protection Regulation establishes notification requirements where personal-data breaches meet the relevant reporting threshold.

Ahold Delhaize’s statement that it has found no evidence of sensitive data being taken does not conclude the technical investigation, but it means that a confirmed theft of personal information should not presently be presented as a fact.

For the company, the immediate challenge remains restoring online services while maintaining normal supermarket operations. The wider commercial consequences, including the cost of the interruption and its effect on sales, have not yet been quantified publicly.

Belgium’s three regions have reached an agreement with the European Commission to strengthen measures against water pollution, improve wastewater treatment and increase protection against floods and droughts.

The joint statement, signed in Leuven on Monday, 19th October, sets out commitments for Flanders, Wallonia and the Brussels-Capital Region, including action on industrial pollution, pesticides and persistent chemicals such as per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, commonly known as PFAS.

The agreement was signed by European Commissioner for Environment, Water Resilience and a Competitive Circular Economy Jessika Roswall, Flemish Environment Minister Jo Brouns, Walloon Environment Minister Yves Coppieters and Brussels State Secretary Ans Persoons.

According to the European Commission’s announcement, the agreement follows a detailed examination of Belgium’s implementation of European water legislation and identifies measures requiring greater attention from regional authorities.

European Commission seeks faster implementation

Belgium is the second EU Member State to complete a structured dialogue under a Commission initiative launched in November 2025.

The process is intended to improve implementation of existing environmental requirements rather than establish an entirely new legislative framework.

European water legislation already obliges Member States to assess the condition of their rivers and groundwater, control pollution and prepare management plans intended to improve water quality.

However, achieving the objectives of the EU’s Water Framework Directive remains difficult in several countries, particularly where pollution, agricultural activity and urban development place competing demands on water resources.

Belgium presents additional administrative complications because responsibility for environmental policy and water management is divided principally between three regional governments.

Watercourses also cross regional and international boundaries, requiring cooperation with neighbouring countries.

The Commission’s review examined Belgium’s third generation of river basin management plans and its second generation of flood risk management plans.

Technical discussions identified areas where implementation could be accelerated, particularly regarding pollution controls, water efficiency and coordination between public authorities.

Flanders to address industrial pollution

Under the agreement, Flanders will prioritise investment in water resilience and stronger action against industrial pollution.

The region intends to use its IMPULSE programme to support improvements in water management and pollution reduction.

Industrial discharges are among the issues specifically identified for closer scrutiny.

The joint statement calls for more systematic reviews of permits governing water abstraction and industrial wastewater discharges, particularly where existing activities place pressure on rivers and groundwater.

The agreement also highlights the need to tackle persistent chemical pollution.

PFAS have become a significant environmental concern because many of these substances degrade extremely slowly and can accumulate in water, soil and living organisms.

Certain PFAS compounds have been associated with adverse health effects, although the risks depend on the individual chemical, exposure level and duration.

The Commission’s commitments include stronger action on PFAS and pesticides, alongside improvements in monitoring and pollution prevention.

Agricultural pollution is another area requiring attention.

Fertilisers and pesticides can enter rivers and groundwater through runoff or infiltration, creating difficulties for water treatment and contributing to the deterioration of aquatic ecosystems.

The three regions have agreed to strengthen cooperation with farmers, retailers and researchers to support more sustainable agricultural practices, including expanding markets for organic products.

€300 million for river restoration in Wallonia

Wallonia has committed to continuing investment in river restoration and improved water resilience, with particular attention to the Vesdre basin.

The region intends to use a €300 million loan secured from the European Investment Bank in 2025 to support restoration work.

The Vesdre basin experienced severe flooding in July 2021, when widespread destruction across eastern Belgium exposed weaknesses in flood protection and the management of vulnerable river valleys.

Restoration measures can include improving river channels, reconnecting floodplains and using natural systems to retain water during periods of heavy rainfall.

The regional authorities also intend to support industrial companies investing in water-efficient production technologies and environmental innovation.

These measures are intended to reduce pressure on water resources while helping businesses adapt to changing environmental requirements.

Wallonia has additionally committed to supporting cleaner agricultural practices, consistent with the wider national objective of reducing pollution from fertilisers and pesticides.

Brussels focuses on wastewater treatment

The Brussels-Capital Region will concentrate on improving water governance and wastewater treatment.

Urban wastewater infrastructure is particularly important in densely populated areas, where drainage networks and treatment facilities must accommodate domestic sewage, commercial activity and rainfall.

Heavy precipitation can place additional pressure on combined sewer systems, potentially increasing the risk of untreated or insufficiently treated wastewater entering natural watercourses.

Improving treatment capacity and water management requires investment in infrastructure, monitoring and coordination between the authorities responsible for sanitation and environmental protection.

The Brussels commitments therefore form part of the wider European effort to modernise urban wastewater systems and improve the ecological condition of rivers passing through major cities.

Cross-border water management

The agreement also identifies the need for closer cooperation in the Scheldt and Meuse river basins.

Both river systems cross national boundaries, making their management dependent on coordination between Belgium and neighbouring countries.

Regional governments have committed to supporting the restoration of floodplains and the removal of barriers affecting shared watercourses where appropriate.

The measures are intended to improve the condition of aquatic ecosystems while strengthening natural protection against floods and droughts.

The Commission will support Belgium through initiatives under the European Water Resilience Strategy, including research, digital technologies, technical expertise and assistance in mobilising public and private investment.

However, the joint statement signed in Leuven does not itself establish a new binding regulatory regime or guarantee that all the investments identified will be financed.

Its importance will depend on whether the three regional governments translate their commitments into funded projects, revised permits and measurable improvements in water quality.

For the European Commission, Belgium’s agreement is also part of a wider programme of structured discussions with Member States on compliance with EU water legislation. Further national dialogues are expected as Brussels seeks to improve implementation across the Union.

Brussels, 19 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – Belgium’s federal government is discussing a Belgian police reserve that would receive military training and support civilian officers during violent riots. Defence Minister Theo Francken has proposed the new force following … Read more

Brussels, 18 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – Delhaize online orders have returned to full capacity in Belgium following a major cybersecurity incident that disrupted supermarket operations, delivery services and internal ordering systems. The restoration, confirmed on Saturday, 17 … Read more

Liège, Belgium, 18 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – Liège education protests have intensified concerns about rising tuition fees, school funding and access to education in French-speaking Belgium. Hundreds of students demonstrated in the eastern city earlier this … Read more

Brussels, 18 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – Belgium’s federal government has shelved a proposed €4 billion emergency budget package for 2027, shifting its attention towards a broader agreement to deliver €10 billion in savings by 2029. The decision, … Read more

Belgium has announced it will accelerate the delivery of surplus Lockheed Martin F-16 fighters to Ukraine. Instead of delivering three flyable F-16s before the end of the year, Brussels will ship 10.

It's unclear how many will be flyable. Previously, Belgian officials explained the first seven secondhand F-16s would include just three airworthy examples. The other four would be broken down for spare parts.

It's good news for Ukraine, but hardly cause for nationwide celebration. The handful of flyable F-16s that should arrive in the coming two months could make good recent F-16 losses. But those shipping-soon Belgian F-16s won't actually grow Ukraine's F-16 fleet by much, if at all.

The dozens of supersonic F-16s in action in Ukraine fly often and fight hard. They shoot down Russian drones and cruise missiles, tangle with Russian warplanes, and lob precision glide bombs at Russian forces on the ground. Russia launched about 2,000 jet-powered drones at Ukraine in September, up from some 350 in June, and F-16s are among the few weapons fast enough to catch them, the Wall Street Journal's editorial board noted. Every 300 flying hours, each jet must go abroad for a lengthy inspection.

Explore further

Ukraine loses another F-16 to onboard emergency

The main constraint on the pace of F-16 sorties, besides maintenance demands and the availability of trained pilots, is munitions: running low or out of air-to-air missiles and glide bombs, the F-16s routinely aim their 20-mm guns at Russian targets. But even 20-mm ammunition sometimes runs low.

The busy F-16s and their equally busy pilots need reinforcement. But reinforcements are slow coming. Belgium is only slightly accelerating its F-16 shipments amid reports it will eventually give Ukraine all 53 F-16s it's gradually retiring as new Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighters arrive to re-equip the Belgian air force.

Further complicating the picture, Norway's six F-16s, promised in 2023, were still being refurbished in Belgium this spring. Some arrived there in pieces.

Yes, Ukraine got 24 fight-ready F-16s from the Netherlands and most of the 19 Denmark promised. But it's lost five of those jets since 2024. And others are so worn out from relentless flying that they're badly in need of maintenance. The Belgian firm Sabena, which services Ukrainian F-16s, has struggled to keep up, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said about half of the jets spend long stretches abroad for repairs. That slows the return of repaired planes and further squeezes the front-line force.

One wing, too few jets

In short, it's possible the Ukrainian air force's 107th Aviation Wing, its sole F-16 unit, has fewer than 40 ready-to-fight F-16s. Those 53 Belgian F-16s will help grow the wing, but piecemeal. Ukraine should expect a handful of operational jets from Belgium this year. Under a schedule from May, the last 27, half the total, may not arrive until 2029.

To be clear, additional F-16s support the 107th Aviation Wing. The Netherlands sold 18 of its old F-16s to Romania for a token price in order to equip a training squadron, funded by a consortium of Ukraine's allies, that feeds trained pilots to the 107th Aviation Wing. But these 18 jets aren't available for front-line use. They don't even legally belong to Ukraine.

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Ukraine is running short of its best missiles for hunting Russia’s jet drones. Now MiG-29s are firing 1970s weapons

The delays in supplies of combat-ready F-16s matter because the Ukrainian air force is under stress. Its last few dozen ex-Soviet warplanes, including Mikoyan MiG-29 and Sukhoi Su-27 fighters, are even older and wearier than the ex-European F-16s are. And they've suffered staggering losses in the air and on the ground in nearly 56 months of hard fighting in the wider war.

The air force does have a few ex-French Dassault Mirage 2000s that are at least as capable as the F-16s, but France has donated only a handful of the supersonic jets—and one has crashed. Any further supplies of Mirage 2000s could be complicated by the French presidential election in April 2027. The leading far-right and far-left parties are both friendly toward Russia and hostile to Ukraine.

Some relief is coming, although not quickly. Sweden has pledged 16 surplus JAS-39C/D Gripen fighters to the Ukrainian war effort; the first of these could arrive early next year. Later on, Ukraine also plans to buy 20 newer JAS-39E/Fs. Kyiv has also negotiated to purchase 16 new Rafale fighters from Paris, but the soonest these could arrive is 2028.

For now, F-16s are the main solution to Ukraine's air defense problems. Kyiv surely wishes it had more of them, sooner.

Belgian foreign minister urges further EU sanctions and links attack to Israel’s ‘illegal settlement policy’

Masked settlers attacked a group of European diplomats during a visit to the occupied West Bank on Saturday, Belgium’s foreign minister said, on a second day of high-profile assaults on Palestinians and others during the sensitive olive harvest.

At least four people have been killed and more than 100 injured since the harvest began earlier this month, according to the Palestinian health ministry. Activists say Israeli authorities do little to stop attacks that involve weapons ranging from slingshots to guns. An attack on Friday seriously injured a Washington Post photographer and others.

Brussels, 17 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – Belgian authorities have arrested a 26-year-old man in connection with the violent killing of a mother of two in Saint-Gilles, Brussels. The suspect was detained three days after the woman’s body … Read more

A new exhibition in Belgium brings together a 1956 painting by Paul Delvaux and its original preparatory drawing, revealing how the artist transformed his composition and concealed elements beneath the finished work.

Scientific examination of a painting by Belgian surrealist Paul Delvaux has revealed significant changes to its original composition, including figures and other details concealed beneath layers of paint. The findings are being presented in a new exhibition opening on 16 October at Musée L in Louvain-la-Neuve.

The exhibition, La Ville lunaire II: The Hidden Side of Paul Delvaux’s Painting, examines a work completed in 1956 and held in the museum’s permanent collection. Through X-ray imaging, infrared reflectography and ultraviolet examination, researchers have been able to investigate the artist’s working methods and compare the finished painting with an original preparatory drawing.

The exhibition, which runs until 7 February 2027, follows the acquisition of the drawing by the King Baudouin Foundation in 2024. Its subsequent deposit at Musée L has made it possible to examine the two works together and reconstruct the development of a composition that underwent substantial alterations.

A Painting Concealing Its Own History

Completed in June 1956, La Ville lunaire II depicts a mysterious nocturnal landscape, with a long avenue, buildings, streetlamps and figures arranged within an unsettling architectural setting.

The painting measures approximately 89 by 139 centimetres and was executed in oil on a fibreboard panel. It entered the museum’s collection in 1990 through a bequest from Dr Charles Delsemme.

Its carefully constructed perspective and unusual treatment of space reflect Delvaux’s interest in creating scenes that appear familiar while remaining detached from ordinary reality.

The museum’s collection records describe the work as a strange nocturnal landscape, with wooden barriers and a sequence of streetlamps establishing its distinctive spatial arrangement.

Yet the painting visible today differs considerably from the composition Delvaux originally envisaged.

Earlier technical examinations had already established that important details were covered during the painting process. The new exhibition brings those findings into direct comparison with the preparatory drawing, enabling visitors to see how the artist’s intentions changed.

An auction catalogue published in 2024 identified several elements present in the drawing and concealed in the painting, including a moon in the right-hand sky, a seated figure on the right and two figures wearing robes near the centre.

These changes are significant because they suggest that Delvaux did more than adjust minor details. He altered the population and lighting of the scene, potentially changing how the composition would be experienced by the viewer.

The reasons for those decisions remain uncertain.

How Scientific Technology Reveals Hidden Paintings

Modern conservation techniques allow researchers to examine works of art without removing the paint that covers earlier stages of their creation.

Infrared reflectography can reveal underdrawings and certain changes concealed beneath surface paint, depending on the materials used by the artist. X-ray imaging can detect differences in the composition of pigments and structures below the visible surface.

Ultraviolet examination provides further information about surface materials and alterations, including some later interventions.

When combined with documentary evidence, these methods help researchers distinguish between an artist’s initial design, revisions made during painting and changes introduced after completion.

The Musée L exhibition uses these techniques to investigate what art historians call pentimenti — visible or detectable alterations that record an artist changing their mind during the creative process.

The preparatory drawing, measuring approximately 28 by 45 centimetres, provides an additional reference point. Executed in ink and pencil, it contains elements that were subsequently revised or painted over in the final composition.

Displayed alongside the finished work, it allows visitors to follow the artist’s decisions from the preliminary design to the version that eventually entered the museum’s collection.

The technical findings also demonstrate the importance of preserving preparatory studies, which can contain information absent from completed paintings.

Paul Delvaux and the Belgian Surrealist Tradition

Born in Antheit in 1897, Paul Delvaux became one of Belgium’s best-known twentieth-century painters, developing a distinctive artistic language associated with surrealism.

His paintings frequently depict classical buildings, railway stations, deserted streets and solitary figures, often arranged in environments where architectural precision contrasts with an atmosphere of uncertainty.

He was influenced by the Italian painter Giorgio de Chirico, whose deserted urban spaces and dramatic perspectives helped establish the visual language of metaphysical painting.

Delvaux’s relationship with de Chirico has been examined extensively by art historians, including Joël Roucloux, whose study of La Ville lunaire II analysed its architectural perspective, shadows and the psychological effect of its composition.

The painting’s apparently moonlit setting is particularly interesting in light of the concealed moon identified by technical examination.

The absence of that celestial body from the final visible composition changes the relationship between the painting’s title and its visual content, leaving the viewer to interpret the source of its unusual illumination.

This approach distinguishes Delvaux from other Belgian surrealists, including René Magritte, whose work frequently relied on recognisable objects placed in logically contradictory situations.

For Delvaux, architecture, perspective and the arrangement of human figures were equally important in constructing a world that appears coherent but resists conventional interpretation.

A New Examination of a Familiar Work

The exhibition forms part of Musée L’s programme devoted to research into its permanent collections, rather than a conventional retrospective of the artist’s career.

Its central purpose is to explain how a single painting developed, from its first drawn composition through successive revisions to its completed form.

The research has been supported by the Jacqueline Delcourt-Nonkels Fund, managed by the King Baudouin Foundation.

For visitors, the opportunity is to examine not only a painting by one of Belgium’s leading surrealists, but also the evidence of the artistic decisions that shaped it.

The exhibition is open at Musée L in Louvain-la-Neuve from 16 October 2026 to 7 February 2027. By presenting the original drawing, technical images and finished painting together, the museum offers a detailed examination of Delvaux’s methods and the changes he made to one of his most carefully constructed nocturnal scenes.

Belgium plans to deliver 10 F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine by the end of 2026, Prime Minister Bart De Wever announced on 16 October, raising the expected number from three amid delays in transferring the aircraft.

The expanded commitment comes as Ukraine faces sustained Russian drone and missile attacks and needs additional combat aircraft to strengthen its air defenses. 

De Wever made the announcement at a press conference in Brussels alongside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Anadolu Agency reported. He said Belgium’s deliveries had fallen behind schedule because its new US-made F-35 fighter jets arrived later than expected.

Belgium also discussed supplying more ammunition for Ukraine’s F-16s.

F-16 deliveries delayed by F-35 schedule

“We will deliver 10 this year,” De Wever said, explaining that delays in receiving Belgium’s F-35s had held up the transfer of its F-16s. The new aircraft are now beginning to arrive, allowing Belgium to move forward with deliveries to Ukraine.

Zelenskyy confirmed that Kyiv expects additional F-16s from Belgium by the end of the year and thanked Brussels for the agreement.

The announcement marks an increase from Belgium’s previously reported plan to send three F-16s to Ukraine by the end of 2026. The new figure would more than triple the number expected under that earlier commitment.

F-16s to help counter Russian jet-powered drones

De Wever said Ukraine urgently needs operational fighter jets and described the F-16 as one of the few weapons capable of effectively countering Russian jet-powered drones.

The aircraft can also intercept cruise missiles and other aerial targets, while carrying out electronic warfare and combat missions. Ukraine received its first F-16s in 2024 after allies agreed to supply the aircraft and train Ukrainian pilots. 

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Belgium discusses ammunition and financial support

Zelenskyy and De Wever also discussed supplying additional ammunition for Ukraine’s F-16s, including 20 mm rounds produced by Belgian defense company FN Herstal.

The leaders also reportedly discussed Ukraine’s financial needs, though neither provided details on potential next steps. Belgium remains at the center of discussions over frozen Russian assets, as Brussels hosts Euroclear, which holds a large share of the immobilized funds.

Russia has placed five foreign-owned businesses under compulsory administration, including Belgian manufacturer Ontex and French flooring group Tarkett. The latest seizures deepen the confrontation over sanctions, frozen Russian assets and the future of European investment in Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered the transfer of five Western-owned businesses into compulsory Russian management, extending a campaign of asset seizures targeting European companies that continued operating in Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The decree, signed on 15 October, affects businesses with combined annual revenues exceeding 53 billion roubles, approximately €530 million. They include French flooring manufacturer Tarkett, Belgian hygiene products group Ontex, German packaging producer Menshen, Kappa Rus and Eviosys Packaging Kuban, now linked to American group Sonoco.

Under Presidential Decree No. 738, operational control has been transferred to Centre Capital, a little-known Moscow company established in February 2026 with registered share capital of just 10,000 roubles.

The decision follows similar interventions against Nestlé, Auchan, FM Logistic and Metro in September. Together, the measures demonstrate how Moscow is using foreign-owned businesses as instruments of economic retaliation against countries supporting Ukraine.

Foreign businesses placed under Russian control

Centre Capital is headed by Marat Mirkhaydarov, a former senior official in Russia’s Zabaykalsky region who reportedly served with the Akhmat military formation during Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The scale of the companies placed under his management contrasts sharply with the financial standing of the administrator.

Tarkett’s Russian operations generated approximately 19.3 billion roubles in revenue during 2025, while Kappa Rus recorded 16.5 billion roubles and Ontex RU another 10.3 billion. Eviosys Packaging Kuban and Menshen Packaging CIS reported approximately 6.1 billion and 1.4 billion roubles respectively.

The decree does not formally transfer ownership of the companies to Centre Capital. It does, however, remove the foreign shareholders’ effective control over management, operations and commercial decisions.

For Belgian manufacturer Ontex, the consequences are immediate.

In an official statement issued on 16 October, the Aalst-based company confirmed that a government-appointed administrator had assumed operational control of its Russian subsidiary.

Ontex Russia employs approximately 350 people, operates a manufacturing facility in Noginsk and maintains a sales office in Moscow. The subsidiary accounts for around five per cent of the group’s total revenue and between seven and eight per cent of adjusted EBITDA.

The company said it was examining measures to protect its assets and maintain business continuity.

Tarkett likewise confirmed that it was losing effective control of its Russian operations.

A mechanism established in 2023

The legal framework for such interventions dates to April 2023, when Putin introduced Decree No. 302, allowing the Russian authorities to place assets associated with countries designated as unfriendly under temporary external management.

The appointed administrator can exercise extensive ownership-related powers, although the formal right to dispose of the assets remains excluded.

Crucially, the arrangement can be terminated only by presidential decision. There is no automatic deadline for returning operational control to the original owners.

Moscow maintains that the measures are reversible. Nevertheless, the loss of management authority raises questions about whether businesses could eventually be returned with their financial position, organisational structure and commercial value intact.

The latest decree extends the process already documented by EU Today following the September takeover of Nestlé and Auchan’s Russian operations.

The Kremlin’s approach also serves domestic economic objectives. Keeping factories, retail networks and distribution facilities operating under Russian management helps preserve employment, production capacity and established supply chains.

At the same time, appointing Russian administrators allows the authorities to exercise greater influence over businesses originally developed through foreign capital, technology and expertise.

European companies caught in sanctions confrontation

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has explicitly linked the seizures to the nationality of the affected companies and the policies of their governments.

He accused European states of participating in the unlawful seizure of Russian property through sanctions and financial restrictions.

Moscow’s argument centres partly on approximately €210 billion in Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the European Union, most of them held through Belgium-based securities depository Euroclear.

The European Union has used extraordinary revenues generated by those assets to support Ukraine, while further proposals involving the underlying funds remain subject to legal and political debate.

Belgium has been particularly concerned about potential financial exposure and legal claims. As EU Today reported in September, a Belgian Council of State judgment raised additional questions about the administrative procedures governing certain frozen assets.

The dispute has also moved into the European courts, with the Bank of Russia challenging EU measures intended to protect Euroclear against the enforcement of Russian judgments.

Moscow’s treatment of European businesses adds another dimension to this confrontation. By retaining control over foreign-owned industrial and commercial assets, Russia possesses a means of exerting pressure on companies whose governments support sanctions and military assistance to Ukraine.

The implications are particularly serious for Western banks that still maintain substantial Russian operations.

Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank International and Italy’s UniCredit remain exposed to Russia through local subsidiaries. Any extension of compulsory administration to financial institutions could create additional difficulties involving deposits, capital and banking supervision.

The cost of remaining in Russia

The seizures also expose the financial risks faced by Western companies that delayed their withdrawal after February 2022.

Many initially sought to protect their investments, employees and commercial infrastructure. Others reduced operations but retained ownership, expecting that conditions might eventually permit an orderly sale or renewed business activity.

Russian restrictions have progressively complicated that calculation, requiring foreign investors from designated countries to accept substantial discounts on asset sales and obtain official approval for transactions.

Companies remaining in the country now face the additional possibility that the government will appoint administrators without their consent.

The consequences extend beyond the businesses immediately affected. Russia is establishing a precedent under which foreign investment can remain legally owned by its original shareholders while its economic benefits and operational management are placed beyond their control.

For European governments, the latest decree illustrates the increasing connection between commercial interests and geopolitical decisions.

The Kremlin has demonstrated that sanctions imposed over its invasion of Ukraine can be answered not only through diplomatic or financial measures, but also through direct intervention in European-owned businesses operating on Russian territory.

Any eventual negotiation over sanctions relief and the restoration of economic relations will consequently have to address the status of these assets, the rights of their original shareholders and the question of compensation.

Until then, Western companies remaining in Russia face an investment environment in which the ultimate authority over their businesses rests increasingly with the Kremlin rather than their shareholders.