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NATO Air Commander Details Thinking Behind The Alliance’s New Air Defense Plan

15 September 2026 at 21:23

The top U.S. Air Force officer in Europe, who also serves as the NATO Allied Air Command leader, said he has been tasked with enacting new alliance plans to defend against cruise missiles and drones. He was responding to questions about a drone that NATO had to shoot down after it entered Lithuanian airspace overnight. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said Tuesday morning that the incident was “part of a broader pattern of Russian aggression and provocation against Europe, testing our readiness and our resolve.”

The drone incursion into Lithuania took place against the backdrop of the ongoing Russian war on Ukraine and amid a spate of so-called ‘hybrid’ or ‘gray zone’ actions Moscow has been accused of carrying out throughout Europe, including a recent attempted drone attack on the Leipzig-Halle airport in Germany.

We now know that Russia is responsible for the attempted explosive attack at Leipzig airport. Russia's repeated hybrid attacks on Germany and Europe are unacceptable. (1/4) pic.twitter.com/o3vBjgpeb1

— German Embassy Washington (@GermanyinUSA) September 1, 2026

“I don’t know what’s in the mind of Putin or his fielded forces about those one-way attack drones or even cruise missiles, like we’ve seen enter Polish airspace just a few months ago. In July, we had an AS-23 cruise missile enter Poland,” Lt. Gen. Jason T. Hinds, Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe/U.S. Air Forces Africa (USAFE), and Commander of the Allied Air Command, said in response to a question about the drone shootdown over Lithuania. He was speaking during a media roundtable at the Air & Space Forces Air, Space and Cyber Conference that TWZ is attending.

This video grab taken from footage of TVN Poland on July 30, 2026 shows the Polish army securing a large crater, the probable impact site of a projectile linked to the strikes carried out in Ukraine overnight by Russia, in Tarnawa-Kolonia, eastern Poland. Residents of this locality in the Lublin region heard, shortly before 4:00 a.m. (2:00 a.m. GMT), a powerful explosion that shook the windows of their homes. The impact site is located around 80 km from the Ukrainian border. NATO said on July 30 it was in close contact with Warsaw as it blamed Russia for a missile that crashed in Poland, and vowed to "continue to take all necessary measures to defend" alliance territory. (Photo by various sources / AFP via Getty Images)
This video grab taken from footage from TVN Poland on July 30, 2026, shows the Polish army securing a large crater from a Russian missile that crashed in Poland. (Photo by various sources / AFP) –

Hinds added that while he doesn’t “know the why behind” the drone incursion into Lithuania, he has been tasked by U.S. Air Force Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich, who serves as NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), “to fully implement EVA [Enhanced Vigilance Activity] Eastern Sentry and now its Standing Defense Plan 12000, which gives the nations the capabilities that they need to defend their airspace against either one-way attack drones like the one that you described last night, or a cruise missile.”

EVA Eastern Sentry is a mission NATO stood up in September 2025 after “an unprecedented number of Russian drones and planes violated the airspace of several NATO Allies,” according to the alliance. “Allies are contributing additional capabilities and assets to NATO’s deterrence and defense – for instance, more fighter jets, helicopters, transport aircraft, air defense systems, surveillance aircraft and frigates – and improving the coordination of these assets through NATO.”

Standing Defense Plan 12000 is a new plan for integrated air and missile defense across the alliance. Grynkewich introduced the concept during testimony to Congress in March.

Hinds acknowledged that Russia could be testing the alliance.

“It’s not about the small UASs; that’s typically a national responsibility, and it could be probing,” the Air Force general noted. “Regardless of the intent behind it, what we want to be prepared for is the second that a one-way attack drone or a cruise missile is first and foremost detected – hopefully well before it enters NATO territory – we want to know it. We want to know where it’s coming from. We want to have the capability to sense it. We want to be able to have the C2 [command and control] systems to be able to decide what to do about it, and then have the right kit to be able to act.”

Despite an integrated air and missile defense system that includes Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries, NATO currently is primarily “using air power” against drones and cruise missiles “and that’s not putting us on the right side of the cost curve,” Hinds stated. “But we want to get there.”

Using NATO jets to take down drones “is very effective, just like what you saw last night, and many other times,” but not necessarily efficient, Hinds explained. 

“I think there’s been at least five other cases of allied nations providing air power to shoot down one-way attack drones,” he proffered. “I want to get to the point where we’re doing it efficiently, using lower-cost interceptors, hopefully ground-based, and in some cases air-based that are cheaper to use, so we’ll see what the intent may be. Intelligence organizations are going to provide us with that intelligence later on, but I just don’t know yet.”

You can see one of those NATO jet engagements with drones in the following video.

NATO airpower in action this morning, safeguarding Latvian airspace. pic.twitter.com/Ugzbx8aaZS

— Marko Mihkelson 🇪🇪🇺🇦🇪🇺 (@markomihkelson) June 8, 2026

It should be noted that Europe is starting to follow the American lead in using less expensive laser-guided, air-to-air rockets as drone-killing weapons. TWZ was the first to report about the use of 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) rockets by the U.S. The U.K. Royal Air Force announced in May of this year that its Typhoons were now equipped with APKWS rockets while the French recently tested their own 68mm laser-guided rockets from Rafale fighters.

The Defence Procurement Agency has successfully completed integration testing of 68 mm laser-guided rockets on the Rafale fighter jet. The time between the contract being awarded for this new capability and initial operational capability being achieved was less than 8 months. pic.twitter.com/rR2Nij9EzY

— French Aid to Europe 🇨🇵 🇪🇺 (@aidefranceukr) July 13, 2026

As the threats have evolved, NATO has “transitioned away from air policing, and we’ve transitioned to air defense for some specific reasons,” the general pointed out. “One is readiness. Air policing is a readiness decrementing mission that the alliance has done for years. There’s also an assurance mission that we did for 32 nations. That’s transitioned to air defense now. Air defense means we have the right kit, multi-domain, to be able to be put in the right place based on indications, warnings, or real threats, like you saw last night, inside of the Baltic nations, to be able to respond decisively and quickly.”

“There’s also a deterrence value there,” Hinds added. “So if Russia does fly a one-way attack drone or a cruise missile, they know that we’re going to be in the right spot to be able to detect it and then defend against it.”

“These are limited incursions, right? Small numbers. Here’s what I see: hybrid activities may, in fact, only be one of the few levers that Putin has available to him, because he sees that he does not have an advantage in geography, domain, or readiness,” Hinds suggested.

“Think about that,” he urged. “So what are we seeing? We’re not seeing a massing of forces across the opposite side of Finland, a new NATO nation. We’re not seeing a massing of forces whatsoever in any domain opposite of Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia. You’re seeing a significant number of one-way attack drones in the Black Sea targeting Ukraine. Some of them are entering Romania. What you’re not seeing is a direct confrontation in geography. We’re not seeing direct competition in domains. And I think Putin knows that we are ready. I know he knows that we’re a defensive alliance. I know he knows that we have an advantage in every domain against them, and I think that’s likely why you’re seeing things like what you’re seeing with hybrid activity.”

NEW DELHI, INDIA - SEPTEMBER 11: Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks during a Russian-South African bilateral meeting, on September 11, 2026 in New Delhi, India. Russian President Vladimir Putin is in India for a three-day visit starting Friday, 11 September 2026. The high-profile trip revolves around Russia's participation in the 18th BRICS Summit, which India is hosting at the Bharat Mandapam this weekend. The trip marks Putin's second face-to-face engagement with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in less than two weeks, following their bilateral meeting at the SCO Summit in Bishkek. (Photo by Contributor/Getty Images)
Russian President Vladimir Putin. (Photo by Contributor/Getty Images) Contributor#8523328

Though below the level of armed conflict, these Russian activities raise the potential for something worse, Hinds posited.

“The risk about hybrid activity, from my perspective, is it could lead to escalation, and that’s where I hope that we get back towards deterrence again, and that the nations they’re going to decide to do what they want to do when it comes to these hybrid activities,” the general said. “Some of them are law enforcement. Some of them are military responses, and that’s up to the nations to decide how they’re going to deal with that. Not me.”

“But what I owe General Grynkewich is to ensure that we are demonstrating our deterrence each and every day, and we’re doing that effectively across all domains,” Hinds added. “And to ensure that Putin knows that if he tries something against the alliance, that we will be there, and we’re ready to win decisively if challenged.”

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post NATO Air Commander Details Thinking Behind The Alliance’s New Air Defense Plan appeared first on TWZ.

EU moves to speed up recognition of qualifications and make skills more portable

Executive Vice-President Roxana Mînzatu presents Fair Labour Mobility package © European Union

The European Commission has unveiled what it calls an ambitious “Fair Labour Mobility” package aimed at making it easier for people to work across EU borders while strengthening protections against exploitation and fraud.

The proposals would allow workers to prove social security and health insurance entitlements digitally and make qualifications easier to understand and recognize. The Commission estimates the measures could generate €6 billion in benefits by 2040.

Central to the package is a European Social Security Pass, or ESSPASS, enabling people to request and receive documents such as the European Health Insurance Card and the A1 certificate for posted workers online. Documents could be stored in the EU Digital Identity Wallet and verified by national authorities.

Brussels is also proposing faster recognition of professional qualifications. Procedures for regulated professions, including doctors and nurses, with the aim of reducing the target processing time from three months to five weeks.

Recognition of qualifications obtained outside the EU would also be streamlined, with common standards intended to cut average processing times from 14 months to four months.

The European Federation of Nurses Associations (EFN) has welcomed the Commission’s plans for recognising qualifications from outside the EU, arguing that they bring greater transparency to a labour market already heavily reliant on internationally recruited healthcare professionals.

EFN Secretary General Paul De Raeve said recruitment from third countries was already well established and frequently organised through bilateral arrangements between governments. Denmark, he noted, has gone considerably further, establishing a school in Delhi to prepare Indian nurses for work in Denmark, including Danish-language training.

“This is going on,” De Raeve said, arguing that international mobility cannot simply be prevented when European health systems need staff and qualified professionals want to move. In the short term, he said, overseas recruitment is also difficult to avoid given that educating a nurse takes around four years.

For De Raeve, an important improvement in the Commission proposal is therefore not simply facilitating recruitment, but putting it within a clearer European framework. The proposed directive would establish common rules for recognising qualifications obtained outside the EU, including aligned documentation requirements.

It would also provide stronger mechanisms for checking whether qualifications are genuine and meet European standards. Training programmes and institutions seeking access to automatic recognition would undergo EU-level assessment, potentially including independent review, site visits and direct examination of training environments.

De Raeve particularly welcomed this approach, pointing to the risks of fraud in diploma accreditation. Having universities and training institutions formally assessed and certified would give regulators and employers greater confidence that somebody arriving with a qualification has been trained by a legitimate institution to an appropriate standard.

He also welcomed plans to reduce administrative delays for individual professionals.

For nursing, De Raeve argued, faster recognition and stronger verification could help Europe recruit internationally without lowering professional standards, while replacing opaque bilateral arrangements with more consistent EU-level rules.

The proposals still require approval by the European Parliament and EU governments. Key measures would then be phased in over several years, with improvements to the Labour Authority expected during 2028–2030.

Lockheed Flexes To Modular AGM-158 JASSM Missile Concept

15 September 2026 at 19:27

Lockheed Martin has unveiled a modular airframe concept for its stealthy and combat-proven AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) family that could support multiple configurations, launch methods, and sensor packages while making use of the existing JASSM and Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) production infrastructure. Highly survivable, the missiles are an incredibly important and staple weapon for the U.S. military, and for select export customers.

Called AGM-158 FLEX, the new concept is centered on a common airframe with interchangeable components. Lockheed Martin says it has invested more than $35 million of its funds in the effort so far, including airframe design, testing, prototype production, subsystem qualification, and work with suppliers.

U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Joseph Herdliska, 131st Aircraft Maintenance Squadron load crew member, prepares to load an AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile onto the B-2 Spirit weapons load trainer during a weapons load competition at Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., Jan. 23, 2015. The competition is designed to showcase the teamwork, precision and attention to detail amongst Airmen in support of nuclear deterrence and global strike operations. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Joel Pfiester/Released)
An Air Force load crew member prepares to load an AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile onto the B-2 Spirit weapons load trainer during a weapons load competition at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Joel Pfiester/Released Tech. Sgt. Joel Pfiester

The company says the FLEX design will use removable nose sections that can accommodate sensor suites associated with the AGM-158 family. A removable boat tail would allow the same basic airframe to be configured for different launch methods, including air, surface, and subsurface launch. That would open the AGM-158 architecture up to ground-, ship-, and submarine-launched applications, although Lockheed Martin has not provided details on the specific launchers, platforms, or configurations envisioned. It’s worth noting the LRASM has been tested in vertical launch configuration for vessels equipped with the Mk 41 launch system.

A 2016 test of LRASM from a Mk 41 launcher on the Navy’s Self Defense Test Ship. Lockheed Martin

In addition to the Navy vertical launch tests, the idea of moving the JASSM family beyond its traditional combat aircraft launch platforms is not new. The Air Force’s Palletized JASSM concept, better known as Rapid Dragon, has demonstrated the ability to deploy JASSM-ER from palletized launchers carried inside cargo aircraft, using an expendable airdrop system. FLEX takes a different approach by building those kinds of launch options into the airframe architecture itself, with modularity supporting various launch configurations for the same basic weapon.

For aircraft-launched weapons, Lockheed Martin says FLEX will retain compatibility with current and future JASSM and LRASM launch platforms.

NAS PATUXENT RIVER, Md. -- An F-35 Lightning II test pilot conducts the first flight test to certify the F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing variant of the fighter aircraft for carrying the AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). As part of ongoing weapon integration efforts, the Pax River F-35 Integrated Test Force (Pax ITF) team for the first time flew test flights Jan. 14 with two AGM-158 loaded on external stations. LRASM is a defined near-term solution for the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) air-launch capability gap that will provide flexible, long-range, advanced, anti-surface capability against high-threat maritime targets. The Pax River ITF’s mission is to effectively plan, coordinate, and conduct safe, secure, and efficient flight test for F-35B and C variants, and provide necessary and timely data to support program verification / certification and fleet operational requirements.
An F-35B carrying the AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). U.S. Marine Corps Kyra Helwick

The company is also proposing multiple airframe lengths. A 206-inch configuration is associated with the supersized JASSM-XR, while a 168-inch version is consistent with the dimensions of JASSM-ER. Lockheed Martin says JASSM-XR will be the first configuration of the FLEX airframe.

The AGM-158 family has already grown well beyond the original JASSM. The AGM-158A is the baseline stealthy air-launched land-attack missile, with a publicly reported range of roughly 230-330 miles, while the AGM-158B JASSM-ER uses a more efficient engine and additional fuel to roughly double that reach, to around 575 miles or more.

Alongside the land-attack variants is the AGM-158C LRASM, which uses the JASSM airframe but substitutes a sophisticated imaging infrared anti-ship seeker, electronic support measures, datalink, and other capabilities, for operations against heavily defended surface combatants.

A U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber, assigned to the 509th Bomb Wing, deploys an AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile to support a live-fire sinking exercise as part of Valiant Shield 2026 over the Philippine Sea, June 27, 2026. The B-2 flew into the Mariana Island Range Complex to successfully employ the AGM-158C LRASM and demonstrated flexibility across the globe and hold maritime vessels at risk. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech Sgt. Thomas Barley)
A B-2 deploys an AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile to support a live-fire sinking exercise as part of Valiant Shield 2026 over the Philippine Sea, June 27, 2026. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech Sgt. Thomas Barley Tech. Sgt. Thomas Barley

Finally, the much larger JASSM-XR is being developed with a substantially stretched fuselage to carry more fuel and a larger 1,000-pound-class warhead, with a range expected to approach or exceed 1,000 miles. This would give it a similar striking capability as the Tomahawk cruise missile, although in a stealthier package.

Beyond range and launch options, the company is pitching its new FLEX concept as a way to simplify future upgrades. Components could be replaced as they become obsolete or new capabilities become available without necessarily requiring a completely new missile design.

That approach could have an industrial-base advantage, particularly as the United States seeks to increase production of long-range weapons. Lockheed Martin says FLEX would use the existing JASSM/LRASM production line, supply chain, mission-planning infrastructure, and software ecosystem rather than establishing an entirely new manufacturing and support architecture.

The company says its JASSM/LRASM production infrastructure includes a 225,000-square-foot facility opened in 2022 with increased automation and a robotic paint line.

Notable, however, is the fact that FLEX is being proposed at a time when the U.S. Air Force is pursuing affordable mass as a key priority.

For example, as part of a slew of low-cost cruise missile offerings, the service has been moving ahead with the Extended Range Attack Munition, or ERAM, a new air-launched missile explicitly intended to provide a relatively low-cost, rapidly producible standoff weapon. The Air Force conducted a live-warhead ERAM test in January of last year, less than 16 months after the program received its initial contract, and described the weapon as a means of generating mass against fixed targets. ERAM is understood to have a range of between 150 and 280 miles, putting it below the reach of the baseline JASSM, let alone the JASSM-ER or XR.

The Extended Range Attack Munition live-fire test on Jan. 22, 2025, at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. via U.S. Air Force

However, the emerging class of lower-cost weapons are intended very much more to complement than compete with JASSM. While the Air Force plans to buy thousands of the cheaper missile, the JASSM will still be needed to take up the higher end of the cost and capability list.

Lockheed Martin mentions that FLEX should “unlock future cost savings,” but this sounds more about giving customers the ability to swap out components and upgrade capabilities on existing missile rounds, to avoid obsolescence, rather than facilitate mass production.

As it stands, JASSM has evolved into a family of increasingly capable and longer-range weapons, but those capabilities necessarily come with a different set of cost and production considerations than a weapon designed from the outset around large-scale production. Lockheed Martin’s announcement does not disclose a target unit cost for FLEX, nor does it explain how the eventual cost of a FLEX-derived weapon would compare with a baseline JASSM or LRASM. The unit price of the latest subvariants of the JASSM-ER is around $1.2 and $1.5 million, according to official budget documents.

The new weapon is a way of getting more variants and launch options out of the established JASSM/LRASM architecture, potentially with less development work than creating entirely new weapons. Whether that translates into enough savings or production capacity to satisfy the military’s growing demand for large numbers of standoff weapons remains to be seen.

For Lockheed Martin, the proposal also offers a way to extend the relevance of the AGM-158 family as the company and the Pentagon pursue additional range, new launch platforms, and potentially new launch methods.

The flexibility of the missile could be particularly relevant to the Agile Combat Employment concept, and the wider U.S. military in the Indo-Pacific, where forces are expected to operate from a larger number of dispersed and potentially austere locations. A common missile architecture that can be adapted to different launch platforms and different target sets could allow weapons to be positioned and employed across a distributed force rather than tying particular missile variants to particular launchers.

The original JASSM/LRASM has also become a significant export weapon, with Australia, Finland, Poland and several other U.S. allies cleared to acquire variants of the missile. While the advanced capabilities of the weapon have seen its export opportunities carefully controlled, FLEX could potentially open up the market to more customers, including less-advanced, ‘sanitized’ versions.

Pilot and Weapon Systems Officer conduct a pre-flight check on the JASSM-ER loaded to a Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18F Super Hornet at RAAF Base Amberley, Queensland. Australian Department of Defense LAC Campbell Latch

Lockheed Martin’s announcement provides few details on FLEX’s eventual cost, production rate, schedule, or specific performance beyond the stated airframe dimensions. For now, the concept demonstrates that the company is seeking to create a more adaptable architecture around an established missile family, one that has played a critical role in numerous operations since its introduction.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Lockheed Flexes To Modular AGM-158 JASSM Missile Concept appeared first on TWZ.

Un pluralisme en trompe-l'œil

15 September 2026 at 18:03

Les Iraniens sont régulièrement invités à se déplacer dans les bureaux de vote pour élire leur maire, leur député et le président de la République. Mais, outre l'interdiction de partis politiques indépendants, le système demeure verrouillé en raison de l'implacable filtrage des candidats par le Conseil des gardiens de la Constitution.

JPEG - 83.9 kio
Jean Gaumy //// Agriculteurs près de Rasht, province de Guilan, Iran, 1986
© Jean Gaumy/Magnum Photos

@IMAGE 3516.HR.ai

Bien que la République islamique d'Iran se distingue de nombre de régimes autoritaires voisins par son origine révolutionnaire et par le maintien d'institutions électives, ses dirigeants semblent aujourd'hui guidés par deux impératifs que ne renieraient pas certains autocrates arabes. Le premier est d'empêcher la remise en cause du système institutionnel (voir la carte « Institutions de la république islamique ») et d'assurer à n'importe quel prix la pérennité de la Jomhuriye Eslamiye Iran (« République islamique d'Iran »), instaurée après la révolution de 1979. Cela se traduit par l'absence de véritables partis politiques indépendants, par l'interdiction et la répression de nombreuses organisations d'opposition, ainsi que par des vagues d'arrestations et d'exécutions de leurs militants. Ces restrictions concernent aussi les organisations syndicales et les médias.

Dans ce cadre très contraint, le second impératif relève quant à lui de la nécessité de veiller aux apparences en admettant un certain pluralisme mais uniquement au sein d'un périmètre idéologique bien défini. Ce qui exclut, par exemple, un changement des institutions. Officiellement, la « voix du peuple » compte puisque les Iraniennes et les Iraniens désignent au suffrage universel leur président, leurs députés et leurs conseillers municipaux. Mais, en réalité, le système dominé par le clergé et placé sous l'autorité du Guide suprême oriente à son gré la vie publique grâce à plusieurs mécanismes de contrôle. À cet égard, l'élection, tous les quatre ans, d'un président de la République illustre à la perfection ce formalisme démocratique puisque personne ne peut être candidat sans l'aval du Conseil des gardiens de la Constitution (texte fondateur adopté par référendum le 3 décembre 1980, et modifié le 28 juillet 1989). Composé de six clercs et de six juristes, le Conseil, ou Shora-ye negahban-e qanun-e assassi, vérifie la conformité des lois avec la Constitution ou les préceptes de l'islam, et c'est lui qui décide qui peut se présenter sans avoir à fournir d'explications publiques sur le rejet de tel ou tel postulant. En somme, cette structure joue à la fois le rôle de Conseil constitutionnel et de commission de contrôle des listes électorales.

En 2013, année de l'élection du modéré Hassan Rohani, ce Conseil fit beaucoup parler de lui en rejetant la totalité des candidatures liées au camp des réformateurs, généralement plus favorables à l'ouverture vers l'Occident, à un assouplissement des restrictions sociétales et aux privatisations (les conservateurs, quant à eux, défendent davantage les normes religieuses et se montrent plus méfiants envers l'Occident, tout en soutenant des intérêts économiques puissants liés aux oligarques). C'est ainsi qu'Ali Akbar Hachemi Rafsandjani, pourtant lui-même ancien président de la République (1989-1997), fut empêché de concourir. Dans le même temps, et peut-être par souci d'équilibre, le Conseil refusa aussi de permettre au vice-président sortant, l'ultraconservateur Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, très proche du président Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), de se présenter. En 2017, tandis que M. Rohani allait être réélu, ce fut au tour de M. Ahmadinejad de subir l'affront d'un refus de validation de sa candidature. À l'époque, les observateurs se perdirent en conjectures. Était-ce dû à la volonté du Guide suprême de la révolution Ali Khamenei d'empêcher le retour aux affaires d'un homme aux déclarations intempestives et dont les deux mandats (2005-2009 puis 2009-2013) furent marqués par un raidissement du régime et, surtout, par la dégradation des relations avec la plupart des pays occidentaux ? Quoi qu'il en soit, M. Ahmadinejad est, depuis cette date, systématiquement candidat aux scrutins présidentiels (2017, 2021 et 2024) sans jamais pouvoir obtenir le feu vert du Conseil.

Jeunes et femmes écartés

En 2021, il ne fut pas le seul à être écarté, puisque, comme en 2013, la majorité des candidats réformateurs furent priés de rester chez eux, y compris M. Mohsen Hachemi Rafsandjani, le fils de l'ancien président. Le Conseil provoqua aussi une polémique de grande ampleur en décidant de changer les règles officielles d'admission (âge, niveau d'études, etc.) à quelques jours seulement de la clôture des listes. Seuls ceux ayant entre 40 et 75 ans étant habilités à se présenter, cette manœuvre fut interprétée par les médias proches des réformateurs comme la volonté d'exclure le très jeune ministre sortant de l'information Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi.

Un autre aspect du tri des candidats à l'élection présidentielle illustre le caractère non démocratique de la République islamique. À ce jour, aucune femme n'a pu obtenir l'aval du Conseil. Cette fermeture intransigeante semble même dissuader les impétrantes. En 2017, elles étaient 137, toutes orientations politiques confondues, à déposer leur candidature. Ce nombre est tombé à 40 pour le scrutin de 2021 et… à 4 pour 2024, dont la députée de Téhéran Zohre Elahian. Pourquoi une telle exclusion alors que des Iraniennes sont élues au Majlis, l'Assemblée consultative islamique, même si, en moyenne, elles n'y constituent qu'entre 4 % et 6 % de l'ensemble des députés ? La question est posée avec insistance depuis la fin des années 1980 avec l'irruption, dans le champ politique, d'Iraniennes se revendiquant à la fois de la République islamique et du féminisme. Mme Faezeh Rafsandjani, fille cadette de l'ancien président et favorable à un rapprochement avec les États-Unis, a ainsi très tôt défendu l'idée que la loi ne pouvait empêcher les femmes de se présenter à la magistrature suprême : « Quelle est la différence entre la présidence de la République et la direction d'une administration [dirigée par une femme]  ? Aucune, déclarait-elle dans les colonnes du Monde diplomatique en 1996 (1) alors qu'elle venait d'être élue députée de Téhéran. Dans les deux cas, il s'agit d'une responsabilité exécutive. Alors pourquoi une femme ne pourrait-elle pas diriger le pays si elle peut être à la tête d'une administration ? (…) Ce n'est pas l'islam mais l'interprétation par le clergé de ses préceptes qui est à l'origine de l'interdiction des femmes à la magistrature. » Mme Azam Taleghani, ancienne députée et fille de l'ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani, figure importante de la révolution de 1979, a combattu, elle aussi, cette restriction. Première Iranienne à déposer une candidature à l'élection présidentielle, en 1997, elle renouvela cette démarche à plusieurs reprises afin de contraindre le Conseil des gardiens à clarifier sa position. En 2017, elle résumait ainsi son combat : « Les femmes représentent 50 % de la population iranienne ; le pays mérite donc au moins une candidate. »

La bataille pour la licéité des candidatures féminines à l'élection présidentielle tourne autour de l'article 115 de la Constitution, qui exige que le président soit choisi parmi les rajol-e siasi. La traduction littérale de ces termes arabes équivaut à « homme(s) politique(s) ». Mais de nombreuses personnes en Iran, y compris des religieux, estiment que c'est sa définition plus large, autrement dit « personnalité(s) politique(s) », qui doit primer. Quoi qu'il en soit, le 13 septembre 2020, M. Abbas-Ali Kadkhodaei, alors porte-parole du Conseil, admettait dans une déclaration qu'il n'existe pas de disposition juridique formelle interdisant l'accès des femmes à la fonction suprême (2) : « Il ne s'agit pas à proprement parler d'interdictions légales, mais plutôt de considérations culturelles. Une femme pourrait accéder à la présidence un jour (3).  » Le scrutin de 2024 n'a pas confirmé cette prédiction. Peut-être sera-ce le cas en 2028 ?

« Où est mon vote ? »

Malgré les limites politiques de l'exercice (absence de partis politiques et d'organisations indépendantes, tri des candidats, absence des femmes), les dirigeants de la République islamique ont toujours présenté l'élection présidentielle comme une preuve de la légitimité du régime. Il est vrai que le déroulement des campagnes, avec profusion d'articles, des débats parfois musclés entre candidats et une multitude de sondages, tranche souvent avec les plébiscites peu surprenants auxquels on peut assister au Proche-Orient, notamment à l'époque des régimes baasistes en Irak et en Syrie, avec des présidents élus à plus de 95 % des suffrages… Mais au fil du temps, cet argument de la légitimité s'avère à double tranchant. En 2009, c'est pour protester contre le trucage du scrutin que des millions d'Iraniens ont défilé dans la rue malgré la répression, qui, selon un bilan officiel, a provoqué la mort de 109 personnes (plusieurs milliers, selon l'opposition à l'étranger). « Où est mon vote ? », clamaient les manifestants, accusant le régime d'avoir frauduleusement œuvré à la réélection de M. Ahmadinejad, ce dernier affirmant que le scrutin avait été « totalement libre » et qualifiant ses contempteurs de « racailles ».

Ce « mouvement vert », de la couleur de M. Mir Hossein Moussavi, principal adversaire de M. Ahmadinejad, a démontré les limites du système puisque ce dernier n'a pas eu d'autre choix que de truquer le scrutin pour empêcher la défaite du président sortant. Par son usage des réseaux sociaux, notamment Twitter (aujourd'hui X), il a inspiré d'autres vagues à travers le monde : les occupations populaires de places publiques à Madrid, New York ou Athènes, sans oublier les « printemps arabes » de 2011. Mais il a surtout constitué le point de départ d'une séquence qui demeure ouverte et qui se traduit souvent par le même enchaînement dramatique : colère populaire et manifestations — souvent liées à la dégradation de la situation économique —, répression sanglante, arrestations et jugements expéditifs parfois suivis d'exécutions. L'élection présidentielle de 2009 a aussi dégoûté un grand nombre d'Iraniens de la politique. Cette année-là, le taux de participation fut de 85 %. Au second tour du scrutin de 2024, cet indicateur que les autorités ont longtemps brandi comme une preuve de légitimité du régime atteignait à peine 50 %, et seulement 40 % pour le premier.

Voir en ligne : /mav/209/BELKAID/69944

(1) Lire Azadh-Thiebaut Kian, « Islamistes et laïques pour la première fois unies », Le Monde diplomatique, novembre 1996.

(2) Cf. Raz Zimmt, « Will Iran let a woman run for president in 2021 ? », Atlantic Council, 15 octobre 2020.

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