Alinhamento do Brasil à Europa em meio às atuais tensões geopolítica cria uma ameaça grave à política tradicional de neutralidade do Brasil.
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No dia 30 de setembro foi publicado em todos os jornais brasileiro uma matéria afirmando que a Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (Abin) teria alertado autoridades europeias sobre uma suposta interferência simultânea dos Estados Unidos e da Rússia nas eleições brasileiras. O caso levanta questões que vão muito além da disputa eleitoral de 2026. O problema central está na acusação contra Moscou, bem como nas circunstâncias políticas e institucionais em que essa acusação foi apresentada.
No sistema brasileiro de inteligência, a Abin é vinculada institucionalmente à Presidência da República – enquanto a Polícia Federal, outro órgão de inteligência do país, tem mais vínculos com o Poder Judiciário. Sua função é produzir informações estratégicas para assessorar o governo brasileiro. Por isso, quando representantes da inteligência brasileira comunicam a autoridades estrangeiras que existe interferência russa no processo eleitoral, é inevitável perguntar em que medida essa avaliação corresponde à posição política do governo que controla a estrutura da agência.
A questão ganha ainda mais importância porque, segundo as informações divulgadas, a delegação europeia recebeu uma acusação sobre interferência russa sem que fossem apresentados publicamente elementos substanciais sobre sua natureza. Não foram identificados, ao menos no material tornado público, agentes, operações, mecanismos de financiamento, estruturas de propaganda ou campanhas específicas atribuídas a Moscou. Existe, portanto, uma acusação, mas seus fundamentos permanecem praticamente desconhecidos.
Isso produz uma situação particularmente conveniente para determinados atores políticos. A Europa, que é hostil à Rússia e a Trump, recebe uma informação segundo a qual tanto Washington quanto Moscou estariam tentando influenciar as eleições brasileiras. Isso permitiria a Bruxelas – e ainda mais especialmente à França e à Alemanha, que são os principais “amigos” de Lula atualmente – eventualmente “apoiar” o Brasil em ações de “contrainteligência” para combater a suposta influência estadunidense e russa. Em outras palavras, a acusação de interferência, mesmo sem provas, pode vir a servir como argumento para justificar uma interferência real (da Europa).
Há ainda uma questão política mais ampla. Uma parcela significativa da esquerda brasileira consolidou nos últimos anos uma interpretação segundo a qual Vladimir Putin pertence a uma espécie de “internacional de extrema direita”, ao lado de Donald Trump e de outros movimentos conservadores ocidentais. Essa leitura transforma Rússia, Trump e a direita brasileira em elementos de um mesmo campo político internacional, apesar das diferenças profundas entre suas respectivas posições e interesses.
Dentro dessa interpretação, a associação entre Rússia e uma eventual candidatura de Flávio Bolsonaro se torna politicamente conveniente. Flávio é identificado com Trump, com o Partido Republicano e com a direita americana. A existência de uma suposta conexão russa permitiria inserir a disputa eleitoral brasileira em uma narrativa internacional mais ampla, na qual diferentes forças conservadoras seriam apresentadas como partes de uma mesma rede de influência.
Contudo, é absolutamente óbvio que a Rússia não tem qualquer interesse em interferir nas eleições brasileiras a favor de qualquer dos lados. Ademais, a maior parte dos ativistas pró-Rússia no Brasil é identificada com a esquerda ou neutra em relação a ambos os lados da política nacional. A acusação parece ser feita com o simples intuito de agradar a União Europeia, já que os europeus preferem Lula a Flávio (por este ser subordinado a Trump). E o fato de não haver detalhes que substanciem as acusações apenas reforça este ponto.
O ponto realmente relevante é outro: por que uma agência de inteligência subordinada à Presidência da República apresentou às autoridades europeias uma acusação contra a Rússia sem que seus fundamentos fossem posteriormente esclarecidos? E por que isso ocorre justamente durante a preparação das eleições brasileiras e em um momento de deterioração extraordinária das relações entre Rússia e Europa?
A resposta a essas perguntas importa porque o Brasil está inserido em um ambiente internacional cada vez mais polarizado. A Rússia ocupa posição central nos BRICS e mantém relações estratégicas com o Brasil, enquanto a Europa atravessa uma fase de crescente confronto com Moscou. Nesse contexto, qualquer informação oficial brasileira que associe a Rússia a uma operação de interferência eleitoral possui consequências diplomáticas graves.
Ademais, as tensões entre Rússia e Europa crescem cada vez mais e há risco real de conflito devido às constantes provocações europeias. É óbvio que em tal contexto não interessa ao Brasil se tornar parte de qualquer lado da crise. Mas não há nada pior para a política de neutralidade brasileira do que reportar à União Europa uma acusação formal contra a Rússia.
Em tese, é possível que o relatório tenha sido entregue à Europa sem comunicação prévia ao presidente brasileiro – embora isso seja muito improvável. Se Lula quiser preservar a neutralidade brasileira, o correto a ser feito é desmentir a Abin publicamente e pedir desculpas pelo incidente. Contudo, resta saber se ele estará realmente disposto a fazer isso, considerando que a União Europeia é o principal “aliado” internacional do governo Lula atual.
Peace cannot be built through uninterrupted rearmament or by forcing one side into capitulation.
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This is the first part of Mats Alexandersson’s series on war, peace, and security. The next three parts will be published during September and October on the Clarté blog.
For a long time, the United States has united economic, financial, military, and political power to secure a U.S.-centered capitalist world order. This has often been legitimized with what has been called liberal hegemony: a rhetoric in which democracy, individual rights, market economy, and international rules are presented as universal norms. But in practice, these principles have repeatedly been subordinated to the demand to preserve American supremacy and prevent rival great powers from dominating strategic regions.
What has come to be called the rules-based world order has therefore also functioned as a self-image and a language of power. The United States has ascribed to itself a special historical task: to guarantee stability, open markets, and security in the world economy. This belief in an American superiority with a special historical task has become a kind of meta-ideology. Behind this universalism, however, a more tangible class and power interest has operated, in which the American state’s geopolitical role has ultimately served the expansion and security of capital.
Two figures clearly demonstrate this line. Henry Kissinger made American realpolitik visible in its most brutal form. In Chile, the United States helped undermine Salvador Allende’s democratically elected government and subsequently supported Pinochet’s dictatorship. The same logic recurred in Cambodia, East Timor, and support for Pakistan’s military regime: democracy and human life had to give way to geopolitical control.
When Zbigniew Brzezinski in The Grand Chessboard in 1997 more sophisticatedly formulated that no rival must be allowed to dominate Eurasia, this practice became an explicit doctrine.1 The line from Kissinger to Brzezinski is therefore clear: from secret intervention to open strategy for global supremacy. It is in this development that today’s bloc formation, war economy, and growing risk of great-power war must be understood.
The painting “Die Namenlosen” (1916) by the Austrian painter Albin Egger-Lienz.
Why Eurasia is gaining additional significance
Today, Secretary of State Marco Rubio constitutes a central node in the U.S. foreign and security policy apparatus, where the White House, the Pentagon, intelligence services, NATO, and financial policy bodies cooperate. At the same time, the strategic environment is increasingly shaped by the technology and defense industry: AI, cloud, satellite, semiconductor, and weapons companies influence the technology of war, information flows, and investments. American hegemony therefore appears not only as state exercise of power, but as an intertwined military, digital, and financial system.
On Brzezinski’s map, Europe was never peripheral. In The Grand Chessboard, Eurasia is described as the decisive geopolitical playing field, and Europe as the United States’ most important bridgehead on the continent. An integrated Europe, bound to the United States through the transatlantic link and NATO, would strengthen American influence in western Eurasia. Europe therefore appears less as an independent power pole than as a strategic platform in a U.S.-led order.
This logic becomes clearest in Brzezinski’s view of Russia and Ukraine. He argued that Russia’s most important geostrategic option lay in a Western orientation, but on terms that did not make the country an equal power pole. Ukraine was given a key role as a “geopolitical pivot”: without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire, while control over Ukraine would once again give the country decisive strategic weight. Here the limitation of the great-power perspective is also visible: Ukraine has been reduced to a piece in a larger power game, despite its own political agency and right to self-determination.
Brzezinski advocated a geopolitical pluralism in Eurasia, that is, an order in which no single power may dominate the entire continent. In practice, this meant that the United States should support regional counterweights, alliances, and independent states in order to limit both a revanchist Russia and a rising China. That model can be interpreted as a strategy for balance of power, but also as a manual for playing regional actors against one another in order to preserve American supremacy.
The same approach characterized Brzezinski’s analysis of Central Asia and the Caucasus, which he described as the “Eurasian Balkans”: an area where energy, transport routes, weak states, and ethnic conflicts make the region an object of great-power rivalry. The region thus becomes primarily of strategic value to external powers, not through the local societies’ own goals. Superpower thinking turns smaller countries into objects of geopolitics rather than equal political subjects.
There is rearmament for war
The historical retrospective is needed to understand today’s situation. The war in Ukraine, Europe’s rearmament, and the growing fear of a Russian conflict with NATO cannot be explained solely as the consequence of an isolated conflict. They must also be seen against the background of the U.S.-led security order that emerged after the Cold War — an order whose goal has been to preserve American dominance in Eurasia. Today, this policy has had contradictory consequences: Russia, China, and Iran have moved closer to one another, Europe’s room for maneuver has been limited, and the risk of great-power conflict has increased.
Brzezinski’s book formulated this strategy unusually openly. The United States was to prevent a rival power or coalition from gathering sufficient strength to dominate Eurasia. This meant limiting a resurrected Russia, preventing China from becoming an equal competitor, and keeping Europe politically and militarily tied to the United States. In this perspective, NATO is not only a defense alliance, but also a tool for American power projection in Europe and its neighborhood.
The Eurasian counterweight
Cooperation between China, Russia, and Iran is more than a temporary reaction to sanctions and individual wars. China contributes industry, capital, and market; Russia contributes energy, raw materials, military capability, and geographical depth; Iran contributes regional weight and a strategic location. Their interests are not identical, and the cooperation contains clear contradictions. But the relationship between China and Russia has acquired a material foundation that makes it more durable than many Western assessments previously assumed.
Here lies an ironic consequence. A policy intended to prevent a Eurasian counterweight may have helped create it. At the same time, the United States faces its own economic tensions: large budget deficits, growing national debt, and high interest rates increase vulnerability. The dollar’s status as a reserve currency continues to provide room for maneuver, but does not eliminate the risk of a crisis of confidence. The cost of such a crisis would likely be passed on to ordinary wage earners through inflation, cutbacks, and deteriorating public services.
Europe’s dilemma
Economist Jeffrey Sachs has argued that Europe has historically had significant economic complementarity with Russia: European industry and technology could be linked to Russian energy, raw materials, and market. According to Sachs, sanctions, conflict policy, and dependence on the United States have broken this possibility and weakened Europe’s strategic independence.2
That assessment is disputed, not least because Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has drastically changed the conditions for economic cooperation. But it raises a necessary question: Can Europe formulate its own security policy, or is the continent reduced to an arena for other powers’ conflict? Sachs advocates direct diplomacy with Moscow, a clearer separation between EU foreign policy and NATO, and a European defense that is more independent and less dependent on the United States.
The risk of war
The acute danger is escalation. There is no simple or risk-free path to a military defeat for Russia, but policy continues to sharpen the confrontation. If the goal slides from Ukraine’s defense to a lasting weakening or subjugation of Russia, the risk increases that the proxy war turns into a direct conflict between nuclear powers.
Peace cannot be built through uninterrupted rearmament or by forcing one side into capitulation. A sustainable peace requires diplomacy, recognized security interests, and an international order in which no great power is given the right to dominate others. Public opinion in Europe and the United States can become decisive: when the costs of the arms race, social cutbacks, and the risk of war become clear, pressure can grow for a different course.
Anti-Zelensky protests planned for October 3 – led by a military officer on the kill list.
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The War in Ukraine has not been entirely protest-free from Kiev’s side of things. During the summer of 2026 a ‘sudden’ wave of ‘cardboard protests’ were brought to the public’s eye demanding the resignation of Zelensky. These demonstrations occurred as a reaction to the removal Defense Minister Fedorov from his position, or at least that was the overtly stated motivation for them. Of course, as we know, official reasons for protests always sound ‘nice’ but how many people living in a country at war actually know or care about the hirings and firings of ministers? Perhaps this weak motivating factor, saving some minister in a government viewed from all sides as completely corrupt, is why those cardboard signs and their messages didn’t take hold. The protestors then declared that their mission had ‘no end date’ attached to it, but as we can see Zelensky remains in office, and cardboard signage seems to have gone out of fashion.
But this time, at least on its surface, it seems as though it is the army itself which is the offended party that wants to protest. Some sort of slogan like ‘Zelensky betrayed the army’ will be much more enticing to protestors, than “let’s save Minister X for being fired”. Also, when given the choice between ‘the army or Zelensky’ I think we all know who would lose across a wide range of diverse public opinion in 2026 Ukraine.
Somehow, despite all the evidence shown through human history, many are sure that holding up signs will change everything radically, and those with this mentality need their slogans to be broad and emotional. According to Gazeta.Ru the situation with the upcoming October 3rd anti-Zelensky protests will look something like this:
“Ukrainian military officer Alexander Todorov on the MayiakUA YouTube channel announced a series of rallies demanding the resignation of Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky and his team.”
According to him, the public actions are scheduled for October 3rd, 2026. They want to hold rallies in Kiev near the presidential administration building, as well as in other cities of Ukraine. Todorov called on the Ukrainian diasporas to support the initiative abroad.
The military man criticized the current leadership. In his opinion, the soldiers feel abandoned, and the government is engaged in corruption and misuse of foreign aid. Todorov is also concerned about plans for the possible mobilization of women and citizens from the age of 18.
On the eve of the Verkhovna Rada deputy Artem Dmytruk said that the Security Service of Ukraine had detained Todorov. The politician did not provide details. There have been no official comments on the incident yet.”
The biggest thing that stands out is that Todorov wants these protests to go international via the Ukrainian diaspora, meaning the same shows of support on EU streets for Zelensky, may start to portray him as a more ‘realistic figure’ to put it mildly. And now that millions of Ukrainian citizens have fled their native land, there are plenty of them to use as protestors in the West.
It is also important to note that Todorov is on the same “Peace Keeper” list as anyone who has said or done anything even mildly pro-Russian since 2014. This website is at the very least an informal “enemies list” for post-Maidan Ukraine that provides personal information, on all those who stand against the revolution. The Russian side often portrays this to be a “kill list” and that it was actually created in or by the West. According to Izvestia the site works as such:
Myrotvorets (Peacekeeper) positions itself as a database with information about those people whom the owners of the resource consider to be involved in crimes against the security of Ukraine. The website is officially registered in Canada, and in Ukraine it has the status of an independent non-governmental media outlet.
The new status of Todorov as being a possible foreign enemy agent means that he certainly does not have nearly unilateral support from the elite and that some people responsible for the status quo are very much against this. Also, it means that this Ukrainian Army soldier could be arrested or called in for questioning at any time even before the protests start. We should also keep in mind that supposedly Todorov was the organizer of the following political demonstrations, some occurring even before the Maidan:
2011 — Against Petro Yushchenko
2012 — Against local authorities and power engineers (electric companies)
2014 — Against radicals and Kolomoisky
2017— Against Poroshenko
2024 — Against the military leadership and the TCC (press gangs)
As you can see none of the protests above achieved anything, but none of them happened under the conditions of 2026 after Putin ‘took the gloves off’ during the summer. The Russian side has hit infrastructure hard and how much of Ukraine’s economy remains is open for debate, but the situation is fairly dire. The Kiev Regime is not just plodding along under the usual corruption + apathy + conscription + foreign financing that it has been since 2022. Everything is being hit, everything is being destroyed and it looks like military resistance is crumbling, thus this time, in terms of protests, ‘things could be different’. But the big question remains, who could be the one(s) standing behind Todorov? Who would benefit from yet another revolution in Ukraine?
Who is behind these upcoming protests?
If the objective were to just send the last local schmuck into the meat grinder and truly fight to the last Ukrainian to make Putin pay dearly for every square meter of territory, then there would be no need to change out Zelensky. Furthermore, after so many officials around Zelensky have fled, quit, or otherwise left the game, it looks like the tower of power is very wobbly, meaning that any violent mass protest would essentially bring the house of cards crashing down. Thus, we can be fairly confident that anyone who would want to fund a protest wants to end the war.
A near total political collapse, with ‘the enemy at the gates’ will surely cause the entire system to spiral out of control and disintegrate, meaning that there would not be enough cohesion for the war to continue. Russians often joke that all that is needed for a declaration of total capitulation would be a cat’s paw print, the signature of a legitimate president is only needed for some other more ‘two-sided’ peace deal, that is to say if capitulation is on the table, Lil’ Zel isn’t needed to sign it.
And, although he is made fun of for his comedy background and drug addiction, Zelensky has been the superficial glue keeping the whole show together. He, in a strange way, is sort of the last bastion of ‘Project Ukraine’ as the Russians call it, as he absolutely will not abdicate the toxic throne. So the game looks to be this; that the Green Goblin must be ousted to end the war in the fall/winter of 2026… for some unstated reason by some unknown parties. But who could they be?
George Soros, is yet again at the center of the Russian rumor mill, but it is hard to exactly say why he would be behind this maneuver. Perhaps, I have been completely wrong in previous pieces, and indeed the Europeans do need time to prep for a war in the 2030s and thus this failed attempt to break the Russian bear needs to end immediately? Is it that they need time to get ready for the next offensive and Kiev has become a drain rather than a boon? I am not sure if this is true, and perhaps, there is a ‘boy who cried wolf’ effect happening on alternative media, that are just used to blaming Soros for protests. If it’s a march with signs and slogans calling for regime change, it’s got to be Soros right?
Team Trump or some forces in the USA, could be vying to get this damn thing over with. Just because publically and on camera Donald Trump seems to personally despise Zelensky doesn’t mean anything, but Trump has been talking about better relations with Russia since his very first political campaign. Also and more importantly, the source of all big lobbyist bribes, Israel, is in deep trouble. Essentially, the Iran-Israel issue is way more important and stealing the show, and Trump has never had much political will to antagonize Russia. When D.C. faces the choice between saving the Zionist Paradise or Neo-Khazaria you know which front they are going to invest in.
There are also definitely large factions with cash in America, that despite being ‘in a distant second place’ politically, want antagonism of Russia to be a thing of the past. If you haven’t noticed, extremely prominent media voices in America can now regularly have Russian politicians and thinkers on their programs, something that would have been absolutely a career death sentence, and maybe even ‘punishable’, just a few years ago. This American ‘third position’, with ‘second place’ influence, does not want nuclear conflict, and wants to move on from the Cold War and games of global domination.
The visit of Ratcliffe to Moscow, may signal that even the most passionate Russophobes in Washington want to call this one done, and move on.
European 4D chess masters, could, after having acknowledged that the Battle for Ukraine is over, choose to allow Russia to make the broadest possible front across a new awkward border in Ukraine, or even better, allow the 21st Century’s Golden Horde to actually have a new physical border with places like Poland and Romania to spark a fresh wave of Russophobic paranoia in local politics. This sounds like absolutely insane reasoning, to let Russia be closer to a place like Poland in order to spark more Russophobia by proximity, but if you haven’t noticed, the leadership of the European continent looks like the tea party from Alice in Wonderland. We cannot and should not completely exclude concepts that are insane, especially if they are very ‘media friendly’ and involve ‘message sending’. Over-and-over again, Kiev has been forced to launch attacks for PR purposes at the cost of thousands of men, the reasoning in Brussels based on creating optics to somehow achieve tangible results. Like it or not this is how they do things. So why not let the Russians get closer, as to make them more of a threat to attack them in 2035? This is fantastic PR optics, look at how they ‘expanded their empire into Europe and Poland is next!’.
Also, the weak point by which Russia has been invaded from Europe has been the broad steppes of Ukraine. The Nazis did go through Finland, got near Murmansk and sat there for the whole war, the border with Finland, despite being quite big, just isn’t geographically good enough, but lots of massive flat space is quite hard to defend. Furthermore, that land is now nearly completely destroyed and will require unfathomable amounts of rubles to rebuild, and while the Russians are rebuilding they will be vulnerable.
What if the protests succeed?
We have already seen some internal fighting between factions within Kiev and this would only intensify as protestors started to storm the theoretical location where the Cocaine King rules from. Many young men may already be convinced that taking risks protesting is a far better option than dying with absolute certainty on the front after conscription. Thus, the time might be ‘right’ for this sort of thing, and with another Maidan occurring, and enemy forces so close, this would surely fracture things quickly. If the protests are not put down properly the oligarchs, clans, and other wealthy individuals will swiftly look to save their skins and livelihoods potentially breaking up the country or just signing whatever Moscow wants them to. Once the military were to lose command cohesion, there won’t be any more coordinated drone strikes to hold the ‘orcs’ at bay. Ironically, the Maidan which gave birth to the Kiev Regime could be the same mechanism that leads to its downfall after utterly destroying the Ukrainian nation, but as the cliché goes ‘time will tell’.
Le perdite dell’Ucraina diventano sempre più difficili da nascondere di fronte ai crescenti problemi di mobilitazione e alla carenza di risorse umane. Le dichiarazioni di Tusk e Budanov sollevano il velo sulla portata della crisi, che potrebbe portare a un ulteriore inasprimento della mobilitazione.
Lo scorso maggio, Anne Keast-Butler, direttrice del Government Communications Headquarters (Gchq) britannico, ha dichiarato che, alla fine di maggio, le forze armate russe avevano subito quasi mezzo milione di morti e circa un milione tra feriti e dispersi.
Richard Knighton, Capo di Stato Maggiore delle forze armate britanniche, ha fornito ulteriori dettagli. Secondo le sue valutazioni, enunciate l’11 settembre, l’esercito russo avrebbe riportato una quota preponderante delle perdite a partire dal gennaio 2023. Cioè da quando «la Russia ha conquistato appena il 2% del territorio ucraino […]. Credo che queste cifre mostrino chiaramente lo spreco insensato e futile di vite umane a fronte di progressi così scarsi e per un obiettivo così illegittimo del presidente Putin», ha affermato Knighton.
Per lo Stato Maggiore di Londra, le perdite totali subite dalla Russia in Ucraina supererebbero l’ammontare complessivo dei caduti registrati dalle forze armate sovietiche e russe in tutti i conflitti combattuti dalla seconda metà del XX Secolo.
Le stime dell’alto comando britannico risultano sostanzialmente convergenti con quelle formulate dal Center for Strategic and International Studies (Csis) statunitense, che all’inizio di luglio quantificava in 1,4 milioni di unità il totale delle vittime riportato dalla Russia, tra cui circa 450.000 morti.
Mediaziona, testata indipendente russa che, con la collaborazione della «Bbc», tiene dall’inizio del conflitto il conto dei caduti russi sulla base dell’analisi di registri cimiteriali, necrologi e post sui social network, fornisce una stima di quasi 260.000 morti e oltre 350.000 feriti al 21 settembre.
Quanto alle perdite ucraine, è molto più difficile reperire stime pubbliche all’interno dei Paesi membri della Nato. Un delle poche eccezioni era costituita dal Csis, che a giugno stimava 125.000-150.000 morti e 400.000-500.000 feriti.
Qualcosa è tuttavia cominciato a cambiare. Lo scorso 17 settembre, nel corso di un intervento pronunciato davanti alla Camera Bassa del Parlamento polacco, il primo ministro Tusk ha affermato, sulla base di informazioni ottenute dal governo ucraino, che, «di recente, l’Ucraina ha registrato 27.000 tra morti e feriti al mese; si tratta, purtroppo, di cifre record nel senso più triste del termine per questa guerra. A questo ritmo, l’inverno in Ucraina potrebbe rivelarsi catastrofico».
Tusk ha imputato il netto peggioramento della situazione sul fronte bellico alle «nuove capacità tecnologiche della Russia», a partire dai droni dotati di motore a reazione impiegati con sempre maggiore frequenza dalle forze armate russe.
Non è chiaro se il dato numerico indicato dal premier polacco si riferisca al periodo estivo o a un lasso di tempo più lungo, ma risulta perfettamente compatibile con il quadro tratteggiato soltanto poche settimane prima da Budanov, che in qualità di capo del gabinetto del presidente Zelensky ed ex direttore del Gur aveva quantificato in almeno 30.000 persone al mese l’ammontare minimo degli ucraini da mobilitare per reggere l’urto russo.
Le valutazioni relative alle perdite riportate dall’Ucraina formulate da Tusk e Budanov non collimano affatto con le stime riferite dal presidente Zelensky, che a luglio aveva parlato di 50.000 caduti e 400.000 feriti subiti dall’Ucraina a partire dal febbraio 2022, e risultano profondamente discordanti rispetto alla narrazione propinata in tutto l’Occidente fin dall’inizio del conflitto.
Con qualche eccezione. In un’intervista rilasciata a «Sky News Australia» nell’ottobre dello scorso anno (segnalata in Italia soltanto da «Analisi Difesa»), James Carden, specialista di questioni geostrategiche con trascorsi come consigliere del Dipartimento di Stato per le relazioni russo-statunitensi sotto l’amministrazione Obama, dichiarò che «dalle mie fonti risulta che il rapporto di perdite tra ucraini e russi è di 36 a 1. Sono le perdite ucraine ad essere vicine a un milione. La guerra d’attrito attuata fin dall’inizio dai russi è stata un successo, sono gli ucraini ad essere sull’orlo del disastro».
Nel novembre 2022, la stessa presidente della Commissione Europea Ursula Von der Leyen si lasciò sfuggire che l’Ucraina aveva subito fino a quel momento circa «oltre 20.000 caduti civili e 100.000 soldati». Senonché, il filmato originale del discorso fu rimosso e sostituito con una versione “epurata” dallo scottante riferimento alle perdite ucraine.
Resta quindi da capire il perché due dei più strenui sostenitori dello sforzo bellico ucraino come Tusk e Budanov abbiano deciso proprio ora di sollevare il velo su una realtà molto meno edificante rispetto a quella descritta da governi e giornali sia negli Stati Uniti che in Europa.
Una infusione di pessimismo risulta funzionale per un verso a “predisporre” l’opinione pubblica ad accettare nuovi e ben più gravosi sacrifici per sostenere l’Ucraina, identificata a tutt’oggi come “scudo d’Europa” dal presidente Zelensky e dai suoi collaboratori.
Per l’alto, a legittimare l’adozione di misure che restringano il perimetro legislativo per il conferimento dello status di rifugiati agli ucraini in età di servizio militare. Si tratta, in altri termini, di aprire il varco a provvedimenti implicanti il rimpatrio forzato, prodromico al reclutamento nelle fila dell’esercito, di almeno una parte dei cittadini ucraini riparati presso i Paesi membri dell’Unione Europea. A partire proprio dalla Polonia, che di concerto con Russia e Germania ospita il maggior numero di rifugiati ucraini divenuti nel corso dei mesi oggetto di crescente risentimento popolare.
Budanov, dal canto suo, ha riconosciuto il forte malcontento suscitato in seno all’opinione pubblica ucraina dai sempre più ricorrenti episodi di mobilitazione forzata, e posto contestualmente l’accento sulla necessità che lo Stato adotti un approccio più costruttivo.
A tale scopo, il viceministro della Difesa Liubov Halan ha annunciato un’imminente riforma dei Centri territoriali di reclutamento che sembra tuttavia discostarsi profondamente dalle raccomandazioni dell’ex direttore del Gur.
Lo si evince dalle affermazioni di Roman Kostenko, che in qualità di segretario della Commissione Parlamentare per la Sicurezza Nazionale, la Difesa e l’Intelligence ha proclamato l’introduzione di “modifiche radicali” alle procedure di mobilitazione, comprendenti una possibile abbassamento dei requisiti per la coscrizione relativi all’età contestualmente al passaggio a un modello di reclutamento più “estensivo” reso impellente anche dalla portata sempre più imponente del fenomeno dei cosiddetti “imboscati”.
Già nel gennaio di quest’anno, l’allora ministro della Difesa Fedorov aveva dichiarato alla Verkhovna Rada di aver ereditato oltre 200.000 casi di “abbandono arbitrario del reparto” (un reato distinto dalla diserzione perché presuppone l’intenzione di tornare a combattere da parte dell’inosservante) e più di due milioni di cittadini ricercati per renitenza alla leva.
Le donne restano, quantomeno per ora, escluse dalla riforma del meccanismo di coscrizione, come specificato dalla Verkhovna Rada attraverso una nota che sottolineava l’assenza di iniziative legislative e perfino di discussioni interne riguardo la mobilitazione femminile. Il pronunciamento del Parlamento ucraino fa seguito alle dichiarazioni di Keith Kellogg, generale a riposo ed ex inviato speciale dell’amministrazione Trump per l’Ucraina e la Russia secondo cui Kiev dovrebbe procedere al coinvolgimento delle donne, in quanto «combattono bene quanto gli uomini». Negli stessi giorni in cui Kellogg forniva i suoi suggerimenti, il «Telegraph» descriveva il servizio militare femminile in Ucraina come una vittoria per il femminismo, riportando le dichiarazioni di un’operatrice di droni favorevole alla leva femminile.
La proposta di mobilitare la componente femminile della società ucraina era già stata discussa all’inizio del 2026, dopo che una donna comandante di unità di droni aveva appoggiato pubblicamente l’idea sull’onda del clamore popolare suscitato dalle convocazioni militari recapitate per errore a una decina abbondante di donne ucraine. Nei primi giorni di agosto, è stata presentata una petizione che sollecita la coscrizione delle donne senza figli, sponsorizzata dall’ex ministro della Difesa Alekseij Reznikov secondo cui, «così come Israele, possiamo sopravvivere solo se tutti accettano di dover difendere l’Ucraina […]. Il reclutamento delle donne, raddoppierebbe le nostre risorse per la mobilitazione».
In Germany’s recent state elections, voters as young as 16 could cast ballots. The results confirmed a global trend of political division between young women and men.
“On 1 January, we both deleted Instagram, TikTok and Snapchat. And whichever of us would be the first to start watching Reels again or download Instagram would have to eat a slice of rotten cheese,” Greta and Lena told Germany’s Deutschlandfunk radio station.
The 16-year-old girls live in a village in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and chose to delete social media because they had been spending far too much time on it. They often scrolled on TikTok or Instagram late into the night, affecting their performance at school. This summer, however, both reinstalled TikTok for a month. This time without the punishment of a slice of rotten cheese.
They did so for an experiment with journalists from Deutschlandfunk. The journalists wanted to find out what political content the girls would consume through TikTok, the popular Chinese social network, during the peak of the election campaign. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern went to the polls on the third weekend of September. And, as is well known, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) swept the state, just as it had two weeks prior in Saxony-Anhalt.
Greta and Lena, however, were in a markedly different position from their peers in Saxony-Anhalt. For the first time, the north-eastern federal state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern had allowed 16- and 17-year-olds to vote in state elections. Since young people consume much of their news on social media, Greta and Lena immersed themselves in TikTok, one of the networks now most popular among young Europeans.
For the first few minutes, the girls watched a range of non-political videos — recipes, tomato growing and “silly” AI videos. Then, at around the third minute of scrolling, the first political content appeared. First came a video about Erich Honecker, the former East German communist politician. “Why am I seeing so much stuff about the GDR here?” Greta wondered. As she continued scrolling, she came across AfD co-leader Alice Weidel herself.
It was the first moment when the girls began to notice how quickly their initially apolitical feed was changing. “I feel as if it is constantly just AfD,” Greta said later. She added that she had not searched for any such content in advance. Over the following month, the girls kept a diary of their feed and observed how, after political videos, more and more similar content began appearing — not only from the parties themselves, but also from a range of accounts that picked up and further spread their messages.
The experiment confirmed what has been known for some time: TikTok and other networks alongside it can quickly form the political world a young person sees and the views they come to adopt. At the same time, algorithms are accelerating a trend of a political divide between young women and men, which was also reflected in the results of the state elections mentioned above in Germany.
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