File image.

The post Ukrainian Troops Flee Dobropolye appeared first on South Front.

File image.

The Houthis (Ansar Allah) released footage on October 8 showing their forces driving Saudi-backed forces from al-Shamayatayn district in the southwestern Yemeni province of Taiz.

The footage include scenes from the capture of al-Turbah, the district’s main city. The footage showed Houthi fighters moving through positions and areas they said had been abandoned by the Saudi-backed forces. It also shows several vehicles and loads of weapons captured by the group.

The release came as the Houthis reported further gains in Jabal Habashi, west of Taiz. Pro-Houthi Yemeni media said the group had expelled government troops from the highest peaks of the mountain, including Najd al-Oud and al-Anaqib, adding to their gains across the province.

Separately, Houthi military spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree said the group had shot down a Turkish-made Bayraktar Akıncı acombat drone over Taiz while it was carrying out what he described as hostile operations. He said the drone was brought down with an “appropriate weapon.”

The developments show growing Houthi pressure on the western and southern approaches to Taiz, even as Saudi-backed forces continue efforts to reverse earlier territorial losses.

Click to see full-size map. (Islamic World News)

Meanwhile, the Saudi-backed counterattack toward Bab al-Mandab meanwhile remains stalled. The strategic waterway remains under the control of the Houthis.

All in all, the Houthis maintain the upper hand on all fronts in Taiz. The two main objectives for the group now are likely to reach Taiz city, which is already under a tight siege, as well as to restore control over the few positions it lost near Bab al-Mandab, most notable of which is Dhubab’s airstrip. Fighting could go on for weeks, or even months.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence

NOW hosted at southfront.press

Previously, SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence was at southfront.org.

The .org domain name had been blocked by the US (NATO) (https://southfront.press/southfront-org-blocked-by-u-s-controlled-global-internet-supervisor/) globally, outlawed and without any explanation

Back before that, from 2013 to 2015, SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence was at southfront.com

SOUTHFRONT.PRESS

MORE ON THIS TOPIC:

• More Victories For The Houthis
• Houthis Set Riyadh Airport Ablaze, Issue Last Warning to Saudi Aviation (Videos)

 

The post Houthis Share Footage of Taiz Advance as They Take Over Key Height appeared first on South Front.

An EU Parliament memorial for victims of the 7 October attack caused disarray and anger as well as grief in a divided European house.

It was crowned by a towering Israeli flag, alongside the EU’s.

The exhibit set up in Strasbourg’s parliament included maps showing Occupied Palestinian Territories as part of Israel and sold trinkets made from debris of Israeli missiles.

But it made no mention of the 74,200 people killed by Israel in Gaza in the past three years, after Palestinian militants Hamas killed some 1,200 Israelis in a surprise attack.

This situation struck a chord with the sole Palestinian in parliament, left-wing French MEP Rima Hassan, who tried to take down the Israeli flag in protest, and toppled over the EU one as well in an unwanted domino effect.

“My action was in no way directed at the victims of 7 October or their memory,” Hassan told EUobserver. 

Instead, it targeted “this incessant and untenable double standard, for a Russian flag would never be permitted, and rightly so, within the [EU] institution’s premises”.

The memorial was organised by German centre-right MEP Hildegard Bentele, who chairs the parliament’s Israel delegations, alongside the Israeli embassy, and the The International Movement for Peace & Coexistence (IMPAC) group in Brussels, as well as others.

“During a conversation with a member of my team, the guest artist [at the EU Parliament memorial] claimed that Palestine ‘does not exist’,” Hassan added.

Her family were expelled from their birthplace by Israel in 1948 along with hundreds of thousands of others in what Palestinians call the Nakba (Catastrophe).

But in the cacophony of narratives in the EU assembly, those who saw her anti-Israel flag protest as offensive or antisemitic had echoing voices.

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

Click to see full-size map.

The post Military Situation In Syria On October 8, 2026 (Map Update) appeared first on South Front.

File image.

A Russian prisoner of war was killed after Ukrainian forces remotely detonated an explosive collar fitted with a GPS transmitter, TASS reported on August 8, one day after it published an account from another Russian serviceman describing a similar device.

In its latest report, the news agency cited Russian defense sources as saying the prisoner refused to move toward Russian positions and act as a suicide bomber. The sources said the collar was then detonated remotely.

“Ukrainian militants detonated a collar with explosives on a Russian prisoner. The guy became another suicide bomber,” the sources told TASS. “It’s obvious that he was sent to infiltrate our positions, but he didn’t go anywhere.”

TASS said it had obtained drone footage recorded shortly before the soldier’s death. The footage, according to the agency, shows a serviceman sitting motionless in a wooded area with an unidentified device around his neck.

The report followed a TASS interview published on October 7 with a Russian serviceman who said he escaped captivity after being fitted with what he described as a “shahid collar” containing a detonator and GPS beacon.

The serviceman said he had been captured while fighting near the border of the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions. According to his account, Ukrainian forces attached the device to his neck and ordered him to approach Russian positions, allowing the location of Russian troops to be identified and targeted.

“It was at the border of the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions,” the serviceman told TASS. “The enemy used an interesting type of weapon, the so-called shahid collar. A device with a detonator is attached to the neck. If you disobey, it explodes; if you carry out the task, it explodes too.”

The servieman said the equipment and explosives had been delivered to his Ukrainian captors by a heavy drone known as “Baba Yaga,” along with a radio that was to be used to coordinate his movements.

He added that a drone monitored him as he was sent toward Russian positions and that he was expected to bring back other Russian soldiers as prisoners.

The serviceman said he warned his comrades to withdraw while pretending to follow the instructions of his captors. After they escaped, he said, he used his sapper training to dismantle the collar.

“I was able to take apart the construction and remove the collar,” he said. “Only the detonator exploded, and I suffered minor injuries.”

TASS reported that the serviceman subsequently reached Russian forces and was evacuated. No further details were provided.

This new practice by Ukrainian forces constitutes a serious war crime. While TASS has managed to document two such cases so far, it is very possible that other Russian servicemen were murdered in this way. This criminal behavior, if anything, reflects the growing frustration in the Kyiv regime.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence

NOW hosted at southfront.press

Previously, SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence was at southfront.org.

The .org domain name had been blocked by the US (NATO) (https://southfront.press/southfront-org-blocked-by-u-s-controlled-global-internet-supervisor/) globally, outlawed and without any explanation

Back before that, from 2013 to 2015, SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence was at southfront.com

SOUTHFRONT.PRESS

MORE ON THIS TOPIC:

• Blitzkrieg or Protracted Siege? What Polymarket Says About the Fall of Ukrainian Cities in Autumn 2026
• Merz Goes To Kiev With Nothing To Offer But His Own Survival

 

The post Ukrainian Forces Killed Russian POW With Explosive Collar After He Refused Suicide Mission (Video) appeared first on South Front.

Click to see full-size map.

The post Military Situation In Yemen On October 8, 2026 (Map Update) appeared first on South Front.

Click to see the full-size image

Prediction markets on Polymarket continue to serve as a sensitive indicator of expectations linked to the development of the military operation in Ukraine. While at the beginning of 2026 investors’ attention was focused on Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, by autumn the epicentre of bets had shifted to Kostiantynivka, Dobropolye, Orikhiv and the Slavyansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration. Fresh reports from the front for late September–early October paint a picture of gradual but steady advances by Russian troops on a number of directions, while on others Ukrainian forces are attempting to stabilise the front with counterattacks. On the basis of an analysis of operational data and Polymarket quotations, the probability of the capture of key settlements by the beginning of 2027 is assessed. Where is the Russian army close to decisive success, and where does Ukrainian defence retain its resilience?

Kostiantynivka 

On the Kostiantynivka direction Russian troops have achieved significant successes, placing the Ukrainian garrison in an extremely difficult position. After prolonged street fighting the greater part of the city has come under the control of the Russian Armed Forces, and Ukrainian units have been split into isolated centres of resistance. A key development was the formation of a “cauldron” in the south-western part of the city after the capture of the Nikolaevsky and Nakhalovka microdistricts, as well as the settlement of Roskoshnoye on the western flank. Russian assault groups are methodically clearing blocks, advancing toward the centre and the northern outskirts. Ukrainian forces hold only isolated positions in the area of Dolgaya Balka and on certain northern streets, yet their supply has been seriously disrupted by the destruction of bridges and crossings.

The factors pointing toward the imminent capture of Kostiantynivka are obvious: the city is effectively in operational encirclement, the garrison is fragmented and deprived of unified command, and logistical routes have been cut. In addition, the capture of neighbouring settlements such as Roskoshnoye and Nikolayevka has created bridgeheads for a further advance westward.

Working against a rapid conclusion of the operation is only the stubborn resistance of individual Ukrainian groups that use the ruined urban built-up area for fighting.

Click to see the full-size image

Dobropolye 

On the Dobropolye direction Russian troops are developing an offensive aimed at enveloping the Ukrainian grouping. Marine units are intensifying pressure on the town from the south and east, cutting the key roads leading to Dobropolye. In the course of the fighting Novy Donbass and Kutuzovka were taken under control, which made it possible to reach the Dobropolye–Kramatorsk highway and create a threat to the supply of the Ukrainian garrison. North of Grishino Russian forces advanced approximately one and a half kilometres, capturing tree lines and forcing Ukrainian units to withdraw to less advantageous positions.

Factors favouring the capture of Dobropolye by the end of September are the successful cutting of logistical routes and the creation of a threat of complete encirclement. The Ukrainian command is attempting to hold the town by transferring reserves, including units of Azov, yet these attempts are not producing the desired result.

Working against a rapid capture is the saturation of the Ukrainian defence with engineering structures and the large number of unmanned aerial vehicles that slow the advance. Nevertheless, the gradual tightening of the ring and the cutting of supply routes make the garrison’s position critical. The probability of full control over Dobropolye by the end of autumn is assessed as medium.

Click to see the full-size image

Orikhiv 

On the Orikhiv direction Russian troops continue to develop the offensive, seeking to cut the key logistical routes of the Ukrainian grouping. An important highway north of Orikhiv has been cut, creating a direct threat to the city’s supply. Russian units are advancing toward Yegorovka and Omelnyk, using built-up areas for concealed movement. Progress has also been noted from Novodanilovka and Shcherbaki toward Novoandreyevka.

Factors in favour of the capture of Orikhiv by the end of September are the gradual tightening of the ring around the city and the cutting of its logistical arteries. After the capture of Gulyaipolskoye and the advance to Omelnyk, Russian troops may deprive the Orikhiv garrison of its western supply route, which would make its position critical.

Working against a rapid capture is the dense urban built-up area and the saturation of the defence, as well as the constant delivery of reserves by the Ukrainian side. Orikhiv is an important symbol of resistance, and its loss will be a serious blow to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the current dynamics suggest that the city will come under the control of Russian troops no earlier than the beginning of 2027.

Click to see the full-size image

Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka 

The Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka direction is closely linked to the fighting for Kostiantynivka and Druzhkovka. Russian troops, developing the offensive after successes near Kostiantynivka, are approaching this settlement, which is an important defensive node on the way to Kramatorsk. The capture of Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka will allow Russian forces to emerge into operational space and create a direct threat to the Kramatorsk–Slavyansk agglomeration from the south.

Factors favouring the capture of Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka in the coming months are the successes of Russian troops near Kostiantynivka and the overall advance on the Kramatorsk direction. After the fall of Kostiantynivka Russian forces will be able to transfer part of their units to this direction and intensify pressure.

Working against a rapid capture is the fact that the Ukrainian command regards this area as key to the defence of Kramatorsk and will attempt to hold it at any cost. Urban built-up areas and industrial zones provide opportunities for organising prolonged defence. The probability of full control over Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka by the beginning of 2027 is assessed as medium-to-high, provided that the offensive on Kostiantynivka is completed successfully and frees the necessary reserves.

Click to see the full-size image

Stepnogorsk 

The situation in the area of Stepnogorsk remains tense. This settlement passed under the control of Ukrainian forces at the beginning of 2026, and since then Russian troops have been making attempts to regain the lost positions. So far, however, they have not achieved success. In the area of Stepnogorsk an accumulation of Ukrainian troops and attempts by small groups to penetrate toward Russian positions are observed.

Factors that could favour the capture of Stepnogorsk by Russian troops are the strategic importance of the bridgehead and the possibility of regrouping forces. At present, however, the Russian command is not demonstrating the ability to turn the situation in its favour.

Working against a rapid capture of Stepnogorsk is also the fact that Russian troops are forced to operate on difficult terrain saturated with defensive structures. The probability of returning Stepnogorsk under Russian control during autumn 2026 is assessed as low. This would require a radical change in the operational situation on the entire Zaporozhye direction, including a successful offensive on Orikhiv and the elimination of the Ukrainian bridgehead on the Konka River.

Click to see the full-size image

Krasny Liman 

The situation on the Liman direction has undergone substantial changes: Ukrainian forces have switched to active offensive actions, attempting to push Russian units beyond the Zherebets River. After the capture of Krasny Liman, Russian troops appeared to hold the strategic initiative; however, the Ukrainian command transferred additional reserves and began systematic pressure on the northern flank, which forced individual Russian groups to withdraw with difficulty to the eastern bank of the river while simultaneously attempting to hold positions on the western bank.

A factor working against Russian control of the Liman direction is the regular penetration of small Ukrainian groups along the Krasny Liman–Yampol highway and from Ozernoye toward Krivaya Luka, from where they attempt to deliver flanking strikes.

Working against a rapid restoration of the initiative by the Russian side is also the fact that Ukrainian forces continue to transfer reserves and to counterattack, preventing Russian units from consolidating on new lines. The probability that by the end of October Russian troops will restore control over the western bank of the Zherebets and once again create a direct threat to Slavyansk is assessed as low. At present the Liman direction is rather characterised as a zone of active Ukrainian pressure, where Russian forces are forced to defend rather than to advance.

Click to see the full-size image

Conclusion 

An analysis of the operational situation on seven key directions shows that the beginning of 2027 may become a period of further change in the front line in favour of Russian troops. Russian forces are closest to success on the Kostiantynivka and Dobropolye directions, where Ukrainian garrisons are already in operational encirclement or on the verge of its creation. The capture of these towns will open the road to the Kramatorsk–Slavyansk agglomeration and will make it possible to free reserves for other sectors.

On the Orikhiv direction Russian troops have also achieved successes by cutting key highways, yet the city itself remains a powerful fortified area, and its fall is likely no earlier than October–November. Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka will probably be taken by the beginning of 2027 if the offensive on adjacent directions continues. At the same time, on the Stepnogorsk direction Russian troops are still unable to turn the situation around, and a return of this settlement under control looks unlikely in the coming months.

Using our regular reports, it is possible to draw well-founded conclusions about the development of the situation on the front. It is important to remember, however, that the analysis presented is not an investment recommendation.

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Ukrainian Forces Killed Russian POW With Explosive Collar After He Refused Suicide Mission (Video)
• Fighting Intensifies Between Liman and Slavyansk
• Russian Overnight Strike Hits All At Once

The post Blitzkrieg or Protracted Siege? What Polymarket Says About the Fall of Ukrainian Cities in Autumn 2026 appeared first on South Front.

Click to see full-size image. (X)

Yemen’s Houthis (Ansar Allah) claimed two separate ballistic missile attacks on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on October 8, as explosions disrupted air traffic in the Saudi capital and reports emerged of fires and possible strikes on oil and defense-related infrastructure elsewhere in the kingdom.

In a statement issued early in the day, Houthi military spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree said the group had “targeted King Khalid Airport in Riyadh with a ballistic missile,” which he said “hit its target accurately” and disrupted airport operations.

Saree issued another statement hours later, saying a second ballistic missile had struck the airport successfully and caused damage and further disruption to air traffic.

Saudi authorities said their air defenses intercepted two ballistic missiles fired toward Riyadh. Still, impacts were reported.

The attacks produced visible disruption at King Khalid International Airport. The Associated Press reported that a large explosion was heard at the airport, where fire and ambulance crews were deployed and passengers were told to evacuate.

Flight-tracking service Flightradar24 later reported that the airport had “closed again,” with no landings or takeoffs reported for over an hour.

Reuters reported that smoke was rising from a stationary civilian aircraft at the airport. Three people briefed on the incident said the aircraft was believed to have been empty.

The latest disruption came one day after Saudi authorities reported that an attack on King Khalid International Airport had killed one person and wounded eight. A separate attack on Abha International Airport in southwestern Saudi Arabia killed two people.

The escalation extended beyond Saudi Arabia’s airports. Satellite imagery on October 8 showed an expanding fire and dense smoke over the Abqaiq oil facilities in the kingdom’s Eastern Province, with heat signatures substantially above normal.

The Houthis subsequently warned personnel working in Saudi oil facilities to stay away from sites they consider military targets.

“We warn all employees, including experts, engineers and workers in all Saudi oil facilities, against being present in places that represent targets for our forces,” Saree said.

He repeated an earlier warning to international airlines, saying it was the group’s “last” warning against continuing to operate flights through Saudi airspace, which he said had become a theater for its military operations. Saree noted that the warning did not apply to the airspace over Mecca and Medina.

The Saudi-led coalition responded to the broader escalation with strikes inside Yemen. Coalition spokesman Maj. Gen. Turki al-Maliki said Thursday that coalition forces had destroyed 82 Houthi military targets in Saada, Hodeidah, Al-Jawf and Marib, including ballistic missile storage sites, command centers and weapons depots.

Saree separately claimed that the Houhtis had struck Saudi-backed forces with ballistic missiles at Qa’wa camp in the Ras al-Arah area and at concentrations south of Bab al-Mandab, Al-Suqya and Ras al-Arah. He claimed the attacks caused casualties and fires at weapons stores.

The escalation in strikes on Saudi Arabia came as the kingdom’s allies in Yemen continue to lose ground in Taiz and have yet to make any meaningful gains close to Bab al-Mandab. Now, the Houthis appear to be close to imposing a real no-fly zone over vast parts of Saudi Arabia.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence

NOW hosted at southfront.press

Previously, SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence was at southfront.org.

The .org domain name had been blocked by the US (NATO) (https://southfront.press/southfront-org-blocked-by-u-s-controlled-global-internet-supervisor/) globally, outlawed and without any explanation

Back before that, from 2013 to 2015, SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence was at southfront.com

SOUTHFRONT.PRESS

MORE ON THIS TOPIC:

• Pakistan Strikes Houthis as Turkey Rejects Direct Role in Yemen
• Syria Leaves Door Open for Joining Disastrous Saudi War on Yemen

 

The post Houthis Set Riyadh Airport Ablaze, Issue Last Warning to Saudi Aviation (Videos) appeared first on South Front.

Click to see the full-size image

Written by Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher

Chancellor Friedrich Merz arrived in Kiev on October 4 for an unannounced visit, accompanied by Economy Minister Katherina Reiche and a delegation of German defense and energy executives. Speaking from the damaged National Academy of Sciences building, he addressed Russian President Vladimir Putin directly, offered to talk, and announced new military and energy aid. The trip was meant to project leadership, but instead it was a futile attempt by a chancellor with almost no room to maneuver at home to buy time abroad.

Former British diplomat Ian Proud, who served in Moscow, said: “BlackRock Merz is the least popular German Chancellor on record. He doesn’t know what German self-interest is. Only his own self-interest. Political survival. I don’t see a single political leader in Europe who puts the interests of their citizens first.” Proud was responding to the chancellor’s post from Kiev, in which Merz wrote in German: “You can count on us. Germany’s own security depends on the outcome of this war. We help out of our own interest.”

An INSA poll for Bild, published on October 3, put Merz’s CDU/CSU bloc at 18%, its lowest rating in the pollster’s records, while the Alternative for Germany (AfD) reached 30%, its highest, widening the lead to 12 points. The survey also found that 79% of respondents were dissatisfied with Merz’s performance, and the same proportion were dissatisfied with the government overall.

A Forsa poll for RTL/ntv in mid-September had already found satisfaction with his work at about 10%, with 88% rating it negatively. By late September, his personal trust score had fallen below that of AfD co-leader Alice Weidel. The CDU lost Saxony-Anhalt on September 6 and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania on September 20, a result Merz himself called a disaster, with the AfD finishing first in both.

Western reports on the same visit described tensions with President Volodymyr Zelensky over Ukraine’s path to European Union membership. Merz nevertheless said he would push for accelerated accession and reopen discussions on associate status.

Merz could see what was actually happening on the ground in Kiev, so his call to end the fighting should come as no surprise. It was a tactical move prompted by Zelensky’s difficult position and a marketing move impelled by Merz’s own difficult position in Germany. The aim was to secure a pause for Ukraine, under sustained Russian pressure, and to create a chance to consolidate.

“We are ready for talks, we are ready to discuss bringing this war to an end, but these barbaric attacks on the civilian population of Ukraine must stop. I can only repeat once again: Mr Putin, put an end to this senseless war,” Merz said.

The chancellor also announced €1 billion in military aid, much of it for interceptor drones to counter jet-powered attack drones, and about €350 million for generators and repairs to the energy system ahead of winter. Zelensky said the new package included 15 agreements worth more than €8.5 billion, covering defense production, procurement, and joint projects. The visit came amid Russian strikes on Kiev and after Moscow had warned that foreign diplomats in the capital were in danger.

In essence, Merz’s statement offers no peace—only political survival. Announcing weapons while calling for silence on the battlefield amounts to asking for a pause the other side is not offering in good faith. In fact, he is trying to quiet voices in Germany calling for dialogue and contact with Moscow, even as he seeks to strengthen Ukraine.

Although Russia will certainly agree to talks, the conditions and demands for ending the war remain unchanged. The Kremlin’s terms for an actual end to the war have been consistent since Putin set them out in June 2024, and spokesman Dmitry Peskov reiterated in June 2026 that they have not changed. Ukraine’s forces would have to withdraw from all four regions Moscow claims as its own — Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporozhye — including parts the Russian army does not hold, and Kiev would have to publicly renounce NATO membership, not merely offer a private assurance.

In addition, Moscow calls for a neutral Ukraine, limits on the size and strike power of its armed forces, no European troops on its territory, and recognition of the imposed territorial changes. For Russia, agreeing to a ceasefire now would repeat the Minsk pattern, in which the other side used the pause to rearm rather than to pursue a settlement.

Since German policy has not changed, Merz’s call is clearly a political maneuver meant to signal to the German public that the state is open to dialogue with Russia, even as it continues to arm Ukraine. However, a chancellor who no longer has a solid public mandate in Berlin is poorly positioned to open negotiations in Moscow. Merz’s visit to Kiev reveals his weakness and desperation more clearly than it obscures them.

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Tango On An Empty Dance Floor
• The Sonderstab Loophole: How Berlin Learned To Pay Without Buying
• Class Dismissed: France’s School Crisis Goes Up in Smoke

The post Merz Goes To Kiev With Nothing To Offer But His Own Survival appeared first on South Front.

Two 14-year-old boys were killed when an explosive device detonated in the evening in the Konotop district of Sumy Oblast, according to the statement by Oleh Hryhorov, head of the Sumy Regional Military Administration. The children encountered the dangerous device in a field, suffered severe injuries, and died at the scene, the statement said.

In 2022, Russian forces occupied parts of Sumy Oblast, but Ukraine liberated the region in April. Russia intensified its offensive again in 2025. Today, mines, unexploded ordnance and Russian drones shot down over the region pose a danger, as their warheads can detonate after falling. Overall, 146 children in Ukraine have suffered mine-related injuries, former Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko reported in April. For example, two months ago, an 11-year-old boy and a 15-year-old boy in Sumy Oblast were injured when an explosive device detonated.

Hryhorov expressed his condolences to the parents and relatives of the victims and urged people to remain cautious:

“Please be as careful as possible and remind children: do not approach unknown or suspicious objects, touch them, or try to move them. Take care of yourselves and your loved ones,” Hryhorov said.

Demining efforts continue in Sumy Oblast

On 24 February 2022, Russian forces entered the territory of Sumy Oblast. The first battles in the region took place that same day. In particular, Russian forces attempted to break through to Sumy, but Ukrainian troops repelled the offensive. On 11 April 2022, Ukraine restored control over the entire Sumy region.

As early as 7 June 2022, deminers were working in the Konotop, Sumy, and Okhtyrka districts, according to the Government Portal. That day, they surveyed areas and neutralized explosive devices.

The work of deminers remains deadly dangerous. In September 2024, two pyrotechnicians from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast were hit by a mine while demining Sumy Oblast: one died, while the other was hospitalized. In July 2025, deminer Oleh Petrenko was killed during humanitarian demining operations in Shostka District when a Russian FPV drone detonated, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine reported. Another pyrotechnician was injured, the statement said.

Nevertheless, the work continues despite the danger. In 2025, State Emergency Service deminers in the Sumy Oblast found and neutralized 5,283 explosive devices, the agency said in April. Sumy Oblast ranked sixth among all Ukrainian regions by this figure.

Twenty-two percent of Ukraine’s territory is potentially contaminated with explosive devices — more than 133,000 square kilometers, former Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko reported in April this year. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, State Emergency Service and National Police deminers have surveyed more than 248,000 hectares of territory and found more than 1 million 112 thousand explosive devices, the statement said.

“L’Occidente si trova a un bivio: il prossimo decennio determinerà se manterrà il suo posto al vertice del mondo o si accontenterà di un futuro di declino, sottomissione e indebolimento”. Il segretario di stato americano, Marco Rubio, ha scelto la collina della Pnice, dinanzi all’Acropoli, per un discorso che evidentemente non era rivolto solo alla Grecia di oggi, pur celebrando quella di ieri. La Pnice infatti, non solo si trova a strapiombo sull’antica agorà, ma era la sede dell’ecclesia, l’assemblea dei cittadini ateniesi. Per cui quelle parole pronunciate da Rubio sono un monito per il futuro occidentale, in un frangente internazionale in cui le pressioni economiche della Cina da un lato e quelle belliche di Iran e Russia dall’altro rappresentano il nocciolo delle nuove sfide. “Scegliamo di rafforzare il nostro Paese, senza scuse, di riprendere il controllo delle nostre catene di approvvigionamento critiche, di reindustrializzare la nostra economia, di ricostruire le nostre difese e di puntare al predominio nelle tecnologie e nei settori del futuro”.

Ecco il primo punto: le catene, i commerci, le materie prime, la scienza. Non è un caso che Rubio, al di là di tutti i riferimenti all’antica Grecia, ha inteso fare puntuali riferimenti a dossier strategici, che però è lecito ammettere fino ad oggi sono stati sottovalutati dall’occidente, in primis quello sulla terre rare (non a caso gli Usa hanno voluto riequilibrare la partita con la Pax Silica). Prima però Rubio aveva ripreso il filo della storia, ricordando che la Grecia è impressa nell’architettura del governo americano, nelle imponenti colonne e nei monumenti che adornano la capitale. “Gli antichi Greci sembrano esercitare un potere quasi mistico sulla nostra memoria. Ci invitano a tornare a loro ancora e ancora”, ha insistito, come per mescolare passato e futuro.

“Atene ci ha donato la democrazia. Platone e Aristotele ci hanno donato la filosofia. Ad Atene abbiamo assistito alla prima espressione completa di ciò che è venuto a definire l’Occidente”, ha aggiunto, sottolineando un altro elemento che si aggiunge alla lunga schiera “di prospettiva”.

Quando il ministro egli Esteri Usa dice che per gli antichi greci la ricerca dell’eccellenza era il principio cardine dell’esistenza umana e che coloro che costruirono il Partenone guardavano in alto (perché credevano che la più alta ambizione fosse quella di superare tutti gli altri, di sforzarsi di essere i migliori) tocca il punto centrale dello sviluppo futuro. L’occidente, e quindi anche l’Ue, deve cambiare angolo di visuale per ricostruire”Esistono grandi rovine in tutto il mondo. In molti casi, si tratta di luoghi in cui la Storia sembra essersi esaurita, vestigia di civiltà lontane scomparse da tempo dalla memoria collettiva. Ma l’Acropoli è diversa”, ha affermato.

Per poi entrare nel cuore del dibattito futuro quando ha detto di credere che l’Europa possa “risvegliarsi dal suo lungo sonno e riaccendere la fiamma che fu accesa qui millenni fa”.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Aux Etats-Unis, un rapport du Government Accountability Office (GAO-26-108663) épingle l’Immigration and Customs Enforcement( ICE). Le GAO, l'organisme d'audit du Congrès américain, constate que la police de l'immigration,ICE, a multiplié les chantiers de détention sans aucun plan stratégique. Le centre floridien « Alligator Alcatraz » a coûté environ un milliard de dollars à l'État pour onze mois d'existence, soit grossièrement trois millions par jour. Le ministère de la Sécurité intérieure, lui, vante 13,2 milliards d'économies.

LE COURRIER
DES STRATÈGES

Restez libre !

LA NEWSLETTER · GRATUITE

Le Courrier,
chaque matin.

L'essentiel de l'actualité, passé au crible par les cinq plumes du Courrier. Dans votre boîte, chaque jour ouvré.

Gratuit. Vous restez libre de partir quand vous voulez.

JE M'INSCRIS lecourrierdesstrateges.fr

lecourrierdesstrateges.fr

Restez libre !

Commandé par quatre élus démocrates, le document du GAO dresse le constat d’une administration qui empile les initiatives sans feuille de route. Pour l’exercice 2025, l’ICE a reçu quelque 3,8 milliards de dollars destinés aux opérations de rétention. La loi budgétaire de juillet 2025 a ensuite débloqué 45 milliards de dollars de capacité jusqu’en 2029. Résultat : des démarrages et arrêts successifs, des chevauchements et, selon Heather MacLeod, directrice du GAO chargée de ces questions, « du gaspillage ».

LE COURRIER
DES STRATÈGES

Restez libre !

ABONNEMENT

Allez au fond
des choses.

Deux grands formats par jour. Les cinq plumes du Courrier. La série Sécession, le dimanche.

Le monde commente. Vous, vous comprenez.

S'ABONNER lecourrierdesstrateges.fr

lecourrierdesstrateges.fr

Restez libre !

Des milliards engagés sans plan d’ensemble

Le constat du GAO est sévère : l’ICE aurait lancé plusieurs initiatives simultanément sans disposer d’un plan stratégique permettant d’en articuler les besoins, les coûts et la durée. L’agence avait reçu environ 3,8 milliards de dollars pour ses opérations de rétention durant l’exercice 2025. En juillet 2025, la loi budgétaire a porté à 45 milliards de dollars la capacité de rétention prévue jusqu’en 2029.

Six opérations sont recensées : Guantanamo Bay, des bases militaires, onze entrepôts, l’achat de centres existants, les installations de Floride et l’utilisation d’établissements du Federal Bureau of Prisons.

Le cas des entrepôts est particulièrement parlant : environ 1 milliard de dollars ont été engagés en décembre 2025 pour onze sites, dont sept devaient finalement être revendus. Deux autres installations ont été achetées en juillet pour 1,5 milliard de dollars.

LE COURRIER
DES STRATÈGES

Restez libre !

TELEGRAM · L'INFO EN CONTINU

Entre deux éditions,
le fil.

La newsletter vous donne le matin. Le fil vous donne l'instant.

Gratuit, et en continu.

REJOINDRE LE FIL t.me/resterlibre

t.me/resterlibre

Restez libre !

Un milliard de dollars pour onze mois d’existence

« Alligator Alcatraz » concentre cette logique. Le centre floridien, mis en place en huit jours selon les responsables, a ouvert en juillet 2025 avant de fermer en juin 2026. Son coût atteint environ 1 milliard de dollars pour l’État de Floride. Le montage financier mérite attention : l’ICE n’a pas directement payé le centre. Le Department of Homeland Security(DHS) rembourse la Floride par l’intermédiaire d’une subvention de la FEMA de 608 millions de dollars, tandis que l’État attend encore plus de 500 millions.

À partir du milliard et des onze mois d’existence, cela représente un ordre de grandeur d’environ 3 millions de dollars par jour. Ce calcul n’est pas celui du GAO, mais il suffit à mesurer l’échelle de la dépense. Le GAO recommande donc l’élaboration rapide d’un plan stratégique. L’ICE accepte cette recommandation, mais indique qu’il lui faudra près d’un an pour y répondre. Pour le GAO, cette échéance cadre mal avec l’urgence invoquée.

Le Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conteste toutefois la lecture du rapport,affirmant que les coûts étaient « appropriés et nécessaires ». Le DHS revendique plus de 13,2 milliards d'économies. Ce chiffre n'est étayé nulle part dans le rapport : c'est une déclaration du ministère.

L'ICE a accepté d'élaborer un plan, mais pas avant près d'un an. Mme MacLeod juge elle-même ce délai peu compatible avec l'urgence. Un autre rapport sur les coûts est attendu avant la fin de l'année. Quand une administration reçoit des dizaines de milliards sans obligation de prioriser ni de séquencer, le contribuable finance la précipitation et l’improvisation. Le rapport du GAO ne tranche pas sur la politique migratoire ; il rappelle une vérité budgétaire élémentaire : ouvrir le robinet sans compteur produit mécaniquement de la dépense sans retour.

LE COURRIER
DES STRATÈGES

Restez libre !

TIPS · SANS ABONNEMENT

Offrez-nous
un café.

Un média libre vit de ses lecteurs. Un pourboire ponctuel, sans compte ni engagement, quand le cœur vous en dit.

Vous donnez ce que vous voulez. Vous restez libre.

LAISSER UN POURBOIRE merci !

lecourrierdesstrateges.fr

Restez libre !

La leçon budgétaire dépasse donc largement le débat migratoire américain : lorsqu’une administration dispose soudainement de dizaines de milliards, l’absence de plan préalable peut transformer la rapidité d’action en machine à dépenser. L’argent public n’est pas moins gaspillé parce qu’il est américain.

Illustrative image. (Telegram)

Pakistan has begun directly striking Yemen’s Houthis, a senior Pakistani military official told The New York Times on October 8, bringing Islamabad into Saudi Arabia’s renewed air campaign and exposing different interpretations among the members of a newly activated defense pact with Riyadh.

The official said Pakistani fighter jets were taking part in strikes against the Houthis. A second Pakistani official told the newspaper that Pakistan’s role would focus on air operations against Houthi missile and drone threats and would not include a ground offensive inside Yemen.

The reports came three days after Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey activated their Makkah Joint Defense Agreement following a series of Houthi attacks on Saudi territory.

The pact states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all three, but the governments have taken different approaches to how that obligation should be carried out.

Pakistan had already confirmed that its forces were in Saudi Arabia. Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, spokesman for Pakistan’s military, said on October 8 that Pakistani forces were operating in the kingdom in “multiple capabilities and domains.”

Turkey has taken a more limited approach. Reuters reported on October 7 that Ankara was providing Saudi Arabia with mainly defensive and technical assistance, including air defense systems, logistical support, drone operators, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.

Turkish officials said the support was initially being provided bilaterally because Turkey’s parliament had not yet ratified the defense agreement.

Following Reuters’ report, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan made clear that Turkey would not follow Pakistan into direct attacks inside Yemen.

Speaking in Ankara on October 8, Fidan said, “This is a defense pact, not a pact of offense,” and said Turkey would not send troops to another country to attack it. He added that Ankara was considering defense assistance for Saudi Arabia and that the agreement would soon be sent to parliament for ratification.

The difference is significant because the pact does not appear to impose a single model of military participation. Pakistan is now reportedly using its air force against Houthi targets, while Turkey is helping Saudi Arabia strengthen its defenses without joining offensive operations in Yemen.

The Pakistani contribution is relatively limited in size. Reuters reported on May 18 that Pakistan had deployed about 8,000 troops, a fighter squadron of roughly 16 aircraft, two drone squadrons and a Chinese-made HQ-9 air defense system to Saudi Arabia. The fighter squadron consisted mostly of JF-17 aircraft.

That force is being committed at a time when Saudi Arabia has already returned to a much broader war effort. Saudi-backed Yemeni forces launched a major offensive on October 4 to recover territory from the Houthis around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, with more than 100 Saudi warplanes supporting the operation, according to The Associated Press. The Houthis have largely repelled the offensive. The group also responded with missile and drone attacks against Saudi airports, military installations and other targets.

Saudi Arabia has fought this war before, with no success. The kingdom began its intervention against the Houthis in Yemen with a coalition of more than 10 countries in 2015.

At the time, Saudi Arabia was reported to have mobilized around 100 warplanes and 150,000 troops, while aircraft from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain participated in the campaign.

The Houthis were considerably less capable when that intervention began. Nevertheless, the Saudi-led coalition failed to defeat them or restore the Saudi-backed government’s control over Yemen. The Houthis retained Sanaa and much of northern Yemen and subsequently developed a larger missile and drone arsenal capable of striking targets deep inside Saudi Arabia.

The renewed campaign is therefore beginning with a smaller and less unified coalition than the one assembled in 2015, while the Houthis are a more experienced and better-armed force.

Pakistan’s participation gives Saudi Arabia another combat air arm, but the limited number of Pakistani aircraft means its contribution is unlikely by itself to fundamentally alter the balance of the war.

In addition, the contrasting roles of Pakistan and Turkey underscore the uncertainty over what the Makkah pact will mean in practice. Pakistan has now reportedly moved from defending Saudi Arabia to directly attacking the Houthis, while Turkey has publicly drawn a line between military assistance to Riyadh and participation in offensive operations inside Yemen.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence

NOW hosted at southfront.press

Previously, SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence was at southfront.org.

The .org domain name had been blocked by the US (NATO) (https://southfront.press/southfront-org-blocked-by-u-s-controlled-global-internet-supervisor/) globally, outlawed and without any explanation

Back before that, from 2013 to 2015, SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence was at southfront.com

SOUTHFRONT.PRESS

MORE ON THIS TOPIC:

• Syria Leaves Door Open for Joining Disastrous Saudi War on Yemen
• Barefoot, Houthi Fighters Eradicate Saudi-Backed Forces in Taiz (Video)

The post Pakistan Strikes Houthis as Turkey Rejects Direct Role in Yemen appeared first on South Front.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Trying to pin the blame for the depletion of U.S. military stockpiles on something other than the war in Iran, President Donald Trump fell back on a usual scapegoat last week: Ukraine. “The Biden administration gave far more munitions away to Ukraine, at no cost to them whatsoever, than we have used in Iran,” Trump wrote on Truth Social.

This is a familiar refrain. Trump loves to remind his audience that because of him, Americans are “not spending on Ukraine anymore” and instead, Europe is footing the bill. In truth, most people in the United States don’t think about Ukraine much these days. But since Trump himself brought it up, it’s worth asking: What exactly is going on with U.S. military support to Ukraine?

The answer might surprise you. Despite Trump’s rhetoric, the United States remains deeply embroiled in Ukraine’s ongoing conflict with Russia in ways that create national security risks and run counter to Trump’s own foreign policy goals.

It is true that Trump has reduced U.S. support to Ukraine compared to its high mark under his predecessor, Joe Biden. First, his administration has stopped the use of Presidential Drawdown Authority to transfer weapons from U.S. stocks directly to Ukraine. The Biden administration used this mechanism to give Ukraine almost $35 billion in weapons free of charge. Second, the Trump administration has not requested additional funds for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), which uses U.S. financing to purchase new weapons for Ukraine.

But Trump has not cut off all assistance to Ukraine. Several important channels remain. First, there are about $13 billion in outstanding USAI contracts as of June 2026, down from $20 billion in January 2025. These contracts, signed by Biden and now implemented by Trump, will procure weapons for Ukraine through about 2028. Weapons in the pipeline include longer-lead time systems like NASAMs, Patriot missiles and components (Ukraine is reportedly receiving at 10-20 PAC-3s per month under these contracts), counter-drone systems, artillery rockets, and ammunition.

These continuing deliveries are not new awards, but they are still taxpayer-funded military aid to Ukraine that will add up to about $20 billion in aid over the 4 years of Trump’s term. Weapons produced under these contracts come off overburdened U.S. production lines. This has a high opportunity cost given the limits of U.S. defense industrial capacity. Without obligations to Ukraine, industrial resources could shift to different weapons or systems that the United States needs more.

If the Trump administration were serious about ending U.S. spending on the Ukraine war, it could still recoup these funds and reallocate the money to support U.S. defense production needs. It has instead allowed the aid to continue.

There has also been some new funding approved since Biden left office. Congress included about $800 million of USAI funding in the 2026 and 2027 NDAAs. We can expect more in future bills as well.

And the State Department has continued to send military aid of its own. A portion of this aid goes through the Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior, including drones, armored vehicles, guns, grenade launchers, and similar equipment. Since this equipment ends up with Ukraine’s National Guard and border police it is often counted as non-military and intended for things like counterdrug operations, but today these personnel serve as combat units.

The State Department has also approved $3 billion of new arms sales to Ukraine in 2025 and 2026 that will be at least partially funded from foreign military financing (FMF), which means U.S. dollars supporting foreign government purchases of U.S. weapons. Some of these funds may come from money allocated but not spent under President Biden, but much of the funding will be new, coming from the State Department’s budget.

The bottom line is that U.S. weapons transfers to Ukraine continue under Trump, amounting to, on average, as much at $5 billion per year. But this is no longer the most important, or expensive, type of support that the United States gives to Ukraine.

For example, the United States gives Ukraine real-time targeting information, including on the movement of Russian troops and the location of key command centers. This information has been important to Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign on Russian logistics as well as its deep strikes against military and energy targets inside of Russia. In addition, U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance assets in countries on the NATO border (including routine E-3 flights) are integrated with Ukraine’s air defense network, improving the accuracy and speed of Ukraine’s response.

Beyond intelligence, the United States also provides logistical and maintenance support, including forward and remote assistance to repair American-made equipment, necessary spare parts to keep older systems running, and training. It also facilitates the expensive transfer of European purchases of U.S. weapons.

The cost of the intelligence, logistics, and other operational support the United States provides to Ukraine does not show up anywhere as an itemized bill, even as U.S. assistance increases. But we can use available public information to draw some conclusions about the expenses incurred.

The 2024 defense supplemental bill, for instance, allocated about $15 billion to “military training, intelligence sharing, increased presence, and other support activities.” In theory, these funds are intended to cover activities conducted in support of Ukraine that would not occur if the United States remained uninvolved in that conflict. Some portion of this money will go to the salaries of military personnel who would be paid no matter where they work.

Since about a third of each military service’s budget is personnel costs, we could estimate the cost of extra activities conducted for Ukraine, excluding baseline manpower, at about $10 billion over the course of a year or so. If Trump has truly expanded intelligence sharing with Ukraine, this price tag may have increased over time.

The money included in the bill is likely only a portion of the actual burden the U.S. military and intelligence community have shouldered to support Ukraine’s war. Many intelligence activities, like tasking and analyzing satellite data and collecting signals intelligence, might be covered in classified national security budgets. Starting in 2023, in fact, the classified intelligence budget increased by 10%, a large jump over the 2022 total. The increase was justified by intelligence community leaders as resulting from shifts in the national security landscape, including especially concern about China’s rise and spillover from conflict in Ukraine. Since the total increase in funding was about $10 billion, we can guess that Ukraine-related expenditures might amount to $3-$5 billion per year, or about one-third to one-half of the total increase.

All told, then, U.S. taxpayers are still spending roughly $20 billion per year on Ukraine. Today, assistance to Ukraine comes primarily in the form of direct operational support, not weapons. But the shift in type of aid increases the risk of U.S. support to Ukraine to average Americans.

First, assisting Ukraine in striking energy targets inside of Russia has a perverse effect on the Trump administration’s efforts to keep gas prices low. As Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent acknowledged, Ukraine’s strikes inside Russia push global oil prices up, imposing higher costs of living on Americans.

Second, U.S. intelligence support deepens U.S. involvement in Ukraine’s war, making it an all-but-direct combatant. Russian assistance to Iran, both in terms of weapons and intelligence sharing, is a reaction to the comparable U.S. role in Ukraine, and it leaves U.S. servicemembers in the Middle East and elsewhere less safe. Growing U.S. participation in Ukraine also increases the risk that miscalculation leads to a direct U.S.-Russia confrontation, a nightmarish possibility given the degraded state of U.S. military readiness.

Trump promised to end the war in Ukraine in 24 hours. He has instead deepened U.S. entanglement in ways that create real risks and new fiscal costs for the United States. American interests would be best served if the United States were to walk away entirely, but if Trump instead opts for the status quo, he should at least be honest about it.

Original article: responsiblestatecraft.org

Click to see full-size image. (U.S. Central Command)

The post Chasing a Victory That Can’t Be Won, Washington Eyes Attack On Iran Before Elections appeared first on South Front.

Illustrative image.

Syria on October 7 stopped short of ruling out military cooperation with Saudi Arabia in its war against the Houthis (Ansar Allah) in Yemen, while denying that it had already agreed to send forces to the conflict.

The statement from Syria’s Ministry of Information came after Asharq Bloomberg Washington bureau chief Hiba Nasr reported on X that “Syria may join the war in Yemen,” citing multiple sources and stressing that “No final decision has been made, but the idea is under discussion.”

Reuters subsequently reported that Damascus was considering military assistance to Saudi Arabia, citing a United States official and a Syrian military official. The options included defensive assistance to protect Saudi territory as well as the deployment of Syrian forces to fight alongside Saudi-backed Yemeni troops.

Later, Axios reported that Saudi Arabia and Syria were discussing the possible deployment of Syrian troops to Yemen, citing three U.S. officials. It said Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa was seriously considering the proposal but had not made a final decision.

Damascus responded by emphasizing its support for Riyadh while avoiding a categorical rejection of military cooperation. The official Syrian Response account on X, operated by the Ministry of Information’s Foreign Media Directorate, said, “Syria’s position is clear: we stand firmly with Saudi Arabia against threats to its security and stability.”

“At the same time, Syria’s policy in the region is focused on stability, peace and cooperation, not opening new fronts,” the statement said. “Our priority is Syria: rebuilding the country, strengthening its institutions, working with our partners on reconstruction and improving the lives of Syrians.”

It added that “any military cooperation with partner countries would take place only through official channels and existing bilateral frameworks.”

The wording left open the possibility of future assistance while making clear that Damascus was not announcing participation in the Yemen war yet.

The reports emerged after al-Sharaa met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh on October 6. The Syrian presidency said the meeting addressed bilateral relations and regional developments but did not announce any military agreement concerning Yemen.

Reuters reported that a U.S. official said Saudi Arabia had requested Syrian forces to fight the Houthis, but that claim was rejected by Ahmad Zaidan, Sharaa’s personal media adviser. Zaidan claimed that the reports were false, according to the news agency.

The Syrian response therefore drew a distinction between an immediate Saudi request for troops, which Damascus denied, and future military cooperation.

The Reuters report noted that Syria’s main priority remained rebuilding after years of civil war, while military involvement in Yemen could expose the country to a wider regional conflict.

Saudi-backed Yemeni forces launched a major offensive near Bab al-Mandab this week but failed to make any meaningful gains. Meanwhile, the Houthis have expanded their control in the province of Taiz and continued strikes on Saudi territory.

The renewed fighting has turned the conflict into a wider regional confrontation, increasing pressure on Riyadh to secure military and technical support from its partners. The kingdom is already receiving support from Turkey and Pakistan, members of the Mecca defense pact.

Being in an extremely difficult economic situation, Syria could end up joining the war against the Houthis in one way or another if Saudi Arabia offers serious financial incitement. Still, this would carry great risk for Sharaa, as the Houthis and their allies will certainly strike back, possibly targeting Syria’s fragile infrastructure. This would be catastrophic for Damascus.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence

NOW hosted at southfront.press

Previously, SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence was at southfront.org.

The .org domain name had been blocked by the US (NATO) (https://southfront.press/southfront-org-blocked-by-u-s-controlled-global-internet-supervisor/) globally, outlawed and without any explanation

Back before that, from 2013 to 2015, SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence was at southfront.com

SOUTHFRONT.PRESS

MORE ON THIS TOPIC:

• Syria Is Preparing to Join Saudi War on Yemen, and It Would Be a Big Mistake
• Turkey Pushed Syria To Meeting With Hezbollah

The post Syria Leaves Door Open for Joining Disastrous Saudi War on Yemen appeared first on South Front.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Last week, 7 ARAD-7 rifles of Israeli manufacture were seized by the Brazilian Federal Police at a transport company located in Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, while they were being prepared to be sent to drug traffickers of the Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP) organization. These are the same drug traffickers who control a territory called “Complexo de Israel,” which brings together the favelas Cidade Alta, Parada de Lucas, Vigário Geral, Cinco Bocas, and Pica-Pau.

Two years ago, we wrote here at the Strategic Culture Foundation an article about the danger of “narcopentecostalism” – the deep linkage between drug trafficking and neo-Pentecostalism in some favelas – pointing to this new phenomenon as a possible national security threat for Brazil, as well as a potential focus of activities aimed at destabilizing the social fabric and religious persecution. Indeed, in TCP territories, Catholic churches and Afro-Brazilian religious centers are closed and violently attacked.

Nevertheless, at the time we wrote that article, in July 2024, there were not yet enough material elements to incisively affirm the existence of a direct connection between narcopentecostalism and the State of Israel. TCP traffickers exalted the State of Israel, used Israeli patches and uniforms, but all of this was circumstantial and could be explained by mere adherence to evangelical discourse.

Now, however, we have more specific evidence to be able to return to the topic and raise concern about the possible link between Israel and one of Brazil’s main drug trafficking organizations.

After all, to date it is still not known how these modern Israeli rifles reached the logistical branch of an important Brazilian criminal organization, when this specific rifle is still uncommon among Brazilian police forces and nonexistent among the military.

The first objection that could be raised would be about Israel’s “interest” in arming or financing a criminal organization in Brazil. Well, it would not be the first time.

In the 1980s, 500 automatic weapons (including IMI Galil rifles and Uzi submachine guns) and 200,000 rounds of ammunition were found in a warehouse belonging to the Medellín Cartel, one of the largest drug trafficking organizations in Colombia. At the time, “independent investigations” concluded that the person responsible for the operation, the mercenary and retired Israeli military officer Yair Klein, had acted on his own. Klein himself, however, always stated that his activities in Colombia (which involved not only arms sales but also the training of paramilitary groups) had the knowledge and authorization of Israeli authorities.

Klein’s link to the Israeli state apparatus, demonstrating that he was not really an “independent agent,” is confirmed by the fact that when he was arrested in Sierra Leone in 1999 for selling weapons to insurgents of the Revolutionary United Front, the State of Israel intervened to secure his release, as well as refused all extradition requests.

Another interesting and recent piece of news involves Mexico, where authorities declared that 80% of the weapons found with soldiers of the drug cartels were of U.S. origin… and most of the remaining 20% were of Israeli origin. Indeed, Israel officially exported 24,000 automatic weapons between 2006 and 2018 to Mexico’s military and police institutions, and another 18,000 in more recent years. Note, however, that estimates from independent observatories suggest that Mexican cartels as a whole possess an arsenal of several hundred thousand automatic weapons. If something like 15-20% of these weapons are of Israeli origin, then we are talking about any number between 20,000 and 100,000 Israeli-origin weapons in the hands of the cartels. These are numbers that simply do not match the figures of official Israeli arms exports to Mexican security forces.

One last point that may draw attention is the recent attention the U.S. has given to Brazilian criminal organizations, with the PCC and CV groups categorized as terrorist groups by Donald Trump’s government. What draws attention is the fact that the TCP – the 3rd largest criminal organization in Brazil, with a presence in some other countries in the region, operations in several Brazilian states, and at least one verifiable link to an individual connected to Al-Qaeda’s financing network, not to mention an operational alliance with the PCC – was left out of the categorization.

Naturally, it could be a coincidence. But even so, it is an interesting coincidence that the neo-Pentecostal criminal organization apparently armed by Israel is exactly the one that was not categorized as terrorist by the White House.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

A major scandal has erupted at Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND), one of the most serious cases to hit the agency in recent years.

Germany’s Federal Prosecutor General is investigating former BND President August Hanning on suspicion of espionage against the state, obtaining state secrets, attempted treason, and engaging in intelligence activities. Another long-serving employee of the agency is facing charges of aiding and abetting attempted treason and espionage against the state. Both men have been detained, and the Federal Prosecutor General’s Office has confirmed their arrests.

Information: What is Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND)?

The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is Germany’s official foreign intelligence service. Its founder was Reinhard Gehlen, who served as the head of intelligence on the Eastern Front during Nazi Germany. In its early years, the agency recruited numerous former members of Nazi organizations such as the Gestapo and the SS. During the Cold War and in the period that followed, the agency continued to be one of “American imperialism’s biggest partners” in Europe.

Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) officers detained Hanning at his home in Nordwalde, near Münster, in the early hours of the morning. This was reported by WDR, NDR and Süddeutsche Zeitung.

At the same time, another former senior BND employee was detained in Bavaria. The suspect, identified as Manfred D., was reportedly Hanning’s former chief of staff and had worked at the BND until spring 2026. Investigators searched locations associated with the suspects both there and in Berlin.

Information: What is the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA)?

The Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt – BKA) is Germany’s federal criminal police agency responsible for combating crime at the national level.

The two senior figures in German intelligence are expected to appear before a judge today or tomorrow. The judge will formally notify them of the arrest warrants and decide whether they will remain in custody pending trial.

What are the charges?

First of all, it is alleged that D., Hanning’s former chief of staff, provided Hanning with highly classified information from the BND in exchange for money until at least 2022. It is not unusual for retired intelligence officers to take on roles such as security consultants for various organizations after leaving government service. In Hanning’s case, however, investigators suspect that the former BND chief may have prepared a security analysis for a foreign intelligence service “in at least one instance.”

According to information obtained by WDR, NDR and Süddeutsche Zeitung, that foreign service was not Russia.

In another case, Hanning is alleged to have used information obtained from internal BND documents in his communications with a foreign agent.

In fact, the story of how Hanning first came onto investigators’ radar goes back to last year.

According to information obtained by Tagesschau from intelligence sources, Hanning came under investigation after searches were carried out at his home and offices in September last year. At the time, the Hamburg State Criminal Police Office (LKA) was searching for evidence related to the kidnapping of Christina Block’s children.

Child abduction and sensitive documents

The case concerned allegations by the Hamburg prosecutor’s office against restaurant entrepreneur Christina Block and her lawyer, Ingo Bott, over the abduction of children. Prosecutors accuse Block of arranging the kidnapping of her two young children at the end of 2023 amid a custody dispute with her former husband. Hanning is also alleged to have been involved in the attempted abduction. Hanning denies the allegations.

According to the allegations, Hanning, together with a former LKA employee who was his business associate, conspired to hand the children’s father a hard drive containing images and videos of child sexual abuse material.

Information: Who is Christina Block?

Christina Block is the daughter and heiress of Eugen Block, founder of Germany’s well-known Block House steakhouse chain. She is accused of instigating or planning the violent abduction of her two youngest children from Denmark and their transfer to Germany on New Year’s Eve 2023.

The LKA also discovered an electronic data storage device containing highly sensitive material while examining materials seized from Hanning last year.

According to the findings, the former intelligence chief had access to highly classified BND documents from the recent past that he had absolutely no reason to possess. Hanning’s tenure at the BND, meanwhile, had ended in November 2005.

In total, D. is believed to have passed approximately 2,000 documents to Hanning. A significant portion of these reportedly consisted of briefings prepared for the weekly “intelligence situation” meetings held at the Chancellery, where the heads of the country’s security agencies exchange information.

According to information obtained by investigators, the documents included reports on highly sensitive subjects such as Iran’s nuclear program and the Russian military. Intelligence sources say that some of the documents even contained information obtained from foreign intelligence services.

The leaking of such material is being described in the intelligence community as virtually a “super-GAU.”

Information: What is a super-GAU?

Super-GAU is a German-derived term referring to the largest and most destructive situation or catastrophe imaginable, going beyond even the worst-case scenario that has been designed for. It is derived from the German expression “Größter anzunehmender Unfall” (“the greatest assumed accident”).

‘Treason against the state’ allegations

Following the Hamburg LKA’s investigation, the documents seized were handed over to federal authorities. The Federal Prosecutor General’s Office launched a secret investigation into Hanning and the alleged informant within the BND in May 2026.

It is not yet known how long Hanning had been receiving confidential internal information. According to security sources, the most recent documents seized date from June 2022.

It is also unclear how the alleged informant inside the BND managed to remove the material from the tightly secured agency.

The BND was asked for an urgent statement on the matter. The agency referred the case to the Federal Prosecutor General’s Office, citing the fact that an ongoing investigation was involved.

August Hanning’s lawyers have so far failed to respond to an urgent request for comment on the allegations.

Not the BND’s first case

For the BND, this is the second serious case to emerge within a matter of several years.

A former BND official is currently on trial before the Higher Regional Court in Berlin, accused of spying for Russia together with another suspect in 2022. In that case as well, highly classified information concerning BND cyber operations was allegedly leaked outside the agency.

If the allegations against Hanning and the other suspect are confirmed, the case will reach unprecedented proportions in the history of German intelligence.

There has never been another case in German history in which suspicions of treason against the state have targeted such a senior government official as a former head of an intelligence agency.

August Hanning is also a prominent figure in the intelligence world. Throughout his career, he held positions at key points in Germany’s security architecture. Before becoming president of the BND, he served as an official responsible for confidentiality and security at West Germany’s diplomatic mission in East Germany.

He later held various positions at the Federal Chancellery, including serving as Coordinator of the Federal Intelligence Services. Hanning, who holds a doctorate in law, became head of the BND in 1998.

After leaving the intelligence service, he became a State Secretary at the Federal Ministry of the Interior at the end of 2005. Four years later, he was placed into temporary retirement.

Of course, it would not be enough to view this case simply as an instance of “rot” within the institution. We reach this conclusion particularly by recalling how German intelligence has been involved in dirty operations from the very foundation of the agency and throughout its history.

It was not merely a matter of one former director. German intelligence has been involved in numerous dirty operations, from employing Nazi war criminals to Operation Rubikon, carried out jointly with the CIA, and NATO’s secret stay-behind/Gladio networks. In all of these cases, methods strikingly similar to those employed by Hanning were used.

What happened in Hanning’s case is that he continued using what he had learned during his retirement — and was caught.

From this perspective, the Hanning affair can be read not so much as the story of a “rotten official,” but rather as the story of an “official who got caught.”