Australia has no need to buy fuel from Russia, despite US President Donald Trump’s move to bring Russian diesel back to world markets. Climate Change and Energy Minister Chris Bowen says that imports from Russia will remain banned to ensure the country does not benefit from its invasion of Ukraine, Bloomberg reports.
Trump has agreed with Russia's President Vladimir Putin to release Russian diesel onto global markets, a move Ukraine says funds a war that has killed more than 80 Ukrainian civilians in two days.
“We don’t need or want Russian fuel in Australia. We do not want Vladimir Putin to benefit from this war in the Middle East. What the United States does is a matter for them, but we won’t be changing our approach,” Bowen said.
The deal Australia is turning down
Trump announced on 9 October a series of cargoes beginning this month totaling about 13.5 million barrels of Russian diesel. The release upends years of sanctions, as the White House looks for ways to tame soaring fuel prices before the US midterm elections.
Bowen draws a clear line between that approach and Australia’s. What the US does is its own affair, he stresses, but Canberra will maintain its arrangements with trading partners to keep Russian fuel out of the market.
Enough fuel to hold the line
Australia can hold out without Russian supply, Bowen argues. The country has 43 days’ worth of petrol, two days more than a week earlier, and 31 days’ worth of diesel, one day less, he notes.
He adds that Australia stays in close contact with domestic refiners to keep them running at full capacity. The stance lets Canberra wait out high prices rather than buy fuel that would send money to Moscow.
Australia’s fuel costs have stayed high since the war between the US and Iran disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the route that normally carries about a fifth of the world’s oil and gas.
Washington has put its sanctions on Russian diesel on hold. The US Treasury has authorized the sale, delivery, offloading, and import of Russian-origin diesel fuel, effectively suspending sanctions on that trade until 7 April 2027, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) said on its website on 9 October.
The waiver lets Russian diesel back onto world markets and, Ukraine argues, hands Moscow fresh revenue for its war, which has killed more than 80 Ukrainian civilians in two days. Until now, it was unclear whether Washington would roll back the sanctions it imposed on Russia in 2022.
OFAC has issued the measure as General License 135, signed by the office’s director, Bradley Smith, according to the report. It authorizes transactions in Russian-origin diesel that sanctions would otherwise block.
The license sets one limit. It does not permit any debits from accounts at US financial institutions held by Russia’s central bank, its National Wealth Fund, or its finance ministry, the document says.
Trump’s promise of cheaper fuel
On 9 October, US President Donald Trump wrote on Truth Social that Russia would immediately supply more than 300,000 tons of diesel, then 500,000 tons in November, and another million tons right after.
Moscow would later send the US up to 3 million more tons, depending on the state of Russia’s refineries, Trump added, framing the deal as a way to bring down energy prices.
Why the volumes fall short
Analysts say the amounts are too small to move prices much. Together, the first tranches would cover about a day and a half of US demand, while US diesel use alone runs near 16 million tons a month. Experts read the move as politics ahead of an election rather than a real shift in the market, pointing out that Trump cited volumes in tons, which look larger than the barrels traders track.
The deal drew fury in Kyiv, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called it a weak decision by strong partners. The EU is moving the other way, with ambassadors approving the bloc’s largest sanctions package against Russia’s war machine, due for final adoption on 12 October.
Europe will not loosen its pressure on Russia after the US-Russia diesel deal, EU Foreign Policy chief Kaja Kallas says. She has announced that EU foreign ministers will approve the bloc’s largest set of sanctions against Russia’s war machine since the full-scale invasion on 12 October.
Washington has just eased the pressure on Russia, letting Russian diesel back onto world markets and handing Moscow more money to wage war. This comes as Russian strikes have killed more than 80 Ukrainian civilians in two days, 22 of them on Russian President Vladimir Putin's birthday on 7 October.
Moreover, Russia has stepped up its hybrid attacks against Europe, both EU Member States and NATO Allies. It is now the time to tighten sanctions, not loosen them, Kallas says.
“Suspending sanctions on Russian diesel provides Moscow with more revenues to wage war. This is not the time to ease pressure on Russia, and Europe won’t,” she claims.
A split with Washington
On 9 October, Trump claimed he had agreed with Putin to put more than 300,000 tons of Russian diesel on world markets immediately.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called the deal a weak decision by strong partners, arguing that Russia turns oil-product revenue into weapons against Ukraine's civilians, according to the BBC.
The package aims at the missile chain
On 7 October, EU ambassadors approved the 22nd package of sanctions, with about 1,700 listings, Ukrainian President’s Commissioner for Sanctions Policy Vladyslav Vlasiuk notes. It is expected to be formally approved on 12 October.
This package contains the largest number of sanctions targeting Russia’s defence industry. Of these, 60% were drawn from Ukrainian decrees and proposals. The package includes measures targeting machine tools, Lancet drones, ballistic weapons, and related technologies.
“The core of the package is Russia’s missile programme and electronic components: electronics, capacitors, resistors, and semiconductors. It also covers electronic warfare, shipbuilding, and explosives,” Vlasiuk says.
It took just a few weeks from Ukraine's decision to the European one.
"But we are already working on further measures, including sectoral sanctions targeting energy, the defense industry, finance, and trade,” he stated.
US President Donald Trump said on 9 October that he had agreed with Russian leader Vladimir Putin to bring Russian diesel to world markets to lower energy prices. However, energy analysts say the deal, which drew fury in Ukraine, is unlikely to lower diesel prices meaningfully, CNN reports.
Trump wrote on social media that Putin would “immediately supply” more than 300,000 tons of diesel, with another 500,000 tons in November. Together, those volumes would cover about a day and a half of US demand, according to the US Energy Information Administration.
Meanwhile, former head of the Center for Countering Disinformation Andrii Kovalenko says that US diesel consumption alone is about 16 million tons per month, and global consumption is roughly 120 million tons.
The US experts read the move as politics more than a market shift. Trump spoke in tons rather than barrels because the figure looks bigger to an ordinary observer, said Dan Pickering, founder of Pickering Energy Partners, calling it “more politics than a game changer.”
Doubts Russia can even deliver
Former US officials question whether Putin holds the diesel Trump described, as Ukrainian strikes strain Russia’s refineries. A former senior State Department official says it hardly matters whether the fuel arrives, because Putin “has already achieved the result he wants,” with Trump believing he has a pre-election card that could move markets.
Even if the fuel flows, it would be a temporary measure. Gregory Brew of Eurasia Group says that he suspects Putin expects Ukraine to halt its strikes on Russian refineries in return, and that he cannot imagine Zelenskyy agreeing.
A win for Putin without conditions
For Putin, the gain is plain, Kovalenko says: he pushes for sanctions relief and for no new US sanctions, all without any demand to end the war in Ukraine.
"Trump’s bet was more on the news itself, driving prices down somewhat, because, in reality, figures like these shouldn’t bring prices down," Kovalеnkо believes.
He adds that Trump will "make a big fuss about diesel ahead of the elections, nothing more," and that the average American is unlikely to feel any lasting effect.”
Earlier, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned that allowing Russia to sell petroleum products abroad without securing a lasting de-escalation agreement would help finance Moscow's war against Ukraine.
He criticized the decision, calling it "a birthday gift for Putin," per Axios.
The next day after the announcement, Russia launched six bombs on Zaporizhzhia, killing 17 people.
Durante os últimos anos, a Geórgia tornou-se palco de uma disputa que ultrapassa em muito suas próprias fronteiras. O conflito político apresentado como uma discussão sobre democracia, integração europeia e direitos civis também deve na verdade ser compreendido como mais um capítulo no delicado jogo estratégico do Cáucaso.
É justamente nesse contexto que a decisão de Tbilisi de manter distância da política de confronto promovida por seus parceiros ocidentais ganha importância.
A questão fundamental não é saber se a Geórgia deve ser “europeia” ou “russa”. Essa formulação é excessivamente simplista. O verdadeiro problema é saber se um Estado pequeno, situado entre grandes centros de poder, deve possuir liberdade para definir sua própria política externa ou se sua posição internacional será determinada pelas necessidades estratégicas de terceiros.
O governo georgiano optou pela primeira alternativa.
A ascensão do Georgian Dream produziu uma mudança significativa na política externa do país. Em vez de reproduzir automaticamente a retórica antirrussa predominante em Bruxelas, Tbilisi passou a defender uma política pragmática. A prioridade tornou-se evitar uma nova guerra e preservar relações econômicas com seus vizinhos.
Para a Geórgia, isso não é uma questão abstrata. A Rússia continua sendo um importante parceiro econômico. Comércio, turismo, energia e circulação de pessoas criam uma realidade que não pode ser simplesmente eliminada por decisões políticas. Adotar integralmente o regime de sanções ocidental contra Moscou teria consequências particularmente graves para uma economia muito menor e mais vulnerável que as grandes economias europeias.
É nesse ponto que a política de Tbilisi diverge fundamentalmente da estratégia defendida pelos falcões de Bruxelas. Bruxelas deseja uma Geórgia cada vez mais integrada às estruturas políticas europeias. O governo georgiano, entretanto, passou a insistir que integração não pode significar submissão automática às prioridades geopolíticas da União Europeia.
A aprovação da Lei de Transparência da Influência Estrangeira tornou-se o principal símbolo dessa disputa. Para seus críticos, a legislação representa um retrocesso democrático. Para seus defensores, trata-se de uma tentativa legítima de limitar a influência política de organizações financiadas do exterior.
A mesma divisão aparece nas questões culturais. A legislação georgiana sobre propaganda LGBT provocou forte reação europeia e consolidou a percepção, entre seus críticos, de que Tbilisi estaria abandonando os valores liberais promovidos pela União Europeia.
Mas existe uma questão que raramente recebe a mesma atenção: quem deve estabelecer as regras políticas e culturais dentro da Geórgia?
Para o Georgian Dream, a resposta é o próprio Estado georgiano. Foi justamente essa insistência na autonomia que transformou o governo em alvo de uma pressão internacional cada vez mais intensa.
Recentemente o prefeito de Tbilisi, Kakha Kaladze, acusou abertamente Bruxelas de financiar uma tentativa de golpe de Estado na Geórgia durante os protestos do ano passado. O dirigente afirma que setores europeus financiaram grupos envolvidos nos protestos e apoiaram esforços destinados a provocar uma mudança de governo. Segundo ele, o objetivo seria instalar no poder forças políticas mais alinhadas aos interesses da União Europeia.
De fato, não há qualquer novidade nisso. Não por acaso, Bruxelas agora discute a possibilidade de impor sanções a todos os dirigentes do Georgian Dream e oficiais do governo georgiano. Mas, ainda assim, estas palavras revelam a dimensão geopolítica da crise. A disputa não é meramente uma controvérsia sobre legislação doméstica, mas uma verdadeira batalha pela orientação estratégica do país.
E aqui aparece o principal risco para a Geórgia. O Cáucaso não é um espaço neutro. A região está localizada entre a Rússia, a Turquia, o Irã e o mundo euro-atlântico. Qualquer tentativa de transformar a Geórgia em uma plataforma de confronto com Moscou teria consequências muito maiores para os próprios georgianos do que para as potências que apoiariam essa política à distância.
A experiência ucraniana tornou essa questão ainda mais evidente. Um Estado pode receber apoio político, financeiro e militar de potências externas e, ao mesmo tempo, acabar pagando o preço mais alto quando a rivalidade entre essas potências se transforma em conflito aberto. Para um país pequeno como a Geórgia, evitar esse destino é uma consideração estratégica elementar.
Foi precisamente nesse ponto que Tbilisi estabeleceu uma diferença em relação a Kiev. Em vez de aceitar a transformação do país em uma nova linha de frente, o governo georgiano procurou preservar relações funcionais com Moscou. Isso não significa uma aliança com a Rússia. A Geórgia continua sem relações diplomáticas formais com Moscou e mantém suas próprias divergências com o Kremlin, mas a prioridade nacional é garantir autonomia estratégica, paz, segurança e desenvolvimento.
Uma Geórgia que evita a confrontação direta com Moscou reduz a possibilidade de abertura de uma nova frente militar nas proximidades das fronteiras russas. Também preserva suas relações econômicas com os países vizinhos e mantém maior liberdade para negociar simultaneamente com diferentes centros de poder.
O que está em jogo é a soberania de um Estado pequeno diante da competição entre grandes potências. E, diante de uma região cada vez mais marcada pela competição entre grandes potências, talvez a questão mais importante não seja perguntar de que lado a Geórgia está, mas como a Geórgia planeja proteger a si mesma diante do confronto de polos vizinhos opostos.
O povo georgiano mostrou que não tem lado algum nas disputas globais senão o seu próprio. E agiu corretamente ao fazê-lo.
Ukraine has published data on 20 vessels that carry Russian oil and liquefied natural gas or refuel the sanctioned fleet, parts of the logistics network the Kremlin uses to fund its war, Ukraine's Defense Intelligence reports. All 20 are under British or Ukrainian sanctions, and only one faces US restrictions.
Russia’s shadow fleet runs on roughly 500 aging ships of uncertain ownership that dodge sanctions and keep oil money flowing. That seaborne oil trade is worth more than 80 billion euros a year.
The headline vessel is the Russian ship Portovyy, an LNG carrier and floating gas store owned by the sanctioned Gazprom since 2021, according to the agency. On 15 August 2026, it left the Gulf of Finland with Russian LNG for the first time since November 2021, sailing the Northern Sea Route to the Chinese port of Beihai to unload.
Portovyy is now at the Zhoushan Huafeng Shipyard in China, which has been set as the site for its maintenance, intelligence says, an example of the foreign yards Kyiv wants closed to the sanctioned fleet.
Russia buys up gas carriers through shells
Two more gas carriers show how Moscow expanded the fleet in spring 2026 through front companies, intelligence said. The Avacha, once owned by China’s Jovo Energy, was bought by the little-known Tudor Maritime of the Marshall Islands, took the Russian flag in June, and now ships gas from the Arctic LNG 2 project to Beihai.
The Chaivo, formerly owned by Greece’s Maran Gas Maritime, was also bought by Tudor Maritime and moved under the Russian flag in July. Now it carries cargo to Beihai from a floating gas storage facility off Kamchatka, intelligence says.
A call to close the loopholes
Intelligence urged partners to act together: tighten control over sales of commercially owned ships, block servicing of the sanctioned fleet at foreign yards, and cut off the energy revenue that Russia turns into weapons against civilians.
Russia is building ice-class ships at home and, at the same time, widening its shadow fleet through offshore networks. The UK Foreign Office made the same point on 1 October, saying Moscow is assembling a new shadow fleet to keep its gas revenues flowing.
A Russian air strike with guided bombs on the southeastern city of Zaporizhzhia has killed at least 17 people, including three children, according to Ukraine’s State Emergency Service. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has tied the attack to a US decision to let Russian diesel reach world markets without demanding Moscow halt its strikes on Ukraine first.
On 9 October, President Donald Trump said that Russia would immediately supply more than 300,000 tonnes of diesel fuel to the US and global markets, a further 500,000 tonnes during November, and 1 million tonnes immediately thereafter. The move has already drawn criticism from US lawmakers in both parties.
“Today, Russia expressed its gratitude for the lifting of sanctions on diesel exports by dropping five guided aerial bombs on residential buildings in Zaporizhzhia,” Zelenskyy wrote on Telegram.
Zelenskyy vows to keep hitting refineries
These figures were accurate at the time the post was written. Later, the State Emergency Service reported that the death toll had risen by two. Meanwhile, Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine would not stop striking oil refineries that bring additional revenues for the Kremlin, which spends them on the war.
“There will be responses to Russian attacks. Thank you to everyone who is helping,” Zelenskyy concluded.
According to Zelenskyy, two of the injured are in critical condition, and doctors are fighting to save their lives. Information is also being verified regarding another 12 people who may have been at the strike site.
“Thirteen of our regions came under attack overnight. Residential buildings, infrastructure, and railway facilities have been damaged,” the Ukrainian leader said.
More pressure on Kremlin
Zelenskyy stressed that the latest Russian strikes further demonstrate the need to increase pressure on Russia. In his view, easing restrictions is interpreted by the aggressor as a signal that it can continue the war and attack Ukrainian cities.
“This night provided yet another confirmation that Russia interprets any easing of pressure as a signal that it can supposedly continue fighting and that it can supposedly drop bombs on cities,” he emphasized.
He also noted that Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities are inflicting such losses on Russia and stressed that Ukraine would respond to Russian attacks.
Russia’s demands for the extradition of International Criminal Court judges and Washington’s sweeping sanctions against the institution have converged within days. The two governments have different grievances, but the consequences of their actions increasingly overlap, raising questions about the political relationship between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and the future of international criminal justice.
Russia and the United States have intensified their campaigns against the International Criminal Court (ICC) almost simultaneously, exposing an increasingly consequential convergence between the policies of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump.
On 8 October, Moscow demanded the extradition of ICC President Tomoko Akane and eight other current and former officials. The following day, Washington announced sanctions against the court as an institution, extending earlier measures against individual judges and prosecutors.
The timing raises an obvious question: are these independent campaigns arising from different disputes with international justice, or do they reflect a broader political understanding between Washington and Moscow?
There is no publicly established evidence of a coordinated operation or an agreement between Trump and Putin to undermine the ICC. Nevertheless, the strategic consequences of their respective actions are remarkably similar. Both weaken an institution pursuing criminal proceedings against political leaders whom the two governments seek to protect.
Different grievances, overlapping interests
Russia’s hostility towards the ICC is directly connected to the arrest warrant issued against Putin in March 2023 over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied territories.
The court subsequently issued warrants against senior Russian military commanders, including Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, over alleged crimes involving attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.
Moscow’s response has been to pursue ICC personnel through its own criminal justice system. The latest extradition demands follow convictions handed down in absentia by a Russian court in December 2025.
Washington’s confrontation with the ICC has a different immediate origin. The Trump administration objects to the court’s jurisdiction over American nationals and Israeli officials, particularly following the arrest warrants issued against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has presented the American campaign as a defence of US sovereignty. Yet the sanctions announced on 9 October are not confined to the Israeli proceedings or any investigation involving American personnel.
They target the institution itself, potentially disrupting financial transactions and commercial relationships essential to its operation. This distinction matters because a court-wide restriction necessarily affects investigations beyond those cited by Washington. That includes Ukraine.
The Anchorage question
The political context cannot be separated from the relationship between Trump and Putin, including their meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, in August 2025.
The summit formed part of Trump’s efforts to negotiate directly with Moscow over the war in Ukraine. The American president has repeatedly treated relations with Putin as a question of diplomatic bargaining, seeking arrangements that might produce an agreement where conventional Western pressure has failed.
Against this background, suggestions that pressure on the ICC might form part of a wider accommodation with Moscow warrant scrutiny. However, the proposition that Trump specifically offered Putin assistance in neutralising the court during their Anchorage discussions remains unsubstantiated. There is no verified public account establishing such a commitment.
A more defensible conclusion is that Washington’s independently declared campaign against the ICC also advances an important Russian interest. For Putin, the benefit is clear. Measures designed to restrict the court’s financial and administrative capacity could complicate investigations into Russian conduct, irrespective of the American administration’s stated intentions.
The relationship therefore need not involve explicit coordination to produce politically significant results.
Why sanctions against the institution matter
The escalation from targeting individual prosecutors to sanctioning the entire ICC represents a substantial change. Previous American measures imposed personal and financial restrictions on selected officials. The latest approach threatens the broader infrastructure upon which international criminal proceedings depend.
The court requires banking facilities, secure communications, technology services and commercial suppliers. American sanctions can reach beyond US territory because of the international financial system’s dependence on dollar transactions and American service providers.
The ICC had already anticipated this vulnerability. According to details disclosed in September, the institution has pursued alternatives to American software and financial services to reduce its exposure.
Nevertheless, operational continuity and investigative effectiveness are not necessarily the same thing. The court may remain formally functional while facing additional costs, delays and restrictions affecting prosecutors, investigators and international cooperation.
For Ukraine, this is particularly significant. The ICC holds and evaluates evidence connected to alleged Russian war crimes, including the deportation of children and attacks on civilian infrastructure. Its proceedings preserve a judicial process independent of whatever diplomatic settlement Washington and Moscow might eventually negotiate.
Weakening that capacity would not invalidate existing warrants or automatically destroy evidence, but it could make the pursuit of accountability more difficult.
Europe’s response and its limitations
The European Union now faces a dispute with Washington over an institution that European governments have spent decades supporting.
On 9 October, eight governments issued a joint statement, reaffirming their support for the ICC and rejecting the American sanctions. The signatories included Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain, Japan and Canada.
The European Commission also indicated that the EU was prepared to take measures necessary to preserve the court’s operations. Such assurances are politically important, but they do not automatically resolve the practical consequences of American restrictions.
European financial institutions and technology suppliers must consider their own exposure to US sanctions. Sustaining the court may require alternative payment arrangements, commercial protections and potentially further European regulatory intervention.
The EU has discussed extending its blocking statute to shield European operators from the effects of American sanctions. Whether that mechanism can provide sufficient protection remains uncertain.
The dispute also extends beyond the ICC’s current investigations. Ukraine and the Council of Europe are developing a separate Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, designed to address jurisdictional limitations preventing the ICC from prosecuting Russia’s leadership for the decision to launch the invasion.
The two institutions have distinct legal mandates, although cooperation between them is envisaged. Undermining the ICC would not automatically prevent the special tribunal from operating, but it would weaken an important part of the wider international accountability framework.
A convergence with consequences for Ukraine
Washington and Moscow have not adopted identical positions towards the ICC. Russia seeks to discredit and punish the officials responsible for pursuing Putin. The Trump administration is attempting to restrict the court’s authority and operational capacity, principally in response to proceedings involving Americans and Israelis.
Yet their actions converge at precisely the point where the ICC’s independence becomes politically inconvenient. The distinction between motive and consequence is essential. It would be premature to describe the American sanctions as evidence of a secret bargain struck in Anchorage. It would be equally mistaken to overlook the assistance these measures could provide to Moscow.
The broader concern is that the United States, traditionally central to Western efforts to hold Russia accountable for its invasion of Ukraine, is now applying pressure to one of the principal institutions carrying out that work.
For European governments, the immediate question is no longer simply whether they support the International Criminal Court. It is whether they are prepared to protect its practical independence when the political and financial pressure comes not only from Russia, but also from Washington.
Until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Czech Vanadium was among the European companies which clearly had Russian owners.
Since 2007, the company has been controlled through the Evraz group by Russian businessman Roman Abramovich, who is close to Russian leader Vladimir Putin.
The ferrovanadium producer was part of a chain through which vanadium ore mined in Russia reached Europe before being sent on to Abramovich’s factories in the US. Ferrovanadium is an alloy added to steel to help improve its properties. And Czech Republic accounts for six percent of global production.
But sanctions following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced the oligarch to sell up.
Evraz, the holding company in which Abramovich is the largest shareholder, supplied the Russian army, according to media reports. But Evraz denied this.
In 2024, the Abu Dhabi-based company Metco (now ‘Metco Holding’) became the sole shareholder in the Czech factory, but it is not clear who controls it.
Czech authorities and police suspect the transfer of the vanadium factory to a new parent company in the UAE may conceal the true owner. They are seeking to establish who is really behind the opaque company in the Persian Gulf, and whether it is still Roman Abramovich.
According to Deník N sources familiar with the investigation, specialists from Czech police bodies for organised crime (NCOZ) and the financial intelligence unit (FAÚ) are involved.
“Yes, we are investigating who is behind the company. There are many leads and the suspicion is clear that the company may still be backed by its former owners from Russia,” a source close to the investigation confirmed.
NCOZ spokesperson Jaroslav Ibehej declined to comment in more detail on the search for Czech Vanadium’s beneficial owner. “As a rule, we neither confirm nor deny what we are working on,” he said.
According to documents in the Czech judicial database, the company is formally controlled by one owner — a Dubai-based lawyer of Indian origin who provides nominee services for beneficial owners. The lawyer has been linked to money-laundering investigations in Ukraine and Moldova.
Apparent fake owner scheme
The officially declared owner of Czech Vanadium is Nikhil Skariah Kolekunnel. According to the ADGM free zone business register in the UAE, he is both the sole shareholder and director of Metco Holding.
However, the Gulf state’s database does not disclose so-called beneficiaries, who are entitled to the company’s profits and may also secretly control it.
Although the Czech judicial register lists Skariah as Czech Vanadium’s beneficial owner, this does not necessarily indicate the person exercising control in the background. For example, trustees of trust funds are also listed in the registers as beneficial owners.
The nature of Skariah Kolekunnel’s business suggests that he performs the specific role of an administrator, a so-called fiduciary — someone who accepts an ownership mandate and effectively manages another person’s assets.
He is a lawyer originally from India who founded two law firms in the UAE years ago. His companies represent large corporations and businesspeople who do not wish to publicly acknowledge ownership of a business.
“South Bridge Legal is an advisory firm for comprehensive business establishment in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and the UAE. Our highly experienced team has been active in the sector for more than 10 years, providing services tailored to the unique needs of every ambitious entrepreneur setting up companies in Dubai,” the company wrote on its website.
“We have all activities, which is tax management, tax consulting, accounting, corporate services, offshore company formation, free zone company formation…everything,” Skariah said in a recently published video on YouTube.
Metco Holding’s address in Abu Dhabi suggests it may be a shell company. And it is headquartered from a WeWork.
Moldova and Ukraine links
‘Skariah’, the name of the Indian administrator, had already emerged eight years ago in connection with the concealment of ownership structures during an investigation into the privatisation of Moldova’s national airline. At the time, Skariah appeared as the owner of the opaque company Gold Craft FZE, established in Dubai in 2015.
“On Monday 1 October 2018, one day before the privatisation agreement for Air Moldova was signed, a plane from Istanbul landed at Chișinău International Airport. One of the passengers, a 39-year-old man, was carrying nearly €2.6m in cash in his luggage. He declared the money to customs officers, which, according to the Office for the Prevention and Fight against Money Laundering, he had borrowed four days earlier from Gold Craft FZE in the United Arab Emirates,” the investigative outlet RISE Moldova reported.
It finds that Andrei Ianovici brought cash from Dubai, equivalent to tens of millions of Czech crowns. Later that day, he deposited the money in a bank, and it ended up in the accounts of Civil Aviation Group SRL. That company privatised Air Moldova, and Ianovici was one of its partners.
The true origin of the money was never established, leading local investigators to suspect that the money had not been earned legally. No charges were brought, however.
According to court records, Skariah was also involved in disputes in Ukraine, where Gold Craft FZE claimed ownership of an Ilyushin aircraft which the company allegedly purchased in 2017.
Skariah’s Russian-linked empire
However, the UAE-based lawyer was not the only individual to have emerged as an administrator of Czech Vanadium. Another is Sergei Gushchin.
A man of this name was formerly a prominent Russian businessman in rail freight transport and, although he withdrew from Russia three years ago, he appears on Ukrainian sanctions lists for supporting the Russian army.
Gushchin became a senior manager at PJSC TransContainer, a Russian rail freight carrier, after Evraz sold its stake. In the past, a quarter of the company was owned by the holding company of Abramovich.
Meanwhile another of Gushchin’s companies, Rail Service, formed a joint venture with Evraz in 2019 focused on the production of railway wheels.
According to a UAE register, Gushchin was a director and shareholder of Metco, which became Czech Vanadium’s parent company from 2022-23.
US credit-rating agency Moody’s shared data with Deník N that listed Gushchin as a recent beneficiary of Metco Holding and as the company’s director.
Moody’s data shows Sergei Gushchin as Metco Holding’s director.
Russia’s ferrovanadium monopoly
Czech Vanadium’s revenues regularly exceed €81m, and in 2024 the company reported profits of more than €8m. This summer, the company sent over €0.6m of that sum to the Dubai company, the remaining funds staying in its retained earnings account.
Last year, the company recorded a modest €0.2m loss. Its accounts retained more than €12m in undistributed profits in total.
Czech Vanadium’s business remains closely tied to Russia. Last year alone, vanadium oxides or hydroxides worth nearly €82m were imported into the Czech Republic from the Russian Federation. Russia is effectively the sole supplier of the raw materials needed to produce ferrovanadium. According to the statistical office database, exports mainly go to the United States, as well as Germany and Taiwan.
Czech Vanadium did not reply to requests for comment or an explanation of its ownership structure.
It also did not answer the question of how a Dubai lawyer had bought the Czech company, which, according to some estimates, is worth more than €40m.
Company representatives have not responded to questions about its owners since 2024, when the company left the Evraz group structure.
Fake owner model in US
Jiří Skuhrovec, an analyst at Datlab, specialises in the global vetting of business partners. He says Abramovich uses a similar model for concealing ownership in the United States.
Sanctions also forced the Russian oligarch, who became better known through his former ownership of the British football club Chelsea, to withdraw from US companies. But Skuhrovec concluded that they were probably still controlled by people linked to Abramovich just like the factory in Czech Republic.
“We mapped the entire chain, from the Russian ore supplier through the Czech smelter to the final recipient: the US company Strategic Alloys LLC. Until recently, all three companies officially belonged to Abramovich, and all three are now controlled by people with links to his Evraz group. Abramovich may therefore still secretly control the entire supply chain for this strategic raw material. This would be a textbook case of sanctions circumvention, as well as an obvious security risk,” Skuhrovec said.
Findings led Datlab and Transparency International to submit a complaint to police. “We believe that the 16m Czech crowns (around €655,000) in distributed profit may have gone to Abramovich, who is on a sanctions list. That would constitute a criminal offence,” the analyst explained.
In brief:
Czech Vanadium, owned by Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich’s holding company until 2024, was taken over by Dubai-based company Metco Holding.
The company is opaque, and Czech authorities are investigating who actually owns the Czech factory. It is suspected it is still linked with former owner.
This would amount to circumventing sanctions imposed by the European Union.
Deník N and Datlab analyst Jiří Skuhrovec found that the company is backed by lawyer Nikhil Skariah Kolekunnel and Sergei Gushchin, who conduct business with Abramovich’s Evraz group.
Skariah has been linked to money laundering in Moldova and Ukraine. He has long covered for companies that are in fact owned by someone else.
President Donald Trump announced an agreement with Vladimir Putin on Friday, 9th October, under which Russia will resume substantial diesel exports to American and international markets, despite Washington’s existing sanctions against Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine.
According to Trump’s announcement following the telephone conversation, Russia will immediately release more than 300,000 tonnes of diesel, followed by 500,000 tonnes in November and another million tonnes shortly afterwards. A further three million tonnes could become available once Russian refining capacity permits.
The announcement was accompanied by a temporary authorisation from the US Treasury allowing transactions involving Russian diesel until 7 April 2027. It represents a substantial departure from the administration’s recent sanctions policy, which had sought to restrict Russian energy revenues and strengthen Washington’s negotiating position over Ukraine.
The timing is politically significant. Trump faces congressional midterm elections on 3 November, while diesel prices have become a growing economic concern for American businesses and consumers. The agreement gives the White House an opportunity to present itself as addressing fuel costs, although its practical effect on prices remains uncertain.
Russian diesel cannot resolve the global supply shortage
Trump has linked the proposed Russian deliveries to his administration’s efforts to restore energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that the combined measures will produce a rapid reduction in diesel prices.
The disruption of maritime energy supplies following the confrontation with Iran has, however, created a problem considerably larger than the quantities Russia has initially promised.
The first two deliveries amount to approximately 800,000 tonnes. Even including the subsequent million tonnes, the announced volumes are modest relative to global consumption. Their arrival may provide temporary relief in individual markets, but there is little evidence that they could independently reverse the wider shortage.
Russia’s capacity to maintain larger exports is also uncertain.
Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries have disrupted production and contributed to restrictions on petroleum exports. Moscow has periodically imposed limits to protect domestic supplies, while damaged facilities require repairs before returning to normal operations.
The condition of those refineries is explicitly acknowledged in Trump’s announcement, which makes the proposed additional three million tonnes dependent on their recovery.
This introduces a further contradiction. Washington is seeking Russian diesel at precisely the moment Ukraine is attempting to reduce Moscow’s capacity to refine and export petroleum products.
The economic benefits of the agreement may consequently depend partly on developments in a military campaign that the United States has previously supported through intelligence cooperation with Kyiv.
Zelenskyy rejects sanctions relief without Russian concessions
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded critically to the agreement, describing the relaxation of economic pressure as a concession to Putin that had not been accompanied by any meaningful Russian commitment to de-escalation.
In his response to the American decision, Zelenskyy argued that Moscow would exploit renewed export revenues to prolong its war rather than make concessions towards a settlement.
Ukraine has indicated that it remains prepared to consider reciprocal measures concerning attacks on energy infrastructure. Such arrangements would require Russia to stop striking Ukrainian facilities in exchange for restrictions on Ukrainian operations against Russian energy targets.
No comparable undertaking was announced as part of Friday’s diesel agreement.
This distinction is central to Kyiv’s objections. Sanctions relief has traditionally been regarded as leverage to obtain changes in Russian behaviour. In the present arrangement, Moscow stands to receive additional commercial opportunities without publicly agreeing to alter its military campaign.
Lukoil negotiations raise further questions
The agreement also comes amid separate discussions concerning the international assets of Lukoil, Russia’s second-largest oil producer.
The discussions have reportedly involved figures connected to Trump’s diplomatic efforts, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, alongside Russian representatives.
On Friday, another development complicated the proposed transaction when Carlyle withdrew from the competition to acquire Lukoil’s international assets, previously valued at approximately $22 billion.
The negotiations illustrate the extent to which potential commercial cooperation has entered the broader American-Russian relationship.
There is no verified evidence, however, that the diesel agreement was concluded to facilitate a particular acquisition or benefit individuals connected to Trump’s administration. The commercial negotiations and Friday’s sanctions decision remain separate developments unless further evidence establishes a direct connection.
Washington and Europe move in different directions
The American decision creates an additional complication for European sanctions policy.
The contrast with Washington’s diesel authorisation is substantial. While European governments are attempting to restrict Russian petroleum revenues, the United States is providing a temporary legal route for renewed sales.
The development also recalls the difficulties already examined by EU Today in its reporting on sanctions enforcement against Russia’s shadow fleet, where differences in national restrictions and their application have complicated efforts to control petroleum exports.
For Moscow, the significance of Friday’s agreement extends beyond the immediate revenue generated by diesel sales. It establishes that the United States is prepared to relax particular economic restrictions before securing a settlement over Ukraine.
Whether the arrangement ultimately lowers American fuel prices will depend on production, shipping and international market conditions. The diplomatic consequence is already apparent: Russia has obtained an opportunity to restore part of its international energy trade without accepting publicly announced conditions concerning its war against Ukraine.
For Kyiv and European governments, the question is whether this remains a narrowly defined response to an energy shortage or marks the beginning of a broader American policy of separating commercial relations with Moscow from negotiations over Ukraine.
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