The Houthis (Ansar Allah) attacked Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on October 10, killing at least 13 people and injuring over 300, the deadliest attack on the kingdom in more than a decade, forcing authorities to suspend operations at the airport.
This was not an isolated incident.
Since the fighting resumed between Saudi Arabia and the Iran-backed group in July this year, Houthis have attacked at least five Saudi airports, including King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Airport in Jizan, Abha International Airport, Najran Airport, King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, and King Fahd International Airport in Dammam.
So far, at least 20 people have been killed in these attacks, and hundreds more have been injured, apart from damage to runways, terminals, and aircraft.
Just the King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh has been attacked three times this week. The two previous attacks on King Khalid Airport this week killed four and caused heavy damage to a Saudi commercial plane parked on the tarmac.
The Houthis, in fact, have declared the whole of Saudi airspace as “a zone of military operations,” saying airlines should avoid flying in the country.
Saudi Arabia operates one of the Middle East’s most extensive, multi-layered air-defense networks. Its upper tier includes US-supplied THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) alongside Patriot batteries, South Korea’s Cheongung-II AD system, and improved HAWK launchers.
It also fields French Crotale SAMs, Avenger systems with Stinger missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and Silent Hunter laser systems supplied by China.
The Houthis are also enforcing a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia by choking the Bab-el-Mandeb strait in the Red Sea and have also targeted the country’s oil refineries and East-West oil pipeline.
In fact, in the ‘fog of war,’ it is easy to miss the context that the Houthi-Saudi war did not begin with these strikes on Saudi airports; nor did it start in July when a 2022 ceasefire between the two sides broke over Saudi air strikes on Sana’a airport.
The two sides have been fighting for nearly two decades.
The Houthis are a Zaydi Shiite politico-religious movement from northern Yemen’s Saada region, originating in the 1990s as a revivalist group opposing corruption in central government, their economic and social marginalization, and increasing Saudi-backed Wahhabi influence in Yemen, including in traditionally Zaydi areas.
Saudi Arabia’s longest land border with Yemen stretches roughly 1,200 km, much of it still porous. Consequently, expanding Iranian influence through the Houthi rebels carries security implications Riyadh cannot afford to overlook.
The Houthis drone and missile capabilities, and the strategic importance of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb routes for Saudi oil exports, add more risks for Riyadh.
Due to these factors, Riyadh has a vested interest in both containing rising Iranian influence in Yemen and weakening the Houthis’ military capabilities, while at the same time, preventing the economic collapse of Yemen.
If Yemen collapses, the crisis will inevitably spill into its northern neighbor – Saudi Arabia. There are already over 2 million Yemeni migrants in the country, and an economic collapse can further push millions of Yemeni citizens into the country.
Riyadh regularly provides grants to the Yemeni government to prevent its collapse and has already provided US$12.6 billion in the last 14 years. After investing so much money, Riyadh clearly tries to control who leads the country and its policies.
However, Saudi involvement in Yemen was never limited to just financial aid.
Riyadh first got militarily involved in Yemen 17 years ago, in 2009.
Between 2004 and 2010, the Yemeni government and the Houthis were engaged in constant hostilities. This warfare often spilled into Saudi Arabia’s southern parts as well.
After Houthi attacks on Saudi border posts in November 2009, which killed border guards, Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on Houthi positions with F-15 and Tornado fighter jets, and even conducted limited ground operations.
Notably, this was the kingdom’s first unilateral military operation in decades.
Fighting continued in 2010, and there were substantial Saudi casualties, with more than 130 Saudi soldiers dead by some estimates.
Riyadh and the Houthis reached a ceasefire in 2010, which stopped the fighting. Meanwhile, the Houthis continued to gain ground in Yemen. By the end of 2014, the Houthis had occupied the very strategic Sanaa and Aden airports.
In March 2015, Saudi Arabia returned to Yemen with Operation Decisive Storm. This time, Riyadh was not alone. It cobbled together a coalition of eight countries, including the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan. The US also provided logistics and intelligence support.
The campaign began with massive airstrikes targeting air defenses, airports/air bases, missile sites, and Houthi positions. Riyadh also imposed a naval blockade of Yemen.
The coalition particularly targeted Yemeni airports, airbases, air defense missiles, and civilian and military aircraft. The aim was to neutralize any aerial capability that the Houthis might have gained after seizing Yemeni government assets.
In March itself, the Saudi-led coalition launched airstrikes on Sanaa International Airport, the adjacent al-Dulaimi air base, and Al Anad Air Base.
Reports say the attacks damaged or destroyed scores of aircraft, including a Yemeni Air Force CASA CN-235M-300 cargo plane and a Beechcraft Super King Air at al-Dulaim.
The strikes also damaged one Mi-8 helicopter, two Bell 214 Huey helicopters, multiple Su-22 ground-attack fighters, and F-5 jets. The coalition destroyed an Ilyushin Il-76TD cargo aircraft at Sanaa International Airport in late March.
The coalition also damaged the runway at Sanaa International Airport.
The coalition attacked Sanaa Airport again in April. A Yemeni Felix Airways Bombardier CRJ702ER civilian aircraft was set ablaze, and another cargo plane was hit. Two Yemeni Air Force MiG-29s were also reported destroyed in related strikes at the airport.
When an Iranian cargo plane, allegedly carrying humanitarian aid, tried to land at the Sanna airport, coalition jets targeted the airport again and bombed the runway, rendering it unusable.
Brigadier General Ahmed Asseri, spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition, told Reuters at the time that the airport was bombed after an Iranian aircraft refused to coordinate with the coalition and the pilot ignored orders to turn back.
He said the bombing of the runway made it unusable for planned aid flights.
“Airport officials said the strikes set a civilian aircraft operated by Yemeni Felix Airways ablaze. A cargo plane was also hit they said,” a contemporary Reuters report said.
The airport at the Red Sea city of Hodeidah was also bombed.
These attacks continued in May.
A contemporary report said that one MiG-29, two F-5s, three Su-22s, one Mi-8, and two Il-76TD cargo planes were destroyed in Saudi-led airstrikes in Yemen in May.
The Yemeni Air Force was effectively neutralized in these attacks. The coalition strikes destroyed most MiG-29s, Su-22s, F-5s, and support aircraft on the ground or rendered them unusable.
The coalition further attacked Yemeni airports in 2017 and 2018.
The Saudi-led operation continued for seven years, from 2015 till 2022, when a ceasefire was reached between Riyadh and the Houthis.
This ceasefire was broken in July 2026 when Riyadh once again bombed Sanaa airport in order to not let an Iranian plane land at the airport.
However, by July 2026, the Houthis had considerably improved their offensive capabilities.
This time, it’s the Houthis who are enforcing a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia and repeatedly targeting its civilian airports, as well as oil infrastructure.
While the Houthi attacks on Saudi airports are making global headlines, the prelude to these attacks was written over a decade ago in 2015, and the final chapter of this nearly two-decade-long conflict between Riyadh and the Houthis has yet to be written.
The post Prelude to Saudi-Houthi War: When 9-Nation Coalition Led by Saudi Arabia Bombed Yemen With U.S. Support appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
By Kevin Barrett | October 12, 2026
On October 7, 2026, a front-page New York Times headline vaunted “Trump’s Retreat.” It wasn’t referring to Mar-a-Lago or Epstein Island.
The full headline, complete with subhead, reads:
“Trump’s Retreat: From the Gulf to Britain, American Forces Pull Back. A war that was intended to demonstrate the reach of American power has now done the opposite. It is a lesson in unintended consequences.”
The “war that was intended to demonstration the reach of American power” was, of course, Trump’s ill-fated attack on Iran that began last February 28. But by publishing the story on October 7, the three-year anniversary of the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, the Times insinuated, intentionally or not, a causal link between Hamas’s heroic 2023 concentration-camp breakout and the collapse of the American empire following Trump’s losing war on Iran.
What the Times did not come right out and say, of course, is that the US has bled itself dry fighting losing wars for Israel, and that the October 7, 2023 provocation set off Israel’s long-planned US war on the last of the “seven countries in five years” that 9/11 was designed to “take out.”
About a month after the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Gen. Wesley Clark got word that the whole purpose of 9/11 was the destruction of Israel’s region enemies:
So I came back to see him a few weeks later, and by that time we were bombing in Afghanistan. I said, “Are we still going to war with Iraq?” And he said, “Oh, it’s worse than that.” He reached over on his desk. He picked up a piece of paper. And he said, “I just got this down from upstairs” — meaning the Secretary of Defense’s office — “today.” And he said, “This is a memo that describes how we’re going to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, finishing off, Iran.”
Thanks to resistance from the people of the region, and from realists in the US national security sector, Clark’s “seven countries in five years” turned out be be “seven countries in twenty-five years.” And the seventh, Iran, is not being “taken out.” Instead, it is Iran that is “taking out” the US empire.
But it was the Palestinian Resistance, specifically its Al-Aqsa Flood concentration camp breakout, that gave Iran the opportunity to show what it could do. Absent Al-Aqsa Flood, we would be living in a very different world:
* “Normalization” with the abnormal Zionist entity would have continued apace, and the Palestinian cause marginalized.
* US military bases would have continued to permeate and surround the Middle East.
* US naval forces would have continued to swarm unimpeded through the Strait of Hormuz and all over the Persian Gulf.
* The illusion that the US could protect and control Middle Eastern energy supplies would have been maintained.
* Propped up by its Middle Eastern footprint, the US empire’s military juggernaut would have continued to intimidate the world, leading to a gradual drawdown of US political and economic power over the next few decades, rather than the rapid collapse taking place right now.
Robert Kagan, dean of the neocons, has pointed out that without Trump-n’-Yahu’s idiotic attack on Iran last February 28, the US would have continued to successfully deter Iran from taking advantage of its geography and establishing control of the Persian Gulf. That deterrence did not depend on America’s power to defeat Iran and/or keep the Strait open. America had no such power, as we are seeing now. Instead, deterrence worked by creating uncertainty in the minds of Iran’s leaders about what might happen if they aggressively moved to seize control of the Strait. It worked by convincing them that seizing the Strait might cost them their lives. Most importantly, it worked by virtue of the fact that Iran’s leaders, unlike American and Israeli ones, are morally upright and unwilling to engage in acts of aggression.
By attacking Iran, Netanyahu and his blackmailed pedo-slave Trump removed all of Iran’s incentives to remain deterred. First and most importantly, it handed Iran its right of self-defense on the proverbial silver platter. Seizing Hormuz suddenly became a defensive act, not an aggressive one.
By martyring many of Iran’s top leaders, including Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei, Trump-n’-Yahu also removed the deterrent effect of Iran’s leaders fearing for their lives if they seized the Strait of Hormuz: “If they’re going to try to kill us even if we don’t take over the Strait, what have we got to lose?” Suddenly Iran’s perception of its best path to security radically shifted from “reason, moderation, and accommodation” to “hardline military moves aimed at transforming the regional security equation.”
Clearly, the February 28 attack on Iran was supremely irrational. Every serious analyst knew Iran would respond by seizing control of the Strait. That had been war-gamed thousands of times. And if the US lost hugely to Iran in 2003, according to the Millennium Challenge simulation, how was it going to win in 2026, after Iran had built up a powerful and impregnable drone and missile force?
How could a would-be global hegemon be so stupid? The answer, of course, is that Trump obeyed orders from Netanyahu to attack Iran. But that just passes the buck to Netanyahu. How could he be so stupid? After all, when the US is defeated and driven out of West Asia, Israel’s days will be numbered.
Netanyahu’s irrationality, like Trump’s, stems from narcissistic hubris. Both leaders are monstrously egotistical. Both see the world through the distorting prism of their own self-serving vanity.
Netanyahu’s personal project, for more than four decades, has been inciting the US to destroy Israel’s regional enemies. Often that incitement has taken the form of reckless acts of false flag terror, as FFWN co-host Wyatt Peterson observed in his recent article “Blood and Terror Flow Wherever Bibi Goes.”
Clearly Netanyahu, and his co-ethnic agents like Paul Wolfowitz, have been frustrated by the slow pace of the US march on Tehran, which should have been taken out “five years” after 9/11. Pushback from American realists, and presidents like Bush and especially Obama who listened to them, has been driving Bibi up the wall ever since 9/11, which Bibi famously said was “very good…for Israel” and should have incited a quick clean sweep of Israel’s regional enemies, most importantly the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Decades of frustration at Israel’s inability to unleash a huge regional war—as a cover for accelerating the genocide of Palestine, grabbing territory from neighboring countries, and destroying Iran—led to Netanyahu’s hubristic incitements of October 7, 2023 and February 28, 2026.
In October 2023 Netanyahu got the Hamas attack he wanted, slaughtered his own civilians to raise the body count, and charged madly into his long-desired regional Armageddon. But instead of paving the road to Greater Israel, it has set the stage for a world without Israel:
* Israel has failed to achieve all of its military objectives, including defeating Hamas, freeing hostages militarily, emptying Gaza, emptying the West bank, putting an end to Hezbollah, seizing and settling territory in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, and overthrowing the Islamic Republic of Iran and its allies including not just Hezbollah, but also AnsurAllah in Yemen and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq.
* US withdrawal from the region leaves Israel naked, exposed to surrounding nations who view it as an illegitimate settler colony and recklessly expansionist threat, and who will seize every available opportunity to put an end to the genocidal Zionist experiment.
* Israel has been completely delegitimized on the world stage, as witnessed by the Nobel Committee’s decision to thumb their noses at Trump and give the prize to anti-genocide UN investigator Navi Pillay.
Netanyahu’s grotesquely irrational war, “a lesson in unintended consequences,” stems not just from Bibi’s individual psychopathy, but from the larger psychopathy of the hardline Zionist movement he leads. These people may or may not believe in Yahweh, their Bronze Age tribal god, but they certainly do believe that Yahweh gave them a real estate deed to everything between the Nile and Euphrates more than 2500 years ago, so they are going to try to steal all that land before somebody else does.
The drooling, demented Zionists aren’t thinking strategically. They’re emoting. They’re perpetually driven to hysterics by the thought that somebody somewhere might say something “antisemitic” (meaning critical of Jews or Zionism). They’re endlessly whining about real or imaginary ill-treatment from the goyim, who want them stuffed into gas chambers or driven into the sea, and who kicked them out of every country they’ve ever lived in for no reason at all.
So they feel they have a valid excuse to lie outrageously about Hamas supposedly roasting babies and raping Jewesses, and using such tall tales (along with all the other tall tales from the Torah to the Holocaust) as an excuse to hunt children for sport, train dogs to rape prisoners, and commit the world’s first-ever live streamed genocide.
It is that fundamental irrationality, the product of 2500 years of mental illness “from Yahweh to Zion,” that is driving the US empire to its destruction in West Asia. On the opposite side of the ledger, the sanity, decency, and heroism of the concentration camp prisoners who broke out of their death camp on October 7, 2023—and their brave backers in the Axis of Resistance—has brought down what used to be, just a few years ago, the world’s mightiest empire.
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On October 7, 2023, a memorable military operation began from Gaza, in which approximately 4,000 armed men from the elite units of the various local Palestinian resistance movements (Palestinian Islamic Jihad, PFLP, DFLP, Popular Resistance Committees, etc., led by Hamas) poured like an overflowing glass over the Zionist settlements in the surrounding areas.
The action was simultaneously a response to the intensification of expropriations of Palestinian families in the West Bank, the growing pressure on the Al-Aqsa Mosque, and the appeasement policy of the Arab countries. It aimed, through the capture of Israeli military personnel (active and reservists), to force the Zionist entity into a war of attrition that could lead to significant exhaustion of Israel, internally and externally, and to a reassertion of the Palestinian State question.
Apparently, one of the expectations of the Hamas leadership was that Hezbollah and Iran, and perhaps the military organizations of the West Bank, would also engage, briefly and sustainably, in the conflict with Israel. For a series of reasons – entirely different for each of the actors – this did not happen, except in the case of Hezbollah, and only in a limited way until the ground invasion of Lebanon, and in the case of Iran, also in a limited way during the 12-Day War.
The event led to cataclysmic transformations in the Middle East that we can already describe, and to a panorama that may be disconcerting for many who predicted a scenario of total Zionist victory.
It is not our intention to provide a detailed description of the processes that were initiated by the Gaza War, so we will only attempt to summarize each of the scenarios in their main events and current panorama.
As for Gaza itself, its population was the victim of ethnic cleansing. The death toll, if we add all causes, may reach 200,000, that is, 10% of the population of the Gaza Strip. A significant part of the Hamas leadership, in turn, was assassinated during the war. Israel, however, was defeated in the conflict, considering that it failed to achieve its objectives of destroying Hamas, permanently occupying the entire Gaza Strip, and displacing the Palestinian population. The material and social damage to Israel, in turn, was immense. 60 billion dollars in general economic losses, increased internal social tensions, and total – perhaps irreversible – destruction of Israel’s international image. Furthermore, unable to defeat Hamas, Israel was forced to accept a peace agreement imposed by the US. Meanwhile, Hamas continues with approximately 12,000 active fighters and another 15,000 young recruits in training, so that it will soon return to approximately the same level of strength as before October 7, 2023.
On the Lebanese front, the conflict led to the displacement of more than 1 million Lebanese from their homes, the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah, and some other leaders of the movement, the political destabilization of Lebanon, and involved the ground invasion of the country by the State of Israel, which, however, also failed to achieve its objectives of forcing the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah, in turn, which was significantly degraded between 2023 and 2024 for trying to operate as regular armed forces, returned to insurgency warfare and, with the increased use of drones and new technological tools, blocked Israel’s advance in 2026.
As for Syria, we witnessed the collapse of Bashar Al-Assad’s government and the takeover of the country by terrorist militias linked to Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other extremist groups, which led Ahmed Sharrah to the presidency. Israel took advantage of the moment to destroy most of Syria’s military hardware and occupy a security belt around the Golan Heights, establishing a tenuous alliance with the Druze tribes and militias of the region. The fall of Assad imposed difficulties on Hezbollah’s logistics, which relied on Syria for the transit of equipment coming from Iran. If Israel expected free passage through Syria, however, the situation is made more complex by the fact that the region is disputed, as an area of influence, with Turkey, so that tensions between both countries continue to increase.
The Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian scenarios allowed one to say, in early 2025, for example, that Israel would be advancing significantly in its objectives outlined in the Oded Yinon Plan of destabilizing and fragmenting neighboring countries to facilitate the construction of Greater Israel. We would have here, at that moment, the collapse of the Shiite Crescent strategy and of Qassem Soleimani’s geopolitical project. When we add the Iraqi and Iranian scenarios, as well as the general context of the Middle East, the situation changes significantly.
Because in the space between the 12-Day War and the Iran War, we saw the collapse of US regional power in the Middle East, the rise of Iran as the main contender for regional hegemony, and Israel’s retreat to a more defensive and rear-guard position.
Signs that the Israeli project was more fragile than it seemed at first glance appeared already in the conflict with Iran in 2025. Unable to defeat Iran, which was pounding Israeli defenses and infrastructure with swarms of drones and missiles, Israel had to appeal for help from the US, which carried out a largely symbolic airstrike against empty nuclear facilities in Iran. This did not go unnoticed.
The new round of conflict in 2026, beginning at the end of February, despite starting with the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, led to the elimination of a good part of US bases in the Middle East, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the destruction of Israeli air defense capabilities, the evacuation of US troops in Iraq, and the destruction of the myth of the US’s incontestable military superiority.
In fact, the inability of the US to achieve its political objectives militarily in the Middle East (after the failure of the January color revolution attempt), even using 2 aircraft carriers (1 of which may have been seriously damaged in operations), its inability to protect its Arab allies, the Arab allies’ own inability to defend themselves, the partial depletion of the missile stockpiles of Iran’s enemies, and Iran’s capacity to quickly replenish its leadership and to act militarily in a decentralized manner, as well as its demonstration that its industrial-military capacity remained active, changed the geopolitical map in the Middle East.
To some extent, today, it is Iran that calls the shots. The evacuation of Iraq by the US reopens the country to the penetration of Iranian influence, which puts at risk even Ahmed Sharrah’s domination of Syria.
To circumvent Iranian control of Hormuz, the Saudis have been experimenting with using the Red Sea and land routes. If these efforts were successful, the importance of Hormuz would diminish and, with it, Iran’s bargaining power. The problem is that, exactly when this began to happen, the Yemeni Ansarullah entered the board, initiating a large-scale military operation to defeat the rebels supported by Riyadh. The Saudi response to the Houthi advances led to the partial closure of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and attacks not only against ARAMCO facilities, but even against Saudi oil wells.
If we return to the Israeli geopolitical panorama, finally, the country still finds itself with a Palestinian problem in Gaza, Hezbollah active in Lebanon, unable to advance in Syria because of the Turkish threat, and with its defensive military capabilities considerably reduced.
Far from the “Pax Judaica” and “Greater Israel,” we are seeing the repositioning of geopolitical actors, and the actor in the most advantageous position is, today, Iran. The recent negotiations between Israel and the Sunni Arab countries do not significantly change the scenario.
3 years after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, therefore, it is not possible for us to say whether the objectives of Ismail Hanyeh and Yahya Sinwar were achieved, but it is impossible to deny that Hamas’s boldness completely changed the map of the Middle East, prevented the Palestinian cause from falling into oblivion, and hindered the normalization of relations between Israel and Muslim countries.
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On October 9, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced blocking sanctions against the International Criminal Court as an institution: a ban on all transactions, the freezing of assets under US jurisdiction, and the cutoff of cloud services, software, and payment processing. “Either the ICC will end its threats, or we will end the ICC,” he said. The sanctions include a six-month transition period and take full effect by April 2027. That date, not the announcement itself, is Europe’s real deadline.
Rubio has repeatedly tied Israeli interests to US actions against the court. The ICC previously issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on charges of war crimes in Gaza. While the October 9 announcement focused heavily on protecting American personnel, the administration had previously denounced the tribunal’s investigations against “the United States and our close ally Israel” as “illegitimate and baseless,” indicating that Washington’s campaign is aimed at shielding both US and Israeli officials.
Europe: Between Declaration and Enforcement
The European Commission called the sanctions “deeply regrettable” and said it was “ready to take any necessary measures” to keep the Court functioning and protect operators within the Single Market. But the same formula contains a brake: the six-month delay “leaves room for dialogue.”
Kaja Kallas, speaking for the EU, called threats against the Court “unacceptable,” reaffirming commitment to the rules-based order but stopping short of announcing any protective mechanism. António Costa promised support through political, diplomatic, financial, and practical means, without naming a single concrete instrument.
Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot is one of those publicly demanding activation of the EU Blocking Statute. “The Court’s independence cannot depend on whom it investigates. Europe must act,” he said, after securing a place for the issue on the agenda of the October 12 meeting of EU foreign ministers.
The Netherlands, where the Court sits, asked the European Commission to prepare the statute but called it a “nuclear option,” emphasizing that six months provide space for dialogue. Germany and France joined a joint statement by eight countries expressing “strong disagreement,” without mentioning countermeasures.
Why the Blocking Statute Is No Panacea
The Blocking Statute (Council Regulation No. 2271/96 of 1996) was created to counter US extraterritorial sanctions related to Cuba, Iran, and Libya. Its mechanism includes a prohibition on EU companies and citizens complying with the designated third-country sanctions, a refusal to recognize foreign court judgments based on those sanctions, and the right to recover damages in court. In 2018, after the US withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, the regulation was expanded.
Adding the US sanctions against the ICC to the regulation’s annex would mean a legal prohibition on European banks, insurers, and cloud providers complying with the US restrictions. But its purpose is not to save the ICC itself. It protects European operators and jurisdiction: the regulation binds European operators and cannot compel American banks, Microsoft, Amazon, or payment systems to keep servicing the Court.
Activating the statute in this case would be unprecedented: in its thirty years of existence, it has never been applied against US sanctions affecting an international judicial institution. Its earlier use concerned US measures against those same countries, which were bilateral trade restrictions rather than an assault on a body of international justice. If the EU goes ahead, it would be the first time the Blocking Statute is transformed from a trade-defense instrument into an instrument for defending what Brussels calls the “international legal order.”
That is why it is called “nuclear”: it means legal confrontation, but it does not solve the problem of technological dependence. The ICC relies on American banking services, payment systems, cloud servers, and software. The Blocking Statute can prohibit European companies from complying with the sanctions, but it does not create an alternative to dollar clearing, global payment networks, or the servers where the Court’s data is stored.
For Washington, it is enough that American companies themselves refuse to work with the ICC because of the risk of secondary sanctions; the Blocking Statute cannot prevent that.
What Is Already Happening and What Might Happen
The practical effects of the sanctions are already beginning to show. In response to earlier US measures, the ICC has shifted its office and collaboration software from Microsoft to openDesk, a German open-source platform, and developed workarounds for banking, insurance, and payroll. It has also paid staff months in advance to limit potential payroll disruption. But these safeguards do not eliminate the Court’s broader reliance on American financial and technological infrastructure, and full sanctions could still disrupt its operations.
The alternatives Europe can offer are limited: activating the Blocking Statute, developing payment and clearing alternatives to dollar-based infrastructure, and providing European cloud services. None can be implemented quickly enough to replace American financial and technological infrastructure by April 2027.
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The Asymmetry That Explains Everything
The ICC began work in 2002, and its early practice focused predominantly on African conflicts: the DRC, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, and Libya. This imbalance fueled accusations of selectivity and neocolonialism; in 2025, three Sahel states announced their withdrawal, calling the Court an “instrument of neocolonial suppression.”
The United States signed the Rome Statute under Clinton but never ratified it; in 2002, Congress passed the American Service Members’ Protection Act, authorizing the president to use “all necessary means” to free any American detained by the ICC. Washington did not object to the Court’s early focus on African situations, even as it rejected jurisdiction over itself. Its opposition hardened once the ICC moved toward cases involving the US and its allies.
In 2020, after the Appeals Chamber authorized an investigation into crimes by US military personnel and the CIA in Afghanistan, Washington sanctioned Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and a senior Court official. The following year, Prosecutor Karim Khan “deprioritized” the American component of the case. No US citizen has ever been indicted by the ICC.
Rubio calls the ICC a “body of globalists” threatening US sovereignty and has urged US allies to rein it in. The criticism has a real basis: the Court can hear cases involving crimes committed on the territory of a state party even if the accused’s country has not joined the Rome Statute. But the ICC remains a treaty court, dependent on state cooperation, Western donors, and political decisions of the UN Security Council.
Washington’s contradiction is built into the design itself: the US is attacking an institution that grew out of the liberal order it helped create. Europe’s is different: a declaratory commitment to international law coexists with the practical costs of reducing reliance on American infrastructure.
What October 12 Will Reveal
October 12 will show whether the EU moves from declarations to legal obligations. If the final document includes a European Commission decision to add the US sanctions against the ICC to the annex of Regulation 2271/96, that would mean a legal prohibition on European companies complying with the US measures — an unprecedented use of the Blocking Statute.
If the outcome is a general declaration, a call on Washington to rescind the sanctions, and a mandate for the Commission to “prepare options,” that would confirm a scenario in which Europe defends the principle of ICC independence but is not prepared to pay for that defense through a direct collision with US extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The probability of full and immediate activation of the statute on October 12 is low. A more realistic scenario is a political declaration of support, a Commission mandate to prepare a legal mechanism, and the preservation of the six-month pause for negotiations.
The Dilemma Beyond The Hague
The question is not whether the ICC survives past April 2027. The question is whether Europe can defend what Brussels calls the “international legal order” when the costs of that defense fall on its own companies, banks, and technological supply chains.
The Blocking Statute is a test of the EU’s ability to act not as a regulator but as a geopolitical player willing to bear the costs of conflict. If Europe limits itself to declarations and negotiations, it will confirm the formula Washington has already internalized: European sovereignty ends where American extraterritorial jurisdiction begins.
If it activates the statute, it will launch an open legal conflict with an ally on which its security depends. For now, every signal points to a third option: prepare the instrument, defer the decision, and bet that Washington will back down on its own.
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Saudi Arabia is desperately trying to reverse its losses on the ground in the Yemeni conflict, while Houthi attacks reach its airports and threaten its oil trade. Yet the coalition Riyadh has assembled does not match the war it wants to fight. Washington is engaged in the conflict with Iran, Turkey excludes offensive deployments, and Pakistan draws the line at crossing into Yemen. The kingdom has foreign support, but the burden of recovering and holding territory still falls on its weakened Yemeni partners.
Retreat Before the Counteroffensive
By early October 2026, Riyadh was responding to a deteriorating military position. The Houthis’ September advance along Yemen’s western coast brought the loss of Mokha and strategic positions around Bab el-Mandeb. These setbacks exposed the weakness of Saudi-backed forces and strengthened the Houthis’ leverage over a shipping route increasingly important to Saudi oil exports.
The renewed Saudi–Houthi escalation began with the July 13, 2026, strike on Sanaa airport’s runway. Saudi aircraft sought to prevent an Iranian Mahan Air flight carrying a senior Houthi delegation from landing without coalition permission. The plane later landed in Hodeida after Omani mediation, but the Houthis retaliated against Abha airport and subsequently announced a blockade on Saudi shipping. The strike broke the relative calm established by the 2022 truce; September’s coastal offensive then turned the confrontation into a major territorial setback for Riyadh’s partners.
The retreat exposed divisions within the anti-Houthi camp. Saudi–Emirati cooperation had broken down, and the withdrawal of the UAE left command arrangements that Riyadh failed to replace effectively. The factions expected to carry the offensive remained divided and poorly prepared for a sustained campaign. Saudi airpower could not compensate for the absence of a coherent local force.
The cost is also being felt inside Saudi Arabia. The October 10, 2026, attack on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport killed 12 people and wounded 309, according to Saudi authorities, and temporarily suspended operations. Riyadh blamed the Houthis, who renewed their warning against using Saudi airports and airspace on October 11. Airport disruption, cancelled flights and attacks on oil facilities bring the economic consequences of the war directly into the kingdom. The Saudi air campaign has not secured its civilian infrastructure.
Operation Dawn of Yemen began on October 5, 2026, after Saudi-backed Yemeni leader Rashad al-Alimi announced military action the previous day. The immediate objective was to recover the coastal positions lost in September, alongside the Saudi-backed Yemeni government’s broader ambition to restore its authority over Houthi-held territory. On October 11, the coalition announced the destruction of 136 military targets in a large-scale operation. That tally says little about whether Saudi-backed units can hold territory, secure supply routes or reopen shipping lanes.
Houthi footage released October 10, 2026: Shawaz drone strikes on Saudi-backed forces in Kahbub and Al-Waziya, as presented by the movement’s military media
Why Taiz Matters
The counteroffensive has produced conflicting accounts of control on the coast. On October 9, 2026, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Yemen announced that Bab el-Mandeb and Mayun Island had been cleared of Houthi forces. The Houthis maintained that they still held those positions. Control of the waterway remains contested, despite Riyadh’s announcements of success.
Taiz adds another strain after the coastal setbacks. Pressure on its approaches threatens supply routes and forces Saudi-backed units to divide their effort between the inland front and the Red Sea coast. The Houthis can disrupt their opponents’ counteroffensive without winning every coastal engagement: sustained pressure inland prevents those opponents from concentrating their forces. Saudi airpower does not resolve the fragmentation of the Saudi-backed Yemeni forces expected to hold the ground.
Houthi military footage released October 10, 2026: the movement presents advances and the surrender of opposing fighters in Sami, As-Silw and Al-Mawasit, Taiz province. The fighting places further pressure on the ground forces on which Riyadh’s campaign depends
The Iran War Narrows Saudi Options
The US–Israeli war with Iran, which began in February 2026, has expanded the military demands on Washington. Regional deployments, shipping protection and operations against Iran compete with Saudi requests for a larger American role in Yemen. Riyadh cannot assume that American support will expand on its terms. Its dependence on outside assistance has grown at the same time as the regional war has made that assistance more conditional.
The Iran war compounds Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability. Disruption at Hormuz has increased Riyadh’s dependence on its westbound pipeline and Red Sea ports. Southbound cargoes from Yanbu must pass Bab el-Mandeb; northbound exports follow a different route. Moving crude across the peninsula bypasses Hormuz, but it does not remove the threat to shipping off Yemen.
Pressure at Bab el-Mandeb gives Iran an additional advantage while the Houthis gain territory and bargaining power of their own. Their overlapping interests put Riyadh under pressure on two fronts. A Washington–Tehran agreement would not automatically end the war in Yemen: the Houthis have their own territorial, political and economic demands.
Washington is already involved through military advisers, intelligence and targeting support. The issue is the extent of that involvement, not American neutrality. Earlier in October 2026, Trump rejected Saudi requests for direct strikes; after the Riyadh airport attack, he said the United States might join them. Riyadh still lacks a firm American commitment to the wider offensive. Its requests compete with Washington’s military operations and priorities in the Iran war.
Allies Draw Their Own Lines
Riyadh’s response is to widen its support network through the Mecca pact, signed with Turkey and Pakistan on August 7, 2026, and activated on October 5. But an agreement to defend Saudi Arabia is not an agreement to win its war in Yemen. Pakistan’s military presence and Turkey’s technical, intelligence and air-defense assistance address the kingdom’s security without supplying a joint ground campaign across the border.
The alliance has a secretary-general, retired Pakistani general Nauman Mahmood, but its detailed force-generation timetable, operational command arrangements, cost-sharing formula and mission duration remain unpublished. On October 8, 2026, Ankara excluded offensive operations while parliamentary ratification was pending. On October 9, Islamabad confirmed a substantial military presence in the kingdom but ruled out crossing into Yemen to attack the Houthis. Riyadh is obtaining defensive commitments, not a combined expeditionary army.
Pakistan’s decision-making has also shifted. In 2015, parliament unanimously rejected participation in the Yemen war while promising to defend Saudi territory and holy sites. In October 2026, reinforcement commitments are proceeding without a parliamentary vote. The government says it followed the necessary procedures. The political result is a narrower domestic debate over a commitment that could draw Pakistan further into the conflict.
Fewer political checks make deployments easier to authorize and harder to reconsider once costs and casualties accumulate. Pakistan’s own security pressures add another burden: the October 11, 2026, emergency in opposition-run Khyber Pakhtunkhwa coincides with its commitments to Saudi Arabia. Islamabad is extending support abroad while managing a deepening confrontation at home.
Peshawar, October 11, 2026: police guard the approach to the Red Zone. Pakistan’s overseas security commitments coincide with emergency measures at home
Saudi-led coalition footage, October 9, 2026: the coalition announces strikes on three Houthi missile launchers. The continuing attacks inside Saudi Arabia expose the limits of destroying individual launch sites
Defensive support can still sustain the offensive by freeing Saudi assets for use in Yemen. France’s support for the defense of Yanbu and Britain’s refueling assistance contribute to that effort. But none of this repairs the weakness of Riyadh’s Yemeni ground forces. Pakistan also has its border with Iran and its mediation role to consider, while Turkey keeps its commitment separate from offensive operations. Each partner sets limits according to its own interests.
Different Interests, No Shared Victory
Pakistan’s proposed $1.21 billion IMF disbursement awaits board approval. Turkey’s September 2026 inflation was 29.73%, with its policy rate at 37%. Both face financial pressures that favor limited missions over an open-ended expedition. Who pays for the current assistance remains undisclosed.
Saudi Arabia’s updated deficit forecast is 4.9% of GDP. September 2026’s non-oil purchasing managers’ index stood at 55.3, indicating expansion before the latest escalation. The airport attacks and disruption to transport now place that activity under additional pressure. Riyadh must finance the campaign while protecting the infrastructure and trade on which its wider economic plans depend.
The Houthis are using that pressure to advance their negotiating demands. On October 10, 2026, the Houthi authorities proposed reciprocal exclusion of airports, ports and other humanitarian infrastructure from blockade and attack. The proposal seeks to exchange limits on disruption for concessions over access and blockade. It puts the economic consequences of continued fighting at the center of the bargaining.
The conflict of interests runs through the entire coalition. Riyadh wants to reverse Houthi gains and protect Saudi infrastructure. The Saudi-backed Yemeni government wants to restore its authority. Turkey and Pakistan seek bounded commitments, and Washington calculates its involvement against the Iran war. The Houthis seek concessions while preserving their military leverage. A common adversary has not produced an agreed objective or a shared willingness to bear the cost.
Saudi Arabia therefore has partners willing to help defend the kingdom, but those partners have made no common commitment to reverse Riyadh’s setbacks in Yemen or sustain the ground campaign of the Saudi-backed Yemeni government. That is the gap behind the coalition’s announcements and strike tallies. Without stronger local forces and a political settlement addressing shipping, attacks and access, additional foreign support can prolong the campaign without resolving it. Riyadh risks remaining surrounded by allies while carrying a war none of them has agreed to finish.
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L’Impero ottomano e in minor misura seppur ugualmente lo stato turco fondato da Mustafà Kemal, detto Atatürk, ovvero padre dei turchi, era ed è una nazione formata da molti popoli, ma non cosmopolita, bensì polietnica, la turchicità e la lingua turca ne rappresentavano e ne rappresentano la sintesi
La società polietnica turca, come spiega il professor Şükrü Hanioğlu[1], non è una società multietnica in senso occidentale, ogni comunità etnica e ogni gruppo linguistico, pur connotata da una forte identità sociale e culturale, è estranea al multiculturalismo tutto confondente di matrice anglo – statunitense, così come allo stesso modo è priva di una dimensione nazionalistica, essendo l’appartenenza alla nazione turca parte dell’identità.
La turchicità e la lingua turca dunque si sostanziano come collante di una pluralità etnica, linguistica e religiosa che ha tutto l’interesse a coltivare la propria specificità e a perpetuarsi, pur dentro la cornice della nazione turca.
Questa peculiare forma di plurime identità, etniche ma non nazionali e ancor meno nazionaliste, è stata in parte trasformata nel corso della seconda metà del Novecento dall’introduzione dall’esterno, leggasi ingerenza statunitense, dentro alcune comunità, massimamente quella curda, di un nazionalismo funzionale a propagandare il separatismo etnico, in ultima istanza una risorsa dell’imperialismo in funzione di contenimento delle spinte di autonomia e sovranità della Turchia, tuttavia la recente scelta dei separatisti curdi di deporre le armi e rientrare nell’alveo della comunità nazionale turca, accettando di porsi sul piano della democrazia politica, rappresenta un’ulteriore vittoria della Turchia, intesa ad assolvere un fondamentale ruolo nella costruzione del nuovo ordine mondiale multipolare e sempre meno legata agli interessi euro – atlantici, anche in ragione del sempre più acceso confronto con l’entità statuale sionista, che rischia, per colpa di Tel Aviv, di degenerare in un pericolosissimo conflitto armato dagli imprevedibili sviluppi tanto per l’Asia Occidentale, quanto per il Mediterraneo.
La storia della civiltà turca si dipana dai tempi del sovrano turco Osman figlio di Ertuğrul, diventato sultano di un impero che aveva in Bursa la sua capitale e da lui prenderà il nome di ottomano, il tutto, siamo nel 1299, mentre Dante Alighieri ancora fa politica a Firenze.
Osman è seguito dal figlio Orhan, dal nipote Murad, in successiva continuità con Bayezid, detto Ylderim, ovvero il Fulmine, sebbene sconfitto da Timur e Lan, ovvero Tamerlano, quindi Mehmet I e infine Murad II. Tutti e sei questi primi sultani riposano a Bursa, cuore anatolico anche della Turchia moderna, ospitati in “turbe”, ovvero mausolei, di incomparabile bellezza artistica e architettonica islamica.
La svolta più significativa avviene con Mehmet II Fatih, figlio di Murad II e settimo sovrano, detto appunto il Conquistatore, che riposa a Istanbul – Costantinopoli, avendola conquistata e avendone fatto il cuore di un impero che per diversi secoli ha rappresentato una assoluta potenza presente su tre continenti.
Da poco più di un secolo la Turchia è una repubblica kemalista, ovvero orientata al coinvolgimento popolare delle lavoratrici e dei lavoratori nei destini della nazione, con una profonda tradizione di autentica emancipazione femminile.
Il partito patriottico Vatan, guidato dal marxista Doğu Perinçek, un pragmatico rivoluzionario capace nella sua lunga militanza di poter vantare profonde e durature amicizie con Mao Ze Dong, Deng Xiaoping e Kim Il Sung, si avvia a tenere ai primi di gennaio 2027 il suo prossimo congresso e ha nel frattempo pubblicato le tesi congressuali, come sempre di grande rilevanza e di profondo interesse.
Nel complesso nelle tesi per l’imminente 17° Congresso, pubblicate nel numero di TEORİ rivista teorica del Partito di settembre 2026, Vatan ribadisce la sua adesione al socialismo scientifico e al marxismo, intensi non dogmaticamente, ma creativamente, alla ricerca di una sintesi teorica originale.
Il congresso intenderà ovviamente procedere al rafforzamento organizzativo interno e al radicamento sul territorio, forte di una avanguardia militante di quadri politicamente consapevoli e ben formati, non disdegnando tuttavia una attenta valutazione delle forze in campo a partire dal ritorno al kemalismo e all’antimperialismo del CHP, ovvero il socialdemocratico Partito Popolare Repubblicano, il quale, ora guidato da Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, intende ripristinare, abbandonando le derive atlantiste degli ultimi anni, la centralità del patriottismo repubblicano e l’impegno per l’uguaglianza dei cittadini, con un intervento riequilibratore dello stato.
Al proposito Vatan rilancia la necessità di politiche sociali, proponendo il blocco triennale degli affitti e l’istituzione di un tribunale speciale contro la corruzione, con processi rapidissimi e confisca dei beni dei corrotti.
Vatan si propone di elaborare una legge esplicita per vietare le organizzazioni e la propaganda LGBT, intese non come strumenti di salvaguardia dei diritti individuali, che il Partito rispetta e non discute, ma come pesante strumento eterodiretto di intromissione atlantista nelle scelte della Turchia, oltreché come uno strumento di alienazione naturale dei generi biologici e di frantumazione della famiglia, cellula fondamentale di resistenza della nazione lavoratrice.
Il Partito dichiara inoltre di combattere, oltre all’ideologia LGBT, il cosmopolitismo e il femminismo di matrice neoliberale.
Le tesi ammoniscono altresì che l’avanguardia rappresenta pur sempre una minoranza ed è dunque chiamata a non isolarsi dalle masse, altrimenti tenderebbe inevitabilmente a trasformarsi in una struttura di potere separata.
Vatan riconosce nell’Eurasia e in particolare nell’alleanza strutturata tra Turchia, Russia, Cina e Iran il cuore della costruzione del nuovo ordine mondiale multipolare. Viene formulata una critica radicale all’eurocentrismo del XIX e del XX secolo, accusato di aver intrappolato la sinistra occidentale in una pesante autoreferenzialità che le impedisce di capire la nuova fase storica e l’avvento del multipolarismo.
Le tesi congressuali criticano duramente la cosiddetta “coscienza di sinistra”, sia nella sua versione liberal e genderista di matrice compromissoria, socialdemocratica e in ultima analisi atlantista, sia nella sua versione massimalista e spesso violenta, definita “rozza e settaria”, ispirata a un ribellismo controproducente e in ultima istanza prossimo a un atteggiamento che intende imporre la dittatura di una minoranza sulla maggioranza della popolazione. Piuttosto il socialismo scientifico invita a ripensare ed agire nel solco della “coscienza dei lavoratori”, fondata sui valori morali popolari di onestà, solidarietà, rispetto del lavoro altrui e giustizia sociale.
La dimensione dell’umanità – nel duplice significato di insieme degli esseri umani e modalità di relazione – assurge a categoria del socialismo scientifico e viene richiamata in aperta contrapposizione rispetto alla precarizzazione, alla mercificazione, all’iper – individualismo in cui sono schiacciati gli esseri umani, non solo in Turchia, ma in tutte le nazioni a regime capitalistico.
Il Partito integra nel materialismo storico una lettura assolutamente innovativa delle nuove tecnologie. Si teorizza che lo sviluppo della robotica e dell’Intelligenza Artificiale non rappresenti una minaccia per il proletariato, ma la precondizione tecnica reale per la sua piena ed effettiva liberazione.
Anzi con molte ragioni Vatan legge nello sviluppo scientifico e tecnologico, come la Cina Popolare dimostra, la possibilità per la prima volta nella storia dell’umanità di edificare una reale società dell’abbondanza, riducendo progressivamente la necessità del lavoro manuale alienato e ponendo le basi materiali per l’abolizione dello sfruttamento dell’uomo sull’uomo.
Il Partito celebra anche l’origine della sua storia politica, quando tra la fine degli anni ‘60 e gli albori degli anni ‘70 il movimento Aydınlık, antesignano del Partito e oggi nome del pregevole settimanale edito dallo stesso, ha assunto una posizione, unica nel panorama turco, di critica del sistema sovietico, in posizione filo – cinese.
Tuttavia questo riannodare i fili del tempo non è frutto di un’esigenza meramente celebrativa, ma intende piuttosto riannodare il passato per guardare al presente.
Intanto il Partito ha sempre interpretato il tragico esaurirsi del campo sovietico non come il fallimento del socialismo scientifico, ma come la conferma empirica delle tesi storiche da lungo tempo espresse dalla dirigenza guidata da Doğu Perinçek, confermando come la degenerazione burocratica e il revisionismo moderno, iniziati dopo la scomparsa di Iosif Stalin dai suoi successori, abbiano inevitabilmente portato al collasso dello stato socialista e alla paurosa perdita delle conquiste popolari.
Per altro, mentre i sovietici dichiaravano prematuramente di aver realizzato il “comunismo”, cercando malamente di nascondere gli enormi limiti della loro esperienza, la Cina piuttosto non ha statalizzato forzatamente ogni aspetto della società ma, promuovendo un’economia pianificata e mista in cui la proprietà statale e quella privata coesistono, ha evitato l’ipertrofia burocratica che ha contributo alla fine dell’esperienza sovietica.
Infatti in Cina ancor oggi si lotta contro le disuguaglianze, applicando misure concrete per contrastare i processi di stratificazione in classi all’interno dello stato e della società.
Tutt’altro discorso e tutt’altra analisi conduce dunque, con molte ragioni, Vatan rispetto al cammino intrapreso in questo ultimo mezzo secolo dalla Cina Popolare, in cui nel solco di Deng Xiaoping e oggi di Xi Jinping i comunisti si sono affermati non come un “Partito-Stato” oppressivo, perché non hanno usurpato il potere dei lavoratori, ma hanno agito come nucleo dirigente di un autentico “potere popolare” in cui la dialettica tra avanguardia e masse rimane aperta, vitale e orientata verso il socialismo, senza disdegnare il fondamentale vincolo marxiano di sviluppo delle forze produttive e di accrescimento del benessere dei cittadini, con fondamentali elementi di ridistribuzione rispetto alle necessità infrastrutturali della nazione cinese e al diritto inalienabile in una società socialista a casa, scuola, istruzione, cultura, salute e lavoro, possibili solo in un quadro di eccezionale primato economico, scientifico e tecnologico, con ricadute immediatamente messe al servizio della cittadinanza.
[1] Si rimanda al suo pregevole “Breve storia del tardo impero ottomano” (in Italia edito da Sellerio) per ogni approfondimento legato alla polietnicità dell’identità turca.
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