The Trump administration’s reported proposal to restore Russian gas supplies to Europe through Ukraine marks a reversal of Washington’s longstanding energy policy. Behind the promise of an economic incentive for peace lies a more consequential question: whether Europe is being asked to restore the very dependence on Moscow that it has spent four years dismantling.

The administration of US President Donald Trump is considering the restoration of Russian natural gas supplies to Europe, including through Ukraine’s pipeline network, as part of a proposed settlement to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. The initiative would offer Moscow renewed energy revenues while potentially opening opportunities for American investors to participate in the trade.

According to a New York Times investigation published on 17 October, presidential envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have raised the proposal with Ukrainian and European officials, including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The White House has confirmed that economic incentives for Russia and Ukraine form part of its peace diplomacy, although no agreement on renewed gas transit has been announced.

The proposal would require Ukraine to reopen a transit route that ceased operating for Russian exports in January 2025, while European governments would be expected to resume purchases they have spent years reducing. American negotiators reportedly regard the prospect of renewed commercial revenues as an incentive for President Vladimir Putin to reach a settlement.

There is, however, a considerable difference between offering Russia a commercial opportunity after a verified peace agreement and restoring a source of revenue and political influence before Moscow has demonstrated any willingness to abandon its territorial objectives.

From opposition to Russian gas to facilitating its return

The reported initiative represents a reversal of Trump’s earlier position on European energy security.

During his first presidency, Trump repeatedly warned Germany that its dependence on Russian energy exposed it to political pressure from Moscow. Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2018, he accused Berlin of becoming dangerously dependent on Russian supplies. Members of the German delegation visibly smiled at his remarks.

The episode acquired renewed significance after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Germany had developed an extensive commercial relationship with Gazprom, while the Nord Stream pipelines were intended to facilitate Russian gas deliveries directly to Germany, bypassing traditional transit countries, including Ukraine.

Trump maintained his opposition to those energy relationships well into his second presidency. As EU Today reported in September 2025, he told European governments that continuing to purchase Russian energy amounted to financing the war against themselves.

Washington is now reportedly considering precisely the commercial relationship that Trump previously identified as a strategic danger.

The change cannot be explained solely by the objective of ending the war. It also coincides with discussions about a substantially different economic arrangement, in which American commercial interests could participate in infrastructure and transactions previously dominated by Russia and European energy companies.

American investors and the economics of peace

On 8 October, Reuters disclosed negotiations involving Kushner and Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s investment envoy, concerning possible American investment in the Nord Stream pipelines.

The discussions included the prospect of US investors profiting from renewed Russian gas deliveries to Europe. Separate negotiations have involved assets belonging to the Russian energy company Lukoil.

The White House has denied that Nord Stream was a subject of recent discussions and has said any agreements must benefit American taxpayers and companies. There is no established evidence that Witkoff, Kushner or members of Trump’s family would personally profit from the proposed gas arrangements.

Nevertheless, the possibility of American participation changes the commercial equation. Russian gas returning to Europe through infrastructure involving US investors would no longer be exclusively a Russian-European business relationship.

That distinction matters financially, but it does not necessarily resolve the underlying security problem. American ownership of transit infrastructure would not eliminate Moscow’s ability to influence production, supply volumes or export decisions.

The European Union has already confronted the consequences of allowing an energy relationship to become a source of geopolitical leverage. Introducing American intermediaries would not, by itself, remove that vulnerability.

Europe’s legal and political obstacles

The proposal also conflicts with legislation already adopted by the European Union.

In January 2026, the Council formally approved a regulation phasing out Russian natural gas imports. The restrictions began taking effect in March, with the remaining long-term LNG imports scheduled to end in January 2027 and pipeline imports in autumn 2027.

Consequently, restoring substantial Russian supplies would require changes to existing EU policy or the use of legally available exceptions. Neither Washington nor Moscow can make that decision on Europe’s behalf.

Germany has already opposed the reported American initiative. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s security adviser, Günter Sautter, reportedly objected during discussions in Florida, while former economy minister Robert Habeck warned against recreating dependence on an unreliable supplier.

The economic attraction remains understandable. European industry faces substantial energy costs, and cheaper pipeline gas could offer relief to some consumers and manufacturers. Yet commercial prices do not account for the wider costs associated with supply disruption, strategic exposure and the potential use of energy exports as political leverage.

Europe’s decision to reduce Russian gas imports was therefore not simply a change of supplier. It was a response to the security implications of its previous energy model.

The consequences for European politics

The initiative also intersects with divisions inside European politics, particularly in Germany.

Alternative for Germany (AfD) has repeatedly advocated restoring Russian energy imports, arguing that sanctions and expensive replacement supplies have damaged German industry. Sahra Wagenknecht’s left-wing BSW has advanced similar arguments concerning energy prices and relations with Moscow.

The overlap extends beyond energy policy. On 14 October, AfD and BSW representatives supported a motion in Saxony-Anhalt calling for an end to military assistance for Ukraine.

A US-backed proposal to restore Russian gas could give these parties an additional argument against the federal government’s existing approach. They would be able to point to Washington’s own negotiations when questioning the economic and strategic rationale for maintaining restrictions on Russian energy.

This does not establish that the Trump administration’s gas initiative is intended to strengthen particular European political movements. It does demonstrate how the same policy could serve several objectives simultaneously: commercial rapprochement with Russia, a negotiating incentive for Moscow and a change in the European debate over sanctions.

A peace incentive that could restore Russian leverage

The central uncertainty concerns the relationship between renewed revenues and Russian military objectives.

Washington’s argument assumes that the prospect of substantial future gas income could persuade Putin to accept a settlement. Yet negotiations over commercial cooperation have so far produced no demonstrated change in Moscow’s fundamental territorial demands.

Meanwhile, Russia continues attacking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. On 18 October, Zelenskyy reported 76 Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy, oil and gas facilities during the preceding week, despite Trump’s announcement of an energy ceasefire that neither Kyiv nor Moscow had confirmed.

There is also an unresolved contradiction in Washington’s wider sanctions policy. Having previously demanded that Europe stop financing Russia through energy purchases, Trump has recently suspended additional American sanctions against Moscow while his representatives explore new economic arrangements.

For Ukraine, renewed transit could restore revenue lost when the previous gas agreement expired. For Russia, however, the potential benefits extend beyond immediate export earnings. Access to European markets would restore commercial relationships and a degree of political influence that Moscow lost after the invasion.

The distinction is fundamental. A peace settlement that permits carefully regulated economic cooperation after Russian withdrawal and enforceable security guarantees would be different from an agreement that restores Moscow’s commercial advantages in anticipation of concessions that have not yet been secured.

The question for European governments is therefore not merely whether Russian gas could once again become cheaper than alternative supplies. It is whether restoring that trade would leave Europe better protected against another confrontation with Moscow, or recreate the vulnerabilities that became apparent in 2022.

Washington’s proposed economic bargain cannot answer that question on Europe’s behalf.

• US Energy Secretary Chris Wright defended Trump's decision to buy Russian diesel.
• Wright said the relief is actually an "incentive" for Russia to end its war with Ukraine.
• Ukraine's President Zelenskyy and several US lawmakers have criticized the move.

President Donald Trump is still playing hardball with Russia, according to US Department of Energy Secretary Chris Wright.

Wright defended Trump's decision to waive sanctions on Russia during a Sunday interview on CNN's "State of the Union with Jake Tapper and Dana Bash."

In September, Trump signed into law a sanctions package targeting Russian officials and parts of its economy in an effort to pressure Russia amid its war on Ukraine. Last week, Trump issued an executive order waiving those new sanctions, other restrictions, and some duties on Russia.

In early October, Trump also announced an agreement with President Vladimir Putin under which Russia would supply over 300,000 tons of diesel fuel to America and the global market.

"President Trump waived sanctions just on diesel exports, and what's the one thing Russia has not been able to export over the last month or so? Diesel, because they're short of diesel," Wright said.

The Energy Secretary said waiving the sanctions solves two problems: the diesel oil shortage and Russia's ongoing war with Ukraine.

"This is pressuring Russia. Russia does not have diesel to export," Wright said. "The only way they can get additional diesel to export is if they turn down the conflict with Ukraine."

Wright said Russia would have to enter into an energy ceasefire or reduce its war efforts to have enough additional diesel to export.

"This is not going soft on Russia. This is an incentive to end the war," Wright added.

Trump elaborated on his reasoning further on Sunday in a Truth Social post.

"I am in the process of negotiating Peace in the war between Russia and Ukraine, and don't want to do anything that will drive, foolishly, Russia away from the bargaining table," he wrote.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said waiving sanctions on Russia "seems wrong" to him. US lawmakers on both sides of the political aisle also criticized the move, including Republican Sen. Thom Tillis.

"Beyond irresponsible. What part of enforcing a law passed 86-11 by the Senate does the President and his advisors not understand? It's unconscionable that this administration is capitulating to a Russian dictator who illegally invaded Ukraine and butchers innocent civilians every single day," Tillis wrote on X.

He added, "If the President wants to actually bring down energy prices, he can do it by solving the Iran problem, not by doing a solid for Vladimir Putin."

Diesel and regular gas prices have skyrocketed globally as the US war on Iran drags on. Following surprise attacks by the US and Israel on Iran in February, Iran effectively shut down the Strait of Hormuz, which is a major waterway through which much of the world's diesel and oil is shipped. Last week, the International Energy Agency ‌said the diesel shortage could run into 2027.

That's a problem for Trump, who is hoping voters overlook high gas prices and concerns over the cost of living when they head to the polls this November for the midterm elections. Higher diesel prices mean higher shipping costs, which trickle down to consumers as inflated prices for everyday goods.

Wright also appeared on ABC's "This Week" on Sunday, during which he said Trump was trying to find "innovative" ways to end the Russia-Ukraine war.

"This is a motivation for Russia to figure out how they can actually export some diesel," he said.

How are Ukraine’s drones disrupting Russian supply lines — and can Ukraine hold on to its advantage? Flying far behind enemy lines, “middle-strike” drones hunt the fuel, ammunition, and reinforcements Russia needs to sustain its assaults. Starlink has helped make this campaign possible, but dependence on

This weekly update from the Kyiv Independent aims to shed light on the situation facing Ukrainians living under Russian occupation and the ever-tightening control of information imposed by the Kremlin.

Key news as of Oct. 17:

• Eleven Ukrainians, including 96-year-old woman, return from Russian-occupied territories, ombudsman says
• Russia sends terrorism

In the three weeks since a health worker’s death in Siberia, officials have stonewalled the WHO – setting a worrying precedent for future pandemics

Is there a plague outbreak in Russia? If the answer were a clear yes, there shouldn’t be much reason to worry. With swift medical intervention, plague is treatable. But in the nearly three weeks since a worker at a Siberian plague research unit died of a mysterious respiratory illness, state officials have been consistently tight-lipped about what happened and whether there were any further cases.

It is this uncertainty that has the World Health Organization (WHO) and international community worried: partly because there is a – very small – risk of an outbreak, and partly because it is yet another warning that the international coordination we rely on to prevent pandemics is fraying along with the rest of international politics, and could easily fail to protect us in the future.

Key developments on Oct. 17-18

• Massive Ukrainian drone attack hits oil facility, bridge, and data center in St. Petersburg
• US resumes intel sharing on Russian missile launches with Ukraine, Zelensky says
• Ukraine hits Russian drone manufacturing plant in Rostov Oblast
• 'Planned operation' — Zelensky confirms Ukraine's

Click to see the full-size image

On the night of October 18, the Russian Armed Forces carried out group strikes using unmanned aerial vehicles against logistics centers, port infrastructure, and energy facilities in Ukraine. According to a statement by the Russian Ministry of Defense, the targets included warehouses containing dual-use cargo and vessels used to supply the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

In turn, the Ukrainian side carried out a massive drone attack on Russian regions, focusing primarily on St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region: oil terminals, a data center, a distribution center, a boiler house at a thermal power plant, and bridge infrastructure were struck, and residential areas were damaged. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, 1,015 Ukrainian UAVs were shot down over Russian territory.

Russian Strikes on Ukraine

Logistics Infrastructure

• Nova Poshta logistics center (Rivne). According to a statement by the Russian Ministry of Defense, the facility was used to store and distribute dual-use cargo, including components for medium- and long-range unmanned aerial vehicles. The center served as part of the logistics chain supplying Ukrainian forces. Damage to the facility complicates the delivery of components for drone assembly in Ukraine’s western regions.

• Polko Group production and warehouse facilities (Manevychi, Volyn Region). The facilities were reportedly involved in the manufacture of explosives and the loading of munitions for long-range drones. The facilities are part of the warehouse infrastructure used to accumulate and transship cargo toward Rivne and neighboring regions.

Click to see the full-size image

• Warehouse in the Novomoskovsk area (Dnipropetrovsk Region). The nature of the cargo stored there is not specified in available sources. However, the facility’s location in the industrial area of Dnipropetrovsk Region suggests that it was part of the logistics supply chain supporting Ukrainian Armed Forces groupings in the eastern direction.

• Bulk carrier 30 km east of the Port of Odesa. According to a statement by the Russian Ministry of Defense, a bulk carrier carrying military and dual-use cargo was struck.

Energy Infrastructure

• Prydniprovska Thermal Power Plant (Dnipro, Dnipropetrovsk Region). The Prydniprovska TPP supplied electricity to industrial consumers in the region, including facilities linked to military production.

• Belolesye substation (Odesa Region). The substation supplies electricity to, among other things, port infrastructure and enterprises in the region.

• Critical infrastructure facilities (Vinnytsia Region). Damage to critical infrastructure was reported, accompanied by power outages.

Strikes on distribution substations create local power shortages and complicate the operations of industrial enterprises involved in the production and repair of military equipment.

According to monitoring sources, UAV strikes were also carried out against targets in Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, and Kharkiv Regions. In addition, during the preceding day, aviation and missile forces struck targets in Donbas, Kherson, Poltava, Cherkasy, and Zhytomyr Regions.

Strikes on Russian Territory

St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region

• St. Petersburg Oil Terminal. A fire was reported on the terminal’s grounds. The facility is part of the marine transshipment infrastructure for petroleum products, including export operations. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, 144 UAVs were shot down over Leningrad Region overnight.

• Ruchyi oil depot. The largest fuel terminal in St. Petersburg, with a total capacity of 73,900 cubic meters. A fire was reported.

• VKontakte (VK) data center. The facility in St. Petersburg was attacked. According to the company, all services continued to operate. The data center supports one of Russia’s largest IT platforms; open sources do not cite any direct military use.

• Ozon distribution center. A fire was reported following the attack. The facility is part of civilian logistics infrastructure.

• A boiler house at a local thermal power plant. The extent of the damage and its impact on heat supply were not specified.

• Cable-stayed bridge. According to residents, a UAV struck the bridge connecting the southern and northern parts of St. Petersburg. There is no official information on the condition of the structure. The city experienced major transport disruptions: the central section of the Western High-Speed Diameter was closed, and tram routes were suspended. Pulkovo Airport temporarily suspended arrivals and departures.

• Residential areas. In St. Petersburg, 12 apartment buildings and two private homes were damaged. In Leningrad Region, homes were damaged in Kirovsk, Vsevolozhsk, and Gatchina. In Novoselye, 55 parked cars were damaged. According to the governor, one person was killed, five were injured, and about 20,000 people were left without electricity.

Border and Other Regions

• Oryol Region. A telecommunications tower and a post office building were damaged.

• Bryansk Region. Over the past day, 281 UAVs were shot down. One person was killed and six were injured.

Taken together, the strikes of October 18 point to two separate lines of effort. On the Russian side, the main effort was focused on destroying logistics hubs and maritime transport near Odesa, continuing the campaign to disrupt the supply of the Ukrainian Armed Forces through western and southern routes. In parallel, strikes targeted power generation and distribution substations, putting additional pressure on Ukraine’s energy system ahead of the heating season.

On the Ukrainian side, the attack had a clear focus on St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region. Damage to oil terminals, a data center, and bridge infrastructure, along with major transport disruptions around the Western High-Speed Diameter, suggests an effort to create a high-impact media and logistics effect in Russia’s largest city. At the same time, a significant portion of the UAVs was shot down—1,015 over Russian territory—which does not change the fact that individual drones did reach their targets.

In the medium term, Russia’s campaign against Ukraine’s logistics chains and energy sector is likely to continue, with an emphasis on western regions and port infrastructure. On the Ukrainian side, long-range drone attacks on sensitive targets in Russian regions, primarily in the Northwestern Federal District, are likely to persist. Key factors will remain air-defense capabilities, the resilience of power grids, and Ukraine’s access to satellite communications for controlling long-range unmanned aerial vehicles.

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Military Situation In Ukraine And Ukrainian Attacks On Russian Territory On October 17, 2026 (Maps Update)
• Russia Strikes Ukraine’s Steel and Energy Sector
• Ukraine’s Black Sea Escalation Threatens Global Trade, With Risks Of Spiralling

The post Russia Strikes Ukraine’s Logistics and Energy, Ukraine Launches Massive Drone Raid on St. Petersburg appeared first on South Front.

Two people killed and at least 17 injured as Russia and Ukraine continue to trade strikes on power infrastructure

Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Sunday thanked the Trump administration for resuming intelligence sharing between the two countries, but maintained the US had intentionally throttled its Starlink satellite internet access so that Donald Trump could send a “message” in his ongoing feud with the Ukrainian president.

In an interview on NBC, Zelenskyy said the US had “unblocked” intelligence on impending Russian ballistic missile strikes, which have pounded the country’s energy infrastructure as winter draws in.

By Patrick LAWRENCE

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In her revelatory work The Cultural Cold War, the late British author was the first to shine so unblinking a light on the sprawl of the C.I.A.’s cultural interventions.

Frances Stonor Saunders was fond of epigraphs (as am I). At the front of The Cultural Cold War: The C.I.A. and the World of Arts and Letters (The New Press, 1999), the British journalist, documentarian and author quotes some lines from Dante’s Inferno, the last of which is, “Before my age was full, I went astray.”

I had not lived half my life when I succumbed to complacency and moral blindness: This is my reading of the line from Canto XV. And how fitting it is at the start of Saunders’ exhaustively researched account of how the Central Intelligence Agency, its tentacles reaching into every corner of American culture, did so much to lead our republic into what the Italian poet would call its selva oscura, its dark wood —the state of lostness America has never since escaped.

Frances Stonor Saunders died on the last day of August, having suffered from a virulent strain of brain cancer. She was a mere 60. We had a few acquaintances in common, but I never met her. It was nonetheless something like losing a friend when, just this past week, I heard of her death. And so this brief appreciation.

The Cultural Cold War made Stonor Saunders’ reputation. It took a prominent place on my shelf of Cold War books as soon as it was published. At last the curtain parted on the insidious use the C.I.A. made, or attempted to make, of painters, poets, playwrights, novelists, editors, jazz musicians, singers, dancers, actors, scholars and other cultural figures in its long-running operation to promote the appeal of American life as against the Soviet Union and altogether the postwar socialist alternative.

This was an immense “soft power” operation avant la lettre — before we had the term. One could also call it an early variant of the “cognitive warfare” to which we are now incessantly subjected, the primary object of which was to keep postwar Europe from swinging leftward, as the French, the Italians and others were poised to do.

From Saunders’s Introduction:

“Drawing on an extensive, highly influential network of intelligence personnel, political strategists, the corporate establishment, and the old school Ivy League universities, the incipient CIA started, from 1947, to build a ‘consortium’ whose double task was to inoculate the world against the contagion of Communism and to ease the passage of American foreign policy abroad. The result was a remarkably tight network of people who worked alongside the Agency… Whether they liked it or not, whether they knew it or not, there were few writers, poets, artists, historians, scientists, or critics in postwar Europe whose names were not in some way linked to this covert enterprise.”

Who Was Who & Who Stood Where

Jackson Pollock in 1951. (Hans Namuth /Wikimedia Commons,Public Domain)

Jackson Pollock and others among the Abstract Expressionists, Leonard Bernstein and others among the American composers then prominent, Robert Lowell, James Baldwin, Mary McCarthy and other writers of their generation, Duke Ellington and other jazz stars — if they weren’t sent abroad on the C.I.A.’s nickel, their work was.

There were the hundreds of books the Agency took a role in promoting, It paid for translations of Eliot’s Four Quartets, Luigi Barzini’s The Italians, Boris Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago. It covertly supported magazines — Encounter and The Paris Review famous among them — along with radio stations and, of course, newspapers — and those who wrote and edited for them. As of 1956 the Agency owned a considerable piece of the Rome Daily American.

Saunders, who did years of interviewing and archival research for this book, lays out her findings over 427 well-written pages and was the first to shine so unblinking a light on the sprawl of the C.I.A.’s cultural interventions.

One of the things I like about Saunders’s book, among many, is her exposure of those artists and writers who knew of the Agency’s interventions and wanted nothing to do with them, those who knew and cooperated and those who served its purposes unwittingly.

Pollock had no idea of the use to which the Agency put his work, Baldwin wanted nothing to do with the Congress for Cultural Freedom (C.C.F.), infamous as a C.I.A. front. Ever true to her tough-minded politics, neither did Lillian Hellman.

Mary McCarthy knew all about the Agency’s funding of the C.C.F. and its other projects and was fine with all of it. I’ve never liked McCarthy’s novels, and Saunders gave me a good reason to distrust her. She was prominent among that group of Americans known as Cold War liberals, for whom I have long nursed an abiding contempt.

McCarthy in 1963. (Dick DeMarsico/ World Telegram / Library of Congress. New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection/Wikimedia Commons/Public Domain)

I wish Saunders had given more attention to the profligate corruptions of generations of American journalists and newspaper editors, but her definition of culture is narrower than mine; I speculate that journalism’s service to the Agency was a room so large she chose not to enter it.

The surrender of many American journalists to the Cold War cause is well-enough documented in any case. See, for example, Carl Bernstein’s celebrated “The C.I.A. and the Media,” which Rolling Stone published in October 1977, and the House hearings that Bernstein’s piece prompted a couple of months later — the Church Committee, whose hearings ran from January 1975 to April 1976, having flinched from this responsibility.

Chronicler of Secrecy

The who-was-who and the who-stood-where and the who-did-what of The Cultural Cold War give Saunders’s book an historical specificity I do not think anyone has matched, with the exception of Joel Whitney’s Finks (OR Books, 2016), which draws heavily on Saunders’s work. She did not leave those of whom she wrote any place to hide.

As I reflect back on her accomplishment now, it seems to me to lie in something she never mentions. Saunders gave us a chronicle of the U.S. culture of secrecy in its earliest days, the first decades after the 1945 victories, when America set about making itself a global imperium.

What comes through in The Cultural Cold War is how little those alive at the time were able to know about their time. Too many events, too many decisions, too many reasons for things happening as they did were hidden, rendered inaccessible.

The C.I.A.’s Cold War interventions have had many enduring consequences. The Agency systematically discredited the principle of nonalignment, which was held high among then-emergent non–Western nations. America brings the same with-us-or-against-us fallacy to the 11 members and 10 partners comprising the BRICS  — a complete failure to grasp one of the 21st century’s significant realities.

It is the same with the out-of-hand dismissal of all suggestions of moral equivalence in global affairs with those it deems adversaries: The United States is always righteous and never acts but in defense of itself or its always-democratic allies and/or clients. It is never to be accused of aggression. This is what I mean by moral blindness.

The Agency’s most disturbing legacy, at least to me, is how little of our world we are able actually to see. Daniel Patrick Monihan warned us of this just before the U.S. century turned in Secrecy: The American Experience (Yale, 1998). So, in her way, did Saunders a year later. Foolish it would be, naïve in the extreme, to think the time she described so piercingly is not the time in which we live.

It is the historians now who tell us who we are — this by telling us who we were.  This is why I honor Frances Stonor Saunders as I do. She told Americans of their past, and, so, of their present.

Original article:  consortiumnews.com