"The main purpose of the visit is to show Finland's strong support for Ukraine as the war of aggression continues and the country prepares for the winter," the Finnish government said.
I have wanted to write an article for sometime about the differing fates of Russia and Ukraine since the onset of the conflict in 2014. The headline is that Ukraine has never made up the difference in increased trade with Europe having cut its trade with Russia to the bone since 2014. This has inadvertently meant that Europe has had to inject significant sums of capital into Ukraine just to prevent its currency from collapsing as the war has gone on. Russia has diversified its trade away from Europe such that its export model is as strong today as it was in 2014, giving it the liquidity it needs to underwrite the war effort.
Key finding:
Ukraine exported 24% less and imported 46% more in 2025 than in 2014. The war has driven up imports while exports never recovered from the signing of the DCFTA and have been hampered by the war effort.
The yawning trade deficit Ukraine has built since the war started has placed greater strain on European sponsors to provide the capital Ukraine needs to prevent its currency collapsing, in addition to providing funding to meet its fiscal requirements.
This funding challenge for Europe will persist after the war ends until Ukraine can become self-sufficient in boosting exports and/or attracting sufficient foreign investment to offset its trade deficits.
Russia’s export strength and consistent surpluses have been unaffected by war. After the Ukraine crisis started, Russia started to diversify its major energy exports away from Europe, allowing it to weather the progressive reduction of exports to Europe. Indeed, Russia gained a huge windfall in 2022 from surging energy prices. There is no evidence that sanctions have impacted Russia’s export model in a significant way.
Russia has already started to reaccumulate FX reserves after the oil price collapse of late 2014, until before the war started. Following the immobilisation of $300bn in Russian FX reserves, Russia started to accumulate reserves in monetary gold, to sanction-proof future earnings. Russia now has liquid reserves of over $420bn meaning the immobilisation of its foreign currency reserves is no longer an economically limiting factor.
Detailed analysis
Russia’s export model in which it runs consistently large trade surpluses has ensured it can generate the reserves of foreign currency and gold which have undoubtedly helped to bankroll the war in Ukraine. Ukraine’s trade deficit has yawned since the war started, requiring continual injections of European capital to prevent its currency from collapsing.
This helps to explain by Russia can sustain the war for longer; it doesn’t need to take on significant new debt, its debt remaining low at 20%. Ukraine can only fund the war and keep its national accounts in balance with European money that cannot be guaranteed long-term and which, in any case, has increased Ukrainian debt by an average of 20% of GDP each year since the war started. This is not sustainable.
The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement of 2014 has disadvantaged Ukraine because it forced a choice away from trading with Russia.
The starting point for this is the signature by Ukraine of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with Europe on 27 June 2014.
Herman van Rompuy, then President of the European Council said that “stronger political and economic ties will bring greater stability and prosperity to the entire European continent.”
President Poroshenko said “over the last months, Ukraine paid the highest possible price to make her European dreams come true.”
Yet, the true price of this agreement has borne by Ukraine which saw its exports collapse and its imports increase, as it make a “sovereign choice” not to maintain trade links with Russia.
That was a catastrophically bad choice. Russia had accounted for around 25% of Ukrainian exports prior to 2014 and that figure fell to less than 5% in 2021 before the war started. Ukraine did not make up that gap by increasing the volume of exports to Europe, which have remained largely unchanged.
Indeed, this same pattern can be seen in Georgia which has also seen no real increase in exports to the EU after it signed the DCFTA. The EU uses a number of trade dispute mechanism and other non-tariff barriers to put blockages in the way of import growth from DCFTA partner countries.
So, by encouraging Ukraine to trade with Europe and not with Russia, Europe has imposed a deadweight economic loss on Ukraine which took a sovereign decision to forgo a previously profitable trade relationship, to pursue a political goal of EU integration.
Moreover, since the war started, imports into Ukraine have surged leading to a progressive ballooning of its trade deficit. This surge in imports has been caused by Ukraine purchasing weapons from the US using borrowed European and domestic funds. So, Ukraine is borrowing money to create a trade deficit that needs to be filled with further inflows of capital.
Dragged into a persistent and growth trade deficit by war, Ukraine needs continued injections of foreign funds to prevent its currency collapsing.
The graph below maps the growth in Ukraine’s trade deficit with the corresponding growth in receipts classified as Secondary Income within its quarterly balance of payments. These inflows of capital as Secondary Income are injections from Europe (principally) that are vital to shore up Ukraine’s FX reserves and so prevent a run on the currency. The key point is that foreign funding to Ukraine is more than just a fiscal event and top it. It is a vital support mechanism in circumstances where Ukraine is unable to attract sufficient inflows of foreign investment during a time of war.
Russia simply hasn’t faced the same challenge, choosing instead to diversify its exports to other countries as Europe progressively shut down trade. Sanctions haven’t dented trade.
The graph below illustrates in an elegant way how Russia’s trade has changed and evolved since. Russia’s exports have gone through peaks and troughs since 2014, although the troughs have often been caused by global events such as the 2014 and 2016 oil price collapses and COVID,
The onset of the war in Ukraine caused a huge windfall in income from exports as oil prices surged. Despite the imposition of thousands of sanctions by western nations after the war commenced, Russia’s exports have remained highly resilient. This is down to Russia’s diversification of its exports towards countries in Asia.
In short, despite many headlines in western mainstream media of sanctions ‘denting Russia’s war economy’ there is no substantive evidence that this has been the case.
Russia’s export model continues to be an engine room that provides the liquidity it needs to fund the war without taking on significant new debt. This gives it a significant advantage over Ukraine and its European backers in the ‘war of attrition’.
Russia has accumulated reserves since the war started to make up for the immobilisation of $300bn in FX by western nations. Russia now invests in monetary gold to sanction-proof its assets.
Finally, I have been commenting for some time that Russia started the process of accumulating Foreign Exchange Reserves in 2017 as it shifted its monetary policy to embrace a weak rouble to maximise rouble income from exports and as it undertook a number of dollar purchases via the Finance Ministry. You can see this reserve accumulation in the graph below.
After the war started, following the large windfall in earning from exports in 2022 and still solid trade figures after that, Russia continued to accumulate reserves. However, following the freezing of its foreign currency assets, it has chosen instead to store its reserves in monetary gold, to sanction proof them.
While Russia would undoubtedly like to see the return of its immobilised assets after the war ends (big question mark) it has nevertheless built up a significant financial buffer to the tune of over $420bn in reserve assets in addition to those assets that remain frozen.
This deep well of reserves undoubtedly helps to underwrite Russia’s war effort without the need for significant borrowing. Russia’s debt today sits at around 20% of GDP.
In 2021 Ukraine’s debt sat at around 49% of GDP. Today it sits at around 110% of GDP.
Russian forces are preparing to resume mechanized assaults in southern Ukraine after a pause of several months and are moving armored vehicles toward areas where they plan to launch offensives, Anastasiia Shevchenko, deputy spokesperson for the Southern Forces Grouping, told Ukrinform on 22 October. The Huliaipole axis remains the hottest in the Southern grouping’s zone, with 10 to 20 combat engagements reported on an average day, she said.
On the Huliaipole axis, one of Russia’s largest force groupings is fighting Ukrainian forces, comprising units from several Russian combined-arms armies, the spokesperson says. Over the past week, as the weather worsened, Russian forces began local assaults there with infantry, motorcycles, and armored vehicles, seeking to break through toward Zaporizhzhia and blockade the city, Ukraine’s 7th Air Assault Corps reported, adding that the area is one of Russia’s key priorities in southern Ukraine. Russia has used fog this way before: last November, Russian troops moved under its cover to avoid detection by Ukrainian drones as they advanced on Huliaipole, the Institute for the Study of War assessed.
Russian forces have abandoned large-scale assaults across a broad front and are attempting to infiltrate Ukrainian positions in small groups. They periodically use motorcycles and quad bikes for assaults, Shevchenko said, adding that these vehicles are fast and maneuverable.
However, Russian forces should not expect to advance unimpeded, the spokesperson noted. Ukrainian units control Russian supply routes and systematically detect and strike Russian personnel and equipment while they are still moving toward their launch positions, she added.
“Specifically, speaking in numbers, since the beginning of October alone, units of the Southern Forces Grouping (Forces) have destroyed more than 3,000 occupiers and 1,300 pieces of weapons and military equipment. Thus, the enemy is suffering significant losses in the operational zone of the Southern Forces Grouping (Forces),” the spokesperson concluded.
Ukrainian drones disrupt Russian logistics
Russian forces had stopped using military vehicles because Ukraine’s unmanned systems forces controlled their logistics, Shevchenko said in comments to Ukrinform on 16 September. Ukrainian drones spotted Russian troops and equipment in time and struck them mostly on their routes of advance, she said.
Ukrainian air strikes destroyed bridges near Polohy in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, complicating Russian supply operations along the Huliaipole axis, Ukraine’s 7th Air Assault Corps reported on 21 September. Russian forces had used these bridges to move personnel, heavy equipment, and ammunition for their offensive toward Orikhiv. Disruptions to logistics have forced Russian units to rely more on motorcycles, which are more vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes, the corps said.
Explore further
Ukraine timed its Huliaipole operation around the weather — and it worked. Here’s why that won’t happen again soon
Russian forces are also expected to use fog and rain as cover for assaults, Mykola Zinko, deputy commander of the unmanned systems battalion of the 5th Assault Brigade, said on 19 October. Russia has brought up reserves, and its heavy equipment will move out under the fog, he said.
Ukraine's Third Army Corps said it carried out successful mechanized assaults behind Russian lines in its Operation Vivaldi.
Yevhen Kotenko/ Ukrinform/Future Publishing via Getty Images
Mechanized assaults have been rare in Ukraine, but amid a major offensive, its forces pulled off two.
The Ukrainian commander behind the operation doubted the assaults would succeed.
He said using armored vehicles now needs extensive planning and support, much like a special operation.
A massive Ukrainian operation retaking territory from Russian forces has shown that assaults with tanks and armored vehicles are still possible in a drone-heavy war, but far more support and planning are now necessary to execute them.
Tanks and other armored vehicles have faced serious challenges on battlefields dominated by drones, mines, and artillery, prompting both sides to move away, tactically speaking, from large-scale mechanized assaults. Those decisions have led observers to question whether tanks still have a role in modern warfare.
Those discussions have taken a new turn in the wake of recent Ukrainian combat operations.
Ukrainian forces involved in Operation Vivaldi, a counteroffensive that has so far taken back 277 square kilometers of territory, carried out two successful mechanized assaults behind Russian lines this week, Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi, the commander of Ukraine's Third Army Corps, the unit conducting the operation, told the Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi.
George Barros, the director of innovation at the Institute for the Study of War, a US think tank, told Business Insider that this appears to be "the first successful mechanized tactical level breakthrough in a drone-dominated battlefield."
Sharing details of the operation, Biletskyi said he had been skeptical it could be done, remaining unsure until the last minute whether armored vehicles could be used successfully, but he decided to allow brigade commanders to try.
The assaults required extensive preparation and coordination. "Today, the use of armored vehicles is effectively a special operation. It requires extremely detailed planning and the coordination of a huge number of assets," Biletskyi told Militarnyi,a Ukrainian military news site.
Tanks have struggled in Ukraine, leading to their reduced role in large assaults and reassessments about how they can be used in modern warfare.
SERGEI CHUZAVKOV/AFP via Getty Images
Barros said that while the assault's territorial gains were limited, he believes it is the most consequential and meaningful offensive in theater and in military science observed so far.
"It's a really big deal," he said. "It decisively proves that it is possible to achieve mechanized maneuver at the tactical level in a drone-dominated battlefield."
The mission planning involved separate training for vehicle crews and infantry, fitting vehicles with additional equipment, and extensive support to shield the advance. Biletskyi did not specify the equipment used, but electronic warfare, additional armor, and supporting drones and robots are among the kinds of tools that can help protect assault forces.
"The big lesson here is that the tank isn't dead, and the tank isn't obsolete," Barros said, "but rather the prerequisites to make the tank useful have become lengthy and extensive and very difficult to achieve, but all the same important and critical for success on the battlefield."
The challenge is replicating that success. Such assaults require more resources and preparation time than some units can reasonably dedicate to the mission. Barros noted that very few Ukrainian units are as well trained and well equipped as the Third Army Corps, Vivaldi's lead unit.
The Third Army Corps, shown here using an armored vehicle in training, showed how mechanized warfare can be done under new conditions.
Third Army Corps
But if Ukraine is successful in proliferating these lessons and tactics into other elements of its armed forces, "then we will have a Ukrainian military that is extremely capable and able to roll back the Russians, whereas the Russians still lag potentially years behind the Ukrainians in terms of being able to conduct these kinds of maneuvers," he said.
The recent Vivaldi assaults build on a broader effort to bring armored vehicles back into bigger offensive breakthrough operations.
ISW observed in May that Ukraine, for the first time since 2023, was beginning to carry out more frequent mechanized counterattacks, including using armored vehicles in front-line attacks.
In August, ISW assessed that Ukraine had been able to reintroduce limited mechanized maneuver through improved planning, suppression of Russian air defenses, and an emerging drone advantage. And by October, the think tank had detected an edge for Ukraine in these kinds of renewed operations.
Biletskyi said this week that the mechanized assault allowed his forces to achieve the partial encircling of the settlement of Nove and the deployment of infantry behind Russian lines to attack drone operators concealed in wooded areas.
He said the attacks degraded Russia's ability to conduct drone operations and gather battlefield intelligence, setting conditions for a tactical breakthrough.
Eliminating drone operators is key, Barros said, because it allows Ukrainian forces to push forward. It's something he said Ukraine has become better at over the course of the year, which was why Ukrainian vehicles were able to advance further. Vivaldi's leaders have emphasized the importance of shaping the battlefield by weakening the enemy first, including through the use of artillery, drones, and robots.
The war's dense networks of drones, land mines, and artillery have made large armored assaults difficult and dangerous. Inexpensive drones, in particular, make it hard to concentrate forces and complicate maneuvers. Both sides have added protective armor while decreasing tank activity, often keeping them farther from the front.
Vivaldi shows they're not out of the fight, though.
Western partners are still betting on tanks and buying new ones, but they foresee changes in how they are supported and deployed. Officials say tanks still have a place, but their role may shift. They will need to work alongside assets like drones.
Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, said in May that "legacy platforms are not obsolete" but "the decisive question is the force mix: how can we combine ships, aircraft, tanks and high-end systems with robotics, drones, sensors, software and new effectors to increase lethality and better protect our soldiers?"
This proposed settlement—designed to help end a conflict that has cost hundreds of thousands of lives and carries a continuing risk of confrontation—addresses the causes of the war rather than only its symptoms.
The war in Ukraine can be ended permanently on terms that protect Ukraine’s statehood, meet Russia’s security concerns, and lay the foundation for a durable European security order. As another round of negotiations gears up in Norway, I propose a settlement concluded as a single package, signed by Ukraine and Russia, adopted by a vote of the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, and guaranteed jointly by the five permanent members of the Council together with other states that choose to join. The proposal rests on the principle of indivisible security set out in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris.
The package would have four core commitments.
The first is Ukraine’s permanent neutrality, adopted in a constitutional law on the model of Austria’s law of 1955, which would return Ukraine to the founding choice of its Declaration of State Sovereignty of 1990. Ukraine would join no military alliance and host no foreign bases or forces, whether of NATO, the European Union, their member states, or Russia. Neutrality would not mean disarmament, and Ukraine would retain armed forces for its own defense.
The second is that Ukraine would pursue its candidacy for membership in the European Union as a permanently neutral state, with a neutrality protocol in its accession treaty on the model of Ireland’s, and Russia would affirm that Ukraine’s membership in the EU is consistent with Russia’s security.
The third is an armistice line drawn along the line of contact on the date of signature. Each side would exercise de facto jurisdiction on its side of the line, neither would recognize the other’s territorial claims, and both would renounce force in any future adjustment. This formula is compatible with both countries’ constitutions, which bar or severely restrict the cession of territory.
The fourth is the end of NATO enlargement eastward. At signature the North Atlantic Council would declare that NATO will not admit Ukraine or other new members in Eastern Europe or the South Caucasus, withdrawing the Bucharest pledge of 2008.
The settlement would take effect as a permanent end of hostilities on signature, not as a temporary ceasefire, and its provisions would be implemented in stages under international verification. No element would be negotiated in isolation, and no party would be asked to make a concession in advance of signature.
The territorial arrangements are designed to address the concerns and claims of both sides. Ukrainian forces would withdraw from the part of Donetsk region that Ukraine now controls, which would become a demilitarized special zone. Russian forces would not enter it, the existing local civil administration would continue to function, and its final status would be left to negotiation. Russia would withdraw from the areas it holds in Dnipropetrovsk region and from the Kinburn Spit. A Northern Security Zone would be demilitarized on both sides of the Russian-Ukrainian border, and Russian forces would leave the areas they hold in Kharkiv and Sumy regions as Ukrainian forces withdraw from their side. The ZaporizhzhiaNuclear Power Plant would remain under Russian control with IAEA safety oversight and would sell an agreed share of its electricity to Ukraine at cost.
A demilitarized belt would run along both sides of the armistice line, with heavy weapons and long-range strike systems withdrawn to agreed distances, and mutual ceilings on forces would apply in the border regions on both sides. In the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, commercial navigation would be free for all Ukrainian and Russian ports, and attacks on shipping and ports would be prohibited.
The settlement in Ukraine should also begin the repair of European security as a whole. NATO and Russia would agree on a moratorium on ground-launched intermediate-range missiles in Europe, refrain from deploying nuclear weapons in any additional state, and restore the NATO-Russia Council. Normal diplomatic relations would be restored on both sides. The parties would convene the first summit of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe since 2010 to entrust the OSCE with monitoring the settlement, verifying arms limits, and overseeing the provisions on rights.
Questions of language, education, culture, and religion would be resolved according to European standards, with the Russian language treated on the same basis as Ukraine’s other minority languages, and Russia would accept the same obligations toward Ukrainian speakers and religious communities on its side of the line. All obligations concerning extremism and incitement would be mutual and monitored by the OSCE. Prisoners of war would be exchanged on an all-for-all basis, detained civilians released, and separated children reunited with their families.
Sanctions would be lifted during 2027. Russia’s immobilized sovereign assets would also be released, and private property seized or immobilized on both sides would be restored. An international reconstruction fund administered by the European Investment Bank would finance reconstruction on both sides of the line, with contributions from all parties, Russia included, in a common effort rather than as reparations. Gas transit through Ukraine could resume wherever there are willing buyers, without any commitment by the European Union to purchase Russian gas.
A report of serious violation by an OSCE monitoring mission of unarmed observers from states outside NATO would trigger consultations among the guarantors and referral to the Security Council. Ukraine would lift martial law and hold elections under OSCE observation, and the newly elected Verkhovna Rada would ratify the settlement and adopt the constitutional law on neutrality, while the Russian Federal Assembly would ratify it at the same stage.
This proposed settlement addresses the causes of the war rather than only its symptoms. Europe has been largely absent from the design of the peace. By putting forward such a framework, European governments can take the lead in building Europe’s indivisible security and help end a war that has cost hundreds of thousands of lives and carries a continuing risk of confrontation between nuclear powers.
Ukraine's High Anti-Corruption Court extended the other obligations of Herman Halushchenko, a former justice minister implicated in a major graft case, for two months.
Three NASAMS launchers of the Dutch military, each can be loaded with six AMRAAM missiles. Source: the Dutch Ministry of Defense.
Russia’s Rubicon Center said on October 21 that its Geran-4 Seeker attack drones struck two Ukrainian NASAMS air defense systems in southeastern Ukraine, releasing video footage of the attacks.
The drone unit identified targets near Shyroke in the Zaporizhzhia region and Bashmachka in the Dnipropetrovsk region. It said both targets were successfully hit.
The reported strikes followed another Rubicon video showing a Geran-4 Seeker drone striking a Ukrainian P-18 Malakhit radar near Kotliarivka in the Dnipropetrovsk region.
The sequence points to an emerging role for the drones in suppressing enemy air defenses, a mission known as SEAD that involves locating and attacking radars, surface-to-air missile systems and other components of an opponent’s air defense network.
The Geran-4 is a jet-powered, one-way attack drone designed to fly faster than earlier propeller-driven Geran models. Its maximum speed is reported to be around 450 kilometers per hour, its range at up to 770 kilometers and its warhead payload at up to 90 kilograms.
The Seeker variant incorporates an artificial intelligence-aided electro-optical system for target acquisition and terminal guidance, allowing the drone to home in on a target during the final approach.
The NASAMS was jointly developed by Norwegian Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace and American Raytheon to defend against drones, helicopters, cruise missiles and warplanes. When armed with reprogrammed AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles, the system has a range of 30 kilometers.
Ukraine’s exact NASAMS inventory remains undisclosed. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said last February that the country had more than 10 systems and continued to receive additional equipment, without revealing the precise number.
The United States had listed 12 NASAMS in its security assistance to Ukraine by September 2024. Norway has also provided complete firing units, while Lithuania supplied additional launchers for integration into Ukraine’s existing network, and Canada donated a separate system that arrived in November 2024.
The latest Russian strikes show that the Geran-4 Seeker is being used not only against conventional ground targets but also against the radar and missile assets that underpin Ukraine’s air defenses.
In 2022, Ukraine relied almost entirely on Chinese components for its military drones. While that dependency has now been drastically reduced, Ukraine still relies on Beijing for essential parts that remain difficult to replace at the necessary scale and cost.
Build a physical border—widen rivers from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Sell resources to those who keep their word. Not one ruble for Europe’s rebuild, Tim Kirby writes.
This is the type of question that in 2022 would have sounded insane both within Russia and even more so in the West. How could ‘Nigeria with snow’ possibly save the Europe that it supposedly ‘attacked’ spontaneously? But now we are at a certain nexus of events that allows one to ask such a question. Trump has started to pull back, or has been forced to pull back, support for Project Ukraine which looks to be winding down. Every locomotive, gas station, sea port, Amazon-like warehouse, and data center has been blown to bits in retaliation for Zelensky’s 40 days of terror during the summer of 2026. The President of the United States has called for a three-way meeting with Xi and Putin which some think could be a call to finally and ultimately divide up the world into zones of influence among great powers. The riots in France have potentially put a final nail in the coffin of the globalist vision for the future, not because the riots are ugly or wrong, but because ultimately the Frankfurt School concept of destroying all forms of identity to maybe achieve something utopian has only taken hold in the West. That is to say, cultural masochism is only destroying the West and has provided strong evidence to Russia, China and others that national sovereignty and cohesion is the way to go. The project to create a world with no form of collective identity has backfired.
To be clear, the defining issue around this nexus is by far is the ‘death of Europe’. Obviously the continent remains physically on the map, but geopolitically it has become a black hole. Trump has wanted to get the U.S. out of NATO since his first presidential campaign, or at least make it profitable. The forces in the States that are ‘America First’ want nothing to do with the continent anymore. Trump may be failing to get the job done, but officially the Monroe Doctrine is back in place, one that leaves European problems for Europe to deal with. This potential global carve up conference, or Yalta 2.0 between Xi, Putin and Trump probably has to do with the Cold War’s Arrakis no longer has any spice left to it. Europe has become a toxic asset after generations of vassalage to Washington/London and rule by Epstein Elites. On the geopolitical game board there is an ever growing dark pit filled by the abyssal legacy of the Monopolar Moment located where Western Europe used to be.
What’s in it for Russia to save Europe?
But as things change and the ‘paper tiger’ of Europe shows its lack of stripes, what is Russia to do about this? Surprisingly, from within Russia and especially from Pro-Russian Westerners (who love to argue with me about this online) there are plenty of calls for mama bear to ‘save Europe’. I must say that I find any such demands to be a true reflection of Western arrogance and over-inflated self-importance. Moscow is the 3rd Rome, it does not need to save your Holy Land to achieve a state of grace.
Pro-Russian Westerners should be well aware of the fact that all of the problems Russia has suffered over the last 300 years, some of them very dire with millions of men lost, all came from the West: Napoleon’s invasion, subversion during the late 1800s mostly by the British, Lenin’s arrival in St. Petersburg from Europe, Marxism as a whole, WWI, WWII, 90s Liberalism, and now Project Ukraine. Truman gets the blame by Russian historians for starting the Cold War, FDR was much nicer bloke for Russia but his health didn’t hold out, so perhaps the American side did cause one major set of problems for the Russians, but the rest all comes from Europe and especially that accursed island, and at this point for Russian society the Cold War is in the past, but WWII is in the present thanks to the Maidan.
Perhaps Putin’s greatest yet quietest triumph is the restoration of Christianity in Russia, and with the Christian spirit comes an obligation to forgive others. However, when one ‘turns the other cheek’ and has the other slapped over-and-over again this duty to our Lord in heaven has been fulfilled and the Motherland is under no moral obligation to do anything for the West. Many, both within and without Russia, put serious blame on the USSR’s ‘geopolitical altruism’ as a cause for its loss in the Cold War. Moscow may have bought all the boots in Czechoslovakia, but it gave away unfathomable resources to all sorts of fickle socialist cousin-nations and got nothing in return by 1991, when they all jumped on the Western bandwagon. Countless billions of Soviet Rubles in oil, coal and anything else the USSR had for export, were just given a way or sold for symbolic prices in Eastern Europe, Cuba, North Korea and beyond. We have become used to the ‘West’ being the source of insane self-destructive policies in our world, but it was not always the king in that department.
I bring up Soviet geopolitical altruism, plus the ‘betrayal’ by the ‘socialist camp’ as the Russians call them, is a very strong argument against Russia doing anything to save Europe. They have tried to be nice to Europe and failed. No matter how many bloggers may be ‘begmanding’ Zelensky-style that Moscow ‘must’ save the West from itself that someone must ‘do something about the protests in France’ or at least protect Christianity in the former Roman Empire, this does not provide a counter argument to the opinion of Marshall Zhukov “We have liberated Europe from Fascism and they will never forgive us.” If Russia saves the EU from its Postmodernist death cult behavior it will never be forgiven for it either, especially from Starbucks socialist intellectuals.
Doing nothing is a fantastic option
If Russia were to ‘do something’ about Europe as it collapses these efforts will only be instantly forgotten and the Western elites (not the people, they have a far better historical memory than their leaders, but sadly they decide virtually nothing) will one day rise up to punish Moscow for all of its efforts. When Alice Weidel speaks about Germany restoring relations with Russia the locals in land of black gold roar with naïve applause. However, as a Westerner I hear something different in her words as they are auto-translated before my eyes. Ms. Weidel does not express some sort of guilt or remorse or a deep desire to live in brotherhood, but something more like an attitude of “we are losing badly, so let’s allow the snow negroes to go back to sending us liquid cotton”. There is no mutual respect or friendship in her voice, just the pragmatism of not fighting the subhuman barbarians to the east because it is ineffective at present for the German economy. Let’s look at it this way, should Russia, even for payment, send resources to rebuild those who have desired its demise for centuries, or sell those resources to countries that only want peace and mostly keep their word? Russia should sell absolutely nothing to the West for the next few generations, no matter how much posh Muscovites like Gucci and Porsche. The rebirth of Europe is the deaths of future millions of Russians.
The last 300 years of history since Peter I became infatuated with the West have never yielded anything for his nation but misery, revolution, exported resources that were needed at home, and piles of humiliation with a cherry on top. Russia is under no obligation to do anything in Europe and the all signs point to the need to take absolutely no action over there whatsoever and let the Postmodernist nightmare run its course.
The irony of Russian history is that somehow it can always make deals with the Muslims, even the Turks who have had a lot of geopolitical tension with them, can still keep their word on deals and common ground can be found across the potentially dangerous Black Sea region. Protestants are as loyal to the Russians as they were to the Native Americans that they wiped off the continent. The biolab network in Ukraine was a 21st century ‘diseased blanket’ but for the primitive aboriginal Slavs. So it is hard to say whether an Islamic France would actually be more hostile to Moscow, perhaps they would want peace and shish kebabs with a rival they could actually respect?
A true border wall would be a better option
There is an old geopolitical folk belief that the border of Russia starts somewhere in the Baltic Sea and ends somewhere in the Black Sea and that its shape throughout history is constantly changing between these two endpoints. There seems to be some truth to this, and when Project Ukraine is finally settled the Russians need to not just establish some border, but change the actual physical landscape of Europe to suit their security needs.
I would propose that the Union State between Russia and Belarus, at the end of the conflict draw up a plan to unite rivers and canals that somehow connect to the Baltic Sea and go down towards the Black Sea. Supposedly the oceans are rising and thus there should be plenty of water to fill this passageway. Furthermore, all of these natural and unnatural bodies of water must be widened to something like at least a kilometer. The steppes between Russia and Germany have been nothing but a nightmare zone of conflict since WWI and that is due to its geography, since the West will probably never change its attitude towards Russia, it is vastly easier for Moscow to alter the landscape than the minds of the Epstein Elite. Will the Baltic states object to this? Yes, but who knows what their fate will be after the Special Military Operation ends and America abandons them.
Having a final definitive, although expensive to produce, line on every map in the world with only a tiny number of bridges, that is too wide to cross easily, would finally define a concrete dividing point between the ‘barbaric’ East and ‘civilized’ West. That is to say, Russia must achieve some sort of physical separation, or possibly segregation from a mentally diseased Europe for centuries to come. Putting up a massive border wall would also be a boon, but that would be quite costly to the Russian taxpayer. The important thing is that there must be a potent form of division that is felt by both sides. The term Zaporozhia, means something like “along the threshold” and the threshold to Russia is eternally open, someone needs to close the damn door already and flick the lock.
In Summation Russia does not need to save Europe, it needs to fully and completely divide itself from it:
Geopolitical altruism is a methodology of failure, the more Russia spends on itself the more powerful and wealthy it becomes. Today’s Russia flourishes under the challenges that crushed the all too generous USSR from within.
The Western elites (not the people) will always hate Russia and they should not be allowed to rebuild via Russian resources, even if they are willing to pay for them. There are other better customers. Let them rot in the Postmodern grave they’ve dug for themselves.
There needs to be a permanent physical border between Russia and Europe, the easiest way would be by uniting and widening preexisting rivers and canals.
Supposedly Christian Europe has wished death upon Russia for generations, maybe a Caliphate won’t be so bad for Moscow? How many Russians died to Islamic extremism as opposed to the Third Reich?
Russia cannot and must not spend one ruble to rebuild Europe let alone a single soldier’s life.
Russia is under no obligation to save your country of origin, it never was, and never will be.
A high-ranking EU politician has gone on hunger strike over the humanitarian crisis in besieged Oleshky in Ukraine.
Pina Picierno, an Italian MEP and a vice-president in the EU parliament, told EUobserver she is refusing to eat solid food to draw attention to the besieged Ukrainian town.
Eight kilometres from Kherson, Oleshky is reported to now have 1,700 inhabitants, down from 24,000 people before Russia’s full-scale invasion.
The EU says the town is without access to food, medicine, clean water and basic care.
The only route to escape is tapped with mines and rife with attack drones, Ukraine’s foreign minister Andrii Sybiha warned last Saturday (17 October).
Saying that Russia wants to make Oleshky a “death trap”, the Ukrainian minister urged the UN and International Red Cross to secure evacuation corridors and immediate humanitarian access to Oleshky.
“Families are starving, surviving on leftover garden vegetables, preserves and even snails,” he said.
Pope calls Putin over Oleshky
The Vatican has attempted to mediate, with Pope Leo calling last week for Russian president Vladimir Putin to arrange a humanitarian ceasefire to allow in aid.
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
Europe’s leaders can no longer trust a word that comes out of Washington. No more slaps on the wrist – we need concrete steps to punish Trump
Historical comparisons are always inexact. No one conflict precisely mirrors another. Yet Donald Trump’s shameless appeasement of Vladimir Putin carries more than a noxious whiff of Neville Chamberlain’s failed attempt in Munich in 1938 to head off war with Nazi Germany. To be fair to the former UK prime minister – and history largely hasn’t been – his peacemaking efforts had the enthusiastic backing of most people in Britain and France who, like him, were desperate to avoid a repeat of the horrors of the first world war. Trump enjoys no equivalent public support for his treachery. Nor does he face the prospect of a US war with Russia. His betrayal of Ukraine is cynically self-interested, globally dangerous and utterly contemptible.
US-Russian talks on agreeing the shoddy terms of a precedent-setting American sell-out of Ukraine are at an advanced stage, after meetings in St Petersburg this week. Trump has zigzagged over the war ever since returning to office. Now, panicked by record-low poll ratings, he seems determined to scapegoat Ukraine and force its de facto capitulation. Recent steps – his shocking decision to fund Putin’s war machine by buying Russian diesel, his waiving of tougher sanctions, his mysterious, lethal interruptions in US satellite and intelligence sharing with Kyiv, and his renewed attempt to oust Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy – mark Trump out as the skulking Judas, the craven Brutus of the modern age. He makes Chamberlain look like a man of iron principle. All that’s lacking is an umbrella.
Simon Tisdall is a Guardian foreign affairs commentator
Russia has a new land-attack cruise missile with a low-observable design, according to Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence agency.
Russia began using the “Filin” against Ukraine in late summer of this year, according to a report published by the intelligence agency on October 22. The report also included an interactive 3D model showing the missile’s components and assembly.
The Filin is allegedly manufactured by Russian company NPO Molniya, part of Tactical Missiles Corporation. It is a ground-launched cruise missile with a reported range of up to 1,200 kilometers and a claimed top speed of 800 kilometers per hour, according to the report.
The missile measures about 3.5 meters long, with a wingspan of roughly 3 meters. Its fuselage is made from carbon- and fiberglass-reinforced composite materials, and some components are produced using 3D-printing technology. It can fly at extremely low altitudes but is also capable of climbing to about 6 kilometers. The report identified versions carrying warheads weighing 50 kilograms or 100 kilograms.
The missile is launched using a solid-propellant booster before its main jet engine takes over. Its navigation system combines an inertial navigation system with a 16-channel Kometa satellite-navigation module, which is highly resistant to jamming.
Notably, the Filin uses an R500 jet engine manufactured by Russian company Reynolds LLC. The same engine has also been identified in Russia’s S-71K Kover and S-71M Monokhrom air-launched cruise missiles.
The Ukrainian intelligence report came just a day after Russia’s state-owned Rostec corporation revealed that it is developing a new generation of attack drones designed to fly farther, faster and more autonomously, building on its Dan-T loitering munition, which the company says has capabilities comparable to cruise missiles.
Recent generations of Russian strike weapons, like the Dan-T, Geran-4 and Geran-5, have blurred the line between an attack drone and a cruise missile, mixing the range, flexibility and low cost of the first with the range and speed of the second. Ukraine’s highly depleted air defense network has been struggling to cope with these weapons. Now, the Filin represents a new threat with higher speed and longer range.
Russia has carried out a massive “demonstrative” attack on Ukraine, bombarding Kyiv with ballistic missiles just hours after Vladimir Putin said he had agreed to resume trilateral negotiations after talks with the US envoy Steve Witkoff.
Overnight, Moscow pounded the Ukrainian capital, killing at least two people and wounding 22, including four children. Targets included the southern bridge over the Dnipro River, civilian houses, energy infrastructure, an ambulance station, office buildings and a monastery.
Russia has carried out a massive “demonstrative” attack on Ukraine, bombarding Kyiv with ballistic missiles just hours after Vladimir Putin said he had agreed to resume trilateral negotiations after talks with the US envoy Steve Witkoff.
Overnight, Moscow pounded the Ukrainian capital, killing at least two people and wounding 22, including four children. Targets included the southern bridge over the Dnipro River, civilian houses, energy infrastructure, an ambulance station, office buildings and a monastery.
Instead of prioritizing stakeholder profit, the Witkoff-Europe combo should address Eurasian security architecture and NATO-Russia-China frontiers to gain traction in Moscow.
Back in December 2025, U.S. commentator Sundance, writing in the Conservative Treehouse, wrote about Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner’s new ‘Money Diplomacy’ solution for Ukraine that “require[d] [the establishment of] a system whereby the western opportunity for financial benefit continues”. From this perspective, the U.S. negotiators would “propose a long-term plan for continued financial benefit”.
From their current language it appears that Witkoff and Kusher are still confident they can construct a financial reward system for western banks, investors, politicians and Ukraine officials that will retain the benefits of war without the ancillary ingredient of bloodshed.
As Sundance noted —
“If the U.S. delegation can pull this off, then Russia can gain the territory they want, corrupt Ukraine officials can keep skimming investment money, the EU can retain the power it wants to extract financial payments, American politicians can use the “long-term recovery projects” for money laundering, and quasi-public/private investment banks can benefit from the exploitation of Ukraine resources”.
From this evident New York real estate worldview, all other issues — territorial boundaries, security and NATO’s encroachment into Central Asia’s security architecture — are but ‘downstream details’ “to the stuff that really matters, the money”.
Monetary diplomacy, however, has not brought a solution for Ukraine (nor for that matter, for Gazaeither). Nonetheless, Witkoff has a new plan that David Ignatius has outlined in his column at the Washington Post.
Ignatius highlights that despite the recent Ukraine “flap” over its targetting of Russian refineries, “the U.S. and Europe are moving toward a joint peace proposal that would deliver financial and security benefits to both Ukraine and Russia as a baseline for a territorial settlement that falls short of both sides’ war aims”. In other words, ‘a sweetener’ dangled to persuade the sides to stop bombing each other’s refineries and to open the path for this ‘new’ initiative.
If Zelensky agrees to halt refinery attacks, “we’re back in, and we go to Moscow”, an American official told Ignatius.
In gist, the 4-point plan envisages a generous reconstruction framework to meet “Zelensky’s myriad cash needs”; security guarantees for Ukraine equivalent to NATO’s Article 5; the economic integration of Russia, Ukraine and Europe through an energy deal — “This might consist of a pipeline carrying Russian oil and gas to Europe with Ukraine and Russia splitting the profits. Such a pipeline could sharply reduce European energy costs”, a U.S. official said. In addition to providing Russia with “long-term access to the European energy market”, a peace deal would specify how and when existing economic sanctions on Russia would be removed.
The final point – wait for it — would be a ceasefire along the existing front line, or the ‘line of control’.
It seems extraordinary: The U.S. and Europeans negotiate amongst themselves, seemingly oblivious to the explicit statements issued by the Russian side.
Oil and gas would be supplied by Russia to the needy Europeans who voluntarily forsook their earlier cheap Russian supply, who are trapped by their own decisions and who denigrate Russia at every opportunity. And with the profits to be “split” with Ukraine? No way will Russia accept such a one-sided proposal.
FM Lavrov said at the UNGA no ceasefireunder any format. That means that any negotiations would have to take place under fire, and Putin has suggested that even then, he would ‘think twice’ about starting any negotiations (whether under fire or not).
Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed just last week that “piecemeal solutions and agreements” would prevent a comprehensive settlement from being reached; a “freeze” of the conflict would not help either —
“[Ukraine] is a highly complex matter, and the settlement must be comprehensive … We need a solution for future generations — one that is guaranteed and safeguarded against setbacks”.
It seems that the Europeans have not grasped that a Korean-style cessation of hostilities (as argued by General Kellogg) along a front where two militaries face each other is a recipe for precisely no solution. It has been 73 years since the Korean War was frozen by armistice. Nothing has changed.
The repeated return to this mantra of a ceasefire along line of contact, rather than solution first; ceasefire last, shouts out to the Russians that the West wants to keep Ukraine in the locker-room for the time when a platform from which to exert pressure (again) on Russia in the future is to be jacked-up.
The fatal flaw to this initiative is its cultural deafness. For Witkoff and Kushner it may be “all about the stuff that really matters – money” — but that is not the case for Russia.
If the Witkoff-Europe combo recalled Russian history, they would understand why, for Russia, security, security, security comes top.
Walter Munchau cautioned just this week that “the Ukraine war risks escalating” —
“We should be under no illusion about a war with Russia. We are absolutely not in a position to win. Whose bond markets are going to be blown up first? Who is going to run out of interceptor missiles first? … On every [count] — military, energy, finance — Europe is at a disadvantage. That’s not all. There is a relatively plausible scenario in which Ukraine and Iran merge into a single West Eurasian war — and become the ultimate proxy conflict between the U.S. and China”.
If, instead of putting continued ‘stakeholder’ grift first, with its mechanism to ensure “that the western opportunity for financial benefit continues”, the Witkoff-Europe combo chose rather to address the fundamentals to the conflict — the deeper question of a Eurasian security architecture; the definition of where exactly the frontier that separates NATO security interests from those of Sino-Russian interests physically lies — they might find a more receptive audience on their next trip to Moscow.
Alas, circumscribing NATO’s extent is not possible – as things stand.
During previous repatriations, Russia at times returned the bodies of its own soldiers to Kyiv, with Ukrainian officials alleging the practice may have been aimed at avoiding compensation payments to Russian families or reflected a "negligent attitude toward their own people."
Some parts of the missile are apparently 3-D printed, HUR said, while the electronic component stands out for the increased share of Chinese components.
Russia launched 21 ballistic missiles against Kyiv in three successive waves overnight on 21–22 October, striking residential buildings, energy facilities and transport infrastructure just hours after President Vladimir Putin held peace negotiations with US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff in St Petersburg.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed on Thursday morning that at least two people had been killed and 34 injured, including five children, in Russian attacks affecting 12 Ukrainian regions. The capital sustained extensive damage, with strikes reported against railway and metro infrastructure, shopping centres, industrial premises and a monastery.
The bombardment followed a three-hour meeting between Witkoff and Putin on Wednesday, during which the Russian president indicated his willingness to resume trilateral negotiations involving Moscow, Washington and Kyiv. The Russian attacks continued despite the diplomatic initiative, prompting Zelenskyy to call for renewed international pressure on the Kremlin.
Kyiv Under Three Waves of Ballistic Missiles
In a statement published on Telegram, Zelenskyy said Russian forces had launched three waves of ballistic missiles against the Ukrainian capital, causing numerous direct hits and widespread destruction.
The Ukrainian president referred sarcastically to Russia’s supposed humanitarian intentions, an apparent reference to Witkoff’s description of Putin as a humanitarian during their meeting the previous day.
Emergency services were deployed across several districts of Kyiv, where residential and commercial buildings suffered damage. Part of the capital’s metro infrastructure on the Southern Bridge was affected, disrupting traffic, while a strike on an ambulance station in the Pecherskyi district damaged six emergency vehicles. No medical personnel were injured at that location.
According to Ukrainian military and emergency service reports, the overnight assault also involved 210 attack drones and several types of missiles, including Iskander-M, S-400, Zircon and Oniks weapons.
By Thursday morning, Ukrainian air defences had intercepted or suppressed 181 drones. Russian weapons struck 32 locations, while debris from intercepted drones fell at eight others.
The assault followed several consecutive days of Russian attacks against Kyiv, including earlier strikes on hospitals, residential buildings and the capital’s transport network.
Witkoff’s Meeting with Putin
The timing of the latest bombardment placed renewed scrutiny on Washington’s diplomatic engagement with Moscow.
On 21 October, Witkoff met Putin at the Konstantin Palace in St Petersburg, accompanied by Russian officials, including Kirill Dmitriev, the Kremlin’s representative for international economic cooperation. The discussions lasted approximately three hours.
Following the St Petersburg meeting, Witkoff described the discussions as constructive and indicated that negotiations would continue at the technical level between representatives of the United States, Russia and Ukraine.
Putin reportedly expressed agreement in principle to restarting trilateral negotiations, potentially during the first half of November. However, no agreement on a ceasefire or suspension of Russian attacks was announced.
The meeting also attracted controversy after Witkoff praised Putin as a humanitarian following the release of Stephen Hubbard, a 74-year-old American citizen who had been detained in Russia for more than four years.
The remarks prompted criticism from Republican lawmakers in Washington, who questioned the characterisation of the Russian president while Moscow continued its military campaign against Ukraine.
Zelenskyy Calls for Pressure Rather Than Diplomatic Concessions
Zelenskyy characterised the overnight missile attack as evidence that Russia’s participation in negotiations had not produced any substantive change in its conduct.
He argued that diplomatic efforts to end the war should continue but must be accompanied by measures capable of altering Moscow’s military calculations.
Those measures, according to the Ukrainian president, include stronger air defence capabilities, faster deliveries of interceptor missiles, the ability to destroy Russian ballistic missile launchers and continued economic sanctions.
The latest attacks also place Ukraine’s air defence requirements firmly within the ongoing negotiations with Washington. Kyiv has repeatedly sought additional Patriot missiles and more reliable advance warning of Russian ballistic launches, particularly as repeated strikes place increasing demands on its interception capabilities.
For the Trump administration, the immediate question is whether Russia’s stated willingness to negotiate can produce verifiable commitments to reduce hostilities.
The Kremlin has offered the prospect of further talks without announcing a halt to its offensive operations. Kyiv, meanwhile, continues to face missile and drone attacks against civilian infrastructure even as discussions concerning a possible settlement proceed.
The events of 21–22 October leave Washington’s diplomatic initiative moving forward against the background of an expanding Russian aerial campaign, with no indication that Moscow intends to suspend its attacks while negotiations continue.
The arrangement might allow Ukraine to use NATO's existing procurement system and supplier network rather than negotiating each purchase independently.
Login
