Twice in four months, Egyptian warplanes have bombed Sudanese miners inside their own territory, and dozens of bodies have failed to draw from Abdel Fattah al-Burhan a stance worthy of his citizens’ blood. Cairo, for its part, justifies its military operations, while Port Sudan hides behind a fact-finding committee, a cable of condolences and talk of contact between the two leaderships, without daring to name the party accused of killing its citizens.

This is the scene before us: a state acting on the Sudanese border by force of arms, and an army commander who avoids naming the party accused of killing Sudanese, for fear of losing an ally whose approval seems to matter more to him than their lives. On the morning of 10 October 2026, the mining site at Jabal al-Uqaydat in the Shamal al-Wadi area inside Sudan turned into a killing field after it was struck by five consecutive airstrikes, according to the testimony of a survivor relayed by Agence France-Presse. Thousands of miners had been searching for gold in a land exhausted by war; some ended up under the rubble, while others fled to the mountains without water or supplies.

In a significant pinpointing of the site of the bombing, The New York Times, in its report published on 12 October 2026, stated that the targeted mine is located in Sudan’s Red Sea State, about 25 miles from the Egyptian border, or roughly 40 kilometres inside Sudanese territory. Al-Hurra, in its coverage of the June attack, had cited an estimate placing Jabal al-Uqaydat about 20 kilometres inside Sudan; the forty-kilometre distance is cited here as attributed to the American newspaper’s determination of the location of the October strike, which keeps the question of sovereignty and the protection of civilians at the heart of the matter.

Agence France-Presse relayed from survivors that thousands of miners were working at the site, and “Emergency Lawyers” counted 72 dead according to preliminary information, while witnesses told the BBC of more than 60 dead and about 150 wounded. Survivors told Sudan Tribune that the dead numbered at least 200, with more than 15,000 workers fleeing, while the Sudan Doctors Network recorded a preliminary toll of 13 dead and 28 wounded, warning that it could rise.

Cairo Justifies the Bombing While Burhan Avoids Naming the Perpetrator

The “Emergency Lawyers” organization accused the Egyptian air force of targeting civilian miners, considering the attack a violation of international law. When Reuters asked Egyptian security officials about the raid, they did not deny the operation but justified it as ending what they described as border chaos and preventing Egyptian and Sudanese groups from taking control of mining areas.

Two days later, the Egyptian military spokesman announced the continuation of the “third phase” of the campaign, noting that warning leaflets had been dropped on those he described as criminal elements. However, the statement placed the operations inside Egyptian territory and did not include an explicit acknowledgment of carrying out a raid inside Sudan or of the killing of the miners.

Thus Cairo has a military justification for bombing a Sudanese site, while Burhan’s authority is incapable of issuing an explicit condemnation of the party that human rights organizations accuse of killing its citizens. The irony is that the state that is supposed to demand the victims’ rights appeared more concerned about its relationship with Cairo than about naming the party responsible for their blood.

From June to October: The Victims Change, the Silence Remains

The October raid was preceded by a strike that targeted the area on 16 June 2026. Agence France-Presse reported 23 dead, while Sudanese platforms estimated the toll at around one hundred. According to the testimonies received, the operations extended to Jabal al-Uqaydat, the Red Mountain and the area around Souk al-Ansari, and included raids by warplanes and drones followed by a ground incursion. The organization “Darfur Victims Advocacy” relayed from witnesses that an Egyptian force of about sixty armed vehicles had surrounded the miners and detained civilians, some of whom were beaten.

In the days following the June attacks, Radio Dabanga reported the arrival of about two thousand deported miners via the Argeen crossing, according to a local activist, while the crossing’s director spoke of more than three thousand over the preceding days, and the Egyptian army announced the arrest of 223 people, including 136 foreigners. On 22 June, Burhan appeared in Al-Ratj to say, according to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed: “Our northern neighbor — people must respect it and not cross the borders so as not to cause problems for themselves and for the state.”

Sudanese had been waiting for their army’s commander to defend their blood, but they heard him urging them to respect the borders of the neighbor accused of bombing them. When the raid was repeated in October, the Sovereignty Council repeated the scene: condolences over the “painful incident,” a fact-finding committee, and an assurance that the two countries’ leaderships are in contact.

Burhan’s adviser, Amjad Farid, described the bombing as an unjustified and unacceptable crime, noting that border violations could be addressed without warplanes, but his position did not translate into an announced official protest or a clear path to accountability.

Sudan’s Gold: A Wealth Guarded by Force

Al-Uqaydat lies within the gold-rich Nubian Shield belt, and the Chatham House institute estimated that about 60% of gold production in the Northern, River Nile and Red Sea states is smuggled to Egypt, in quantities exceeding one hundred kilograms per day, and more than sixty tonnes since the outbreak of the war through the end of 2024.

By contrast, official gold exports to Egypt in 2024 did not exceed about 16 million dollars, roughly 1% of Sudan’s total gold exports, according to Central Bank of Sudan data cited in the Chatham House report.

Miners told Sudan Tribune that they had observed drilling machinery and trucks carrying rocks across the border into Egypt, and that an Egyptian patrol had previously warned them against approaching a site it said lies inside Egyptian territory. Al-Hurra relayed testimony about friction between workers and personnel of an Egyptian mining company operating near them.

Egyptian Law No. 193 of 2020 authorizes contracting with the Egyptian Company for Mining and the Management and Exploitation of Quarries and Salt Works, affiliated with the National Service Projects Organization, to exploit the quarries and salt works specified by the law for a period of thirty years, while the state-owned Shalateen Mineral Resources Company is active in the south of the Eastern Desert. The businessman Naguib Sawiris also praised the June operation and linked it to investors’ confidence in the Egyptian mining sector.

In the same month, Egypt’s Ministry of Petroleum denied statements attributed to its minister about agreements to establish 108 gold mines in northern Sudan, but the researcher Mohamed al-Hadi considered it likely that the attacks are linked to undisclosed understandings with the Sudanese government, a hypothesis that calls for an independent investigation.

Burhan: When the Ally Becomes More Precious Than the Citizen

The website Al-Hurra relayed from a miner that a group of pro-government joint forces withdrew from the mountain a day before the June raid, and that the Sudanese army did not arrive to evacuate the wounded and collect the bodies until the third day. The testimony raised workers’ suspicions about possible coordination between the two governments, without establishing that it took place.

But Burhan’s silence does not need those suspicions to be proven in order to become a matter of political accountability. Cairo supports the commander of the Sudanese army and considers the war on its borders a threat to its security. Agence France-Presse has verified satellite images showing the repeated presence of Turkish Bayraktar drones at an Egyptian base near Sudan, while reports spoke of facilitating the delivery of drones to the Sudanese army and training its crews inside Egypt, alongside broader military and intelligence cooperation.

An analysis published by the Horn Review in June held that the army’s silence over the raids is linked to Egyptian support for it.

Yet this relationship does not absolve Burhan of responsibility; it multiplies it. Whoever relies on another state’s support in his war cannot make the protection of his citizens a negotiable item, and his need for weapons and political backing must not become an immunity he grants to Cairo at the expense of Sudanese blood.

Sovereignty Tested With the Blood of the Poor

The raids reopen the wound of Halayeb and Shalateen, the disputed triangle under Egyptian control. Sudanese administrative maps confirm that the targeted mining sites lie inside Sudan, while Cairo treats them as part of the border area adjoining the triangle.

Human rights, political and trade union forces have called for an independent international investigation, and the “Sumud” alliance led by Abdalla Hamdok held the Egyptian side directly responsible.

Today, Egypt is required to answer for the bombing and the fall of civilians, not merely to classify them as criminal elements and offer security justifications, and Burhan is required to announce the results of the investigation, determine responsibility, demand compensation and accountability, and take the necessary diplomatic and legal measures.

As for settling for condolences, it is not a defense of sovereignty; it is a declaration that the alliance with Cairo is more precious to the authorities than the Sudanese people’s right to life and justice. At Jabal al-Uqaydat the bill is clear and admits no doubt: the gold crosses the border, the dead remain under the rubble, and Burhan guards his silence.

French authorities are preparing for hundreds of demonstrations on Saturday, 17 October, as student unrest converges with protests over living costs, public spending and government policy. Up to 40,000 demonstrators are expected in Paris, where police and organisers remain divided over march routes.

France is preparing for a nationwide wave of demonstrations on Saturday, 17 October, with approximately 500 protest actions under consideration and more than 90 marches being organised, according to the Interior Ministry. The mobilisation brings together high-school students, trade unions, farmers and supporters of the Yellow Vest movement, raising the prospect of further confrontation after nearly a month of unrest.

Police estimates suggest that around 40,000 demonstrators could gather in Paris, with approximately 150,000 more expected elsewhere in France. The figures remain preliminary, while authorities warn that some protests could involve road blockades, disruption to essential infrastructure and violent clashes.

Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez initially outlined preparations for 250 gatherings and 80 marches on Friday morning. Subsequent assessments from his office indicated that as many as 500 actions were being considered, although not all had been formally organised.

Paris Faces Dispute Over Demonstration Routes

The authorities are particularly concerned about developments in the capital, where negotiations between police and protest organisers have failed to produce agreement over the proposed routes.

Paris police prefect Patrice Faure has rejected proposals for marches terminating near the Opéra district or Place de la Concorde, citing security concerns surrounding central government institutions.

According to details of the security preparations, police have proposed an alternative route between Place de la Bastille and Place de Clichy. The CGT trade union and climate campaigners have accepted the proposal, but student organisations and Yellow Vest representatives continue to oppose it.

Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu has convened an interministerial crisis unit to coordinate the government’s response. Security officials have warned that attempts to obstruct major transport routes or critical infrastructure will not be tolerated.

The Interior Ministry has also indicated that stun grenades, whose use was suspended during the student protests, could again be deployed in cases of particularly serious urban violence.

Yellow Vests Return Amid Rising Living Costs

Saturday’s demonstrations are being promoted as a revival of the Yellow Vest movement, which emerged in 2018 following opposition to fuel taxation before developing into a broader protest against living costs, economic inequality and government policy.

The latest mobilisation has gathered support from organisations demanding measures to address rising fuel, energy and food prices. Campaigners are also challenging the government’s proposed 2027 budget and its implications for public services.

The agricultural union Confédération paysanne has called on farmers to join the demonstrations, arguing that rising agricultural fuel costs and deteriorating conditions in rural communities have increased pressure on producers.

The union has also linked its demands to environmental policy, public-service provision and access to affordable food.

The CGT, student unions and climate organisations have similarly expressed support for the protests, while political backing has come from La France Insoumise and the French Communist Party.

Student Protests Enter Their Fourth Week

The mobilisation follows weeks of demonstrations involving secondary-school pupils, teachers and public-sector workers. What began as protests over shortages of teachers, overcrowded classrooms and deteriorating school buildings has developed into a nationwide confrontation over education policy and policing.

As EU Today previously reported, between 400 and 500 secondary schools faced partial or complete disruption earlier this month as students organised blockades and demonstrations.

The movement has subsequently expanded beyond its original educational demands, with student organisations raising concerns about university admissions procedures, police tactics and government spending priorities.

The scale of the unrest has placed considerable pressure on French authorities. According to figures from the Justice Ministry, 6,877 people were placed in police custody during the protests between late September and 8 October, approximately 86 per cent of them minors.

Violence during the demonstrations has resulted in injuries among police officers, students and educational staff. Clashes on 8 October led to 504 arrests and injuries to 48 police officers, according to Interior Ministry figures.

Education Minister Édouard Geffray has announced emergency measures to address teacher shortages, including the deployment of replacement teachers. The ministry says 2,000 of the 3,000 promised replacements have already been assigned, but student organisations maintain that the measures are insufficient.

Growing Pressure on the French Government

The planned demonstrations come as France faces a difficult debate over public spending, taxation and the 2027 budget. Lecornu’s government must balance demands for higher salaries and increased investment in education against mounting pressure to reduce the deficit.

France’s deteriorating public finances have already attracted scrutiny from eurozone partners, while domestic opposition to spending restraint has become a central issue ahead of the 2027 presidential election.

The convergence of student organisations, trade unions and Yellow Vest campaigners could broaden the protests beyond the education sector, particularly if demonstrations over living costs attract participants who have not joined the recent school protests.

However, the extent of that mobilisation remains uncertain. Online protest maps contain substantially more proposed actions than the authorities’ estimates, and participation figures will not be established until Saturday.

For the government, the immediate test will be whether the demonstrations remain peaceful and whether the authorities can prevent disruption to transport networks and public services without provoking further confrontations with protesters.

Russia has placed five foreign-owned businesses under compulsory administration, including Belgian manufacturer Ontex and French flooring group Tarkett. The latest seizures deepen the confrontation over sanctions, frozen Russian assets and the future of European investment in Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered the transfer of five Western-owned businesses into compulsory Russian management, extending a campaign of asset seizures targeting European companies that continued operating in Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The decree, signed on 15 October, affects businesses with combined annual revenues exceeding 53 billion roubles, approximately €530 million. They include French flooring manufacturer Tarkett, Belgian hygiene products group Ontex, German packaging producer Menshen, Kappa Rus and Eviosys Packaging Kuban, now linked to American group Sonoco.

Under Presidential Decree No. 738, operational control has been transferred to Centre Capital, a little-known Moscow company established in February 2026 with registered share capital of just 10,000 roubles.

The decision follows similar interventions against Nestlé, Auchan, FM Logistic and Metro in September. Together, the measures demonstrate how Moscow is using foreign-owned businesses as instruments of economic retaliation against countries supporting Ukraine.

Foreign businesses placed under Russian control

Centre Capital is headed by Marat Mirkhaydarov, a former senior official in Russia’s Zabaykalsky region who reportedly served with the Akhmat military formation during Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The scale of the companies placed under his management contrasts sharply with the financial standing of the administrator.

Tarkett’s Russian operations generated approximately 19.3 billion roubles in revenue during 2025, while Kappa Rus recorded 16.5 billion roubles and Ontex RU another 10.3 billion. Eviosys Packaging Kuban and Menshen Packaging CIS reported approximately 6.1 billion and 1.4 billion roubles respectively.

The decree does not formally transfer ownership of the companies to Centre Capital. It does, however, remove the foreign shareholders’ effective control over management, operations and commercial decisions.

For Belgian manufacturer Ontex, the consequences are immediate.

In an official statement issued on 16 October, the Aalst-based company confirmed that a government-appointed administrator had assumed operational control of its Russian subsidiary.

Ontex Russia employs approximately 350 people, operates a manufacturing facility in Noginsk and maintains a sales office in Moscow. The subsidiary accounts for around five per cent of the group’s total revenue and between seven and eight per cent of adjusted EBITDA.

The company said it was examining measures to protect its assets and maintain business continuity.

Tarkett likewise confirmed that it was losing effective control of its Russian operations.

A mechanism established in 2023

The legal framework for such interventions dates to April 2023, when Putin introduced Decree No. 302, allowing the Russian authorities to place assets associated with countries designated as unfriendly under temporary external management.

The appointed administrator can exercise extensive ownership-related powers, although the formal right to dispose of the assets remains excluded.

Crucially, the arrangement can be terminated only by presidential decision. There is no automatic deadline for returning operational control to the original owners.

Moscow maintains that the measures are reversible. Nevertheless, the loss of management authority raises questions about whether businesses could eventually be returned with their financial position, organisational structure and commercial value intact.

The latest decree extends the process already documented by EU Today following the September takeover of Nestlé and Auchan’s Russian operations.

The Kremlin’s approach also serves domestic economic objectives. Keeping factories, retail networks and distribution facilities operating under Russian management helps preserve employment, production capacity and established supply chains.

At the same time, appointing Russian administrators allows the authorities to exercise greater influence over businesses originally developed through foreign capital, technology and expertise.

European companies caught in sanctions confrontation

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has explicitly linked the seizures to the nationality of the affected companies and the policies of their governments.

He accused European states of participating in the unlawful seizure of Russian property through sanctions and financial restrictions.

Moscow’s argument centres partly on approximately €210 billion in Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the European Union, most of them held through Belgium-based securities depository Euroclear.

The European Union has used extraordinary revenues generated by those assets to support Ukraine, while further proposals involving the underlying funds remain subject to legal and political debate.

Belgium has been particularly concerned about potential financial exposure and legal claims. As EU Today reported in September, a Belgian Council of State judgment raised additional questions about the administrative procedures governing certain frozen assets.

The dispute has also moved into the European courts, with the Bank of Russia challenging EU measures intended to protect Euroclear against the enforcement of Russian judgments.

Moscow’s treatment of European businesses adds another dimension to this confrontation. By retaining control over foreign-owned industrial and commercial assets, Russia possesses a means of exerting pressure on companies whose governments support sanctions and military assistance to Ukraine.

The implications are particularly serious for Western banks that still maintain substantial Russian operations.

Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank International and Italy’s UniCredit remain exposed to Russia through local subsidiaries. Any extension of compulsory administration to financial institutions could create additional difficulties involving deposits, capital and banking supervision.

The cost of remaining in Russia

The seizures also expose the financial risks faced by Western companies that delayed their withdrawal after February 2022.

Many initially sought to protect their investments, employees and commercial infrastructure. Others reduced operations but retained ownership, expecting that conditions might eventually permit an orderly sale or renewed business activity.

Russian restrictions have progressively complicated that calculation, requiring foreign investors from designated countries to accept substantial discounts on asset sales and obtain official approval for transactions.

Companies remaining in the country now face the additional possibility that the government will appoint administrators without their consent.

The consequences extend beyond the businesses immediately affected. Russia is establishing a precedent under which foreign investment can remain legally owned by its original shareholders while its economic benefits and operational management are placed beyond their control.

For European governments, the latest decree illustrates the increasing connection between commercial interests and geopolitical decisions.

The Kremlin has demonstrated that sanctions imposed over its invasion of Ukraine can be answered not only through diplomatic or financial measures, but also through direct intervention in European-owned businesses operating on Russian territory.

Any eventual negotiation over sanctions relief and the restoration of economic relations will consequently have to address the status of these assets, the rights of their original shareholders and the question of compensation.

Until then, Western companies remaining in Russia face an investment environment in which the ultimate authority over their businesses rests increasingly with the Kremlin rather than their shareholders.

Ukraine was prepared to suspend attacks on Russian oil refineries if Washington supplied anti-ballistic missile systems to protect its energy infrastructure, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has revealed. The proposed compromise was not accepted, despite American pressure on Kyiv to halt its strikes.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has disclosed that Kyiv offered to suspend attacks on Russian oil refineries in exchange for temporary American anti-ballistic missile protection for Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Washington did not provide the requested systems, leaving Ukraine exposed to continued Russian missile strikes while the United States sought to restrict Ukrainian operations against Russia’s oil industry.

Speaking at a press conference in Brussels on Friday, 16 October, Zelenskyy said the proposal had been presented to Washington as a compromise following President Donald Trump’s agreement with Vladimir Putin on Russian diesel supplies and restrictions on attacks against energy facilities.

The Ukrainian president confirmed that Kyiv had not been consulted before Washington reached its understanding with Moscow. He described the diesel agreement as a surprise and objected to arrangements determining Ukraine’s military actions without its participation. Any agreement concerning Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory, he argued, required consultation with the Ukrainian government.

Nevertheless, Zelenskyy said Ukraine had been willing to accommodate American demands, even under an arrangement that did not require Russia to suspend its own attacks. Instead of insisting on reciprocal restrictions, Kyiv proposed receiving sufficient anti-ballistic missile systems to protect its electricity network for the duration of the requested suspension.

The proposal reflected Ukraine’s immediate security requirements. Russia has repeatedly targeted power stations, substations and other critical infrastructure, while Ukrainian forces have attacked Russian refineries to disrupt fuel production and reduce revenues available to Moscow. Halting the Ukrainian campaign without additional defensive capabilities would have left Kyiv surrendering one means of economic pressure while remaining vulnerable to Russian bombardment.

Zelenskyy said he had asked Washington for a limited number of systems, rather than a substantial new military commitment. The proposed deployment would have lasted only as long as the United States required Ukraine to refrain from attacking Russian refineries. However, according to the president, no such assistance was provided.

US diesel agreement deepens dispute

The disagreement follows the diesel arrangement announced by Trump on 9 October, under which Russia agreed to resume substantial petroleum product exports to American and international markets. Washington also authorised certain transactions involving Russian diesel, easing restrictions previously intended to reduce Moscow’s energy revenues.

The agreement created a direct conflict between American energy policy and Ukraine’s strategy of targeting Russian refining capacity. Washington wants additional diesel supplies to ease pressure on fuel markets, while Kyiv regards attacks on oil infrastructure as a means of weakening Russia’s ability to sustain its invasion.

That disagreement intensified after Ukraine resumed attacks on Russian refineries, including a strike against a facility in the Ryazan region. Trump criticised the operations, accusing Kyiv of contributing to higher global oil prices. Zelenskyy, meanwhile, argued that increased Russian diesel revenues would provide Moscow with additional resources to finance its military campaign.

The Ukrainian president’s proposal also exposed the limitations of the temporary energy ceasefire promoted by Washington. Russia continued attacks against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, including electricity facilities, despite the American initiative. Kyiv’s proposed compromise would have addressed the resulting imbalance by providing defensive protection rather than relying on Russian restraint.

Russian strikes underline Ukraine’s defensive requirements

The urgency of Ukraine’s request was illustrated by renewed Russian attacks during Zelenskyy’s visit to Brussels. According to the Ukrainian presidency, strikes on 15 October damaged energy infrastructure in several regions, leaving almost 15,000 people without electricity in Volyn and disrupting supplies in parts of Kyiv and the surrounding region.

Ukraine continues to face shortages of the interceptors required to defend against ballistic missiles. Zelenskyy has identified anti-ballistic capabilities as an immediate priority, particularly as Russia intensifies attacks ahead of winter. During talks with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, he stressed the need for additional missile interceptors and other air defence equipment.

The president also raised these requirements during Friday’s meeting with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa. Discussions covered air defence, protection of energy infrastructure and financial assistance needed to sustain Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression.

European leaders support Kyiv’s position

Zelenskyy said European leaders had supported Ukraine’s position in the dispute with Washington. His remarks came as the EU reaffirmed its intention to maintain economic pressure on Moscow despite the Trump administration’s decision to facilitate Russian diesel exports.

As EU Today reported earlier on Friday, von der Leyen and Costa rejected any relaxation of European sanctions while Russia continues its war. The Commission is preparing a further sanctions package, maintaining a policy intended to restrict Moscow’s ability to finance its military operations.

The contrasting American and European positions have become increasingly significant for Kyiv. Washington is seeking to stabilise fuel markets through arrangements with Moscow, while European governments remain committed to reducing Russian energy revenues and strengthening Ukraine’s military and economic resilience.

For Zelenskyy, the unresolved question is whether Ukraine can be expected to limit attacks on Russian oil infrastructure while receiving neither reciprocal guarantees from Moscow nor additional protection against Russian ballistic missiles. His account of the unsuccessful American negotiations indicates that Kyiv was prepared to compromise, but only if its immediate defensive needs were addressed.

For more than four years, Ukraine has been living through a war that destroys homes, businesses, and infrastructure. People need compensation for the damage and regularly file claims with the authorities. This raises a question: how can citizens exercise their right to compensation, and who can act as the go-between connecting Ukrainians with national and international bodies?

The fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment put direct war damage at $195.1 billion (€173.4 billion) as of the end of 2025. Recovery and reconstruction needs over the next ten years are estimated at $587.7 billion (€522.3 billion), almost three times Ukraine’s nominal GDP for 2025.

Compensation goes to those whose damage has been documented, properly filed, and accepted by an international mechanism. One person working on this problem is Andriy Yermak, Chair of the UNBA Committee for the Protection of Victims of Armed Aggression against Ukraine, Compensation Mechanisms and European Integration Legal Support for Recovery. He is also the initiator of “Advokat+”, a nationwide legal support initiative for Ukrainian service members and their families. His position rests on a simple premise: an unproven right doesn’t pay, and proving it takes lawyers.

Compensation starts with documents

Individuals and companies follow roughly the same process. The claimant must attach proof of ownership and confirmation of value, gather photo and video evidence of the damage, and prove that the military aggression specifically caused it. The required documents depend on the claim category, and, as Andriy Yermak points out from his professional experience, this is where people most often make mistakes. In such matters, a lawyer’s help is often more than necessary.

Businesses face the same questions on a larger scale. Kyiv’s first McDonald’s, opened in 1997, has been damaged by Russian strikes, and the Coca-Cola plant near Kyiv, in operation since 1998, was recently hit by a Russian drone. A company in this position must decide what was lost, how to prove it, and which mechanism to use: the international register, a national program, or a court.

Which mechanisms exist and which are being developed

The international and national Ukrainian compensation system has several components.

The Register of Damage for Ukraine (RD4U). It has accepted claims since April 2024 and operates under the Council of Europe, headquartered in The Hague. As of 30 September 2026, all 43 claim categories are open: 21 for individuals, 11 for legal entities and 11 for the State of Ukraine. By early September, the register had received almost 190,000 claims: about 58,000 were recorded, while the rest were under review. Claims can be submitted through the Diia portal. Yermak stresses that the register records damage but does not pay compensation.

The International Claims Commission. About 40 states and the EU signed the convention establishing it in The Hague in December 2025, and ten have ratified it. Twenty-five ratifications are needed for the commission to begin work. The Verkhovna Rada ratified the convention on 30 April 2026. The commission will review the claims from the register on their merits and determine the amount of compensation in each case.

National programs. Individuals have eRecovery (єВідновлення), which covers owners of homes damaged or destroyed in hostilities after 24 February 2022. Owners of damaged homes get money for repairs, minor or major. Owners of destroyed homes get a housing certificate to buy a new one. Applications go through Diia, an administrative services centre, or a notary, and a commission decides within 30 calendar days. As of 10 October 2026, 273,169 families had received UAH 160.9 billion in total, according to the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development.

Businesses have had a war risk insurance program since 1 January 2026. It rests on Government Resolution No. 1541 and is run by the Export Credit Agency (ECA), whose mandate has already been expanded to cover insurance for domestic investments against war risks. Enterprises in high-risk regions can receive direct compensation for destroyed or damaged assets, such as buildings and equipment, up to UAH 10 million at launch. Businesses that buy war risk policies in Ukraine get part of their premiums back, up to UAH 1 million a year. Only property already enrolled in the program on the date of damage qualifies.

The courts. The Supreme Court has established a practice that allows Ukrainian courts to hear individual claims against Russia for damage caused by armed aggression, without applying state immunity. However, enforcing such judgments is difficult, so victims often turn to state and international mechanisms.

What the system lacks

Yermak says:

“We need lawyers who can work across several levels of law at once: Ukrainian legislation, European regulation and international procedures. And this is where we run into the reform of the legal profession. Under the Rule of Law Roadmap, the Law on the Bar and Legal Practice must be adopted by the end of 2026. How it is written will determine whether the profession gets the independence, legal privilege, and training standards it needs to do this work. At the same time, in a government working group of 27 people, the UNBA holds only one seat.”

Independence plays an important role here: in compensation cases, individuals or companies face official bodies. The lawyer’s role is to challenge a decision without fearing for their own position. In Yermak’s view, this requires upholding legal privilege and adherence to credible professional standards.

The register contains around 190,000 claims, each with supporting documents. Andriy Yermak notes that at this scale, legal practice can be transformed by modern technology. AI, which is now spreading into almost every area of life, can reshape legal analysis and the review of large volumes of data. Today’s lawyers are expected to work properly with data summaries, protect their clients’ confidential information, and keep professional judgment in their own hands. Looking ahead, Yermak believes this raises questions about training the next generation of lawyers: for them, professional standards will cover this practice in both compensation cases and other areas of legal work.

The experience of “Advokat+”

The “Advokat+” initiative, created by Yermak, shows that the profession can scale up quickly. Ukrainian attorneys, often pro bono, help service members and their families with procedures, applications, and complaints. Yermak is convinced that if the profession could organize mass assistance for service members, it can do the same for those affected by destruction. All it needs is training and clear rules.

In the lawyer’s view, several steps are worth taking in this direction:

1. Create training programs for lawyers on working with international compensation mechanisms, including filing claims with the register and working with the future commission.
2. Develop standards for handling evidence: how to document damage, store materials, and prepare a document package that meets international bodies’ requirements.
3. Ensure the UNBA participates in drafting the bar law so the profession’s institutional experience is reflected in the final text.
4. Enshrine legal privilege and the lawyer’s independence in law. A claimant gives a lawyer information about their property, income, and the circumstances of the loss. Without a guarantee of confidentiality, this kind of trusting work is impossible.

The result would be a system in which the scale of damage has been measured, the register accepts claims, and the commission is created. But between an entry in the register and an actual payout lies a path every claimant must walk. Without a trained, independent, and protected profession, the right to compensation will remain formal.

Belgian investigators have searched properties associated with relatives and associates of Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi in an inquiry into alleged laundering of mining revenues, bringing renewed scrutiny to financial links between the two countries.

Belgian police have conducted searches at several properties in Brussels and its surrounding areas as part of an investigation into allegations that money diverted from the Democratic Republic of Congo’s mining sector was laundered through Belgium.

The searches, carried out on 15th October, reportedly involved homes associated with relatives and individuals close to Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi. Belgian prosecutors confirmed that searches had taken place but did not publicly identify those concerned, while the Congolese presidency declined to comment.

The investigation follows a complaint lodged in Belgium in 2025 by civil society organisations from Katanga, the mineral-rich region of south-eastern Congo. Their lawyers, Bernard Maingain and Hervé Diakese, allege that mining revenues which should have benefited Congolese communities were instead diverted and channelled through financial arrangements involving individuals with connections to Belgium.

The allegations have not been established in court. The searches form part of an investigation, and their execution does not establish criminal responsibility on the part of the individuals or organisations whose premises were examined.

Mining revenues under scrutiny

Congo is one of the world’s most important suppliers of copper and cobalt, minerals essential to electric vehicles, batteries, electronics and other advanced industrial products. Its mineral resources also occupy an increasingly important position in the European Union’s effort to diversify strategic supply chains.

Yet the financial arrangements surrounding mineral extraction have repeatedly generated controversy over public accountability, the distribution of revenues and the relationship between political authorities and commercial interests.

The Belgian inquiry concerns an especially sensitive question: whether funds originating from Congo’s mining economy were transferred into the European financial system under circumstances that could constitute money laundering.

According to the details of the investigation published on Thursday, the original complainants maintain that money linked to mining operations was diverted from its intended beneficiaries and used to benefit people connected to the Congolese leadership.

The proceedings are particularly significant because Belgian courts can investigate alleged laundering through Belgian financial structures even when the suspected underlying misconduct occurred abroad, subject to the applicable jurisdictional requirements.

Investigators will need to establish the origin of the funds, the route they allegedly followed and whether those involved knew or should have known that the money represented proceeds of criminal activity.

Belgium’s relationship with Congo

The investigation also has a diplomatic dimension. Belgium ruled Congo until independence in 1960, and the countries retain extensive commercial, political and personal connections.

Brussels remains an important centre for Congolese political and business networks, making Belgium a potentially relevant jurisdiction when investigators examine suspected financial movements connected to the country.

At European level, the inquiry comes as the EU attempts to strengthen relationships with mineral-producing countries while reducing its dependence on concentrated supply chains.

The European Commission’s cooperation programme with the Democratic Republic of Congo specifically identifies responsible sourcing, transparency, due diligence and action against illegal trafficking in raw materials as areas for cooperation.

These commitments have practical consequences for European businesses seeking greater access to copper and cobalt. Investment and supply arrangements depend not only on access to mineral deposits but also on the reliability of commercial records, ownership structures and the institutions responsible for supervising mining revenues.

A money-laundering investigation involving politically connected individuals therefore raises questions extending beyond Congo’s internal affairs.

Implications for European financial supervision

Belgium has recently joined other EU member states in adopting additional measures intended to recover criminal assets and strengthen cross-border cooperation against illicit financial activity.

As EU Today reported on 14th October, European governments have endorsed new international arrangements designed to improve their ability to trace and recover assets associated with serious crime.

The Congo investigation concerns an existing criminal inquiry rather than the application of those newly agreed arrangements. Nevertheless, both developments illustrate the importance of financial intelligence, access to ownership records and cooperation between prosecutors when suspected proceeds move across jurisdictions.

For investigators, the central task will be tracing the alleged flow of money and determining whether financial transactions in Belgium conceal proceeds unlawfully obtained elsewhere.

For Congo, the proceedings arrive during a period of serious domestic instability, including renewed armed confrontation in the east of the country and growing political uncertainty surrounding its leadership.

Former president Joseph Kabila’s involvement in a new opposition alliance has intensified that confrontation, complicating Tshisekedi’s political position as his administration faces continuing security and economic pressures.

The Belgian authorities have not announced any findings establishing that President Tshisekedi personally participated in wrongdoing. The next important developments will be whether investigators identify specific transactions, bring charges or expand the inquiry to additional individuals or corporate structures.

Main Image: Kremlin, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=84821955

Former ENRC Chief Executive Says Unresolved Financial Obligations Could Raise Questions About Kazakhstan’s International Business Reputation.

Following his interview with EU Today, Felix Jeff Vulis discusses his outstanding financial claims, his relationship with Kazakhstan and why he intends to bring the matter to the attention of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.

For more than three decades, Felix Jeff Vulis has maintained close professional ties with Kazakhstan, a country whose transformation into a major international mining and industrial economy he witnessed firsthand.

His relationship with Kazakhstan began in the 1990s, when he helped introduce the country’s economic potential to American investors. In 2001, he joined Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation (ENRC), eventually becoming Chief Operating Officer and then Chief Executive Officer.

Under his leadership and that of his colleagues, ENRC expanded internationally, listed on the London Stock Exchange in 2007 and entered the FTSE 100, becoming one of Kazakhstan’s most prominent industrial companies.

But the relationship between Vulis and the group that subsequently became Eurasian Resources Group (ERG) has taken a different direction.

In a September interview with EU Today, Vulis described his years at ENRC, the challenges of corporate governance and the impact of the British Serious Fraud Office investigation, which ended in 2023 without charges.

He also raised a question that had remained largely outside public discussion: financial and contractual obligations that he believes ERG and related entities have failed to honor.

The first interview concluded with Vulis maintaining that ending a corporate position would not eliminate previously established financial obligations.

Now, in this proposed continuation, Vulis addresses the outstanding claims more directly and explains why he intends to seek the attention of Kazakhstan’s highest political authorities.

The unresolved financial questions

EU Today: In your previous interview, you spoke about financial obligations that you believe remain outstanding. What exactly are you referring to?

Felix Vulis: Throughout my many years with ENRC, I held significant executive responsibilities and worked under various contractual and financial arrangements.

My position is that certain obligations arising from those arrangements have not been fulfilled. These matters include remuneration and other financial entitlements associated with my professional relationship with the group.

I believe the relevant documentation should be reviewed and the legitimate outstanding obligations settled.

EU Today: Are we talking about a substantial amount of money?

Felix Vulis: I would prefer not to discuss specific figures publicly at this stage. There are financial calculations, contractual documents and correspondence that need to be considered.

This is not simply about a number. It is about respecting agreements and commitments.

EU Today: Has ERG been given an opportunity to resolve these matters privately?

Felix Vulis: My preference has always been to resolve outstanding issues through professional discussions rather than public confrontation.

I believe that an agreement remains possible if the relevant parties are prepared to examine the documentation and engage constructively.

But after so many years, I also believe that unresolved obligations cannot simply remain unanswered indefinitely.

Why the president of Kazakhstan?

EU Today: You have indicated that you intend to bring this matter to the attention of Kazakhstan’s President, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Why?

Felix Vulis: Because Kazakhstan is not an ordinary country in my professional life.

My relationship with Kazakhstan began long before I joined ENRC. I have spent decades working with its industries, institutions and people.

I have enormous respect for the country and its economic achievements.

At the same time, the Republic of Kazakhstan is an important shareholder in ERG. I believe that shareholders, particularly those representing a sovereign state, have a legitimate interest in ensuring that companies associated with them respect their financial and contractual commitments.

I intend to inform President Tokayev about my situation and explain why I believe these outstanding obligations deserve attention.

EU Today: Are you asking the President to intervene personally in a private financial dispute?

Felix Vulis: I am not asking the President to act as a judge or to assume responsibility for obligations that legally belong to a corporate entity.

I am asking for attention to a matter that I believe deserves a fair and professional review.

Kazakhstan has worked hard to establish itself as a reliable destination for international investment. That reputation depends, among other things, on confidence that legitimate business commitments will be respected.

EU Today: Do you believe the matter could damage Kazakhstan’s international reputation?

Felix Vulis: I sincerely hope it does not.

Under President Tokayev, Kazakhstan has made important efforts to strengthen its international standing, attract foreign investment and build confidence among its economic partners.

I recognize and appreciate those efforts.

However, when a former chief executive of one of the country’s most internationally recognized industrial groups raises unresolved financial claims, questions can arise about corporate governance and the treatment of contractual obligations.

I believe the best way to avoid unnecessary reputational questions is to examine the matter fairly and resolve legitimate claims.

The international dimension

EU Today: You are an American citizen. Could this matter also be raised in the United States or Europe?

Felix Vulis: As an American citizen, I have the right to protect my legitimate financial and contractual interests through the appropriate legal channels.

If a reasonable settlement cannot be reached, I intend to explore every lawful avenue available to me, including bringing the matter to the attention of relevant European institutions in Brussels and appropriate authorities in the United States.

That may include the US Department of State and the US Department of the Treasury, where there is a relevant basis for doing so.

I would much prefer that such steps prove unnecessary.

EU Today: Would you also approach European political institutions?

Felix Vulis: I reserve the right to raise the matter with appropriate European institutions, including the European Council, through lawful procedures and established channels.

My objective would be to explain my position and seek appropriate consideration, not to turn a private commercial matter into an international political confrontation.

EU Today: Some people might interpret these statements as pressure on ERG. How would you respond?

Felix Vulis: I am simply explaining the options that may be available to someone seeking to protect his contractual rights.

I have no interest in harming Kazakhstan or creating unnecessary difficulties for its international partners.

But I also do not believe that a person should be expected to abandon legitimate financial claims simply because the other party is a large and influential corporation.

Kazakhstan beyond ERG

EU Today: Has this experience changed your opinion of Kazakhstan as a place to do business?

Felix Vulis: No. My respect for Kazakhstan remains unchanged.

I still believe it has extraordinary economic potential, particularly in mining, critical minerals, energy, infrastructure and industrial development.

Its strategic position between Europe and Asia creates opportunities that extend far beyond the extraction of natural resources.

The country has the industrial experience, human capital and geographic advantages necessary to attract significant long-term investment.

That is precisely why I believe questions of contractual reliability and corporate governance matter so much.

EU Today: What message would you like President Tokayev to take from your letter?

Felix Vulis: That I remain a friend of Kazakhstan.

I am proud of the work we accomplished there, and I appreciate the efforts of the President to strengthen the country’s international credibility.

I hope the relevant parties will examine my claims seriously and help facilitate a fair resolution within the appropriate corporate and legal framework.

The strongest message Kazakhstan can send to international investors is that legitimate commitments are respected and contractual obligations are fulfilled.

The final question

EU Today: What would you say directly to ERG’s leadership today?

Felix Vulis: I would say that there is still an opportunity to resolve these matters professionally.

We have a long shared history. I spent an important part of my life helping build this company into an internationally recognized industrial group.

I would prefer to conclude our outstanding business through dialogue, mutual respect and fulfillment of legitimate obligations.

But I also intend to protect my rights.

I believe the responsible course is to sit down, review the facts, address the outstanding financial questions and reach a fair conclusion.

EU Today: What would you say to your former employees in Kazakhstan?

Felix Vulis: Thank you.

People sometimes talk about corporations as if corporations build factories.

They don’t.

People build factories.

People operate furnaces. People go underground. People run power stations. Engineers solve problems at three in the morning.

Whatever disagreements exist today cannot erase what those people accomplished.

I remain extremely proud of having worked with them.

EU Today: After years of silence, why should ERG believe that this time is different?

Felix Vulis: Because I am speaking now.

For years I chose discretion.

That was a conscious choice, not an inability to speak.

I continue to believe that a negotiated solution is better for everybody: for me, for ERG, for its shareholders and for everyone associated with our shared history.

But negotiation requires two sides.

EU Today: What exactly do you want?

Felix Vulis: A table.

The appropriate representatives.

The documents.

A serious discussion about everything that remains outstanding.

And then a comprehensive settlement that allows everybody to close this chapter.

EU Today: An apology?

Felix Vulis: No.

A solution.

EU Today: Revenge?

Felix Vulis: Absolutely not.

Revenge is emotional.

This is business.

EU Today: And if ERG refuses?

Felix Vulis: Then I will continue to defend my rights through every lawful mechanism available to me.

And where I am legally entitled to speak about my own experience, I reserve the right to do so.

EU Today: Is that a threat?

Felix Vulis: No.

It is clarity.

There is still an opportunity to resolve this privately and professionally.

I would prefer that.

After more than twenty years of shared history, I think sitting around a table is a much more intelligent ending than spending the next several years sitting opposite each other in courtrooms.

EU Today: If the people running ERG read only one sentence from this interview, what should it be?

Felix Vulis: Call me.

Let’s sit down and finish this properly.

Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa said the EU would maintain pressure on Moscow, after the United States eased restrictions linked to Russian diesel exports. The statements came as Volodymyr Zelenskyy joined EU leaders in Brussels for talks on Ukraine.

The EU will not lift sanctions on Russia while its war against Ukraine continues, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa said on Friday. Their statements came ahead of discussions at the European Council, where leaders were due to consider further support for Ukraine and the needs of its critical infrastructure before winter. The assurances followed Washington’s move to ease sanctions pressure in connection with a deal involving Russian diesel supplies.

Von der Leyen said the EU had supported the energy truce announced by US President Donald Trump, but accused Russia of failing to observe it. “We have seen that Russia did not respect it. Not a single minute. Instead, Russia escalated. We have to increase the pressure on Russia,” she said. She added that the Commission was working on a 22nd sanctions package and that the bloc would not lift any sanctions unless Russia stopped the war.

Costa also rejected any reduction in pressure. “We will not cancel any sanctions until Russia stops the war,” he said, calling for stronger support for Ukraine and increased pressure on Moscow to secure a genuine ceasefire. The statements set out the position of the Commission and European Council presidents; they were not, in themselves, a new sanctions decision by EU member states.

The US and EU sanctions regimes are separate. Washington’s decision concerns US restrictions associated with Russian diesel exports, while EU measures are adopted by the member states. Moscow said it had resumed diesel exports under the arrangement with the Trump administration, a development that has prompted concern in Kyiv and European capitals. The reported resumption of Russian shipments has brought renewed attention to the effect of energy revenue on the Kremlin’s ability to finance its war.

The Commission describes EU sanctions as a means of reducing Russia’s capacity to fund the war, imposing costs on its political leadership and weakening its economic base. The measures cover energy, trade and finance, alongside listings of individuals, companies and organisations. The EU’s sanctions framework against Russia has been expanded through successive packages since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The leaders’ statements came as Ukraine prepared for another winter of Russian attacks on energy infrastructure. The European Council meeting agenda included continued support for Ukraine and the operational needs of its critical infrastructure. Von der Leyen said the EU would continue to support Ukraine through the winter. She also referred to progress on Ukraine’s accession process, saying the remaining negotiation clusters should be opened by the end of the year.

The EU has recently added measures targeting Russia’s military-industrial sector. In October, it adopted a package of listings aimed at companies and individuals connected to the country’s war effort, as covered in EU Today’s report on the latest sanctions. The diesel arrangement has also followed earlier tensions over the use of sanctions and energy policy, including the US deal with Moscow.

The EU’s stated position is that its sanctions will remain in place until Russia ends the war. The Commission is preparing further measures, while any new package will require agreement among member states. Friday’s statements did not change the existing regime, but made clear that the US decision on Russian diesel would not, by itself, prompt Brussels to ease EU restrictions.

A European Commission survey has found widespread adoption of artificial intelligence among smaller businesses, but considerable reluctance to allow automated systems to make decisions about employees. The findings expose a growing divide between technological investment and confidence in workplace automation.

Artificial intelligence is becoming established across European businesses, but almost half of companies remain unwilling to trust automated systems when decisions concern their employees, according to a European Commission survey published on 14th October.

The Eurobarometer findings show that 42 per cent of the small and medium-sized enterprises and mid-cap companies surveyed already use artificial intelligence or algorithmic management systems, although most deployment remains limited or experimental. A further 21 per cent intend to introduce such technologies in the future.

Despite this expanding adoption, 49 per cent of respondents said they did not trust artificial intelligence or automated systems to make staff-related decisions. The figures suggest that companies increasingly distinguish between using technology to improve business processes and delegating managerial responsibility to software.

The Commission’s survey of European businesses was conducted between March and April 2026, involving approximately 12,826 telephone interviews with company leaders across the EU’s 27 member states.

Businesses prefer assistance to automation

The survey provides a more detailed picture of workplace AI than conventional statistics measuring whether companies have adopted the technology.

Among the businesses interviewed, customer service and client relations were the most commonly reported areas of application, accounting for 47 per cent. Monitoring employee performance and productivity accounted for 36 per cent, while logistics, planning and staff scheduling represented 30 per cent.

These functions differ substantially in their consequences for workers and managers.

A system that helps organise deliveries or forecasts customer demand may improve efficiency without directly determining employees’ working conditions. Software that evaluates performance, allocates shifts or recommends staffing changes can influence employment decisions and requires a different level of organisational supervision.

The survey found that 61 per cent of companies considered AI useful in supporting decisions. However, human involvement remained central: 90 per cent of respondents reported that people continued to make decisions, while fully automated decisions accounted for only 2 per cent.

The results undermine the assumption that adopting AI necessarily means transferring control of business operations to autonomous systems.

For many companies, the immediate commercial value lies in processing information more rapidly, identifying patterns and reducing administrative workloads rather than removing human management entirely.

Investment costs remain a substantial barrier

Financial and organisational obstacles continue to limit adoption.

Half of the companies surveyed cited high investment costs, while 49 per cent identified legal uncertainty and 48 per cent pointed to insufficient expertise.

These findings are particularly relevant to small businesses, which frequently lack dedicated technology teams, extensive data infrastructure or the resources to evaluate complex software systems independently.

For such businesses, purchasing AI tools is only one component of the investment. Implementation can also require employee training, changes to internal procedures, data-security assessments and continuing technical support.

The findings add a workplace dimension to concerns raised in EU Today’s earlier examination of Europe’s AI productivity gap, which identified investment, computing capacity and organisational restructuring as obstacles to translating adoption into higher productivity.

A company may purchase sophisticated software without necessarily achieving corresponding improvements in performance. Those improvements depend on whether the technology is integrated into everyday operations and whether employees have the skills to use it effectively.

Brussels prepares further workplace legislation

The survey arrives while the European Commission is considering additional rules on algorithmic management through its proposed Quality Jobs Act.

The initiative is intended to address working conditions, workers’ rights and the increasing use of automated systems in managing employees.

A consultation launched in July asked European employers and trade unions to consider transparency in automated decisions, excessive workplace monitoring and the responsibilities of companies using AI.

The second consultation phase ended in September, allowing social partners to propose negotiated arrangements before the Commission determines its next legislative steps.

The broader regulatory framework is already changing. As EU Today explained when the AI Act entered a new enforcement phase, Brussels has begun enforcing certain obligations for general-purpose AI models, while important requirements for high-risk applications, including employment-related systems, follow a later timetable.

Stand-alone high-risk systems are scheduled to face the relevant obligations from December 2027, with another deadline in August 2028 for high-risk systems embedded in regulated products.

The distinction matters for employers planning investments today. Existing data-protection and employment obligations continue to apply, but some of the AI Act’s more specific compliance requirements remain subject to transition periods.

The Commission’s latest survey indicates that businesses are already exercising caution independently of these future obligations. Their reluctance to automate sensitive staff decisions suggests that accountability, reliability and employee confidence will remain important factors in determining how extensively artificial intelligence is deployed.

For Brussels, the challenge is to establish workable rules for that transition without making implementation prohibitively expensive for smaller companies, which account for much of Europe’s employment and commercial activity.

Eurozone industrial production contracted for a second consecutive month in August, with Belgium recording one of the steepest declines. The latest figures expose continuing weaknesses in Europe’s manufacturing sector as governments confront high energy costs and growing international competition.

Industrial production in the eurozone fell by 0.5 per cent in August compared with July, according to figures released by Eurostat on Thursday, adding to evidence that European manufacturers are struggling to sustain a recovery amid rising energy costs and uncertain demand.

The decline followed a revised contraction of 0.3 per cent in July, while output across the wider European Union fell by 0.3 per cent in August. Compared with the same month last year, eurozone production was down 1.1 per cent, against a decline of 0.2 per cent across the EU as a whole.

Belgium recorded the largest monthly contraction among the member states covered by the release, at 5.1 per cent, followed by Ireland at 3.1 per cent and Portugal at 2 per cent.

The latest industrial production figures underline the uneven performance of Europe’s factories, with losses concentrated in some economies and sectors while others continue to expand.

Manufacturing weakness spreads unevenly

The sectoral breakdown presents a particularly revealing picture of the pressures facing European industry.

Production of intermediate goods, which include materials and components supplied to other manufacturers, declined by 0.8 per cent across the eurozone in August. Energy production fell by 0.6 per cent, while output of non-durable consumer goods contracted by 2.7 per cent.

By contrast, capital goods production increased by 0.4 per cent, indicating that activity in equipment and machinery manufacturing remained comparatively resilient.

The divergence was also pronounced between member states. Industrial production increased by 6.5 per cent in Sweden, 4.3 per cent in Estonia and 2.6 per cent in the Netherlands.

On an annual basis, Ireland recorded a 15 per cent decline, followed by Belgium at 7.1 per cent and Bulgaria at 5.4 per cent. The Netherlands, meanwhile, registered growth of 9.8 per cent compared with August 2025.

These variations make it difficult to describe Europe’s industrial position as a single, uniform downturn. National production figures reflect different industrial structures, production cycles and exposure to particular markets.

Ireland’s figures, for example, can be influenced by changes in output among large multinational enterprises, while Belgium’s manufacturing economy is particularly exposed to developments in chemicals, pharmaceuticals and energy-intensive production.

Nevertheless, the simultaneous contraction of industrial output across the eurozone reinforces concerns about the strength of the European economic recovery.

Energy prices and industrial competitiveness

The continuing disruption of global energy supplies has complicated the position of European manufacturers, particularly businesses that depend on predictable electricity and gas prices.

The Middle East conflict has increased uncertainty over energy costs and transportation, making production planning more difficult for companies operating with substantial fuel, heating or electricity requirements.

As EU Today reported earlier this week, Brussels has already moved to delay certain methane requirements for energy imports as governments seek to limit additional pressure on gas supplies.

The decision reflects a wider debate over whether the EU’s existing regulatory framework adequately accounts for the international cost disadvantages facing European industrial producers.

Chemicals, metals, fertilisers and other energy-intensive industries must compete with manufacturers operating in markets where energy costs and regulatory requirements can differ considerably.

The problem extends beyond immediate profitability. Persistently unfavourable operating costs can affect decisions about new factories, maintenance, modernisation and the location of future investment.

Those decisions may have longer-lasting economic consequences than monthly fluctuations in production.

Industrial policy under political pressure

The figures arrive as EU governments debate the future of European industrial policy, including the treatment of imported products and the conditions under which companies should qualify for public support.

Recent disagreements over proposed European-content requirements have illustrated divisions between governments seeking greater protection for EU manufacturers and those concerned that restrictive rules could increase costs or disrupt supply chains.

In a recent warning over the proposed Made in Europe framework, Mercedes-Benz chief executive Ola Källenius argued against excluding Britain from industrial arrangements intended to strengthen European production.

The debate is particularly consequential for automotive manufacturers whose supply chains extend across EU borders and into neighbouring countries.

Meanwhile, the proposed EU budget for 2028–2034 has become another focus of disagreement, with member states questioning how much funding should be devoted to industrial competitiveness, strategic technologies and energy infrastructure.

The immediate economic issue is whether European factories can recover production as energy costs remain elevated and external demand fluctuates.

Eurostat’s August figures do not establish how individual government policies have affected output, nor do they determine whether the contraction will continue. They do, however, show that industrial activity entered the autumn with limited momentum.

The next industrial production release, covering September, is scheduled for 16 November and will provide an indication of whether the late-summer weakness persisted into the final quarter of the year.

Nearly 93 million EU residents were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2025, with the latest regional figures revealing sharp differences both between and within member states. The findings raise questions about how effectively European investment is addressing longstanding economic inequality.

More than one in five people living in the European Union remained at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2025, according to Eurostat figures that reveal substantial differences in living conditions across the bloc’s regions.

Approximately 92.7 million people, representing 20.9 per cent of the EU population, fell into the category during the year. Although the total declined slightly from 93.3 million in 2024, regional data show that economic vulnerability remains heavily concentrated in particular areas.

In 26 of the 243 EU regions for which figures were available, at least 31 per cent of residents were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. At the opposite end of the distribution, 24 regions recorded rates below 13 per cent.

The regional figures published by Eurostat show that the highest rate was recorded in French Guiana, at 54.8 per cent, while Slovakia’s capital region, Bratislavský kraj, recorded the lowest at 2.9 per cent.

National averages conceal substantial differences

The contrast is not confined to richer and poorer member states. In several countries, internal regional disparities are more pronounced than comparisons of national economic performance might suggest.

Within Slovakia, the proportion of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in Východné Slovensko was 9.1 times the rate recorded in the Bratislava region.

In Italy, the equivalent rate in Calabria was 8.1 times that of Valle d’Aosta, illustrating the persistent economic divide between parts of the country’s north and south.

These differences are recorded in Eurostat’s regional living-conditions statistics, which provide a more detailed picture than EU-wide or national averages.

The comparison requires care. Eurostat’s measure of poverty or social exclusion combines three indicators: relative income poverty, severe material and social deprivation, and very low household work intensity.

Consequently, the figures do not mean that every person included lacks sufficient income to meet basic needs. They identify people experiencing at least one of the defined forms of economic disadvantage.

Differences in income, employment, household composition and living costs can also influence the results, making direct comparisons between metropolitan areas, rural districts and overseas territories more complicated than a single percentage might imply.

Nevertheless, the scale of regional variation illustrates why national economic growth does not automatically produce equivalent improvements in living standards throughout a country.

Poverty reduction remains an EU commitment

The European Union has set a target of reducing the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by at least 15 million by 2030, including at least five million children.

The limited annual reduction recorded in 2025 indicates that progress remains modest relative to the scale of that objective.

The problem has become increasingly important for European policymakers as housing costs, energy prices and employment insecurity affect household finances in different ways across member states.

In May, the Commission presented an anti-poverty and housing policy package, bringing together measures concerning social inclusion, housing exclusion and child poverty.

The regional figures indicate that such initiatives will need to account for considerable differences in local economic conditions.

Policies designed for prosperous urban economies may have limited relevance in regions characterised by low employment, weak infrastructure or dependence on a small number of industries. Conversely, economic activity and relatively high average incomes do not necessarily prevent serious poverty problems within major cities.

Cohesion funding becomes a central question

The findings have direct relevance to negotiations over the EU’s next long-term budget, covering 2028 to 2034.

The European Commission’s proposal envisages roughly €450 billion for economic, social and territorial cohesion under national and regional partnership plans, including at least €218 billion for less developed regions.

The proposed structure would combine several funding programmes within broader national plans, with the Commission arguing that the changes could improve coordination and make spending more responsive to local requirements.

However, regional authorities have expressed concern that greater national control over financial allocations could weaken their influence over investment decisions.

As EU Today reported earlier this week, representatives of European regions have warned that the proposed budget arrangements could concentrate decision-making in national capitals.

The latest poverty statistics provide a concrete context for that disagreement. Investment priorities may differ considerably between a region experiencing industrial decline, an agricultural area with limited employment opportunities and a metropolitan district facing severe housing affordability problems.

A central question for EU institutions is therefore how funding allocations will reflect measurable regional needs rather than being driven primarily by national political negotiations.

The Commission maintains that its proposed partnership arrangements will protect allocations for less developed regions and continue supporting social inclusion.

Negotiations over the financial framework will determine how those commitments are translated into enforceable rules, while Eurostat’s figures provide a statistical basis against which future claims of progress can be assessed.

With 92.7 million people still at risk, the debate is not simply about the overall size of the EU budget. It is also about whether spending reaches the communities where economic disadvantage remains most concentrated.

Brussels has criticised the Palestinian Authority’s decision to postpone presidential and legislative elections, warning that democratic legitimacy is essential to Palestinian state-building and institutional reform. The delay raises questions about the political conditions attached to substantial European financial assistance.

The European Union has expressed serious concern over the Palestinian Authority’s decision to postpone legislative and presidential elections until September 2027, placing renewed pressure on President Mahmoud Abbas over democratic accountability and the future of Palestinian political institutions.

In a statement issued on 14th October, the EU said it regretted the postponement of legislative elections previously scheduled for 28th November 2026 and a presidential contest expected in early 2027.

The decision extends an electoral impasse that has lasted for nearly two decades. Palestinians last voted in legislative elections in 2006, while Abbas was elected president in January 2005.

The EU’s formal statement called for both contests to be organised as soon as conditions allow, stressing that credible elections are necessary for representative institutions and political accountability.

 

The intervention is particularly significant because the EU remains one of the Palestinian Authority’s most important financial supporters and has made institutional reform a central element of its approach to Palestinian state-building.

Abbas cites obstacles to holding elections

The postponement was announced through the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s executive structures following consultations over the conditions necessary to conduct voting in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

 

Palestinian officials have cited restrictions imposed by Israel, continuing insecurity and difficulties involving election materials, observers and access to voting locations.

Israel has disputed the suggestion that it was responsible for preventing the elections from proceeding.

The practical difficulties are substantial. The Palestinian Authority exercises limited administrative control in parts of the West Bank, while Hamas has maintained de facto control over Gaza since 2007, despite subsequent changes in the territory’s security and governance arrangements.

Holding elections across geographically separated territories under different political and security conditions would require agreements extending well beyond the Palestinian Authority’s existing administrative powers.

Those obstacles do not, however, resolve the separate question of democratic legitimacy.

Abbas’s original presidential term expired in 2009, and subsequent extensions of his authority have not been confirmed through a new presidential election. The absence of regular legislative elections has similarly weakened the representative basis of Palestinian governance.

The latest postponement means that Palestinians must wait at least another year for an opportunity to choose their national political leadership.

Brussels links financial assistance to reform

For the European Union, the delay raises questions about the relationship between political reform and financial support.

In April 2025, the European Commission announced a proposed multiannual programme worth up to €1.6 billion for Palestinian recovery and institutional development between 2025 and 2027.

The programme includes approximately €620 million in direct financial support to the Palestinian Authority, alongside assistance for reconstruction, public services and economic recovery.

European officials have repeatedly stressed that part of this support is linked to implementation of agreed reforms, including improvements in public financial management, transparency and administrative accountability.

Those priorities were central to the Brussels donor discussions previously examined by EU Today, where international partners considered how a reformed Palestinian Authority might assume a greater role in Gaza’s future governance.

The election postponement adds a political dimension to those financial arrangements.

The EU’s statement did not announce any suspension of funding, nor did it specify that electoral delays would automatically trigger financial penalties.

Instead, Brussels emphasised that continued assistance to the Palestinian Authority must accompany progress towards institutional reform and the development of credible representative structures.

That distinction matters because European financial assistance also supports public services and civilian needs, which could be affected by reductions in funding unrelated to the conduct of elections.

Elections and the two-state policy

The EU has consistently presented a functioning Palestinian administration as a necessary component of its support for a negotiated two-state settlement.

Its position depends on the existence of institutions capable of representing Palestinians, administering public services, exercising legitimate authority and negotiating internationally.

A prolonged absence of elections complicates that objective, particularly when Palestinian political factions remain divided over leadership and the future organisation of government.

The dispute also affects European discussions concerning Gaza’s reconstruction and its relationship with the West Bank.

Brussels has supported the eventual reunification of Palestinian governance under a reformed administration, but such arrangements face difficulties if the authority expected to assume responsibility lacks a renewed electoral mandate.

In its latest statement, the EU reiterated its willingness to support an eventual election process, including the deployment of an EU Election Observation Mission.

Such missions can provide independent assessments of electoral procedures, but their deployment depends on the necessary political arrangements, security conditions and access.

The European Union’s position now presents Abbas with a specific political demand: to establish conditions under which Palestinian voters can elect both a president and a legislature, rather than allowing temporary postponements to become a permanent substitute for elections.

For Brussels, the immediate question is how to pursue that demand while maintaining assistance to Palestinian institutions and civilians and supporting a diplomatic settlement.

The next test will be whether the Palestinian Authority produces a credible electoral timetable and the administrative arrangements needed to hold the postponed votes in September 2027.