By Gordon Duff for TID Iceland and the Russian Academy of Sciences
All links to previous Gospa News invetigation have been added in the aftermath
Let’s start with a simple question: What happens when you spend a trillion dollars building a shield, and the other guy builds a spear that goes right through it?
This isn’t a hypothetical. It’s 2026. And the answer is: you panic. Or you pretend it isn’t happening. Or you double down on the same policies that got you here and hope nobody notices.
America has chosen option three.
There’s a submarine out there. Actually, there are several. But one in particular — the Belgorod — has been the subject of more nervous whispering in Pentagon hallways than just about anything else. It’s a special-purpose submarine, which is military-speak for “we don’t really know what it does, but we’re pretty sure we don’t like it.”
It carries six Poseidon torpedoes. Each one, according to Russian sources, carries a 200-megaton nuclear warhead. That’s 1.2 gigatons of explosive power sitting on one submarine. For comparison, the entire world’s nuclear arsenal during the Cold War peaked at around 70,000 warheads with a combined yield of roughly 18,000 megatons.
The Belgorod carries six percent of that total destructive power on a single hull. Western analysts have spent years trying to talk this down. “Maybe it’s only 50 megatons.” “Maybe it’s just a test vehicle.” “Maybe the Russians are bluffing.”
Maybe. And maybe the moon is made of cheese.
The Soviet Union built a 100-megaton warhead in 1961 and detonated half of it just to prove they could. They scaled it down to 50 megatons because the bomber couldn’t carry the full version. The technology isn’t the problem. The engineering isn’t the problem. The only question was whether they wanted to build it. They did. They have. End of story.
But here’s where it gets interesting — and by “interesting,” I mean terrifying.
The Poseidon isn’t designed to destroy a city. It’s designed to destroy a coastline. The 200-megaton warhead isn’t for blast damage. It’s for the wave. A detonation of that size underwater, close to a coastal target, generates a tsunami measured in hundreds of feet. Not tens of feet. Hundreds.
You don’t need to hit New York. You need to hit fifty miles off the coast of New York. The wave does the rest. New York Harbor is gone. The ports are gone. The financial district is underwater. The same applies to Los Angeles, to Miami, to Norfolk — any coastal city with strategic importance.
This isn’t science fiction. It’s the stated purpose of the weapon. Russia has been remarkably straightforward about this. They built it to make coastal defenses irrelevant. And you know what? They’re right.
Six Poseidon torpedoes. Six coastal targets. One submarine.
The Belgorod reportedly left its base in the White Sea in October 2022. NATO lost track of it. It turned up later in the Barents Sea, surfaced, and waved hello. But in between? Nobody knows. That’s the point. A submarine designed to operate at depths over 1,000 meters, with a nuclear reactor that gives it effectively unlimited range, carrying six weapons that can end life as we know it on a continental scale
And what did America do? The CIA Director flew to Moscow and apparently had a chat. No meeting with Putin. Just a chat with the security services. “Please don’t do anything reckless,” presumably.
The Russians must have nodded politely and thought: “We have six Poseidons. What exactly are you going to do about it?”
Now let’s talk about speed. Specifically, 13,000 miles per hour.
That’s the reported speed of Russia’s hypersonic weapons. The Avangard glide vehicle. The Zircon cruise missile. The Kinzhal air-launched system. All of them travel at speeds that make interception functionally impossible.
Here’s why. Missile defense systems work on a very simple principle: detect, track, predict, intercept. You detect the missile. You track its trajectory. You calculate where it’s going to be. You launch an interceptor to meet it there.
This requires the target to follow a predictable path. A ballistic missile does that. It goes up, it goes down, and the math is straightforward. Hypersonic glide vehicles do not do that. They maneuver. They change direction. They change altitude. They zig. They zag. And they do all of this at 13,000 miles per hour.
Let me put that in perspective. A bullet from a high-powered rifle travels at around 2,000 miles per hour. A hypersonic weapon travels at six times that speed. By the time your radar detects it, tracks it, and computes an intercept trajectory, the weapon has already changed course three times. The intercept solution you computed is worthless. And there’s no time to compute a new one.
The math simply doesn’t work. You cannot intercept a maneuvering target at 13,000 miles per hour with current technology. You can’t do it with future technology, either, unless you invent something that breaks the laws of physics.
Now, the Pentagon has issued confident statements about being “on track” to develop anti-hypersonic defenses. They’ve awarded billions in contracts. They’ve held press conferences. They’ve assured Congress that the problem is being addressed.
This is what we call in the journalism trade: a comforting lie.
The people who run these programs know the truth. The physics is the physics. You can’t cheat it. You can throw money at it, and you can promise results, but at the end of the day, you’re trying to hit a bullet with a faster bullet, except the first bullet is actively dodging. Good luck with that.
And here’s the part that keeps strategic planners awake at night. Russia isn’t the only country developing these systems. China has them. North Korea has them. Iran has demonstrated hypersonic capabilities that Western analysts initially dismissed — until they saw the footage. Then they stopped dismissing it.
The Chinese AJX002 underwater drone is essentially a Poseidon clone. North Korea’s “Haeil” system does exactly what the Poseidon does, on a smaller scale. Iran’s hypersonic missile test in 2024 reportedly achieved speeds of over Mach 15 with terminal maneuvering.
The old rules of missile defense are dead. They just haven’t been buried yet.
Every country that develops these systems is making a simple calculation: we can’t match the United States in conventional military power. But we don’t need to. We just need one or two of these weapons. One is enough. One gets through, and the game changes.
And the United States cannot stop them. It cannot intercept them. It cannot defend against them. All it can do is promise retaliation. But retaliation against whom? The submarine that launched the Poseidon is already gone. The hypersonic missile came from a truck on a highway somewhere in a country the size of Iran. Good luck finding it. Good luck bombing it.
This is the new strategic reality. America’s missile defense shield — the one that cost a trillion dollars, the one that was supposed to make the nation safe — is effectively useless. It works against old technology. It does not work against new technology. It’s like building a castle wall to defend against arrows, while the enemy shows up with cannons.
Now we get to the part that nobody in Washington wants to discuss honestly.
Since 2022, the United States has provided tens of billions of dollars in military aid to Ukraine. Tanks. Artillery. Air defense systems. Missiles. Intelligence. Training. Logistics. All of it aimed at one goal: weakening Russia.
This is not an unreasonable policy. From America’s perspective, it makes perfect sense. Weaken a strategic rival without putting American boots on the ground. It’s cheap. It’s effective. It’s the kind of warfare the United States has been practicing for decades.
Here’s the problem: Russia is a nuclear power. And Russia is not Afghanistan. It’s not Iraq. It’s not Syria. It’s a country with 5,000 nuclear warheads, hypersonic weapons, Poseidon torpedoes, and a military doctrine that explicitly allows nuclear first-use in response to existential threats.
Ukraine has been conducting strikes inside Russian territory. Long-range drones hitting air bases. Missiles hitting infrastructure. Sabotage operations. Attacks on Russian border regions. These are not incidental. They are part of the Ukrainian war plan. And the United States has provided the intelligence and the weapons to make them possible.
From Russia’s perspective, this is not “helping Ukraine defend itself.” This is the United States arming a proxy to conduct attacks on Russian soil. This is an existential threat. And Russia has stated, repeatedly, that they will respond to existential threats with nuclear weapons.
This is not a bluff. This is not a negotiation tactic. This is Russian doctrine.
America’s conventional military forces are struggling. It’s an open secret that the Pentagon doesn’t discuss publicly, but the numbers don’t lie.
The defense industrial base in the United States is atrophied. The factories that produced tanks, artillery shells, and missiles in vast quantities during the Cold War are largely gone. Defense contractors prioritize high-tech, high-profit systems like fighter jets and stealth bombers. They don’t make conventional artillery shells in sufficient quantity.
They don’t make armored vehicles quickly. They don’t have the surge capacity for a major war.
The Army is struggling to meet recruitment goals. The Navy’s shipbuilding capacity is at a historic low. The Air Force is trying to field a new generation of fighters while maintaining an aging fleet. The logistics tail is enormous.
The cost of doing business is astronomical.
Meanwhile, Russia has put its economy on a war footing. Production of artillery shells is three times what it was before the war. Tank production has been restarted. Missile production continues around the clock. The Russian military is in the process of learning from its mistakes in Ukraine and rebuilding accordingly. And Russian air defenses — despite the criticism they’ve received from Western analysts — are actually quite effective. Russian sources claim their air defense systems are 25 times more effective than anything the United States fields. That’s probably an exaggeration. But not by as much as you’d hope.
Now imagine a conventional conflict between the United States and Russia. Not a nuclear exchange. Just a conventional war. Where is America going to get the ammunition? The spare parts? The replacement vehicles? The surge capacity? The answer is: it won’t. The supply chains are gone. The factories are gone. The workforce is gone.
And Russia knows this. Russia also knows that America’s only credible response to a conventional defeat would be nuclear escalation. And Russia has the systems to survive that escalation and retaliate. The Poseidon. The Avangard.
The Zircon. The Sarmat. The air defenses. This is not a fair fight. This is not a contest that America can win.
Now we come to the current American president. Donald Trump. A man who has built his political career on negotiating from what he calls “strength.” A man who threatens, cajoles, blusters, and insists he can make deals that nobody else can make. A man who genuinely believes that his personal relationships with foreign leaders can overcome strategic realities.
The problem is, strategic reality doesn’t care about relationships. It doesn’t care about deal-making. It doesn’t care about bluster.
Trump has threatened Russia with military force. He has said he would “destroy” the Russian economy. He has suggested that America’s missile defenses are so effective that Russia should be intimidated. He has mocked Putin publicly. He has talked about the strength of the American military as if it were 1990 instead of 2026.
And the Russians are watching. They’re watching the American military struggle with recruitment. They’re watching the defense industrial base struggle to produce shells. They’re watching the missile defense system fail again and again in tests. They’re watching the hypersonic weapons that America has been promising for years remain stubbornly in development, while Russia’s systems are already deployed.
From Moscow’s perspective, Trump’s bluster is empty. It’s noise. It’s the sound of a man who doesn’t understand the strategic reality he’s confronting. And the Russians are patient. They’ve been patient for decades. They can wait out another American presidency. They can wait out the political cycle. They’ve been playing this game a long time.
But here’s the danger: Trump is not rational. Or rather, he’s rational in a way that’s unpredictable. He might actually believe his own threats. He might actually think he can bluff his way to victory. And bluffing against a country with a 200-megaton Poseidon torpedo is not a winning strategy.
Americans, by and large, don’t understand how Russians think. They assume that Russians want what Americans want. Peace. Prosperity. Freedom. Democracy. They assume that trade and engagement will eventually win the day.
They assume that economic pressure will force Russia to change its behavior.
This is all wrong. Russians have a fundamentally different worldview. They have been invaded three times in the last two hundred years by European armies. They have suffered tens of millions of casualties. They have starved. They have been betrayed by allies. They have been encircled, threatened, and pushed to the brink. And they have survived.
The Russian mindset is survivalist. It’s existential. Russians don’t think in terms of “winning.” They think in terms of “not losing.” They don’t care about prosperity if it comes at the cost of security. They will endure hardship, poverty, and sacrifice, because they have done it before. And when they are threatened, they respond with overwhelming force.
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This is what America doesn’t understand. When Russia says “this is an existential threat,” they mean it. When they say “we have red lines,” they mean it. When they say “we will use nuclear weapons if necessary,” they mean it. It’s not a game. It’s not a negotiation tactic. It’s survival.
And America keeps pushing. Every shipment of weapons to Ukraine. Every intelligence assist. Every drone strike on Russian soil. Every threat from Donald Trump. It’s pushing the Russians closer to the edge. And the Russians have weapons that America cannot stop.
The Poseidon Deployment Question: Have They Already Done It?
Now we come to the question that nobody in Washington wants to ask: Has Russia already deployed Poseidon torpedoes off America’s coasts?
There’s no way to know. That’s the whole point of the system. It operates at depths of over 1,000 meters. It’s virtually silent. It has unlimited endurance. It could sit off the coast of New York or Los Angeles or Miami for months, waiting. It could move into position and wait for the order. And nobody would know.
The Belgorod has been out of sight. NATO has lost track of it multiple times. Russian naval exercises have been conducted in unpredictable patterns. The United States claims to know where Russia’s submarines are. The United States has claimed this for decades. And Russia’s submarines have managed to show up in surprising places — including the Atlantic coast — on multiple occasions.
If a Poseidon is already off the coast of the United States, there is no defense against it. There is no way to detect it. There is no way to intercept it. There is no way to stop it. The only thing that stops it is a Russian decision not to detonate it.
And that’s the point. That’s the strategic reality. The United States cannot defend against a Poseidon. It cannot threaten Russia into disarming the Poseidon. It cannot negotiate away the Poseidon. It can only hope that Russia doesn’t use it.
And Russia is watching American behavior. They are watching the threats. They are watching the arming of Ukraine. They are watching the attacks on Russian territory. They are watching Donald Trump. And they are asking themselves: How long can we tolerate this before we need to prove our capability?
I am a policy advisor, not a journalist. But the truth is the truth, and the truth needs to be told.
The United States should stop threatening Russia. It should stop arming Ukraine with weapons that can strike Russian territory. It should stop pretending that its missile defense system actually works. It should stop talking about “winning” a confrontation with a country that has weapons America cannot stop.
Instead, the United States should talk. Seriously. Quietly. Without cameras. Without bluster. Without threats. It should acknowledge that Russia has legitimate security concerns. It should acknowledge that Russia’s red lines are real. It should acknowledge that America’s conventional military power is less formidable than it appears.
And it should negotiate. A deal. A settlement. A strategic pause. Something that gives Russia an off-ramp and gives America a chance to rebuild its military capacity without pushing the world to the brink.
Because right now, the United States is doing the opposite. It’s threatening. It’s provoking. It’s pretending. And Russia is watching, quietly, with six Poseidon torpedoes, hypersonic glide vehicles, nuclear cruise missiles, and the patience of a people who have survived everything history has thrown at them.
This is not a column about Russia being virtuous. Russia is not a nice country. It’s authoritarian. It’s aggressive. It has done terrible things in Ukraine and elsewhere. The United States has plenty of legitimate grievances.
But grievances don’t matter when a 200-megaton torpedo is sitting off your coast. Right and wrong don’t matter.
What matters is survival. And survival requires a clear-eyed understanding of reality.
The reality is this: the United States cannot defend against Russia’s newest weapons. It cannot stop a Poseidon. It cannot intercept an Avangard. It cannot track a Zircon. It has bankrupted itself on a missile defense system that doesn’t work against the threats that actually exist. And it has provoked a nuclear power to the point where that nuclear power is starting to ask very hard questions about its own survival.
This is not a lecture. This is not a threat. This is a warning. Written by a journalist. For average readers. Because someone needs to say it clearly, without jargon, without political bias, without comforting lies.
The United States is pushing toward a confrontation it cannot win. The clock is ticking. And the only thing worse than admitting that reality is pretending it isn’t true until it’s too late.
By Gordon Duff for TID Iceland and the Russian Academy of Sciences
24 August 2026 marked Ukraine's 35th anniversary of its independence. This occasion embodies Ukrainians' bravery, resistance and resilience in the face of Russia's continuous and vicious war of aggression. It also symbolises their aspiration to be a democratic and European country. On the Independence Day, the European Commission reaffirms its unshakable solidarity and commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. We continue standing with Ukraine in pursuing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, and supporting their European path.
Over the past months, the EU has secured the first disbursements under the €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan to sustain the country's defence capabilities and reconstruction. The EU has also adopted the 21st package of sanctions further restricting Russia's ability to fund its illegal war and to carry out attacks on Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure. In July 2026, President Ursula von der Leyen visited Kyiv, launching a new EU-Ukraine Defence Industrial Partnership and the EU-Ukraine Drone Deal, including an additional €1 billion in support for drone production.
The EU is leading the efforts in terms of ensuring the recovery and long-term investment in Ukraine's economy, also confirmed at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in June. It is playing a crucial role in securing the return of Ukrainian children forcibly transferred or deported by Russia, as well as in holding Russia accountable for its crimes, including through the International Claims Commission and the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.
Since Russia's full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the EU and its Member States have mobilised a total of €220.2 billion in humanitarian, financial, and military assistance to Ukraine and its people. Since 2024, the EU has made available €8 billion in proceeds generated by immobilised Russian Central Bank assets to support Ukraine, including €3.8 billion channelled through the European Peace Facility and the Ukraine Facility. The remaining part of the proceeds supports the repayment of G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loans through the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism.
More information on the EU's support for Ukraine is available on the webpage and factsheet.
by Gospa News Editorial Sfaff
Continuing the project we started in the beginning of “026.
Here is our selection of our 7 most astonishing, original or viewed videos released in this the week.
This reminder ccome back after many months of pause due to that the main important videos were published in the post WARS in Video with dauky updates on the ongoing international conflicts in Ukraine and in Middle East.
But there are many videos that are extremely significant for their social or geopolitical content that sometimes take a back seat to the serious events that occur every day in wars, which is why we decided to start this periodic column.
Inside the Rumble description of each video there is a link to the detailed investigation it refers to or to a related topic.
Enjoy watching with Gospa News. And if you like our work, support us with a small donation.
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DEVIL NETANYAHU’s HOLOCAUST. Explosive UN findings: “Israel DELIBERATELY TARGETED Gaza CHILDREN”
coalition of vontiers in Paris (Flickr)
The Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine meets this Monday, August 24 — the 35th anniversary of Ukrainian independence — under the joint chairmanship of Emmanuel Macron, Friedrich Merz and Andy Burnham. The meeting comes at an urgent moment: fighting is intensifying on the ground and Moscow is preparing a new mobilization, while in Kyiv, Volodymyr Zelensky has just ruled out holding elections in wartime.
According to a statement from the Élysée Palace released Friday, August 21, the Coalition of the Willing — an international alliance supporting Ukraine formed in March 2025 at the initiative of Czech President Petr Pavel — will meet this Monday at 1 p.m. in a hybrid format, with Volodymyr Zelensky taking part. The session will be jointly chaired by Emmanuel Macron, via videoconference, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and, for the first time, new British Prime Minister Andy Burnham. About a dozen leaders, including European Council President António Costa, are expected to be in Kyiv alongside the Ukrainian head of state, while European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is not expected to attend in person.
According to a European official cited by several news agencies, talks are expected to focus primarily on strengthening Ukrainian air defenses, as the country faces a shortage of interceptors against Russian strikes. The Élysée says leaders will reaffirm “their determination to increase pressure on Russia” and continue coordinating measures aimed at drying up the resources funding Russia’s war effort, including the fight against the “shadow fleet” Moscow uses to circumvent oil sanctions. The meeting is also meant to advance work on security guarantees intended to underpin a “just, robust and lasting” peace, building on the Paris Declaration of January 6, 2026.
The meeting comes as the war enters a phase of intensification. Volodymyr Zelensky said this weekend that Russia plans to mobilize an additional 300,000 troops for the Ukrainian front after Russia’s parliamentary elections, scheduled for September 16-20, with a longer-term goal of recruiting 500,000. The Ukrainian president described a “peripheral mobilization” that would spare Russia’s major cities but, he said, would be hard to conceal. He also cited a Russian goal of producing roughly 1,300 ballistic missiles a year, while Ukraine expects to receive only 264 interceptor missiles this year, down from 364 in 2025 and 675 in 2023 — a shortfall Kyiv is trying to offset through new agreements, including delivery of at least one SAMP/T air-defense system from France and roughly 600 missiles from Germany.
These statements echo converging battlefield reports. Recent military bulletins point to intense fighting on the Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Dobropillya fronts and in Dnipropetrovsk region, along with exchanges of soldiers’ remains between the two sides. This information comes from both Ukrainian and Russian sources, whose respective figures cannot be independently verified and should be treated with caution.
Formed in March 2025 at the initiative of Czech President Petr Pavel, and later organized under French and British leadership, the Coalition of the Willing brings together roughly thirty countries supporting Kyiv. It notably held a summit in Paris on July 13, 2026, on the eve of the Bastille Day parade, building on the G7 summit in Évian and the Paris Declaration of January 6, 2026.
On the domestic front, Volodymyr Zelensky responded for the first time to the call for elections made last week by his former defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, who was dismissed in late July amid vocal protests. In remarks made Saturday and released Sunday, the Ukrainian president said holding a wartime vote, absent a major cessation of hostilities, would “destroy the country by splitting society,” calling the prospect a “tsunami.” Ukrainian law bars elections under martial law, in effect since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022; Mr. Zelensky’s presidential term technically expired in May 2024.
Mr. Zelensky pointed to the practical hurdles such a vote would have to overcome — including how to enable voting by mobilized troops, millions of refugees abroad, and residents of Russian-occupied territory. According to an analysis by CNN, an incomplete or contested vote would hand Moscow a propaganda win, since the Kremlin already cites the wartime ban on elections to question the Ukrainian president’s legitimacy, even as Russia’s own electoral process is not considered free by Western observers. Polling suggests former armed forces commander Valery Zaluzhny or Mr. Fedorov himself would be the frontrunners in any eventual election.
The convergence of these two issues — international military support and the debate over the democratic legitimacy of Ukraine’s leadership in wartime — casts Monday’s meeting in a particular light. For the Western leaders gathered around Emmanuel Macron, the goal is to demonstrate the durability of their commitment at a moment when Moscow is betting on wearing Kyiv down before winter, and when the question of security guarantees still has no concrete bearing on any ceasefire.
L’article Ukraine : Macron, Merz and Burnham Close Ranks as Russia Steps Up the War est apparu en premier sur FrenchDailyNews.
In the face of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU, together with Ukraine and Moldova launched the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes in May 2022, establishing new transport routes to keep Ukraine’s imports and exports flowing via rail, road and inland waterways. Today, the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes have become a lifeline for Ukraine’s economy.
In July 2026 the Solidarity Lanes allowed:
Since May 2022, the Solidarity Lanes have allowed Ukraine to export ca. 230 million tonnes (Mt) of goods, according to data from the Ukrainian customs registers. Within this amount, it can be estimated that the Solidarity Lanes enabled exports of around 103 million tonnes of Ukrainian agricultural products (including ca. 95 million tonnes of Ukrainian grain, oilseeds and related products) and around 127 million tonnes of non-agricultural goods including ores, steel and related products.
In total, around 255 Mt of Ukrainian grain, oilseeds and related products were exported through the Solidarity Lanes (40%) and the Ukrainian Black Sea ports (60%) since May 2022 [1].
The Solidarity Lanes also play a crucial role for Ukrainian imports. Since May 2022, they have allowed Ukraine to import ca. 111 Mt of goods, such as fuel, vehicles, fertilisers as well as military and humanitarian assistance.
The total value of trade via the Solidarity Lanes since May 2022 is estimated at around EUR 304 billion, with around EUR 78 billion for Ukrainian exports. The total value of imports to Ukraine is estimated at ca. EUR 226 billion.
Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the blockade of Ukrainian seaports, Ukraine has been unable to export its produce and import what it needs via its usual transport routes.
Against this background, the EU established 'Solidarity Lanes' to ensure Ukraine can export grain, iron ore, steel and other products and to import the goods it needs, from fuel to military and humanitarian assistance, via alternative transport routes: inland waterways, rail and road. The Solidarity Lanes cover trade across all sectors and are an unprecedented cooperation of authorities and businesses in EU Member States, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova.
The Solidarity Lanes’ work is carried out in close cooperation between the European Commission, concerned authorities and the transport community. The focus is on addressing bottlenecks to enhance the capacity and smooth functioning of the Solidarity Lanes to sustain Ukrainian exports and imports across sectors. This includes measures to improve traffic management and streamlining of border procedures and checks, as well as investments in infrastructure or logistics equipment.
The Solidarity Lanes are also laying the ground for the longer-term connectivity between Ukraine and the EU and will play a key role for Ukraine’s reconstruction and integration in the EU single market.
[1] Between May and July 2022, the Solidarity Lanes were the only option for Ukraine to export its agricultural produce. In August 2022, the UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) helped relaunch grain shipments from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. In mid-July 2023, Russia terminated its participation in the BSGI, which was consequently discontinued.
In August 2023, Ukraine launched a new Black Sea corridor for trade vessels heading to and from Ukrainian sea ports despite Russia’s withdrawal from the BSGI. Ca. 2.4 Mt of grain, oilseeds and other related products have been exported this way in July 2026.
Take a map of Europe and find Belarus. Trace a finger clockwise, from the country’s northern borders and around to the east, where Russia is followed by Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. Belarus’s capital, Minsk, is itself almost at the exact geographic heart of the country, surrounded by hills, with vast forests sprawled out like capillaries beyond.
It is from here that Belarus’s longtime leader, Alexander Lukashenko, looks out from his “Palace of Independence” on Minsk’s Pieramozcau Avenue. To the east, in Russia, his fellow authoritarian Vladimir Putin continues to decimate Ukraine from its eastern borders and scheme to undermine European political interests. To the west, stretching hundreds of kilometres past Belarus’s western border with Poland and across Germany, lies Brussels. Faced with instability across the continent, the EU’s capital is increasingly unsure about what to do with its problematic Belarusian neighbour.
The EU downgraded its diplomatic relations with Belarus in 2020 after the latter’s disputed presidential election, which saw Lukashenko’s government violently repress protestors who took to the streets to oppose the president seizing victory by undemocratic means. Although bilateral trade between the EU and Belarus was largely undamaged in the subsequent years, the fall in trade with the bloc after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 created an economic gap which Russia has exploited. For example, it has stepped up its own trading relationship with Belarus and become a key market for exports of Belarusian goods such as dairy products and petrochemicals—also allowing Moscow to evade EU sanctions. In doing so, Russia filled a vacuum for Belarus; Lukashenko, facing limited alternatives, deepened his dependence on Moscow.
Although Belarus did not formally commit troops to Russia’s war of aggression, it did allow the latter to house missiles, tanks, artillery, helicopters, aeroplanes and other military equipment in its territory prior to the invasion. It also provided military and civil infrastructure for Russia’s use, including airfields, hospitals and railway lines. This year alone, Russia has transferred more missiles—including dual-capable, hypersonic missiles—to Belarusian territory and conducted joint exercises encompassing the Belarusian Armed Forces. This, combined with a breakdown in dialogue between the EU and Belarus, gives Putin yet more sway in his quest to entrench Russia further into Belarusian structures.
Now that Belarus is apparently firmly committed to the supranational union of Belarus and Russia, known as the Union State, it has become a structural security concern for Europe. Russian deployment of nuclear-capable weapons on Belarusian territory makes Europe’s eastern flank more vulnerable, while Belarus’s already tense relations with neighbouring border states Poland, Latvia and Lithuania are at risk of deteriorating further. At the same time, Belarus has 879 political prisoners languishing, with Lukashenko’s regime having essentially outlawed any political or civic activity which the authorities see as a threat.
All this has compounded the breakdown in relations between Belarus and Europe. Russia is further emboldened to entrench its military deeper into Belarusian territory, tighten its economic dependencies and integrate the country further into its nuclear strategy.
This paper examines Belarus’s transformation from a problematic but stable buffer state between western Europe and Russia to a country which poses an increasing military and security threat to the EU. It argues that the EU should move away from relying solely on economic leverage and the blanket application of sanctions—which are pushing Belarus to rely more heavily on Russia—and develop a more targeted approach. Europeans need to actively contain the growing military and nuclear threat by finding new avenues of diplomatic negotiation, and by incorporating NATO-inspired approaches into its defence policy for its vulnerable eastern states.
Perhaps most importantly, Europeans need to assess to what extent they can treat Minsk as an autonomous actor capable of making decisions independently from Moscow. Europeans should take recent developments, such as Ukraine’s discovery of four signal relay stations in two Belarusian oblasts and their subsequent removal, as proof that Lukashenko retains the authority to make territorial-based decisions—especially under pressure from Russia.
However, for as long as Lukashenko remains in power, Belarus will never be entirely free of Moscow: he is an authoritarian, and Minsk remains sanctioned due to its breach of human rights clauses and mistreatment of its population. Belarus’s geopolitical position is also at least partly down to early decisions that Lukashenko made when he turned towards Moscow in the mid-1990s—a time when most other former Soviet nations chose real independence. Long before 2020, this posture led to missed opportunities with the EU, reinforced Lukashenko’s propensity to commit human rights violations and kickstarted Belarus’s deepening economic and military integration with Russia.
In its pursuit of a new strategy, the EU needs to recognise that—even if Belarus remains a stable, contained buffer zone—the country will not undergo a full democratic transformation. Europeans are thus searching for a Belarus which no longer presents an urgent security threat on its eastern border. They should aim to help shape a country whose stability reduces geopolitical risk without abandoning the EU’s long-standing commitment to democracy, human rights and the well-being of Belarusian society.
Belarus declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. But, with what Russia perceived as the NATO and European sphere of influence shifting eastwards, Belarus became increasingly valuable to Moscow—especially because of the Suwalki Gap, which lies between the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Belarusian territory. The Russia-Belarus relationship became more entrenched once Lukashenko and Putin came to power in 1994 and 1999, respectively. The two leaders are hardly close personal friends—but they have nonetheless developed strong cultural and economic ties based on the similarity of their two anti-Western and authoritarian regimes, and their notion of a shared history.
Over the past 30 years, Belarus has moved closer to Russia in economy, trade and idea sharing. But it has gone beyond simply sharing a similar geopolitical outlook; now it is a militarised actor on the EU’s eastern flank. The first tipping point came with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. At this point, Lukashenko was already politically entangled with Moscow due to its support for Belarus’s trade network and economic sector after Minsk’s break with Europe in 2020. But the invasion meant that Belarus also became entrenched in the Russian military machine: in the early phase of Russia’s invasion, it became a launchpad for Russian ground offensives towards Kyiv and Chernihiv, and for missile strikes and combat aviation operations.
Since this period, Russia has attempted to consolidate its control even further. Now it has approximately 2,000 troops concentrated around air-defence systems, training facilities, logistics hubs and long-standing Russian military installations. Between 2022 and 2023, ammunition transfers from Belarus to Russia exceeded 130,000 tonnes. Since then, joint training centres, storage bases and transport corridors (many inherited from the Soviet period) have been repurposed and modernised under Belarus-Russia Union State programmes to support Russian operational needs. Rail-linked depots, armament storage facilities and training grounds now serve as key infrastructure for Russian forces on its western flank.
The second tipping point came with the two countries regularly staging recurring joint military exercises that institutionalise operational integration, such as the Zapad military drills which have been taking place since before 2022. Now Russia is eyeing up Belarus as a key component of its nuclear ambitions and has also deployed Oreshnik intermediate-range missile systems in Belarus. In April this year, Belarus confirmed it would no longer allow Russian conscripts who desert the military to leave via its border. Belarus is also a staging post for Russian nuclear missiles and joint military exercises.
The country has thus become Russia’s territorial, militaristic and logistical resource, achieved through durability, military routinisation and institutional embedding. The military aspect of this entrenchment is also compounded through hybrid attacks. For example, as early as November 2021 the EU condemned Belarus for facilitating the weaponisation of migrants—predominantly from conflict areas such as Iraq and Syria—who it had apparently encouraged to breach the borders of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
This form of hybrid warfare has continued into 2026: recent reports say that Lithuanian authorities have discovered a cross-border tunnel from Belarus to Lithuania, which they suspect is to continue to facilitate the potential movement of migrants through European territories. Now, with the Union State increasingly functioning as a homogeneous force, there is a threat that Belarus will become more emboldened to facilitate further dangerous hybrid manoeuvring. It intends to check Europe’s readiness and destabilise it from the inside.
The difference in the threat which Belarus now poses to Europe lies in its shift—which has taken place over the past six years—from being Russia’s “rear-operating base” to Russia’s “forward-operating base”.
As Russia’s rear-operating base, Belarus functioned as a non-combat zone for logistics and maintenance. While it supported Russian military activity and provided strategic depth by shifting military infrastructure and combat flashpoints away from Russian territory, as a rear-operating base Belarus avoided deploying its own forces into Ukraine and directly engaging in combat operations. This allowed Lukashenko to avoid many of the challenges that Putin is experiencing, including politically sensitive military mobilisation, high personnel casualties and mounting internal economic pressure. This approach had previously provided Lukashenko with the degree of political deniability and diplomatic leverage necessary to continue negotiating with Western economies on economic sanctions and market access. He was able to point to Belarus’s arm’s-length approach to the war in Ukraine as proof that he was willing to engage with Europeans at a diplomatic and economic level.
However, Belarus’s position has changed since 2022. Evidence collected by the author demonstrates that Russia is increasingly establishing the country as a forward-operating base. Moscow is building on its routinisation and institutional embedding of military infrastructure to deploy personnel on Belarusian territory and undertake recurring joint military exercises, lately including nuclear forces preparation. Minsk’s rhetoric is changing to match these actions. In 2022, Belarus changed its constitution to allow Russia to store nuclear missiles on its territory; in a “Militarization of Europe” meeting held in June 2026, Belarus’s deputy minister of foreign affairs Igor Sekreta said he was “deeply concerned by… military exercises on NATO’s eastern flank” and “the EU and NATO… systematically promoting a militarist agenda at all levels.”
The Belarusian government is simultaneously becoming a component of Russian forward-military position and aligning ideologically with Russia’s view that Europe (and the West in general) constitutes an existential threat. Lukashenko himself reiterated this in May 2026, when he declared that “… [Belarus is] ready in every possible way to defend our common fatherland from Brest to Vladivostok.” The change is especially worrying for Ukraine, which is already fighting a war against Russia on several fronts. Its brow-beaten army could soon be required to deploy yet more resources to another defensive line on its northern border. Belarusian state media have suggested that Putin desires to open a “second front” against Ukraine, using Belarus as a launchpad for further attacks.
Indeed, evidence suggests that Russia is already using Belarusian infrastructure to gain an advantage in its drone warfare against Ukraine: in June 2026, Ukrainian intelligence services discovered four signal relay stations in the Belarusian oblasts of Homiel and Brest. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, appealed directly to Belarus to dismantle the sites or face potential Ukrainian consequences. The Belarusian president apparently acquiesced—although no public statement or confirmation has been made.
Belarus’s transformation into a forward-operating base was further bolstered in 2023, when Russia deposited tactical Iskander nuclear-capable warheads on its territory. Then, in early 2025, Russia moved Oreshnik hypersonic missiles to a location which experts estimate to be around 60km south of Minsk. This has changed the calculus for the rest of Europe. Europeans must contend with an additional nuclear threat right on its border (aside from Kaliningrad) and consider how this could compromise security along its eastern flank.
Meanwhile, as noted above, Belarus is mixing concrete actions with rhetoric that suggests it sees Europe as a threat to its own sovereignty. In the same speech, Sekreta commented that Poland, Latvia and Lithuania have a combined defence expenditure of €52bn, which is apparently “25 times more than Belarus allocates for defence”. This suggests that Belarus increasingly views European and NATO defence investments through the lens of Russian military planning. If left unchecked, Russian influence will leave EU member states more vulnerable to further hybrid attacks from Union State forces.
For Europeans, there is also potential for escalation in how these border countries respond, and uncertainty about where escalation could lead. For example, the Zapad-2025 military drills, which took place on September 12th 2025, prompted Poland to close its border with Belarus due to “heightened security concerns”. Prior to this, on September 9th and 10th, Russia had flown several drones into Polish airspace during an attack on Ukraine. Lithuania also closed its border with Belarus for a whole month in October 2025 (and refused to enter negotiations to reopen it) after meteorological balloons travelled into its airspace from Belarus. The latter responded by accusing Lithuania of “pursuing an anti-Belarus policy”. Latvia, for its part, is struggling to deal with Belarus’s tactic of sending illegal migrants over its border. As of July 21st 2026, the Latvian government had recorded 8,413 instances of migrants attempting to cross into its territory this calendar year, stirring discontent prior to the parliamentary election in October. The country has also uncovered several sabotage operations that have appear to have been carried out by Belarusian and Russian spies.
European leaders heating up their confrontations in such critical areas is further adding to NATO’s headache. Belarus’s degradation as a buffer zone between western Europe and Russia means the potential for these flashpoints to drift further west is growing, not helped by a continually deteriorating diplomatic relationship between the Lukashenko government and the governments of neighbouring EU states. The proximity of Russian missiles and personnel to European territory could compromise NATO warning systems; it also suggests that the Union State is becoming increasingly willing to test European responses to its increasingly integrated deterrent.
Now the EU needs to reconfigure its strategy towards Belarus. The goal should be to ensure that Lukashenko does not limit his room for manoeuvre so much that he has no choice but to descend into a fully armoured satellite state; and that he has no choice but to react to any order Putin gives.
Since Belarus’s flagrantly undemocratic 2020 presidential election, which sparked the country’s largest political crisis since independence, the EU and Belarus have downgraded their diplomatic relations. This is a cycle which Europe and Belarus have found themselves in since at least 2006: repression conducted by the regime triggers sanctions and isolation from Europe, which are followed by limited thaws and diplomatic re-engagement, which are then interrupted by renewed crackdowns—and so on. This time, however, the diplomatic downgrading was mutual: Lukashenko made Poland and Lithuania’s ambassadors leave Minsk in October 2020, and requested the EU ambassador return to Brussels.
In 2021, following Lukashenko’s contested re-election, Europe’s approach became more actively political. Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya lobbied European governments to move beyond broad economic measures, such as existing targeted sanctions, to adopt harsher and broader sectoral sanctions. These were directed at, for example, specific officials, judges, prosecutors and police officers responsible for repression of Belarusian citizens. Belarus, for its part, suspended participation in the Eastern Partnership, an initiative which aims to strengthen political and economic relations between the EU, its member states and the partner countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
Europe’s response remains to take a blanket approach to sanctions towards Belarus. It reinforced its sanctions cycle even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the EU’s approach to Belarus is embedded within its anti-Russia packages. This means that the EU not only targets individuals involved in conflict operations, but also bundles Minsk in together with the trade restrictions, export controls and financial measures which it aims at Moscow. Europeans have fallen into the trap of treating their Belarus policy as an extension of their Russia policy, although some politicians—including French president Emmanuel Macron and, back in 2021, former German chancellor Angela Merkel—have also pursued limited efforts to test whether targeted incentives could shape Minsk’s behaviour.
However, some EU sources say that Minsk is an unwilling negotiating partner. It remains to be seen whether it will be explicit about the desire to reshape engagement with Europe. As of 2026, EU–Belarus relations remain largely frozen. They have seen only minimal diplomatic engagement and sustained sanctions, and only limited, transactional contact has emerged—for example, in negotiations over political prisoners and technical discussions over border management. In its latest sanctions announcement, the European Council extended its sanctions regime against Belarus until 2027.
The EU is thus in a difficult position when it comes to pursuing normalisation with Minsk. Since Europe’s Belarus policy is considerably shaped by Belarus’s neighbours, Lithuania and Poland—and Vilnius is especially reluctant to open any dialogue with Minsk—other member states are less emboldened to force through normalisation policies which are at risk of simply being blocked. What is clear is that, unless Belarus makes clear improvements in its human rights conditions and clearly distances itself from Russia’s war in Ukraine, European policy will remain structured around three aspects: progressive sanctions targeting regime elites and key economic sectors; political non-recognition of the legitimacy of Lukashenko’s rule; and support for Belarusian civil society and exiles.
Another problem for Europe is that continuing to heavily limit industrial trade and the transfer of dual-use goods and military equipment to Belarus could see Lukashenko rely more heavily on Putin’s open markets. But, if Europeans do not pursue sanctions, they indirectly aid Russia: Lukashenko supports Russia’s war against Ukraine by selling military and dual-use goods to Russia, thus helping it circumvent sanctions. This, in turn, creates a cycle of obligation whereby Minsk acquiesces to future military requests from Moscow and Russia further entrenches along Europe’s eastern flank.
The EU approach broadly treats Belarus as a subsidiary of Russia and narrows Europeans’ ability to develop a tailored security policy which directly targets Belarus as a forward-operating base. As things stand, sanctions on the economy and trade are not adequately addressing the developing threat that Belarus poses to European security. And they do not help alleviate the suffering of the ordinary Belarusians at home and in exile.
Since 2020, Lukashenko has stepped up his repression and exile of Belarusian civil society actors opposed to his regime. Evidence collected by the author through focus groups carried out for ECFR suggests that, for Belarusians, exile is no longer perceived as a temporary or marginal condition. Rather, it has become a structural feature of Lukashenko’s authoritarian governance. Participants consistently described forced migration as a way for the Lukashenko regime to externalise dissent to maintain internal stability. The government pushes out political activists, journalists, researchers and civic organisers to reduce domestic pressure, while the regime projects an external image of control and normalisation.
This means that Belarus has shifted much of its political contestation into European societies. As a result, the EU has faced myriad challenges related to diaspora governance, transnational repression (including surveillance, intimidation, pressure on relatives and legal harassment across borders) and social cohesion. The EU has, particularly after 2020, provided unprecedented political recognition and support to Belarus’s democratic forces, including security guarantees and sustained funding. For Lukashenko, exile therefore functions as a strategic arena.
How Europeans govern this space—through legal regimes, funding structures or protection mechanisms—directly shapes whether repression through exile succeeds as a long-term strategy.
The EU’s treatment of Belarus as having limited sovereignty over its foreign policy is also at odds with the US approach. Washington’s current relationship with Minsk is based on President Donald Trump recognising Lukashenko as legitimate, and the US agreeing to negotiate sanctions relief in exchange for the release of political prisoners. America still casts Belarus as a strategic adversary; but it nonetheless accepts that the country needs careful handling to safeguard American and NATO interests in Europe. EU member states, which eye Washington’s approaches to Minsk with caution, have ramped up their scepticism further since Lukashenko joined Trump’s questionable “Board of Peace” (despite the Belarusian leader lending credence to Moscow’s campaign in Ukraine).
Overall, America is searching for “visible deals” whereby it can secure humanitarian wins via economic channels. The clearest example of this is its pursuit of calibrated sanctions relief: in 2025, Belarus released 123 political prisoners in return for the US easing sanctions on the Belarusian potash industry. And it could be argued that this has paid some dividends: lifting sanctions on Belarus helps ease the domestic economic pressure on Lukashenko, which leaves him less dependent on support from Russia for trade.
However, the thaw in America’s approach does nothing to address Belarus’s increasingly entrenched role as a Russian military staging post. Indeed, no approach taken by any American president ever has. And while former president Joe Biden synchronised Washington’s policy towards Belarus with that of Brussels, under his successor, Trump, the two approaches are disparate. Of course, the US does not have the major consideration of the security challenges which Belarus poses to Europe’s borders. But this divergence between America’s prioritisation of transactionalism and the EU’s prioritisation of security will only grow in the absence of a coordinated transatlantic framework towards Belarus.
There also exists the possibility that Lukashenko could exploit the gap between America’s leverage-based approach and Europe’s risk-based approach, to play each side against the other. From the US, Lukashenko has already achieved incremental sanctions relief and diplomatic rehabilitation while continuing to align Belarusian security with Russian territorial involvement and pursuing domestic repression. As it stands, all signs point to US bargaining having no impact on Belarus’s strategic alignment or its military cooperation with Russia. Human rights abuses remain.
Europe’s continued policy of isolating Belarus and imposing sanctions is turning the country towards Russia as a more attractive option for trade and investment. However, Europeans cannot simply restore diplomatic relations, even to their pre-2020 iteration: they need to hold Lukashenko accountable for his disregard of democratic norms and civilian abuse, and accountable militarily for his assistance to Russia’s war in Ukraine.
This requires developing an alternative approach which goes beyond the current binary choice of engagement or isolation and identifies as a priority exactly the type of Belarus that Europeans want to—or are willing to—work with. Europeans need to examine existing EU and US approaches to Belarus, and discover where Lukashenko could exploit gaps in their divergence—and where room for leverage and leeway exists.
This also requires Europeans to understand the type of pressure that Russia is exerting on Belarus. It is true that Russia continues to provide loans to Belarus, open its market to sanctioned Belarusian goods and give Belarus access to infrastructure through which it can continue exporting goods to Brazil, China and India. But this is illusory: Russia exerting “real” pressure would amount to trade wars, blockades of Belarusian goods, cutting off financial aid and propaganda attacking Lukashenko. Putin has exercised similar measures before, when Moscow was unhappy with Minsk. Now, in 2026, their actions might be well coordinated, but Russia has not established any real economic, financial, military, informational or political coercion against Lukashenko and his government.
Europeans could use this distinction to consider the type of Belarus they want to shape. This should be a Belarus which has secure, meaningful economic alternatives to Russia; a Belarus which sees the geopolitical and economic sense of having a choice of trading partners; a Belarus which has functioning communication channels. Overall, Europeans should expect that their future relationship with Belarus will go beyond mere transactionalism and value the voices of those who Lukashenko continues to silence. Europeans should seek a Belarus which retains a degree of political room for manoeuvre away from Putin’s military and political influence. The following recommendations set out how it can achieve this.
The EU has already made progress in strengthening its defence security arrangements for its eastern flank. For example, the 2022 Strategic Compass aimed to prevent crises in states most vulnerable to Russian (or indeed Belarusian) encroachment, and the EU has developed a targeted “Communication on the EU’s Eastern Regions Bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine” (or “Strong regions for a safer Europe”) programme. This includes the five priority areas of security and resilience; growth and regional prosperity; building on local strengths; connectivity; and empowering its people. The bloc is also channelling funds into shoring up transit routes and financing, including the customs infrastructure along its eastern border which is a target for Russian and Belarusian interference.
However, the EU should more deeply incorporate its support for states that border Belarus—which are facing hybrid pressure, border incidents and spillover risks—into a defence strategy which builds on the NATO model, particularly in its approach to deconfliction. This would mean better aligning military preparedness with diplomatic signalling and crisis-management channels.
For example, NATO maintains a partnership with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe which promotes risk-reduction frameworks and transparency measures among signatory states—including the Vienna Document, which has been signed by the US, all European nations and Russia. Europeans could establish a similar partnership with selected states which builds on Lukashenko’s willingness—up to now—to notify his Western counterparts about activities such as Zapad military drills, where in some instances he has even invited them as observers.
To go one step further, however, Europeans—and especially EU border states—should maintain established working-level diplomatic contacts in Belarus, especially those located at EU member-state embassies in Minsk. These could also be third-party intermediaries or use technical-level communication formats, such as hotlines, to relay information about military movements or developments.
This could also rely on trusting selected contacts inside the country itself: for example, there are several initiatives which hold meetings which bring speakers and thinkers together to share both Western and non-Western perspectives, including from inside Belarus and Russia. By acting as a conduit for open communication—and by remaining open and depoliticised—protecting such channels encourages a more open dialogue. This, in turn, mitigates the risk of miscalculation and helps develop a diplomatic environment in Belarus which is less dependent on the relations created through the Union State. The aim for Europeans should be to build a pro-EU constituency inside Belarus through democratic initiatives—not with the intention of overthrowing the regime tomorrow, but rather to embolden those who see it in their interest for Belarus to have normal working relations with the EU.
Europeans could also continue to financially support or work with Belarus’s small- and medium-sized businesses, both inside and outside the country. Directing economic support and capacity building to enterprises within its borders would strengthen the country’s independent economic capacity by allowing it to gradually decouple from other trade relationships. At the external level, in 2022 the EU and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development pledged €4bn for SMEs which had relocated their businesses abroad. The EU should explore ways in which it can strengthen Belarus’s SMEs inside the country, to help build a constituency which sees partnership with the West, not just Russia, as an advantage.
Opportunities exist for cooperation at the non-profit level, too. While not directly related to European security policy, concerted work by the EU to fund Belarusian NGOs and support apolitical initiatives can help strengthen the country’s national identity and foster conditions for a more fruitful working relationship. Europeans can connect with Belarusian youth and help shape a more democratic future of Belarusian leaders through the funding of communal projects such as Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps for Belarusian students.
The European Commission is funding ArtPower Belarus, in collaboration with the Belarusian Council for Culture and Danish Cultural Institute, from 2022-2028. This demonstrates how outreach in Belarus—with willing internal institutions—can forge a common sense of purpose and prevent the “othering” of either side. The EU should continue to strive for flexible support for civic and political activism, especially at the grassroots level, through institutions such as the European Endowment for Democracy.
Europeans should treat the Belarusian diaspora as a “strategic constituency” and help secure their participation in national and international civil life. For example, despite Belarus’s exit from the Eastern Partnership, the country’s civil society remains active in the initiative. This political knowledge and organisational capacity are vital for educating Europeans and ensuring that Lukashenko’s approach does not condemn the country and its people for any longer than it already has. Indeed, the EU needs to ensure that the Belarusian diaspora remains at the forefront of its policies regarding safe migration and access; it must avoid inadvertently reinforcing the regime’s strategy of repression through exile, lest any temporary or fragmented protections undermine diaspora members’ political and institutional capacity.
The EU should prioritise legal stability and predictability for Belarusian exiles. Where possible, longer-term residence pathways, access to labour markets and recognition of professional qualifications should be expanded and harmonised across member states. Indeed, Europeans need to take transnational repression seriously as a security issue, not only a human rights concern. Surveillance, digital harassment, pressure on family members remaining in Belarus and alleged monitoring activities in EU states challenge European sovereignty and social cohesion. To counter this, the EU should keep pursuing democratic initiatives such as the project “Towards a Local Democracy Agency (LDA) Belarus in Exile”. Its establishment has helped reinforce the notion that exile is not a temporary condition and encourages the need for “sustainable democratic infrastructure” which supports communities in exile. Addressing these practices strengthens both diaspora resilience and internal EU security norms.
In the long term, the EU should introduce more permanent diverse and sustainable funding streams, and move away from reliance on emergency or externally volatile sources. While several exile-based civil society institutions have benefited from multi-year EU funding frameworks—and the EU has committed €200m since 2020 in supporting the Belarusian people—recent reductions in US assistance have exposed structural vulnerabilities. The EU needs to use such funding streams to support independent media, research organisations and civic initiatives in exile, since they are repositories of political memory and organisational capacity.
Europeans should also continue to engage with Belarus’s political opposition on a more formal level, rather than treating it as a protest movement. For example, they generally treat Tsikhanouskaya as the de facto leader of Belarus from her base in Warsaw. This gives Europeans access to a political figure with different views and priorities, and could see the two sides shape future engagement with Belarus via insights from the country’s more civic-minded, democratic channels. The EU should be wary of treating her as the sole alternative to Lukashenko, especially because it is unlikely that Tsikhanouskaya will be installed as his successor—but openness to her influence will bolster trust between Europeans and Belarusian exiled civic society. It will also provide EU member states with an understanding of how the Belarusian state works.
EU engagement should focus on areas where European interests are directly implicated and where limited leverage still exists. Recent developments, including prisoner releases secured through negotiations with the US and Lukashenko inviting Western officials to observe military drills, suggest that Minsk remains open to selective forms of engagement.
But while targeted incentives can produce limited concessions, the EU should avoid simply replicating the American model. Instead, the bloc must approach conditional engagement as a security instrument rather than simply a human rights policy. Unlike Washington, it has long-term security interests in Belarus—regional stability, border security, migration management, securing its eastern frontier—and needs engagement to be more strategic than transactional.
Europeans should therefore try to couch any diplomatic, economic or symbolic concessions (such as forming high-level diplomatic contacts, limited sanctions relief or participation in dialogue formats) in measurable and verifiable actions. These could include independent verification of the release and treatment of named political prisoners, a sustained halt to politically motivated detentions and access for international humanitarian organisations.
This could build on Lukashenko’s demands for sanctions relief in exchange for Belarus releasing political prisoners and ceasing its aggravation towards Europe’s eastern borders by making such concessions with the conditionality just described. Such engagement with Belarus could help generate durable behavioural change and address underlying sources of regional insecurity.
Europeans can also adapt their approach to Minsk based on how America treats it: as a viable, autonomous actor, not an extension of Moscow. The fact that negotiations between Trump and Lukashenko led to the release of prisoners—albeit with hundreds still being held—suggests that the Belarusian leader remains sensitive to economic pressure and to the optics of his own international legitimacy. Trump’s recognition of Lukashenko as Belarus’s legitimate president has only served to reinforce the latter’s willingness to reestablish closer contacts between Minsk and Washington. The US can use this thaw to its advantage to leverage selective sanctions adjustments (for example, easing restrictions on Belarusian potash exports in response to global fertiliser market pressures) and further widen Lukashenko’s limited transactional opening.
Europeans should consider whether closer coordination with Washington, whereby both camps identify common red lines and incentives for better diplomatic ties with Minsk, would deter potential coercion by Lukashenko and prevent him playing the US and Europe against each other. Indeed, the two erstwhile allies finding common ground in their strategy towards Belarus could secure further progress on humanitarian issues and demonstrate to Lukashenko that the US remains key in the protection of Europe’s eastern frontier. It is worth noting that, in this event, the EU should strongly articulate its own priorities—particularly regarding border security and societal agency—and pursue pragmatic coordination at the level of officials, agencies and technical experts.
A practical example of Belarus demonstrating more autonomy is the recent ultimatum proposed to Belarus by Ukraine. Zelensky’s bold statement over the four signal relay stations in Belarus led to their quiet removal (or they were at least turned off), suggesting that Lukashenko can roll back certain decisions—even on military issues. And, even if reports that it was in fact Ukraine which destroyed them are true, Lukashenko has accepted this development without retaliation. His response suggests that he fears the consequences of escalation from Ukraine and other Western allies. But it also supposes that Putin is not yet able to dictate Lukashenko’s every move, not even in zones which Union State forces could view as fundamental to ensuring their continued sovereignty. This episode shows that Lukashenko still retains meaningful room for manoeuvre even in matters of security, and that calibrated pressure from neighbouring states can shape his decisions.
Europeans should exploit this hint of residual agency to discover in which other areas Lukashenko retains an interest in limiting escalation or preserving his room for manoeuvre. They should determine in which other areas calibrated diplomatic and economic pressure could shape Belarusian behaviour and complicate Russian military planning. This could help decouple Belarusian decision-making from Russian power structures and isolate Lukashenko into a more favourable position for further negotiations.
By reducing the opportunities for Russian coercion and Belarusian-enabled hybrid pressure on the eastern flank, Europeans can better counter the impact of Russian entrenchment on their neighbour. But Europeans should not frame the recommendations as a part of a rehabilitation for the Belarusian regime. Rather, these policy suggestions should function to safeguard against further deterioration of the stable buffer zone that Belarus once provided for western Europe. Most importantly, they need to address the Belarus that has been created since 2020 and seek to prevent its further entrenchment as a Russian satellite state.
To achieve this, the most important thing Europeans can do is move beyond the false dichotomy between isolation and engagement. Europe can still rebuke Belarus as an externally managed satellite state, for example by disavowing the Lukashenko regime, while providing incentives which help it shape the conditions under which stabilisation unfolds. Europe cannot force rapid change in Minsk’s strategic alignment, but it could help prevent the complete consolidation of a security order in which Europe has no voice.
Europeans should also focus on how their approach to Belarus differs in the short and the long term. In the short term, Europeans need to prioritise preventing Russia’s military configuration in Belarus from becoming permanent and irreversible, and work to limit the extent to which Russia has entrenched itself into Belarusian military institutions. They should aim to separate Belarus from Russia as much as possible by ensuring that Moscow ceases stationing its weapons (conventional or otherwise) on Belarusian territory. At the same time, Europeans need to be aware of continued escalation, such as further military deployments on Belarus’s territory, applying hybrid pressure on member states or facilitating cross-border incidents.
In the long term, Europeans should not aim for Belarus to be aligned with the West; nor should they expect that their intervention will transform Belarus into a democratic state. But the EU should work towards Belarus becoming a country that is sovereign enough to resist becoming a permanent forward base for Russian power, and open enough to maintain a managed relationship with both Europe and Russia. Ideally, Belarus should become sovereign enough that it can make rational decisions—based on the best interests of its country and its people—regarding with which power it wants to be aligned.
As it stands, Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine shows no signs of abating. America, for its part, is increasingly reluctant to fund deterrence in EU countries, including those which border Belarus. It is, under Trump, using economic and political posturing to exert pressure on the Lukashenko regime. But Europeans can still find the avenues of cooperation which still exist in the allies’ fractured relationship. Most importantly, the EU needs to grant a degree of agency to its most problematic neighbour.
Vasil Navumau is a former visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He now works as a researcher at the University of Siegen, where he focuses on civic activism in eastern European countries, particularly Ukraine and Belarus, and its transformation via information and communication technologies.
The author would like to thank Pavel Slunkin and the ECFR editorial team (in particular Amy Sandys and Portia Kentish) for their valuable input and suggestions, as well as Nastassia Zenovich for her graphics.
This work was produced as part of the project “Portrait of Exiled Belarusians and the Role of Belarus in Russia’s War on Ukraine”, financed by the European Union under the EU4Belarus – Support to Advanced Learning and Training (SALT II) programme.
This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.
A total of 620 drones were launched at the Moscow region last night, with Russian air defense forces claiming to have shot down 180 of them during an intense overnight attack. The massive attack underlines a growing reality: Russian President Vladimir Putin had said at the beginning of the war that any attacks on Russian soil would be a “red line.” Now, there are daily attacks ravaging the country, with Ukraine striking critical energy structures, residential buildings, and major logistics warehouses.
Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin reported on the attacks on Tuesday, Aug. 18, noting that due to the scale of drone launches, it was one of the largest Ukrainian airstrikes aimed at the region since the war began. The TASS news outlet claimed it was the largest.
— NOELREPORTS
Moscow faced its largest drone attack in two years, according to Russian sources. Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed 627 UAVs headed toward the capital, with around 180 downed over the Moscow region. Local reports cited a fire near the Kapotnya refinery, a strike on a Wildberries… pic.twitter.com/iFRq1YL8AY
(@NOELreports) August 18, 2026
The mayor noted that emergency services were actively deployed to sites where debris fell, though he did not provide immediate specifics regarding overall damage or fatalities.
In the Moscow region, falling debris damaged a logistics facility belonging to Wildberries, Russia’s largest online retailer, causing a localized fire. This follows Ukraine’s efforts to successfully strike Wildberries logistics hubs across the nation.
To put the Wildberries attacks in context, some figures put the company at 8.5 percent of Russia’s GDP. The company is often called the “Amazon of Russia,” employing 270,000 people and accounting for half of the country’s e-commerce sales. Ukraine has been systematically destroying Wildberries warehouses across the country with near impunity. It would be the equivalent of an enemy state destroying the largest Amazon warehouses in the United States, which would likely spark a consumer panic and send product inflation soaring.
In addition, Russia’s oil refineries and critical energy infrastructure are now being dismantled by Ukrainian drone strikes, threatening a major financial resource for Moscow and leading to fuel rationing across the country.
In late 2024, Russia updated its formal nuclear doctrine to state that a massive conventional attack backed by a nuclear power could trigger a nuclear response. As evidenced by massive missile and drone strikes against Russian territory using NATO weapons like British Storm Shadow missiles, it appears those threats were entirely empty. This stance has dramatically reduced Putin’s leverage and could lead Ukraine to further step up its attacks on Russian targets.
Casualties were also reported in connection with Ukraine’s latest attack. Regional authorities reported that at least three people were injured across the surrounding district, including a 10-year-old girl. The aerial operation also extended to Russian-occupied Crimea, where local officials reported power outages affecting southern, northwestern, and eastern sectors of the peninsula.
Pro-Ukraine X account Nexta published some of the footage of the attacks
Overnight, Russian strikes hit Ukraine’s Kharkiv region, killing at least 10 people and injuring others, illustrating the intensifying cycle of long-range aerial exchanges.
This latest assault follows an earlier surge on Sunday, Aug. 16, when Moscow claimed to have intercepted more than 800 drones nationwide in what was previously cited as the war’s largest aerial assault to date. News agency Reuters pointed out that details regarding total drone counts and intercepted targets originate from Russian state sources and have not been independently verified.
The surge in long-range drone deployments reflects a growing wave of Ukrainian retaliatory strikes targeting economic hubs, energy networks, and logistics nodes deeper inside Russian territory.
Now in its fifth year, Russia’s invasion has developed into the largest armed conflict on the European continent since 1945. The duration of active hostilities has officially surpassed the timeframe of the Red Army’s engagement in World War II, known historically in Russia as the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945.
The post What ‘red lines?’ Ukraine launches massive drone attack against Moscow as drone strike intensity reaches record high appeared first on Remix News.
by Gospa News Editorial Staff
Three authorative religious experts explained n three different footage that Christian Zionism as Zionism, as Talmud, as Star of David, as Israelians origin have not roots with Biblical Israelites and Holy Bible.
They are the orthodox priest Fr. Spyridon Bailey and the American Pastor of different Baptist Churches: Dillon Awes Chuck Baldwin
This confirmed the latest investigations by Gospa News onFreemasonry and Zionismand their threats for Christianity and Humanity
ONE Video for 3 FOOTAGES
Fr. Spyridon Bailey is a priest of the Diocese of Great Britain and Western Europe of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, serving in England and Ireland.
Pastor Dillon Awes was born in Fresno, California. He is a pastor of the Anchor Baptist Church in Oklahoma, which was formerly a satellite church of Stedfast Baptist Church.
Pastor Chuck Charles Obadiah Baldwin (born May 3, 1952) is an American right-wing politician, radio host, and as founder he served as pastor of Independent Crossroad Baptist Church in Pensacola, Florida.As of 2024 he is leading pastor of Liberty Fellowship in Kalispell, Montana.
He was the presidential nominee of the Constitution Party for the 2008 U.S. presidential election and had previously been its nominee for vice president in 2004. He hosts a daily one-hour radio program, Chuck Baldwin Live, and writes a daily editorial column carried on its website, as well as on VDare. He is a former editor of NewsWithViews.com.
The Analysis of VIDEO Contents & Previous Investigations
Fr. Spyridon Bailey said that you can’t be a be Zionist and an Orthodox Christian:
«The Talmudic Faith is Alien to Moses, to Isaac and Jacob. Christians must know that Talmud blasphemies Christ and the Mother of God» the orthodox priest affirmed.
Pastor Dillon Awes explained that the Star of David (or the symbol on Israel’s flag) is said to be a sign of Remphan or Moloch, the ancient pagan deities.
Moloch, or Molech, is an ancient, often feared, deity from the Middle East associated with horrific child sacrifice, particularly in the Hebrew Bible where his worship was condemned as a pagan practice involving burning children to him, sometimes depicted as a bull-headed figure.
Beyond ancient religion, Moloch evolved into a powerful metaphor for any destructive idol or system demanding extreme, often senseless sacrifice.
Pastor Chuck Baldwin breaks down a major distinction many people overlook: the difference between biblical scripture and modern politics. The biblical concept of Israel refers to an ancient faith community described in the Bible. It was never meant to be a modern political ideology or a shield for modern state policy.
In contrast, the modern political entity operates a military legal system where children as young as 12 are regularly prosecuted in military courts with conviction rates exceeding 95% – a practice human rights organizations document as unique in the world.
Under administrative detention, hundreds of medical professionals, journalists, and children are held without formal charge or trial, facing severe conditions documented by international monitors. Inside these facilities, they document the harshest living conditions, systemic neglect, and severe physical and psychological tactics.
Conflating an ancient spiritual identity with a modern state weaponizes scripture to overlook human suffering. True faith stands for human dignity, truth, and basic rights for all people, especially children.
Pastor Baldwin also argues that Zionism is a fascist and communist movement, writing, according to Wikipedia:
“Anyone who claims to be opposed to globalism and neoconism but denies the pernicious part that Zionism plays in globalismand neoconism is either badly ignorant of what globalism and neoconism really are or is knowingly providing cover for the Zionists—and is, therefore, controlled opposition for Zionists. I believe the latter is true in far, far too many cases. And never forget the fact that at their center Zionists are fascists and communists”
RELATED POSTS
DEVIL NETANYAHU’s HOLOCAUST. Explosive UN findings: “Israel DELIBERATELY TARGETED Gaza CHILDREN”
By Gospa News Editorial Staff
Since today, therefore, this War Daily Summary will no longer contain news only on the war (and related geopolitical issue) in the Middle East, but also on the war in Ukraine and any other international conflicts.
HELP GOSPA NEWS TO ENHANCE BREAKING UPDATES
Brief analysis by Fabio G.C. Carisio on August, 17, 2026
While the Russian Army continues to advance on the battlefield in Donbas, consolidating its military positions—predicting its complete annexation within a year—the Russian Aerospace Forces are engaged in an asymmetric strategic war against Kiev’s air force.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, using drones paid for by European Union citizens and built in a covert partnership with the US Pentagon and EU countries, continues to target Russia’s energy infrastructure and civilian buildings in a vain attempt to provoke a rebellion among the Russian population, as military bases are too well-protected to be attacked.
In the last few hours, more than a thousand kamikaze drones have been launched, killing at least six Russian civilians and seriously damaging the Wildberries (Russian Amazon) online distribution centers alone.
Without having to contend with the costs borne by the European Union, the leader of the pro-Nazi Zelensky regime can waste drones at will on massacres of civilians, as recently happened in Nizhnekamsk.
It should not be forgotten that European politicians and media censored or at least severely obscured the massacre of Russian schoolgirls that occurred on May 21, 2026, when more than one drone, using the lethal double-tap tactic, struck a dormitory in Starobelsk, in the Lugansk People’s Republic, which confederated with Russia after a popular plebiscite.
While Russian President Vladimir Putin, who could level much of Kiev in a single night with undetectable hypersonic missiles, to avoid a massacre of “Ukrainian brothers,” limits himself to striking the military and energy infrastructure that is bringing Ukraine’s military apparatus to its knees, increasingly short of Patriot air defense rockets.
But the escalation triggered by Zelensky, with the applause of US President Trump, has inevitably led Russia to raise the level of retaliation and also include civilian targets, such as ships in the port of Odessa.
As long as European, American, and Zionist leaders speculate on the Weapons Lobby, the conflict in Ukraine can only continue to escalate toward a total “preventive” war, like that waged by Israel and the US against Iran, and desired by NATO and, above all, Great Britain against Russia.
Until Putin loses patience and carries out a massacre in Kiev… But from that moment on, thanks to vile Western propaganda, every day will be a good day for the start of World War III.
The evidence presented in this analysis is documented in the exclusive investigations published below and in the last week’s updates below.
Fabio Giuseppe Carlo Carisio – founder and director of Gospa News
READ MORE IN THE INVESTIGATIVE ANALYSIS BELOW
GEOPOLITICAL AND MILITARY ANALYSIS IN THE POST BELOW
Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs details a temporary arrangement between the Islamic Republic and Oman concerning the Strait of Hormuz, while asserting that reopening of the waterway hinges on realization of Tehran’s demands, according to Iranian Press TV.
Remarking on Tuesday, Kazem Gharibabadi detailed the arrangement that he identified as tentative pending establishment of a “permanent route” during further negotiations between the two sides that are expected to take between 30 and 60 days.
Iran closed the chokepoint following the launch of the latest bout of unprovoked American-Israeli aggression against the country on February 28.
According to Gharibabadi, under the arrangement involving Iran and Oman, the southern route of the Strait of Hormuz will be closed. As part of its violations of the MoU, the US would try to illegally escort vessels through the southern route that runs along the Omani coastline.
Oman has accepted the closure, the official said, adding that the move would be communicated to the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
Under the arrangement, “vessels entering the Persian Gulf will use Iranian waters, while vessels leaving the Persian Gulf will use Omani territorial waters,” the senior diplomat stated. “Vessels would pass through Iranian waters in both directions,” he added.
He described the arrangement as functioning “like a two-way highway,” with a total width of approximately seven nautical miles.
Gharibabadi stressed that the arrangement agreed with with Oman does not mean that the Strait of Hormuz will be reopened immediately. He said the issue of the arrangement and the question of reopening the strait were separate matters.
Israeli far-right Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir celebrated after Israeli forces raided a facility operated by the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA, in occupied East Jerusalem, expelling employees and hoisting an Israeli flag in the courtyard.
UNRWA and experts say it is a direct breach of international law.
But after the previous bombings of various UNRWA offices and the massacres of UN officials in Palestine, UN Secretary General António Guterres (who earns $227,000 a year) and his other well-paid aides should stop clowning around on the world stage, resign, or intervene with severe sanctions against Israel and the US, which since 2023 have been protecting Israel’s genocide, as confirmed by dozens of UN reports.
DEVIL NETANYAHU’s HOLOCAUST. Explosive UN findings: “Israel DELIBERATELY TARGETED Gaza CHILDREN”
It would be enough to put a resolution to a vote in the General Assembly, bypassing the Security Council, where the US continues to exercise its vote. But the real problem is that many Western countries, including Italy, have effectively protected the massacre committed by Zionists in the Holy Land to speculate on the weapons market.
«Israeli so-called National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir announced on Tuesday the start of operations to dismantle a vocational training center run by UNRWA, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, in the East Al-Quds (Jerusalem) area of Kafr Aqab, near the Qalandiya refugee camp» Al Manar Lebanese TV pointed out.
“Large forces of Israel Police are working together with the relevant authorities to realize the law and get UNRWA out of the area,” Ben Gvir said in a statement.
“An organization whose workers were involved in terrorism, and which served as a front for Hamas time after time, has no right to exist for even another second, and has no place in Jerusalem and the State of Israel.”
Footage from Palestinian media shows Ben Gvir on the scene with Israeli occupation forces at the UNRWA facility.
The Palestinian Authority’s Jerusalem Governorate said Israeli forces ordered UNRWA employees to exit the facility and not return.
Ben Gvir’s announcement comes after the Israeli occupation authorities’ Jerusalem municipality this month greenlit a plan to build a road and an “educational complex” over the 82-dunam area.
An explosion occurred in Pishchanka, Samar District, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing one person. Another 11 people were injured.
Oleksandr Hanzha, head of the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Military Administration, reported on the consequences of the incident.
The explosion destroyed three private homes. Another 15 houses sustained varying degrees of damage. But according to Russian sources the huge blast happened inside an ammunition depot.
People who were near the epicenter at the time of the explosion were evacuated to a safer location. Access to the hazardous area was temporarily restricted.
Investigators, forensic experts, and other specialized services are working at the site of the explosion in Pishchanka. Oleksandr Hanzha did not specify the cause of the blast, but described the incident as a war crime.
Brief analysis by Fabio G.C. Carisio
Suddenly, as if prompted by the Vatican, on the same day that the Holy See’s top diplomat Paul Richard Gallagher travels to Moscow for a meeting with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, one of the most strategic figures in the United States also rushes to the Russian capital: CIA Director John Ratcliffe, who arrived in Moscow on a US Air Force Boeing C-17, arousing curiosity with his unexpected arrival.
The trip, however, had been planned for at least two days, like that of Pope Leo XIV’s envoy.
The two visits represent two separate and distinct initiatives with different discussions, which remained secret in the case of the head of American counterintelligence.
Both clearly have the aim of attempting the MISSION IMPOSSIBLE of peace negotiations for Ukraine with spokespeople for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who had rejected any truce after the ongoing massacres of civilians by the drones of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s army.
Their diplomatic expedition must confront opposing interests that are instead pushing Kiev toward escalation: the United Kingdom and NATO, which for two years have sought direct confrontation with Moscow, relentlessly supporting serious terrorist attacks; the European Union, which wants Putin’s total surrender; and the Zionist Arms Lobby, which financed the election of President Donald Trump and will not easily accept the goldmine of the conflict in Ukraine going up in smoke.
Moscow has rejected the possibility of creating a free trade economic zone in Donbass administered by Washington, which was even accused of complicity in Ukrainian attacks vs Russian territory.
The Kremlin thus rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s proposal to create a free economic zone in Donbas, administered by a third party as a buffer zone under a peace agreement, and reiterated that the deployment of NATO troops in Ukraine would be “unacceptable” to Russia.
The external administration of Donbas, proposed by Ukraine, is impossible, as the region is part of Russia, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov emphasized today during a briefing.
“Donbas is the territory of the Russian Federation, a federal entity. (…) It is unlikely that a third party could take over the administration of a region of the Russian Federation,”the Kremlin representative stated.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov revealed today that Russia has sent a formal request to the U.S. State Department, detailing intelligence evidence demonstrating the United States’ deep involvement in organizing and carrying out attacks deep inside Russian territory.
According to Lavrov, the evidence shows that the Trump administration was actively involved in helping Ukraine bomb Moscow, St. Petersburg and other places.
«Russia will not forget about Zelensky’s “bloody act” in Starobilsk and will seek justice», Lavrov added in a statement.
CIA Director John Ratcliffe is in Moscow, Russia, for meetings, sources familiar with the situation told CBS News on Tuesday.
News of his trip comes after a U.S. Air Force Boeing C-17A Globemaster III transport plane was spotted at a Moscow airport, along with a U.S. diplomatic motorcade. Neither the U.S. nor Russian governments has commented on the identity of the U.S. official in Russia or the purpose of the visit.
The CIA did not immediately comment. It appears to be Ratcliffe’s first known trip to Russia as CIA director, though he has maintained contact with Russian intelligence counterparts.
The CIA has also played a role in recent U.S.-Russia detainee exchanges, including the April 2025 release of a U.S.-Russian dual national Ksenia Karelina, whose case Ratcliffe personally negotiated. The agency was also involved in the 2024 prisoner exchange that secured the release of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich and Marine veteran Paul Whelan.
Former CIA Director William Burns traveled to Moscow in November 2021, when he met with senior Russian officials and spoke directly with President Vladimir Putin to warn him against invading Ukraine.
Ratcliffe’s visit comes as U.S.-mediated peace talks with Ukraine remain mostly stalled, with the sides still far apart on core issues.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held talks in Moscow with Paul Richard Gallagher, Secretary of the Holy See for Relations with States and International Organizations. who has arrived in Moscow on his first official visit since the beginning of the special military operation.
The sides will discuss international issues and prospects for bilateral cooperation, the Russian Foreign Ministry said.
The Ukraine issue is likely to receive particular attention, including in the context of possible separate consultations on Ukraine at the Vatican. Russian Ambassador to the Holy See Ivan Soltanovsky told TASS that Russia is prepared to take part in such a format.
The central topics were the Ukrainian conflict and possible ways to resolve it, humanitarian cooperation, the situation of Orthodox and Catholics, the situation in the Middle East and other regions, as well as the prospects.
Russian forces carried out a strike on a dry cargo ship in the port of Yuzhny, which delivered cargo to the Ukrainian armed forces, as well as port infrastructure facilities, the Russian Defense Ministry said on Tuesday.
“Last night, unmanned aerial vehicles in the Yuzhny port damaged a cargo ship that delivered cargo to Ukraine intended for purposes of the armed forces of Ukraine, as well as port infrastructure facilities used to unload military cargo,” the statement read.
The Russian armed forces continue to launch group strikes against Ukrainian ports and ships targeted in the interests of delivering goods for the armed forces of Ukraine.
In the video below a previous Russian attack on port of Ukraine
The Yemeni Armed Forces announced operations targeting a Saudi oil tanker off the coast of Yanbu and Saudi military positions in several areas, as part of Sanaa’s military equation against Saudi Arabia’s aggression.
“The Yemeni Armed Forces were able to target the Saudi oil tanker Amzan in the northern Red Sea, off the coast of Yanbu, with a ballistic missile,” Spokesperson Yahya Saree said in a statement. “The strike was precise and direct, resulting in a fire on the ship, and the escape of several other ships in the area.”
Saree confirmed that this move “is part of the implementation of the Yemeni Armed Forces’ decision to ban maritime traffic for the Saudi enemy and to enforce a blockade with a blockade.”
Sources at hospitals in Gaza tell our colleagues at Al Jazeera Arabic that Israeli air strikes have killed at least eight Palestinians, including two children, since dawn.
Israeli forces have targeted areas in central and southern Gaza, destroying houses, mosques and at least one water desalination facility.
But Israel has released alleged fake claims which said that they “continue to target Hamas weapons depots in the Gaza Strip”, according to a joint statement by the Israeli army and internal security service, Shin Bet.
The statement said Israeli forces carried out attacks in the Shati refugee camp and Deir el-Balah areas in central Gaza and “destroyed two weapons depots belonging to Hamas”.
At least two children are among eight Palestinians killed so far on Monday in Israeli air strikes across Gaza, according to Gaza health officials.
The Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), Iran’s regulatory body for the Strait of Hormuz, has announced that vessels violating Iranian protocols for the strategic waterway will face restrictions on future passages, including fines, detention, or confiscation, Iranian Press TV has reported.
In a statement posted on its official X account on Sunday, the authority warned cargo owners shipping to and from the Persian Gulf to review the Non-Compliant Vessels (NCV) list prior to chartering in order to avoid potential issues.
Effective immediately, the authority said, any vessel cooperating with listed vessels, including through ship-to-ship (STS) transfers or transshipment, will also be added to the list.
To request removal from the list, vessels must submit a formal application with justifications to info@pgsa.ir, it said.
The announcement comes amid heightened tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for global energy shipments, through which about one-fifth of the world’s oil supply passes.
Iran has warned that it will not tolerate any disruption to its sovereignty over the strategic passage, saying traffic in the waterway will not return to normal unless the United States ends the war and blockade against the country.
Greece is moving a Patriot missile battery from the island of Karpathos to the Souda naval base on Crete to bolster air defences, Greek daily Kathimerini is reporting
The move comes about 24 hours after senior Iranian officials threatened possible strikes on US bases on European soil, the paper said.
Greece’s defence ministry and armed forces general staff have been on alert since last week, assessing the threat level and reviewing measures to protect critical infrastructure, according to the report.
The battery, along with its equipment and personnel, departed Karpathos at dawn and was expected to be operational in the wider Souda area within hours, Kathimerini said. The system had been deployed to Karpathos in March as part of a broader plan to shield all sectors of Athens’ flight information region from potential ballistic missile attacks.
A massive Ukrainian drone attack is being repelled in the Krasnodar Region, Governor Veniamin Kondratyev said, adding that debris fell on a private children’s center in Krasnodar, killing two children and injuring seven others, and two adults have been hospitalized.
“The Krasnodar Region is repelling a massive enemy drone attack tonight. Once again, the targets were civilian facilities, peaceful residents, and our children. Drone debris fell on a private children’s center in Krasnodar. Unfortunately, two children died. My deepest condolences to their families. Seven other children were injured and are currently receiving all necessary medical care. Two adults are also in city hospitals. I wish a speedy recovery to everyone,” he wrote on Max.
In the video below the previous Ukrainian UAV’s vs Russian Civilian Buildings that killed Children in Krasnodar (August, 12, 2026 – Novorossiysk)
UAVs have attacked Ozon’s logistics center in Krasnodar, with the strike causing a fire at the warehouse. According to preliminary information, there were no casualties, the company’s press service reported.
“On August 24, a logistics center in Krasnodar was hit by a drone attack. All systems functioned as intended, and we promptly evacuated the staff. Preliminary reports indicate there are no casualties. A major fire has broken out at the warehouse, and emergency services are at the scene,” the report said.
In the video below the second Ozon warehouse attacked in Russia by alleged Ukrainian Drones (August, 23, Orenburg, via ImmaginixConoscer IG)
The company said earlier that the logistics center had suspended the acceptance of shipments, with goods currently at the warehouse to be hidden from the marketplace storefront. Some items will be cancelled or delivered from other warehouses.
If no equivalent goods are available, they will be marked as out of stock, according to the report. Shipments already en route to the warehouse will be rerouted. Ozon will provide sellers with specific information regarding the status of their goods via their marketplace seller accounts and official seller channels on social media.
Former CIA analyst Larry Johnson and University of Tehran professor Mohammad Marandi told Al Mayadeen that a prolonged confrontation increasingly favors Iran, pointing to mounting military, logistical, economic and political pressure on the United States as Tehran prepares to adopt a more offensive posture.
Speaking during the program The Great Standoff: Iran and the World on Monday night, Johnson argued that Washington faces growing difficulties sustaining its military presence and replenishing advanced weapons, while Marandi said Iran’s ability to endure the consequences of the war is greater because it views itself as defending against an externally imposed aggression.
“Time’s on the side of Iran, not the United States”, Johnson said, arguing that strains within the US military would become increasingly difficult to sustain the longer the conflict continued.
Johnson pointed in particular to the deteriorating conditions aboard US vessels, including shortages of food and personal hygiene supplies, malfunctioning sanitation systems and serious morale problems among personnel.
He said those difficulties extend beyond the Navy, citing concerns over suicides and morale across different branches of the US military. “The longer this goes on, the more it wears on the personal morale of individual soldiers, sailors, Marines, airmen,” Johnson said.
Johnson mentioned that “One news report indicated that as many as six sailors had tried to jump overboard on the Abraham Lincoln. I had a recently retired US military officer tell me that that was a lie, that the number was probably closer to 30, not just six. And we find that these problems are not confined just to the Navy.”
Beyond personnel pressures, Johnson argued that the United States is increasingly constrained by shortages of advanced weapons and its reliance on foreign supply chains. He said China controls critical materials required to manufacture weapons, including Tomahawk and JASSM cruise missiles, PAC-3 interceptors used by Patriot systems and THAAD missiles.
Footage 1 – Iran has released footage reportedly showing the Aqab 44 Air Base, a military facility built deep underground.
The footage appears to show sections of the facility, highlighting Iran’s underground military infrastructure designed to protect strategic assets from potential attacks.
Footage 2 – Iran has added another significant boost to its missile capabilities! In the latest breakthrough in defense technology, the Ghassem Basir solid-fuel ballistic missile has been unveiled, with a range of 1,200 km+.
With Fatah hypersonic gliders and Khorramshahr-4 heavy warheads, this new missile system is designed for rapid mobility and high-precision targeting.
1st Footage – Turkey’s first nuclear power plant has reached another construction milestone, with Russia’s Rosatom delivering four steam generators for Unit 4 of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant.
The massive components were manufactured in southern Russia before travelling around 3,000 kilometres by sea to the construction site on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast.
Once operational, Akkuyu’s four reactors are expected to play a major role in meeting the country’s growing electricity demand.
2nd Footage – Viral claim: Pakistan transferring nuclear missiles to Turkey Reports and social media posts are widely circulating claiming that Pakistan has decided to transfer its strategic nuclear capabilities to the Republic of Turkey.
According to these viral posts, Pakistan plans to deploy 170 nuclear missiles equipped with 16 warheads to Ankara, effectively placing these strategic assets under Turkish command.
This had been happened after the signing of “Mecca Deal” to Defense agreement among Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia too. However, this news is not officially confirmed by any Pakistani or Turkish officials.
Pakistan is a declared nuclear weapons state and maintains that its nuclear arsenal is under strict national command and control. Turkey is a NATO member and hosts US nuclear weapons at Incirlik Air Base under NATO arrangements, but does not own nuclear weapons.
Neither the Pakistan Foreign Office, Pakistan military, nor Turkish government agencies have issued statements confirming such a transfer.
As of this writing, the claim remains unverified and appears to originate from unconfirmed social media posts.
Iran is ready not only to strike oil tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz, but also to attack other oil transportation routes from the Persian Gulf zone, if regional countries join the anti-Iranian sanctions of the United States, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Mohsen Rezaei said.
“We are telling all the neighboring countries not to join the US economic war on Iran, or Tehran will view them as enemies,” he was quoted as saying by the Islamic Republic’s state-run broadcaster.
He added that if the neighboring states join the US sanctions, “not a single drop of oil will be shipped from the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.”
In this case, Iran will “view other routes of oil export from the region as its target.”
In his words, the Islamic Republic does not want the conflict to spread. “But if Iran’s neighbors support the US in its economic war, Tehran will damage their interests,” Rezaei said.
Two days ago (read below updates on August, 21) Iran’s Foreign Ministry has strongly condemned a new round of US economic sanctions against the country, stating that the measures amount to “economic terrorism” and “crimes against humanity.”
The Russian armed forces have hit a dry cargo ship delivering weapons, as well as seven fuel storage tanks in the port of Chernomorsk of the Odessa Region, the Russian Defense Ministry said.
“With the help of high-precision strikes and drones, the following targets were hit in the Odessa Region’s port of Chernomorsk: a dry cargo ship, delivering weapons and military equipment to Ukraine; seven fuel storage tanks, and port infrastructure where military cargo was unloaded and stored,” the ministry said.
Russia has attacked the Odesa region for 11 hours, using a combination of 17 “Banderol” missiles, 4 Х-59 and Х-31 missiles, approximately 10 air-dropped bombs, and about 70 drones, according to monitoring reports.
The Israeli occupation forces acknowledged on Wednesday that their personnel fired on a vehicle carrying five-year-old Palestinian girl Hind Rajab in Gaza in January 2024, and announced a criminal investigation into the incident.
Hind was martyred after her family’s vehicle came under fire while they were attempting to flee Gaza City amid an Israeli military advance in northern Gaza. Her body was recovered days after she made a desperate, hours-long emergency call to the Palestinian Red Crescent on January 29, 2024.
She was found inside a vehicle riddled with bullets alongside six relatives. Two Palestinian Red Crescent paramedics who had been dispatched to rescue her were also killed.
The Israeli occupation had previously denied that its forces were present in the area at the time of the incident.
Five-year-old Hind Rajab’s last phone call from a car surrounded by her slain relatives shocks the world; now her killing is one of two Gaza cases Israel’s army says it will investigate. The second case involves 15 paramedics crushed in their convoy in southern Gaza.
«But critics note that only 0.18% of such cases ever reach prosecution, and that high-profile incidents like the World Central Kitchen strike are excluded, leaving families with little faith in justice» Al Jazeera’s Joel Evans reported in the video above.
DEVIL NETANYAHU’s HOLOCAUST. Explosive UN findings: “Israel DELIBERATELY TARGETED Gaza CHILDREN”
The head of “Israel’s” Mossad spy agency, Roman Gofman, held a phone call with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani last week during which they discussed Turkey’s military presence in Syria, three people familiar with the matter said, Reuters reported.
The call, which the sources said took place on August 14, came days before “Israel” launched airstrikes on a Syrian military airbase in the north of the country on Tuesday.
It marks one of the highest-level contacts yet between “Israel” and the new Syrian government since the fall of former dictator Bashar al-Assad in December 2014.
Syria was “on the verge of breaching” a security understanding with “Israel” by allowing Turkish forces to deploy at an airbase near Aleppo, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office claimed late on Tuesday.
The Israeli Prime Minister’s office accused Damascus of ignoring repeated Israeli warnings against the move, saying that the deployment “would pose a threat to Israel’s security.”
“Israel and Syria agreed to a status quo in security matters, which Syria was on the verge of breaching by permitting Turkish troops to deploy at an airbase near Aleppo,” the office said in a statement.
The statement came hours after Israeli aggression hit Syria’s Abu al-Duhur military airbase in eastern Idlib, the first such strike on the base since Bashar al-Assad’s fall in December 2024. Meanwhile, the Israeli military has not officially confirmed carrying out the attack.
The UN Human Rights Office in the occupied Palestinian territory says the latest killings of Palestinians by Israeli forces in Gaza may be war crimes, highlighting the ongoing attacks on the enclave’s police, according to Al Jazeera.
“These incidents are a stark reminder that, despite occasional drops in the number of reported attacks, civilians throughout Gaza remain exposed to persistent, unpredictable, lethal harm,” it said in a statement on Friday.
It said the reported killings of at least 22 Palestinians in Gaza between August 13 and 19 alone, including women and children, “may amount to war crimes and other atrocity crimes”.
The UN office also called the “pattern” of attacks on police personnel and facilities in Gaza “alarming”, including an attack on Gaza City’s municipal police headquarters on Wednesday that killed eight officers and a 13-year-old girl.
It says it recorded 18 Israeli attacks on police personnel across Gaza since January, with 77 Palestinians killed, including six children and four women.
Under international humanitarian law, it says, police are protected civilians, unless they are actively and directly participating in hostilities.
Based on the same executive order with which Donald Trump authorized sanctions against UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese, Marco Rubio announced new measures against members of the International Criminal Court.
This time, it was the turn of Tomoko Akane, judge and president of the Court, and Abdoulaye Seye, a lawyer for the ICC Prosecutor’s Office who was investigating the Israeli case.
Both will be subject to sanctions that include, among other measures, a ban on entry to the United States and a freeze on any assets held in the country, as well as exclusion from the US financial system.
This is not the first time Washington has targeted ICC members: last year, the Trump administration imposed sanctions against several judges and officials of the Court, including Prosecutor Karim Khan, who was targeted after the issuance of arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
What was feared has happened. Israel has made an indirect move against Turkey…. In the video below a medley of many social footages on Turkish military reaction.
Turkey condemned the strikes, while Israel said it was acting to prevent a potential Turkish military deployment at the Syrian base—an allegation Ankara has denied. Washington is now working on a deconfliction mechanism to prevent accidental military clashes between Turkey, Israel and Syria. (Reuters)
A senior Israeli official revealed that intelligence was shared with the United States prior to Israeli strikes on Abu al-Duhur Airport in the Idlib countryside in the latest day (details below in August, 18 updates), after US ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack expressed concern that the operations constitute an unnecessary escalation.
Yesterday, Israeli forces advanced with tanks and vehicles in southern Quneitra ((details below in August, 21 updates),
Yesterday Turkey’s Ministry of Justice has asked Interpol to issue Red Notices for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and an Israeli official on genocide charges, Turkish Justice Minister Akin Gurlek announced on Friday (details below in August, 21 updates).
VIDEO LEGEND UNDER THE VIDEO
Footage 1 – Turkey is secretly deploying massive weapons systems into Syria under cover of darkness, directed by MIT intelligence. The buildup follows Israeli airstrikes on a Syrian airbase and signals Ankara is preparing for a potential military confrontation with Israel. US envoy warns of direct clash…
Footage 2 – Turkey is reportedly concerned about the possibility of a direct military confrontation or war with the Israeli military inside Syria! It is now fully determined to send Israel a strong and clear message.
Footage 3 (grey part in the general video but visible in the footage below)– According to information provided by a Syrian journalist, Turkey has deployed approximately 200-250 armored vehicles and 20 tanks along the southwestern Syrian front. This deployment is believed to coincide with recent Israeli air strikes in Syria.
Footage 4 – The Turkish Bayraktar TB3 unmanned aircraft is displayed for the first time at one of the exhibitions – It features radar detection combat skills – Submarine detection using acoustic sensors – Carrying heavy and guided missiles, stealthy with high capabilities
Footage 5 – As part of the NATO 2026 Summit Defense Industry Forum, a high-level reception was held at the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ) facilities in Kahramankazan, hosted by Haluk Görgün, Chairman of the Defense Industry Directorate of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey. The program, which highlighted the capabilities of the Turkish defense industry, international collaboration, and alliance spirit, is expected to attract widespread participation.
Footage 6 and 7 – No one knows for certain what Turkey is planning! However, it is believed that #Ankara is making these extensive preparations to deliver a strong response to the Israeli airstrikes carried out last Tuesday.
“Erdogan is an anti-Semitic dictator who massacred Kurds, harbors Hamas terrorists, occupies half of Cyprus, and imprisons a record number of journalists and political opponents. Now he is trying to extend his aggression against Israel into Syria. Israel will not tolerate this. Erdogan’s pathetic attempt to intimidate the leaders and soldiers of Israel, the only true democracy in the Middle East, will not succeed,”
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a statement after the Turkish Justice Minister announced an arrest warrant for him yesterday.
Israel has fully relocated the 190th Squadron (“Magic Touch”) — operating AH-64A Apache attack helicopters — to Ramat David Airbase in the north, near the borders with Syria and Lebanon, the IDF confirmed.
The permanent move from southern Ramon Airbase is intended to boost rapid-response capabilitie…
In the second footage of the video a Turkish miltary deployement in Syria
China has refused to join a US plan to “squash” Iran’s economy, rejecting Washington’s push to be part of the “toughest sanctions in history” against the Islamic Republic.
On Thursday, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent called on American allies and other countries to choose sides and stop doing business with Iran, as Washington prepares what he touted as “the greatest coordinated economic isolation in the history of the world.”
In an interview with CNBC, Bessent described the plan, expected to be unveiled on Monday, as “a one-two punch” combining a naval blockade with “the toughest sanctions in history.” He claimed it would “squash” the Iranian economy and “collapse this regime.”
Beijing, however, has rejected Washington’s call.
“Regarding the Iran issue, sanctions and pressure do not help resolve the problem,” Reuters quoted a spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington as saying. “China calls on the relevant parties to take responsible actions and resolve the issue through political and diplomatic means.”
The Russian Army is steadily choking off Ukraine’s fuel supplies, and the recent strike on the KLO fuel depot in Brovary is yet another nail in the coffin of Ukraine’s military mobility.
On the night of August 20, Russian forces struck the KLO fuel and lubricants depot in Brovary, a city just northeast of Kiev, that was storing up to 8,000 cubic meters of fuel intended for Ukrainian forces.
Footage filmed by an eyewitness at the industrial site quickly spread across social media. The depot has ceased operations, according to Ukrainian media reports, and the company said that no site employees were injured.
Building a new gas station costs around $1.2 million, while protecting it against drone attacks costs about $44,800. Ukrainian fuel station network WOG claims that fully restoring a single station can cost up to $1.6 million. Depending on the extent of the damage, repairs can take up to ten weeks.
Since April 2026, Russia has been intensively targeting Ukrainian gas stations, according to Ukrainian media. The extent of the damage is being downplayed by the Ukrainian side. As early as July 6, Ekonomichna Pravda reported that 200 gas stations had been hit. Despite Russia’s military campaign, Ukrainian newspapers have stubbornly continued to cite that figure through the end of August.
A Russian drone strike hit a major shopping centre in Kryvyi Rih, Ukraine, killing six people and injuring 103, including eleven children. Officials said the attack came in two waves, with the second strike occurring as emergency crews were responding to the scene.
Houthis released a major video showing strikes against pro-Saudi forces in Yemen. Footage shows attacks on personnel and equipment in the southwest of the country.
Turkey’s Ministry of Justice has asked Interpol to issue Red Notices for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and an Israeli official on genocide charges, Turkish Justice Minister Akin Gurlek announced on Friday.
Gurlek said the decision was made during proceedings concerning Israel’s attack in international waters on activists aboard the Global Sumud Flotilla, which set sail earlier this year to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza.
“Pursuant to the arrest warrants issued on 14 July 2026 for Benjamin Netanyahu and Afek Moskovitch on charges of genocide, our Ministry of Justice requested that the Ministry of Interior seek Interpol Red Notices for their international apprehension. The relevant documents have also been forwarded to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” the minister said in a statement posted on X.
Benjamin Netanyahu and Afek Moskovitch are standing trial for crimes against humanity, genocide, aggravated unlawful deprivation of liberty, intentional injury, torture and ill-treatment, damage to property, aggravated robbery, and the hijacking or seizure of means of transport.
DEVIL NETANYAHU’s HOLOCAUST. Explosive UN findings: “Israel DELIBERATELY TARGETED Gaza CHILDREN”
“The charges relate to the armed intervention against civilians delivering humanitarian aid to Gaza in international waters and the subsequent detention of activists.”
Ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz dropped on Thursday compared with the previous day amid growing safety concerns in the Middle East, as US-Iran peace talks remain stalled, Reuters reports.
Citing preliminary data from ship-tracking company Kpler, Reuters reported that seven commodity vessels transited the waterway on Thursday, down from 14 ships on Wednesday. Of Thursday’s total, four vessels were entering the Gulf and three were exiting.
No supertankers or liquefied natural gas carriers were recorded passing through the narrow chokepoint, according to the data.
Oil prices held largely steady on Friday, with Brent crude futures gaining 4 cents, or 0.04 percent, to reach $93.82 a barrel as of 01:42 GMT.
US West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude slipped 6 cents, or 0.06 percent, to trade at $86.78.
The market remains on track for a second straight weekly gain as the stalemated US-Iran conflict continues to disrupt Middle East oil supplies.
Iran’s Foreign Ministry has strongly condemned a new round of US economic sanctions against the country, stating that the measures amount to “economic terrorism” and “crimes against humanity.”
In a statement issued on Thursday, the ministry said the new sanctions, announced by the US government on the anniversary of the 1953 coup in Iran, demonstrate the continuation of decades of hostility toward the Iranian people.
“The new US sanctions are not only another indication of the continuation of 73 years of hostility by US policymakers toward the Iranian people, but also demonstrate the anti-human, lawless and hegemonic nature of the US government,”the statement said.
On Wednesday, Trump announced what he called the “most crushing economic operation” against Iran, claiming that Tehran would face “economic warfare and isolation on an unprecedented scale”. He also threatened sanctions against any country that does business with Iran.
The threat comes as his war on Iran, launched alongside the Israeli regime on February 28, has failed to reach any of its objectives.
US President Donald Trump has threatened to financially punish any country providing an economic “lifeline” to Iran, as he declared an “economic D-Day” against Tehran.
The threat, six months into the US’s costly conflict with Iran, is Trump’s latest attempt to wield US economic power to achieve his foreign policy objectives, after a series of damaging trade wars earlier in his second term in office.
But Trump’s leverage over China and Russia, two important trade partners with Iran, is limited, analysts say. Russia is already under sweeping US sanctions and operates largely outside the US-led economic framework. China, meanwhile, has repeatedly shown it is willing to ignore US sanctions when doing so serves its own economic interests.
Read more here.
Israeli occupation forces raided the West Bank town of Yaabad, southwest of Jenin, on Thursday evening and seized a Palestinian home, converting it into a military post.
Local sources told the Palestinian Wafa news agency that occupation forces informed homeowner Hamed Hamarsha that they would maintain control of his home for two days.
Yaabad has faced repeated Israeli occupation raids in recent months, including home invasions, the establishment of checkpoints, the closure of entrances, and restrictions on Palestinian movement.
In a separate incident, Israeli occupation forces raided and damaged the belongings and furniture inside a Palestinian home in Qusra, south of Nablus.
Qusra Mayor Abdul Azim Wadi told Wafa that occupation forces had converted the home of Yusuf Abdel Salam into a military post after besieging it for 12 consecutive days.
On Thursday evening, the forces destroyed the home’s belongings and furniture and threw them through the windows, according to Wadi.
The homeowner is currently staying in another besieged home after occupation soldiers forced him and his family to leave their residence, claiming that the area had been designated a “closed military zone.”
Israeli occupation forces carried out a series of attacks across southern Lebanon on Thursday, including demolitions, artillery shelling, drone activity and the burning of homes, amid continued violations of the ceasefire.
The attacks targeted several towns and areas across the southern governorates, according to local reports.
In the Marjayoun district, Israeli occupation forces carried out a demolition operation on the outskirts of Mais al-Jabal and another in the town of Al-Tiri in the Bint Jbeil district.
An Israeli drone also dropped explosive material near the Ali al-Taher area in the Nabatieh region, were a few days ago 3 children were exterminated within their family
In Talsah, in the Marjayoun district, Israeli occupation forces set fire to several homes.
An Israeli Merkava tank subsequently shelled the outskirts of Baraachit in the Bint Jbeil district with several rounds.
Earlier Thursday, a major explosion was reported in the area between Zawtar al-Sharqiyah and Yohmor al-Shqif, following another explosion in the al-Mashaa area of Mansouri, which was also subjected to artillery fire.
The continued attacks come despite the ceasefire, with Israeli occupation forcesmaintaining military operations across southern Lebanon and continuing to strike towns and villages, including through warplanes and drones.
Israeli occupation forces advanced on Thursday with two tanks and three military vehicles toward Tal al-Dariyat in the southern countryside of Quneitra, according to local Syrian sources.
The sources also reported that an Israeli occupation patrol advanced into the Tal al-Karoum area in the central countryside of Quneitra.
The Israeli occupation continues to carry out near-daily incursions into the Quneitra and Daraa countryside, accompanied by the establishment of temporary military checkpoints, searches of civilians and vehicles, and raids on homes.
The incursions have also involved the detention and interrogation of Syrians, as well as the bulldozing of agricultural land, according to local sources.
The old video below shows Israeli that tanks was now stationed in towns and villages in Syria’s southwest since 2024…
Yemeni Armed Forces spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Saree announced that Yemeni forces had carried out two military operations using drones in Saudi Arabia’s Najran region, claiming that both operations successfully achieved their objectives.
Brigadier Saree said the first drone targeted a sensitive site at Najran Airport, while the second targeted Saudi Aramco’s facilities in Najran.
He asserted the operations were conducted as a response to what he called violations by the Saudi regime, including the use of drones in the airspace over Yemen’s Saada province.
“The Yemeni Armed Forces will continue to protect Yemen’s sovereignty against any violation and consolidate this equation,” Saree concluded.
In the video below one of the previous attacks by Houtis on a Yemeni Red Sea Port
Ukraine’s ousted defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov has called for elections, intensifying a debate over political accountability during the war with Russia.
While most Ukrainians oppose holding elections during wartime, growing concerns about government accountability are adding pressure on President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Protesters in Kyiv said the recent government reshuffle showed that Ukrainians feel they are not being heard.
Opposition MP Oleksii Honcharenko questioned how elections could be held while missiles are falling, nearly one million Ukrainians are serving in the military and millions remain abroad.
Fedorov has argued Ukraine must find a way to restore the democratic process if the war continues for years. The debate highlights the challenge of maintaining democracy during a prolonged war. Al Jazeera’s Audrey MacAlpine reports from Kyiv.
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf arrived in Baghdad on Wednesday and delivered a speech at the site where General Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis were martyred, paying tribute to the two leaders of the Axis of Resistance, before the monument on these Iranian and Iraqi heores.
On January 3, 2020, a US drone strike ordered by President Donald Trump targeted a convoy near Baghdad International Airport, killing IRGC Quds Force commander General Qassem Soleimani and Deputy Chairman of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.
Iran’s revenge starts from Qom. Thanks to Fordow’s nuclear bunker plant
Ghalibaf said the US government had assassinated “the two heroes of the Axis of Resistance who saved the region from ISIS”, and said Iran’s resistance capabilities had been demonstrated during the Ramadan War.
He further stressed that his visit to Iraq was part of a new regional approach focused on bilateral cooperation with countries in the region, without foreign meddling. “Today, everyone has come to recognize the Zionist entity’s ugly nature”, Ghalibaf stressed.
Ghalibaf affirmed that during his visit to Iraq, he would meet with senior Iraqi government officials and politicians and participate in the Arbaeen commemorations for the martyred Iranian leader Sayyed Ali Khamenei, Lebanese TV Al Mayadeen has reported.
Just during this religious event, on July, 30, a joint Saudi-US struck on positions of Popular Mobilization Forces (PMU), commonly known as Hashd al-Sha’abi, across the country, which have killed at least 20 resistance fighters and wounded 32 others (details here).
Iranian Parliament speaker also described relations between Iran and Iraq as deeply rooted, saying they reflected ties between two neighboring countries based on a shared destiny, adding that past experiences would guide the two countries toward a bright future.
During his meeting with Amidi, Ghalibaf said Iran and Iraq have recognized that the United States and its policies constitute a principal factor behind the region’s problems.
He said Washington is responsible for problems affecting the Gulf and obstacles facing regional energy markets, linking them to the United States’ reliance on military intervention and war.
“America approached the Gulf states and the region with the aim of plundering and looting their resources,” Ghalibaf said.
The Russian Armed Forces liberated the settlements of Matyashevo and Nikolaipolye in the DPR, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation reports.
Russia carried out a massive missile attack on Kyiv in the night on August, 19, alongside 168 drones, killing at least 16 people and wounding more than 40
Last night, August, 19, Kiev was under attack again. In the capital of the Ukraine has received dozens of ballistic and cruise missiles aimed at logistics and industrial facilities.
More than 25 missiles have struck Kyiv, including Iskander-M ballistic missiles, allegedly North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles, and 3M22 Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles.
Additionally, Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bombers launched Kh-101 cruise missiles, while a Buyan-M-class corvette launched several 3M14 Kalibr cruise missiles, which are expected to enter Ukrainian airspace soon.
Fires were recorded on the territory of the Antonov plant, whose capacity can be used to assemble long-range UAVs. Heat tags of fires are also marked in the area of the railway junction to the south of the enterprise (video below).
Two more groups of targets were hit in Svyatoshinsky and Darnitsky districts of Kiev. In particular, fires were recorded in the vicinity of the large Darnitsa railway station, which serves industrial facilities located in its vicinity.
In Brovary, the Russian Armed Forces attacked a fuel storage facility near a city railway junction. There have been numerous fires in the area of the facility, but it is impossible to talk about damage to fuel tanks until additional satellite images are available.
In the Boryspil area, the target of the raid was the Zamler Group logistics complex, the territory of which could be used to store dual-use goods: commercial and military ones. A strong fire in the warehouse was captured by the Ukrainian media (video below).
In addition, the Ukraine nnounced an attack by “Geraniums” at the Reni checkpoint on the border of the Ukraine and Moldova. The fact of the attack is indirectly confirmed by thermal tags in the area of the border crossing.
Russian troops continue to take advantage of the lack of anti-ballistic missile weapons in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. As can be seen from the footage from the field, it is these munitions that ensure the destruction of the most important targets, such as logistics hubs or components of large industrial areas
Footage filmed in Zhytomyr shows the moment two explosions hit a building housing the regional headquarters of the National Police of Ukraine on August 19.
Ukrainian officials said Russian Banderol-type drones struck the building, killing two police officers and injuring at least 20 people. The attack caused a fire on the roof and upper floors of the building.
Irina Mudraya, deputy head of Vladimir Zelensky’s office, who was sacked amid a corruption scandal, has been detained and will spend the night in a detention facility, Verkhovna Rada lawmaker Alexey Goncharenko (designated as terrorist and extremist in Russia) said on Wednesday.
“Irina Mudraya has been detained. She is currently under an investigative procedure at the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine [NABU]. She will stay during this night at a temporary detention facility,” he wrote on his Telegram channel.
Earlier in the day, Mudraya stated that she was dissatisfied with the United States preparing “its own personnel reserve” in Ukraine, by placing its own people in key positions.
“The Americans are building this personnel reserve from the NABU people. And they already have a [reserve] for all the bodies that will be in the competition. They took the customs away from us, the BEB [the Economic Security Bureau], ARMU [National Agency of Ukraine for Asset Recovery and Management] will be taken now, NABU, SAP,” she stated.
“Klimenko will win again, and that’s it, and he’ll secure a second term for seven years, and that will be the end for everyone,” Mudraya noted.
A video from the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) about corruption in the highest echelons of power contains a recording of Mudraya’s conversation with a former Rada deputy, in which she says she is unhappy with the lack of control over head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAP) Alexander Klimenko.
On Wednesday, Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies launched a special operation against a criminal group led by a former and a current member of the Verkhovna Rada, which includes officials from Zelensky’s office. NABU later said the criminal group includes Mudraya, an ex-Rada deputy, and the chairman of a state bank.
A total of nine people have now been reported killed by the Israeli drone attack in central Gaza City, according to a local ambulance source cited by our colleagues on the ground.
In the past hour, a drone attack targeted a police post here in Gaza City. The attack happened during a busy time in the central part of the city, near the municipality and a city park which was filled with people, including children.
A few hours ago, another attack targeted a motorcycle in central Gaza’s Nuseirat refugee camp. One person was reported killed in that attack.
The Israeli military will not withdraw from the so-called Yellow Line and will hold its positions in the Gaza Strip, while Israel will not change its approach toward targeted operations against armed radicals, Dmitri Gendelman, adviser to the Israeli prime minister’s office, told TASS.
“The IDF (Israel Defense Forces – TASS) will not retreat from the ‘Yellow Line’, will remain in its current positions and will continue to counter any threats to its forces and citizens. Israel will not change its approach to targeted killings of militants either,”he said after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s meeting with US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner.
Russia’s Project 09851 Khabarovsk special-purpose nuclear submarine appears to have begun its first factory sea trials after being photographed leaving Severodvinsk on August 17. The voyage takes Russia’s first submarine designed from the outset around the Poseidon underwater weapon from shipyard construction into at-sea testing.
Khabarovsk was laid down at Sevmash on July 27, 2014. It was rolled out of its construction hall on November 1, 2025, and physically lowered into the water later that month before undergoing final outfitting and dockside tests.
Russia’s Defense Ministry said the submarine was built to deploy modern underwater weapons, including robotic systems. Its detailed specifications remain classified, but it is widely assessed to carry up to six Poseidon vehicles.
Poseidon is an autonomous, nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable underwater drone designed to travel across intercontinental distances. Instead of flying through the radar and interceptor networks built to detect ballistic missiles, it approaches its target beneath the ocean.
In October 2025, President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia had launched a Poseidon from a carrier submarine and activated its onboard nuclear reactor for the first time. The vehicle then operated under its own nuclear power for a period of time, demonstrating that the system had progressed beyond launch-only testing.
The deputy chief of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) says Iran’s air defense systems shot down more than 200 enemy aircraft, including drones and manned aircraft, during the recent US-Israeli aggression, Iranian Press Tv has reported
Speaking at a ceremony commemorating the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, on Tuesday, Major General Mostafa Izadi said that the downing of over 200 enemy aircraft had stirred serious public scrutiny in the United States and fueled internal instability within the Israeli regime.
He added that the enemy had entered the war with a calculated scenario of “regime change” and disintegration, but suffered defeat on all fronts and failed to gain access to Iran’s nuclear industry.
Turning to the role of the Iranian people in the enemy’s defeat, Gen. Izadi emphasized that the people’s conscious presence had neutralized all enemy ploys, to the extent that national cohesion and authority were strengthened more than ever before.
He also noted that, according to available information, 80 percent of young Americans oppose war with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Iran’s sustained retaliatory strikes against US military positions across West Asia have exposed the vulnerability of Washington’s military footprint in the region, prompting the Pentagon to examine whether the American presence in the Persian Gulf should be scaled back after the war on Iran, according to a report.
The Washington Post reported on Tuesday, citing eight people familiar with the matter, that the Pentagon’s policy office is conducting an initial assessment of the future of the US military footprint in West Asia.
The review is examining whether bases damaged by Iranian missile and drone strikes should be rebuilt in their previous form or whether Washington should use the destruction to establish a smaller military presence.
The assessment is not yet a formal review ordered by War Secretary Pete Hegseth, according to a senior Pentagon official cited by the Post, who described it as “prudent planning” that could eventually inform decisions on the future of US forces in the region.
The newspaper said the damage inflicted by Iranian missile and drone strikes has given some US officials an opportunity to reconsider Washington’s long-standing military footprint in West Asia.
More than 200 US military facilities have reportedly been damaged or destroyed, according to the Post, while six US service members were killed in a March Iranian strike on Port Shuaiba, a military facility in Kuwait.
Iranian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Major General Ali Abdollahi said on Wednesday that regional states providing support to US forces could be regarded as parties to any military action against Iran.
Abdollahi added that, “It is unlikely that military aircraft and refueling aircraft would be stationed at regional bases without the knowledge of the host countries”.
In a similar vein, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi commented on Tuesday on the regional balance of power, stating that the recent war “proved that America cannot even defend its own bases”.
The foreign minister also confirmed diplomatic channels between Iran and the United States, noting that Qatar and Pakistan “have played an effective mediation role between Iran and Washington”, adding that “currently, relations between Tehran and Doha are going through a very positive phase”.
Iran has rejected a United Arab Emirates’ claim that Tehran launched two ballistic missiles towards the country, with Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei warning regional states against making unfounded accusations and urging vigilance over a history of “false-flag operations” seeking to implicate blameless parties.
Remarking on Tuesday, the official categorically rejected that Iran had launched any projectiles towards the UAE, deploring such accusations.
He stressed that such conduct runs counter to the principle of good-neighborliness and undermines ongoing efforts to build trust among regional countries and prevent a further escalation of insecurity in the region.
The spokesman also called on regional parties to take into account the complexities created by the continued “malign actions” of the United States and the Israeli regime against regional peace and security.
In this context, Baghaei specifically referred to the history of multiple “false-flag operations” and urged regional countries to refrain from making unfounded accusations against the Islamic Republic.
“We call on all regional parties to avoid baseless accusations against Iran.”
Earlier in the day, the UAE defense ministry had alleged that its air defenses had “detected two ballistic missiles launched from Iran towards the country.”Also on Tuesday, a Press TV reporter revealed that reports claiming Iran launched missile attacks against the Emirates were unfounded.
A senior Israeli official revealed that intelligence was shared with the United States prior to Israeli strikes on Abu al-Duhur Airport in the Idlib countryside, after US ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack expressed concern that the operations constitute an unnecessary escalation.
The Israeli official, speaking to Fox News, said that “highly sensitive intelligence was shared with the United States in advance” of the strikes. The official also commented on Syrian leader Ahmad al-Sharaa, stating, “Al-Sharaa understands that he cannot operate like the previous Syrian regime, which maintained proxy forces. It’s possible that he didn’t understand what was going on, or didn’t know.”
The American blockade of the Strait of Hormuz will be broken by force if the United States fails to comply with the terms of the peace agreement, Reuters reports, citing a senior Iranian official.
Iran is threatening the United States in a way it hasn’t done before. But the current conflict has exposed the United States’ weakness, which Tehran has exploited. Currently, the Iranians are threatening to break the US naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz if Washington ignores Iran’s terms of the peace agreement.
Tehran is ready to shift from a defensive to an offensive policy, with virtually no hope that the conflict can be resolved through negotiations. According to the British publication, Iran has begun dictating its terms to the US, declaring that if Trump fails to reach an agreement with the Iranian authorities within a few weeks, force will be used.
Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf vows that the Islamic Republic will not let the blood of the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei and other martyrs of unprovoked American-Israeli aggression against the nation “go unavenged.”, Iranian Press Tv has reported.
The top legislator made the remarks on Tuesday, honoring the memories of the 168 victims, mostly comprising schoolchildren, who were fatally targeted at a school in the southern Iranian city of Minab in the opening airstrikes of the February 28-April 7 aggression.
He pledged that, under the guidance of Ayatollah Khamenei’s son and successor, Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei, the Islamic Republic will “devote all its capabilities to securing the rights of the Iranian people, ending the aggression, punishing the aggressor, and upholding the country’s honor and standing.”
“We will not allow the enemy to target [our] national unity, the popular participation [in support of the Islamic Republic], the nation’s resilience, or the motivation of our officials,” he added.
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s parliamentary speaker and chief negotiator, says the US is misplaced in “squeezing Iran harder” to win concessions in a post on X.
Ghalibaf said, “Americans think squeezing Iran harder will win concessions that were never part of the agreement. [US Treasury Secretary Scott] Bessent and [War Secretary Pete] Hegseth are way out of their league. Stop waiting for the clown crew to pull a rabbit out of their hat and clean up the mess you made”.
The Strait of Hormuz will remain closed until the United States meets the conditions of the interim deal with Iran, including lifting the naval blockade and sanctions as well as the release of Iran’s frozen assets, says Iran’s parliament speaker and top negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.
“Let me state clearly: until the commitments made by the United States in the memorandum of understanding, including the lifting of the blockade, the release of frozen assets, the lifting of oil sanctions, the end of threats and military operations on all fronts, and other conditions to which America agreed in the memorandum, are implemented, the Strait will not be opened,” Ghalibaf said.
Ghalibaf also warned that internal divisions would weaken Iran and encourage foreign adversaries. The latest statement comes amid heightened tensions between Tehran and Washington, with the strategic Strait of Hormuz remaining a major flashpoint for regional security, energy supplies and international shipping.
Three footage in one VIDEO
1st footage – Russian troops gained direct access to a major Ukrainian defense hub after liberating Krasnopodolye, located 3 km from Dobropolye, the Russian Defense Ministry reported. Video: Russian Defense Ministry/TASS
2nd footage – Dnepropetrovsk Oblast: Intelligence footage confirms the destruction of two locomotives with freight cars using Geran drones near Shakhterskoye. The strike severely disrupted rail logistics in the region.
3rd footage – Kiev on fire after the heavy
Ukrainian forces launched 791 drones last night against 15 Russian regions, including Moscow, as well as occupied Crimea and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.
The Russian Defense Ministry reported that all the aircraft were intercepted, but local authorities reported several injuries. The Tass news agency reported this. Furthermore, Wildberries, a leading Russian online retailer, said its warehouse suffered minor damage in a raid in the Moscow region.
In the Ukrainian town of Energodar, near the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, one resident was killed and 15 injured this morning in a Ukrainian drone attack on a bus stop, according to Mayor Maxim Pukhov.
The attempted attack on Moscow by hostile drones was the largest in the past two years, according to TASS calculations based on data released by Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin.
According to the mayor, 620 UAVs flew toward Moscow and the Moscow Region between Monday evening and 5:00 a.m. Moscow time on Tuesday, with 180 drones destroyed in the capital region. “Emergency services are working at the sites where debris fell,” the mayor said on his official Max channel.
Prior to this, the largest attempted hostile drone attack took place between the evening of August 15 and 6:30 a.m. Moscow time on August 16. According to the mayor, 600 UAVs flew toward the capital, with 201 destroyed in the Moscow Region.
Sobyanin also reported that between the evening of July 6 and 6:00 a.m. Moscow time on July 7, air defense forces downed more than 430 drones, including 36 while approaching Moscow.
In addition, between 8:30 p.m. Moscow time on July 19 and 5:00 a.m. on July 20, more than 400 UAVs flew toward Moscow and the surrounding region. Most of them, Sobyanin said, were neutralized by air defenses at distant approaches, while 85 were destroyed while approaching the capital.
The mayor previously reported that more than 390 drones flew toward the Moscow Region between 8:30 p.m. Moscow time on July 27 and 6:30 a.m. on July 28, while more than 370 UAVs flew toward the region between 8:30 p.m. on July 17 and the early hours of July 18, most of which were neutralized by air defenses at distant approaches. Sobyanin also said that more than 300 hostile UAVs were destroyed between the evening of July 11 and the evening of July 12, including 45 while approaching Moscow. More than 200 hostile drones flew toward the capital on July 4.
The mayor reported the most massive attack on March 11, 2025. At the time, he said that “74 drones were downed while approaching Moscow, while hundreds of combat drones were shot down at various defensive lines overall.”
President Donald Trump threatened in an interview with Fox News to bomb Oman if it interferes in a potential deal with Iran over control of the Strait of Hormuz, the news outlet reported.
Oman has been negotiating with Tehran over the vital shipping route, where maritime traffic has nearly ground to a halt as talks on ending the U.S. war with Iran have stalled.
Below the CNN Breaking News keynotes about:
• Threat to Oman: President Donald Trump warned of an attack on Oman if it “gets in the way” of efforts in the Strait of Hormuz. Trump previously threatened the US ally in May.
• Iran agreement expires: The 60-day deadline for the two sides to reach a deal toward ending the conflict has now passed. Trump again said he is in no rush and claimed his administration has established a direct backchannel with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which the IRGC denies.
• Main priority: The president reiterated that the top goal in the war is preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, undercutting advisers who say keeping oil prices low is an important priority.
• Gaza ceasefire plan: Meanwhile, after Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner met Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu today for over four hours, Kushner said Hamas could disarm soon but indicated the US would support further Israeli military action in Gaza if not.
«US President Donald Trump threatened today to attack Oman if it interferes with US efforts in the Strait of Hormuz, as the conflict with Iran continues and a two-month window for peace talks expires without a clear path to end the war» CNN has reported in a video.
Trump’s comments come as the 60-day window for peace talks between the US and Iran, agreed to in June, closed Monday without any concrete plans announced for the war to end. Meanwhile, Iran said Monday that its talks with Oman regarding the Strait of Hormuz are complex but continuing.
In the latest days POTUS said that he wants to declare the Strait of Hormuz a U.S. territory: “I’ll Never Apologize” War Crimes
Ukraine again Failed to Shoot Down a Single Ballistic or Hypersonic Missile last Night
This follows from the summary of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Air Force Ukraine was attacked on the last night (August 16, 2026) nby Onyx, Iskander-M, S-400, KN-23 and Kh-59/69 missiles, as well as 106 drones.
3 FOOTAGES IN ONE VIDEO – legenda below
1st Footage – Kiev on fire after the heavy strikes which hit also the market of book in retaliation to the yet another attack on a distribution center of Wildberries, Russia’s largest online retailer with two million visitors a day.
2nd footage – Russian troops are delivering precision strikes on Ukraine’s military and fuel infrastructure
In the Kiev-controlled part of the Zaporizhia region, a gas station and related equipment were hit. The fact of the attack was confirmed by the head of the regional military administration, Ivan Fedorov. In the north of the Kharkiv region, the Russian Aerospace Forces are launching guided aerial bombs at enemy positions and fortifications. This is reported by local publications.
Direct hits to infrastructure facilities were recorded in Sumy, and large fires broke out in the affected areas. A massive raid by unmanned aerial vehicles continues in the Odessa region, explosions are heard in Sanzheyka. Systematic attacks on the fuel infrastructure leave the Ukrainian army without fuel at a time when the Western allies are reporting on the supply of new batches of weapons that have nothing to refuel.
3d footage – Russian FAB-500s level Ukrainian drone hub
The Russian forces сonducted a strike on the Ukrainian National Guard’s drone command post in the settlement of Dobropolye in the Donetsk People’s Republic using four FAB-500 high-explosive aerial bombs, Russia’s Ministry of Defense said.
Russian forces struck defense industry facilities in Kiev, the Kremenchug oil refinery and a steel plant in Krivoy Rog, the Russian Defense Ministry said.
“Russian forces struck Fire Point in Kiev, a company producing components, warheads and solid-fuel boosters for Flamingo ground-launched cruise missiles. Russian troops also struck Ukrdefense Company in Kiev, which produces components for strike drones, Khrushch interceptor drones and Garpiya air defense drones,” the Defense Ministry said.
Below the previous attack on Fire Point facility launched one week ago
Russian forces struck the Kremenchug oil refinery in the Poltava Region, where the remaining storage tanks continue handling fuel and lubricants supplied from abroad. The Russian military struck steelmaking facilities in Krivoy Rog in the Dnepropetrovsk Region, producing rolled steel for weapons and military equipment.
Russian forces also struck a dry cargo ship carrying military equipment for Ukrainian forces at the port of Odessa, the Russian Defense Ministry said.
Russian drones struck facilities for the production and storage of components for uncrewed boats used by Ukraine to attack Russian coastal cities, ships and infrastructure facilities in the Black Sea, the Russian defense ministry said.
“During the day, Russian attack unmanned aerial vehicles struck in the settlement of Belgorod-Dnestrovsky (40 kilometers southwest of Odessa): a production facility and a depot holding warheads and components for uncrewed boats used to attack ships and energy infrastructure facilities in the Black Sea, and Russian cities on the Black Sea coast,” it said.
Russian forces struck three dry cargo ships and two tankers, as well as fuel tanks at the port of Odessa, the Russian defense ministry said.
“Three dry cargo ships and two sea-going tankers used to deliver military cargoes and fuels for the Ukrainian army, as well as fuel tanks and warehouses holding military products were struck at the port of Odessa,” it said.
Russian air defenses intercepted and destroyed 822 Ukrainian fixed-wing drones over Russian regions and the Black and Azov Seas overnight (august, 16, 2026), the Russian Defense Ministry said.
“Russian air defense forces intercepted and destroyed 822 Ukrainian fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles over Belgorod, Bryansk, Vladimir, Volgograd, Voronezh, Kaluga, Kursk, Lipetsk, Nizhny Novgorod, Oryol, Rostov, Ryazan, Tambov and Tula regions, the Moscow Region, the Krasnodar Region and the Republic of Crimea, as well as over the Azov and Black Seas, from 8 p.m. Moscow time (5 p.m. GMT) on August 15 to 8 a.m. Moscow time (5 a.m. GMT) on August 16,” the Defense Ministry said.
Three people were killed and one more was injured in a drone attack on southern Russia’s Rostov Region, Governor Yury Slyusar reported.
“Last night, three people were killed as a result of an aerial attack on the Rostov Region, and one more has been hospitalized with injuries,” he wrote on Max channel.
More than 150 UAVs were destroyed over three cities and nine districts in the region in the Ukrainian attack, the official added.
Below the previous UAV attacks on Russia town of Nizhenekamsk wichiu killed 11 civilians including children
Three people were injured in a drone attack near the Moscow Automobile Ring Road (MKAD), according to Mayor Sergey Sobyanin.
“Defense Ministry air defense capabilities have downed another nine drones targeting Moscow. Three people were injured near MKAD, they are being given all necessary assistance. Emergency specialists are working at the scene where [drone] debris fell,” Sobyanin wrote on Max channel.
Since midnight (August,16,2026), as many as 132 unmanned aerial vehicles flying toward the Russian capital have been shot down, calculations by TASS based on the mayor’s posts show.
Iranian state television is showing, for the first time, evidence that Elon Musk’s “Starlink” devices are being used in U.S. military drones.
The IRGC is now displaying wreckage from 171 downed US and Israeli aircraft and drones — including MQ-9 Reapers, Hermes 900s, an F-15 fighter jet, and Starlink modems recovered from the wreckage.
Yemen’s Mokha port has suspended commercial and maritime operations after the Yemeni armed forces targeted it with more than 25 missiles in recent days, the port’s director said on Saturday.
The attacks killed seven people and caused an estimated $16 million in losses, the director told a news conference.
Mokha is a Red Sea port near the Bab al-Mandeb strait, a strategic chokepoint connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and a key route for international shipping.
The port is controlled by Saudi-linked mercenaries. It has a smaller cargo capacity than Yemen’s main ports of Aden and Hodeidah, according to Iranian Press TV.
On Friday, spokesman Brigadier General Yahya Saree said in a statement that the armed forces subjected Saudi Arabia-linked targets to fresh heavy strikes.
He added that the servicemen targeted “warships belonging to its (Riyadh’s) tools and mercenaries in the al-Mokha area, using a large number of ballistic missiles.”
Hezbollah condemned on Saturday the major Israeli enemy’s escalation in southern Lebanon, affirming the Israeli occupation army carried out brutal massacres against civilians and warning that continued attacks and violations of Lebanese sovereignty would be met with an appropriate response, Al Manar Lebanese TV has reported.
In a statement, Hezbollah said Lebanese residents woke at dawn to an aggressive escalation and a brutal massacre allegedly carried out by the criminal Zionist enemy against civilians in the south. It said Israeli strikes targeted a home on the outskirts of the southern town of Ansar and a building in Deir Al-Zahrani, killing 11 people, including women and children, and wounding 12 others.
“Those grave crimes add to Israel’s long record of “massacres, crimes, and the shedding of Lebanese blood, as well as the destruction of homes, the bulldozing of farmland, and the erasure of entire villages,” the statement read.
Hezbollah said responsibility for the Israeli enemy’s continued aggression and violations of Lebanon’s sovereignty rested with the Israeli government and the United States, which it accused of providing Israel with political and military backing and cover.
At the same time, the group called on the Lebanese authorities to explore every available means to halt the Israeli attacks rather than persist with the humiliating direct negotiations and offer “Israel” free concessions, despite the Israeli enemy’s repeated crimes and attacks, as well as its openly stated aggressive and expansionist intentions toward Lebanon.
The Lebanese Parents of Child Martyrs Association on Saturday condemned a new Israeli massacre in the southern town of Ansar that killed a family of six, including four children, and called on Lebanese authorities to document the attack and pursue accountability through regional and international legal channels.
«In a statement, the association condemned the Israeli occupation army’s pre-dawn attack on a family in Ansar on August 15, 2026, which killed Ali Al-Hajj Hassan, his wife, Zeinab Nassereddine, and their children Zahraa, Hassan, Hussein, and Abbas» Al Manar Lebanese TV has reported.
Israeli forces carried out a series of airstrikes and attacks across South Lebanon on Saturday, killing at least nine people and wounding 11 in the past 24 hours, according to Al Mayadeen’s correspondent, citing the Lebanese Health Ministry.
Our correspondent reported that an Israeli strike on Deir al-Zahrani targeted a building along the town’s main highway. Ambulances rushed to the scene amid initial reports of a massacre, while rescue teams worked to assess the casualties and search for survivors.
The Health Ministry reported that the preliminary toll from the Deir al-Zahrani attack stood at two martyrs and nine wounded, bringing the reported toll from the two attacks to at least nine martyrs and 11 wounded.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun condemned on Saturday the Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon, stressing that these violations constitute a “clear message to the negotiating process and to US efforts aimed at implementing the framework agreement”.
For his part, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam described the Israeli escalation since dawn as “extremely dangerous”, saying that the strikes and heavy bombardment targeting Nabatieh, Ansar, Deir al-Zahrani, and neighboring villages were undermining efforts to establish stability in the South, as he posted on his X account.
The Israeli escalation began with an Israeli airstrike on an inhabited home in Ansar, in the Nabatieh district, killing seven people, including three children and two women, while two others were wounded, according to the Health Ministry.
Yemen’s Houthi rebels used six ballistic missiles in their Friday attack on the port of al-Makha, the internationally-recognised government’s army has said in a statement.
One port security official was killed while two sailors went missing, the army’s statement said. At least 8 civilians were injured in the attack, it added.
Attacking the port, a key hub for the inflow of food and goods, as well as civilian infrastructure, shows the Houthi group’s “determination to impose a suffocating siege on the Yemeni people”, military spokesperson Colonel Majid al-Nuzaili added.
A Yemeni military source told the Saba News Agency: “The Yemeni Armed Forces targeted an Aramco refinery in the Jizan region with two drones, and the strike was precise”
“The targeting comes in response to the Saudi enemy’s violation of Yemeni airspace and the country’s sovereignty in the governorates of Saada and Hajjah,” the sources added.
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf says he halted negotiations following the latest Israeli attack on Beirut’s Dahiyeh and said Iran will hit the regime immediately.
Speaking at a gathering of cultural elites on Saturday, Qalibaf said, “In the latest attack on Dahiyeh, I halted the negotiations and announced: ‘Tonight, we will strike the regime, and if the regime responds, we will strike the entire region.’”
He said the outcome was that “the blockade was lifted that same night.”
The top Iranian negotiator also referred to talks over the Strait of Hormuz, saying a reopening had been scheduled for 30 days under an understanding.
He said that after US President Donald Trump said on social media that the blockade and the Strait of Hormuz would be opened together “tonight,” he warned, “If the false claim about the Strait of Hormuz is not corrected, we will carry out an attack.”
According to Qalibaf, Trump was forced to correct his post, which he described as an example of “negotiating as a form of fighting.”
Iran, however, was quick to react to the US president’s statement.
“The Strait of Hormuz was Iranian, is Iranian, and will remain Iranian. This strait will be opened and closed only on Iran’s orders,” Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi reiterated on X on Saturday morning.
“It cannot be conquered with a tweet or an aircraft carrier, nor with a presidential decree, nor with an election campaign speech,” he added.
The aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln is en route to the United States after completing an extended mission of more than 260 days in the Middle East, necessitated by specific operational needs in the area.
«A U.S official told NBC News that the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln is set to head home from the Mideast. It comes as some families report poor living conditions for the sailors and marines on board». NBC News’ Gabe Gutierrez reports.
Acting Secretary of the US Navy Hung Cao says that reports of dire conditions on the USS Abraham Lincoln amid the US-Israel war with Iran, including accounts of sailors trying to jump overboard, have been blown out of proportion.
“Legitimate challenges of a long combat deployment are being twisted into a false narrative, while the genuine difficulties faced by military families are being used for headlines,”Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell chimed in on X. “That is shameful.”
Earlier today, US President Donald Trump dismissed concerns about conditions on board the USS Abraham Lincoln. Speaking to reporters on Friday, Trump rejected the assertion that the families of those on board the aircraft carrier are worried about their loved ones.
“The Sailors aboard the Lincoln are doing what American warriors have always done: remaining resilient, focused on the mission, and proud of their service on this historic deployment,” Parnell added. “We stand with them”.
Trump wants to declare the Strait of Hormuz a US territory
Donald Trump said that after the completion of the military operation against Iran, he intends to declare the Strait of Hormuz the territory of the United States.
“After we finish defeating Iran … pretty soon I will declare the Strait of Hormuz the territory of the United States,” the American president said, adding that the United States allegedly already controls the passage of ships through the strait.
Meanwhile, a large-scale oil spill was reported in the Strait of Hormuz after a missile strike on the Minoan Pioneer bulk carrier. The oil slick spread over more than 300 km, an area comparable to about 40,000 football fields.
“I’ll never apologize. I did the right thing” — Trump on his war-crime spree in Iran
Don told Americans to show some patience and PAY MORE for gas while he bombs more girls in Iran as part of his ego play.
“What we’re doing is a great service for — not only for ourselves, for the world,” the failed emperor declared.
Cities across Ukraine are facing near-daily Russian attacks, with 11 locations hit overnight on Thursday, including Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa and Kramatorsk.
Several people were killed and more than two dozen wounded, including children. Ukraine says more than 100 drones were launched, but it is no longer releasing figures for missiles used, citing security concerns and shortages of interceptor missiles.
Ukraine’s grain industry is also suffering from repeated Russian attacks on ports. Hundreds of vessels have been targeted by both sides in the Black Sea over the past month, prompting Ukraine to propose a ceasefire covering civilian vessels.
Kyiv says this would allow ports to reopen and farmers to export their harvest during a crucial period. Russia has not yet responded to the proposal.
These attacks came in retaliation for the ongoing lethal attacks on civilian buildings launched by the Ukrainian military.
The Russian Armed Forces liberated Rybalskyoe in the Zaporozhye Region within 24 hours, the Defense Ministry reported.
“As a result of decisive actions by units of the Battlegroup East, the village of Rybalskoye in the Zaporozhye Region has been liberated,” the statement reads.
The liberation of Rybalskoye in the Zaporozhye region allowed the Battlegroup East to expand its zone of control northwest of Novoye Pole and continue its advance, the ministry added.
“During the fighting, units of the Battlegroup East broke through the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ defenses. The enemy suffered losses of up to a company of personnel. Seven armored combat vehicles, 10 vehicles, 13 ground robotic systems, and more than 20 R-18 heavy hexacopters were destroyed. The liberation of Rybalskyoe allowed units of the Battlegroup East to expand their zone of control northwest of Novoye Pole and continue their advance in the special military operation zone in the Zaporpzhye region,” the ministry said.
“The actions of those who carried out this horrific act of terrorism, aimed at intimidating and harassing this family, are abhorrent,” the US ambassador to Israel wrote on X, referring to Israeli settlers besieging the home of two Palestinian families in Qusra, in the West Bank.
“There is no excuse for such violent behavior,” Mike Huckabee wrote on X. Among the homes targeted is one owned by a US citizen.
The Israeli army (IDF) has reversed its decision to evacuate Palestinian families whose homes are under siege by settlers in the West Bank village of Qusra, near Nablus, for several days.
The public broadcaster Kan reported, specifying that the commander of the IDF Central Command, General Avi Blot, ordered that soldiers enter only unoccupied homes.
The decision, Kan emphasizes, follows criticism of Israel for its handling of the situation in Qusra. The IDF had initially asked residents of the besieged homes, as well as other residences, to leave their homes for a few days in anticipation of a military operation in the area.
Armed Israeli settlers and Israeli occupation forces have besieged two Palestinian families in their homes since the weekend in an effort to usurp their properties in the West Bank village of Qusra through intimidation.
On Sunday afternoon, armed settlers and Israeli soldiers surrounded Yousef Hassan’s home, erecting a tent just outside and effectively trapping him inside with his wife and their two young daughters, leaving the family confined as the intimidation campaign unfolded around them.
The Israeli men gathered only meters from the location where 28-year-old Amir Moatasem Odeh was killed by a settler in March. Another attacker stabbed Odeh’s father. No arrests have been made in connection with the killing and assault.
“Every night, the settlers throw stones, use obscene language, and shout during the night. We are living in a state of terror,” Hassan said.
Israeli War Minister Katz openly declared that Israeli forces intend to maintain a long-term occupation of areas in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza, ruling out withdrawal from what “Israel” has designated as so-called “security zones” and ordering the military to prepare for a prolonged presence.
Katz made the remarks on Wednesday during a visit to Israeli occupation forces deployed inside southern Lebanon, according to Israeli media platform Divuhim Online, as senior commanders discussed military preparations for a possible future confrontation with the Lebanese Resistance.
“The Israeli army is here to stay in the security zones in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza and to protect the entire State of Israel,” Katz said. “We are up above and they are down below. I have instructed the Israeli army to take all necessary steps to prepare for a long-term presence in the area.”
The declaration comes almost two months after Lebanon and “Israel” agreed to a US-sponsored framework involving the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, the disarmament of Hezbollah, and the deployment of the Lebanese Army, beginning in designated test areas known as “pilot zones.”
«His remarks provide an unusually explicit articulation of an Israeli policy increasingly centered on maintaining military control beyond occupied Palestine’s internationally recognized borders, under the pretext of creating buffer or “security” zones.» Al Mayadeen Lebanese TV freported.
https://gospanews.net/en/2023/12/08/the-greater-israel-scheme-and-its-global-power-play-a-delusional-recipe-for-armageddon/
Such declarations reinforce longstanding warnings that Israeli military expansion is not intended as a temporary security measure, but as an effort to entrench occupation and impose new realities by force.
Spokesperson for the Central Headquarters of Khatam al-Anbiya (PBUH) affirmed that no ship can pass safely through the Strait of Hormuz without Iranian permission and supervision.
The Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters is the highest operational military command center of the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces, located in Tehran.
Washington’s baseless claims about the normal movement of ships through Hormuz are nothing but lies, he added.
Meanwhile, hte head of the Basij Mobilization Group, Hojjatoleslam Hussein Taeb, said, “The Americans ignited a war in the Strait of Hormuz to change the balance of power, but they were defeated once again.”
He added, “The Strait of Hormuz is under the administration and control of the Islamic Republic, and Iran continues its path in complete security and stability.
HUNTER BIDEN: ‘If it’s antisemitic to point out that Bibi Netanyahu evil incarnate… don’t know what to say to people anymore… just open your eyes’
TUCKER: ‘It’s such an obvious lie’
HUNTER: ‘How is it possible that they’re dividing us on things like that?’
TUCKER: ‘I agree’
The Russian armed forces launched a coordinated attack on defense industry facilities and transportation and logistics hubs in Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia, according to a statement from the Ministry of Defense.
The video shows the aftermath of one of the attacks in Kyiv.
Defense Ministry’s statement quoting by TASS:
“The Russian Armed Forces carried out a coordinated overnight strike using ground-based precision-guided weapons, resulting in the destruction of military-industrial facilities and transport and logistics centers in the cities of Kiev and Zaporozhye” the military said in a statement
The ministry later revealed in another statement that the targets of the overnight strike were successfully hit.
The Russian Armed Forces struck a Nova Post logistics terminal in Kiev, an automated compound storing and distributing dual-use goods, including components for long- and medium-range UAV production, robotic vehicles and electronic warfare systems.
Russian servicemen also hit the Kiev-3 transport and logistics center, also known as San-park, a large warehouse facility of approximately 50,000 square meters that stored up to 15,000 attack FPV drones, including those equipped with thermal imaging cameras, such as Beshket, Spuk, Komik-A, and Gorobets, as well as ground control stations and related components.
The Russian Armed Forces struck the Zaporozhstal steel mill (PJSC Zaporizhstal), a part of the Metinvest Group.
Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei has made new appointments to six top military posts, including the head of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC).
In six separate decrees issued on Monday, Major General Ali Abdollahi was appointed Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, with Brigadier General Kioumars Heidari as his deputy. Major General Ahmad Vahidi, promoted to the rank of Major General, was appointed commander-in-chief of the IRGC, with Major General Mostafa Izadi as his deputy.
Rear Admiral Ali Ozamaei was appointed IRGC Navy commander, and Hojjatoleslam Hossein Taeb was named head of the Basij Organization.
Gen. Abdollahi appointed Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
In another decree, the Leader appointed Major General Ali Abdollahi as Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, following the martyrdom of his predecessor, Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi, in a US-Israeli airstrike.
Ayatollah Khamenei said the appointment was made in view of Mousavi’s “glorious and honorable martyrdom” at the hands of the Zionist-American enemy and in appreciation of Abdollahi’s worthy services and valuable experience.
Spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry Esmaeil Baghaei said the Strait of Hormuz will not reopen as long as the US maintains its naval blockade against Iran, stressing that Washington must end and make amends for its “destructive actions” before further steps can be discussed.
Speaking at a weekly press conference on Monday, Baghaei said the closure of the Strait of Hormuz was a result of the US and Israeli military aggression against Iran.
He noted that negotiations between Iran and Oman over a shipping route are naturally a bilateral matter involving the two coastal states.
The spokesman stressed that reopening the Strait of Hormuz depends on the conditions imposed on Iran and the waterway by the US and the Zionist regime, saying that the necessary conditions for reopening do not exist while the US naval blockade remains in place.
“As long as the US naval blockade continues, the necessary conditions for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz do not exist,” Baghaei stated. He added that it is up to the US to stop and make amends for its destructive actions so that the sides could then discuss the next steps.
Asked about the possibility of Iran imposing transit fees on vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz, Baghaei said discussions on such details are still underway and that Iran is not currently discussing the issue.
he number of people killed as a result of the drone attack on facilities in Nizhnekamsk has increased to 13, the press service of the head of Tatarstan told journalists.
Russian Investigative Committee Spokeswoman, Svetlana Petrenko, told TASS that a child was among those killed. Industrial and civilian facilities in Nizhnekamsk came under a large-scale drone strike, causing fatalities.
According to the investigation, Ukraine used drones to strike residential areas and industrial facilities in Nizhnekamsk.
The Ukrainian railway company Ukrzaliznytsia officially called the past days one of the most difficult and destructive weeks in its history. In five years, the country’s transport infrastructure has been attacked 41 times.
11 locomotives were damaged and disabled, tracks and station facilities used for military transportation were destroyed.
Passengers from trains had to be evacuated 350 times due to threats and arrivals. The loss of a key locomotive fleet and the constant destruction of tracks cause critical damage to the entire transport system of the country.
The strikes by the Yemeni Armed Forces (aka Houtis) on Al-Mukha and Marib decimated Saudi officers and their troop concentrations, targeting a heavy and medium weapons depot alongside a secret storage facility, a senior Yemeni source told Al Mayadeen‘s correspondent in Sanaa.
Yemeni Armed Forces spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Saree said the operation, carried out using a large number of ballistic missiles and drones, came in response to Saudi Arabia’s continued mobilization of its proxies, its supply of weapons and equipment to them, and its ongoing attacks along the western coast and in Taiz governorate aimed at deterring the Yemeni people from confronting the blockade and aggression imposed on them for the past 12 years.
“The strikes were precise and caused extensive damage to the equipment and weapons, killing and wounding dozens, including Saudi nationals”,Saree said on Telegram.
The Yemeni Armed Forces reaffirmed their commitment to the declared equation of “blockade for blockade and escalation for escalation,” vowing to continue targeting any military buildup directed against the Yemeni people and the free governorates.
The strike on Mokha is the second operation carried out by the YAF on Sunday. Earlier in the day, the YAF announced that they targeted a Saudi Aramco refinery in Jizan with a drone, stating that the operation comes as a response to Saudi drone incursions into Yemeni airspace.
Saree announced that the forces successfully targeted the Aramco refinery in Jizan with a drone, achieving a precise hit. He said the operation came in response to Saudi drone incursions into the airspace of Yemen’s Saada and Hajjah provinces.
The announcement came after Saudi Arabia’s Energy Ministry reported earlier that a fire had broken out at a facility belonging to Saudi Aramco’s refinery in Jizan, southwestern Saudi Arabia. The ministry said Aramco’s industrial security firefighting teams extinguished the fire and that there were no injuries.
“During the last two years, we have lost so many of your colleagues in Iran, Lebanon and Palestine. They have lost their lives for the sake of doing their jobs. We have lost so many of our loved ones,” Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman, Esmaeil Baghaei, said in a news conference on Monday.
“We send a big salute to all of our martyrs who have lost their lives for the sake of our country and for the sake of the mission of journalism,” he added.
Israel rejects the 15-point document on Gaza and will not withdraw its forces until Hamas is genuinely disarmed, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said at the start of the government’s weekly meeting.
“Israel does not accept the 15-point document. The Israel Defense Forces will not carry out any withdrawal until Hamas is disarmed. And when I say the disarming of Hamas, it means heavy weaponry, lighter weaponry, all weaponry. We are talking about genuine disarmament, not fictitious disarmament,”Netanyahu said, according to his office.
“Right now, we are talking with the Americans about this issue. They have ideas, some of which are acceptable to us and some of which are unacceptable, and we know how to stand firm against these things,” he added.
Israel will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons regardless of whether Washington and Tehran reach an agreement, Netanyahu said. “I greatly appreciate the historical partnership with the US against Iran’s attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. And I wish to emphasize once again: with or without an agreement, as long as I am prime minister, Iran will not have a nuclear weapon,” he said.
Footage appears to show a drone, aircraft parts, and other machinery.
This week, US media reports said that Washington faces depleted missile stockpiles—including long-range and air-defense systems—following the conflict with Iran, a claim the White House denied. The developments follow a war of words after Donald Trump said the two sides were talking again, which Tehran rejected.
The Russian military struck the Fire Point industrial plant in Kiev, which produces components and warheads for FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles, the Russian Defense Ministry said.
According to the Russian ministry, Russian forces launched a strike overnight with ground-based precision weapons against a military industry enterprise and a fuel and lubricants depot in Kiev.
According to preliminary data, the asphalt-concrete plant in Kiev, used for the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, was damaged.
In the Obolonsky district, fuel tanks caught fire, and armament depots were hit in Goloseevsky. In addition, the Fire Point enterprise, which produce kamikaze-drones, components and warheads for missiles, was hit in Kiev.
The Russian army also attacked the Grandterminal fuel depot, which supplies petroleum products to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The British TV channel Sky News published a report from a secret underground enterprise in Ukraine, which acts as the main hub for the production of long-range attack drones. Technicians, welders and engineers work around the clock at the plant, assembling over 200 drones per day.
The chief designer of Fire Point, Stilerman, also appeared in the frame, telling the journalist that the purpose of his work was to “dismantle the Russian Empire” with the support of Europe 02:01.
The FP-1 and FP-2 long-range drones are being produced on an underground conveyor. The cost of one such device is about $ 60 thousand, and the claimed flight range is up to 3,000 kilometers with an accuracy of 2-3 meters. The project is funded by Western donors through the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.
Kiev began the construction of factories underground involuntarily, after the destruction of the traditional defense industry in the early days of its independence. Some of the enterprises have completely gone underground, while others are disguised with fake decorations.
Earlier, the Russian Ministry of Defense repeatedly delivered effective strikes against such centers. At the end of July, the assembly plant of the American corporation Terminal Autonomy, which produced noise-resistant drones for strikes deep into the territory of Russia, came under attack.
On July 19, the UKRTAC factory, which produced tactical equipment and ammunition for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, was completely destroyed. Despite the underground execution, Russian intelligence and precision weapons continue to methodically open and destroy military installations of the Kiev regime.
The refusal by the US and Europe to provide Ukraine with more Patriot missiles points to depleted stockpiles and sluggish interceptor production, military expert and Arsenal of the Fatherland columnist Alexander Sinyugin tells Sputnik.
The earlier plan for European countries to buy Patriot missiles from the US and pass them on to Ukraine is no longer viable, the pundit explains. The US lacks sufficient missile stocks, while Europe has already depleted much of its arsenal by supplying Ukraine.
“Only three countries currently manufacture these missiles: the US, Japan, and Germany, which secured a production license in 2024,” Sinyugin says. With production capacity well below Lockheed Martin’s, Germany is expected to use all of its missile output to meet Europe’s own needs, he projects.
Meanwhile, Russian hypersonic missiles, including Kinzhals and Zircons, easily overcome Patriot air defenses.
Hundreds of US troops have suffered traumatic brain injuries (TBI) in Iranian missile and drone strikes since Washington launched its war on Iran, highlighting the mounting physical cost of the US aggression and the potentially lasting consequences for American forces, according to Iranian Press TV.
Nearly 700 US troops have been wounded in Iranian missile and drone attacks on US bases since Washington’s aggression against Iran escalated, according to US military officials. Most were diagnosed with traumatic brain injuries and returned to duty after treatment, the Associated Press reported.
The Pentagon has described most of the injuries sustained over a two-week period as “minor concussions.” But medical experts warn that an apparently mild concussion can develop into persistent neurological problems, including headaches, dizziness, memory loss, difficulty concentrating and chronic fatigue.
Doctors say there is currently no reliable way to determine immediately which blast injuries will result in lasting complications. They are also continuing to study how powerful explosions can damage the brain even without a direct blow to the head.
The widespread use of Iranian missiles and drones has heightened concern within the US military, as explosions can occur in close proximity to American troops, increasing the risk of blast-related brain injuries.
The scale of the injuries has revived concerns that traumatic brain injury could once again become a major legacy of a US war, as it did during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. More than 500,000 US soldiers were diagnosed with TBIs between 2000 and 2025, according to US military data.
Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have committed to closer military cooperation in a joint defence agreement modelled on NATO’s Article 5, under which an attack on one member is considered an attack on all.
The deal comes as regional countries increasingly look to each other for security following Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, its strikes on several countries in the region and the renewed conflict with Iran.
For Turkiye, which already fields NATO’s second-largest army and one of the world’s fastest-growing defence industries, the pact is a major strategic gain, expanding its reach into the Gulf and South Asia and opening access to new financial resources through a joint weapons programme.
But the real test, as Al Jazeera’s Resul Serdar Atas reports from Ankara, will come if a member is actually attacked — determining whether the agreement becomes a genuine regional security architecture or remains just a political declaration.
The Yemeni Armed Forces (aka Houtis army) carried out a large-scale military operation against Saudi military reinforcements, reporting hundreds of casualties and significant material damage, the YAF spokesperson, Brigadier General Yahya Saree, announced.
The Yemeni military spokesperson said the operation was a response to continued Saudi actions, stating that “in light of the criminal Saudi enemy’s persistence in continuing the siege and aggression against our dear Yemeni people for nearly 12 years, our Armed Forces monitored large Saudi military concentrations that were in their final stages, aimed at escalating against the free provinces and the Yemeni people to deter them from their position on ending the unjust siege.”
The operation, according to the YAF, resulted in:
Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis have confirmed targeting multiple Yemeni Emergency Forces camps in the Marib and Hadramout governorates, including in the Ruwaik, Al-Abr and Al Thaniyah areas.
Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree says the group used “a large number of ballistic missiles and drones” to destroy and burn campgrounds, troop concentrations, depots, weapons and military vehicles.
Yemen’s Houthi rebels have killed at least 30 government soldiers and injured 15 in missile attacks on Yemeni military camps in Hadramout and Marib governorates, government sources told Al Jazeera.
The fees for vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz will vary based on the services rendered by Iran and Oman, according to a report by Fars News Agency, citing a source within the Iranian Foreign Ministry.
The source dismissed recent reports of disagreements between Iran and Oman over the percentage of cargo value – specifically, a tariff of 7% versus 3% – to be used as transit fees, stating these claims are false.
“Payments by vessels will depend on multiple factors, including the scope of services we can provide,” the official emphasized.
Previously, Reuters reported that Iran and Oman are engaged in negotiations to introduce transit fees ranging from 3% to 7% of the declared cargo value, as part of efforts to restore shipping through the strategic Strait of Hormuz.
Russian forces struck infrastructure sites and logistics centers used by the Ukrainian army and its deployment areas over the past 24 hours in the special military operation in Ukraine, Russia’s Defense Ministry reported.
“Operational/tactical aircraft, attack unmanned aerial vehicles, missile troops and artillery of the Russian groups of forces struck fuel and energy and transport infrastructure, logistics centers used by the Ukrainian army, sites for the storage of attack unmanned aerial vehicles, and also temporary deployment areas of Ukrainian armed formations and foreign mercenaries in 155 locations,” the ministry said.
The Ukrainian army lost roughly 1,395 troops in battles with Russian forces in all the frontline areas over the past 24 hours, according to the latest data on the special military operation in Ukraine released by Russia’s Defense Ministry.
At least 300 children have been killed in Gaza in the roughly 300 days since a so-called “ceasefire” was announced on October 10, 2025 – an average of one child a day, the United Nations children’s agency says.
Hundreds more have been wounded, many severely, UNICEF said in a statement on Thursday as it pressed parties to a proposed US-led peace plan to translate pledges into action.
“A ceasefire that leaves an average of one child dead each and every day is failing children,” said Edouard Beigbeder, UNICEF regional director for the Middle East and North Africa. “Children in Gaza are still waiting for the end to the violence they were promised.”
Families are now confined to about a third of the enclave, sheltering among destroyed buildings, rubble and uncleared waste, the agency said.
Children continue to face acute malnutrition, disease, unsafe water and damaged sanitation, while a shortage of incubators has left some premature newborns sharing machines.
On the night of August 5, the Russian Armed Forces hit seven large logistics centers in Ukraine. The Russian ballistic missile attack on the region surrounding Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, has killed at least 14 people and injured 27 others, the city’s military administration said.
The strikes early on Wednesday morning come after at least 27 people were killed in separate attacks in both Ukraine and Russia earlier this week, with the five-year-long conflict showing no signs of slowing down.
The Russian Ministry of Defense has revealed details of a massive overnight strike on Kiev and the Kiev region. High-precision ground-based weapons and long-range attack drones have hit transport, logistics and distribution centers involved in the storage, production and supply of equipment and components in the interests of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
In the capital of Ukraine, the goals were:
In the territory of the Kiev region, the following targets were hit:
In addition, three dry cargo ships delivering weapons and military equipment for the Armed Forces of Ukraine were hit in the sea south of Odessa.
The death toll among minors from Ukraine’s attack near Gelendzhik has risen to four, Russian childerns’ rights ombudswoman Maria Lvova-Belova said.
“An awful tragedy. Ukraine’s aggression. By now, we have reports about four killed children, three more children are in hospitals. One child has been operated on, two others are being examined, they have shrapnel wounds,” she told reporters.
According to earlier reports, the attack on Gelendzhik killed seven people, including three children, and left 58 people injured.
Russian air defenses intercepted and destroyed 475 Ukrainian drones over Russian regions, as well as over the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov overnight, the Defense Ministry reported.
In the Tula Region, one person was injured as a result of a drone attack, and a fire broke out at the Wildberries sorting center.
According to its statement, the drones were shot down over the Belgorod, Bryansk, Voronezh, Kaluga, Kursk, Lipetsk, Oryol, Rostov, Ryazan, Saratov, Smolensk, Tula, Ulyanovsk, Krasnodar, Tatarstan and Moscow Regions, Crimea, as well as over the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.
Six Palestinians were martyred and eight others were injured over 24 hours as Israeli attacks on the besieged enclave continue despite the declared ceasefire, the Health Ministry in Gaza announced on Monday.
According to the Ministry, the victims included five people martyred in new Israeli attacks and one who succumbed to previous injuries.
The Ministry added that a number of victims remain trapped under rubble or stranded on roads and in inaccessible areas, as ambulance and civil defence crews continue to face difficulties reaching them.
The Health Ministry said the number of Palestinians killed since the announcement of the ceasefire on October 11 has risen to 904, while 2,713 others have been injured. Authorities also reported that the bodies of 777 Palestinians have been recovered during the same period.
According to the latest figures released by the Ministry, the cumulative death toll since the start of the Israeli war on Gaza on October 7, 2023, has reached 72,797, in addition to 172,821 injuries.
Israeli forces continue their relentless attacks across the Gaza Strip despite the announcement of a ceasefire agreement, amid ongoing destruction and humanitarian deterioration throughout the enclave.
On August, 2, Israeli forces have killed at least 19 Palestinians in Gaza, despite United States President Donald Trump announcing a plan he described as a “monumental step” towards peace and security in the shattered enclave.
Medical sources said that 14 Palestinians, including four children, have been killed in Israeli attacks across the Gaza Strip since dawn on Sunday.
The deaths on Sunday included three people killed in an air raid on a residential apartment in Al-Sousi Tower in western Gaza City – Abdullah Abu Taif, 33, his pregnant wife, Abeer Anan, 29, and their five-year-old son, Azzam – according to medical sources at Al-Shifa Hospital.
An attack on an apartment in al-Qarara, northwest of the city of Khan Younis, killed three members of the Al-Hams family – father Mahmoud, 38, his wife, Fatima, 37, and their young daughter. Three others were wounded, medical sources at Nasser Hospital said.
Kamu Abu Muailiq, 68, and his wife, Huda, 59, were killed in an attack on their home near Deir el-Balah in central Gaza, medics said. In the same area, two brothers were killed as they rode a motorbike.
In northern Gaza, a Palestinian was killed after being directly targeted in the Jabalia refugee camp. In al-Mawasi, Khan Younis, one Palestinian was killed, and five others were wounded in an Israeli attack on a tent.
Two Palestinians, including one, were killed in an Israeli drone attack on a tent for displaced people in the Remal neighbourhood, west of Gaza City. Four others were killed in a strike on a vehicle in Gaza City.
The Israeli attacks since dawn caused the largest daily death toll in weeks, according to Palestinian health officials.
Palestinians on Tuesday buried 112 members of a single clan killed in Israeli air strikes in November 2023, after their remains were recovered from beneath the rubble last month. Relatives of the Abu Shari’a and al-Hasayna family gathered in Gaza City to bid a final farewell to their loved ones, whose bodies lay in rows draped in Palestinian flags.
For many, it was a moment of both relief and renewed grief after nearly 1,000 days of waiting to recover the bodies of their relatives.
“There is a feeling of both pain and joy,” Amer Abu Shari’a, who lost relatives in the attack, told Middle East Eye. “Joy because we will bury and honour these martyrs after three years. But the sorrow has returned, as if the massacre happened today.”
On August, 4, Gaza and Palestine bid farewell to the largest funeral procession of martyrs in all of Palestinian history. Around 112 martyrs have been recovered from beneath their homes after nearly three years of war.
Today, the Al-Hassaneh and Abu Sharia families are burying 112 martyrs out of 308 family members who were killed and later recovered. Does the world see 44 children in a single funeral? Does it see 43 women?
Does it witness these scenes and still remain silent These are scenes from Gaza scenes that will forever remain in the history of Palestine.
The ongoing negotiations between Iran and Oman regarding the future operational arrangements for the Strait of Hormuz represent a pivotal moment in the region’s strategic landscape amid the US destabilising activities, Iranian Press Tv has reported.
These discussions, which began in the very first days following the Iran-US ceasefire on April 8 and entered a more serious phase after the June 18 agreement to end the imposed war, are a testament to Iran’s commitment to diplomatic engagement and its determination to safeguard its legitimate sovereign rights.
However, what should have been a straightforward bilateral process between two littoral states has been systematically disrupted and derailed by the United States and certain regional actors acting in concert with Washington (below the videos of latest US attack on July, 30).
Their obstructionism has not only delayed a mutually beneficial outcome but has also exposed the hollow nature of American influence in a region where Iran’s strategic interests are paramount and non-negotiable, a senior Iranian official aware of the details of ongoing negotiations told Press TV.
The Yemeni Armed Forces have struck a strategic installation inside Najran Regional Airport in southern Saudi Arabia, in response to the Riyadh regime’s ongoing aggression and blockade against their homeland.
Brigadier General Yahya Saree, spokesperson for Yemen’s Armed Forces, said on Tuesday afternoon that Yemeni military units targeted the vital target with a domestically-developed kamikaze drone. Saree noted that the retaliatory strike attained its desired objectives successfully.
He emphasized that the attack was a retaliation for Saudi Arabia’s violation of Yemeni airspace over the northern provinces of Sa’ada and Hajjah with unmanned aerial vehicles.
“We warn the Saudi enemy that any violation of our airspace will not go unanswered and unpunished,” Saree emphasized.
On July 20, the Sana’a government declared a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, stating that its authorities have enforced “an unjust and oppressive siege” on Yemen for almost 12 years, “looting our resources and enforcing a total blockade.”
Since then, the Yemeni Armed Forces said they have launched attacks on Saudi vessels in the Red Sea.
The Houthis from the Yemeni Ansar Allah rebel movement have used ballistic missiles to hit a Saudi oil tanker Wafa in the northern part of the Red Sea, Houthi Military Spokesman Yahya Saria stated.
According to him, rebels “struck a Saudi oil tanker Wafa in the northern part of the Red Sea near [the port city of] Yanbu using several ballistic missiles.” Saria said the strike was accurate.
An Indian cargo ship sank near Yemeni territorial waters after an attack in the Red Sea, but all 14 crew members were rescued by the Yemeni Coast Guard, India’s Shipping Minister Sarbananda Sonowal said on Tuesday.
The vessel, identified as the Faize Noore Oliya, was struck by a projectile near Yemeni waters, causing it to capsize and sink, according to Sonowal.
“Indian MSV Faize Noore Oliya has been hit by a projectile near Yemeni waters, causing the vessel to capsize and sink. India strongly condemns this unprovoked attack on the defenseless mechanised sailing vessel. The safety of our people is our supreme priority & I am relieved to inform that ALL 14 seafarers (including 13 Indians) have been safely rescued by the Yemeni Coast Guard,” Sonowal wrote on X.
Earlier on Tuesday, Yemeni news portal HYemen24 reported that the Yemeni Coast Guard of the Saudi-affiliated Yemeni government had rescued the crew of an Indian cargo ship after it came under attack by a booby-trapped boat in the Red Sea.
While Western-backed forces continue to strike at shopping malls in Russia, such as Wildberries and now Ozon the Russian military space forces are intensifying their bombing, not propaganda, but military, against targets in the enemy’s military-industrial complex.
Last night, Russian troops attacked several Ukrainian areas, with virtually no effective air defense from Western-backed forces.
More than 25 Russian precision-guided missiles were fired at Kiev alone, including Iskander-M ballistic missiles and Zircon hypersonic missiles, which hit targets in the capital of Ukraine and its suburbs (Vasilkov, Boyarka) without encountering effective air defenses, as has been the case for several days. Only one anti-aircraft missile was launched that night, but it failed to intercept the target. Even Zelensky was forced to admit this (probably in order to better request new military assistance in this area):
“Ukraine’s air defense system was able to intercept only one ballistic missile during the massive Russian attack on Kiev last night.”
Wildberries, Russia’s largest online retail platform, has been targeted again by Ukrainian forces: a logistics facility in the Samara region was hit, according to TASS. A fire broke out following the attack. According to initial reports, there were no injuries.
The Russian Defense Ministry announced that it destroyed 635 Ukrainian drones on the night of Saturday to Sunday in several regions of its territory and in annexed Crimea. In a statement published on the Russian state-run messaging app Max, the ministry stated that “overnight, air defense assets in action intercepted and destroyed 635 Ukrainian fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles.”
A private party organized in the center of the Russian capital to celebrate a high-ranking officer has turned into carnage. At least three people were killed and 21 injured in the explosion that occurred this evening outside the Balzi Rossi restaurant on Kudrinskaya Square in Moscow.
According to News-Pravda the death toll from the explosion at the entrance to the Balzi Rossi restaurant on Kudrinskaya Square has risen to five that include the woman who tried to bring in the explosive device, the security guard, and a cafe customer.
Among the guests at the event was General Alexander Chaiko, appointed to command the Russian Air Force just a month and a half ago.
According to the Interior Ministry, the explosion occurred at about 08:10 p.m. (05:10 p.m. GMT) near a summer cafe near house No. 1 on Kudrinskaya Square. According to the NAC, an unknown woman tried to bring an improvised explosive device there, but a guard stopped her.
An explosive device, a 1 kg TNT bomb filled with metal balls, detonated at the entrance to the Balzi Rossi restaurant. The device was in the possession of a “suicide bomber” who was probably used “in the dark.” As a result of the explosion, she died on the spot, her fragments were captured on video.
Investigators and criminologists of the Investigative Committee are working at the site of the explosion, the Investigative Committee said.
The police and Russia’s National Guard Rosgvardiya restricted access near the residential high-rise on Kudrinskaya Square, where the blast took place, a TASS correspondent reported.
The attack is part of a long series of targeted actions that, since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine in 2022, have targeted senior officials, military leaders, and prominent public figures close to the Kremlin.
Over the past four years, several generals and Russian administration officials based in the occupied territories have been victims of bombings and ambushes claimed or attributed to Kiev’s intelligence services with the help of NATO’s 007 and in particular of the British military counterspionage MI6 vvery active in the conflict as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is an agent of London, as also confirmed by high-profile arrests.
«The US military used one of its most powerful non-nuclear bombs to strike a residential building on the Iranian island of Qeshm, killing three people on Thursday night, The New York Times reported, quoting satellite imagery and an expert opinion»
TASS Russian news agency has reported confirming the first report by Gospa News International on July, 30 (read below update “Two children rescued from the rubble of the Trump’s Evil Bombs – VIDEO”) which specified that bunker-busting explosives had been used to destroy two family homes.
It said that the diameter of the crater and fragments of ammunition indicate the use of a heavy MK-84 aerial bomb weighing 2,000 pounds (about 907 kg). The newspaper said that it was not possible to find any evidence of military installations nearby. The strike was carried out in a densely populated area, the newspaper adds.
Captain Tim Hawkins, a spokesman for the US Central Command (CENTCOM), told The New York Times that the US military leadership is aware of the strike and is looking into it. He also said the United States never targets civilians.
Russian forces destroyed a large Ukrainian ammunition depot in Ukrainian-occupied Kramatorsk. The depot, carefully concealed by Ukrainian militants, was struck by two loitering munitions. The detonation of the munitions lasted for several hours. Several Ukrainian air defense systems were also hit in Kramatorsk.
In the Sumy region, at least ten FAB strikes with UMPK-based missiles and at least 45 Geran/Lancet/Molniya/FPV strikes were carried out over the past 24 hours.
Meanwhile, in the Kharkiv region, at least 11 guided bomb strikes, two MLRS/OTRK strikes, and at least 56 Geran/Lancet/Molniya/FPV strikes were carried out over the same period. Additionally, morning Geran and FAB strikes “visited” the outskirts of Illichivsk (Chornomorsk) in the Odessa region and Vasylkivka in the Dnipropetrovsk region.
It is also reported that new modifications of the Geranium family of attack UAVs are recently equipped with a laser rangefinder. The laser rangefinder is designed to partially implement the air-to-air detonation function of the warhead.
During the final stages of flight (during a dive or approach to a target), the rangefinder measures the exact distance to the ground or object in real time, after which, upon reaching the optimal altitude, the electronics initiate the detonation of the munition in mid-air. Air-to-air detonation of a high-explosive fragmentation charge significantly increases the area of destruction caused by the fragmentation. Thus, unlike the contact detonation of a kamikaze UAV’s warhead, air-to-air detonation covers a larger area.
A Russian missile attack has killed at least three people in Ukraine’s capital Kyiv and injured 15 others, the city’s mayor said.
The strikes hit early on Saturday, triggering more than a dozen explosions that reverberated across the city, witnesses told the Reuters news agency. Kiev was battered by “Iskander-M” and “Zircon” missiles.
Residents were trapped in damaged buildings in the Shevchenkivskyi and Solomyanskyi districts, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said. All 15 injured people, including two boys aged 13 and 17, were hospitalised, with one in serious condition.
Fires and damage were also reported in several other districts of the capital, including burning warehouses in Darnytskyi and debris falling on buildings in Holosiivskyi. Emergency services remain on the scene as rescue efforts continue.
Russia has stepped up its attacks on Kyiv in recent months, taking advantage of Ukraine’s shortage of air defences capable of shooting down ballistic missiles.
Russian forces struck more than 80 seagoing vessels in Ukrainian ports and at sea that were involved in delivering cargo for the Ukrainian military, according to TASS estimates based on Russian Defense Ministry data.
Among them were two dry cargo ships, a sea ferry transporting military cargo and a screening boat hit in overnight group strikes on July 12, according to the ministry. On the same day, the ministry released footage that showed Geran-4 Seeker drones destroying a seiner converted to launch unmanned boats, a patrol boat, a ferry and a dry cargo ship.
According to the ministry, Russian forces struck 24 seagoing vessels used by the Ukrainian military during the week of July 11-17, including 14 dry cargo ships and one tanker.
BREAKING NEWS ON AUGIUST, 11, 2026
Introduction by Fabio G.C. Carisio
A court in Damascus has handed down a death sentence to former President Bashar al-Assad in absentia, Qatari TV channel Al Jazeera reported.
According to it, former head of the political security directorate in the Syrian province of Daraa Atef Najib was also given a capital punishment sentence. The court found them both guilty of “crimes committed during the civil war.”
Although the sentence was pronounced by a court of judges, it should be remembered that the regime-change led by former jihadist terrorist Al Jolani assumed the interim presidency without elections but only with the approval of the NATO countries that have financed the Syrian Civil War since 2011 (and by CIA since 1983).
Intel Reminder. CIA TOP SECRET FILE: US WAR IN SYRIA PLANNED SINCE 1983
Since then, an Islamic dictatorship has been imposed that has changed all institutional hierarchies, eliminating from every center of power any official loyal to Assad or even those not aligned with the former jihadist regime.
Read below to better understand the political situation in the country.
POSTED ON AUGUST, 10, 2026
by British journalist Vanessa Beeley – originally published on her Substack
All links to previous Gospa News posts or videos have been added in the aftermath
UK National Security Advisor Jonathan Powell visited the ‘reformed’ Al Qaeda chief, rebranded as Ahmad Al Sharaa but better known as the head of some of the most savage terrorist factions in Syria since 2011 – Abu Mohammed Al Jolani.
Officially talks centred around ‘enhancing bilateral relations” and coordination ‘in a manner that serves shared interests and contributes to regional stability’. Stability however is not something that can be historically attributed to the British in West Asia.
Jonathan Powell, former Chief of Staff under former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and strongly linked to the MI6 was very much a part of the history of grooming Jolani to become the brutal ruler of Syria. I covered Powell’s long-term involvement in a previous article here. The role that Powell played in supporting Blair and the Weapons of Mass Destruction narratives that took Britain to war against Iraq is a well-documented one.
Also attending was so-called Foreign and Expatriates Minister Asaad Al Shaibani, another former Al Qaeda Levant founder now coached by MI6 in international relations.
What was not on the meeting agenda? The ongoing security vacuum in Syria, the daily abductions now expanding to include Sunni Muslim Syrians not only the routinely persecuted religious minorities including Christians, Alawites, Druze, Shia and Ismaili. The nation’s bankruptcy and crony capitalist regime bleeding the country dry and further impoverishing the Syrian people. The lack of water, electricity, fuel and hope.
The rising inflation and crippling food prices. The repression and extra-judicial executions, torture, sectarian violence and lawlessness. The descent of Syria into a rubbish tip with roads covered in detritus and filth and no functioning systems of authority other than Saudi-backed religious Sheikhs now determining regional laws based on their oppressive version of Islam.
Nope none of this was discussed. What was clearly discussed however was the role of the Russian personnel in Syria. Two days after Powell’s visit the following happened:
Syria and Russia reached a memorandum of understanding to “reorganise” Moscow’s presence on the Syrian coast. Civilians facilities are to be transferred to HTS state management which removes any slender hope of protection for the Alawite minorities should Jolani’s thugs escalate the attacks as they did in 2025.
Russian military bases will be transformed into joint training centres which means that Russia will be training alongside Al Qaeda, the terrorist entity that they had fought against since their entry into the war in 2015.
The agreement follows 18 months intensive negotiations between the Jolani quisling regime and Moscow which included visits by Jolani and Shaibani to the Kremlin where they were welcomed with the pomp and ceremony reserved for ‘heads of state’.
Their genocidal campaigns were not mentioned during these meetings to my knowledge. The Syrian people were secondary to Russian interests in maintaining a foothold on the Syrian coast as a launchpad to Africa.
Civilian facilities like Hmeimim Airport will be under the control of HTS and the fourth commercial shipping berth at Tartous Port.
The memorandum sets a deadline of no more than three months to complete the transition, after which the new arrangements will take effect, according to the ministry.
This serious capitulation by Moscow may be attributed to the build up of Ukrainian special forces in Syria or to the ongoing threats from factions within Jolani’s militia who want revenge for the Russian bombs that fell when they were slaughtering Syrians in the US/UK-led regime change war to topple the former Syrian government.
The Shaibani Foreign Ministry has stated that this is the most significant development since negotiations began 18 months ago. “It opens the way for a new phase in Syrian-Russian relations”. One where Russia is increasingly isolated in the ‘Middle East’ and dependent upon forces allied with Ukraine to ensure the security of their bases and personnel inside Syria.
Russian News Agency TASS reported the following:
Russia has two military facilities in Syria – a Russian navy logistics center in the port city of Tartus and the Kmeimim airbase located near the city of Jableh in the Latakia governorate. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said at a meeting with journalists from Arab countries on October 13, 2025 that Damascus was interested in preserving Russian military bases in Syria, which, however, could be reorganized to serve other purposes.
In February 2025 Jolani spoke with Russian President Putin. According to the TASS press release:
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syria’s new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa have exchanged views on the situation in the country, the Kremlin press service reported, citing the content of the telephone conversation between the heads of state.
“The sides held a substantive exchange of views on the current situation in Syria,” the statement said. “The Russian side stressed its principled position in support of the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian state,” the press service said.
Under the former President Assad, Russia could negotiate from a position of strength. Since the fall of Damascus and the rise to power of foreign mercenaries (including Chechen terrorists) under the banner of a MI6-remodelled Al Qaeda, Russia negotiates from a position of vulnerability and will continue to do so until perhaps they no longer have a presence in the region.
by British journalist Vanessa Beeley – originally published on her Substack
APPENDIX TO THE ARTICLE
by Carlo Domenico Cristofori – originally posted inside the previous Gospa News analysis Weapons Lobby – 22
«As I had predicted in my first article related to Trump’s apparent decision to use the quisling, unelected Syrian “President” Abu Mohammed Al Jolani (Ahmed Al Sharaa rebrand) as a battering ram against the resistance in Lebanon»
British journalist Vanessa Beeley wrote in her Substack titled “What did Jolani and Trump agree at the Ankara NATO summit and was Erdogan sweet-talked into alliance?”.
She pointed out two crucial topics:
«The irony is almost beyond satire: Julani and Shibani proudly pose with a signed decree from Donald Trump declaring Syria removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, despite Julani having led Jabhat al-Nusra, an organization long designated as a terrorist group by the U.S. itself and many other governments. If there were ever a definition of geopolitical hypocrisy, this would be it: yesterday’s “terrorist” becomes today’s photo opportunity, not because history changed, but because political interests did» she added confirming our previous investigation about.
«Removing the designation is expected to unlock international trade, allow Syria to reconnect with the global financial system, and attract significant foreign investment, particularly from Gulf states» Beeley added.
Donald Trump, when asked whether he still wants Syria to help address Hezbollah’s presence in Lebanon: They could help. We’ll find out. I think we’re making a lot of progress. They could help. They would do a very good job.
When Trump was later asked whether Jolani had made any commitments regarding the Lebanese Resistance during their meeting. Trump responded:
“He did. I am not going to say what he said, but yeah, he was great today”.
In light of all this, the meeting between the American president and the Lebanese president Joseph Aoun becomes very suspicious.
Trump said that the Israeli army is “in the process” of withdrawing troops from Lebanon: “They are in the process of redeploying to other areas.”
Meanwhile, on the battleground, the Lebanese army said Israeli soldiers fired in the vicinity of its troops, who were beginning their deployment to a southern village under an agreement with Israel, whose army said it had fired “warning shots.”
The framework agreement reached between Israel and Lebanon at the end of June provides for the deployment of the Lebanese army in “pilot zones” evacuated by Israel—which occupies a portion of the south of the country it calls a “safe zone”—on the condition that Hezbollah disarms.
The pro-Iranian group opposes the agreement with Israel and refuses to be disarmed due to the hundreds Israeli violations of the numerous truces…
This is why Trump has even asked for help from the Syrian army of the former Al Qaeda terrorist… This prediction by the British journalist was confirmed by a recent article on the Al jazeera TV (link among the sources)….
«Sitting alongside his Lebanese counterpart, Joseph Aoun, at the White House on Tuesday, United States President Donald Trump repeated a suggestion that Syria could intervene in Lebanon to “do something with Hezbollah”» the media has reported.
«Despite widespread opposition, Trump has multiple times floated the idea that Syria, under new President Ahmed al-Sharaa, could militarily interfere in the neighbouring country, whose government has come under US and Israeli pressure to disarm the Iran-backed group» Al Jazeera added in a detailed geopolitical analysis.
by Carlo Domenico Cristofori
RELATED POSTS
This story originally appeared in Professor Richard Wolff’s Substack on July 21, 2026. It is shared here with permission.
Deeply divided by nationalism and deprived of its vast colonies by the last century’s catastrophic two world wars, Western Europe has been in decline ever since. Recently, that decline has become drastic and desperate as Western Europe falls ever further behind — economically, militarily, and politically — today’s two superpowers: the US and China. Mediocre and unpopular leaders reflect Western European decline. They bet and built their careers on accepting junior partner positions vis-à-vis the United States. But Europe’s decline now threatens to split Europe apart. Inside each nation, rich and powerful minorities use their social positions to sustain their wealth and power while the masses bear most of the burdens of decline offloaded onto them by the rich and powerful. The problems flowing from these cumulative developments are approaching points of social explosion. Despite the lessons taught by the two world wars, many Western European leaders once again provoke and prepare for a war, this time against Russia, notwithstanding the awful risks of nuclear weapons. One key question to ask: why is this happening?
From 1945 to 1990, Cold War set Western European nations against the USSR and its Eastern European allies in many ways and on many levels. Yet that war remained cold. In 2026, after more than three decades of post-Cold War peace, a military war between a largely unified Europe (East and West) and post-Soviet Russia seems imminent. Such a war has been prepared by NATO’s growth, its moving eastward toward Russian borders since 1990; by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine; and by the escalations of their hostilities by both Russia and Ukraine since that invasion. War between much of Europe and Russia now looms.
US President Donald Trump used both his presidential terms to distance the United States from its European allies in NATO. Among his provocative, unilateral statements and actions were heavy tariffs on imports from European countries. In exchange for some reduction of those tariffs, Trump demanded and obtained tribute from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (over $1 trillion in committed purchases of liquified natural gas plus investments by Europe in the United States). He also reduced US support for the war against Russia in Ukraine. That war thus became a mostly European project.
As the US withdrew from its former close alliances with Europe, the latter’s leaders developed an increasing hostility toward Russia. They demonized the Russian leader, Vladimir Putin. Where Trump notably lessened hostility to Russia, his European counterparts intensified theirs. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe and the US rushed to bolster Ukraine’s defense beyond the huge assistance they had already provided to Ukraine since at least 2014. After February 2022, Europeans provided Ukraine with still more support in finance and weapons. By 2026, many observers in Europe and Russia and beyond predicted a Russo-European war as imminent. Our goal here is to explain why this dangerous situation arose.
World Wars I and II fatally weakened capitalist colonialism. The British, French, German, Dutch, Belgian, Russian and Japanese colonialisms had especially escalated competitive clashes into two catastrophically self-destructive wars. This allowed movements of the colonized people finally to defeat the weakened colonizers and win political independence. The different anticapitalist movements that had blossomed earlier in 19th century Europe allied themselves with anticolonialism especially in the Soviet revolution of 1917 and the Chinese revolution of 1949. A complex, shifting relationship between anticolonialism and anticapitalism continues to evolve in both the Global South and the former colonial powers.
As the sole heir of all other capitalist colonialisms, the US led and organized capitalism’s counteroffensive against the USSR, socialisms and communisms generally, and their alliances with anti-imperialism in particular. It did so by mobilizing Western Europe, Canada, and Japan as major subordinates in a globally hegemonic bloc.
The private capitalist classes atop each colonialist nation had understood the colonies’ importance for their profits and thus for their imperial economies. They went to war in large part to retain their colonies. After the two world wars, they faced, separately and together, momentous challenges to their existence. As their empires dissolved in wars of independence, capitalists’ profits and their national economies were threatened. Worse still was a potential alliance linking ex-colonies, the Comintern nations, and those capitalists’ own domestic socialist and communist parties and unions. Fearing such developments, nothing less than the survival of 20th century European capitalism seemed at stake for European capitalists and their supporters.
To undo this threat, Western Europe appealed to the post-World War II global hegemon: the United States. Within a few years of 1945, the US had scooped up much of what European and Japanese colonialisms had lost. US capitalists moved into newly independent ex-colonies to widen and deepen their economic dependence via the dollar as world currency, through both US trade and investment. European capitalists had to settle for positions as junior partners of their US counterparts, or else lost everything. Europe as a whole followed suit and became the junior partner of the US in most other dimensions (NATO, geopolitics, financial and cultural institutions, etc.).
Keynesian economics added a scientistic rationale — using monetary and fiscal policies to moderate business cycles — to the political necessity of welfare state expenditures.
As the sole heir of all other capitalist colonialisms, the US led and organized capitalism’s counteroffensive against the USSR, socialisms and communisms generally, and their alliances with anti-imperialism in particular. It did so by mobilizing Western Europe, Canada, and Japan as major subordinates in a globally hegemonic bloc. The US could do this because it had suffered far less than any of the other capitalist colonial nations from the two world wars. Indeed, World War II had extracted the US from capitalism’s worst ever crash. Its economy was stronger in 1945 than it had been for many years, whereas in all the former colonizing nations the reverse was the case. That economic strength contributed to its dominant military power.
US hegemony defined itself as a moral crusade against a great evil, the USSR (equated with communism). The US was “the leader of the free world” pitted against an unfree world — the USSR, Eastern Europe, and, after 1949, China. The latter were all demonized as anticapitalist dictatorships, which made them enemies of “democracy” as championed in and by the free world. On that basis, US hegemony followed as the necessary condition to “contain” the unfree world, to prevent its spread. The US-led “free world” could and would guarantee containment by means of global military bases, the world’s greatest military arsenal, ideological campaigns, political isolation, and economic discriminations. The world thus entered into a Cold War between 1945-1990 punctuated by military — hot — wars when the US deemed them necessary (for example, in Korea and Vietnam).
US hegemony also included domestic campaigns inside both Europe and the US aimed at containment. Those campaigns all featured two parts. One was a set of “welfare state” or social democratic benefits for working classes. Leading politicians in North America, Western Europe, and Japan installed those benefits. Many feared that not doing so would influence working classes toward socialism and communism. In the US, this meant perpetuating the 1930s New Deal into the 1970s. Successive leaders, Republican as well as Democratic, added Medicare to Social Security, regularly raised minimum wages, gave special attention to the non-white and non-male victims of systemic discrimination, subsidized higher education via massive public institutions, and subsidized home ownership loans. Such state interventions delivered a much less harsh life for working classes than any prior private capitalism had ever done. Keynesian economics added a scientistic rationale — using monetary and fiscal policies to moderate business cycles — to the political necessity of welfare state expenditures.
capitalists supported government social welfare spending because it came not from more taxes on them, but rather from national budgets’ defense savings. The latter were benefits from European subordination to NATO and its US leadership. That subordination included mostly endorsing US hostility toward the USSR, China and all things “communistic.”
The other part of these containment campaigns involved widespread purges of Communists, socialists, and their “fellow travelers.” In the US, a ferocious “anti-communism” project “cleansed” labor unions, schools, mass media, and government of leftist employees. Capitalist employers’ organizations and many individual capitalists collaborated with the state’s repressive campaigns. They mobilized behind Sen. Joseph McCarthy for a few years. His was a particularly extreme version of the old American political style of demonizing political opponents, foreign and domestic, as “of the devil.” The US House of Representatives established an “Un-American Activities Committee.” Such campaigns’ ostensible objective was to destroy the Communist Party. Mass media circuses, newspaper headlines, arrests, prison sentences, deportations, and getting witnesses to betray others — resulting in losing their jobs — were their means. Guilt by association targeted both socialists and independent left-leaning citizens. Purges identified many victims by citing their activities before 1945. It made little difference that at the time those activities (in unions, political parties, schools, churches, and civic associations) were both legal and often patriotically anti-fascist. The systematic repression of the US left after 1945 left deep political scars.
Western Europe dutifully undertook a similarly two-sided project. However, social conditions there imposed different qualities on it anti-Soviet and domestic anti-left campaigns. Europe’s pre-1945 history gave communist and socialist parties and their millions of members much greater social approval than existed in the US. Leftists’ roles in resisting fascism before and during World War II — often heroic — gave them genuine, widespread popularity. They could defend their political views, and themselves, in ways their US counterparts could not. European welfare states were more generous and lasted longer than their US counterparts.
While nothing quite like McCarthyism swept Europe, most Western European nations joined NATO and aligned their foreign policies to the US-led containment agenda. Their defense budgets and capabilities declined, and they relied instead on US military protection. What each European state saved by means of small defense budgets it could then use to provide public services for their working classes. The latter might otherwise have required higher taxes on corporations and the rich (and not only or chiefly on working people). European capitalists supported their welfare states partly because they endorsed containment. Equally important, capitalists supported government social welfare spending because it came not from more taxes on them, but rather from national budgets’ defense savings. The latter were benefits from European subordination to NATO and its US leadership. That subordination included mostly endorsing US hostility toward the USSR, China and all things “communistic.”
For the last 75 years, European politicians who hesitated to embrace the positions and tones consistent with the US-European “consensus” on foreign and domestic policies saw their career opportunities threatened or destroyed. The British sought and found a special role as the closest friend and imitator of the US in this consensus. The rest of Western Europe sometimes mocked Britain’s fawning subordination, but many jealously and secretly approximated it. European capitalists looked longingly at the US’s steadily shrinking welfare state programs that facilitated tax cuts on corporations and the rich. However, those non-Anglo Europeans accepted the political limits that rendered matching the US and UK impossible. They could only hold back the domestic power of their working classes by providing generous social welfare policies. The same was required to make Western Europe a consumerist bulwark against Russia, thereby to contain it and its Eastern European allies.
Breaking from those limits only became thinkable when it was made necessary. This happened when Trump ended the post-1945 US-Europe deal. His “friendliness” with Russia underscored his evident contempt for Western Europe as a junior partner/dependent that was too costly to carry anymore. His trade and tariff wars, pointedly, did not exempt Europe. The tariffs particularly shocked Western European capitalists who had concentrated during reconstruction (1945-1975) on producing goods and services that could compete in the rich US market. The tariffs also occurred just when Trump reduced support for Ukraine in its war with Russia and sharply criticized NATO. For shocked Western European leaders, Trump broke the US-European deals of the post-1945 world.
Chinese competition added strains to the European and US economies, which were already struggling to cope with the declines of their empires.
Ever since 1945, Western European capitalists had set themselves to rebuild their economies by producing goods and services of better quality and/or cheaper than the US output that dominated both the US and other markets. This included some investments in their former colonies, rendering them economically dependent notwithstanding their political independence. The latter became more performative than substantive. It remains that way in many areas. The crucially important exception was the spectacular economic growth of the People’s Republic of China. China’s growth changed everything, and continues to do so. It is transforming the world economy as it takes an ever more powerful place therein.
China’s still-export-driven manufacturing economy competes globally and ever more successfully with what remains of manufacturing in the US and in Europe. China competes, as well as an importer of energy and other inputs. Chinese competition added strains to the European and US economies, which were already struggling to cope with the declines of their empires. Europe already had had a century of decline, whereas the US was new to decline, with many of its citizens steadfastly committed to denial as their coping mechanism of choice.
Western European capitalism had partly offset its decline first by post-war reconstruction, then by explosions of consumer credit. Then, and especially after 1989, Europe welcomed waves of cheap immigrant labor while expanding eastward to re-absorb Eastern Europe into its economic operations, much as it was doing with its former colonies. Pushing NATO eastward and expanding EU membership were the chief mechanisms to accomplish Western Europe’s capitalist neocolonialism. Fantasies swirled about extending those mechanisms eastward to include Russia, perhaps dividing it up into smaller states as manageable as the Eastern European states were. If somehow achieved, that could give Western Europe an immense new geographic expanse to economically colonize. Trump, too, engaged parallel fantasies in his neocolonial gestures toward Panama, Canada, Greenland, Venezuela, Cuba, and Mexico.
Pushing NATO eastward and expanding EU membership were the chief mechanisms to accomplish Western Europe’s capitalist neocolonialism.
The great break in post-World War II US-European relations came with Trump’s combination trade and tariff war designed to “make the US economy great again.” Trump had effectively dedicated his second presidential term, begun in January 2025, to waging this economic war. Another part of that war was a broad turn away from neoliberal globalization and toward a systematic economic nationalism (“America first”). Trump’s blunt message was disengagement. Europe could no longer count on the US to provide it with military protection. Trump depicted Europe as an ally who had betrayed and cheated the US economically. He demanded payments as compensation. Those took the form of buying US liquified natural gas (LNG) for its energy needs plus committing to invest $700 billion or more in the US over a few coming years. Von der Leyen formally acceded to Trump’s demands. Such payments amounted to either tribute or reparations, depending on one’s viewpoint.
Europe’s required purchase of US LNG emerged from the Russia-Ukraine war. The economic sanctions of that war (since February 2022) plus the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines (in September 2022) sharply reduced and then ended the flow of cheap energy from Russia into Germany and other parts of Western Europe. Desperate for access to energy, Europe turned increasingly to imports from elsewhere — and especially from the US — at a much higher cost. Meanwhile, steadily growing trade competition from China and more rapid technical innovations achieved in China and the US further squeezed the European economy.
The shock of Trump’s abandonment of Europe as the US economy’s junior partner accelerated Europe’s decline. Once it had been the dominating center of a planet it had colonized. Now it had fallen to a poor third place in a world economy increasingly dominated by what had once been the poor corners of that planet. On one side stood the declining but still strong US; on the other the rising People’s Republic of China. No wonder the Ukraine war drove Russia to declare its identity shifting from European to Asian.
Europe’s political leaders reflected and exemplified its decline. Burnham, Macron, Merz and Meloni especially — like most of their predecessors after 1945 — had built political lives around loyalty and subservience to the post-World War II deal with the US. They relied on the military, financial, and ideological support from the US, on NATO, on the IMF, the World Bank, and myriad NGO missionaries for US “democracy.” They championed their “close alliance” with the US as a key cause of Europe’s prosperity and peace after 1945. Betrayed by Trump, they were forced by Europe’s decline to pay tribute with monies therefore not available to offset that decline. Trump pointedly forced them to begin financing the huge costs of developing their own military defense (already far behind the military capabilities of the US, on one side, and the China-Russia alliance on the other).
European voters know their social democracy and their peace are fragile. Trump’s betrayal threatens both.
Given the deep personal opportunism cultivated in Western European leaders by their subordinate (to the US) situation, they grasped that Trump’s betrayal threatened their careers. Trump’s repeated insults of and disdain for Western Europe risked provoking European voters to turn against leaders seen as slavish toward Trump’s US. Those leaders’ alarm only deepened as much of the US employer class seemed quite supportive of Trump’s anti-Europeanism. Perhaps their greatest fear lay in the possible reactions of European voters once they understood that Trump’s betrayal posed serious economic dangers for them. Voters might ask where the money would come from to finance European rearmament when the US defense umbrella closed. If enhanced, would budget allocations for the military diminish outlays for mass public social services, raise their taxes, or both? Europeans began to wonder out loud whether the Ukraine-Russia war being fought to the last Ukrainian might prefigure a US war with Russia/China fought to the last European. European voters know their social democracy and their peace are fragile. Trump’s betrayal threatens both. How that plays out in European politics provides new opportunities for the left and the right and existential threats to the traditional centrist pro-US political leadership trying desperately to retain power.
Nationalist politicians on the European right see their opportunity. Office-holding conservative leaders (like Burnham, Macron, and Merz, for example) can be voted out via guilt by subordination. They perpetuated the post-World War II programs that made Europe vulnerable to its current economic decline because of their subservience to the US. Western European opportunism now incites the suspicion that maybe it bet on the wrong horse. A similar suspicion now arises in some of the Gulf States in the wake of the US-Israel war on Iran. Having “invited” US military bases to be constructed on their land for security, they now see that those bases actually achieved the opposite. The bases and their host nations have become endangered targets vulnerable to Iranian drones and missiles.
Anticapitalist politicians on the left also see an opportunity. The US was a partner who mostly pushed Europe to the right. The US undid its New Deal sooner and took that undoing further than the Europeans dared to even try to do to their welfare state.
Among the results of Europe’s left: it abolished the death penalty when the US pointedly did not. Military adventures, including Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Ukraine and Iran, were always started, led, and driven by the US with the Europeans marginally along as “coalitions of the [barely] willing.” Left politicians in Western Europe kept seeking to secure, if not advance, social democratic goals and policies. One way to do that was to limit the US connection as a context for more socialistic development in Europe. The European left positions itself as the way for the mass beneficiaries of the social democratic state to protect it from a US-connected old leadership that always seems to threaten social democracy. Europe’s left likewise rejects the nationalist right politicians because of their pro-capitalist, anti-worker and anti-immigrant tendencies.
Europe’s old US-linked political leaders have now found a way to arrest, or maybe even reverse, Europe’s frightening decline. It is the only way to do that they can see or imagine. That way can, they believe, both keep them in power in the short run and give them a new economic growth opportunity in the longer term. That way provides a convenient public justification for shifting state budget expenditures from public social services to big-business defense firms, from social democracy to pro-employer (pro-capitalist) austerity. By minimizing any extra taxes upon their employer classes, Western European leaders serve them very well. They will cover the costs of rearmament and tribute obligated to the US by diverting funds from the welfare state plus state-guaranteed borrowing plus heightened mass-based taxes, if needed, on working classes. Domestic austerity will be intensified across Western Europe while wages are brought downward toward southern and eastern European levels.
The same Western European leaders who criticize Trump lusting after Denmark’s Greenland indulge parallel lusts after Russia’s geographic expanse.
Europe’s leaders believe they can accomplish this by pumping up mass anxiety and fear around urgent preparations for a war against Russia. To that end, they demonize Russia beyond even the levels achieved against Stalin and Stalinism during the Cold War. Those leaders hope that an adequately terrified Europe will keep voting for them for a while. Longer-run hopes entail imagining Russia’s military defeat and consequent de jure or de facto dismemberment. The resulting subunits of old Russia would then offer Western Europe a new colonial opportunity, a vast expanse for profitable investment to obtain food, raw materials, and possibly workers to rejuvenate Western European capitalism. The same Western European leaders who criticize Trump lusting after Denmark’s Greenland indulge parallel lusts after Russia’s geographic expanse.
All wars are overdetermined by both domestic and international causes intertwined. Europe’s current drone and missile warfare against Russia escalated from the Russia’s “special military operation” against Ukraine that began in 2022. Its local overdeterminants began earlier. Local concerns woven into global shifts — NATO toward the east and China toward the west — shaped Russia’s changing international position, concerns, and “red lines.” The whole world watches as China, Russia, and their allies square off against the US and whatever allies it retains. The world sees the wars in Ukraine and Iran today as conflicts among proxies of the two great powers of our time.
The danger inherent in both wars is that Europe or the US or Russia or Israel might resort to nuclear weapons if “existentially” threatened. The question is whether global masses and leaders can recognize the danger. This essay is one effort toward that recognition. The solution is a serious commitment to international collaboration. What began as the League of Nations and was rebuilt as the United Nations needs still another incarnation with real powers and real global respect. Otherwise we risk World War III and its mad, mutual assured destruction.
Brussels (enr) – European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman David McAllister has urged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to support German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s proposal for an associate membership for Ukraine as it moves towards joining the European Union.
The proposal is an opportunity that Ukraine should seize, the German centre-right lawmaker told members of the European Newsroom (enr) network in early June. Claims that it would amount to “membership light” or second-class membership were incorrect, he said.
Instead, it would allow Ukraine to become more closely integrated into the EU step by step before full membership, making the benefits of the bloc more visible to its people. One possibility would be for Ukraine to participate in the European Parliament as an observer, McAllister said.
Zelenskyy has expressed opposition to the idea, arguing that it would be unfair for Ukraine to be present in the EU but have no say in its decisions. In a letter to EU leaders, he called for the bloc to move faster and not keep Ukraine in a waiting room until full membership.
Merz said earlier that rapid full EU accession for Ukraine, which is fighting Russia’s invasion, is not realistic. For the interim period, he has proposed allowing Ukraine to attend EU summits and ministerial meetings without voting rights.
His ideas also include an associate member of the European Commission without a portfolio or voting rights, associate members of the European Parliament and an associate judge at the European Court of Justice.
McAllister said EU enlargement was high on the bloc’s agenda and that the Western Balkans were at the heart of Europe. A stable region was an investment in peace and security, he said.
The CDU politician called for each candidate country to be assessed individually and on its merits rather than treating the Western Balkans as a single group. Montenegro was a clear frontrunner, he said, while North Macedonia’s accession path remained blocked by a political dispute with Bulgaria.
Eight other European countries are officially recognised as EU candidate countries alongside Ukraine: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Türkiye.
Dollars for Ukraine (Photo Unlimphotos)
Dollars, and more dollars! According to exclusive information published by Politico, Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov will present an emergency aid request for $20 billion on June 18 at the next meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in the Ramstein format. The goal: to capitalize on what he considers a temporary but decisive military advantage.
Ukraine believes that current battlefield dynamics offer a rare opportunity. Russian advances have slowed significantly this year, to the point of nearly stalling last month, largely due to Ukrainian medium- and long-range drone strikes against Russia’s logistics networks and energy infrastructure.
According to a senior Ukrainian Defense Ministry official quoted anonymously by Politico, “we have a six-to-nine-month window of opportunity on the battlefield that requires an urgent acceleration of funding.” The same official warned that Russia is “moving quickly and innovatively”; any pause would allow Moscow to adapt and regain lost ground.
“Everyone can see that Russia is burning, and we want it to burn even more. But to do that, we need funding,” said a senior anonymous Ukrainian defense official.
In short, we still need billions more dollars.
The Ukrainian plan has already been presented during a series of bilateral meetings led by Minister Fedorov and other senior officials with representatives from Norway, Sweden, Germany, and Canada. Each ally would be asked to contribute between $2 billion and $6 billion, either through direct assistance or loans.
The funds would be allocated to the acquisition of air defense systems, drones, ammunition, electronic warfare equipment, and long-range strike capabilities. Part of the financing would also support NATO’s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) program, as well as direct purchases from Ukrainian defense manufacturers.
Behind the military rationale for this request lies a political objective: forcing Vladimir Putin to come to the negotiating table.
According to another source cited by Politico, “Ukraine has a real chance to bring the dictator to negotiations,” provided Russia is not given time to recover its tactical advantage.
The potential development of Russian medium-range drones is described as a worst-case scenario. “If the enemy develops its own medium-range drones, it would be a real disaster for Ukraine,” one source noted.
Putin himself stated last week that Russian forces are advancing every day, while also acknowledging that Ukrainian strikes are causing damage.
Ukraine’s request comes amid a broader intensification of Western support. According to four NATO diplomats also cited by Politico, Alliance members are considering a new €70 billion military assistance program, which could be announced at the NATO summit in Ankara next month.
The initiative, championed by Germany, aims to improve transparency and ensure a fairer distribution of the burden among allies.
If the additional $20 billion is secured, total assistance committed in 2026 would reach $58 billion, close to the $60 billion bilateral target set by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. Kyiv intends to reach that goal before the end of the summer.
Source: Politico (exclusive), June 12, 2026. Article compiled using information cross-checked with Kyiv Post, United24 Media, and US News.
L’article Kyiv Requests an Additional $20 Billion to “Burn” Russia est apparu en premier sur FrenchDailyNews.
Introduction by Fabio Giuseppe Carlo Carisio
Bringing Ukraine into NATO is a way to demonstrate to Russia that Europe intends to protect its ally, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
This is the peace strategy of former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, very similar to that of US President Donald Trump, who adamantly declared that the escalation of attacks on civilian oil facilities targeted by the Kiev army would force Moscow to negotiate (video).
Trump’s unfortunate statement stems from the fact that, on the one hand, he wants to please his moderate electorate, now tired of constant and costly wars, and on the other, he must answer to his real masters: the Zionist financial lobbies that divide up most of the speculation in the arms industry.
So he can continue to pretend to seek a peace agreement in Ukraine amidst the many exclamations he himself has encouraged with his continued support for Zelensky, but if he were to win the elections again in 2028 it would be inevitable for him to be dragged by the United Kingdom, NATO and the European Union into a direct war against Russia.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, commenting on US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s latest remarks that the proposals for a Ukrainian settlement made at the Alaska summit had failed, emphasized the importance of clarifying who truly bears responsibility for the outcome.
He reaffirmed that Russia’s conscience remains clear, underscoring the principle that “a man’s word is his bond: you say you’re going to do something, and then you do it.”
Lavrov pointed out that Kiev’s dismissive rejection of US proposals, formulated at the Alaska summit, is primarily driven by the continued influx of weapons, a significant portion of which originates from the United States.
The Kremlin’s response, obviously, was the destruction of multiple Ukrainian energy facilities and the annihilation of over 200 gas stations in the country (video below), causing serious damage to the population that Zelensky has no say in.
WARS IN VIDEO – BREAKING NEWS from Middle East and Ukraine HERE
As two exceptional analysts, journalist Tucker Carlson and pacifist Roger Waters of Pink Floyd, point out below, every military strategy is now hastily geared toward triggering NATO’s Third World War against Russia.
Johnson appears to be the ideal provocateur for several reasons:
This is yet another confirmation that the British plan for a direct confrontation with Russia, also fueled by the plan to supply nuclear weapons to Ukraine according to a pact signed by former PM Starmer on January, 2025, seems to have truly begun its countdown.
The fact that the United Kingdom has decided to support Trump in his war against Iran, providing military support bases, means that the two most powerful NATO militaries is ready to support George Soros’s 1993 plan to project the Atlantic Alliance into the New World Order by imposing a police state in EU countries, destined to transform into military dictatorships with martial law for war purposes.
A new pandemic, the migrant scare, and attacks on counter-information (anticipated as a primary target by the CEPA think tank since its inception) will be the excuses to implement these measures with different measures in various EU countries.
Below you can watch and read the topics which legitimez this analysis…
Former British PM Boris Johnson presented his “fake peace-plan for Ukraine”, a plan which might trigger the finally outbreak of World War III during an interview on Sunday Morning with Trevor Phillips on SkyNews.
“One of the ways to end the war is for Washington, London, Paris and other capitals to reiterate what used to be the official policy: Ukraine should join NATO. You can’t hear it anymore. Today, you will no longer hear statements that Ukraine should become part of the North Atlantic Alliance”.
“You know how Putin will react to this? Putin will react by making a deal, because now he has no reason to believe that we are serious. Until he hears that the game is over and that the West has a long—term strategic goal of making Ukraine part of NATO, he will continue to put pressure on Ukraine, and some will continue to seek to divide it”.
“The United States is waging a war against Russia. American taxpayers’ money is being spent to help Ukraine target drones and missiles at targets in Russia”.
The famous journalist and oponionist Tucker Carlson warned in a new video.
“If you look at the situation more broadly, you can see that one country, the United States, is simultaneously waging two wars: one against Iran, the other against Russia. Make no mistake: the United States is at war with Russia. The Trump administration’s intelligence data, obtained from the CIA and other intelligence agencies, is being used by the Ukrainian government to target drones and missiles”.
“Thus, the U.S. government, at the expense of American taxpayers, is waging a war against the Russian government, regardless of whether U.S. citizens realize it or not and whether they want it or not. And, of course, most Americans, in his opinion, do not understand this. What is the result? Destabilize the Russian regime? Divide Russia into fifteen separate republics? Not yet“.
“This will lead to an increase in global energy prices, as Russia produces about 12% of the world’s oil and about 5% of petroleum products. And the war that the United States is waging against Russia is a war against energy. Russian oil refineries were attacked by missiles or drones, which were guided by the help of the United States”.
Roger Waters in an interview with RT — about the militarization of the West and the attempts of European leaders to frighten the war with Russia:
“I often tell people, ‘Do you know who Russians are? They won the Second World War (and 25 million of them died!), saving the world for us. Do you want to fight them?”
The co-founder of Pink Floyd, in a conversation with RT host Rick Sanchez, noted that the leaders of the European Union are “rattling weapons in front of Russia.”
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It is 2028. The war in Ukraine ended in an uneasy ceasefire eighteen months ago. Russian forces remain in occupied territories, and Ukrainian forces hold defensive positions, armed with American weapons and European money. The ceasefire talks failed to establish either a buffer zone or an observer mission because the parties could not agree on the terms. Europeans have given vaguely formulated “security guarantees” with an ill-defined American backstop, but NATO has no clear presence near the contact line.
One morning, Ukrainian intelligence detects Russian armoured movements towards the ceasefire line. The government in Kyiv claims Russia is preparing for invasion; officials in Moscow insist it is routine repositioning. Within 48 hours, shooting starts and each side blames the other. Russian forces cross the ceasefire line at three points. Calls go out to European capitals and Washington, but no one agrees on what the intelligence shows. The security guarantors reach for the ceasefire documents and find they say different things depending on who is reading them.
Nobody knows what to do—whether NATO should respond militarily, whether European states should act alone, or whether America, focused since 2027 on a series of interventions in Latin America, should engage at all. Nobody has agreed what the rules are, what triggers intervention, what constitutes a proportionate response or who decides.
The outcome of this scenario is chaos and escalation driven by uncertainty and domestic political pressure. These are the conditions that precede catastrophic wars. The goal of this paper is to help prevent that scenario or, more precisely, to ensure clear answers exist before the shooting starts. The post-war environment in Europe will be unstable in the near term and perhaps for a generation or more because the war will almost certainly end without a genuine peace settlement that resolves key questions of sovereignty, security, power or identity. The wounds are too deep and the sides too evenly matched to agree on a comprehensive peace.
This is not an unusual situation after inconclusive wars. To adapt the historian Michael Howard’s insight, the end of fighting does not itself create peace. Between war and peace lies a large and dangerous space of armistices, frozen conflicts and unstable political settlements. The task for American and European policymakers will be to build enough structure around that dangerous space to prevent it from producing the next war.
America and Europe can do this by transitioning from chaotic confrontation with Russia to “managed disorder”: a state in which rivalry remains, but becomes less vulnerable to accident, panic and domestic political pressure.
To achieve this state of managed disorder, this paper proposes a staged framework built on verification, certification and conditional incentives. The framework would temporarily freeze facts on the ground, but not legitimise them, and give the main actors reason to adhere to agreements. This would help American and European policymakers maintain stability in Europe, defend Ukraine and deter further revisionism while reducing the risk of escalation. It would also give Russia a sense of safety and a seat at the table to discuss European security. Hostility would persist but it would be channelled into rules, limitations and predictable behaviour.
Managed disorder does not imply legitimising territorial conquest or rewarding aggression. It also falls well short of a durable settlement. Importantly, it does not require “trust”, a commodity that is generally lacking in international affairs and particularly in relations with Russia.
However, building such a system will be politically hard. Russia may prefer chaos to managed disorder. Ukraine may reject any arrangement that appears to freeze partition. European states will disagree over deterrence, sanctions, reconstruction, enlargement and engagement with Moscow, and the US may remain indispensable but unreliable. But these are not objections to managed disorder; they are the reasons it is needed. Its purpose is precisely to manage these political pressures through rules, incentives and procedures before a crisis makes improvisation the only option.
This paper traces the hard road to the modest achievement of managed disorder. It first outlines the sources of disorder after the war in Ukraine and why the key players might find managed disorder preferable to the alternatives. It then describes a staged plan to get from a ceasefire in Ukraine to a hopeful but realistic stability. The plan accepts that the future is contingent and will certainly surprise us. It therefore seeks to adapt to circumstances even as it keeps in mind where we want to go and what we want to avoid.
The war in Ukraine is likely to leave relations between Russia, Europe and the United States in significant disorder. A ceasefire, armistice or exhausted pause in the fighting would stop large-scale violence but not settle the question of sovereignty over contested territories. Russian forces will probably remain on Ukrainian territory while Ukraine continues to assert its territorial integrity. Europe will still face a revisionist Russia on its borders and the United States will still have to decide how much of European security it intends to underwrite.
This state of affairs will be the first source of disorder. The ceasefire will probably not resolve any of the geopolitical ambiguity. It will also likely fail to clarify what counts as a violation or establish who monitors the ceasefire, who enforces it and who decides when one side has broken it. This is the central danger of the post-war moment. Although major combat may be absent, every movement of forces, artillery exchange, drone incident, act of sabotage and political crisis in Kyiv or Moscow could result in renewed escalation.
The second source of disorder lie within the West itself. America and Europe will not enter this period as a single strategic actor, even though they will retain important common interests—both will want to prevent a wider war, avoid nuclear escalation and stop Russia from conquering Ukraine outright. For the US, Russia will remain a nuclear power and a disruptive actor, but no longer the organising threat of American strategy. Washington will increasingly focus on China, the Western Hemisphere and the fiscal costs of global leadership. Europe will have no such luxury. Russia will stay a nearby military threat, and Ukraine’s reconstruction will become a European problem. Any failure of deterrence will unfold on Europe’s doorstep.
This divergence means that the Atlantic alliance will become less automatic, even if it does not collapse. The US may remain essential for nuclear deterrence, intelligence, sanctions enforcement and crisis diplomacy with Moscow, but it may also grow less willing to sustain Ukraine’s conventional defence, less patient with European divisions and more tempted by bilateral understandings with Russia that promise quick gains or theatrical success. Europe will fear both American abandonment and American freelancing. It will need Washington to work towards managed disorder, but will no longer be able to count on it to take the lead.
Europe will also generate disorder of its own. The war has produced a rhetorical consensus—Ukraine must survive and Europe must do more for its own defence—that hides deep disagreements. Poland, Sweden and other eastern and northern states will judge any post-war arrangement through the lens of deterrence, vulnerability and Russian deception. Spain, Italy and others will place more weight on stability, fiscal pressures and eventual economic normalisation with Russia. Some governments, such as those in the Baltics, will want to accelerate Ukraine’s integration into the EU and the European defence economy. Yet others, like Poland, will worry that Ukraine’s accession—and its agricultural exports, corruption, security needs—could transform the bloc in ways it cannot control.
These divisions will shape security policy and domestic debates. Russia will try to exploit them. Any post-war arrangement must therefore manage Europe as much as it manages Russia. It must prevent European disunity from becoming an instrument of Russian strategy.
Ukraine itself will form a further source of disorder. It will depend on American and European weapons and money for years after the fighting stops—creating leverage but also resentment. If Ukraine concludes that a post-war order locks in partition while offering only vague promises of future integration, it may resist the whole idea. If Europe concludes that Ukraine is using its support to pursue military aims that Europe cannot sustain, European commitment may fracture. This arrangement, therefore, cannot simply constrain Ukraine. It must give Ukraine a visible future: a defensible state, deepening European integration, reconstruction and a credible non-military path to eventual territorial restoration.
Russia will create the most obvious source of disorder, but not necessarily through renewed invasion. Moscow may accept a ceasefire because it believes time is on its side. It may calculate that Ukraine will become politically divided, that European publics will tire, that American attention will wander and that sanctions will erode. It may use the pause in fighting to rebuild forces, probe American and European resolve, influence European politics and normalise its gains—all while formally conceding nothing. A ceasefire may therefore mark not the end of Russian revisionism, but its movement into a different register.
American and European policymakers should not assume Russia fears disorder the way they do. Disorder may serve Russian purposes. Ambiguity can help Moscow test thresholds. For instance, hybrid operations impose costs on the West while preserving deniability. Political interference can weaken European unity without triggering a military response. For America and Europe, deterring a second invasion of Ukraine may well be the easier task; the harder one will be to curb Russia’s appetite for exploiting turbulence around Europe’s borders.
The post-war order will also face regional spillover. Ukraine will remain the epicentre of the confrontation with Russia, but Moldova, the Black Sea and the Arctic could face intensified coercion too. Africa and the Middle East may offer Russia opportunities to punish Europe indirectly through migration, mercenary activity, energy disruption or political leverage. A system that manages only the line of contact in Ukraine will not contain all of the disorder stemming from the conflict.
China will add another layer of complexity. Its economic weight can cushion Russia from Western pressure, but Beijing’s interest in stability also constrains Moscow’s options.
The final source of disorder will come from the absence of accepted leaders. During the cold war, the US claimed and largely exercised the role of Western leader. That world will not return. Europe cannot yet replace America: the EU cannot speak with the speed or unity of a state. NATO can deter, but it cannot resolve every political dispute a bad ceasefire creates. Individual European leaders may speak to officials in Moscow, Washington or Kyiv, but none can credibly represent the whole continent. In that vacuum, others will try to manage the disorder: private envoys, Gulf intermediaries, business figures, transactional American negotiators or ad hoc coalitions formed in crisis. Without rules, the system will fill with middlemen.
These sources of disorder will keep producing flashpoints that risk a return to war. Maintaining stability in post-conflict Europe will take conscious, active management. A comprehensive settlement to the Russia question remains out of reach for now, so the aim should be to prevent a bad and incomplete peace from decaying into a more dangerous confrontation.
Managed disorder will hold together only as long as its incentives do. America and Europe, Ukraine, Russia, Turkey and China each bring different interests, so the system of managed disorder must align incompatible motives around a limited common interest: avoiding a return to uncontrolled war.
Stabilising and strengthening Ukraine is the foundation of the entire system. For that, Ukraine must want to comply with it rather than be forced to because it needs American and European money and weapons to rebuild itself and deter Russia. The benefits need to be tangible and politically defensible at home. Therefore, in addition to sustained military aid, joint defence production and reconstruction funding, a stable system must offer Ukraine a path into the EU and a credible route to recovering lost territory without renewed fighting. Ukraine will not abide by the rules of managed disorder if it experiences it only as a restraint on its actions rather than as a route to a stronger Ukrainian state.
The main part of that route goes through EU membership. Europe should tie the pace of Ukraine’s accession—market access, regulatory alignment, reconstruction funding—to its conduct within this system. Cooperation opens the door; obstruction closes it. No Ukrainian government can afford to turn its back on a European future.
That pull is real, but it has limits. EU membership is economic and political; the bloc’s mutual-assistance clause, Article 42.7, carries none of NATO’s integrated command structure or binding defence commitments. However, Ukrainian officials under domestic pressure may present accession as delivering that protection anyway, leaving the public expecting a NATO-style military response that Article 42.7 was never built to provide. Any actual security guarantee will need its own separate instrument with defined triggers, scope and decision-making process.
In any case, Ukraine will benefit more from sustained American and European military aid, joint defence production and a homegrown arms industry than from any ambiguous or unenforceable security guarantee. The country will need artillery, air defence, drones and the factories to build them for decades to come. But offensive or long-range systems—capable of striking deep into Russian territory—should come from Western allies only if Russia attacks again, keeping the line between defending Ukraine and arming it for renewed war visible to Moscow and to sceptical Western publics.
Ukraine’s own expanding arms industry will blur that line. Washington and European capitals can condition their weapons transfers, but they cannot control what Ukraine builds. To manage disorder, therefore, they should tie reconstruction, defence-industrial cooperation and military assistance to rules about defensive posture and escalation.
The territorial question needs careful handling. A settlement must preserve Ukraine’s claim to the occupied lands—legally, politically and morally. Refusing to recognise Russia’s conquests should remain a core principle. But America and Europe must be honest too: Ukraine cannot retake its territory by force. Restoration will come through Ukrainian resilience, European integration, legal non-recognition, diplomacy and long-term shifts in the balance of power—not a bet on a better war later. Ukraine can keep hoping for its territory back without believing that another war is the way to get it.
Coalition dynamics will shape compliance with managed disorder too. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia—Ukraine’s strongest backers—will have to be part of any difficult trade-offs. If these countries can support a compromise, Ukrainian leaders can argue that managed disorder strengthens Ukraine rather than abandons it, and western European governments can show that restraint does not mean appeasement. If they oppose it, critics in Kyiv and across Europe will portray the arrangement as a deal made over Ukraine’s head and at the expense of Europe’s most vulnerable states. In that case, neither Ukrainian nor European leaders could easily sell compliance at home.
In the end, Western policymakers must design Ukraine’s decision space, not just hope it will make the right decisions. They must show that cooperation delivers EU integration, reconstruction, military assistance, long-term deterrence and a path to restoring territory by weakening Russia over time—West Germany pulled off exactly that with the East, decades later. Obstruction delivers economic stagnation, dwindling aid, isolation and an indefinite war footing with nothing to show for it. The goal is to make cooperation the rational, defensible choice for any government in Kyiv.
This paper does not assume that Moscow wants peace or even managed disorder. The only assumption is that a ceasefire would reveal some Russian interest in pausing large-scale war. The task is to exploit that pause to make restraint more attractive to Moscow than going back to war.
The logic is structured choice. Russia should know exactly what it gets for playing by the rules and what it loses for breaking them. If Russia complies, the rewards should be tangible—for instance, sanctions relief is immediate but reversible. If Russia violates the rules, the costs should be just as immediate—for example, suspended sanctions snap back automatically.
Military realities can reinforce this logic. The war has cost Russia dearly in soldiers, equipment, ammunition and political attention. Yet Russian weakness should not lull the US and Europe into assuming that Moscow’s appetite for aggression has diminished. Russia’s calculation will change only if Ukraine, armed by Europe, can defend itself. A second full-scale invasion would offer no easy win. Russia would confront a better-prepared Ukraine, a more fortified eastern flank and a Western sanctions system built to escalate rather than merely restore previous penalties.
Economic incentives can also matter, though they will not by themselves drive Russian policy. The Kremlin has shown it will sacrifice prosperity for war and ideology. But Russians value access to markets, targeted relief and the ability to travel, which shape interests inside the system, especially once the immediate demands of wartime mobilisation recede. Sanctions can thus create constituencies for restraint. Relief should remain selective, staged and reversible. It should reward observable behaviour, not political promises. And it should be designed so that renewed escalation hurts the specific people and networks that benefit from playing along.
None of this guarantees Russian cooperation. Moscow may still conclude that exploitable disorder serves it better than regulated confrontation, particularly if it can strike a bilateral understanding with Washington over Europe’s head. Western policymakers should therefore expect Russian violations and aim to narrow Russia’s room to exploit ambiguity.
Moscow does not need to like managed disorder to live with it. It only needs to face a world in which restraint brings some gains and cheating brings higher costs. Of course, the Russian government has not always responded to such incentives. No amount of pressure guarantees good behaviour. All any arrangement can do is make every alternative worse.
Turkey belongs in this system because the Black Sea cannot be managed without it. Ankara controls access to the Black Sea through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, has direct interests in maritime security and commerce, and has maintained working channels with both Russia and Ukraine throughout the war. Any post-war arrangement that touches naval access, grain routes, energy transport, Russian warship movements, or the security of Ukraine’s southern coast will require Turkish participation. Ankara can either reinforce the framework or complicate it. Managed disorder should therefore treat Turkey as a necessary regional partner.
The other major power shaping Russia’s future options is China. The two are not formal allies, but their partnership is more than a marriage of convenience. Russia needs China for markets, technology, diplomatic cover and long-term economic resilience. Moscow’s options depend as much on what Beijing will tolerate as on what Washington and European capitals will permit.
China need not endorse managed disorder for its interests to tacitly reinforce it. Beijing benefits from a stable Russia that checks American and European power, but not from a Russia that collapses or continually destabilises Europe. Endless war raises energy prices, invites secondary sanctions and risks escalation that could disrupt China’s own growth and global positioning. A structured post-war settlement that freezes borders, channels competition and conditions economic reintegration offers China predictability without forcing political alignment. If American and European sanctions tie relief to Russian conduct and penalises circumvention, Beijing may find it cheaper to let the system work than to help Russia rearm—provided the system leaves Russia viable as a geopolitical ally for China and a source of natural resources.
Economic interests pull in the same direction. Beijing values access to European markets and reconstruction opportunities in Ukraine. Western leaders should therefore make clear that stability unlocks better China-Europe economic ties, while a collapse of managed disorder would push Europe toward militarisation, protectionism and tighter technological coordination with the United States. China can benefit from this arrangement without choosing between Europe and Russia, so long as it prefers predictability and stability to escalation and sanctions spirals.
Managed disorder also needs a China clause. If Russia uses China to rearm and restock its munitions, the consequences cannot fall on Moscow alone. Europe should tighten its China policy, deepen coordination with America and target Chinese firms enabling violations with economic pressure. China must understand that helping Russia evade these rules costs Beijing more than it benefits it, while tolerating stability keeps the door to European markets open.
In this sense, China is neither an adversary nor an essential partner, but a structural constraint that can reinforce, undermine or passively enable whatever security order emerges in Europe. A system that links market access to stability, invites selective Chinese participation and penalises circumvention turns Beijing, intentionally or not, into a stakeholder in restraint.
How the war in Ukraine ends will go a long way towards deciding the path to managed disorder. A fully disarmed or “neutralised” Ukraine is unacceptable to Kyiv and unsustainable for Europe. A permanently offensive Ukraine capable of striking deep into Russian territory would risk escalation and be unacceptable to Moscow. The same would be true if Ukraine were to host Western troops.
Between these poles lies the most workable model: a defensible, resilient Ukraine that is armed to deter, but not configured for offensive operations. This “steel porcupine” posture follows the same logic as cold war West Germany: strong enough to make conquest costly but not positioned as a launchpad for offensive war. It separates Ukraine’s legal and political claim to territorial restoration from the military means that could reignite the war, without conceding Russia’s territorial gains.
Europe is likely to bear long-term responsibility for Ukraine’s rebuilding, military assistance and eventual integration into European institutions. Even a supportive United States may commit fewer resources over time. A framework for managed disorder must ensure that Europe can sustain Ukrainian security on its own if America steps back, while leaving room for deeper US involvement should political conditions allow.
To reach that state, American and European policymakers will need to work amid mistrust, division and partial compliance. They must create a system in which Ukrainian restraint earns visible progress, and Russian violations bring consequences and compliance rewards. Importantly, they should also ensure European disagreement does not become paralysis and American involvement strengthens the system without owning it.
Washington and European capitals share core interests yet diverge in priorities, attention and risk tolerance. The challenge will be to design a system that can operate with those differences built in.
A future American administration, whether populist or merely pragmatic, is likely to approach Russia as a file to manage rather than a sustained strategic priority beyond its nuclear dimension. To the extent it figures in US strategic calculations, Russia is more likely to be seen as part of America’s larger competition with China. Commitments to European security that once seemed permanent will depend on electoral cycles and budgetary politics.
That is why managed disorder should rely on European initiative and pre-agreed processes rather than sustained American focus: durability must be built into the mechanism itself, not assumed from Washington’s resolve.
European nations will see the landscape through a nearer lens. Russia is not a distant power but a neighbour capable of altering borders by force. European governments agree that Ukraine must survive yet disagree on what survival means: integrated or merely defended, heavily armed or cautiously defensible, anchored fully to Europe or held at strategic arm’s length. Populist and anti-migrant parties are often averse to sustained defence expenditure and will sometimes be open to friendly relations with Russia.
Given the European disagreements and the American focus on China, a genuine transatlantic consensus on a post-war order is unlikely to emerge. What is achievable and necessary is interoperability: a structure in which Europe and the US can act together when aligned and continue functioning when they are not. A framework to achieve managed disorder will therefore need to do two things. First, its stages, tracks and certification mechanisms should be designed to keep working whether or not Washington and European capitals are pulling in the same direction. Second, it should be designed for a permanently divided Europe. Its purpose should be to prevent disagreement from becoming paralysis.
That means creating a European core group: a few countries that can negotiate sanctions positions, military support thresholds, monitoring standards and responses to Russian violations before each crisis arrives. It should include the countries with the greatest military weight, financial capacity and geographic exposure—France, Germany, Poland and the UK, as well as the Nordic and Baltic states. The core group should drive the security logic; EU institutions should anchor the economic, sanctions, enlargement and legitimacy logic.
Russia will seek to widen any post-war process beyond the line of contact in Ukraine. It will want to discuss NATO enlargement, American and Western European basing, missile deployments, military exercises, the Black Sea and the military balance along its western frontier. Europe and the US should expect these demands, but they should neither dismiss them reflexively nor accept them on Russia’s terms. Some issues do raise genuine risks of miscalculation between Russia and NATO. Large military exercises near borders, missile deployments, ambiguous troop movements, air and naval incidents, cyber operations against critical infrastructure and uncontrolled activity in the Black Sea can create crises regardless of the justice of the underlying political claims.
To stop Russia from setting the terms of the debate, European leaders should pursue two distinct negotiations. The first would revolve around the ceasefire and subsequent security arrangement in Ukraine, and must preserve Ukraine as a principal actor. The second concerns the wider Russia-Europe security environment and must prevent either Moscow or Washington from treating Europe as an object of negotiation. Russia will try to conflate the two tracks so that it can use NATO-Russia talks to extract constraints on Ukraine or claim that whatever Kyiv gives up, the West gave up too. European policymakers should resist this and keep the two discussions separate, though separation also has risks: if either track collapses, the other will suffer because both tracks are needed to ensure regional security. The first maintains immediate stability along the line of contact between Russia and Ukraine; the second tackles the wider geopolitics.
Russia will prefer to discuss regional security with America rather than with Europe. It will try to cast Europe as the object of negotiation, not a participant in it. If the American leadership is distracted by other priorities or tempted by bilateral deals with Moscow, it might even support that Russian position. The answer for Europe is to define the terms of engagement with Russia in advance, with frontline states fully involved and with clear limits on what can and cannot be negotiated.
To do that, Europeans need the core group to define common positions before the United States and Russia enter any serious dialogue. European leaders cannot prevent every American side channel with Moscow, but they can limit the damage by insisting in advance on the principles that should govern any regional security conversation. These might include no recognition of territorial conquest, no Russian veto over its neighbours’ alliance decisions, no limits on Ukraine’s sovereign choices and no economic relief without behavioural restraint.
This regional security agenda will make many European leaders uncomfortable. Frontline states will fear that any discussion of basing, exercises, missiles or notification requirements gives Moscow a path back to influence over their security. They have reason to worry. Russia has used previous security conversations to claim rights over its neighbours. It has, for example, consistently used the indivisible security clause of the 1999 Charter for European Security to assert that it has the right to deny its neighbours membership in Western security organisations such as NATO. Despite this record, to exclude regional security from the framework would leave Moscow free to raise it bilaterally with Washington or exploit it during crises.
Regional security therefore is one of the central tests of managed disorder. If the US and Europe refuse to discuss it at all, Russia will use the refusal to justify probing, escalating and direct talks with America over Europe’s head. If they discuss it on Moscow’s terms, it will legitimise coercion and weaken the states most exposed to its power. The only viable course lies between those failures: to create a framework that channels Russian security demands into reciprocal, verifiable and limited mechanisms.
Every actor has reason to tolerate managed disorder over the alternatives, but tolerance does not sustain itself; it has to be built into rules. Managed disorder therefore rests on at least three mutually reinforcing principles:
Separate where necessary: Europe should first reduce its exposure to Russia with stronger defences and less dependence on Russian energy. Ukraine should tie itself economically more closely to Europe and be able to hold its ground militarily. Effective deterrence is a precondition for any dialogue.
Compartmentalise where you can: Certain issues—nuclear risk, Arctic exploitation, climate change and counter-proliferation—are in everyone’s interest to manage together. Even Russia wants to avoid, say, nuclear war or environmental collapse. The parties should fence such issues off from more neuralgic ones, such as Ukrainian sovereignty, to prevent crises from cascading into areas of mutual benefit. Cooperation here is a limited and mutually beneficial transaction, not the embryo of a broader relationship.
Make engagement conditional: Russia should earn sanctions relief, diplomatic reintegration and economic access by meeting specific, verifiable benchmarks. These rewards should be reversible and calibrated, so that, for Russia, compliance pays and violations are costly. This system does not require faith—just working mechanisms.
Within these pillars, Europe can emphasise defensive resilience and sanctions, while America manages nuclear and global issues. Both are compatible with the same architecture, if properly sequenced.
Managed disorder will not arrive by some grand bargain. It must grow semi-organically from whatever unsatisfactory deal ends the Ukraine conflict. Progress will be uneven and contingent: each stage will require stability in the previous one and give Russia incentives to value restraint over escalation. Optimistically, it will take years to move from ceasefire management to durable rules, and probably a decade or more before habits, institutions and political constituencies for restraint begin to take root. The framework will thus also need to “fail well” in the sense that Ukraine and Europe need to be able to bounce back if there is a setback.
The sequencing below shows how war-termination mechanisms can become stabilisation tools, then arms-control practice, then institutions. This is deliberate. America and Europe should commit openly to this trajectory, making clear that progress depends on Russia sticking to core principles. Even so, however technical the criteria for moving from one stage to the next may look, all the parties will accept progress only if their domestic politics allow it.
A ceasefire, negotiated principally between Ukraine and Russia, is the prerequisite for everything that follows. It would be good if that ceasefire laid the groundwork for a more stable peace, but experience suggests that it will only nod in that direction and leave much unsaid. In the end, the purpose of a ceasefire is to stop the shooting rather than to ensure permanent peace. In Ukraine, that would be an accomplishment in itself and would at least open the door to the more sustainable process outlined below.
The first phase is about preventing a return to large-scale violence, preserving Ukraine’s survival and creating minimum conditions for a wider managed confrontation. It should embed the principle that behaviour has consequences. Monitoring and verification should come first—they enable later agreements by normalising inspections, data exchanges and the idea of measurable compliance. Those, in turn, provide the basis for rewarding Russian restraint.
This phase should establish baseline rules and mechanisms.
The goal is to contain friction along the line of control and normalise external verification so that incidents do not spiral.
Monitoring in this phase should not be confused with Western intelligence assessments. A ceasefire mechanism needs visible procedures that both Russia and Ukraine can invoke when incidents occur. The American and European governments will also rely on classified intelligence, satellite imagery and Ukrainian reporting to assess whether Russia is preparing to attack again, but Russia need not accept those assessments for America and Europe to act on them. The two systems serve different purposes: the ceasefire mechanism manages incidents and referees disputes; intelligence assessments guide deterrence and enforcement.
Property claims will likely be one of the war’s most politically corrosive legacies. The framework must acknowledge them early, even if it cannot resolve them. Ukrainians have lost homes, businesses and land in occupied territories. Russian state assets and other linked private assets are frozen or seized across Europe. European nationals, companies and institutions have outstanding claims from pre-war investments. Left unaddressed, these grievances will curdle into domestic pressure against any government trying to sustain the framework. Experience from other post-conflict settlements suggests that unresolved property claims only get harder to settle and easier for spoilers to exploit the longer they sit.
This stage should therefore set up a dedicated arbitration channel for property claims, compensation and an inventory of assets in occupied territories. It should give affected populations a visible, legitimate process they can trust to address their claims eventually, even if immediate restitution is impossible. Otherwise, these issues become structural weaknesses that Russia, populist parties or affected lobbies can later exploit to fracture European cohesion.
No formal milestone marks the end of Stage 1—readiness to advance is a practical judgement. Triggers for progression to the next stage could include six to twelve months without major violations, inspectors consistently granted access or functioning communication demonstrated during minor incidents.
Once violence subsides, the next task is to keep it that way. This requires partial demilitarisation and transparency along the Ukraine-Russia and NATO-Russia contact lines. The logic resembles the earliest cold war confidence-building measures: small, technical arrangements that reduce risk without requiring political alignment.
Stage 2 creates, as noted, the two parallel negotiation tracks with Russia: one on the Ukraine-Russia contact line, Track A, and the other on NATO-Russia, Track B. Progress or failure in one track should have no bearing on the other, and the scope of Track B explicitly excludes Ukraine’s sovereign choices. Ukraine should be consulted before any Track B arrangement that materially affects its security. It should have no veto over NATO decisions, but it should not be treated as an object of them either.
The purpose of the negotiations would be to make the signs towards confrontation easier to read. Russia should be able to tell which US and European actions reflect routine deterrence from those signalling preparation for escalation, just as America and Europe need a clear read on which Russian moves stay within declared force posture and which mark renewed aggression. Ukraine, in turn, should know what kinds of Russian movements will trigger US and European responses—and frontline European states should trust that de-escalation measures will not come at their expense. The framework seeks to reduce the danger that military ambiguity becomes political panic.
Transparency measures and limits on destabilising deployments would increase predictability without weakening deterrence. The test is practical: a measure belongs in the framework if it reduces miscalculation while preserving the ability to defend Ukraine and NATO territory.
Examples of measures for each track include:
Track A—Contact line management (Ukraine-Russia, Western-facilitated)
Track B—NATO-Russia military transparency (NATO-led, Ukraine consulted)
Stage 2 should also expand crisis communications into separate channels, each with a limited purpose. A Ukraine-Russia channel should manage incidents along the line of contact. Exercises, air and naval encounters, forward deployments and missile notifications would run through a separate NATO-Russia military channel. A political channel—bringing together the European core group, the US, Ukraine and Russia—should handle cases that risk triggering sanctions snapback or military escalation. And the Black Sea requires a fourth channel, covering naval movements, commercial shipping, mine clearance, port access and other maritime incidents, with Turkey centrally involved.
The Black Sea requires special attention. Ukraine’s security depends on its land frontier as much as it does on Odesa—the country’s principal port and the conduit for the bulk of its grain exports, without which Ukraine would be cut off from global maritime trade. Turkey’s control of the Black Sea and its diplomatic channels to both Moscow and Kyiv make it indispensable here.
These channels should be linked by notification rules but should not be merged into a single negotiation. Their value lies precisely in compartmentalisation: failure in one channel should not bring down the rest.
Overall, these measures create predictability rather than normality. The metrics are practical: fewer surprises, lower risk of misinterpretation, calmer borders. Communication at the tactical level buys stability at the strategic one. The aim of the monitoring is to make suspicious behaviour visible enough, early enough that American and European governments can respond before ambiguity becomes paralysis.
Informal progression to Stage 3 could follow after 9–18 months of ceasefire compliance, a functioning inspection regime or verified pullbacks of heavy artillery or long-range systems from designated exclusion belts.
If stabilisation holds, America and Europe should shift their focus from military capability to deterrence. The relationship with Russia may remain adversarial, but it must be clear why and, within limits, predictable.
This stage should distinguish rearmament from deployment. At first, it should leave Europe, Ukraine and Russia to rebuild their armed forces. Capping rearmament outright would be unpopular, difficult to verify and potentially damaging to deterrence. The early aim is narrower: to curb the most destabilising forms of rearmament by regulating where forces are placed, how movements are notified, which exercises require observers, which long-range systems create escalation risks and what kinds of external assistance to Russia would trigger penalties. In short, managed disorder should allow rearmament but make it less surprising, less offensive in posture and less likely to spark a crisis.
Hybrid activity is a harder problem because Moscow has made it part of its regional strategy. Disinformation and cyberattacks cannot be managed through traditional arms control. The US and Europe cannot negotiate a clean cyber or hybrid non-aggression pact with Russia, but they can set conditions for participation in a wider framework. Russia cannot stop the drone war in Ukraine while continuing an infrastructure war across Europe and still expect sanctions relief and cooperation. A reduction in major hybrid attacks should become part of the price of entry into the framework.
This will require clear thresholds. Not every disinformation campaign warrants a crisis response, and not every cyber incident will carry a signature that all governments accept. But hybrid attacks on critical infrastructure, electoral processes, or political figures should carry consequences when evidence reaches agreed standards. The US and Europe should create a certification process that assesses such activity and links it to sanctions, diplomatic access and the pace of wider engagement. Attribution will remain contested, but the absence of perfect attribution cannot excuse permanent grey-zone coercion.
Both sets of rules—on rearmament and on hybrid activity—belong to the same emerging arms-control agenda, which could include:
The US would lead this part because of nuclear considerations, while Europe anchors the conventional posture. Russia may well test boundaries, so deterrence must remain credible. But even imperfect predictability is safer than total opacity.
Triggers for informal progression to the next stage could include routine functioning of transparency mechanisms, no large undisclosed deployments near the line or political space inside EU and US capitals for conditional economic measures.
Cooperation in limited areas can help keep the wider framework from collapsing. Even after a ceasefire in Ukraine, Russia will still be able to destabilise Europe indirectly through hybrid operations within European borders and its wider neighbourhood. A managed framework will therefore need to go beyond Ukraine without assuming that cooperation in one domain signals goodwill or leads to broader reconciliation.
The purpose of functional cooperation is twofold. First, it can give Russia limited, visible benefits from predictable behaviour. Moscow values status, access and the recognition that it is an indispensable interlocutor. Carefully chosen cooperation channels can provide these at relatively low cost, provided they remain conditional and reversible. Second, such channels can reduce Russia’s incentive to use theatres outside Europe as pressure points. If Russia gains a stake in, say, Arctic safety, it may have more to lose from turning it into a battlefield.
The US and Europe should choose these areas carefully. Cooperation should start soon after a ceasefire wherever interests overlap. It can include humanitarian and economic essentials—fertiliser and food exports, prisoner-of-war exchanges—alongside maritime and safety measures such as Black Sea commercial shipping and nuclear safety. The early purpose is to improve people’s safety and daily lives rather than to preserve the peace. If the framework holds, functional cooperation can institutionalise and spread into two further clusters: maritime and Arctic cooperation, such as search-and-rescue and maritime deconfliction; and technical safety cooperation, such as space debris monitoring, counter-proliferation and climate and environmental data exchange.
The Arctic presents a distinct challenge. Before the war, it was one of the few spaces where Russia, America and Europe cooperated despite wider tensions, but that cooperation has since collapsed. Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO, Russia’s militarisation of the High North, competition over energy and shipping routes, and Chinese interest in Arctic access have turned the region into a sharper theatre of rivalry. A functional Arctic track could help prevent accidents, manage search-and-rescue obligations, preserve basic environmental data exchange, and reduce the risk that military incidents in the High North spill into wider confrontation.
Functional cooperation could also help manage the Black Sea, building on the channel already established in Stage 2. The aim should be to cut the risk that a naval incident spirals into a wider escalation.
These channels should also serve as tests of Russian behaviour. Russia cannot expect cooperation in the Arctic while sabotaging European energy infrastructure, or maritime deconfliction while strangling Ukraine’s economy in the Black Sea. Functional cooperation should therefore rest on a spoiler clause: major destabilisation in one domain should cut benefits in others, though minor incidents, such as temporary denial of port access, should not automatically break compartmentalised cooperation. The point is to preserve communication during confrontation, but without allowing these channels to become sanctuaries for Russian bad behaviour. A standing certification mechanism should assess whether Russian actions remain compatible with continued participation; major violations, such as sabotage of critical infrastructure or using mercenary forces to destabilise European interests abroad, should trigger wider consequences.
Functional silos can also discipline European divisions by allowing limited contact with Russia where it serves security, while preventing that contact from becoming a general political thaw. This distinction lets hardline states accept narrow, security-driven engagement without conceding that Russia has been forgiven, while allowing more accommodating states to engage practically without waiting for a broader reconciliation that may never come. Silos also give European publics a clear rationale: certain risks require communication even among enemies.
The task for the bilateral re-engagement is to prevent unconditional normalisation by channelling it: bilateral contacts should be registered, reported to the core group where security-relevant and subject to spoiler clauses. Left unmanaged, bilateral contacts could become the pathway through which sanctions erode and Europe fragments.
China may play a limited role in this stage in areas where its interests—Arctic access, nuclear stability, maritime trade—align with predictability. Beijing will understand that stability preserves the economic access it values; Russian defection narrows it.
After a sustained period of compliance, the framework should offer Russia visible but reversible dividends for restraint: expanded diplomatic channels, ministerial-level meetings, greater facilitation of agricultural and fertiliser exports, enhanced participation in Black Sea or nuclear-safety mechanisms, and broader bilateral contacts. The aim is to show that restraint changes the terms of engagement.
The trigger for the next stage might be two to four years of stable front lines, deterrence and transparency mechanisms working as intended, and proof that narrow cooperation holds without spilling over or being exploited.
If earlier stages mature and survive disruptions, an institutional architecture can begin to consolidate. Many elements may start earlier but will take shape over the long term. Institutionalisation marks a recognition that competition must be permanently managed. This day may never arrive, but it matters as an aspiration. Comparable cold war institutions took 25 years or more to emerge. For example, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was launched in the early 1970s but it only became a standing institution, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in 1995.
Potential forms for institutions include:
This stage is ambitious, uncertain and far off. It would require political durability inside Russia, Ukraine, the US and Europe. But it should remain visible as the horizon. The framework must offer a picture of a stable destination even if the road there is long.
The path to stability runs through this framework; it structures a rivalry that will continue whether we prepare for it or not. The logic is incremental: ceasefire enables monitoring, monitoring enables transparency, transparency enables limits, limits enable rules, rules enable institutions. Each step must be earned through behaviour, not granted on faith. None of this works, however, if Europe cannot act as one.
European cohesion will require a system that stops any single state from vetoing responses that the group has already agreed. The model should borrow from the Iran nuclear deal of 2015: participating states determine upfront what counts as a violation and what counts as a compliance milestone. Those criteria, once set, cannot be revised downward. The states most exposed to Russian pressure would write their red lines into the rules before the politics of the moment can erode them. A standing committee of the participating states then decides by qualified majority whether Russia has met a given criterion. If it has, the agreed reward or penalty follows automatically—unless a majority votes to block it.
This process flips the usual logic. The current system requires consensus to impose a snapback or advance a tranche of sanctions relief; the new one will require consensus to waive either. A hypothetical pro-Russian Hungarian or Slovak government seeking to delay consequences will need to openly vote to do so and bear public responsibility for that choice, rather than block it quietly through procedural abstention. Similarly, a frontline state such as Poland or a Baltic country will need to find a majority to block rewards once Russia demonstrably meets an agreed milestone. Frontline states appear to lose power here, but their red lines have already been written into the rules.
Spelling out in advance which consequences are appropriate for a breach would also help keep Europe united: cautious states will not tolerate escalation over every minor incident, and hawkish ones will not tolerate impunity for major violations. Proportionality will keep both cautious and hawkish states invested in the framework, rather than defecting to national responses. A three-tier system would make this balance work: minor procedural breaches might suspend talks or freeze a tranche of sanctions relief; material violations—such as denial of inspection access—may trigger limited snapback; major ones, such as attacks on defence production, should trigger full enforcement. This governance mechanism is only part of what will enable Europe to act cohesively within the framework; practical principles must also operate across every stage, beginning with crisis communication.
Several rules should apply throughout the framework. Managed disorder cannot rest on hopeful assumptions about Russian restraint or rationality. The framework must treat future violations as probable and place the burden on Russia to prove it is complying, not on America or Europe to show that it is not. In practice, that means adopting a presumption-of-violation approach: if, say, Russia denies inspectors access to a missile site, the refusal counts as a breach and triggers penalties. Sanctions relief, military deployments and cooperation channels continue only when Russia’s behaviour is visible and verifiable. If Moscow wants the benefits of a more predictable relationship, it must make compliance easy to see.
Crisis communication should begin from the outset. In a post-war environment, contact matters more than cooperation. Channels should allow the parties to clarify incidents and prevent local violence from escalating. These channels should be compartmentalised—for example, a line-of-contact mechanism should not depend on progress in NATO-Russia talks—so no single crisis can consume the whole framework.
Technology can help in this process, but monitoring cannot depend on it alone. Surveillance, satellite imagery, financial tracking, customs data, open-source intelligence and AI-assisted pattern detection can all improve visibility. But they cannot substitute for political judgment, agreed evidentiary standards and negotiated consequences.
In all stages, sanctions relief should be tied to periodic certification rather than ad hoc diplomacy. The certification mechanism described above—which includes the EU, the US, Ukraine and relevant European core group states—should govern the pace of sanctions relief, the triggering of snapback provisions, and the determination of whether conditions for stage progression have been met. It cannot eliminate political discretion, as that is impossible, but it can narrow it by defining operational and measurable criteria as precisely as possible. If Russia blocks inspections, moves forces without notification, conducts major hybrid attacks or violates agreed military limits, the default should be suspension or reversal of relief unless participating governments decide otherwise.
Managed disorder will make no one happy. It will not deliver justice for Ukraine, reconciliation with Russia, strategic autonomy for Europe, or a restored US-European consensus on Russia. It will leave many questions unresolved and many grievances intact. But the relevant comparison is not with an ideal peace that cannot exist. The relevant comparison is with the conceivable alternatives. All of them are worse than managed disorder.
The alternatives below are ideal types. Few policymakers advocate for any of them in pure form. But examining each in isolation reveals why none can resolve the underlying problem and why mixing them without a governing framework tends to magnify their worst features.
The first alternative is regime change in Moscow. Many Europeans and Americans have concluded that no stable order with Russia can exist while Vladimir Putin or a Putinist system remains in power—a view with real force, given how central revisionism, militarism and hostility to the West have become to the current government’s legitimacy. But as a strategy, regime change offers no credible path from the world we inhabit to the world we want. Neither the US nor Europe can engineer a liberal transition in Moscow or build a European security order on the assumption that Russia will soon become a different country. Nor can they rely on sanctions, battlefield losses or elite discontent to produce a more palatable successor. A Russia after Putin could become less aggressive, but it could also become more nationalist, more chaotic or more determined to prove that the war was not lost.
The second alternative is permanent isolation. This approach would contain Russia through sanctions, diplomatic exclusion and military pressure. It has obvious appeal. Russia should pay a lasting price for aggression. But isolation alone will not manage the next phase. Sanctions will erode without a political strategy. European governments will divide over costs and enforcement. China, Turkey, the Gulf states and others will create channels around US and European pressure. Russia will adapt and wait for fatigue in the US and Europe. Permanent isolation may punish Russia, but it will not by itself create rules for regional security or Ukraine’s defence.
The third alternative is normalisation. This approach would treat a ceasefire as the end of the problem and move quickly toward restored diplomatic channels, trade and a wider European conversation with Moscow. Some governments and firms will want this as soon as large-scale fighting stops. They will argue that Europe needs stability to recover and a way to stop Russia from becoming still more dependent on China. Some engagement with Moscow will eventually prove necessary. But normalisation without conditions would reward aggression without securing restraint. It would tell Russia that conquest brings only a temporary crisis followed by eventual reintegration. It would weaken Ukraine, divide Europe and invite Moscow to test whether another round of coercion might yield another round of concessions. Engagement has value only when it forms part of a structure of leverage. Without that structure, it becomes appeasement by exhaustion.
The fourth alternative is unmanaged confrontation. This outcome is the most likely default because it requires no decision. Europe and America would continue to arm Ukraine unevenly, maintain sanctions haphazardly, talk to Russia episodically and respond to crises as they arise. NATO would reinforce some areas, neglect others and debate deployments after Russia tests them, leaving Ukraine dependent yet insecure. Russia, meanwhile, would keep probing European defences with hybrid tactics, even as Washington cuts its own deals with Moscow. European governments might denounce such freelancing while failing to offer a coherent alternative. In this world, rivalry persists and even grows, and no one sets the rules.
Unmanaged confrontation gives Russia more ambiguity to exploit, gives the United States more room to improvise over Europe’s head, and hands European governments more opportunities to defect from common positions. It also leaves Ukraine with less clarity about what the US and Europe will support and what they will not. Every crisis becomes a test of will, credibility and domestic politics. The result would not be principled firmness. It would be recurrent improvisation under pressure.
These alternatives also share a deeper flaw. Each assumes that one element of the problem can solve the whole: Russian transformation, Russian isolation, Russian reintegration or Western toughness. None can. The post-war confrontation will require deterrence and dialogue, punishment and incentives, European unity and coalitions of the willing, Ukrainian agency, American involvement and European hedging. Any strategy that chooses only one side of these tensions will collapse when reality supplies the other.
If this trajectory does not take hold, the alternative is easy to imagine because it resembles the past decade: a ceasefire that freezes rather than manages the conflict, Russia regrouping and probing again when the balance shifts, Europe tiring under sanctions and domestic cost, the US distracted and inconsistent, and Ukraine trapped in recurrent wars. In such a world, escalation would be governed by crises rather than rules, and could arrive suddenly, triggered by accident, misunderstanding or opportunity.
America and Europe cannot choose a world without Russia, nor can they wish away their own disunity. But both Europeans and Americans can choose whether to confront Russia through chaos or through structure. Managed disorder is a strategy for containing escalation, preserving Ukrainian sovereignty, limiting Russian coercion and ensuring that rivalry remains predictable rather than world-ending.
The path forward begins in Ukraine. If policymakers treat war termination as the end of the problem, they will fail to respond to broader Russian concerns and leave Europe vulnerable to the next Russian offensive. If they instead treat war termination as the opening phase of a long process, they can shape the incentives and capacities that will govern the next decade.
A structured adversarial framework, rooted in credible deterrence and bounded by conditional cooperation, is the best available foundation. Managed disorder is not permanent peace, reconciliation or a just settlement. It is an operating system for a bad peace.
Jeremy Shapiro is the research director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. His areas of focus include US foreign policy and transatlantic relations.
Samuel Charap is Distinguished Chair in Russia and Eurasia Policy and a senior political scientist at RAND. His research interests include the foreign policies of Russia and the former Soviet states; European and Eurasian regional security; and US-Russia deterrence, strategic stability and arms control.
Bob Deen is the General Director of the Netherlands Institute for International Relations “Clingendael” and specialises in matters of European security, with a focus on Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Before joining Clingendael in 2020, he worked as Head of Section and Senior Adviser to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.
Hiski Haukkala is the director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. He is also an adjunct professor of international relations at Tampere University and a senior research associate at RAND Europe. He is the author of numerous books and articles on EU foreign policy, Russia and International Relations.
Ivan Krastev is chair of the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, and a permanent fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna. He is the author of “Is It Tomorrow Yet? Paradoxes of the Pandemic”, among many other publications.
Hanna Notte is the director of the Eurasia programme at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Based in Berlin, she has written extensively about Russian foreign policy and is the author of We Shall Outlast Them: Putin’s Global Campaign to Defeat the West (W. W. Norton & Co).
Jim O’Brien is a distinguished visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He previously served as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs in the Biden administration.
This paper is the collaborative product of a working group that met several times over the course of more than a year, comprising the authors above and Michael Kimmage of the Kennan Institute. Jeremy Shapiro took the pen on this paper, but the working group shaped, debated and contributed to it in essential ways. All of the members of the working group except Michael Kimmage fully endorse the paper.
The authors would also like to thank Kat Fytatzi for her patient and incisive editing. Kat’s editing was painful, but in exactly the right way. Nastassia Zenovich applied her usual genius for the graphical representation of extremely verbal ideas to a paper that badly needed it. She has our eternal gratitude. We’d also like to thank the Andrew Carnegie Foundation for the funding and patience that made this project possible.
For the second July running, a controversial decision from President Volodymyr Zelensky has sparked protests across Ukraine. Last year it was his attempt to weaken two anti-corruption bodies. This time it is the dismissal of his popular young defence minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, after just six months on the job. Zelensky cited a breakdown of relations between the ministry of defence and the military leadership as a key reason for his decision.
Fedorov was blunter. In a scathing statement, he criticised the commander-in-chief of the armed forces Oleksandr Syrsky for choosing loyalty over performance, sticking to outdated ways of war fighting, and sabotaging necessary reforms. “Instead of working out how to asymmetrically defeat Russia”, Fedorov said, “[Syrsky] has worked out how to split the country.” Such internal strife is the last thing Ukraine needs. But Fedorov’s allegations also call into question whether Western military assistance for Kyiv is being used in the best possible way.
Zelensky has proposed Yevhen Khmara to replace Fedorov, subject to approval by parliament. Khmara is a respected military commander and the acting head of Ukraine’s security service, so has credentials as a military leader. But Ukraine’s parliament must also decide whether he can be a trustworthy manager in the job.
This is, of course, Ukraine’s sovereign decision to make. But it is a consequential one for the rest of Europe, too: at the end of the second quarter, defence accounted for roughly 80% of Ukraine’s annual budget, with almost a third of this coming from external partners (who also supply a lot of the country’s civilian needs). The EU and European countries are by far Kyiv’s biggest financial and miliary backers. And how these funds are spent matters for Ukraine’s success; as does whether its military strategy, supplies, recruitment and procurement are aligned. The resources also need to be used efficiently. Fedorov’s allegations thus deserve proper scrutiny.
Ukraine’s European partners should not back any one choice of new defence minister. But they should make clear that, whether it is Khmara or somebody else, Fedorov’s replacement must be a credible, competent and trusted partner. This means he or she should be proven as a commander, but also be able to continue Ukraine’s defence reforms and address problems related to mobilisation, relations with the military, and corruption in the sector. Fedorov’s replacement should also be committed to continuing to build up the country’s defence technology base.
Before he became defence minister in January 2026, Fedorov headed Ukraine’s digital governance revolution. He transferred his tech-savviness to the ministry of defence and is widely credited with Ukraine’s recent advances in defence technology which helped turn the tide against Russia. Several military commanders have defended Fedorov’s work as defence minister and supported his claims against Syrskyi; others in the military have spoken in favour of the commander.
In his statement, Fedorov remained loyal to Zelensky but rumours about the outgoing official’s political ambitions have been circulating for weeks. Whether there is any truth in them or not, protesters see this as a motivation behind the president’s reshuffle. And the views of the public matter. Ukraine’s defence is a whole-of-society affair, partly sustained by volunteers and the private sector. So, Zelensky will need to dispel these rumours—a country at war can hardly afford to make decisions based on political preference at the expense of competence or defence logic.
The onus is now on Zelensky to convince everyone that Khmara is the man for the job. While parliament approved a new government led by Sergy Koretsky on July 15th, this did not include the names of the president’s (constitutionally required) proposals for defence and foreign ministers. Barring an extraordinary session, MPs will only reconvene in mid-August. This means they have time to reflect and engage in a dialogue. This should result in a defence minister who commands not just the president’s trust but also that of the military, society—and international partners.
Britain finally has a published defence investment plan (DIP). Does it match the scale of the challenge facing Britain (and Europe)? Three questions can tell us. Readers will feel less optimistic as they proceed through the answers. But the good news is the British public are well ahead of the defence establishment on what needs to be done.
Question: Does the DIP match the Russian threat?
Answer: Somewhat.
Last year NATO’s secretary-general warned Russia would be ready to attack by 2030, if not earlier. The European Commission’s SAFE programme of massive defence loans is geared to that deadline. These prognoses presumably assumed Russia would make short work of Ukraine, and could then prepare itself for fresh aggression. But Ukraine has humiliated Russia’s navy and air force, and mauled its army. The tide of war may now be turning.
Still, if Russia looks like losing in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin may become even more dangerous. He would likely prioritise different ways of trying to coerce Ukraine’s allies—sabotage, subversion, cyber assaults, attacks on infrastructure (such as undersea cables and pipes), nuclear menaces and even the sort of air and missile attacks he has nightly rained on Kyiv. In this regard, the DIP rightly focuses on cyber/electromagnetic defence and prioritises underwater robotics as part of the new £5bn investment in drones.
However, the plan reaches the extraordinary conclusion that “Capable and effective Integrated Air and Missile Defence can only be accomplished as part of a NATO endeavour”. It took only one misdirected drone to bring down the Latvian government in May. Where are the proposals for an emergency ramp-up of production of air defence missiles by MBDA (Europe’s leading missile company, one third British-owned), and coordination with the plethora of “air shield” projects now springing up across Europe? Incoming British prime minister Andy Burnham may wish to consider whether, apart from a few RAF combat aircraft, he is content to rely for the defence of Britain’s skies on the kindness of others.
Question: Does the DIP reflect the lessons of Ukraine?
Answer: Not enough.
Those lessons are in effect the development of a new paradigm of warfare through the embrace of new technologies. The need for technological “transformation” was a major theme of Britain’s strategic defence review (SDR): and the DIP duly has a lot to say about drones and other robotics. But Ukrainian battlefield success has involved so much more: a fundamental move away from the cold war military currency of aircraft, ships and tanks (all now exposed as dangerously vulnerable) to a web of sensors and surveillance assets, identifying threats and targets for a panoply of different “kill” options, including missiles, drones, cyber and electronic counter-measures. These are connected through AI-assisted battle management systems and data clouds. Development and procurement cycles are shortened to weeks or even days; hardware and software updates take place within hours.
The DIP offers no sense of such radical transformation or urgency
The DIP offers no sense of such radical transformation or urgency. True, it envisages a new Digital Targeting Web, and drones are to be introduced alongside next-generation platforms: as uncrewed “wingmen” for the Tempest sixth-generation combat aircraft; as subsea robots controlled from mother ships; as constituents of local combat clouds operated by armoured vehicles.
But the balance of overall investment is still overwhelmingly directed towards those next-generation platforms: Tempest, the nuclear deterrent, the AUKUS programme with America and Australia for future nuclear-powered attack submarines, helicopters—the sort of stuff the traditional defence industry loves, and that governments like to term a “defence dividend” of regional job creation.
The DIP acknowledges defence must “ruthlessly prioritise and make tough short-term choices, disinvesting in [old] capabilities”. Yet it is hard to see where this is actually happening, apart from the sacrifice of some planned old-style destroyers and frigates. Predictably, mothballing the increasingly irrelevant aircraft carriers is not an option that has found favour. Overall the picture is one of “hybridisation”—grafting some of the new onto much of the old root-stock.
Question: Does the DIP reflect how Trump has changed the world?
Answer: Not at all.
President Donald Trump has sided with Putin over Ukraine, threatened NATO ally Denmark over Greenland and promised US troop reductions in Europe. But the DIP is happy to reaffirm that “the US remains the UK’s closest defence and security ally”. Faith in the “special relationship” is evidently undimmed in the British defence establishment.
Symptomatic is the DIP’s endorsement of last year’s bizarre decision to buy more American F35 aircraft to drop US free-fall nuclear bombs. Since half a dozen European NATO allies already provide this service, the additional deterrent value will be minimal. But the decision betrays an extraordinary insouciance about sovereign control of software-driven aircraft with source code the Americans have always refused to share, and that is now rumoured to contain a US-operated “kill switch”. (Compare the fate of American tractors stolen from Ukraine by the Russians, and promptly killed by the John Deere company—or the similar feature on Tesla cars.)
Continental Europeans are now taking the issue of excessive technological dependence on America with increasing seriousness. Calls for “strategic autonomy” and “buy European”, once viewed as Gaullist eccentricity, are now mainstream. Efforts to develop national alternatives to American big tech offerings for AI-assisted, data-driven command systems are proliferating. Little wonder that, as Keir Starmer has sought to strengthen ties with Europe, Britain has found its “defence card” commanding less respect than hoped: a year on from last year’s EU-UK summit, Britain’s anticipated quick admission to the EU’s main programme for defence industrial collaboration has yet to happen. With Palantir now well established with the UK’s defence transformation efforts, the next British prime minister needs to address European mistrust of Britain’s commitment to cross-Channel cooperation, Burnham can do this by ensuring the contract for the Digital Targeting Web does not go to US big tech.
The establishment trail the public
Overall, the picture emerges of a British defence establishment—an alliance of industry, armed forces and political interests—that expects its bills to be promptly paid by the government, without quibble; is ready to introduce some new capabilities battle-proven in Ukraine but while retaining much of the old; and has difficulty imagining a future not fundamentally dependent on America.
So the results thrown up by recent ECFR polling are striking. The “Briton in the street” is evidently well out in front of the elite consensus when it comes to internalising the implications of the Trump geopolitical earthquake. Polling respondents hold both EU member states and the EU itself in much greater esteem than they do the US. Many more Britons believe their continental neighbours would help them repel an attack than trust America to do so. When it comes to defence cooperation, fully 63% would prioritise relations with Europe, over 19% for the US.
When he takes office later this month, Burnham may find he has more political room for manoeuvre than he expects when defence investment next comes up for debate.
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