An anti-corruption investigation reaching from Ukraine's Presidential Office into the management of state-owned Sense Bank has raised questions far beyond the alleged laundering of UAH 150 million. At stake are the governance of nationalised assets, the independence of Ukraine's anti-corruption institutions, a planned bank privatisation, an international arbitration worth more than $1 billion and Kyiv's credibility as it moves deeper into EU accession negotiations.
A week after Ukrainian anti-corruption investigators unveiled an operation carrying the improbable codename “Forrest Gump”, the affair has developed into one of the most consequential governance scandals to hit wartime Ukraine.
At its center is a deceptively simple question: Where did UAH 150 million — approximately $3.4 million — used to secure the release on bail of former Justice and Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko, a centerpiece of the biggest corruption scandal of Zelensky government, actually come from?
The answer alleged by Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau, NABU, and Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, SAPO, is extraordinary.
Investigators say criminal proceeds under the supervision and manual management of deputy head of the Office of the president of Ukraine Iryna Mudra were converted into apparently legitimate funds through a series of companies and bank accounts. The source of the money is linked with the main suspect of another corruption scandal Timur Mindich, a close ally of president Zelensky, and the goal was to post bail for a suspect in the Operation Midas investigation into alleged corruption surrounding the state nuclear company Energoatom.
NABU's official account says members of a criminal organisation, acting with representatives and officials of a state-owned bank, arranged the laundering of UAH 150 million during June 2026. The cash was allegedly introduced into the legitimate financial system through accounts belonging to shell companies before being used for bail.
The most revealing evidence released by NABU is not just a bank transfer but Mudra’s own confessions, which give wider picture. In one recorded exchange, a female voice attributed to her says: “Corruption should be systematised and controlled… There is no need to fight it.” A male interlocutor adds: “And lead it.” This is said by one of the highest Ukrainian official in charge of judicial reform. Yet her own words are arguably more disturbing, presenting corruption not as an abuse to be eliminated but as a system to be organised and kept under political management.
Other recordings portray Mudra discussing state owned Sense Bank, where this money-loundering operation took place, as an asset to be under direct political control and used for enrichment. She recounts a proposed arrangement under which political figures politicians from Zelensky party Servant of the People would refrain from attacking the bank while “Sense Bank has to pay them”, and quotes an instruction she received from above to “take over the bank” because it contains “serious flows”. She then describes its managers as compliant figures who would carry money wherever a senior Presidential Office official instructed them, adding that they had “crawled” to her “like kittens” asking to be taken under protection.
NABU’s published recording also appear to show Mudra discussing protection from the institutions supposed to investigate such conduct. She asks how to mobilize votes for “our” candidates to NABU’s Public Oversight Council and describes SAP chief Oleksandr Klymenko as “not one of ours,” warning that if he secured a second term, “we’ll all be fucked.” Taken together, these phrases suggest something broader than participation in a single suspicious transaction: an alleged attempt to control a state-owned bank while influencing the bodies capable of investigating that control. If authenticated and confirmed in context, they would provide unusually direct evidence of political capture and consciousness of wrongdoing. Mudra denies criminal conduct and says the excerpts were released selectively and without their full context.
Revelations are shocking in many dimension and will have influence for years to come. One of the most striking revelation is usage of the state-owned Sense Bank as systemic money-laundering machine.
Sense Bank carries unusual political and legal baggage. Until 2022 it was known as Alfa-Bank Ukraine and was owned through corporate structures associated with ABH Holdings. Among the beneficial shareholders were Russian businessmen including Mikhail Fridman and Petr Aven.
Ukraine subsequently imposed sanctions and, in July 2023, the government took Sense Bank into state ownership. Ukraine's Ministry of Finance says the measure was intended to maintain financial stability and protect depositors after sanctions were imposed on significant shareholders. The state today owns 100% of the bank.
It was therefore no ordinary commercial bank allegedly being exploited. It was an asset that Ukraine had taken into public ownership during wartime, in considerable part because of national-security concerns surrounding its previous ownership.
The source material examined by EU Reporter describes this as a crucial feature of the scandal: after nationalisation, the allegation is not simply that corrupt actors conducted transactions through Sense Bank, but that political influence was progressively established over the institution's governance.
That allegation remains contested and has not been established by a court. But documents released by NABU and widely reported by the Kyiv Independent and other leading Ukrainian media raise questions that are difficult for the Ukrainian authorities to ignore. The Kyiv Independent reported on 22 August that internal Nomination Committee records showed attempts to shape Sense Bank's supervisory board following nationalisation. The paper reported that Iryna Mudra, then deputy head of the Office of the President and chair of the committee involved in selecting supervisory-board members, strongly promoted Mykola Hladyshchenko for a place on the board despite objections concerning competence, potential conflicts of interest and previous employment. Hladyshchenko subsequently became chairman of the supervisory board.
The investigation also cited earlier leaked conversations in which prospective board candidates were allegedly described as “our guys”. Six people reportedly discussed in that context were subsequently appointed. EU Reporter has not independently authenticated those recordings or the leaked committee minutes, so their contents must remain attributed to the publications that obtained them.
However, now the anticorruption agencies established with support and guidance of the EU provide their findings suggesting that the bank was deliberately captured for criminal purposes. NABU says that by early June 2026 the alleged organisers had obtained de facto control of Sense Bank, enabling them to use accounts of controlled businesses in the laundering scheme. That allegation has now triggered action at the highest levels of financial regulation.
The alleged mechanics of the operation read more like a crime thriller than a banking-compliance investigation. According to the investigative material compiled in the source document and subsequent Ukrainian reporting, cash was allegedly concentrated through businesses associated with former MP and developer Maksym Mykytas before being exchanged or routed through companies capable of putting apparently legitimate non-cash funds into the banking system.
The source describes alleged deliveries of cash in bags and boxes, routing through companies including Metrobud and other entities, and discussions about how transactions could pass financial-monitoring controls.
Ukraine's anti-money-laundering regime establishes a UAH 400,000 statutory threshold for certain financial-monitoring obligations, alongside wider risk-based requirements. It would be inaccurate to suggest that every payment above UAH 400,000 is automatically prohibited; rather, banks are expected to identify, scrutinise and where necessary report transactions according to statutory and risk criteria.
The significance of the NABU allegation is therefore not simply the size of the payment. Investigators allege that people involved in the transaction were actively discussing how to overcome or circumvent compliance barriers. Published recordings attributed to members of the alleged group include discussion of a Sense Bank compliance official who could prevent the transaction. Mudra in one recording says that she received demand “from above” to fire a bank official who refuse to clear transaction. The scheme released by NABU paint a shocking picture: to make the transfer the bank's automated monitoring arrangements were temporarily taken out of operation during the transaction.
Those are NABU allegations presented to the court. But the Ukrainian government has already treated them seriously enough to take immediate action. This confirms that NABU accusations are well grounded.
On 19 August, the Cabinet suspended supervisory-board chairman Mykola Hladyshchenko for six months and initiated the suspension of management-board chairman Oleksii Stupak. The Finance Ministry explicitly said that its intervention was designed to address risks including the possible use of Sense Bank for money laundering and inadequate oversight of AML procedures.
The following day, National Bank of Ukraine Governor Andriy Pyshnyi went further. The NBU concluded that Hladyshchenko no longer satisfied the statutory independence requirements for membership of the supervisory board and opened proceedings to examine the collective suitability of the entire board. On 21 August, the government terminated Hladyshchenko's powers altogether. This regulatory reaction matters because it turns the episode from an allegation concerning individual criminal behaviour into a potential failure of corporate governance and banking supervision.
Sense Bank itself has said it is cooperating with the authorities. Following the NABU searches, the bank said it wanted the circumstances established “fully and objectively” and was providing investigators with the information required under legal procedures.
But the key question is different. There have been already multiple accusations of usage of nationalised Sense bank for allegedly corrupt or shadow schemes. NABU revelation did not come from nowhere and were not a separate incidental case. In previous NABU and journalistic investigations shocking facts of how bank has been used were presented. How was it possible that in time of war after nationalisation of one of the biggest banks it could turn into money-laundering machine?
The highest-profile suspect is Iryna Mudra. Mudra served as deputy head of the Office of the President and held responsibility for major legal and judicial-policy issues, including international mechanisms concerning Russian aggression and frozen Russian assets. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy dismissed her on 19 August. Presidential Decree No. 734/2026 confirms the dismissal but does not give a reason. NABU and SAPO served Mudra with a notice of suspicion. On 25 August, Ukraine's High Anti-Corruption Court ordered her held in custody for 60 days while allowing release if UAH 20 million bail is posted. Prosecutors had requested considerably higher bail.
Mudra denies criminal wrongdoing. She has argued that the published recordings have been presented selectively and out of context. Through her lawyers, she has said that she is cooperating with investigators and is prepared to answer their questions through the proper legal process. The underlying source document expressly records those objections and cautions concerning the provenance and quality of some recordings.
On 24 August President Zelenskyy said the anti-corruption bodies had “no questions” for him regarding the investigation.
There is another legal dimension. Former shareholder ABH Holdings commenced ICSID arbitration against Ukraine after the 2023 nationalisation, seeking more than $1 billion and alleging unlawful expropriation. UNCTAD records the dispute as ABH v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/24/1, concerning the former ownership of Alfa-Bank/Sense Bank. A separate proceeding, EMIS v Ukraine, also concerns alleged unlawful expropriation of Sense Bank.
The government's 2023 decision was taken in the context of sanctions and financial-stability considerations. Whether it complied with the relevant investment treaties is a matter for international tribunals, not for a criminal investigation conducted three years later. Nevertheless, evidence about how the asset was governed after nationalisation could become relevant contextual material in those proceedings.
ABH's case alleges that the taking of Sense Bank was unlawful. Ukraine will defend the nationalisation on its own legal and national-security grounds. A subsequent allegation that politically connected actors exploited the nationalised institution does not answer that legal dispute, but it could make the factual history of the asset considerably more uncomfortable for Kyiv. The source analysis supplied to EU Reporter correctly identifies this potential intersection. Forrest Gump can raise a question about bad faith in the original nationalisation and the consequences might go much further than a bail for one allegedly corrupt official.
And the cherry on the top: Mudra was also one of the officials responsible for formulating and publicly defending Ukraine’s position against ABH Holdings, the former owner of Sense Bank, in its more than $1 billion ICSID claim over the bank’s nationalisation; she later chaired Ukraine’s delegation in other major international proceedings. This creates a particularly damaging contradiction: an official who defended the takeover as a lawful national-security and financial-stability measure is now accused of helping place the same bank under political control and use it to launder criminal proceeds. The allegations do not by themselves prove that the 2023 nationalisation was unlawful, but they seriously undermine the factual and moral credibility of Ukraine’s case and offer ABH a powerful argument that the bank was not transferred into genuinely independent state management, but into a system vulnerable to political capture.
Forrest Gump is not an isolated investigation. Its roots reach into Operation Midas, NABU's investigation into alleged large-scale corruption at state nuclear operator Energoatom. NABU says Midas uncovered a criminal structure involved in substantial corruption and subsequent money laundering. Later investigative developments have continued into 2026.
The Forest Gump allegations concern money ultimately used as bail for an individual implicated in that wider investigation. This changes the character of the alleged conduct. If prosecutors prove their case, it would mean that money generated through criminal activity was not merely hidden or spent. It was allegedly recycled back into the criminal-justice system itself to secure the liberty of another suspect.
And here we come to the point vitally important for Brussels.
Ukraine formally opened negotiations on the EU's Fundamentals cluster on 15 June 2026. That cluster includes the judiciary, fundamental rights, justice and security, public procurement and financial control. Crucially, it is the first cluster opened and the last to close, and the European Commission has made clear that progress under it determines the overall pace of accession negotiations.
Ukraine is simultaneously receiving extraordinary financial support from the European Union. The Ukraine Facility provides up to €50 billion between 2024 and 2027, and support is tied to democratic mechanisms, the rule of law, sound financial management, anti-corruption safeguards and reform commitments.
The issue for Brussels is therefore not whether corruption exists in Ukraine. No serious accession process operates on the assumption that candidate countries are free of corruption.
The more important test is whether institutions can discover it, investigate it, prosecute it and correct the governance failures that allowed it without political obstruction. Viewed from that perspective, Forrest Gump presents two competing narratives. The negative interpretation is obvious: people occupying some of the highest positions in the Ukrainian state are alleged to have manipulated a nationalised bank and circumvented controls to launder criminal proceeds.
The more positive institutional interpretation is that Ukraine's own anti-corruption agencies investigated them, published evidence, served suspicion notices, triggered removals at a state bank and brought one of the country's most senior former presidential officials before an independent anti-corruption court.
Which narrative ultimately prevails will depend heavily on what happens next.
Via Polish organization Ordo Iuris:
On September 12–13, the Ukrainian company BioTexCom plans to hold a conference in Warsaw aimed at promoting programs offering surrogate motherhood and in vitro fertilization. The company is inviting interested parties to individual meetings with its representatives, offering surrogacy packages worth nearly 65,000 euros. Under Polish law—unlike Ukrainian law—surrogacy may be classified as a criminal offense. The matter of the Warsaw conference has already been referred to the prosecutor’s office.
This event is not an isolated episode but another manifestation of a broader phenomenon: Poland, alongside other Western and Central European countries that lack their own surrogacy regulations, has for years been becoming a market for foreign so-called reproductive companies. In this context, it is worth recalling that the issue of surrogacy has for years been a central concern of the Ordo Iuris Center for International Law—both at the domestic level and in the most important international forums.
Since 2023, the Institute has regularly submitted opinions and positions to bodies of the United Nations (UN) and institutions of the European Union (EU), consistently arguing that surrogacy meets the definition of human trafficking and the sale of children under international law. In February 2023, Ordo Iuris experts published an analysis showing that European Union law does not require member states to legalize surrogacy. When, in December 2024, the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on trafficking in women and girls that for the first time explicitly addressed the phenomenon of surrogacy, the Ordo Iuris Institute described it as a significant precedent.
This activity intensified significantly in 2025. In April, Ordo Iuris submitted an opinion contributing to a UN thematic report on surrogacy, in July it joined the organizations supporting a position presented to the UN Human Rights Council against the legalization of this practice, and in October and November it submitted further positions—including an extensive opinion, “Surrogacy as a Form of Sale of Children and Violation of Women’s Rights”—addressed directly to the UN Special Rapporteur. The year 2026 brought further action: in January, an opinion for the European Commission calling for every form of surrogacy to be recognized as human trafficking, in March, participation in the session of the Commission on the Status of Women, and in July, a commentary summarizing the UN Human Rights Council’s 62nd session, at which the report on violence against mothers was presented.
A special place in these efforts is occupied by the cooperation with Reem Alsalem, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls, who consistently defends the biological understanding of sex and motherhood in her reports. Ordo Iuris took part in informal expert consultations conducted by Alsalem for both of her key documents—the report on violence against women in the context of surrogacy, submitted to the UN General Assembly in October 2025, and the report on violence against mothers, presented to the Human Rights Council in July 2026. Importantly, the Ordo Iuris Institute’s position was explicitly cited in the latter document, in the section addressing the devaluation of motherhood in contemporary public and institutional discourse.
This cooperation also took a direct form: on June 3, 2026, Reem Alsalem personally took part—as a special guest—in the international academic conference “Motherhood in the 21st Century” organized by Ordo Iuris at Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University. During the panel devoted to surrogacy, she presented the findings of her report, outlining the profile of women who become surrogates—almost exclusively poor women, often single mothers or immigrants—and calling for a model of surrogacy abolition modeled on the abolition of prostitution. She was accompanied by Olivia Maurel, spokeswoman for the international Casablanca Declaration—a coalition of more than 150 experts from 75 countries advocating a universal ban on surrogacy—who was herself born through the procedure and shared a moving personal testimony.
This is not the first time the paths of Ordo Iuris and the circle surrounding the Casablanca Declaration have crossed. As early as April 2024, the Ordo Iuris Institute took part in an international conference in Rome organized by the Declaration’s initiators, devoted entirely to the issue of surrogacy, and addressed its findings in the commentary “The Right to a Child, or the Rights of the Child?” The participation of the Declaration’s spokeswoman in the Warsaw conference in June 2026 is thus a continuation of many years of ongoing cooperation with this coalition, not an isolated episode.
In its opinions submitted to the UN, the Ordo Iuris Institute consistently puts forward a specific legislative proposal: the adoption of a new Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child that would explicitly prohibit surrogacy. The legal argumentation, developed in particular in the November opinion for the Special Rapporteur, invokes Article 35 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 2(a) of the existing 2000 Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, whose definition of “the sale of children”—in the assessment of Ordo Iuris experts—also covers surrogacy agreements under which a child is transferred in exchange for remuneration or another benefit.
The latest element of this activity is a publication that took place just a few days ago. On August 25, 2026, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights published on its official website Polish translations of both of Reem Alsalem’s reports mentioned above—on violence against women in the context of surrogacy and on violence against mothers. Both translations were prepared by the Ordo Iuris Institute. Thanks to this, Polish-speaking lawyers, journalists, public administration officials, and NGOs have gained direct access to the full content of both documents—without relying on the fragmentary quotations and secondary media coverage through which UN reports had until now been known in Polish public discourse.
The actions outlined above—more than a dozen opinions and positions submitted to the UN and the EU, participation in the UN Special Rapporteur’s expert consultations, its own international academic conference in Warsaw, cooperation with the initiators of the Casablanca Declaration, the call for a new international treaty, and the preparation of official translations of UN reports—together form a picture of Ordo Iuris’s systematic, years-long engagement in the fight against surrogacy at both the domestic and international levels. It is against this backdrop that the Ordo Iuris Institute’s opposition to the BioTexCom conference planned for September 12–13 in Warsaw should be understood. The Ordo Iuris Institute has prepared a petition to Poland’s Minister of Justice, Waldemar Żurek, calling for the event to be blocked.
“The conference that the Ukrainian company is planning for September in Warsaw is not a neutral informational event, but a promotional campaign for a commercial reproductive business that treats a woman’s body as a means of production and a child as a product tailored to the client’s expectations.
Polish law does not explicitly criminalize surrogacy, but that does not mean a legal vacuum. An agreement under which a child is handed over in exchange for payment may meet the definition of human trafficking, and organizing and promoting such practices on the territory of the Republic of Poland should meet with a response from the relevant authorities. Ordo Iuris has for years documented the mechanisms of exploitation built into commercial surrogacy: from Colombia, through Ukraine, to the United States—and consistently works to ensure that this problem is no longer treated as the private affair of ‘commissioning parents,’ but is recognized for what it truly is: a form of economic exploitation of women in difficult life circumstances and a violation of a child’s fundamental right to identity and to a bond with the mother who gave birth to them,” notes Julia Książek of the Ordo Iuris Center for International Law.
The post Children for sale: A Ukrainian firm plans to promote surrogacy in the heart of Poland, case referred to prosecutors appeared first on Remix News.
By Gordon Duff for TID Iceland and the Russian Academy of Sciences
All links to previous Gospa News invetigation have been added in the aftermath
Let’s start with a simple question: What happens when you spend a trillion dollars building a shield, and the other guy builds a spear that goes right through it?
This isn’t a hypothetical. It’s 2026. And the answer is: you panic. Or you pretend it isn’t happening. Or you double down on the same policies that got you here and hope nobody notices.
America has chosen option three.
There’s a submarine out there. Actually, there are several. But one in particular — the Belgorod — has been the subject of more nervous whispering in Pentagon hallways than just about anything else. It’s a special-purpose submarine, which is military-speak for “we don’t really know what it does, but we’re pretty sure we don’t like it.”
It carries six Poseidon torpedoes. Each one, according to Russian sources, carries a 200-megaton nuclear warhead. That’s 1.2 gigatons of explosive power sitting on one submarine. For comparison, the entire world’s nuclear arsenal during the Cold War peaked at around 70,000 warheads with a combined yield of roughly 18,000 megatons.
The Belgorod carries six percent of that total destructive power on a single hull. Western analysts have spent years trying to talk this down. “Maybe it’s only 50 megatons.” “Maybe it’s just a test vehicle.” “Maybe the Russians are bluffing.”
Maybe. And maybe the moon is made of cheese.
The Soviet Union built a 100-megaton warhead in 1961 and detonated half of it just to prove they could. They scaled it down to 50 megatons because the bomber couldn’t carry the full version. The technology isn’t the problem. The engineering isn’t the problem. The only question was whether they wanted to build it. They did. They have. End of story.
But here’s where it gets interesting — and by “interesting,” I mean terrifying.
The Poseidon isn’t designed to destroy a city. It’s designed to destroy a coastline. The 200-megaton warhead isn’t for blast damage. It’s for the wave. A detonation of that size underwater, close to a coastal target, generates a tsunami measured in hundreds of feet. Not tens of feet. Hundreds.
You don’t need to hit New York. You need to hit fifty miles off the coast of New York. The wave does the rest. New York Harbor is gone. The ports are gone. The financial district is underwater. The same applies to Los Angeles, to Miami, to Norfolk — any coastal city with strategic importance.
This isn’t science fiction. It’s the stated purpose of the weapon. Russia has been remarkably straightforward about this. They built it to make coastal defenses irrelevant. And you know what? They’re right.
Six Poseidon torpedoes. Six coastal targets. One submarine.
The Belgorod reportedly left its base in the White Sea in October 2022. NATO lost track of it. It turned up later in the Barents Sea, surfaced, and waved hello. But in between? Nobody knows. That’s the point. A submarine designed to operate at depths over 1,000 meters, with a nuclear reactor that gives it effectively unlimited range, carrying six weapons that can end life as we know it on a continental scale
And what did America do? The CIA Director flew to Moscow and apparently had a chat. No meeting with Putin. Just a chat with the security services. “Please don’t do anything reckless,” presumably.
The Russians must have nodded politely and thought: “We have six Poseidons. What exactly are you going to do about it?”
Now let’s talk about speed. Specifically, 13,000 miles per hour.
That’s the reported speed of Russia’s hypersonic weapons. The Avangard glide vehicle. The Zircon cruise missile. The Kinzhal air-launched system. All of them travel at speeds that make interception functionally impossible.
Here’s why. Missile defense systems work on a very simple principle: detect, track, predict, intercept. You detect the missile. You track its trajectory. You calculate where it’s going to be. You launch an interceptor to meet it there.
This requires the target to follow a predictable path. A ballistic missile does that. It goes up, it goes down, and the math is straightforward. Hypersonic glide vehicles do not do that. They maneuver. They change direction. They change altitude. They zig. They zag. And they do all of this at 13,000 miles per hour.
Let me put that in perspective. A bullet from a high-powered rifle travels at around 2,000 miles per hour. A hypersonic weapon travels at six times that speed. By the time your radar detects it, tracks it, and computes an intercept trajectory, the weapon has already changed course three times. The intercept solution you computed is worthless. And there’s no time to compute a new one.
The math simply doesn’t work. You cannot intercept a maneuvering target at 13,000 miles per hour with current technology. You can’t do it with future technology, either, unless you invent something that breaks the laws of physics.
Now, the Pentagon has issued confident statements about being “on track” to develop anti-hypersonic defenses. They’ve awarded billions in contracts. They’ve held press conferences. They’ve assured Congress that the problem is being addressed.
This is what we call in the journalism trade: a comforting lie.
The people who run these programs know the truth. The physics is the physics. You can’t cheat it. You can throw money at it, and you can promise results, but at the end of the day, you’re trying to hit a bullet with a faster bullet, except the first bullet is actively dodging. Good luck with that.
And here’s the part that keeps strategic planners awake at night. Russia isn’t the only country developing these systems. China has them. North Korea has them. Iran has demonstrated hypersonic capabilities that Western analysts initially dismissed — until they saw the footage. Then they stopped dismissing it.
The Chinese AJX002 underwater drone is essentially a Poseidon clone. North Korea’s “Haeil” system does exactly what the Poseidon does, on a smaller scale. Iran’s hypersonic missile test in 2024 reportedly achieved speeds of over Mach 15 with terminal maneuvering.
The old rules of missile defense are dead. They just haven’t been buried yet.
Every country that develops these systems is making a simple calculation: we can’t match the United States in conventional military power. But we don’t need to. We just need one or two of these weapons. One is enough. One gets through, and the game changes.
And the United States cannot stop them. It cannot intercept them. It cannot defend against them. All it can do is promise retaliation. But retaliation against whom? The submarine that launched the Poseidon is already gone. The hypersonic missile came from a truck on a highway somewhere in a country the size of Iran. Good luck finding it. Good luck bombing it.
This is the new strategic reality. America’s missile defense shield — the one that cost a trillion dollars, the one that was supposed to make the nation safe — is effectively useless. It works against old technology. It does not work against new technology. It’s like building a castle wall to defend against arrows, while the enemy shows up with cannons.
Now we get to the part that nobody in Washington wants to discuss honestly.
Since 2022, the United States has provided tens of billions of dollars in military aid to Ukraine. Tanks. Artillery. Air defense systems. Missiles. Intelligence. Training. Logistics. All of it aimed at one goal: weakening Russia.
This is not an unreasonable policy. From America’s perspective, it makes perfect sense. Weaken a strategic rival without putting American boots on the ground. It’s cheap. It’s effective. It’s the kind of warfare the United States has been practicing for decades.
Here’s the problem: Russia is a nuclear power. And Russia is not Afghanistan. It’s not Iraq. It’s not Syria. It’s a country with 5,000 nuclear warheads, hypersonic weapons, Poseidon torpedoes, and a military doctrine that explicitly allows nuclear first-use in response to existential threats.
Ukraine has been conducting strikes inside Russian territory. Long-range drones hitting air bases. Missiles hitting infrastructure. Sabotage operations. Attacks on Russian border regions. These are not incidental. They are part of the Ukrainian war plan. And the United States has provided the intelligence and the weapons to make them possible.
From Russia’s perspective, this is not “helping Ukraine defend itself.” This is the United States arming a proxy to conduct attacks on Russian soil. This is an existential threat. And Russia has stated, repeatedly, that they will respond to existential threats with nuclear weapons.
This is not a bluff. This is not a negotiation tactic. This is Russian doctrine.
America’s conventional military forces are struggling. It’s an open secret that the Pentagon doesn’t discuss publicly, but the numbers don’t lie.
The defense industrial base in the United States is atrophied. The factories that produced tanks, artillery shells, and missiles in vast quantities during the Cold War are largely gone. Defense contractors prioritize high-tech, high-profit systems like fighter jets and stealth bombers. They don’t make conventional artillery shells in sufficient quantity.
They don’t make armored vehicles quickly. They don’t have the surge capacity for a major war.
The Army is struggling to meet recruitment goals. The Navy’s shipbuilding capacity is at a historic low. The Air Force is trying to field a new generation of fighters while maintaining an aging fleet. The logistics tail is enormous.
The cost of doing business is astronomical.
Meanwhile, Russia has put its economy on a war footing. Production of artillery shells is three times what it was before the war. Tank production has been restarted. Missile production continues around the clock. The Russian military is in the process of learning from its mistakes in Ukraine and rebuilding accordingly. And Russian air defenses — despite the criticism they’ve received from Western analysts — are actually quite effective. Russian sources claim their air defense systems are 25 times more effective than anything the United States fields. That’s probably an exaggeration. But not by as much as you’d hope.
Now imagine a conventional conflict between the United States and Russia. Not a nuclear exchange. Just a conventional war. Where is America going to get the ammunition? The spare parts? The replacement vehicles? The surge capacity? The answer is: it won’t. The supply chains are gone. The factories are gone. The workforce is gone.
And Russia knows this. Russia also knows that America’s only credible response to a conventional defeat would be nuclear escalation. And Russia has the systems to survive that escalation and retaliate. The Poseidon. The Avangard.
The Zircon. The Sarmat. The air defenses. This is not a fair fight. This is not a contest that America can win.
Now we come to the current American president. Donald Trump. A man who has built his political career on negotiating from what he calls “strength.” A man who threatens, cajoles, blusters, and insists he can make deals that nobody else can make. A man who genuinely believes that his personal relationships with foreign leaders can overcome strategic realities.
The problem is, strategic reality doesn’t care about relationships. It doesn’t care about deal-making. It doesn’t care about bluster.
Trump has threatened Russia with military force. He has said he would “destroy” the Russian economy. He has suggested that America’s missile defenses are so effective that Russia should be intimidated. He has mocked Putin publicly. He has talked about the strength of the American military as if it were 1990 instead of 2026.
And the Russians are watching. They’re watching the American military struggle with recruitment. They’re watching the defense industrial base struggle to produce shells. They’re watching the missile defense system fail again and again in tests. They’re watching the hypersonic weapons that America has been promising for years remain stubbornly in development, while Russia’s systems are already deployed.
From Moscow’s perspective, Trump’s bluster is empty. It’s noise. It’s the sound of a man who doesn’t understand the strategic reality he’s confronting. And the Russians are patient. They’ve been patient for decades. They can wait out another American presidency. They can wait out the political cycle. They’ve been playing this game a long time.
But here’s the danger: Trump is not rational. Or rather, he’s rational in a way that’s unpredictable. He might actually believe his own threats. He might actually think he can bluff his way to victory. And bluffing against a country with a 200-megaton Poseidon torpedo is not a winning strategy.
Americans, by and large, don’t understand how Russians think. They assume that Russians want what Americans want. Peace. Prosperity. Freedom. Democracy. They assume that trade and engagement will eventually win the day.
They assume that economic pressure will force Russia to change its behavior.
This is all wrong. Russians have a fundamentally different worldview. They have been invaded three times in the last two hundred years by European armies. They have suffered tens of millions of casualties. They have starved. They have been betrayed by allies. They have been encircled, threatened, and pushed to the brink. And they have survived.
The Russian mindset is survivalist. It’s existential. Russians don’t think in terms of “winning.” They think in terms of “not losing.” They don’t care about prosperity if it comes at the cost of security. They will endure hardship, poverty, and sacrifice, because they have done it before. And when they are threatened, they respond with overwhelming force.
PUTIN: The Powerful, Winning CHRISTIAN! A Great Statesman among Devilish Clowns of NWO-NATO’s Circus
This is what America doesn’t understand. When Russia says “this is an existential threat,” they mean it. When they say “we have red lines,” they mean it. When they say “we will use nuclear weapons if necessary,” they mean it. It’s not a game. It’s not a negotiation tactic. It’s survival.
And America keeps pushing. Every shipment of weapons to Ukraine. Every intelligence assist. Every drone strike on Russian soil. Every threat from Donald Trump. It’s pushing the Russians closer to the edge. And the Russians have weapons that America cannot stop.
The Poseidon Deployment Question: Have They Already Done It?
Now we come to the question that nobody in Washington wants to ask: Has Russia already deployed Poseidon torpedoes off America’s coasts?
There’s no way to know. That’s the whole point of the system. It operates at depths of over 1,000 meters. It’s virtually silent. It has unlimited endurance. It could sit off the coast of New York or Los Angeles or Miami for months, waiting. It could move into position and wait for the order. And nobody would know.
The Belgorod has been out of sight. NATO has lost track of it multiple times. Russian naval exercises have been conducted in unpredictable patterns. The United States claims to know where Russia’s submarines are. The United States has claimed this for decades. And Russia’s submarines have managed to show up in surprising places — including the Atlantic coast — on multiple occasions.
If a Poseidon is already off the coast of the United States, there is no defense against it. There is no way to detect it. There is no way to intercept it. There is no way to stop it. The only thing that stops it is a Russian decision not to detonate it.
And that’s the point. That’s the strategic reality. The United States cannot defend against a Poseidon. It cannot threaten Russia into disarming the Poseidon. It cannot negotiate away the Poseidon. It can only hope that Russia doesn’t use it.
And Russia is watching American behavior. They are watching the threats. They are watching the arming of Ukraine. They are watching the attacks on Russian territory. They are watching Donald Trump. And they are asking themselves: How long can we tolerate this before we need to prove our capability?
I am a policy advisor, not a journalist. But the truth is the truth, and the truth needs to be told.
The United States should stop threatening Russia. It should stop arming Ukraine with weapons that can strike Russian territory. It should stop pretending that its missile defense system actually works. It should stop talking about “winning” a confrontation with a country that has weapons America cannot stop.
Instead, the United States should talk. Seriously. Quietly. Without cameras. Without bluster. Without threats. It should acknowledge that Russia has legitimate security concerns. It should acknowledge that Russia’s red lines are real. It should acknowledge that America’s conventional military power is less formidable than it appears.
And it should negotiate. A deal. A settlement. A strategic pause. Something that gives Russia an off-ramp and gives America a chance to rebuild its military capacity without pushing the world to the brink.
Because right now, the United States is doing the opposite. It’s threatening. It’s provoking. It’s pretending. And Russia is watching, quietly, with six Poseidon torpedoes, hypersonic glide vehicles, nuclear cruise missiles, and the patience of a people who have survived everything history has thrown at them.
This is not a column about Russia being virtuous. Russia is not a nice country. It’s authoritarian. It’s aggressive. It has done terrible things in Ukraine and elsewhere. The United States has plenty of legitimate grievances.
But grievances don’t matter when a 200-megaton torpedo is sitting off your coast. Right and wrong don’t matter.
What matters is survival. And survival requires a clear-eyed understanding of reality.
The reality is this: the United States cannot defend against Russia’s newest weapons. It cannot stop a Poseidon. It cannot intercept an Avangard. It cannot track a Zircon. It has bankrupted itself on a missile defense system that doesn’t work against the threats that actually exist. And it has provoked a nuclear power to the point where that nuclear power is starting to ask very hard questions about its own survival.
This is not a lecture. This is not a threat. This is a warning. Written by a journalist. For average readers. Because someone needs to say it clearly, without jargon, without political bias, without comforting lies.
The United States is pushing toward a confrontation it cannot win. The clock is ticking. And the only thing worse than admitting that reality is pretending it isn’t true until it’s too late.
By Gordon Duff for TID Iceland and the Russian Academy of Sciences
On Ukraine Independence Day (24 August), the European Commission approved €6.1 billion in new defence procurement for Ukraine. This funding covers air and missile defence systems, missiles, ammunitions and radars, reaffirming Europe's commitment to supporting Ukraine's defence and resilience against Russia's ongoing aggression.
Ursula von der Leyen, president of the Commission: “On Ukraine's Independence Day, Europe shows our support is unfaltering and concrete. Today, we have approved €6.1 billion for the air and missile defence systems, missiles, ammunition and radars that Ukraine urgently needs. As Russia intensifies its attacks, we are stepping up to help Ukraine protect its people and defend its skies. Europe stands with Ukraine and we will deliver what it needs, when it needs it.”
The funding, part of the €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan (UASL), comes as Russia escalates attacks with ballistic missiles and drones. With 376 missile strikes recorded in July alone, reinforcing Ukraine's defences has become increasingly urgent.
The approval adds to €16 billion in already approved procurement plans, of which €8.35 billion has been disbursed, ensuring Ukraine receives critical supplies on time and at the required scale.
Most procurements will source products from EU defence companies. Given Russia's intensified use of ballistic missiles and jet-engined drones, the Commission emphasises the need for a significant increase in EU deliveries through destocking, reprioritising orders and ramping up the production.
Ukraine's ability to defend itself depends on the rapid availability of critical defence products. The UASL provides €30 billion for budgetary aid and €60 billion for defence across 2026-2027, including €28.3 billion in 2026 to strengthen Ukraine's defence industrial capacity.
Ukraine can request payments by submitting contracts signed with defence companies. The Commission will review these contracts before disbursing funds to ensure the financial assistance is used for the procurements agreed with Member States and the Commission.
In February 2026, the European Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2026/467, establishing the Ukraine Support Loan, providing up to €90 billion in support to Ukraine. This support has two complementary components: strengthening Ukraine's defence capabilities and defence industrial capacities, and support to maintain essential state functions, public services and economic resilience.
Following Ukraine's submission of its Financing Strategy in March 2026, the Council adopted an implementing decision on 23 April 2026, allocating up to €45 billion for 2026. This includes €16.7 billion in budget support, split equally between the Ukraine Facility and Macro Financial Assistance, with each amounting to up to €8.35 billion, and €28.3 billion for defence industrial capacities.
The defence component focuses on reconstructing and modernising Ukraine's defence technological and industrial base, while supporting its gradual integration into the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base.
All funding decisions respond to Ukraine's evolving needs and are subject to agreed conditions and monitoring. Since 2022, the EU and its Member States have provided €220.2 billion in overall support to Ukraine, including €3.8 billion from the proceeds of immobilised Russian assets.
Regulation (EU) 2026/467 - Ukraine Support Loan for 2026 and 2027
Commission implementing decision validating the use of derogations for drones in Ukraine
Macro-Financial Assistance to Ukraine
An anti-corruption investigation reaching from Ukraine's Presidential Office into the management of state-owned Sense Bank has raised questions far beyond the alleged laundering of UAH 150 million. At stake are the governance of nationalised assets, the independence of Ukraine's anti-corruption institutions, a planned bank privatisation, an international arbitration worth more than $1 billion and Kyiv's credibility as it moves deeper into EU accession negotiations.
A week after Ukrainian anti-corruption investigators unveiled an operation carrying the improbable codename “Forrest Gump”, the affair has developed into one of the most consequential governance scandals to hit wartime Ukraine.
At its center is a deceptively simple question: Where did UAH 150 million — approximately $3.4 million — used to secure the release on bail of former Justice and Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko, a centerpiece of the biggest corruption scandal of Zelensky government, actually come from?
The answer alleged by Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau, NABU, and Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, SAPO, is extraordinary.
Investigators say criminal proceeds under the supervision and manual management of deputy head of the Office of the president of Ukraine Iryna Mudra were converted into apparently legitimate funds through a series of companies and bank accounts. The source of the money is linked with the main suspect of another corruption scandal Timur Mindich, a close ally of president Zelensky, and the goal was to post bail for a suspect in the Operation Midas investigation into alleged corruption surrounding the state nuclear company Energoatom.
NABU's official account says members of a criminal organisation, acting with representatives and officials of a state-owned bank, arranged the laundering of UAH 150 million during June 2026. The cash was allegedly introduced into the legitimate financial system through accounts belonging to shell companies before being used for bail.
The most revealing evidence released by NABU is not just a bank transfer but Mudra’s own confessions, which give wider picture. In one recorded exchange, a female voice attributed to her says: “Corruption should be systematised and controlled… There is no need to fight it.” A male interlocutor adds: “And lead it.” This is said by one of the highest Ukrainian official in charge of judicial reform. Yet her own words are arguably more disturbing, presenting corruption not as an abuse to be eliminated but as a system to be organised and kept under political management.
Other recordings portray Mudra discussing state owned Sense Bank, where this money-loundering operation took place, as an asset to be under direct political control and used for enrichment. She recounts a proposed arrangement under which political figures politicians from Zelensky party Servant of the People would refrain from attacking the bank while “Sense Bank has to pay them”, and quotes an instruction she received from above to “take over the bank” because it contains “serious flows”. She then describes its managers as compliant figures who would carry money wherever a senior Presidential Office official instructed them, adding that they had “crawled” to her “like kittens” asking to be taken under protection.
NABU’s published recording also appear to show Mudra discussing protection from the institutions supposed to investigate such conduct. She asks how to mobilize votes for “our” candidates to NABU’s Public Oversight Council and describes SAP chief Oleksandr Klymenko as “not one of ours,” warning that if he secured a second term, “we’ll all be fucked.” Taken together, these phrases suggest something broader than participation in a single suspicious transaction: an alleged attempt to control a state-owned bank while influencing the bodies capable of investigating that control. If authenticated and confirmed in context, they would provide unusually direct evidence of political capture and consciousness of wrongdoing. Mudra denies criminal conduct and says the excerpts were released selectively and without their full context.
Revelations are shocking in many dimension and will have influence for years to come. One of the most striking revelation is usage of the state-owned Sense Bank as systemic money-laundering machine.
Sense Bank carries unusual political and legal baggage. Until 2022 it was known as Alfa-Bank Ukraine and was owned through corporate structures associated with ABH Holdings. Among the beneficial shareholders were Russian businessmen including Mikhail Fridman and Petr Aven.
Ukraine subsequently imposed sanctions and, in July 2023, the government took Sense Bank into state ownership. Ukraine's Ministry of Finance says the measure was intended to maintain financial stability and protect depositors after sanctions were imposed on significant shareholders. The state today owns 100% of the bank.
It was therefore no ordinary commercial bank allegedly being exploited. It was an asset that Ukraine had taken into public ownership during wartime, in considerable part because of national-security concerns surrounding its previous ownership.
The source material examined by EU Reporter describes this as a crucial feature of the scandal: after nationalisation, the allegation is not simply that corrupt actors conducted transactions through Sense Bank, but that political influence was progressively established over the institution's governance.
That allegation remains contested and has not been established by a court. But documents released by NABU and widely reported by the Kyiv Independent and other leading Ukrainian media raise questions that are difficult for the Ukrainian authorities to ignore. The Kyiv Independent reported on 22 August that internal Nomination Committee records showed attempts to shape Sense Bank's supervisory board following nationalisation. The paper reported that Iryna Mudra, then deputy head of the Office of the President and chair of the committee involved in selecting supervisory-board members, strongly promoted Mykola Hladyshchenko for a place on the board despite objections concerning competence, potential conflicts of interest and previous employment. Hladyshchenko subsequently became chairman of the supervisory board.
The investigation also cited earlier leaked conversations in which prospective board candidates were allegedly described as “our guys”. Six people reportedly discussed in that context were subsequently appointed. EU Reporter has not independently authenticated those recordings or the leaked committee minutes, so their contents must remain attributed to the publications that obtained them.
However, now the anticorruption agencies established with support and guidance of the EU provide their findings suggesting that the bank was deliberately captured for criminal purposes. NABU says that by early June 2026 the alleged organisers had obtained de facto control of Sense Bank, enabling them to use accounts of controlled businesses in the laundering scheme. That allegation has now triggered action at the highest levels of financial regulation.
The alleged mechanics of the operation read more like a crime thriller than a banking-compliance investigation. According to the investigative material compiled in the source document and subsequent Ukrainian reporting, cash was allegedly concentrated through businesses associated with former MP and developer Maksym Mykytas before being exchanged or routed through companies capable of putting apparently legitimate non-cash funds into the banking system.
The source describes alleged deliveries of cash in bags and boxes, routing through companies including Metrobud and other entities, and discussions about how transactions could pass financial-monitoring controls.
Ukraine's anti-money-laundering regime establishes a UAH 400,000 statutory threshold for certain financial-monitoring obligations, alongside wider risk-based requirements. It would be inaccurate to suggest that every payment above UAH 400,000 is automatically prohibited; rather, banks are expected to identify, scrutinise and where necessary report transactions according to statutory and risk criteria.
The significance of the NABU allegation is therefore not simply the size of the payment. Investigators allege that people involved in the transaction were actively discussing how to overcome or circumvent compliance barriers. Published recordings attributed to members of the alleged group include discussion of a Sense Bank compliance official who could prevent the transaction. Mudra in one recording says that she received demand “from above” to fire a bank official who refuse to clear transaction. The scheme released by NABU paint a shocking picture: to make the transfer the bank's automated monitoring arrangements were temporarily taken out of operation during the transaction.
Those are NABU allegations presented to the court. But the Ukrainian government has already treated them seriously enough to take immediate action. This confirms that NABU accusations are well grounded.
On 19 August, the Cabinet suspended supervisory-board chairman Mykola Hladyshchenko for six months and initiated the suspension of management-board chairman Oleksii Stupak. The Finance Ministry explicitly said that its intervention was designed to address risks including the possible use of Sense Bank for money laundering and inadequate oversight of AML procedures.
The following day, National Bank of Ukraine Governor Andriy Pyshnyi went further. The NBU concluded that Hladyshchenko no longer satisfied the statutory independence requirements for membership of the supervisory board and opened proceedings to examine the collective suitability of the entire board. On 21 August, the government terminated Hladyshchenko's powers altogether. This regulatory reaction matters because it turns the episode from an allegation concerning individual criminal behaviour into a potential failure of corporate governance and banking supervision.
Sense Bank itself has said it is cooperating with the authorities. Following the NABU searches, the bank said it wanted the circumstances established “fully and objectively” and was providing investigators with the information required under legal procedures.
But the key question is different. There have been already multiple accusations of usage of nationalised Sense bank for allegedly corrupt or shadow schemes. NABU revelation did not come from nowhere and were not a separate incidental case. In previous NABU and journalistic investigations shocking facts of how bank has been used were presented. How was it possible that in time of war after nationalisation of one of the biggest banks it could turn into money-laundering machine?
The highest-profile suspect is Iryna Mudra. Mudra served as deputy head of the Office of the President and held responsibility for major legal and judicial-policy issues, including international mechanisms concerning Russian aggression and frozen Russian assets. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy dismissed her on 19 August. Presidential Decree No. 734/2026 confirms the dismissal but does not give a reason. NABU and SAPO served Mudra with a notice of suspicion. On 25 August, Ukraine's High Anti-Corruption Court ordered her held in custody for 60 days while allowing release if UAH 20 million bail is posted. Prosecutors had requested considerably higher bail.
Mudra denies criminal wrongdoing. She has argued that the published recordings have been presented selectively and out of context. Through her lawyers, she has said that she is cooperating with investigators and is prepared to answer their questions through the proper legal process. The underlying source document expressly records those objections and cautions concerning the provenance and quality of some recordings.
On 24 August President Zelenskyy said the anti-corruption bodies had “no questions” for him regarding the investigation.
There is another legal dimension. Former shareholder ABH Holdings commenced ICSID arbitration against Ukraine after the 2023 nationalisation, seeking more than $1 billion and alleging unlawful expropriation. UNCTAD records the dispute as ABH v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/24/1, concerning the former ownership of Alfa-Bank/Sense Bank. A separate proceeding, EMIS v Ukraine, also concerns alleged unlawful expropriation of Sense Bank.
The government's 2023 decision was taken in the context of sanctions and financial-stability considerations. Whether it complied with the relevant investment treaties is a matter for international tribunals, not for a criminal investigation conducted three years later. Nevertheless, evidence about how the asset was governed after nationalisation could become relevant contextual material in those proceedings.
ABH's case alleges that the taking of Sense Bank was unlawful. Ukraine will defend the nationalisation on its own legal and national-security grounds. A subsequent allegation that politically connected actors exploited the nationalised institution does not answer that legal dispute, but it could make the factual history of the asset considerably more uncomfortable for Kyiv. The source analysis supplied to EU Reporter correctly identifies this potential intersection. Forrest Gump can raise a question about bad faith in the original nationalisation and the consequences might go much further than a bail for one allegedly corrupt official.
And the cherry on the top: Mudra was also one of the officials responsible for formulating and publicly defending Ukraine’s position against ABH Holdings, the former owner of Sense Bank, in its more than $1 billion ICSID claim over the bank’s nationalisation; she later chaired Ukraine’s delegation in other major international proceedings. This creates a particularly damaging contradiction: an official who defended the takeover as a lawful national-security and financial-stability measure is now accused of helping place the same bank under political control and use it to launder criminal proceeds. The allegations do not by themselves prove that the 2023 nationalisation was unlawful, but they seriously undermine the factual and moral credibility of Ukraine’s case and offer ABH a powerful argument that the bank was not transferred into genuinely independent state management, but into a system vulnerable to political capture.
Forrest Gump is not an isolated investigation. Its roots reach into Operation Midas, NABU's investigation into alleged large-scale corruption at state nuclear operator Energoatom. NABU says Midas uncovered a criminal structure involved in substantial corruption and subsequent money laundering. Later investigative developments have continued into 2026.
The Forest Gump allegations concern money ultimately used as bail for an individual implicated in that wider investigation. This changes the character of the alleged conduct. If prosecutors prove their case, it would mean that money generated through criminal activity was not merely hidden or spent. It was allegedly recycled back into the criminal-justice system itself to secure the liberty of another suspect.
And here we come to the point vitally important for Brussels.
Ukraine formally opened negotiations on the EU's Fundamentals cluster on 15 June 2026. That cluster includes the judiciary, fundamental rights, justice and security, public procurement and financial control. Crucially, it is the first cluster opened and the last to close, and the European Commission has made clear that progress under it determines the overall pace of accession negotiations.
Ukraine is simultaneously receiving extraordinary financial support from the European Union. The Ukraine Facility provides up to €50 billion between 2024 and 2027, and support is tied to democratic mechanisms, the rule of law, sound financial management, anti-corruption safeguards and reform commitments.
The issue for Brussels is therefore not whether corruption exists in Ukraine. No serious accession process operates on the assumption that candidate countries are free of corruption.
The more important test is whether institutions can discover it, investigate it, prosecute it and correct the governance failures that allowed it without political obstruction. Viewed from that perspective, Forrest Gump presents two competing narratives. The negative interpretation is obvious: people occupying some of the highest positions in the Ukrainian state are alleged to have manipulated a nationalised bank and circumvented controls to launder criminal proceeds.
The more positive institutional interpretation is that Ukraine's own anti-corruption agencies investigated them, published evidence, served suspicion notices, triggered removals at a state bank and brought one of the country's most senior former presidential officials before an independent anti-corruption court.
Which narrative ultimately prevails will depend heavily on what happens next.
On 24 August, we celebrated Ukraine’s Independence Day. This occasion embodies the bravery, resistance and resilience of the Ukrainian people in the face of Russia’s vicious war of aggression. It also symbolises Ukraine’s journey over the past 35 years in becoming a modern, democratic and European country.
To mark the occasion, the European Commission unfurled the Ukraine flag in front of the Berlaymont building in Brussels, which was also illuminated in Ukrainian colours.
As we celebrate this milestone, the EU reaffirms its unwavering commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, we have provided Ukraine and its people with unprecedented humanitarian, financial and military assistance. So far, this support amounts to €220.2 billion.
Over the past months, the EU has stepped up its support for Ukraine’s economy and defence - because Ukraine’s prosperity is Europe’s prosperity, and Ukraine’s security is Europe’s security.
We made the first disbursements under the €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan to help sustain the country’s financial needs and boost its defence capabilities. And on Ukraine’s Independence Day, we approved €6.1 billion in support for air and missile defence systems, missiles, ammunitions, and radars.
Standing with Ukraine is also about holding Russia accountable. In July, we adopted a 21st package of sanctions, further restricting Russia's ability to fund its illegal war and to carry out attacks on Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure.
The EU has stepped up efforts to secure the return of Ukrainian children forcibly transferred or deported by Russia, and is making sure Russia faces accountability for its crimes through the International Claims Commission and the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.
Ukraine belongs in the European family and in the European Union. We remain committed to supporting and assisting Ukraine on this process. This summer, Ukraine opened two accession negotiation clusters, illustrating its impressive capacity to implement reforms even during times of war.
We continue standing with Ukraine in pursuing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, and supporting their European path.
For more information
Press release - Commission approves €6.1 billion for Ukraine's defence
Visual story - Slava Ukraini, long live Europe
EU chief Antonio Costa has paid tribute to all those who he says are “standing strong in defending their homeland on the front lines and across Ukraine”.
The Portuguese-born official was speaking on Monday at Sofiiska Square in Kyiv, the country's capital, to celebrate Ukraine’s Independence Day.
He told the packed audience that 24 August marks the moment when Ukraine joined the “free nations of Europe”.
He said: “It is a crucial date in Ukraine’s long struggle for freedom and independence.”
He told Ukrainians that their “courage and bravery inspire the world”.
He thanks those fighting in the frontlines: “Their families, their parents, their children, all of them, they are losing and risking their lives for the freedom of Ukraine and the freedom of Europe.”
He recalled EU member states had met on the very first day of the war, on 24 February 2022 “to galvanise European support for Ukraine”.
The president assured Ukraine that “European solidarity has been strong and unwavering ever since,” adding, “We have always been with you in providing political, financial, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support.”
He called the conflict a “terrible war” he hopes will “never happens again”.
The former Portuguese PM assured the war torn country, “We will continue to provide as much support as necessary, for as long as necessary.”
Turning to possible EU accession for Ukraine, he suggested this as: “The best guarantee of security and long-term democratic stability — for Ukraine and for Europe as a whole.”
He said: “Our goal is Ukraine’s integration into the European Union’s peace project: a union of nations that have overcome nationalism, that uphold democracy and the rule of law, and that work together for shared prosperity and development.
“We all know that accession is a demanding process.
"But these challenges should not block our political determination, rooted in geopolitical necessity and the free, democratic choice of the Ukrainian people.”
24 August 2026 marked Ukraine's 35th anniversary of its independence. This occasion embodies Ukrainians' bravery, resistance and resilience in the face of Russia's continuous and vicious war of aggression. It also symbolises their aspiration to be a democratic and European country. On the Independence Day, the European Commission reaffirms its unshakable solidarity and commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. We continue standing with Ukraine in pursuing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, and supporting their European path.
Over the past months, the EU has secured the first disbursements under the €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan to sustain the country's defence capabilities and reconstruction. The EU has also adopted the 21st package of sanctions further restricting Russia's ability to fund its illegal war and to carry out attacks on Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure. In July 2026, President Ursula von der Leyen visited Kyiv, launching a new EU-Ukraine Defence Industrial Partnership and the EU-Ukraine Drone Deal, including an additional €1 billion in support for drone production.
The EU is leading the efforts in terms of ensuring the recovery and long-term investment in Ukraine's economy, also confirmed at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in June. It is playing a crucial role in securing the return of Ukrainian children forcibly transferred or deported by Russia, as well as in holding Russia accountable for its crimes, including through the International Claims Commission and the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.
Since Russia's full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the EU and its Member States have mobilised a total of €220.2 billion in humanitarian, financial, and military assistance to Ukraine and its people. Since 2024, the EU has made available €8 billion in proceeds generated by immobilised Russian Central Bank assets to support Ukraine, including €3.8 billion channelled through the European Peace Facility and the Ukraine Facility. The remaining part of the proceeds supports the repayment of G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loans through the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism.
More information on the EU's support for Ukraine is available on the webpage and factsheet.
by Gospa News Editorial Sfaff
Continuing the project we started in the beginning of “026.
Here is our selection of our 7 most astonishing, original or viewed videos released in this the week.
This reminder ccome back after many months of pause due to that the main important videos were published in the post WARS in Video with dauky updates on the ongoing international conflicts in Ukraine and in Middle East.
But there are many videos that are extremely significant for their social or geopolitical content that sometimes take a back seat to the serious events that occur every day in wars, which is why we decided to start this periodic column.
Inside the Rumble description of each video there is a link to the detailed investigation it refers to or to a related topic.
Enjoy watching with Gospa News. And if you like our work, support us with a small donation.
SUBSCRIBE GOSPA NEWS AND HELP WITH A SMALL FREE DONATION
DEVIL NETANYAHU’s HOLOCAUST. Explosive UN findings: “Israel DELIBERATELY TARGETED Gaza CHILDREN”
coalition of vontiers in Paris (Flickr)
The Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine meets this Monday, August 24 — the 35th anniversary of Ukrainian independence — under the joint chairmanship of Emmanuel Macron, Friedrich Merz and Andy Burnham. The meeting comes at an urgent moment: fighting is intensifying on the ground and Moscow is preparing a new mobilization, while in Kyiv, Volodymyr Zelensky has just ruled out holding elections in wartime.
According to a statement from the Élysée Palace released Friday, August 21, the Coalition of the Willing — an international alliance supporting Ukraine formed in March 2025 at the initiative of Czech President Petr Pavel — will meet this Monday at 1 p.m. in a hybrid format, with Volodymyr Zelensky taking part. The session will be jointly chaired by Emmanuel Macron, via videoconference, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and, for the first time, new British Prime Minister Andy Burnham. About a dozen leaders, including European Council President António Costa, are expected to be in Kyiv alongside the Ukrainian head of state, while European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is not expected to attend in person.
According to a European official cited by several news agencies, talks are expected to focus primarily on strengthening Ukrainian air defenses, as the country faces a shortage of interceptors against Russian strikes. The Élysée says leaders will reaffirm “their determination to increase pressure on Russia” and continue coordinating measures aimed at drying up the resources funding Russia’s war effort, including the fight against the “shadow fleet” Moscow uses to circumvent oil sanctions. The meeting is also meant to advance work on security guarantees intended to underpin a “just, robust and lasting” peace, building on the Paris Declaration of January 6, 2026.
The meeting comes as the war enters a phase of intensification. Volodymyr Zelensky said this weekend that Russia plans to mobilize an additional 300,000 troops for the Ukrainian front after Russia’s parliamentary elections, scheduled for September 16-20, with a longer-term goal of recruiting 500,000. The Ukrainian president described a “peripheral mobilization” that would spare Russia’s major cities but, he said, would be hard to conceal. He also cited a Russian goal of producing roughly 1,300 ballistic missiles a year, while Ukraine expects to receive only 264 interceptor missiles this year, down from 364 in 2025 and 675 in 2023 — a shortfall Kyiv is trying to offset through new agreements, including delivery of at least one SAMP/T air-defense system from France and roughly 600 missiles from Germany.
These statements echo converging battlefield reports. Recent military bulletins point to intense fighting on the Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Dobropillya fronts and in Dnipropetrovsk region, along with exchanges of soldiers’ remains between the two sides. This information comes from both Ukrainian and Russian sources, whose respective figures cannot be independently verified and should be treated with caution.
Formed in March 2025 at the initiative of Czech President Petr Pavel, and later organized under French and British leadership, the Coalition of the Willing brings together roughly thirty countries supporting Kyiv. It notably held a summit in Paris on July 13, 2026, on the eve of the Bastille Day parade, building on the G7 summit in Évian and the Paris Declaration of January 6, 2026.
On the domestic front, Volodymyr Zelensky responded for the first time to the call for elections made last week by his former defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, who was dismissed in late July amid vocal protests. In remarks made Saturday and released Sunday, the Ukrainian president said holding a wartime vote, absent a major cessation of hostilities, would “destroy the country by splitting society,” calling the prospect a “tsunami.” Ukrainian law bars elections under martial law, in effect since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022; Mr. Zelensky’s presidential term technically expired in May 2024.
Mr. Zelensky pointed to the practical hurdles such a vote would have to overcome — including how to enable voting by mobilized troops, millions of refugees abroad, and residents of Russian-occupied territory. According to an analysis by CNN, an incomplete or contested vote would hand Moscow a propaganda win, since the Kremlin already cites the wartime ban on elections to question the Ukrainian president’s legitimacy, even as Russia’s own electoral process is not considered free by Western observers. Polling suggests former armed forces commander Valery Zaluzhny or Mr. Fedorov himself would be the frontrunners in any eventual election.
The convergence of these two issues — international military support and the debate over the democratic legitimacy of Ukraine’s leadership in wartime — casts Monday’s meeting in a particular light. For the Western leaders gathered around Emmanuel Macron, the goal is to demonstrate the durability of their commitment at a moment when Moscow is betting on wearing Kyiv down before winter, and when the question of security guarantees still has no concrete bearing on any ceasefire.
L’article Ukraine : Macron, Merz and Burnham Close Ranks as Russia Steps Up the War est apparu en premier sur FrenchDailyNews.
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