Alinhamento do Brasil à Europa em meio às atuais tensões geopolítica cria uma ameaça grave à política tradicional de neutralidade do Brasil.
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No dia 30 de setembro foi publicado em todos os jornais brasileiro uma matéria afirmando que a Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (Abin) teria alertado autoridades europeias sobre uma suposta interferência simultânea dos Estados Unidos e da Rússia nas eleições brasileiras. O caso levanta questões que vão muito além da disputa eleitoral de 2026. O problema central está na acusação contra Moscou, bem como nas circunstâncias políticas e institucionais em que essa acusação foi apresentada.
No sistema brasileiro de inteligência, a Abin é vinculada institucionalmente à Presidência da República – enquanto a Polícia Federal, outro órgão de inteligência do país, tem mais vínculos com o Poder Judiciário. Sua função é produzir informações estratégicas para assessorar o governo brasileiro. Por isso, quando representantes da inteligência brasileira comunicam a autoridades estrangeiras que existe interferência russa no processo eleitoral, é inevitável perguntar em que medida essa avaliação corresponde à posição política do governo que controla a estrutura da agência.
A questão ganha ainda mais importância porque, segundo as informações divulgadas, a delegação europeia recebeu uma acusação sobre interferência russa sem que fossem apresentados publicamente elementos substanciais sobre sua natureza. Não foram identificados, ao menos no material tornado público, agentes, operações, mecanismos de financiamento, estruturas de propaganda ou campanhas específicas atribuídas a Moscou. Existe, portanto, uma acusação, mas seus fundamentos permanecem praticamente desconhecidos.
Isso produz uma situação particularmente conveniente para determinados atores políticos. A Europa, que é hostil à Rússia e a Trump, recebe uma informação segundo a qual tanto Washington quanto Moscou estariam tentando influenciar as eleições brasileiras. Isso permitiria a Bruxelas – e ainda mais especialmente à França e à Alemanha, que são os principais “amigos” de Lula atualmente – eventualmente “apoiar” o Brasil em ações de “contrainteligência” para combater a suposta influência estadunidense e russa. Em outras palavras, a acusação de interferência, mesmo sem provas, pode vir a servir como argumento para justificar uma interferência real (da Europa).
Há ainda uma questão política mais ampla. Uma parcela significativa da esquerda brasileira consolidou nos últimos anos uma interpretação segundo a qual Vladimir Putin pertence a uma espécie de “internacional de extrema direita”, ao lado de Donald Trump e de outros movimentos conservadores ocidentais. Essa leitura transforma Rússia, Trump e a direita brasileira em elementos de um mesmo campo político internacional, apesar das diferenças profundas entre suas respectivas posições e interesses.
Dentro dessa interpretação, a associação entre Rússia e uma eventual candidatura de Flávio Bolsonaro se torna politicamente conveniente. Flávio é identificado com Trump, com o Partido Republicano e com a direita americana. A existência de uma suposta conexão russa permitiria inserir a disputa eleitoral brasileira em uma narrativa internacional mais ampla, na qual diferentes forças conservadoras seriam apresentadas como partes de uma mesma rede de influência.
Contudo, é absolutamente óbvio que a Rússia não tem qualquer interesse em interferir nas eleições brasileiras a favor de qualquer dos lados. Ademais, a maior parte dos ativistas pró-Rússia no Brasil é identificada com a esquerda ou neutra em relação a ambos os lados da política nacional. A acusação parece ser feita com o simples intuito de agradar a União Europeia, já que os europeus preferem Lula a Flávio (por este ser subordinado a Trump). E o fato de não haver detalhes que substanciem as acusações apenas reforça este ponto.
O ponto realmente relevante é outro: por que uma agência de inteligência subordinada à Presidência da República apresentou às autoridades europeias uma acusação contra a Rússia sem que seus fundamentos fossem posteriormente esclarecidos? E por que isso ocorre justamente durante a preparação das eleições brasileiras e em um momento de deterioração extraordinária das relações entre Rússia e Europa?
A resposta a essas perguntas importa porque o Brasil está inserido em um ambiente internacional cada vez mais polarizado. A Rússia ocupa posição central nos BRICS e mantém relações estratégicas com o Brasil, enquanto a Europa atravessa uma fase de crescente confronto com Moscou. Nesse contexto, qualquer informação oficial brasileira que associe a Rússia a uma operação de interferência eleitoral possui consequências diplomáticas graves.
Ademais, as tensões entre Rússia e Europa crescem cada vez mais e há risco real de conflito devido às constantes provocações europeias. É óbvio que em tal contexto não interessa ao Brasil se tornar parte de qualquer lado da crise. Mas não há nada pior para a política de neutralidade brasileira do que reportar à União Europa uma acusação formal contra a Rússia.
Em tese, é possível que o relatório tenha sido entregue à Europa sem comunicação prévia ao presidente brasileiro – embora isso seja muito improvável. Se Lula quiser preservar a neutralidade brasileira, o correto a ser feito é desmentir a Abin publicamente e pedir desculpas pelo incidente. Contudo, resta saber se ele estará realmente disposto a fazer isso, considerando que a União Europeia é o principal “aliado” internacional do governo Lula atual.
Peace cannot be built through uninterrupted rearmament or by forcing one side into capitulation.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
This is the first part of Mats Alexandersson’s series on war, peace, and security. The next three parts will be published during September and October on the Clarté blog.
For a long time, the United States has united economic, financial, military, and political power to secure a U.S.-centered capitalist world order. This has often been legitimized with what has been called liberal hegemony: a rhetoric in which democracy, individual rights, market economy, and international rules are presented as universal norms. But in practice, these principles have repeatedly been subordinated to the demand to preserve American supremacy and prevent rival great powers from dominating strategic regions.
What has come to be called the rules-based world order has therefore also functioned as a self-image and a language of power. The United States has ascribed to itself a special historical task: to guarantee stability, open markets, and security in the world economy. This belief in an American superiority with a special historical task has become a kind of meta-ideology. Behind this universalism, however, a more tangible class and power interest has operated, in which the American state’s geopolitical role has ultimately served the expansion and security of capital.
Two figures clearly demonstrate this line. Henry Kissinger made American realpolitik visible in its most brutal form. In Chile, the United States helped undermine Salvador Allende’s democratically elected government and subsequently supported Pinochet’s dictatorship. The same logic recurred in Cambodia, East Timor, and support for Pakistan’s military regime: democracy and human life had to give way to geopolitical control.
When Zbigniew Brzezinski in The Grand Chessboard in 1997 more sophisticatedly formulated that no rival must be allowed to dominate Eurasia, this practice became an explicit doctrine.1 The line from Kissinger to Brzezinski is therefore clear: from secret intervention to open strategy for global supremacy. It is in this development that today’s bloc formation, war economy, and growing risk of great-power war must be understood.
The painting “Die Namenlosen” (1916) by the Austrian painter Albin Egger-Lienz.
Why Eurasia is gaining additional significance
Today, Secretary of State Marco Rubio constitutes a central node in the U.S. foreign and security policy apparatus, where the White House, the Pentagon, intelligence services, NATO, and financial policy bodies cooperate. At the same time, the strategic environment is increasingly shaped by the technology and defense industry: AI, cloud, satellite, semiconductor, and weapons companies influence the technology of war, information flows, and investments. American hegemony therefore appears not only as state exercise of power, but as an intertwined military, digital, and financial system.
On Brzezinski’s map, Europe was never peripheral. In The Grand Chessboard, Eurasia is described as the decisive geopolitical playing field, and Europe as the United States’ most important bridgehead on the continent. An integrated Europe, bound to the United States through the transatlantic link and NATO, would strengthen American influence in western Eurasia. Europe therefore appears less as an independent power pole than as a strategic platform in a U.S.-led order.
This logic becomes clearest in Brzezinski’s view of Russia and Ukraine. He argued that Russia’s most important geostrategic option lay in a Western orientation, but on terms that did not make the country an equal power pole. Ukraine was given a key role as a “geopolitical pivot”: without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire, while control over Ukraine would once again give the country decisive strategic weight. Here the limitation of the great-power perspective is also visible: Ukraine has been reduced to a piece in a larger power game, despite its own political agency and right to self-determination.
Brzezinski advocated a geopolitical pluralism in Eurasia, that is, an order in which no single power may dominate the entire continent. In practice, this meant that the United States should support regional counterweights, alliances, and independent states in order to limit both a revanchist Russia and a rising China. That model can be interpreted as a strategy for balance of power, but also as a manual for playing regional actors against one another in order to preserve American supremacy.
The same approach characterized Brzezinski’s analysis of Central Asia and the Caucasus, which he described as the “Eurasian Balkans”: an area where energy, transport routes, weak states, and ethnic conflicts make the region an object of great-power rivalry. The region thus becomes primarily of strategic value to external powers, not through the local societies’ own goals. Superpower thinking turns smaller countries into objects of geopolitics rather than equal political subjects.
There is rearmament for war
The historical retrospective is needed to understand today’s situation. The war in Ukraine, Europe’s rearmament, and the growing fear of a Russian conflict with NATO cannot be explained solely as the consequence of an isolated conflict. They must also be seen against the background of the U.S.-led security order that emerged after the Cold War — an order whose goal has been to preserve American dominance in Eurasia. Today, this policy has had contradictory consequences: Russia, China, and Iran have moved closer to one another, Europe’s room for maneuver has been limited, and the risk of great-power conflict has increased.
Brzezinski’s book formulated this strategy unusually openly. The United States was to prevent a rival power or coalition from gathering sufficient strength to dominate Eurasia. This meant limiting a resurrected Russia, preventing China from becoming an equal competitor, and keeping Europe politically and militarily tied to the United States. In this perspective, NATO is not only a defense alliance, but also a tool for American power projection in Europe and its neighborhood.
The Eurasian counterweight
Cooperation between China, Russia, and Iran is more than a temporary reaction to sanctions and individual wars. China contributes industry, capital, and market; Russia contributes energy, raw materials, military capability, and geographical depth; Iran contributes regional weight and a strategic location. Their interests are not identical, and the cooperation contains clear contradictions. But the relationship between China and Russia has acquired a material foundation that makes it more durable than many Western assessments previously assumed.
Here lies an ironic consequence. A policy intended to prevent a Eurasian counterweight may have helped create it. At the same time, the United States faces its own economic tensions: large budget deficits, growing national debt, and high interest rates increase vulnerability. The dollar’s status as a reserve currency continues to provide room for maneuver, but does not eliminate the risk of a crisis of confidence. The cost of such a crisis would likely be passed on to ordinary wage earners through inflation, cutbacks, and deteriorating public services.
Europe’s dilemma
Economist Jeffrey Sachs has argued that Europe has historically had significant economic complementarity with Russia: European industry and technology could be linked to Russian energy, raw materials, and market. According to Sachs, sanctions, conflict policy, and dependence on the United States have broken this possibility and weakened Europe’s strategic independence.2
That assessment is disputed, not least because Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has drastically changed the conditions for economic cooperation. But it raises a necessary question: Can Europe formulate its own security policy, or is the continent reduced to an arena for other powers’ conflict? Sachs advocates direct diplomacy with Moscow, a clearer separation between EU foreign policy and NATO, and a European defense that is more independent and less dependent on the United States.
The risk of war
The acute danger is escalation. There is no simple or risk-free path to a military defeat for Russia, but policy continues to sharpen the confrontation. If the goal slides from Ukraine’s defense to a lasting weakening or subjugation of Russia, the risk increases that the proxy war turns into a direct conflict between nuclear powers.
Peace cannot be built through uninterrupted rearmament or by forcing one side into capitulation. A sustainable peace requires diplomacy, recognized security interests, and an international order in which no great power is given the right to dominate others. Public opinion in Europe and the United States can become decisive: when the costs of the arms race, social cutbacks, and the risk of war become clear, pressure can grow for a different course.
Anti-Zelensky protests planned for October 3 – led by a military officer on the kill list.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
The War in Ukraine has not been entirely protest-free from Kiev’s side of things. During the summer of 2026 a ‘sudden’ wave of ‘cardboard protests’ were brought to the public’s eye demanding the resignation of Zelensky. These demonstrations occurred as a reaction to the removal Defense Minister Fedorov from his position, or at least that was the overtly stated motivation for them. Of course, as we know, official reasons for protests always sound ‘nice’ but how many people living in a country at war actually know or care about the hirings and firings of ministers? Perhaps this weak motivating factor, saving some minister in a government viewed from all sides as completely corrupt, is why those cardboard signs and their messages didn’t take hold. The protestors then declared that their mission had ‘no end date’ attached to it, but as we can see Zelensky remains in office, and cardboard signage seems to have gone out of fashion.
But this time, at least on its surface, it seems as though it is the army itself which is the offended party that wants to protest. Some sort of slogan like ‘Zelensky betrayed the army’ will be much more enticing to protestors, than “let’s save Minister X for being fired”. Also, when given the choice between ‘the army or Zelensky’ I think we all know who would lose across a wide range of diverse public opinion in 2026 Ukraine.
Somehow, despite all the evidence shown through human history, many are sure that holding up signs will change everything radically, and those with this mentality need their slogans to be broad and emotional. According to Gazeta.Ru the situation with the upcoming October 3rd anti-Zelensky protests will look something like this:
“Ukrainian military officer Alexander Todorov on the MayiakUA YouTube channel announced a series of rallies demanding the resignation of Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky and his team.”
According to him, the public actions are scheduled for October 3rd, 2026. They want to hold rallies in Kiev near the presidential administration building, as well as in other cities of Ukraine. Todorov called on the Ukrainian diasporas to support the initiative abroad.
The military man criticized the current leadership. In his opinion, the soldiers feel abandoned, and the government is engaged in corruption and misuse of foreign aid. Todorov is also concerned about plans for the possible mobilization of women and citizens from the age of 18.
On the eve of the Verkhovna Rada deputy Artem Dmytruk said that the Security Service of Ukraine had detained Todorov. The politician did not provide details. There have been no official comments on the incident yet.”
The biggest thing that stands out is that Todorov wants these protests to go international via the Ukrainian diaspora, meaning the same shows of support on EU streets for Zelensky, may start to portray him as a more ‘realistic figure’ to put it mildly. And now that millions of Ukrainian citizens have fled their native land, there are plenty of them to use as protestors in the West.
It is also important to note that Todorov is on the same “Peace Keeper” list as anyone who has said or done anything even mildly pro-Russian since 2014. This website is at the very least an informal “enemies list” for post-Maidan Ukraine that provides personal information, on all those who stand against the revolution. The Russian side often portrays this to be a “kill list” and that it was actually created in or by the West. According to Izvestia the site works as such:
Myrotvorets (Peacekeeper) positions itself as a database with information about those people whom the owners of the resource consider to be involved in crimes against the security of Ukraine. The website is officially registered in Canada, and in Ukraine it has the status of an independent non-governmental media outlet.
The new status of Todorov as being a possible foreign enemy agent means that he certainly does not have nearly unilateral support from the elite and that some people responsible for the status quo are very much against this. Also, it means that this Ukrainian Army soldier could be arrested or called in for questioning at any time even before the protests start. We should also keep in mind that supposedly Todorov was the organizer of the following political demonstrations, some occurring even before the Maidan:
2011 — Against Petro Yushchenko
2012 — Against local authorities and power engineers (electric companies)
2014 — Against radicals and Kolomoisky
2017— Against Poroshenko
2024 — Against the military leadership and the TCC (press gangs)
As you can see none of the protests above achieved anything, but none of them happened under the conditions of 2026 after Putin ‘took the gloves off’ during the summer. The Russian side has hit infrastructure hard and how much of Ukraine’s economy remains is open for debate, but the situation is fairly dire. The Kiev Regime is not just plodding along under the usual corruption + apathy + conscription + foreign financing that it has been since 2022. Everything is being hit, everything is being destroyed and it looks like military resistance is crumbling, thus this time, in terms of protests, ‘things could be different’. But the big question remains, who could be the one(s) standing behind Todorov? Who would benefit from yet another revolution in Ukraine?
Who is behind these upcoming protests?
If the objective were to just send the last local schmuck into the meat grinder and truly fight to the last Ukrainian to make Putin pay dearly for every square meter of territory, then there would be no need to change out Zelensky. Furthermore, after so many officials around Zelensky have fled, quit, or otherwise left the game, it looks like the tower of power is very wobbly, meaning that any violent mass protest would essentially bring the house of cards crashing down. Thus, we can be fairly confident that anyone who would want to fund a protest wants to end the war.
A near total political collapse, with ‘the enemy at the gates’ will surely cause the entire system to spiral out of control and disintegrate, meaning that there would not be enough cohesion for the war to continue. Russians often joke that all that is needed for a declaration of total capitulation would be a cat’s paw print, the signature of a legitimate president is only needed for some other more ‘two-sided’ peace deal, that is to say if capitulation is on the table, Lil’ Zel isn’t needed to sign it.
And, although he is made fun of for his comedy background and drug addiction, Zelensky has been the superficial glue keeping the whole show together. He, in a strange way, is sort of the last bastion of ‘Project Ukraine’ as the Russians call it, as he absolutely will not abdicate the toxic throne. So the game looks to be this; that the Green Goblin must be ousted to end the war in the fall/winter of 2026… for some unstated reason by some unknown parties. But who could they be?
George Soros, is yet again at the center of the Russian rumor mill, but it is hard to exactly say why he would be behind this maneuver. Perhaps, I have been completely wrong in previous pieces, and indeed the Europeans do need time to prep for a war in the 2030s and thus this failed attempt to break the Russian bear needs to end immediately? Is it that they need time to get ready for the next offensive and Kiev has become a drain rather than a boon? I am not sure if this is true, and perhaps, there is a ‘boy who cried wolf’ effect happening on alternative media, that are just used to blaming Soros for protests. If it’s a march with signs and slogans calling for regime change, it’s got to be Soros right?
Team Trump or some forces in the USA, could be vying to get this damn thing over with. Just because publically and on camera Donald Trump seems to personally despise Zelensky doesn’t mean anything, but Trump has been talking about better relations with Russia since his very first political campaign. Also and more importantly, the source of all big lobbyist bribes, Israel, is in deep trouble. Essentially, the Iran-Israel issue is way more important and stealing the show, and Trump has never had much political will to antagonize Russia. When D.C. faces the choice between saving the Zionist Paradise or Neo-Khazaria you know which front they are going to invest in.
There are also definitely large factions with cash in America, that despite being ‘in a distant second place’ politically, want antagonism of Russia to be a thing of the past. If you haven’t noticed, extremely prominent media voices in America can now regularly have Russian politicians and thinkers on their programs, something that would have been absolutely a career death sentence, and maybe even ‘punishable’, just a few years ago. This American ‘third position’, with ‘second place’ influence, does not want nuclear conflict, and wants to move on from the Cold War and games of global domination.
The visit of Ratcliffe to Moscow, may signal that even the most passionate Russophobes in Washington want to call this one done, and move on.
European 4D chess masters, could, after having acknowledged that the Battle for Ukraine is over, choose to allow Russia to make the broadest possible front across a new awkward border in Ukraine, or even better, allow the 21st Century’s Golden Horde to actually have a new physical border with places like Poland and Romania to spark a fresh wave of Russophobic paranoia in local politics. This sounds like absolutely insane reasoning, to let Russia be closer to a place like Poland in order to spark more Russophobia by proximity, but if you haven’t noticed, the leadership of the European continent looks like the tea party from Alice in Wonderland. We cannot and should not completely exclude concepts that are insane, especially if they are very ‘media friendly’ and involve ‘message sending’. Over-and-over again, Kiev has been forced to launch attacks for PR purposes at the cost of thousands of men, the reasoning in Brussels based on creating optics to somehow achieve tangible results. Like it or not this is how they do things. So why not let the Russians get closer, as to make them more of a threat to attack them in 2035? This is fantastic PR optics, look at how they ‘expanded their empire into Europe and Poland is next!’.
Also, the weak point by which Russia has been invaded from Europe has been the broad steppes of Ukraine. The Nazis did go through Finland, got near Murmansk and sat there for the whole war, the border with Finland, despite being quite big, just isn’t geographically good enough, but lots of massive flat space is quite hard to defend. Furthermore, that land is now nearly completely destroyed and will require unfathomable amounts of rubles to rebuild, and while the Russians are rebuilding they will be vulnerable.
What if the protests succeed?
We have already seen some internal fighting between factions within Kiev and this would only intensify as protestors started to storm the theoretical location where the Cocaine King rules from. Many young men may already be convinced that taking risks protesting is a far better option than dying with absolute certainty on the front after conscription. Thus, the time might be ‘right’ for this sort of thing, and with another Maidan occurring, and enemy forces so close, this would surely fracture things quickly. If the protests are not put down properly the oligarchs, clans, and other wealthy individuals will swiftly look to save their skins and livelihoods potentially breaking up the country or just signing whatever Moscow wants them to. Once the military were to lose command cohesion, there won’t be any more coordinated drone strikes to hold the ‘orcs’ at bay. Ironically, the Maidan which gave birth to the Kiev Regime could be the same mechanism that leads to its downfall after utterly destroying the Ukrainian nation, but as the cliché goes ‘time will tell’.
Le perdite dell’Ucraina diventano sempre più difficili da nascondere di fronte ai crescenti problemi di mobilitazione e alla carenza di risorse umane. Le dichiarazioni di Tusk e Budanov sollevano il velo sulla portata della crisi, che potrebbe portare a un ulteriore inasprimento della mobilitazione.
Lo scorso maggio, Anne Keast-Butler, direttrice del Government Communications Headquarters (Gchq) britannico, ha dichiarato che, alla fine di maggio, le forze armate russe avevano subito quasi mezzo milione di morti e circa un milione tra feriti e dispersi.
Richard Knighton, Capo di Stato Maggiore delle forze armate britanniche, ha fornito ulteriori dettagli. Secondo le sue valutazioni, enunciate l’11 settembre, l’esercito russo avrebbe riportato una quota preponderante delle perdite a partire dal gennaio 2023. Cioè da quando «la Russia ha conquistato appena il 2% del territorio ucraino […]. Credo che queste cifre mostrino chiaramente lo spreco insensato e futile di vite umane a fronte di progressi così scarsi e per un obiettivo così illegittimo del presidente Putin», ha affermato Knighton.
Per lo Stato Maggiore di Londra, le perdite totali subite dalla Russia in Ucraina supererebbero l’ammontare complessivo dei caduti registrati dalle forze armate sovietiche e russe in tutti i conflitti combattuti dalla seconda metà del XX Secolo.
Le stime dell’alto comando britannico risultano sostanzialmente convergenti con quelle formulate dal Center for Strategic and International Studies (Csis) statunitense, che all’inizio di luglio quantificava in 1,4 milioni di unità il totale delle vittime riportato dalla Russia, tra cui circa 450.000 morti.
Mediaziona, testata indipendente russa che, con la collaborazione della «Bbc», tiene dall’inizio del conflitto il conto dei caduti russi sulla base dell’analisi di registri cimiteriali, necrologi e post sui social network, fornisce una stima di quasi 260.000 morti e oltre 350.000 feriti al 21 settembre.
Quanto alle perdite ucraine, è molto più difficile reperire stime pubbliche all’interno dei Paesi membri della Nato. Un delle poche eccezioni era costituita dal Csis, che a giugno stimava 125.000-150.000 morti e 400.000-500.000 feriti.
Qualcosa è tuttavia cominciato a cambiare. Lo scorso 17 settembre, nel corso di un intervento pronunciato davanti alla Camera Bassa del Parlamento polacco, il primo ministro Tusk ha affermato, sulla base di informazioni ottenute dal governo ucraino, che, «di recente, l’Ucraina ha registrato 27.000 tra morti e feriti al mese; si tratta, purtroppo, di cifre record nel senso più triste del termine per questa guerra. A questo ritmo, l’inverno in Ucraina potrebbe rivelarsi catastrofico».
Tusk ha imputato il netto peggioramento della situazione sul fronte bellico alle «nuove capacità tecnologiche della Russia», a partire dai droni dotati di motore a reazione impiegati con sempre maggiore frequenza dalle forze armate russe.
Non è chiaro se il dato numerico indicato dal premier polacco si riferisca al periodo estivo o a un lasso di tempo più lungo, ma risulta perfettamente compatibile con il quadro tratteggiato soltanto poche settimane prima da Budanov, che in qualità di capo del gabinetto del presidente Zelensky ed ex direttore del Gur aveva quantificato in almeno 30.000 persone al mese l’ammontare minimo degli ucraini da mobilitare per reggere l’urto russo.
Le valutazioni relative alle perdite riportate dall’Ucraina formulate da Tusk e Budanov non collimano affatto con le stime riferite dal presidente Zelensky, che a luglio aveva parlato di 50.000 caduti e 400.000 feriti subiti dall’Ucraina a partire dal febbraio 2022, e risultano profondamente discordanti rispetto alla narrazione propinata in tutto l’Occidente fin dall’inizio del conflitto.
Con qualche eccezione. In un’intervista rilasciata a «Sky News Australia» nell’ottobre dello scorso anno (segnalata in Italia soltanto da «Analisi Difesa»), James Carden, specialista di questioni geostrategiche con trascorsi come consigliere del Dipartimento di Stato per le relazioni russo-statunitensi sotto l’amministrazione Obama, dichiarò che «dalle mie fonti risulta che il rapporto di perdite tra ucraini e russi è di 36 a 1. Sono le perdite ucraine ad essere vicine a un milione. La guerra d’attrito attuata fin dall’inizio dai russi è stata un successo, sono gli ucraini ad essere sull’orlo del disastro».
Nel novembre 2022, la stessa presidente della Commissione Europea Ursula Von der Leyen si lasciò sfuggire che l’Ucraina aveva subito fino a quel momento circa «oltre 20.000 caduti civili e 100.000 soldati». Senonché, il filmato originale del discorso fu rimosso e sostituito con una versione “epurata” dallo scottante riferimento alle perdite ucraine.
Resta quindi da capire il perché due dei più strenui sostenitori dello sforzo bellico ucraino come Tusk e Budanov abbiano deciso proprio ora di sollevare il velo su una realtà molto meno edificante rispetto a quella descritta da governi e giornali sia negli Stati Uniti che in Europa.
Una infusione di pessimismo risulta funzionale per un verso a “predisporre” l’opinione pubblica ad accettare nuovi e ben più gravosi sacrifici per sostenere l’Ucraina, identificata a tutt’oggi come “scudo d’Europa” dal presidente Zelensky e dai suoi collaboratori.
Per l’alto, a legittimare l’adozione di misure che restringano il perimetro legislativo per il conferimento dello status di rifugiati agli ucraini in età di servizio militare. Si tratta, in altri termini, di aprire il varco a provvedimenti implicanti il rimpatrio forzato, prodromico al reclutamento nelle fila dell’esercito, di almeno una parte dei cittadini ucraini riparati presso i Paesi membri dell’Unione Europea. A partire proprio dalla Polonia, che di concerto con Russia e Germania ospita il maggior numero di rifugiati ucraini divenuti nel corso dei mesi oggetto di crescente risentimento popolare.
Budanov, dal canto suo, ha riconosciuto il forte malcontento suscitato in seno all’opinione pubblica ucraina dai sempre più ricorrenti episodi di mobilitazione forzata, e posto contestualmente l’accento sulla necessità che lo Stato adotti un approccio più costruttivo.
A tale scopo, il viceministro della Difesa Liubov Halan ha annunciato un’imminente riforma dei Centri territoriali di reclutamento che sembra tuttavia discostarsi profondamente dalle raccomandazioni dell’ex direttore del Gur.
Lo si evince dalle affermazioni di Roman Kostenko, che in qualità di segretario della Commissione Parlamentare per la Sicurezza Nazionale, la Difesa e l’Intelligence ha proclamato l’introduzione di “modifiche radicali” alle procedure di mobilitazione, comprendenti una possibile abbassamento dei requisiti per la coscrizione relativi all’età contestualmente al passaggio a un modello di reclutamento più “estensivo” reso impellente anche dalla portata sempre più imponente del fenomeno dei cosiddetti “imboscati”.
Già nel gennaio di quest’anno, l’allora ministro della Difesa Fedorov aveva dichiarato alla Verkhovna Rada di aver ereditato oltre 200.000 casi di “abbandono arbitrario del reparto” (un reato distinto dalla diserzione perché presuppone l’intenzione di tornare a combattere da parte dell’inosservante) e più di due milioni di cittadini ricercati per renitenza alla leva.
Le donne restano, quantomeno per ora, escluse dalla riforma del meccanismo di coscrizione, come specificato dalla Verkhovna Rada attraverso una nota che sottolineava l’assenza di iniziative legislative e perfino di discussioni interne riguardo la mobilitazione femminile. Il pronunciamento del Parlamento ucraino fa seguito alle dichiarazioni di Keith Kellogg, generale a riposo ed ex inviato speciale dell’amministrazione Trump per l’Ucraina e la Russia secondo cui Kiev dovrebbe procedere al coinvolgimento delle donne, in quanto «combattono bene quanto gli uomini». Negli stessi giorni in cui Kellogg forniva i suoi suggerimenti, il «Telegraph» descriveva il servizio militare femminile in Ucraina come una vittoria per il femminismo, riportando le dichiarazioni di un’operatrice di droni favorevole alla leva femminile.
La proposta di mobilitare la componente femminile della società ucraina era già stata discussa all’inizio del 2026, dopo che una donna comandante di unità di droni aveva appoggiato pubblicamente l’idea sull’onda del clamore popolare suscitato dalle convocazioni militari recapitate per errore a una decina abbondante di donne ucraine. Nei primi giorni di agosto, è stata presentata una petizione che sollecita la coscrizione delle donne senza figli, sponsorizzata dall’ex ministro della Difesa Alekseij Reznikov secondo cui, «così come Israele, possiamo sopravvivere solo se tutti accettano di dover difendere l’Ucraina […]. Il reclutamento delle donne, raddoppierebbe le nostre risorse per la mobilitazione».
In Germany’s recent state elections, voters as young as 16 could cast ballots. The results confirmed a global trend of political division between young women and men.
“On 1 January, we both deleted Instagram, TikTok and Snapchat. And whichever of us would be the first to start watching Reels again or download Instagram would have to eat a slice of rotten cheese,” Greta and Lena told Germany’s Deutschlandfunk radio station.
The 16-year-old girls live in a village in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and chose to delete social media because they had been spending far too much time on it. They often scrolled on TikTok or Instagram late into the night, affecting their performance at school. This summer, however, both reinstalled TikTok for a month. This time without the punishment of a slice of rotten cheese.
They did so for an experiment with journalists from Deutschlandfunk. The journalists wanted to find out what political content the girls would consume through TikTok, the popular Chinese social network, during the peak of the election campaign. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern went to the polls on the third weekend of September. And, as is well known, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) swept the state, just as it had two weeks prior in Saxony-Anhalt.
Greta and Lena, however, were in a markedly different position from their peers in Saxony-Anhalt. For the first time, the north-eastern federal state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern had allowed 16- and 17-year-olds to vote in state elections. Since young people consume much of their news on social media, Greta and Lena immersed themselves in TikTok, one of the networks now most popular among young Europeans.
For the first few minutes, the girls watched a range of non-political videos — recipes, tomato growing and “silly” AI videos. Then, at around the third minute of scrolling, the first political content appeared. First came a video about Erich Honecker, the former East German communist politician. “Why am I seeing so much stuff about the GDR here?” Greta wondered. As she continued scrolling, she came across AfD co-leader Alice Weidel herself.
It was the first moment when the girls began to notice how quickly their initially apolitical feed was changing. “I feel as if it is constantly just AfD,” Greta said later. She added that she had not searched for any such content in advance. Over the following month, the girls kept a diary of their feed and observed how, after political videos, more and more similar content began appearing — not only from the parties themselves, but also from a range of accounts that picked up and further spread their messages.
The experiment confirmed what has been known for some time: TikTok and other networks alongside it can quickly form the political world a young person sees and the views they come to adopt. At the same time, algorithms are accelerating a trend of a political divide between young women and men, which was also reflected in the results of the state elections mentioned above in Germany.
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Europeans have lead the field on access to abortion, but a conservative comeback has caused a lot of those advances to regress.
Research published earlier this week (28 September) by the Centre for Reproductive Rights (CRR) found that despite an upward trend of legalisation, some countries are still seeking to enforce barriers and rolling back entitlement to abortion care.
This resistance to change is also evidenced in the lack of member state participation in safe abortion funds available since the the ‘My Voice, My Choice’ European citizens’ initiative for safe and accessible abortion was passed into law last February.
EU funds could since then be used to create regional programmes for safe abortion care for anyone who can’t access it in their own country, as well as financing travel to a country where abortion is available.
However, no funds have yet been used.
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Les civilisations peuvent-elles rassembler les fragments d’aperçus et de savoirs plus anciens pour redonner le contexte permettant de rendre le discours moral à nouveau intelligible ?
D’après une intervention donnée à la Higher School of Economics, Moscou, 7 septembre 2026
L’avenir global est souvent présenté comme celui d’un monde multipolaire ou multi-nodal, avec l’hypothèse implicite que les États s’entendraient mieux – et résoudraient leurs différends plus facilement par la discussion que par la guerre.
Ce fut un mème largement répandu dans les années précédant la Première Guerre mondiale. Des livres furent écrits pour suggérer que la guerre ne pouvait pas avoir lieu : le texte définitif sur ce concept, initialement publié en 1910 sous le titre The Great Illusion, devint un best-seller international.
Son auteur, Norman Angell, soutenait que, parce que les nations dépendaient fortement d’un système commercial mondial hautement imbriqué, le coût économique de la guerre dépasserait largement tout gain potentiel. Il affirmait qu’une nation victorieuse subirait tout autant de ruine économique que la vaincue – rendant obsolète le concept traditionnel de conquête militaire. Son argument fut populairement interprété comme rendant la guerre « impossible ».
Son argument se révéla fallacieux ; la Grande Guerre éclata en temps voulu.
Aujourd’hui, l’idée d’une certaine interaction multipolaire persiste, mais la menace de guerre demeure et est exacerbée par le refus de l’Occident d’entendre – ou de comprendre – ce que disent les États souverains civilisationnels. Cette incapacité à écouter avec un engagement empathique est à la racine des lectures catastrophiquement erronées du renseignement occidental concernant l’Iran et la Russie. Et de la présentation de la Chine comme si « autre » qu’elle en devient un livre fermé aux oreilles occidentales.
Dans son influent ouvrage de 1981, After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre soutenait que le projet des Lumières avait coupé l’homme occidental de ses racines traditionnelles, mais avait échoué à produire une morale contraignante fondée sur la seule Raison. Par conséquent, beaucoup de ceux qui vivent en Occident vivent dans un monde de « chaos moral et de fragmentation, où des forces “chaotiques” et désintégratrices ont presque entièrement effacé la véritable enquête morale de la culture européenne ».
Ce qu’il est important de comprendre, c’est que le « chaos moral et la fragmentation » de MacIntyre sont délibérément encouragés pour affaiblir l’attachement national, communautaire et religieux – précisément afin de cibler et d’affaiblir la cohésion nationale et la souveraineté civilisationnelle.
L’argument de MacIntyre est que seule la tradition culturelle, et ses récits moraux, fournissent un contexte aux termes tels que bien, justice et telos :
« En l’absence de traditions, le débat moral est disloqué et devient un théâtre d’illusions où la simple indignation et la simple protestation occupent le devant de la scène. »
« Les lignes sont tracées tôt, et les participants se précipitent pour prendre parti. Mais en prenant parti, ils semblent se rendre incapables d’entendre l’autre… Tout le monde ressent la chaleur, mais personne ne voit la lumière », souligne MacIntyre.
Ce que nous possédons aujourd’hui, suggère MacIntyre, ne sont rien de plus que de simples fragments d’une tradition plus ancienne (la société héroïque). Ces fragments sont tout simplement trop rares, puisque notre discours moral, qui utilise des termes comme bien, justice et devoir, a été dépouillé du contexte qui le rendrait intelligible. En d’autres termes, cela place la vertu du monde héroïque et homérique hors de portée de l’Occident.
Les lignes sont tracées. On se précipite pour prendre parti. Les forces « chaotiques » et désintégratrices d’aujourd’hui ont presque entièrement effacé l’enquête morale de la culture européenne. Le trait le plus frappant des débats moraux est leur tendance à ne jamais aboutir à une résolution.
Quand tous les jugements moraux – dépouillés de leur contexte – ne deviennent guère plus que des expressions de préférence, d’attitude ou de sentiment – l’émotivisme, en d’autres termes – le débat est disloqué ; il se transforme en un théâtre de récits où l’indignation et la polarité occupent le devant de la scène.
Mais, en prenant de tels partis émotifs, les acteurs se rendent incapables d’entendre l’Autre. Les « Autres », alors, qu’il s’agisse de la Russie, de l’Iran ou de la Chine, deviennent simplement invisibles selon les normes de cette approche – car leurs façons d’orienter l’attention humaine vers le monde sont tout à fait distinctes.
Ainsi, nous pouvons être (et sommes) conduits à la guerre par des messages narratifs spécifiquement destinés à contraindre les humains à spatialiser le monde d’une certaine manière, sans que nous en soyons conscients. Nous sommes conduits vers un « seul monde » issu des Lumières, dans lequel toute « altérité » – qu’elle soit russe, iranienne ou chinoise – devient invisible selon les normes, le mode de présence, par lesquels nous abordons les « choses ».
Dans cette « guerre », le monde est mis « sens dessus dessous ». La plupart des gens ne spatialisent pas activement le monde autour d’eux, mais semblent s’être contentés qu’il soit spatialisé pour eux. Les récits sont pétris et étalés sous nos yeux. C’est ainsi que la machine fonctionne. La plupart des gens en Occident croient avoir une prise ferme sur la réalité – les faits, les preuves et les conclusions. Mais en réalité, nous faisons face à une structure qui retourne délibérément comme un gant cette prise imaginaire sur la réalité.
Dans la machine, la « spatialisation » se fait à l’envers : d’abord, ils reçoivent le message, puis ils pétrissent et étalent un récit de la « réalité » comme de la pâte, jusqu’à ce qu’il corresponde au dessein. Et si nécessaire, ils mettent la machine médiatique en marche arrière et pétrissent cette même réalité dans la direction opposée.
Alors, comment les civilisations souveraines peuvent-elles échapper au « piège de MacIntyre » ? Les civilisations peuvent-elles rassembler les fragments d’aperçus et de savoirs plus anciens pour redonner le contexte permettant de rendre le discours moral à nouveau intelligible ?
Sortir de l’espace fustien de la pensée mécaniste et du récit manipulé n’est ni facile ni simple. Bien au contraire. Mais remarquez ce que cela exige – un changement dans notre mode de présence ; la manière dont nous disposons notre attention vers le monde.
La façon dont vous disposez la conscience vers le monde, nous dit le neurologue Iain McGilchrist, est cruciale : car la manière dont vous le faites altère et détermine ce que vous trouverez et comprendrez. Et à mesure que nous spatialisons le monde autour de nous différemment, la perception s’élargit et la spaciosité (jusque-là cachée) de ce qui se trouve au-delà devient visible.
Une récupération de modes de pensée plus anciens – la manière de penser « tout à la fois, tous ensemble » (penser par l’image) et d’autres sources de cognition – peut ouvrir une voie vers une médiation entre les polarités apparemment opposées du subjectif et de l’objectif que la rationalité mécanique laisse si souvent durcies en impedimenta insolubles. L’approche apophatique peut aussi émousser les arêtes vives de la pensée conceptuelle en introduisant l’« entre-deux », trouvant son espace entre les arguments angulaires et tranchants. Ces modes de pensée possèdent leur propre logique qui se tient à l’écart des rigidités des Lumières.
C’est la leçon que l’Iran et sa redécouverte de la pensée ancienne offrent au monde aujourd’hui.
Albert Einstein a un jour fait remarquer que « l’esprit rationnel est un serviteur ; mais l’esprit intuitif est un don précieux. Notre monde, cependant, honore le serviteur – mais oublie [ignore] le don ».
Merz is a dead man walking. Fear and warmongering don’t win votes.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
Having found out the hard way what it means to get slapped in the face at election time in Saxony-Anhalt, the CDU really got pulled backwards through the hedge on the 20th of September in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (Meck/Pomm) and Berlin.
Looking at Meck/Pomm first, voter turnout was 78.1% – about the same as in Saxony-Anhalt with 77.8%.
The official, though still provisional, final result can be classed as a mini-bombshell compared to Saxony-Anhalt, but eye-opening nonetheless. There will be four parties taking seats in the state parliament.
AfD 38.2% = 32 seats
SPD 35.5%, with the incumbent state minister-president looking to stay in office = 29 seats
Die Linke (Left) 6.5% = 5 seats
Die Grüne (Greens) 5.7% = 5 seats
The state parliament has a total of 71 seats.
Now the interesting part: CDU 4.9%, zero seats thanks to the 5% hurdle; as also the FDP 1.0%, also zero seats.
Now let’s bring in a bit of perspective.
The AfD have won the next election, though not with such a large margin as in Saxony-Anhalt, but still a victory.
The incumbent minister-president since 2017, Manuela Schwesig, belongs to the top echelon of the SPD. She previously held the post of Minister for Education, Family, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth on a federal level from 2013–2017, and had held a similar post in the state parliament of Meck/Pomm from 2008–2013. She had a difficult time when the SPD moved away from being a working-man’s party and followed the so-called social reforms that drastically cut into the social security system, Schwesig trying to cushion the hard cuts as far as possible. Her role in politics has always come across as sincere and caring, giving the impression of being honest.
She belongs to the few SPD politicians expected to bring the ailing SPD back into a brighter future, but appears to want to stay in her position in Meck/Pomm, at least for the time being.
The Greens and the Left achieved what was expected of them: the Greens struggling, and the Left still trying to gain strength again after a period of internal turmoil after Sahra Wagenknecht walked out and started her own movement, BSW, taking some left-wing voters with her.
The Greens started out as a pacifist party, against military build-up and environmental degradation. Since 2022, they have become one of the foremost supporters of the regime in Ukraine and of a German and European rearmament, sometimes outdoing the established conservatives. This has cost them a lot of support from the environmental wing, mainly young voters. The anti-war supporters have turned to the AfD, and to some extent to the Left, the only parties propagating a more peaceful and diplomatic solution.
The big bang here in this election is not the FDP. They are of no real significance at the moment, having been in many coalition governments since 1949, always helping the two main parties to necessary majorities. They seem to have lost their own profile, trying to be partner to their campaign opponents and losing their way.
The big thing is the CDU, the governing party nationally, getting a measly 4.9% and thus being kicked out of the state parliament. This is massive. Mr. Merz is basically a dead man walking, and the writing is on the wall for all to see.
The once East German states still feel left behind and cheated after reunification. The programs set up to modernise and repair the old GDR benefited mostly Western German companies and institutions. Tenders were fixed and hundreds of enterprises went into receivership, only to be sold for a song to Western investors.
This is one of the underlying issues still in the minds of ex-GDR citizens and is trotted out as an explanation for just such election results. This is, however, valid only as an excuse to paste over the shortcomings of the established parties, ignoring the real issues such as de-population of the villages with missing infrastructure to care for an ageing population, low employment opportunities, migrant issues, and mistrust of the established parties. The driving power at the time of reunification was the CDU, whose promises did not come to pass. So a socialistic and an alternatively conservative platform were the choices of the day.
The elections in Berlin did not, at first glance, hit the CDU as badly as in the other two German states. Being Berlin, the capital city does, however, put another emphasis on the results. And here too the governing parties lost significantly to the parties on the wings, AfD and Linke. The results are as follows, with gains and losses added for clarification:
Die Linke 25.7% 47 seats +13.5%
CDU 18.8% 34 seats −9.4%
AfD 16.3% 29 seats +0.1%
Grüne 14.3% 26 seats −4.1%
SPD 12.1% 22 seats −10.1%
BSW 4.7% under 5% hurdle, no seats
FDP 2.5% under 5% hurdle, no seats
The participation was 74.2%.
The state parliament has 158 seats and the majority starts at 80 seats. This means there will definitely be a coalition government. All the signs at the moment point to a coalition between the Linke (Left), SPD and Greens.
The AfD have not been able to gain on the same scale as in the other elections. This is due mainly to two factors.
Berlin has an urban environment, and as such a more concentrated electorate with a younger population, and one that has many newcomers from other German states.
The second being massive problems unique to such environments. Affordable accommodation being one of the central issues. The AfD has no track record of city management and no real new concepts on offer that are different enough to entice voters to take the plunge in the direction of the AfD.
It still is surprising that parties with such losses as the SPD can still come into power. Putting the CDU aside, the biggest losers in this election come to power regardless. That is the beauty of a coalition.
The Linke, the Left Party, are not really trusted by the established parties and conservative voters, as there is still an aura of communism surrounding them. Regardless of this, the election results are clear, and it will be interesting to see how the Linke will be able to carry through their campaign themes, mainly focusing on the housing problem, into reality. The other coalition partners will do their best, so no too-radical changes are to be expected.
Here again one can see the ruling parties on the federal level have been given a clear message, and the losses paint a grim picture. It will be an uphill task to change the opinion of the population in time for the upcoming April elections. When hearing the comments coming out of these parties, it seems more than likely that these results will be repeated in the spring of 2027, and then governing Germany will become a next-to-impossible undertaking.
Come what may, one thing has been made abundantly clear. A policy of fear and warmongering, in the face of a future with drastic cuts in the social systems, in health care and pensions, and an economic situation that looks to be getting steadily worse, will not bring voters into the fold. In particular when there is no new vision to face and solve, but only the slash and cut, calling that reforms.
The German Chancellor, just after the polling finished, stood before the press and stated: the election season 2026 is now over. He looked relieved.
At the end of the day, the CDU have few options. If Merz walks back his “reforms”, it will look as if he is weak and giving in to the SPD, making them stronger.
If he aligns himself nearer to the AfD, vote-poaching, that will not help, as the AfD initially devolved out of disgruntled CDU members.
If he continues as before, it is absolutely clear that there is no way Merz and the CDU will win the next federal election, and Merz will have a hell of a job to keep the government toeing the CDU line. If the SPD fails to show how really different they are to the CDU, they too will face disaster. The dangers of being a junior partner in coalitions. A lesson the FDP learned the hard way.
Covering up the fact of having no vision or even a clear plan for the future has never done any ruling party any good the moment alternative ideas are brought forward by a strong opposition party, gaining ground at each election.
Should the next elections in April 2027 go the way these last two did, inside the CDU fear will turn into panic, and there may possibly be federal elections at the end of spring. The outcome of that is anybody’s guess. Trying to get the AfD banned, however, will be the death-knell of a once great political party and the end of democracy as Germany knows it.
By Leonid RAGOZIN
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
It falls to alternative parties like Germany’s AfD to push for peace.
Britain’s Labour Party is not traditionally thought of as a bastion of militarism or authoritarianism. Yet listening to some of what its top figures have been saying recently might cause one to doubt the conventional wisdom on that.
Consider what Labour Party strategist Paul Richards said in a GB News interview earlier this month. Asked how the UK might respond to an increased Russian threat, Richards—who has worked for two Labour governments—gave a disturbing answer. “We’d have to lock some people up,” he said, “some of the pro-Russian voices, people who say there isn’t a threat, [and say] ‘Don’t fight for your country, don’t go to war for Burnham.’”
His comments are not a one-off. They reflect a worrying trend among Britain’s political mainstream—the old parties, media, and think tanks—which has increasingly adopted a siege mentality informed by the far-fetched expectation of imminent war with Russia.
Nor is the trend restricted to Britain. It spans the entire Western world. And it helps explain why the centrist political forces previously seen as “reasonable” are losing ground to the supposed “fringe.” Apocalyptic millenarianism is no longer the domain of radical obscurantists, but of people like NATO’s secretary-general Mark Rutte, who in 2025 seemed to foretell with relish a conflict between Europe and Russia on the scale of the SecondWorld War. “Imagine it,” he said, “a conflict reaching every home, every workplace, destruction, mass mobilisation, millions displaced, widespread suffering and extreme losses.”
It is politicians branded as far right or far left radicals who, surprisingly, have emerged as the main opposition to this unhinged bellicosity.
What’s largely prompting this trend is the very logic of the liberals competing with the populists. Western societies display a demand for performative “toughness,” which caters both to the infantilism of their political classes and the gamification of war in faroff countries.
Things seem to have begun in earnest in 2016, when the prospect of liberals losing to rivals like Donald Trump led the former to embrace conspiracy theories like Russiagate and double down on foreign policy hawkishness as a way of evading responsibility for their own failures. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine served a similar function, providing a theater for “toughness” even as the West has gotten bogged down in what has increasingly turned into a proxy conflict.
Trying to outdo the populists along a different axis, rather than doing the hard work of opposing them with value-based positions, has led the centrists into a trap. It left a vacuum in the center, into which the populists—ever alert to political opportunities—have deftly stepped.
Here is how it plays out in Germany. When the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) suffered an embarrassing defeat in Saxony-Anhalt earlier this month, the party’s leader and premier in North Rhine-Westphalia, Hendrik Wüst, said the government should consider banning the AfD (which won the election by a landslide). Wüst is eyed as a potential replacement for the unpopular chancellor Friedrich Merz.
The CDU went on to suffer additional defeats in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and in Berlin. The former is particularly symbolic, because this is where the Nord Stream gas pipelines make landfall—a fact that makes this state a direct beneficiary of the German-Russian joint venture to supply cheap Russian gas to the German economy.
When Nord Stream 2 was blown up in September 2022, the immediate consensus in the West was that Moscow was responsible. Yet the culprits turned out not to be Russian, but Ukrainian. German police investigators eventually charged individuals associated with Ukraine’s military intelligence service for the attack. (It’s worth noting that this Ukrainian spy agency was rebuilt in 2015 with considerable assistance from America’s CIA.)
Germany’s rejection of Russian gas supplies after Putin’s all-out invasion in Ukraine can be seen as a noble gesture, perhaps, but it had dire consequences for the country’s economy, which contracted in 2023 and 2024 before showing anemic growth in 2025. Even more importantly, it hit every household in Germany with skyrocketing heating and power bills. Interestingly, Germany wasn’t receiving Russian gas at the time of the explosion, which means the attack was aimed at preventing the resumption of supplies after the end of war rather than interrupting ongoing exports.
The German government has never properly addressed the issue at the federal level. On the eve of September elections, Merz’s sharp reaction to the Leipzig drone incident, which he instantly blamed on Russia, contrasted sharply with the virtual absence of a response to the perpetrators of the Nord Stream attack.
Voters in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania slaughtered Merz’s party, excluding it entirely from the state’s legislature for the first time in nearly 80 years. The big winner was the AfD—a party unafraid to ask questions about Nord Stream and which muses about restoring gas supplies after the Ukraine War ends. Voters also largely spared the Social Democrats, under whose leadership Nord Stream was built in the first place (although they had to disown it after Russia’s invasion).
The early days of tension between post-Soviet Russia and the West, which culminated in the war in Ukraine, were marked by squabbles over pipeline projects delivering gas to Europe (remember South Stream or Nabucco?). The unyielding opposition of centrist politicians to such projects has led voters to wonder whether their political establishment is more interested in catering to armsmakers and shale gas producers than in providing for its citizens. It’s hard to think of a better illustration of NATO’s unofficial mission to “keep the Germans down and the Russians out” than the fate of Nord Stream.
The perception of abandonment is what fuels the popularity of the AfD’s sovereigntist stance. And despite accusations of extremism, it is the AfD who sounds the most moderate and reasonable on the vital issues of war and peace.
Indeed, their foreign policy stance provides AfD leaders with one bulletproof rebuttal to accusations of fascism. A defining component of the fascist ideology is aggressive militarism—a trait exhibited by the German political establishment, not its hard-right challengers. The AfD fills the shoes of the old-school left-wing peaceniks when it comes to Ukraine, while the Merz government staunchly supports further escalation while discreetly undermining Trump’s efforts to bring the conflict to a close. The AfD also condemns the war on Iran (which Merz initially supported, before making a U-turn under public pressure).
(Ex-)centrists also advocate an enormous defense spending hike Germany can ill afford, as well as compulsory military service (this latter move has sparked youth protests across the country). The way mainstream German politicians are courting the far right in Ukraine—members of Azov movement prominently featured at the prestigious Munich Security Conference this year, for example—make the charges of nazism levelled against the AfD look especially lame.
Opposing Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which the AfD does, is one thing. Supporting an endless proxy war with a nuclear-armed great power—and committing to fight this “to the last Ukrainian”—is quite another.
And the polls suggest German voters have little appetite for risking their country’s future in such a gambit.
The AfD and other insurgent parties thrive when their opponents lean into hawkishness and authoritarianism, but so far there is little evidence the establishment understands this. Indeed, European political elites are doubling down. They recently invited Zelensky’s former press secretary, Iulia Mendel, to speak in front of the European Parliament. But Mendel is a vocal critic of her former boss, and so the parliament’s centrist leadership banned her from entering after Zelensky’s government imposed sanctions on her (an extrajudicial punishment he is routinely applying to political rivals). By banning Mendel from speaking and turning a blind eye on Zelensky’s abuse of power, the center once again chooses delusion and bellicosity over a genuine commitment to democracy.
Meanwhile, alternatives like the AfD will continue to fill the vacant space left in the middle of the political spectrum.
Original article: www.theamericanconservative.com
Fino a che punto si spingeranno i leader europei e, in particolare, quelli tedeschi, di fronte alla minaccia concreta di perdere il potere per la prima volta in 80 anni?
Dunque, punto della situazione: tra l’inizio e la fine del mese ha rimbalzato per tutto l’etere la notizie che provengono dai lander più orientali della Germania. Iniziamo con i dati dalla Sassonia-Anhalt: per la prima volta nella storia della democrazia tedesca post-guerra mondiale, una singola formazione politica – lo AFD, ovvero “Alternativa per la Germania” – raccoglie alle consultazioni elettorali una percentuale di voto che equivale quasi a metà dei votanti: il fatto è che nella cultura politica della Germania contemporanea nemmeno la CDU (centro cristiano-democratico) ha raccolto tale risultato, su scala nazionale, ad una generazione dalla riunificazione. Ma a pensarci – questo è ancor più eclatante – nemmeno il NSDP nazista ha mai raccolto tale proporzione di voti, persino alle ultime elezioni (svoltesi non in un clima ordinario) del 1933. Un grattacapo vero e proprio per la democrazia tedesca che impone di esporre alcune considerazioni lucide al netto di panico ed isterie.
A monte di tutto, rammentiamo che di un’elezione regionale si parla e il lander in questione è demograficamente piccolo: un paio di milioni di abitanti appena, come a dire il 2,5% della popolazione della Repubblica federale. Regione dell’ex Germania orientale, storicamente feudo di correnti antitetiche al liberalismo occidentale (vetero-comunisti ed ultraconservatori). Detto questo, è altrettanto vero che il consenso elettorale all’AFD – già molto consistente nella precedente consultazione (oltre il 20% ossia il secondo partito) – si è di fatto raddoppiato diventando una specie di gigante tra i partiti, il che non è del tutto ordinario. Considerando il tutto, si può concludere che è assai improbabile che si replichi un risultato del genere su scala nazionale, quanto d’altra parte si deve riconoscere che si è di fronte ad un segnale e di quelli importanti: un messaggio che l’intera società sta esprimendo traverso i canali della democrazia consultiva (perchè a giudicare dai risultati raggiunti è un partito di massa che tocca i gangli nevralgici di ogni strato sociale: anche la fascia istruita della pop. , usualmente orientata in senso progressista, ha concesso circa il 30% del proprio voto, stando alle rilevazioni più specifiche, elemento che amplia il punto interrogativo). Un dato del tutto analogo si è rilevato in Pomerania nella seconda metà del mese che vede il partito sfiorare il 40% ai danni della più tradizionale Cdu. Se proprio si vuole una valutazione, l’Afd probabilmente raggiungerà alle prossime consultazioni di livello nazionale un qualcosa che sta nella forbice 30-35%, che significa grossmodo 1/3 dei suffragi di tutta la Germania.
Fatte salve le considerazioni “tecniche” di flusso elettorale esposte sopra, ce n’è una assai più rilevante che concerne il principio: nel corso delle settimane i commentari in merito ai risultati elettorali in questione si sono propagati come un sisma lungo la rete e altri mezzi di informazione per mezzo di titoli sensazionalistici, finalizzati ad esasperare le perplessità già presenti nell’opinione pubblica tedesca: questo rende da subito difficile affrontare la questione in modo equilibrato, prendendo vita un campo di opinioni polarizzato alle stelle che non permette la riflessione. Responsabile di questo il sistema medesimo (complici i media) che sembra non puntare ad un confronto responsabile bensì fomentare l’isteria collettiva, la divisione. Ecco, la verità è che l’elemento più eclatante di queste elezioni regionali in Sassonia Anhalt, al di là del risultato che vediamo sugli schermi in queste ore, è la reazione ad esso: una reazione ai limiti del senso di responsabilità che vede la parte “moderata” evocare ed invocare la guerra civile, con scenari apocalittici, frasario estremo, esternazioni senza più logica se non quella del panico. In breve le forze che si dicono “democratiche” vistesi sconfitte sul campo per la prima volta, hanno cessato di essere democratiche, riversando un mare di ostilità tale da intaccare l’ordine costituito. Un capovolgimento bizzarro: vediamo una forza considerata estremista conquistare legalmente il governo di una regione, mentre le forze teoreticamente democratiche reagire ai limiti del lecito (invocare in primo luogo la messa al bando di AFD come formazione non conforme alla costituzione tedesca).
Su quest’ultimo punto deve vertere il cuore della riflessione. Rispondere con cieca intolleranza nei confronti dell’avversario vincente mostra purtroppo i limiti del sistema democratico tedesco (la facciata insomma) il quale incapace di fornire risposte ai problemi che affliggono la propria società allora non riesce a fare altro che replicare con l’intolleranza, con il non accettare il risultato delle urne. Il nodo di fondo è che quando un partito – considerato estremista – raccoglie da solo quasi la metà dei consensi come accaduto in Sassonia o in Pomerania è un chiaro messaggio che le cose non vanno come dovrebbero, che vi sono profondi problemi in seno alla società di riferimento: non si può bollare semplicemente tutto come istigazione di una minoranza estremistica quando i suffragi sono pari al 44%, che piaccia o meno. Non è possibile ignorare un messaggio così potente, ricorrende semplicisticamente ad appellativi come “estremista” o “fascista “ : no, in questi casi occorre farsi un esame di coscienza molto serio, partendo dalla ridefinizione degli stessi termini che si utilizzano. Ci si riferisce in primissimo luogo agli appellativi che in modo scontato vengono attribuiti ad AFD (come se fosse una premessa data per certa): lo si definisce “estremista”, lo si definisce “nazista”, ma chi ha deciso tali definizioni ? Il sistema post-bellico/europeista 1945-2025 evidentemente, ma è solo una prospettiva delle cose che si impone come verità: Afd è “nazista” solamente da un punto vista europeista e se si dovesse accettare tale parametro dovremmo quindi concludere che quasi la metà degli elettori di Sassonia e Pomerania sono estremisti (irresponsabile crederlo e comoda via di fuga per giustificare la sconfitta elettorale). La verità è che quando una formazione politica raggiunge tali risultati non è più una cricca di estremisti, ma rappresenta il nerbo della società: un nerbo della società che soffre che ha bisogno di una sponda cui aggrapparsi e se nessuno gliela concede, allora la trova in Afd o qualsiasi altro partito alternativo. In definitiva – punto più importante – frangenti come quello presente fanno emergere il maggiore dei paradossi: il totalitarismo della democrazia. Quest’ultima, la democrazia liberale ovvero il modello socioeconomico principe di tutto il mondo industrializzato, fintanto che regna sovrana, avendo a che fare con gruppuscoli politicamente alternativi di destra e sinistra, può facilmente bollarli come facinorosi ed estremisti senza nemmeno bisogno di bandirli legalmente. Quando tuttavia la democrazia occidentale si ritrova davanti al proprio limite, vale a dire che i cittadini stessi le voltano le spalle per cercare altre sponde e quando tali sponde si rivelano vincenti alle urne al punto da mettere alle corde il sistema ufficiale, allora ecco che la “democrazia” inizia a difendersi e ferocemente diventando tanto totalitaria quanto i propri avversari non democratici. A quel punto si parla di invalidare elezioni, incriminare candidati, mettere fuorilegge determinati partiti previa campagna di demonizzazione come è accaduto in svariati paesi dell’est Europa (vediamo i casi di Romanie e Moldavia, ma anche Bulgaria e Georgia). La verità più scomoda è che democrazia occidentale ha potuto cavarsela perchè per 70 anni ha regnato su società benestanti e protette che non necessitavano di rivolgersi ad altre forze che non quelle convenzionali, prestabilite: adesso che esiste una concorrenza di un modello alternativo – e quindi la reale ipotesi di perdere il potere tanto a lungo detenuto – si può osservare il livello di isteria mediatica che si e a che punto di scorrettezza le forze moderate sono disposte ad arrivare.
Maria, a Colombian woman, thought she was going to Poland to work at one of the country’s biggest meat-processing plants. Instead, the employment agency that arranged her job had quietly enrolled her in school.
She discovered this only after translating the papers she had been given. One said she was a student at an adult secondary school in Sieradz, another enrolled her at a Polish university. But Maria had never applied to either institution, attended a class or even heard of them.
Her case is part of a wider trade in fake student documents that exploited Poland’s labour and immigration systems. Employment agencies used fictitious student status to make foreign workers cheaper to employ, while private universities issued certificates that could help foreigners obtain visas or legalise their stay.
An investigation by the Polish publication Onet found the same schools and universities repeatedly appearing in documents issued to foreign workers from around the world. Some institutions existed largely on paper; in other cases, fraudsters forged documents in the names of legitimate schools without their knowledge.
The schemes went beyond fake student cards. Private universities also issued certificates used to obtain visas, enter the Schengen area or legalise residency.
They cost Poland’s social-security system millions of zloty and left some migrants facing job losses, residency problems and possible deportation – while people linked to the schools have established ties to Poland’s pro-Russian organisations and media.
Polish labour laws incentivise employment of students aged up to 26 under so-called agreements to perform a job. It means employers do not have to pay social security or health insurance contributions for them. The workers cost less than regular employees.
So, student status has become a sought-after commodity that employment agencies have exploited for gains.
A central figure in the case is Dariusz M., a school head in Sieradz detained by police in late May. When reporters from TVN24 posed as employers looking for a way to legalise the employment of foreign immigrants, M. offered to enrol them as students for 750 zloty (around €175) per person.
Prosecutors suspect him of participating in an organised group that allegedly issued around 2,500 false study certificates, costing the Polish state nearly six million zloty (more than €1.4m) in unpaid contributions.
Documents were often arranged by employment agencies with foreign workers unaware they had formally been enrolled at a school.
“In most cases, they do not even know they are involved in something illegal. They trust the employment agency,” said Rocio Flores, president of the Union of Latin American Workers in Poland.
When an inspection uncovers the fraud, the foreign workers face losing their jobs, residency problems and, in some cases, deportation. “We migrants suffer most as a result,” Flores said.
Inspections carried out by Poland’s social insurance authority confirmed there were many such cases.
In August, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna reported that Poland’s social insurance body (ZUS) stepped up inspections of companies employing foreigners with pupil or student status.
They reported that inspectors uncovered cases in which agencies pay schools for fake study certificates despite the worker having never attended classes, with Poland’s social welfare system losing out on millions of zloty.
Not all paperwork for fake students came from education institutions themselves. Some student cards and study certificates were forged in the name of real schools without their knowledge, as was the case of a Cosinus network branch in the town of Piaseczno.
Its head, Elżbieta Gotchold-Leśniewski, showed Onet reporters a file containing 62 forgeries found in various parts of Poland and had been issued to people from South America, Africa, Asia and Europe. “That is not my signature, and the school’s hologram is wrong too. In fact, many things are wrong,” she said.
The forgers incorrectly copied the four-leaf clover in the school’s logo, giving rise to the term “fake four-leaf clovers” in the Polish website’s headline. The documents were nevertheless convincing enough to be accepted by employers or used by holders during ticket inspections on public transport.
A student card and certificate package cost 200 to 800 zloty (€45 to €180). One man called the school directly because he had paid 600 (€140) zloty for a set of documents and wanted to know when classes would begin. The school’s staff told him he was, in fact, not registered there at all.
Since 2022, Poland’s border guard has been investigating a group that, under the cover of three private universities, sold foreigners documents needed to obtain visas or legalise their stays.
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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
The “Heirs of Goebbels” Report
After March 31, 2026, a twenty-page report titled Heirs of Goebbels: Falsification of the Events in Bucha and Bloody Staged Performances of the Kiev Regime began circulating in English. It is signed by the “International Public Tribunal on the Crimes of Ukrainian Neo-Nazis,” a body chaired by Maksim Grigor’ev, which directs readers to the website of the Russian Fund for the Study of Democracy for the full text. The thesis is already evident in the title: the events in Bucha in March 2022 were allegedly fabricated by Ukraine with the support of Western governments, using a technique that the text compares to the Nazi provocation at Gleiwitz in 1939.
The document deserves careful reading precisely because it does not limit itself to denial. Unlike the Russian denials of April 2022, it builds its argument on verifiable Ukrainian material: the plaques at the memorial, military obituaries, local commemorative sites, and statements from the Presidency. It is on this ground that the discussion must take place. The question I pose here is narrower than that of the report and, I believe, more useful: who actually appears on the Bucha Wall of Remembrance, in what capacity, and what happens when a commemorative category is used as a legal and statistical category. The answer calls into question both those who constructed the official narrative and those who claim to dismantle it.
The structure is simple. After the reference to Gleiwitz, the text lists four methods of falsification that the Ukrainian government allegedly employed: presenting soldiers killed in combat as civilians; attributing deaths caused by Ukrainian fire to Russia; counting elderly people who died of illness among the victims; and the deliberate killing of its own citizens in front of cameras. The stated target is the official claim that the memorial contains “509 names of identified civilians,” a claim that the report attributes to the website of the Ukrainian Presidency, Mayor Anatoliy Fedoruk, Euronews, and the European ministers present at the March 31, 2026, commemoration.
The core of the document (pp. 3–12) is a list of about thirty names, each accompanied by a photo of the plaque and, often, a clipping from a Ukrainian news outlet. They can be grouped into five categories. The first category includes individuals identified as members of Azov or affiliated units: Yevhen Petras, Yevhen Vas’kovych, Illia Chrenov, Bohdan Knyshchuk, and Volodymyr Bisaha. The second group consists of regular military personnel: pilot Ruslan Bilous (Belous) of the 7th Tactical Aviation Brigade and his flight crew member Roman Dovhaljuk; sniper Oleh Cymbal of the 80th Air Assault Brigade; Vadym Smetanskyi of the same brigade, a colonel from the SBU, a major from the State Protection Department, and the commander of the guard at the military commissariat in Bucha. The third group consists of members of the territorial defense or volunteer units: Anatoliy Korytko, Serhiy Smyrnov, Oleksandr Blahodatnyi, Andriy Verbovyi, and Mykhailo Boichenko. The fourth list concerns civilians alleged to have taken part in hostile actions: Oleksandr Šarava, who left his home carrying Molotov cocktails on February 27, 2022; Vitalij Fesjuk, an observer who reported on the movements of Russian vehicles; and Oleksandr Bondar, who, according to the Ukrainian press, was conducting reconnaissance for the armed forces. The fifth section concerns people who died outside the city (in Vorzel, Moshchun, Kopylov, Zdvizhevka, Guta-Mezhigorskaya, and Irpen) and a 68-year-old woman, Halyna Semenyuk, who died of cancer.
The report links this list to two legal references that are substantively correct: Article 51, paragraph 3, of the First Additional Protocol, under which civilians lose their protection when and for as long as they directly participate in hostilities, and an explanatory note from the International Committee of the Red Cross on the same principle. Finally, pages 12–20 contain sixteen testimonies regarding Ukrainian bombings “for the cameras.” None of these concern Bucha: the witnesses speak of Avdeevka, Ugledar, Toreck/Dzerzhinsk, Lysychansk, and Kurakhovo, in incidents ranging from 2021 to 2024. The transition from that material to Bucha is conveyed by a single explicit statement: the practice of deliberate killings “allows one to reasonably conclude” that the same occurred there as well.
The legal framework
International humanitarian law defines a civilian by exclusion. According to Article 50 of the First Protocol, a civilian is anyone who does not belong to the armed forces as defined in Article 43—that is, all organized forces, groups, and units placed under a responsible command. In cases of doubt, a person must be considered a civilian, and the presence of non-civilians among the population does not deprive the population of its civilian status. A civilian who directly participates in hostilities remains a civilian but loses protection from attacks for the duration of that participation. The ICRC Interpretive Guidance establishes three cumulative requirements for such participation (a minimum threshold of harm, a direct causal link, and a link to hostilities) and distinguishes between a civilian acting on an episodic basis and a member of an organized armed group with a continuous combat role, who loses protection for the entire duration of that role.
Two additional rules apply to the case of Bucha. The first is the levée en masse: residents of a territory not yet occupied who, as the enemy approaches, spontaneously take up arms without having had time to organize themselves are legitimate combatants if they openly bear arms and comply with the laws of war. The second is domestic. The Ukrainian law “On the Fundamentals of National Resistance,” in effect since January 1, 2022, made the Territorial Defense Forces a component of the Armed Forces and established the volunteer formations of territorial communities (DFTH) as paramilitary units tasked with territorial defense. Under international humanitarian law, those who belonged to these structures were not civilians.
There is, however, one point the report never addresses. Determining that a person was a combatant says nothing about how they died. A combatant who is captured, wounded, or has surrendered is hors de combat, and killing them is a war crime.
In the face of information warfare
According to Western commentators, the report lacks credibility because it contains certain legal inaccuracies. Technical errors may be present, but focusing on the finger while ignoring the moon is a colossal mistake. In Bucha, the crime was committed by the Ukrainians, not the Russians. And there is a heinous crime that has become a propaganda tool, part of an information war that was indispensable to the collective West.
Bucha represented one of the decisive moments in the information war that unfolded around the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. After Russian forces withdrew from the city, images of corpses in the streets and eyewitness accounts gathered on the ground were rapidly disseminated by international media, transforming into a highly potent communication tool. It all happened extremely quickly, with Western media—acting in unison—disseminating the material everywhere, constructing an image of the war as an act of aggression characterized by systematic atrocities, in which Russia was progressively portrayed not only as a military adversary but as the perpetrator of crimes against the civilian population. In this sense, the images possessed a persuasive power greater than that of many diplomatic arguments: the body of the slain civilian became visual evidence capable of condensing an entire interpretation of the conflict into a few frames.
Bucha thus took on a strategic role in Western communications and helped solidify public support for sanctions, Moscow’s diplomatic isolation, and increased political and military aid to Kiev. Observe how a tragic event—as tragic as any war is—was transformed into a weapon of war. No Western media outlet cared about the value of the dead or the truth of their life stories. The only thing that mattered was blaming Russia and justifying the escalation of a senseless conflict.
But the truth comes to light sooner or later.
This is how the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs brought the Bucha case back into the international spotlight. Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that Moscow intends to urge the United Nations to reexamine the events, arguing that the UN did not participate directly in the investigations conducted at the time, but instead ended up accepting the version provided by Kiev as the prevailing one. A few days later, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also revisited the incident, denouncing what he considers a typical practice of information warfare: rapidly constructing a narrative, turning it into the dominant truth, and preventing alternative versions from reaching the public.
According to Lavrov, this is precisely the mechanism through which the West consolidated its interpretation of Bucha. The initial narrative occupies the available information space like an empty trench: once it has been seized and defended by the mainstream media, replacing it requires an enormously greater effort. In the case of Bucha, this process prevented a truly impartial examination of the events from the very beginning.
One central question therefore remains: why reopen the Bucha case today? Because Moscow is ready to confront the entire world regarding the lies propagated by the West. And what about the West?
As AI-powered biometric identification is adopted by police, national authorities should go beyond legal requirements to build trust within the public, a watchdog report has advised.
“To build public trust, law enforcement should publish the results of their fundamental rights impact assessments, going beyond what the AI Act requires,” said the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), an EU branch which keeps tabs on citizens’ freedoms, in Vienna on Wednesday (30 September).
After collecting data from seven EU countries (France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, and Ireland), the watchdog warned that several member states have yet to put necessary frameworks in place as they adopt automated systems to identify people.
Remote biometric identification is increasingly used to compare people’s profiles against databases or watch lists, but as the technology develops it could be rolled out for real-time use in public areas.
“With clear safeguards and independent oversight, remote biometric technologies can support policing without undermining the very freedoms it is meant to safeguard. Ultimately, it is about trust,” said FRA chief Sirpa Rautio.
Effective implementation of the EU AI Act requires clear national laws and consistent safeguards to ensure that AI-powered technologies are not used to identify people taking part in peaceful demonstrations or public gatherings, the FRA says.
The body warns that automated identification of live data may affect people’s private lives and interfere with their right to protection of personal data.
In its survey, 37 percent of people said they fear their data could be used for unauthorised purposes.
And 29 percent of people surveyed by FRA said they would be less willing to take part in peaceful demonstrations or protests if facial recognition was used.
The FRA is worried that surveillance tech powered by AI could be used in exactly those scenarios.
In principle, the EU’s AI Act adopted in 2024 bans real-time remote biometric identification systems in public spaces. But exemptions exist for law enforcement authorities using the technology for finding victims or missing persons, to prevent threats to life or physical safety, stop a terror attack, or to find criminal suspects.
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As the EU seeks budget cuts to break a stalemate in member states’ talks, women’s rights groups are on the chopping bloc, prompting advocates’ concern that the cause is fading from the common agenda.
Research published on Monday (28 September) by rights initiative MOTERIS showed a consistent loss of funding for feminist organisations across EU countries.
Some groups are also facing political conditions on the money they receive, for instance in Poland and Croatia, alongside groups reporting increasing dependance on unpaid work.
And the trajectory points toward decreased funding in the 2028-2034 EU multi-annual framework (MFF), which is currently being haggled in Brussels, making matters worse.
Feminist groups pointed toward AgoraEU as evidence of the trend – the proposed new single-funding stream is to merge grants for culture, media, equality and civil society under in the same MFF bracket, in what would make equally worthy causes and their defenders compete against one another for diluted resources.
And the ongoing cuts at national level meant that “EU funds are a crucial lifeline for many women’s rights groups where state funding is insufficient,” MOTERIS said.
Small, grassroots rights groups, many of whom MOTERIS represents, find it even harder to access grants due to heavy administrative requirements.
Meanwhile, the Czech Republic and Lithuania served as examples of EU countries whose philanthropy was dependent on external top-ups, making them “more vulnerable to geopolitical shifts, such as the withdrawal of US funding.”
MOTERIS staged a protest to push for MFF support for women’s rights groups outside the European Parliament in Brussels on Tuesday (29 September), ahead of an MEPs’ debate on the topic.
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Devastated relatives who arrived from abroad visited the site of the collapsed building where four tourists and an elderly couple lost their lives on Friday morning, September 25, 2026. With tears in their eyes and broken voice they told media reporters that they came for the identification of the victims adding that the recognition was […]
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