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The Ethiopia–Tigray Crisis: The Fragile Peace That Failed to Hold

The Pretoria Agreement brought an end to Ethiopia’s devastating Tigray war—but not its underlying disputes. Four years later, renewed fighting and shifting armed alliances are threatening to reopen the conflict. The consequences could extend far beyond Tigray, destabilising the wider Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s fragile post-Pretoria peace is rapidly unravelling as renewed fighting between federal […]
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Merz Announces New Ukraine Package as German Defence Ties Deepen

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has announced a new package worth more than €1.3 billion for Ukraine during a visit to Kyiv, combining additional military assistance with support for the country’s damaged energy infrastructure as German-Ukrainian industrial co-operation expands.

Merz visited the Ukrainian capital on Sunday while Russian drone attacks continued against Kyiv.

According to the Ukrainian presidency’s account of the meeting, the package includes more than €1 billion for defence and additional financing for the energy sector ahead of winter. Separate reporting put the energy component at approximately €350 million.

The visit also produced an extensive group of bilateral agreements involving governments and companies.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine and Germany had concluded 15 agreements and documents, most concerning security co-operation, production, procurement, orders for German industry and joint projects in Ukraine. He put the total value of the agreements reached during the visit at more than €8.5 billion.

A narrower set of industrial agreements reported during the visit was valued at about €6.6 billion and included air-defence, radar and drone projects.

The visit went beyond another transfer of military aid.

Germany and Ukraine are increasingly constructing a defence relationship based on procurement, industrial production and the transfer of Ukrainian battlefield experience to European manufacturers.

At the Ukrainian-German Business Forum, Zelenskyy said the new security package would strengthen Ukraine’s armed forces immediately while industrial agreements were intended to build longer-term production capacity.

The direction corresponds with a wider shift in European support for Ukraine.

Military assistance is increasingly moving away from transfers of existing national stocks towards contracts financing new weapons production. In July, the EU released €3.47 billion for Ukrainian defence procurement, including financing intended for drones, missiles, air defence and combat aircraft requirements.

Kyiv has since asked European partners to accelerate further financing as the demands of the war outpace scheduled disbursements. EU Today reported in September that Ukraine was seeking early access to part of its 2027 EU funding to close a military budget gap.

The German agreements add a bilateral industrial track to that European system.

They also reflect changes on the battlefield.

Russia has continued to expand large-scale drone and missile attacks, increasing the importance of interceptor production, radar coverage and lower-cost methods of destroying unmanned aircraft. Ukraine’s air-defence problem is increasingly an industrial one: inexpensive attack drones cannot sustainably be countered only with scarce and costly surface-to-air missiles.

EU Today has previously examined how Ukraine’s air-defence battle has become an industrial equation, determined as much by production rates and cost ratios as by the technical performance of individual systems.

German-Ukrainian co-operation is increasingly being shaped by that requirement.

Merz has presented continuing support for Ukraine as a direct German and European security interest, rather than assistance based solely on solidarity with Kyiv.

The argument has acquired greater force as German authorities investigate Russian-linked sabotage and hybrid operations on German territory.

In September, investigators reportedly traced the attempted bombing of a Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig/Halle Airport to a suspected Russian military-intelligence organiser, with EU Today reporting details of the alleged GRU-linked logistics network.

For Berlin, support for Ukraine is now increasingly seen as part of Germany’s own security.

Merz’s visit also carries a domestic political dimension. His government is committing Germany to considerably higher defence expenditure at a time when the CDU has suffered severe electoral setbacks in eastern Germany and voters remain concerned over public finances and economic performance.

Yet Germany’s military and industrial engagement with Ukraine is continuing to expand.

The new package announced in Kyiv is important in itself, particularly as Ukraine prepares for another winter of Russian attacks on its energy infrastructure. The wider development, however, lies in the growing number of defence-production agreements accompanying it.

European governments have spent much of the war debating how to replenish their own weapons stocks while sustaining Ukraine.

The German approach increasingly points towards a different model: Ukrainian operational experience, Ukrainian procurement requirements and European industrial capacity being brought into the same defence-production system.

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Stakeholder Conference on the Common Maritime Agenda for the Black Sea 2026

The Black Sea is a strategic region of key importance for food security, the blue economy, maritime transport, tourism, fisheries, and aquaculture. This was stated by the Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Food, Prof. Dr. Ivan Paligorov, at the opening of the Stakeholder Conference on the Common Maritime Agenda for the Black Sea 2026 […]

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What does Europe want—a war with Russia?

It was common practice during the Cold War to exaggerate the threat from the Soviet Union. Nowadays, Russia has assumed that role. Although the circumstances have changed, some of the political methods employed to create a sense of insecurity are still remarkably similar. Europe is not formally engaging in preparations for war since it desires […]
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Pakistan’s Military Support for the Taliban Opposition: Status and Challenges

Tensions persist between Kabul and Islamabad, accompanied by an information war, psychological pressure, and border and political clashes. Introduction Pakistan has long held connections with various Afghan political factions. Pakistan, over the 1960s and 1970s, progressively supported religious and political groups that were against the Afghan government, aiming to establish an opposing force to its […]
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The Final Frontier Goes to War: The Militarisation of Space

Space is becoming an increasingly contested domain as major powers expand military capabilities, satellite infrastructure, and counterspace systems, while the U.S. Golden Dome initiative reshapes strategic stability and raises new questions about the future of space governance. On 14th September 2026, US Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink confirmed that the US has “on-orbit” […]
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Why America keeps losing wars?

America has become an imperial power that aims to invade and dominate the weak countries. This tendency has created global insecurity and led America to lose wars. In terms of natural resources and firepower, America dominates like no other country. It has the largest and most flexible military, the most weapons, and the most devices […]
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Divided EU cyber defence faces real-life Russian and Chinese threats

Europe is facing more immediate cyber threats, but whether its member states are prepared to deal with it collectively is becoming a question harder to answer.

Even as drone threats, such as Russia’s bomb plot at the Leipzig-Halle airport in Germany in August, dominated European headlines in September, other, less visible hybrid attacks are also being waged against the EU every day, whose sheer weight of numbers should also cause grave concern.

Poland, for instance, recorded 4,200 cyber-security incidents in military networks and systems in 2024 and 7,100 in 2025, Polish cyber command spokesperson, Przemek Lipczyński, told EUobserver.

In 2025, Polish security systems blocked four million phishing emails targeted at soldiers and defence personnel.

And Poland aside, evolving technology meant Russian cyber-attacks “do not know any border”, said Jamila Boutemeur, the EU’s head of cybersecurity body, in what amounted to a single market for hacking.

For its part, the European Union has built its cybersecurity architecture around the Boutemeur’s European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, in Athens, as well as the 27 national cybersecurity agencies.

But as Russia’s threat levels up, the European structure is seeing familiar problems: information is not always shared, responsibilities remain divided between national governments and EU institutions, while ENISA itself is being asked to do more with limited resources.

And the European Court of Auditors (ECA) confirmed it on 21 September in its ENISA study.

“The architecture is there, the structure is there. Now it’s a matter of willingness and trust,” to effectively fight back, said George-Marius Hyzler, the ECA’s main auditor.

Stress test shows EU cracks

“It always boils down to the same thing, lack of information sharing,” he said, identifying the EU’s key weakness.

And for Czech Greens MEP Markéta Gregorová, who is also the lead rapporteur on the EU’s incoming Cybersecurity Act 2 (CSA2), duplication of work also bedevilled the EU’s response.

“The [ECA] auditors describe a system that does not work” and was “wasteful”, she told EUobserver.

“Six European legal acts force the same company to report the same incident to different authorities. Two EU bodies monitor the same threats,” Gregorová said.

She also advocated a stronger operational role for ENISA.

But the EU fault lines have underlying political as well as legal tensions.

Cybersecurity remains largely within the competence of the member states, and governments differ in how much new power they are willing to delegate to European institutions.

And for Dimitar Lilkov, from the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, there were three main sources of friction: national security, trust, and money.

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

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Once Upon a Time in Abkhazia: Drones, Radars, and a Hotelier with a Shotgun

Abkhazian independence would have been a Western favorite show, if it was a vassal for their interests, or a launching pad against Russian targets. If that was the case, they would have recognized its independence, or even granted Teymuraz Tania the title of “Servant of the People”, and organized a campaign to elect him president. […]
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Washington, Beijing and the Taiwan question: how Washington lost control of the Indo-Pacific theater

Torn between its Russian, Chinese, Iranian and North Korean issues, American foreign policy has nonetheless revealed, over the decades, a constant hierarchy: the Sino-American rivalry remains the major geopolitical issue that structures Washington’s Asian policy. With one month to go before the midterm elections, the American election campaign, despite being structured by deep partisan divides, […]
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The Geopolitical Balance in the Red Sea: The UAE Being Displaced by New Players

The persistence of current geopolitical alignments, the attention of Eastern actors to the region, the strengthening of Sanaa’s position in the Red Sea, and the expansion of regional opposition to the UAE’s role will diminish Abu Dhabi’s role in the region. UAE approach For the past ten years, the Southern Red Sea has been a […]
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Ukrainian Soldiers, Potential Mercenaries: Have Gun, Will Travel!

Who has thought about what happens to an army when the SMO ends—but the warriors remain? Ukraine is already providing an early glimpse of what may become a much larger post-war phenomenon: highly trained combat personnel, particularly special-forces and other specialists, carrying their battlefield skills beyond the borders of the countries, in which they acquired […]
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The War Is Spreading: What the Houthi Front Means for the Region

Amid the ongoing US–Iran war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the emergence of a Saudi-Houthi confrontation has added a new layer of complexity to the Middle Eastern conflict, with the potential to widen and prolong the war while drawing additional regional actors into an increasingly broader confrontation. The Saudi-Houthi conflict is not […]
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The Russia-North Korea Strategic Axis: Building a New Eurasian Security Partnership

The Russia-North Korea strategic partnership is reshaping Northeast Asian security through growing political, military and economic cooperation, while also highlighting Russia’s expanding strategic role and the emergence of a more multipolar Eurasian security environment. 7th September 2026 marked the opening of the first dedicated road bridge between Russia and North Korea across the Tumen River. […]
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The Dictator of Kiev Needs the War: Closing Russian Skies to Stay in Power

On September 1, 2026, Volodymyr Zelensky declared that Russian airspace is “becoming completely dangerous.” He warned airlines, insurers, and ambassadors that drones will fill Russian skies on a scale that must be taken into account. “The safe days in Russia’s skies are over.” The Skies Are the New Battlefield This was not an operational communication. […]
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Putin’s Vision for Eurasian Security Architecture: Multipolarity, Security, and Redefining Order

The Eurasian landmass needs local solutions to its indigenous problems, and needs indivisible security instead of zero-sum security. The Eurasian Security Architecture aims to address this basic need. Introduction Many important geopolitical projects begin by arguing that the system can no longer manage the new challenges. In 2024, the Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the […]
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Iran: Not a War, a Military Conflict? — Anything BUT Small Potatoes!

Call it a war, a military conflict, an intervention or something else entirely different—the terminology does little to change the human cost. People are dying, and the fighting has the potential to expand into a far larger regional conflagration. Call it whatever you want—just don’t call it small! The Trump administration insists the fighting with […]
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Kleptocracy and the Incompetence of the illegal Ukraine Regime’s Backers

A high-profile scandal has rocked the European Union, exposing the thorough incompetence of the bloc, which is hell-bent on trying to undermine Russia’s sovereignty by aiding the illegal Kyiv regime. In an egregious incident, the Defense Minister of Estonia, Hanno Pevkur, resigned on September 3, 2026. While resignations may seem rather routine in the fast-moving […]
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Five Things the Headlines Might Have Missed About the Saudi-Houthi Escalation

The escalation of the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis marks the collapse of the old regional security system, in which traditional U.S. guarantees are losing their effectiveness, and real influence is shifting to actors capable of adapting to the new rules of the “gray zone” and informal diplomacy. As global media focuses on […]
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