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Where the rivers run: ranking U.S. states by hydropower

This infographic reveals the top U.S. states for hydroelectric power generation. Washington leads in total output, followed by Oregon and California. See where hydropower is strongest across the country.

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Petrolio e sanzioni: costo Ue della guerra in Ucraina

Ennio Remondino

Segue nostro Telegram.

Petrolio e sanzioni: costo Ue della guerra in Ucraina. Costo anche politico, di consensi. Il prezzo è alto e non tutti sono d’accordo a sostenerlo a quel livello. Scelta politica del vertice ‘Volonterosi-baltici’ di Bruxelles, sostenuto da una maggioranza sofferente di governi alla prese con opinioni pubbliche ed elettori. L’Ucraina fronte difensivo europeo contro le minacce russe? Troppi elettori non sembrano d’accordo.

Conti alla mano

In cinque anni e in misura diversa, i Paesi europei, hanno versato all’Ucraina oltre 200 miliardi di euro. Cifre ufficiali del Parlamento europeo aggiornate alla primavera scorsa, cui si aggiungono i 90 miliardi di prestiti su cui è stato raggiunto un accordo all’inizio dell’estate. Si tratta, solo per le voci più importanti, di 75 miliardi in aiuti militari e di oltre 43 in assistenza finanziaria. Tra i 27, Germania, Francia e Regno Unito sono stati i principali contributori e sostenitori per sforzo economico a favore di Kiev. Tre Paesi alle prese con gravi crisi politico economiche interne. L’Italia quarta in questa graduatoria, anche se cerca di non pubblicizzare molto un impegno così poco elettorale.

Cosa sembra stia accadendo adesso

«Con decisione unilaterale dell’esecutivo Ue, l’Ucraina potrà acquistare i sistemi Patriot con un altro prestito di 6 miliardi», scrive Massimo Nava sul Corriere della Sera. In tutto, conti alla mano, sono oltre 28 miliardi i contributi 2026 soltanto per la difesa, a cui aggiungere 16,7 miliardi al bilancio dello Stato a rischio crack. Questo, nonostante le notizie di scandali in serie per corruzione e mancate garanzie future. A queste cifre, andrebbero sommati i costi sociali del sostegno agli oltre quattro milioni e mezzo di cittadini ucraini fuggiti dalla guerra e attualmente ospitati in diversi Paesi europei. In testa, ancora la Germania, seguita da Polonia e Repubblica Ceca.

Tra solidarietà e scelte politiche

Opache e contraddittorie molte delle scelte politiche ed economiche su fronte Ucraina. Scelte ideologiche a danno spesso rovesciato. La serie di pacchetti di sanzioni contro la Russia che, da un lato, hanno fatto lievitare le bollette europee e rafforzato la dipendenza energetica da Stati Uniti e Paesi arabi, e dall’altro lato, vengono sistematicamente aggirate con la complicità degli Stati  che le impongono, ed incidono solo parzialmente sull’economia russa. «Il che fa temere che il conflitto possa avere ancora una lunga fase di stallo», il pessimismo di Nava. In attesa che si capisca che la pace si fa fra nemici e può essere soltanto la conseguenza di un compromesso.

Bancomat Von der Leyen

Dato di fatto, l’Europa ha sulle spalle il peso maggiore della guerra, sia per quanto riguarda gli aiuti all’Ucraina sia per le conseguenze dirette e indirette della rottura dei rapporti commerciali con la Russia. Rottura unilaterale da parte degli europei e non condivisa da molte altre potenze economiche mondiali. Nei primi nove mesi dell’anno, risulta ad esempio che la Ue ha pagato oltre sette miliardi di euro per gas naturale liquefatto russo, con un aumento del 10 per cento delle forniture rispetto allo scorso anno. Fra gennaio e settembre 2026, i porti europei hanno ricevuto 7,28 miliardi di euro di gas naturale dall’Artico russo. E mancano tre mesi alla fine dell’anno.

Ipocrisia energetica

Non solo l’Europa continua ad acquistare Gnl russo, ma il problema non si limita agli acquisti. È dall’Europa che arrivano i mezzi di trasporto che consentono al gasdotto artico russo di funzionare. «Due armatori dominano il trasporto: Seapeak, di Glasgow, e la greca Dynagas. Senza questi servizi, la catena logistica russa risulterebbe compromessa. Dunque è il denaro europeo che finanzia uno dei progetti energetici più strategici del Cremlino proprio in quella stessa regione», scrive Armèes. E il Financial Times aggiunge: «Nella prima metà del 2026 l’Europa ha importato dalla principale struttura russa di Gnl una quantità di gas mai registrata prima, assorbendo quasi tutta la produzione dell’impianto siberiano».

Allarmi e minacce sulla carta

L’Ue, come spesso avviene, lancia allarmi a parole e propositi sulla carta. Al vertice europeo sull’Artico, in Finlandia, i leader europei hanno discusso di sicurezza, geopolitica e strategia comune nel Grande Nord. È stata firmata una dichiarazione congiunta di 12 Stati dell’Unione affinché la Ue assuma un ruolo più strategico nell’Artico europeo. «Si evidenziano le ambizioni della Russia (la più grande nazione artica) di accrescere la propria influenza nell’Artico, unite alla sua ostilità verso l’Europa – compreso l’aumento delle attività ibride –, e la necessità di rafforzare la politica dell’UE per l’Artico». In gennaio, dovrebbe entrare in vigore, nel nuovo pacchetto di sanzioni, il divieto di importazione.

Castigo formale per aggirarlo

Le sanzioni sono aggirate anche dalla cosiddetta «flotta ombra», le navi cisterna che consentono alla Russia di esportare petrolio. Esiste una lista di oltre 600 imbarcazioni che non avrebbero accesso ai porti europei, ma possono accedere ad altri porti nel mondo, in particolare Cina e India, che sostengono Mosca. Anche il 21° pacchetto di sanzioni Ue, prevede deroghe a favore degli  interessi dei singoli Stati. La Grecia, ha ottenuto una deroga per i servizi di trasporto del Gnl russo per non favorire la concorrenza cinese e danneggiare più l’Europa della Russia. Francia, Italia e Grecia hanno frenato sui visti turistici. La Germania  vuole il merluzzo russo che alimentano l’industria di bastoncini surgelati.

Dai BRICS all’Occidente

Al termine del recente vertice dei Brics, il primo ministro indiano Narendra Modi: «Il numero di conflitti e tensioni nel mondo è in continuo aumento e questo ha un impatto sempre più negativo e di vasta portata sulla vita della gente comune», ha affermato Modi, affiancato dai leader del blocco, tra cui il presidente cinese Xi, il presidente russo Putin e il presidente iraniano Pezeshkian. I leader si sono opposti alle sanzioni unilaterali e alle misure economiche coercitive e hanno criticato le sanzioni non autorizzate dall’Onu. Hanno inoltre criticato l’aumento dei dazi doganali e delle barriere tariffarie che minano il commercio globale e le catene di approvvigionamento. A dire in un colpo solo di Stati Uniti ed Europa.

www.remocontro.it

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Ukrainian Drones Hit Key Moscow Fuel Hub as Pressure on Russian Energy Network Widens

A large fire has broken out at the Volodarskaya petroleum-products station outside Moscow following an extensive overnight drone attack. The facility occupies an important position in the pipeline network supplying petrol, diesel and aviation fuel to the Russian capital and its principal airports.

A major fire was reported at the Volodarskaya linear production and dispatch station in Moscow region early on Tuesday, bringing Ukraine’s campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure to another important point in the capital’s supply network.

Footage published from the area around Konstantinovo showed a substantial blaze at the facility, with reports from local residents that storage tanks were burning. The material identified the site as the Volodarskaya station, operated by Transneft-Upper Volga and connected to the petroleum-products network serving the Moscow region.

The extent of the damage was not immediately clear. There had been no detailed assessment from Transneft by Tuesday morning establishing whether pumping equipment, pipelines or only storage facilities had been affected. This distinction will determine whether the attack produces a temporary disruption or a more significant problem for Moscow’s fuel distribution system.

The strike formed part of a large overnight drone attack on Moscow and surrounding districts. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin reported repeated interceptions of drones approaching the capital, while air-defence activity continued across Moscow region. Russian aviation authorities temporarily restricted operations at Vnukovo, Domodedovo, Sheremetyevo and Zhukovsky airports for flight-safety reasons.

There is no evidence at this stage that the airport restrictions resulted from fuel shortages. They were imposed during the drone attack itself. The longer-term significance of Volodarskaya lies instead in the station’s role within the pipeline and storage infrastructure serving the Russian capital.

A major link in Moscow’s fuel network

Volodarskaya is connected to Moscow’s ring petroleum-products pipeline, through which petrol, diesel and aviation kerosene can be moved between refineries, storage facilities and major consumers.

Its importance is documented by Transneft itself. In 2024, the company said it had returned a 32-kilometre petroleum-products pipeline between the Moscow refinery and Volodarskaya to operation as part of a project to increase fuel deliveries across Moscow region.

According to the company’s figures, the project allowed aviation-fuel deliveries to Moscow’s airports to rise almost twofold, to as much as three million tonnes a year. Potential diesel deliveries to Moscow region consumers increased to 2.8 million tonnes annually, while petrol volumes reached 1.6 million tonnes. Transneft specifically identified Vnukovo, Domodedovo and Sheremetyevo as airports supplied through the expanded system.

Transneft has also expanded storage at Volodarskaya. The company previously said it had commissioned additional petroleum-product tanks at the station to support fuel supplies to Moscow and aviation-fuel transportation to the capital’s airports.

Those figures do not mean that every litre of fuel consumed by Moscow depends on Volodarskaya. Russia can move petroleum products by rail and road, and the Moscow region has other storage and distribution facilities. But replacing pipeline volumes on the scale handled by the Moscow system would place additional demands on those alternatives, particularly if disruption were prolonged.

The attack also follows repeated Ukrainian strikes against refining infrastructure supplying European Russia. On 20 September, EU Today reported that a mass drone attack had hit the Moscow Oil Refinery at Kapotnya, one of the main fuel-processing plants serving the capital. The strike reportedly affected its ELOU-AVT-6 primary processing unit, increasing pressure on a refinery that had already been targeted earlier in the year.

The broader campaign has moved beyond individual refineries. Ukraine has increasingly targeted different stages of Russia’s energy system, including storage depots, pumping infrastructure, ports and export terminals. Earlier attacks on the Omsk refinery and Baltic export infrastructure illustrated Kyiv’s effort to put pressure on both domestic fuel processing and the logistics through which Russian oil reaches international markets.

That approach is intended to force Russia to repair several parts of the system simultaneously rather than simply compensate for the temporary loss of production at one refinery. EU Today has previously examined how sustained strikes can put physical pressure on Russia’s oil economy where sanctions alone have limits.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 3 October that Ukraine intended to intensify attacks on Russian oil refineries in response to Moscow’s continuing strikes against Ukrainian cities, while maintaining that Ukrainian operations would not deliberately target civilians.

Volodarskaya adds another element to that campaign. A refinery converts crude oil into usable fuels; a pumping and storage station determines how those products reach consumers. Damaging one without the other may create disruption that can be bypassed. Sustained damage to both processing and distribution infrastructure is more difficult to compensate for.

Much therefore depends on what happened inside Volodarskaya overnight. If the damage is confined to several storage tanks, the Moscow fuel network may be able to absorb the loss. Damage to pumping installations or pipeline connections would have wider consequences, particularly if the facility is attacked repeatedly.

The strike nevertheless demonstrates that a fuel installation closely connected to Moscow’s aviation and transport system can be reached despite the dense air-defence network surrounding the capital. The scale of its effect will become clearer once satellite imagery and operational information show which parts of the Volodarskaya complex were actually damaged.

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Carbon Brief’s Con Trick

Carbon Brief claims that wind and solar power saved the UK from gas imports worth £5.9bn during the Hormuz crisis. Not mentioned, says Paul Homewood, is that the wind and solar power cost more.

The post Carbon Brief’s Con Trick appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

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Listen: Will Germany come back to nuclear energy?

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

Germany shut down its last nuclear power plants in 2023, bringing Angela Merkel’s nuclear exit policy to its conclusion. But now, nuclear power is making a strong comeback everywhere in Europe. Will Germany return to nuclear policy?

Until now, German chancellor Friedrich Merz had been reluctant to bring the nuclear topic on the table, partly because there was no agreement within his coalition. He has even said that Germany’s nuclear phase-out was irreversible. But that position is not shared by everyone in his own party.

And as support for the far-right AfD (Alternative for Germany) grows — a party that is strongly in favour of nuclear power — nuclear energy is becoming less politically taboo in Germany.

According to a non-public document sent by Berlin to other EU member states and reported by the media Euractiv (currently Rapporteur), the German government wants nuclear energy to be taken into account when the EU sets its climate targets for 2040.

For now, those discussions focus on renewable energy. Germany is not proposing to abandon renewable-energy targets, but rather to leave room for other low-carbon technologies, including nuclear power and carbon capture.

The logic is similar to the debate over the EU’s 2035 target for new cars: the overall objective remains, but countries could have more flexibility over how they achieve it.

And that proposal is likely to be welcomed in France. But could they convince a majority of EU countries? The picture across Europe is changing.

Many EU countries already operate nuclear power plants, while others are building new reactors or considering a return to nuclear. Italy, for example, is looking to revive a nuclear industry after abandoning nuclear power following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.

Poland has never operated a nuclear power plant, but it is now developing its first one. And several other countries that currently have no reactors are seriously considering building them.

Only a small group of EU countries remain opposed to developing nuclear power, including Austria, Portugal, Luxembourg and Malta.

So why has nuclear power become more politically acceptable again? The legacy of Chernobyl and Fukushima still matters. But Europe’s energy crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also changed the debate.

The shock of soaring fossil-fuel prices has encouraged governments to look for energy sources that can provide electricity without relying on fossil fuels — and nuclear power is increasingly being presented as one of them. Although there are major questions around that argument.

Nuclear power can provide large amounts of low-carbon electricity once a reactor is operating. But building and renovating reactors is extremely expensive and can take decades.

Take France’s Flamanville reactor: its final cost has been estimated at around €23bn , compared with an initial estimate of around €3bn.

There are also questions over nuclear waste, the risk of accidents, and the security of uranium supplies. European countries remain partly dependent on foreign suppliers, including Russia, for uranium.

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Beijing’s Useful Idiots: Germany, California and the Green Road to Chinese Supremacy

Germany and California parade as climate superpowers – yet both import energy, destroy industry and hand supply chains to Beijing. Western virtue, says Tilak Doshi, is made in Chinese coal-fired factories.

The post Beijing’s Useful Idiots: Germany, California and the Green Road to Chinese Supremacy appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

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Solar’s rise: The states generating the most sunshine power

Solar power is surging across America. This infographic ranks the top U.S. states for utility-scale solar generation, based on the latest data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Texas leads the nation in total solar output, followed by California and Florida. See which states are driving America’s solar energy boom and how solar fits into each state’s overall electricity mix.

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[Explainer] Gas glut or supply crunch? And what it means for EU methane rules

The EU has decided to delay its methane regulation, and the reason is simple enough. 

Europe imports almost 90 percent of its gas, which makes it one of the most exposed buyers in the world. And the US-Israeli war with Iran has choked gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz. 

Making matters more complicated is the fact that Europe is still phasing out Russian gas, with a total ban on Russian overseas liquified gas due to be implemented next year.

So few were surprised when energy commissioner Dan Jørgensen told ministers in Dublin this week that he will propose delaying the import part of the regulation by a year to 2028, although member states and parliament still have to formally agree.

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

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Oil Prices Fall as Europe Agrees to Release Emergency Diesel Reserves

Oil prices fell on Friday after European governments backed the release of emergency diesel stocks as part of a wider G7 intervention intended to ease pressure on fuel markets and avert possible US restrictions on diesel exports.

Oil prices fell on Friday after European governments agreed to release emergency diesel reserves, bringing additional supplies onto a market strained by disruption in the Middle East and shortages of refined fuel.

Brent crude futures fell $1.80, or 1.76 per cent, to $100.50 a barrel during trading on 2 October, while US West Texas Intermediate dropped $2.02, or 2.18 per cent, to $90.85, according to market data reported during Friday’s trading.

The fall came as the Group of Seven agreed to release 100 million barrels of oil and petroleum products from emergency stocks over four months. The package includes a substantial release of diesel during the first 20 days.

The G7 leaders’ statement on energy security and market stability said the releases would be co-ordinated through the International Energy Agency and would take account of commitments already made earlier this year. G7 governments will also discuss whether additional diesel releases are required.

The agreement marks a rapid development from the negotiations reported earlier on Friday. As EU Today reported before the G7 meeting, Washington had been pressing European governments, particularly France and Germany, to make more of their strategic diesel stocks available.

President Donald Trump had also raised the possibility of restricting US diesel exports as his administration sought to reduce domestic fuel prices. Such a restriction would have had significant consequences for Europe because the United States has become an important supplier of diesel to the European market.

A French proposal discussed by EU governments earlier on Friday envisaged European countries releasing around 50 million barrels of diesel, alongside another 50 million barrels of crude oil from International Energy Agency members.

The eventual G7 agreement also addresses the risk of export restrictions directly. The seven governments committed themselves to avoiding restrictions on energy and energy-product exports between G7 countries and called on other producers to refrain from measures that could worsen market shortages.

For Europe, the intervention comes as diesel supplies remain physically available but prices are being pushed higher by tight conditions on international markets.

The European Commission’s Energy Union Task Force met on Friday to examine diesel supplies and prices. The Commission said EU diesel supplies remained stable for the time being, but acknowledged that prices were high because of tight global markets.

The latest intervention follows a much larger emergency action earlier this year. In March, the International Energy Agency agreed its largest-ever co-ordinated stock release, making 400 million barrels available after the Middle East conflict severely disrupted international oil markets.

Europe’s contribution to that March operation consisted largely of refined petroleum products rather than crude oil, reflecting the particular pressure facing the continent’s fuel markets.

The pressure is part of a wider European energy problem. EU Today reported this week that the Middle East conflict has added more than €100 billion to Europe’s energy import bill, despite the continent receiving no corresponding increase in the physical amount of oil and gas purchased.

European governments have already committed €17.9 billion this year to measures intended to protect households and businesses from the rise in energy costs, according to an EU Today assessment of national support measures.

Diesel represents a particular vulnerability. It remains essential for road freight, agriculture, construction and large parts of European industry, meaning sustained increases in wholesale prices can feed into transport and production costs across the economy.

The present shortage also reflects changes in Europe’s refining sector. Refining capacity has fallen over the past two decades as plants have closed, increasing dependence on imported diesel and other refined petroleum products. That dependence has become more visible since the EU sharply reduced purchases of Russian fuel following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The G7 nevertheless made clear that the emergency intervention would not be accompanied by a relaxation of measures against Moscow. Leaders said they would maintain sanctions against Russia while working with the IEA and other partners to limit the effect of market disruption on fuel and commodity prices.

The EU has separately continued to tighten measures targeting Russia’s energy revenues and its so-called shadow fleet, including restrictions connected with the maritime transport of Russian oil and petroleum products. The EU’s latest sanctions package targeting Russian energy revenues was adopted in July.

Friday’s fall in oil and diesel futures indicates that traders expect the additional stocks to relieve some of the immediate pressure on supplies. European gasoil futures, the main regional diesel benchmark, also fell sharply during the day as details of the proposed releases emerged.

The G7 has asked the IEA to monitor implementation and report within 20 days, including on whether further action is required and how emergency stocks should eventually be replenished.

For Europe, the immediate objective is to contain diesel prices without compromising security of supply. The broader issue remains unchanged: reduced domestic refining capacity and heavy dependence on imported fuel leave the European economy exposed when international supply routes are disrupted.

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G7 releases diesel stocks after Trump pressure, EU denies caving

The EU and its G7 partners agreed on Friday (2 October) to a coordinated release of 100 million barrels of diesel and crude through the International Energy Agency (IEA) over four months.

The release includes “a frontloaded substantial diesel release within the first 20 days,” a press brief released after a Friday afternoon call read.

The call was initiated by French president Emmanuel Macron who holds the rotating G7 presidency on Friday, after he spoke to US president Donald Trump on Thursday.

“Europe has just agreed to release a massive amount of their heavily stocked Diesel Oil. The process will begin immediately,” Trump wrote on Truth Social shortly afterwards.

Trump had pressured EU leaders to agree to the release all week.

On Thursday, US treasury secretary Scott Bessent urged Europe to “immediately” tap its reserves.

And EU leaders had received a proposal from the White Housethe same day for 120 million barrels of diesel over 180 days.

Washington had already approached France, Germany, Italy, Ireland and the UK individually, warning they could face US diesel export bans if they did not comply.

US diesel prices hit a record $6.53 per gallon last week, which is a liability for Trump’s Republicans ahead of the 3 November midterm elections.

Europe’s reward is a single line in the G7 statement, which reaffirms a commitment “to refrain from export restrictions on energy and energy products” between G7 countries.

The EU also on Friday had insisted that any further release come with a US pledge to avoid a unilateral diesel ban, and rejected the suggestion that they buckled to US pressure.

“We fully reject a [US] ban on diesel. A ban would not be beneficial to anyone. It would undermine our trust in the US as a reliable partner,” said Anna-Kaisa Itkonen, the commission’s energy spokesperson.

She declined to comment on the leader’s call ahead of time.

Commission chief spokesperson Paula Pinho said the coordination had “nothing to do with” recent threats.

She noted that gas prices had risen by 140 percent and diesel prices had doubled since February, and that a release agreed in March was still being implemented.

The G7 text presented Friday’s decision to release the 100 million barrels as continuing those commitments.

But the commission’s own oil coordination group concluded this week that there was “no immediate security supply issue” in the EU, Itkonen said.

Emergency stocks exist to deal with supply disruptions, not prices.

But the IEA route gives European capitals political cover, allowing them to present the release as collective action rather than a concession to Washington.

And it may not be the last one. “We will convene in the context of the IEA in the coming days to discuss the possibility of additional diesel releases as necessary,” the G7 statement said.

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EU and US Seek Diesel Agreement as Washington Presses Europe to Release Reserves

European governments and the United States are negotiating over emergency diesel reserves as a global shortage of refined fuel places increasing pressure on transport, agriculture and industry.

The Trump administration has urged France and Germany to release diesel from their strategic stocks, while raising the possibility of restricting American diesel exports if European governments fail to put additional supplies on the market.

Washington has asked Europe to release about 120 million barrels over six months, according to people familiar with the talks.

The demand puts European governments in a difficult position. Releasing reserves could help reduce prices in the short term, but it would also reduce the emergency buffer available if disruption to Russian or Middle Eastern supplies becomes more severe.

The European Commission, France, Italy, Ireland and Britain held discussions on 1 October over possible diesel stock releases. Germany has been involved separately in discussions with Washington.

France and Germany hold a substantial share of Europe’s emergency diesel reserves.

Under the EU’s Oil Stocks Directive, member states must maintain emergency crude oil or petroleum-product stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of net imports or 61 days of domestic consumption, whichever is higher.

The requirement exists to provide a buffer against major supply interruptions rather than normal market fluctuations.

Europe’s dependence on imported oil remains substantial. Oil accounted for around 38 per cent of the EU energy mix in 2024, while approximately 95 per cent of crude oil consumed in the bloc was imported.

The latest dispute follows months of mounting pressure in the diesel market.

EU Today reported in September that President Donald Trump had urged Ukraine to reduce attacks on Russian refining infrastructure as global diesel supplies tightened.

Moscow has since extended restrictions on diesel exports. At the same time, disruption to Middle Eastern refining and shipping has constrained another major source of supply, while China moved on 1 October to suspend most fuel-product exports outside Hong Kong and Macau.

The result has been a particularly sharp problem for Europe because its refining capacity has declined over the past two decades and it has become increasingly dependent on imported middle distillates.

European dependence on outside energy supplies was already becoming more expensive before the latest diesel shortage. Recent Eurostat figures showed that the value of EU petroleum-oil imports increased by 55.8 per cent in the second quarter of 2026, even though the physical volume imported rose by only 1.2 per cent.

The United States has become an increasingly important diesel supplier since Europe sharply reduced imports of Russian refined products following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

That means a US export restriction would have an immediate impact on the European market.

EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič said after discussions with US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer that Brussels wanted a coordinated transatlantic approach to lowering diesel prices.

He said restrictions on US diesel exports would damage Europe’s economic performance and that both sides had agreed to remain in close contact.

Šefčovič also noted that the EU had exceeded its commitment to purchase US energy under the trade agreement reached at Turnberry in 2025.

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright, meanwhile, said he was “highly confident” European governments would release additional stocks.

Wright argued that coordinated action was particularly important as the northern hemisphere moved into the harvest season and towards winter, when demand for diesel and heating fuels normally increases.

Emergency releases have already been used on an exceptional scale this year.

In March, the 32 members of the International Energy Agency agreed to make 400 million barrels of oil from emergency reserves available to the market after disruption caused by the Middle East conflict.

It was the largest coordinated stock release in the organisation’s history.

A further European release would therefore come only months after governments had already drawn on strategic reserves to stabilise markets.

The pressure is increasing as oil prices again move higher. Brent crude settled above $102 a barrel on 1 October amid concerns over Chinese fuel exports and further US military deployments to the Middle East.

EU energy officials are now considering whether the immediate risk of high diesel prices outweighs the value of keeping fuel in reserve against a potentially more serious supply disruption later in the year.

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EU Governments Spend €17.9bn Shielding Consumers from Energy Price Shock

European Union governments have committed €17.9 billion this year to measures intended to protect households and businesses from rising energy prices as disruption in the Middle East and global fuel markets continues to feed through into European inflation.

Twenty-five of the EU’s 27 member states have adopted some form of energy support during 2026, according to the latest assessment of the measures.

More than two-thirds of the spending consists of measures that directly suppress energy prices rather than targeted income support.

The figure has increased since the Commission’s spring economic forecast.

Measures adopted or sufficiently detailed by 4th May were then estimated to cost €14.5 billion, equivalent to around 0.07 per cent of EU GDP. The Commission calculated that extending those measures until the end of 2026 could increase their cost to €38.6 billion.

National measures include reductions in fuel taxes and excise duties, energy vouchers, direct financial assistance and support for companies facing higher production and transport costs.

The Commission has repeatedly urged governments to concentrate assistance on vulnerable households and particularly exposed industries rather than subsidising energy use across the entire economy.

Its spring assessment found that roughly three quarters of the support then in force was not targeted specifically at vulnerable consumers or energy-intensive companies.

Broad price measures can reduce household bills immediately, but they also carry a larger fiscal cost and reduce the incentive to cut consumption when supplies are constrained.

The present shock began with disruption to oil and gas supplies caused by the Middle East conflict.

The Commission responded with its AccelerateEU package of emergency and structural measures, allowing governments to use measures including income support, energy vouchers and lower electricity taxes for vulnerable households.

Brussels says Europe does not currently face an immediate security-of-supply problem for the winter of 2026–27 because supplies have been diversified and strategic reserves remain available.

Price exposure is a different matter. Europe still depends heavily on imported fossil fuels, leaving domestic businesses and consumers exposed when world-market prices rise.

Recent trade figures underline the scale of that vulnerability. EU Today reported last month that Europe’s petroleum import bill increased by 55.8 per cent in the second quarter compared with the same period of 2025, despite only a 1.2 per cent increase in the volume imported.

Natural gas presents another risk. European storage sites entered the autumn at unusually low levels, with EU Today reporting that EU gas stocks were around 67 per cent full in mid-September, leaving the bloc more exposed if winter demand rises sharply.

Pressure has now spread into refined fuel markets as well. Russian diesel exports are restricted, Middle Eastern supply remains vulnerable and China has suspended most fuel-product exports outside Hong Kong and Macau. Washington is simultaneously pressing European governments to release diesel from their strategic reserves.

The energy shock is also affecting the wider economic outlook.

The Commission’s spring forecast had already anticipated weaker growth and higher inflation. It projected EU employment growth of only 0.3 per cent in 2026 and expected the aggregate government deficit to rise from 3.1 per cent of GDP in 2025 to 3.6 per cent by 2027.

More recent Commission estimates indicate that eurozone growth in 2026 could be somewhat stronger than the earlier forecast, while expectations for 2027 have deteriorated.

Inflation is expected to remain around 3 per cent this year and to remain above earlier projections next year. That increases the fiscal problem facing governments.

Large energy subsidies can reduce the immediate impact on households but add to public borrowing and may complicate monetary policy if they support overall demand.

The European Fiscal Board has urged member states to ensure that energy measures are temporary, have clear expiry dates and are directed at vulnerable households and businesses.

The Commission is also drawing lessons from the measures adopted after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Energy support introduced during 2022 and 2023 alone had a net cost equivalent to about 2.1 per cent of EU GDP, according to Commission calculations.

Brussels wants to avoid a second prolonged cycle of broad subsidies while accelerating investment intended to reduce Europe’s structural reliance on imported fossil fuels. That includes grid investment, electrification, renewables and measures to reduce taxes on electricity relative to gas.

For national governments, however, the immediate pressure is coming from bills paid today rather than energy infrastructure planned for the next decade. With €17.9 billion already committed during 2026, further disruption in international oil, diesel or gas markets could determine whether what was designed as temporary support has to be extended into next year.

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Trump about to self-destruct over latest diesel initiative?

The West is run by the dumbest leaders ever.

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It is a mark of our times that Western leaders are not only the weakest that they have ever been, but they are also the dumbest – with Donald Trump leading the pack. His latest initiative has enraged the business press, who have wheeled out all the experts to shoot it down in flames. Trump wants to limit diesel exports from the U.S., which he believes will drive down diesel pump prices in the U.S., but it is such a stupid idea that many political commentators are pointing out his own level of desperation by playing what one called “an economics game of roulette where if the ball lands on a red number we lose everything”. Experts predict that such an initiative would only reduce diesel prices by about 5 percent for American truckers, but, according to the economists at Goldman Sachs, will drive up gasoline prices at the pumps. Quite apart from the diesel ban also wrecking the global oil economy – which will have its own blowback with American consumers – Trump is showing that not only does he not have smart economists around him advising him on these late-night whims which come to him, but he himself understands practically nothing about how the U.S. economy works.

After giving the most vulgar and disgraceful speech at the UN, talking about himself like a Roman Emperor “annihilating” Iran – a civilisation which is about 4,000 years old – it is easy to see, though, how leaders like Trump exist, when there is practically no safety mechanism in place for a U.S. president to behave so appallingly and to be so reckless with the economy. Nothing from Congress, or even either the Speaker of the House or even leaders of either party, to condemn such narcissistic speeches or foolish policy decisions by a man who represents the greatest wrecking ball to Western civilisation as we know it. And even though we saw a glimmer of hope from U.S. media groups who boycotted his Oval Office sessions, few if any journalists are prepared to report on Trump accurately, preferring to give a gloss or simply bypass his buffoonery altogether. In such an environment where the press gives you a free card, is it any wonder that Trump in his second term in office is basically a New Jersey mobster who has lost his mind entirely – drunk on power and corrupted by it, like Rome’s last emperor who was looking for his chicken while the entire empire was collapsing around him?

The sad thing, though, is that he is not alone.

In the EU, we’ve never had such unremarkable, dithering, under-performing, corrupt political wasters as the current coterie of losers running the UK, France and Germany. The UK is particularly bad, as Andy Burnham and Ed Miliband capture the internet’s imagination for a few brief moments as they enter the UN auditorium – and the main takeaway from their perplexed expressions as they look into someone’s camera is that they appear to be both lost and out of their depths, like children on their first day at the big school. While all three throw all their weight behind war talk about the Russians coming – a scam designed to distract people’s attention away from failed public sectors, immigration and economies in tailspins – Burnham stood out this week, though, for a new policy initiative. He’s going to create an Orwellian new police department to control content on the internet, perhaps inspired by the EU’s own German fascist leader – er, European Commission president, I mean – Ursula von der Leyen, who hates free speech so much that she wants it outlawed altogether.

Trump may well end up looking smarter than the leaders of the UK, France and Germany, as these three bankrupt economies now have only one modus operandi, which is to create a phoney war with Russia – which they believe will deflect any blame aimed at them for when these economies hit rock bottom and all these clowns can offer is to turn to international banks and borrow even more. They know their time in office is limited, and so a war is the perfect solution – not only to divert attention away from their own failure but to also give a massive boost to their friends in the industrial military complex, who will be very grateful for the huge new contracts given to them. We should not be surprised that both the children of Trump and even Tony Blair have huge stakes in weapons companies and could really do with a war which shovels billions their way. Yet the diesel initiative from Trump could actually be the last nail in his coffin, as if he goes ahead with it and it proves to actually jack up gasoline prices, he is likely to lose both houses. Already droves of Republican senators and representatives are distancing themselves from Trump’s Iran war and higher pump prices; it’s hard to imagine how many more stupid lies Trump can tell, blaming others for his own self-made calamities.

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Iran War Adds More Than €100bn to Europe’s Energy Import Bill

European Union countries have paid more than €100 billion extra for energy this year without receiving additional oil or gas, according to EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen, as disruption linked to the Iran war drives another energy shock through the European economy.

Speaking ahead of an informal meeting of EU energy ministers in Dublin, Jørgensen said Europe had “surpassed €100 billion” in additional spending.

“We have now surpassed €100 billion that we’ve paid extra for our energy this year without receiving one extra molecule of gas or oil,” he said in the European Commission’s recording of his remarks.

The figure puts a direct cost on the price shock which has followed disruption to oil and liquefied natural gas supplies associated with the conflict involving Iran.

The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted one of the world’s most important energy corridors. Under normal conditions, the waterway handles roughly one fifth of globally traded oil and significant LNG volumes.

Europe remains heavily exposed because most of the oil it consumes and about 80 per cent of its gas requirements come from outside the EU.

The consequences were already visible in trade figures published before the latest ministerial meeting.

Last week, EU Today reported that the EU’s oil import bill had risen 55.8 per cent in the second quarter compared with a year earlier, even though the physical volume of crude imported increased by only 1.2 per cent.

Europe was therefore paying substantially more without materially increasing the amount of energy it purchased.

The pressure has intensified as winter approaches.

EU gas storage is around 70 per cent full, roughly 12 percentage points below the level recorded at the same stage last year. Jørgensen has warned governments to continue filling storage or consider reducing demand if required.

Possible measures include limiting temperatures in public buildings, restricting outdoor heating and switching off unnecessary public lighting, according to recommendations circulated to governments ahead of the Dublin meeting.

The informal meeting of EU energy ministers focused on energy affordability, security of supply and Europe’s continuing exposure to international fossil-fuel markets.

Irish Energy Minister Darragh O’Brien described the situation as the second major fossil-fuel shock Europe had faced in four years and argued that domestic clean-energy production was essential if the EU wanted to reduce its vulnerability to future crises.

Europe is in a stronger physical position than during the 2022 energy crisis.

It has expanded LNG import infrastructure, increased renewable electricity generation and reduced gas demand. It has also sharply reduced its dependence on Russian pipeline gas.

But that restructuring has created different dependencies.

European buyers now compete more directly for LNG on global markets, meaning events in the Gulf, Asia or the United States can rapidly affect the price paid by European consumers.

EU Today reported earlier this month that reduced LNG availability and disruption around Hormuz had left European gas storage at historically weak seasonal levels.

Diesel presents another problem.

Europe became more dependent on imported refined products after reducing purchases from Russia, with the United States now supplying approximately half of EU diesel imports.

Washington has considered restrictions on diesel exports as domestic US prices rise. European officials have urged the Trump administration not to introduce such measures, warning that they would increase pressure on international markets.

Emergency reserves provide some protection.

EU countries are required to maintain strategic oil stocks, while the International Energy Agency coordinated a release of 400 million barrels from member-country reserves earlier this year.

France and Germany hold a particularly large share of Europe’s strategic diesel inventories. Further releases remain possible if international markets deteriorate, although no new coordinated decision has yet been taken.

The current crisis is also feeding into the EU’s longer-term energy debate.

Spain, Portugal and Luxembourg are now pressing for an EU renewable-energy target for 2040, arguing that increasing domestic electricity generation would reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels.

The security argument extends beyond climate policy. An EU Today Research Desk paper published in June examined how concentrated fossil-fuel supply routes and maritime chokepoints can transmit geopolitical shocks into European prices, infrastructure and industry.

The current disruption provides a practical example.

Europe has not bought substantially more fuel, but it is paying tens of billions of euros more because the international price of the energy it imports has risen.

The immediate concern is whether supplies and gas inventories will be sufficient through the coming winter without another sharp increase in prices.

The longer-term question is how much of Europe’s energy demand can be moved away from imported fossil fuels before another geopolitical crisis produces the same result.

For EU governments, Jørgensen’s €100 billion figure provides a measure of the cost of that dependency.

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Oil and gas industry expected surplus – but war brought shortage

In 2023, the International Energy Agency predicted that by 2028 the world’s oil companies would produce more oil than people wanted to buy. Prices responded to that and similar projections of slowing oil demand, dropping too low to attract investment for new wells and refineries. No forecast anticipated that the Strait of Hormuz, the main […]

The post Oil and gas industry expected surplus – but war brought shortage appeared first on Asia Times.

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Coal’s contradiction: Texas generates the most, West Virginia needs it most

Which states generate the most electricity from coal? According to May 2026 EIA data, Texas leads all states with 4,536 thousand MWh of coal-fired generation, followed by West Virginia (3,611 thousand MWh) and Kentucky (3,442 thousand MWh). But while West Virginia is 87.2% dependent on coal, it occupies a modest 8.95% share in Texas’s vast energy mix.

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(Click on the image to enlarge)


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Russia earns record seaborne oil revenues despite Ukraine attacks

Last week, Russia recorded its highest estimated revenues from seaborne oil exports since the start of the war with Ukraine.

The main driver of this demand is the armed conflict and the resulting blockade of the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East. Due to supply problems, buyers are looking for additional sources of crude oil. This also applies to China which, although it has already secured reserves of the commodity, is also starting to increase purchases from the Russian Federation.

Russia’s record revenues from oil sales

Last week, Russia achieved record weekly revenues from seaborne oil exports since the beginning of the war. Oil companies there shipped about 3.99 million barrels of oil a day to foreign markets. Given the high prices, this significantly increased the value of Russian exports.

Bloomberg estimates that the total value of oil shipped from Russian ports last week was about $2.75 billion. That is about $180 million more than the previous week and the highest weekly figure since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war.

Russian oil is now much more expensive than in previous months. As noted earlier, this is influenced by the situation in the global oil market, and in particular, the war in the Middle East. The price of Brent crude remained above $100 a barrel in September.

At the end of September, the price of this benchmark exceeded $103 per barrel. Earlier, prices rose further amid concerns about disruptions in oil supplies from the Middle East.

Average revenues for the last four weeks

The Kremlin has decided to limit fuel exports to support the domestic market. The ban on diesel exports by Russian producers has been extended until Sept. 30, and restrictions on the export of gasoline and some diesel fuels by other exporters remain in place for an extended period.

The UA News portal points out that an exceptional situation has arisen as a result, stating: “Russia cannot export as many petroleum products as before, but it has a surplus of crude oil that it cannot fully process domestically. Consequently, the oil surplus is diverted to the foreign market.”

This situation increases the volume of maritime exports. Russia’s current revenues have significantly exceeded the previous week’s value. To avoid drawing conclusions based on just one week, the agency also calculated average revenue over four weeks. This indicator is less susceptible to sharp short-term fluctuations in prices and volumes.

Over the past four weeks, the estimated average value of Russian oil exported by sea has been around $2.39 billion per week. That is about $290 million more than in the previous four-week period and the most since the second half of May.

Russia may continue to earn significant revenue from crude oil sales. As long as the price of Brent crude remains above $100 a barrel and Russian crude enjoys demand among buyers in Asia, Moscow can generate additional revenue, even despite operational problems at its own refineries.

This situation may change as supplies from the Middle East gradually resume. Reuters reported that exports from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates increased in September, and reconstruction of some infrastructure began after the attacks. This could ease pressure on the global market and affect the price of Russian oil, even if oil prices are expected to remain elevated throughout 2026 and 2027.

The post Russia earns record seaborne oil revenues despite Ukraine attacks appeared first on Remix News.

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