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Moldova is creating protective zones at border crossing points along its border with Ukraine amid the threat of drone attacks. It is also relocating its personnel from joint border crossings on Ukrainian territory back to Moldova. Moldovan Interior Minister Daniella Misail-Nichitin said this on 7 October, according to NewsMaker.

In recent months, Russian attacks on Ukrainian border crossing points near the country's borders with neighboring states have become more frequent. Ukrainian-Moldovan border crossings are among those most frequently targeted by Russia. As a result, Moldova now plans to withdraw all of its border personnel from Ukrainian territory.

A Moldovan border guard was also recently injured when a projectile struck near a passenger bus at the Palanca border crossing, Moldova's Border Police reported.

Chisinau strengthens protection of border crossings against Russian drone attacks

Moldovan authorities are working to strengthen security measures at all Border Police crossing points, including those located on Ukrainian territory, according to the statement.

Authorities are already setting up protective zones so that Border Police officers, government officials and civilians at the crossings can evacuate to a safe location if necessary, the minister said.

Moldova is also discussing moving its personnel from joint border crossings located on Ukrainian territory to Moldova. Personnel have already been withdrawn from two crossings, with plans to do the same at other joint crossings, Missail-Nikitin said.

NewsMaker clarified with Moldova’s Interior Ministry that the measure involves withdrawing Moldovan personnel from two joint border crossing points with Ukraine — Criva and Palanca.

Ukraine and Moldova seek a response to a new challenge

The first time Chisinau withdrew its personnel from Ukrainian territory at the Ukrainian-Moldovan border crossings was a month ago. Moldova temporarily changed the operating arrangements at three joint border crossings with Ukraine because of security risks linked to Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure near the border, Moldova's Border Police reported on 11 September.

The crossings in question are Giurgiulesti–Reni, Briceni–Rossoșani, and Criva–Mamalyga, where Moldovan border guards and customs officers had previously carried out controls on Ukrainian territory, according to the Border Police.

Starting 12 September, Moldovan personnel returned to Moldovan territory for 90 days and began working from existing infrastructure on the Moldovan side. The crossings themselves remained operational, and the cross-border movement of people and vehicles continued. Only the location where Moldovan services carried out their duties changed, the authorities said.

Ukraine is also strengthening the protection of its border infrastructure. The State Agency for Restoration and Infrastructure Development plans to install 135 basic mobile shelters at 28 border crossing points and on access roads leading to them. The shelters are intended to protect civilians crossing the border and border crossing personnel. Procurement is being carried out by the Restoration Services in Vinnytsia, Odesa, Chernivtsi, Zakarpattia, and Volyn Oblasts, according to the statement.

Ukraine’s border crossings near Moldova face ongoing Russian attacks

Russia has repeatedly attacked Ukrainian border infrastructure near the Moldovan border in recent weeks. On 25 August, a Russian drone struck the Vynohradivka–Vulcănești border crossing in Odesa Oblast.

On 5 October, Russian strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure caused an incident near the Palanka–Mayaky–Udobne border crossing. A projectile fell near the crossing, ricocheted off the ground and struck a passenger bus. The control booth was also damaged, and one Moldovan border guard sustained a minor injury.

On 9 September, Russia attacked the Starokozache–Tudora border crossing. One drone struck the crossing, while two others crashed nearby on Ukrainian territory. Two people were killed and three others were injured in the attack, and the crossing was temporarily closed. Russia claimed that this strike on a border crossing was prompted by Ukraine transporting weapons through the facility, a claim Moldova has denied.

Power outages have returned to Kyiv after Russian attacks damaged the energy infrastructure supplying the capital, with authorities warning that the situation could worsen as Russia intensifies its campaign against Ukraine’s energy system ahead of winter.

Russia has repeatedly targeted Ukraine’s power, heating, and other critical infrastructure to disrupt the systems civilians depend on and create a humanitarian crisis during winter. Ukrainian officials have repeatedly warned that this winter will be especially severe, as Russia has expanded its strike capabilities since the summer and Ukraine continues to face shortages of air-defense systems needed to protect its energy infrastructure.

Ukrenergo said on 8 October that emergency outages were being imposed in parts of Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast because of falling voltage in the high-voltage network. Previously announced hourly schedules were suspended, with predictable schedules to resume once the system stabilizes.

In the evening, further disruption came after a Russian attack on an energy facility important to Kyiv. Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal said that energy workers were working to restore power.

Kyiv has been under Russian attack throughout the day, with four people killed and 19 injured.

The attack continues into the evening of 8 October, with air raid alerts active across most of the country.

Kyiv loses power, water, and public transport

The damage throughout the day quickly spread beyond electricity.

The Kyiv City Military Administration said power disruptions temporarily halted metro trains and escalators. Part of the capital’s public transport system was also suspended because of the lack of electricity.

Reduced power to water infrastructure caused lower pressure on the right bank of the Dnipro, particularly in the Holosiivskyi, Sviatoshynskyi, Solomianskyi, and Shevchenkivskyi districts. Some buildings could temporarily lose water, the administration warned.

Russia is hitting the energy system as winter approaches

The outages come as Russia has stepped up attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure ahead of the heating season.

Ukrenergo said Russian attacks had caused new power outages in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. The company said damaged equipment was already limiting the grid’s ability to supply consumers and warned that further Russian strikes could rapidly change the situation.

For 9 October, Ukrenergo announced all-day power restrictions in affected regions, including hourly outages for some consumers. Industrial and business consumers will also face restrictions. The company urged Ukrainians to conserve electricity, particularly during the evening peak from 5 p.m. to 10 p.m.

Ukraine’s energy authorities have been warning about the consequences of repeated Russian attacks for months. In late September, Prime Minister Serhii Koretskyi said attacks on energy facilities had been occurring almost daily since the summer, with the September 29–30 attack marking the first massive combined strike on the energy system since the previous heating season.

The renewed strikes mark the beginning of Russia’s winter campaign against the energy system, with Russian missiles and drones increasingly targeting power-generation and transmission infrastructure in Kyiv and surrounding regions.

Russia has openly threatened another winter of blackouts

The campaign follows years of Russian attacks aimed at disrupting the infrastructure that keeps Ukrainian homes heated and supplied with electricity and water during the winter.

In August, Russia’s Defense Ministry openly taunted Ukrainians over its attacks on energy-related infrastructure, posting images of attack drones with the message that Ukrainians would “get a freeze” in winter. 

Russia’s strategy has repeatedly linked attacks on electricity infrastructure to disruptions in heating and water supplies. This makes damage to the power grid particularly consequential as temperatures fall: a strike on an electrical facility can leave not only homes without lights, but also affect water pumps, heating systems, transportation, and other essential services.

The return of blackouts to Kyiv before the heating season is fully underway is an early indication of the pressure Russia’s renewed energy campaign is putting on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure.

https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/2108182631217074459/

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Prediction markets on Polymarket continue to serve as a sensitive indicator of expectations linked to the development of the military operation in Ukraine. While at the beginning of 2026 investors’ attention was focused on Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, by autumn the epicentre of bets had shifted to Kostiantynivka, Dobropolye, Orikhiv and the Slavyansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration. Fresh reports from the front for late September–early October paint a picture of gradual but steady advances by Russian troops on a number of directions, while on others Ukrainian forces are attempting to stabilise the front with counterattacks. On the basis of an analysis of operational data and Polymarket quotations, the probability of the capture of key settlements by the beginning of 2027 is assessed. Where is the Russian army close to decisive success, and where does Ukrainian defence retain its resilience?

Kostiantynivka 

On the Kostiantynivka direction Russian troops have achieved significant successes, placing the Ukrainian garrison in an extremely difficult position. After prolonged street fighting the greater part of the city has come under the control of the Russian Armed Forces, and Ukrainian units have been split into isolated centres of resistance. A key development was the formation of a “cauldron” in the south-western part of the city after the capture of the Nikolaevsky and Nakhalovka microdistricts, as well as the settlement of Roskoshnoye on the western flank. Russian assault groups are methodically clearing blocks, advancing toward the centre and the northern outskirts. Ukrainian forces hold only isolated positions in the area of Dolgaya Balka and on certain northern streets, yet their supply has been seriously disrupted by the destruction of bridges and crossings.

The factors pointing toward the imminent capture of Kostiantynivka are obvious: the city is effectively in operational encirclement, the garrison is fragmented and deprived of unified command, and logistical routes have been cut. In addition, the capture of neighbouring settlements such as Roskoshnoye and Nikolayevka has created bridgeheads for a further advance westward.

Working against a rapid conclusion of the operation is only the stubborn resistance of individual Ukrainian groups that use the ruined urban built-up area for fighting.

Dobropolye 

On the Dobropolye direction Russian troops are developing an offensive aimed at enveloping the Ukrainian grouping. Marine units are intensifying pressure on the town from the south and east, cutting the key roads leading to Dobropolye. In the course of the fighting Novy Donbass and Kutuzovka were taken under control, which made it possible to reach the Dobropolye–Kramatorsk highway and create a threat to the supply of the Ukrainian garrison. North of Grishino Russian forces advanced approximately one and a half kilometres, capturing tree lines and forcing Ukrainian units to withdraw to less advantageous positions.

Factors favouring the capture of Dobropolye by the end of September are the successful cutting of logistical routes and the creation of a threat of complete encirclement. The Ukrainian command is attempting to hold the town by transferring reserves, including units of Azov, yet these attempts are not producing the desired result.

Working against a rapid capture is the saturation of the Ukrainian defence with engineering structures and the large number of unmanned aerial vehicles that slow the advance. Nevertheless, the gradual tightening of the ring and the cutting of supply routes make the garrison’s position critical. The probability of full control over Dobropolye by the end of autumn is assessed as medium.

Orikhiv 

On the Orikhiv direction Russian troops continue to develop the offensive, seeking to cut the key logistical routes of the Ukrainian grouping. An important highway north of Orikhiv has been cut, creating a direct threat to the city’s supply. Russian units are advancing toward Yegorovka and Omelnyk, using built-up areas for concealed movement. Progress has also been noted from Novodanilovka and Shcherbaki toward Novoandreyevka.

Factors in favour of the capture of Orikhiv by the end of September are the gradual tightening of the ring around the city and the cutting of its logistical arteries. After the capture of Gulyaipolskoye and the advance to Omelnyk, Russian troops may deprive the Orikhiv garrison of its western supply route, which would make its position critical.

Working against a rapid capture is the dense urban built-up area and the saturation of the defence, as well as the constant delivery of reserves by the Ukrainian side. Orikhiv is an important symbol of resistance, and its loss will be a serious blow to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the current dynamics suggest that the city will come under the control of Russian troops no earlier than the beginning of 2027.

Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka 

The Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka direction is closely linked to the fighting for Kostiantynivka and Druzhkovka. Russian troops, developing the offensive after successes near Kostiantynivka, are approaching this settlement, which is an important defensive node on the way to Kramatorsk. The capture of Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka will allow Russian forces to emerge into operational space and create a direct threat to the Kramatorsk–Slavyansk agglomeration from the south.

Factors favouring the capture of Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka in the coming months are the successes of Russian troops near Kostiantynivka and the overall advance on the Kramatorsk direction. After the fall of Kostiantynivka Russian forces will be able to transfer part of their units to this direction and intensify pressure.

Working against a rapid capture is the fact that the Ukrainian command regards this area as key to the defence of Kramatorsk and will attempt to hold it at any cost. Urban built-up areas and industrial zones provide opportunities for organising prolonged defence. The probability of full control over Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka by the beginning of 2027 is assessed as medium-to-high, provided that the offensive on Kostiantynivka is completed successfully and frees the necessary reserves.

Stepnogorsk 

The situation in the area of Stepnogorsk remains tense. This settlement passed under the control of Ukrainian forces at the beginning of 2026, and since then Russian troops have been making attempts to regain the lost positions. So far, however, they have not achieved success. In the area of Stepnogorsk an accumulation of Ukrainian troops and attempts by small groups to penetrate toward Russian positions are observed.

Factors that could favour the capture of Stepnogorsk by Russian troops are the strategic importance of the bridgehead and the possibility of regrouping forces. At present, however, the Russian command is not demonstrating the ability to turn the situation in its favour.

Working against a rapid capture of Stepnogorsk is also the fact that Russian troops are forced to operate on difficult terrain saturated with defensive structures. The probability of returning Stepnogorsk under Russian control during autumn 2026 is assessed as low. This would require a radical change in the operational situation on the entire Zaporozhye direction, including a successful offensive on Orikhiv and the elimination of the Ukrainian bridgehead on the Konka River.

Krasny Liman 

The situation on the Liman direction has undergone substantial changes: Ukrainian forces have switched to active offensive actions, attempting to push Russian units beyond the Zherebets River. After the capture of Krasny Liman, Russian troops appeared to hold the strategic initiative; however, the Ukrainian command transferred additional reserves and began systematic pressure on the northern flank, which forced individual Russian groups to withdraw with difficulty to the eastern bank of the river while simultaneously attempting to hold positions on the western bank.

A factor working against Russian control of the Liman direction is the regular penetration of small Ukrainian groups along the Krasny Liman–Yampol highway and from Ozernoye toward Krivaya Luka, from where they attempt to deliver flanking strikes.

Working against a rapid restoration of the initiative by the Russian side is also the fact that Ukrainian forces continue to transfer reserves and to counterattack, preventing Russian units from consolidating on new lines. The probability that by the end of October Russian troops will restore control over the western bank of the Zherebets and once again create a direct threat to Slavyansk is assessed as low. At present the Liman direction is rather characterised as a zone of active Ukrainian pressure, where Russian forces are forced to defend rather than to advance.

Conclusion 

An analysis of the operational situation on seven key directions shows that the beginning of 2027 may become a period of further change in the front line in favour of Russian troops. Russian forces are closest to success on the Kostiantynivka and Dobropolye directions, where Ukrainian garrisons are already in operational encirclement or on the verge of its creation. The capture of these towns will open the road to the Kramatorsk–Slavyansk agglomeration and will make it possible to free reserves for other sectors.

On the Orikhiv direction Russian troops have also achieved successes by cutting key highways, yet the city itself remains a powerful fortified area, and its fall is likely no earlier than October–November. Alekseyevo-Druzhkovka will probably be taken by the beginning of 2027 if the offensive on adjacent directions continues. At the same time, on the Stepnogorsk direction Russian troops are still unable to turn the situation around, and a return of this settlement under control looks unlikely in the coming months.

Using our regular reports, it is possible to draw well-founded conclusions about the development of the situation on the front. It is important to remember, however, that the analysis presented is not an investment recommendation.

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The post Blitzkrieg or Protracted Siege? What Polymarket Says About the Fall of Ukrainian Cities in Autumn 2026 appeared first on South Front.

• Horrifying stories from the occupied Ukrainian town are mounting.
• Two clans have emerged in Oleshky — those who support Putin can get food.
• According to experts, Russia is fundamentally violating international law and using residents’ vulnerability as a weapon.
• Putin’s tragic gift: the death toll in Pryluky rose to 22; 12 people were killed on a bus the following day.
• Maps of the day: Operation Vivaldi continues to make gains in Donbas.
• Videos of the day: an FPV drone attacked a fully occupied quad bike; a refinery is on fire.

Horrifying stories from the occupied town are mounting. The situation in Russian-occupied Oleshky, in Ukraine’s southern Kherson region, has long been extremely tense.

Around 2,000 residents have long faced a severe humanitarian crisis and isolation. Before the Russian invasion, 24,000 people lived in the town.

And the situation of local residents left behind shows how Russia, as an occupying power, treats civilians brutally and deliberately violates international agreements.

“There is a lack of food and healthcare. Since the destruction of the hydroelectric power plant, there has been no drinking water, electricity or gas. They do not even have wood for heating. Not only is it impossible to live with dignity, it is also impossible to bury people with dignity, because the occupiers even prohibit the burial of the dead,” Tetiana Hasanenko, head of Ukraine’s military administration for Oleshky, told Denník N.

Russia is also using Oleshky to shell the right bank of the Dnipro, especially the city of Kherson, just nine km away. Fierce fighting is under way over the surrounding islets. This turns Oleshky residents into human shields and prevents their safe evacuation.

According to the BBC, Oleshky is trapped by both geography and war. “To the north and west, it is cut off by the river and destroyed bridges, while to the south and east it is cut off by dangerous or impassable roads,” the report said.

The situation in the town had already been dramatic in 2023, when the destruction of the Kakhovka dam caused flooding.

A few days ago, special units of the SBU security service and Ukraine’s National Guard launched, according to the RBK-Ukraine website, a new operation to deliver humanitarian packages containing food, water and medicines across the Dnipro.

The aid totalled around four tonnes, with each package weighing 19 kg.

Footage from the mission can be viewed in this video by Suspilne television.

In these difficult conditions, heavy Vampire drones — dubbed Baba Yaga by Russians — are, according to a Ukrainian website, one of the few ways of providing aid to people on the occupied side of the river. Ukrainian soldiers often deploy them at the front for their own logistics in areas that are extremely dangerous.

Last year, the drone was even described as the most effective combat vehicle changing the course of the war.

According to Hasanenko, Ukraine’s armed forces have regularly dropped food by drone into the occupied area since March.

“They did it, but not on such a large scale. And every time drones fly over, the occupiers punish local people for it,” said the Ukrainian woman, who is in contact with people from Oleshky.

She said people try to immediately transfer the aid into unmarked containers to avoid punishment. “The occupiers believe that if people accept help from the Ukrainian armed forces, they supposedly have some connection with them and are betraying the country — which is not actually their country. And that is why they punish them,” Hasanenko explained.

In recent months, Oleshky residents have relied mainly on their own harvests, but at the end of the season they face a critical food shortage.

There have even been reports that residents were forced to eat dogs. A BBC report from late September revealed shocking findings from the town: people had learned to cook even with weeds.

Some, according to Ukrainska Pravda, caught pigeons or pheasants, while others cooked borscht “in a new way” — from eggs, courgettes, tomatoes and herbs.

“Prices there are not merely high but almost astronomical. Eggs sell for 800 hryvnias a dozen (€19), potatoes and onions for 500 (€11.90), courgettes for 250 (€5.95), and tomatoes for 200 (€4.76), because there was a good harvest,” the website wrote.

Despite the risk of being killed by a mine, residents travel along a “road of death”, lined with burnt-out cars, to the nearest town, Radensk, for food. This was also confirmed by Reuters, which spoke to people who still have relatives there.

“The choice Russia imposes on civilians every day: stay and die of hunger, or leave and risk being blown up by a landmine,” the agency quoted Ukrainian ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets as saying.

Two categories of people and harassment over humanitarian aid. In the hospital, where dead bodies have been lying in the basement for four months, people have been divided into two clans, according to witnesses.

“Those loyal to the Russian regime have some food, sometimes even meat and alcohol. The people they call Ukraine-lovers have nothing. The hospital director took everything from the latest deliveries provided as humanitarian aid and handed it out to his own people,” Ukrainska Pravda quoted the son of a man who remained in Oleshky as saying.

When Ukrainians succeeded in dropping humanitarian aid into Oleshky, a new phase of psychological warfare by the Russian Federation began.

Under normal circumstances, an operation to drop humanitarian aid would not attract so much attention, but according to Ukraine’s SBU security service, the Russian response reached particularly absurd proportions.

According to its information, Russian soldiers were ordered to arrange a series of interviews aimed at discrediting the Ukrainian side.

The recorded interviews were meant to include claims that Ukrainians were shelling Oleshky, positive views of Putin’s regime and expressions of gratitude. The SBU therefore urged Ukrainians to treat such reports cautiously and not spread unverified information.

According to information from the Ukrainian resistance movement in the Kherson region, which cannot be independently verified, those who received the aid faced abuse during interrogations.

According to Hasanenko, the most important thing now is to evacuate people from the town.

“Even what humanitarian missions are doing now, dropping food, will not solve their problems. I have reports in which people wrote that they had food left for two days and that this saved them. But it will not save them forever. Many people are dying there because of drones and artillery shelling. We need to establish a humanitarian corridor,” said the head of Oleshky’s military administration, adding that last winter had already been difficult and that they might not survive this one.

She herself has received reports that people have lost 10, 20 or even 40 kg. “There is one case: a woman wrote that she weighed 110 kg and now weighs 67. She has lost 40 kg and writes to me that she is dying.”

Violations of international law. During the recent UN General Assembly session, Ukrainian foreign minister Andrii Sybiha spoke about Oleshky. Ukraine’s main aim, he said, was to establish a humanitarian corridor in the area and safely evacuate people who have not accepted the Russian occupation.

It is precisely because of this stance, Kyiv says, that the Russian army is retaliating by blockading the town, where tourists had before the war come for its unique natural environment of pine forests and Dnipro inlets.

“There is no supply of electricity or gas. Over the past month, the delivery of food, medicines and other basic necessities has been completely blocked. Horrifying testimonies are coming from occupied Oleshky about how people are trying to survive under a blockade imposed by Russia: they are looking for scraps of food and gathering grass because there is simply no other food,” Ukrainian website NV quoted the foreign minister as saying.

Another dimension of Russian terror, he said, is the hunting of civilians. Russian FPV drones pursue and attack people, turning even an attempt to leave one’s home or move around the town into a deadly risk.

According to TSN, Russia is artificially creating food shortages in Oleshky, selling an ordinary food package for 50,000 hryvnias — nearly €1,000 — compared with a standard price of up to 2,000 hryvnias (€40). When people have no money, they offer their jewellery in exchange for food.

Food was last delivered to the town at the end of May, and according to Ukrainska Pravda, no further attempt to bring in food was made. When locals tried on 2 June, their four cars were blown up by anti-personnel mines, killing two people.

Legally, the humanitarian crisis in Oleshky, as well as the use of the population as human shields, constitutes, according to Ukrainian website Rubryka, a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention — on the protection of civilians in time of war — and a war crime under Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

An occupying power is responsible for those living in occupied territory. “It must provide people with food, medical care and proper sanitation. But Russia is indifferent to all international requirements,” Ukrainska Pravda wrote.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, Oleshky has become a test of Russian dominance in an area “characterised by population decline, damaged infrastructure, chronic insecurity and growing isolation from the rest of Ukraine”.

Rather than reversing these conditions, the think tank said, Russia governs through them.

“Oleshky demonstrates that the humanitarian crisis unfolding across many Russian-occupied communities is not merely a byproduct of war but increasingly appears to be the result of an occupation system that tolerates, exploits, and sustains civilian vulnerability as a means of maintaining control,” wrote US experts.

According to Hasanenko, Russian fears of Ukrainian operations are also behind this. “I think they are simply trying to prevent the Ukrainian armed forces from crossing the Dnipro, because they could begin liberating the left bank. And people simply serve as human shields for them, while they mine everything completely,” she told EUobserver.

A tragic toll on Putin’s birthday. At least 22 people were killed, including five children, in a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile attack on an apartment building in Pryluky, in the Chernihiv region, on 7 October. Rescue workers pulled many people from the rubble of the destroyed building. According to local authorities, Russia fired as many as six cruise missiles at the town.

“This is the ‘gift’ Putin gave himself for his birthday. Killing children, killing people. There were new attacks with Shahed drones and aerial bombs during the day. It is important that leaders do not remain silent about what happened,” said Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, calling on the West to help with air defence.

Brutal Russian attacks continued the following day. As many as 12 people were killed after Russia hit a bus in the Donbas city of Kramatorsk. Putin’s regime is currently facing a crisis at the front, which it is trying to address through massive shelling of Ukrainian cities.

Maps of the day

Ukraine’s successful Operation Vivaldi continues. According to a report by the Institute for the Study of War, Ukrainian forces are continuing counterattacks towards the eastern bank of the Zherebets River, northeast of Lyman. The numerical superiority of Ukrainian forces and drones there is preventing Russian forces from consolidating their positions in the town.

According to September statistics, which we wrote about a few days ago, Russia has just had its worst month in Donbas for the past three years. The US newspaper The New York Times also charted this on its map.

Ukraine Claws Back Land in the Donbas, Thwarting a Russian Push – via @NYTimes using control of terrain data from @TheStudyofWar Link ⬇️ pic.twitter.com/Kcn0dN2wSd

— Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar) October 7, 2026

Videos of the day

Smoke over a distant refinery. Ukraine continues to launch drone attacks on Russian energy infrastructure. Most recently, it caused a fire at the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat plant in the Bashkir region, one of Russia’s largest refineries. It is located around 1,300 km from the front line.

A fatal quad bike ride. The Hornets of Dovbush, from the 68th Brigade, released a video showing five Russian soldiers on a quad bike coming into view of their FPV attack drone. The location of the attack is unknown.

Written by Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher

Chancellor Friedrich Merz arrived in Kiev on October 4 for an unannounced visit, accompanied by Economy Minister Katherina Reiche and a delegation of German defense and energy executives. Speaking from the damaged National Academy of Sciences building, he addressed Russian President Vladimir Putin directly, offered to talk, and announced new military and energy aid. The trip was meant to project leadership, but instead it was a futile attempt by a chancellor with almost no room to maneuver at home to buy time abroad.

Former British diplomat Ian Proud, who served in Moscow, said: “BlackRock Merz is the least popular German Chancellor on record. He doesn’t know what German self-interest is. Only his own self-interest. Political survival. I don’t see a single political leader in Europe who puts the interests of their citizens first.” Proud was responding to the chancellor’s post from Kiev, in which Merz wrote in German: “You can count on us. Germany’s own security depends on the outcome of this war. We help out of our own interest.”

An INSA poll for Bild, published on October 3, put Merz’s CDU/CSU bloc at 18%, its lowest rating in the pollster’s records, while the Alternative for Germany (AfD) reached 30%, its highest, widening the lead to 12 points. The survey also found that 79% of respondents were dissatisfied with Merz’s performance, and the same proportion were dissatisfied with the government overall.

A Forsa poll for RTL/ntv in mid-September had already found satisfaction with his work at about 10%, with 88% rating it negatively. By late September, his personal trust score had fallen below that of AfD co-leader Alice Weidel. The CDU lost Saxony-Anhalt on September 6 and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania on September 20, a result Merz himself called a disaster, with the AfD finishing first in both.

Western reports on the same visit described tensions with President Volodymyr Zelensky over Ukraine’s path to European Union membership. Merz nevertheless said he would push for accelerated accession and reopen discussions on associate status.

Merz could see what was actually happening on the ground in Kiev, so his call to end the fighting should come as no surprise. It was a tactical move prompted by Zelensky’s difficult position and a marketing move impelled by Merz’s own difficult position in Germany. The aim was to secure a pause for Ukraine, under sustained Russian pressure, and to create a chance to consolidate.

“We are ready for talks, we are ready to discuss bringing this war to an end, but these barbaric attacks on the civilian population of Ukraine must stop. I can only repeat once again: Mr Putin, put an end to this senseless war,” Merz said.

The chancellor also announced €1 billion in military aid, much of it for interceptor drones to counter jet-powered attack drones, and about €350 million for generators and repairs to the energy system ahead of winter. Zelensky said the new package included 15 agreements worth more than €8.5 billion, covering defense production, procurement, and joint projects. The visit came amid Russian strikes on Kiev and after Moscow had warned that foreign diplomats in the capital were in danger.

In essence, Merz’s statement offers no peace—only political survival. Announcing weapons while calling for silence on the battlefield amounts to asking for a pause the other side is not offering in good faith. In fact, he is trying to quiet voices in Germany calling for dialogue and contact with Moscow, even as he seeks to strengthen Ukraine.

Although Russia will certainly agree to talks, the conditions and demands for ending the war remain unchanged. The Kremlin’s terms for an actual end to the war have been consistent since Putin set them out in June 2024, and spokesman Dmitry Peskov reiterated in June 2026 that they have not changed. Ukraine’s forces would have to withdraw from all four regions Moscow claims as its own — Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporozhye — including parts the Russian army does not hold, and Kiev would have to publicly renounce NATO membership, not merely offer a private assurance.

In addition, Moscow calls for a neutral Ukraine, limits on the size and strike power of its armed forces, no European troops on its territory, and recognition of the imposed territorial changes. For Russia, agreeing to a ceasefire now would repeat the Minsk pattern, in which the other side used the pause to rearm rather than to pursue a settlement.

Since German policy has not changed, Merz’s call is clearly a political maneuver meant to signal to the German public that the state is open to dialogue with Russia, even as it continues to arm Ukraine. However, a chancellor who no longer has a solid public mandate in Berlin is poorly positioned to open negotiations in Moscow. Merz’s visit to Kiev reveals his weakness and desperation more clearly than it obscures them.

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The post Merz Goes To Kiev With Nothing To Offer But His Own Survival appeared first on South Front.

Two 14-year-old boys were killed when an explosive device detonated in the evening in the Konotop district of Sumy Oblast, according to the statement by Oleh Hryhorov, head of the Sumy Regional Military Administration. The children encountered the dangerous device in a field, suffered severe injuries, and died at the scene, the statement said.

In 2022, Russian forces occupied parts of Sumy Oblast, but Ukraine liberated the region in April. Russia intensified its offensive again in 2025. Today, mines, unexploded ordnance and Russian drones shot down over the region pose a danger, as their warheads can detonate after falling. Overall, 146 children in Ukraine have suffered mine-related injuries, former Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko reported in April. For example, two months ago, an 11-year-old boy and a 15-year-old boy in Sumy Oblast were injured when an explosive device detonated.

Hryhorov expressed his condolences to the parents and relatives of the victims and urged people to remain cautious:

“Please be as careful as possible and remind children: do not approach unknown or suspicious objects, touch them, or try to move them. Take care of yourselves and your loved ones,” Hryhorov said.

Demining efforts continue in Sumy Oblast

On 24 February 2022, Russian forces entered the territory of Sumy Oblast. The first battles in the region took place that same day. In particular, Russian forces attempted to break through to Sumy, but Ukrainian troops repelled the offensive. On 11 April 2022, Ukraine restored control over the entire Sumy region.

As early as 7 June 2022, deminers were working in the Konotop, Sumy, and Okhtyrka districts, according to the Government Portal. That day, they surveyed areas and neutralized explosive devices.

The work of deminers remains deadly dangerous. In September 2024, two pyrotechnicians from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast were hit by a mine while demining Sumy Oblast: one died, while the other was hospitalized. In July 2025, deminer Oleh Petrenko was killed during humanitarian demining operations in Shostka District when a Russian FPV drone detonated, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine reported. Another pyrotechnician was injured, the statement said.

Nevertheless, the work continues despite the danger. In 2025, State Emergency Service deminers in the Sumy Oblast found and neutralized 5,283 explosive devices, the agency said in April. Sumy Oblast ranked sixth among all Ukrainian regions by this figure.

Twenty-two percent of Ukraine’s territory is potentially contaminated with explosive devices — more than 133,000 square kilometers, former Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko reported in April this year. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, State Emergency Service and National Police deminers have surveyed more than 248,000 hectares of territory and found more than 1 million 112 thousand explosive devices, the statement said.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that Russia's war against Ukraine is at a stalemate but could escalate into a broader regional conflict if the deadlock pushes either side toward increasingly dangerous actions.

As Ukraine prepares for its fifth winter since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, a document obtained by RFE/RL sets out a blueprint for a campaign by Moscow to inflict enormous suffering on civilians with attacks aimed at sharply cutting supplies of power, heat, and water.

Intensifying attacks by Russia and Ukraine ahead of the winter are further endangering navigational safety in the Black Sea, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Thursday, adding that world powers must not allow the region to be turned into a new front in the war.

Russian forces struck the eastern Ukrainian city of Kramatorsk on the morning of 8 October, hitting two route buses carrying residents and killing dozens of civilians. The Donetsk Oblast prosecutor's office opened a war-crimes investigation.

Russia has turned everyday movement in frontline Donetsk Oblast into a lethal risk, striking city buses, ambulances, and cars in places its army has not been able to capture.

A route bus run turned deadly

The attack came at around 10:00, catching two route buses in the impact zone. The prosecutor's office said the attackers likely used a UMPB D-30SN. HUR, Ukraine's military intelligence, describes it as a guided glide bomb that can fly up to 100 km when released from an altitude of 12–15 km and carries a warhead equal to a FAB-250 aerial bomb.

30 people were killed and 18 injured after a Russian bomb hit two passenger buses carrying civilians in Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast.

The buses caught fire, and the force of the attack also damaged nearby homes and cars. Some victims were so badly burned that police had to recover… pic.twitter.com/FqLdM0HN1B

— Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) October 8, 2026

The toll rose through the day, from 12 dead in the first reports to 30 killed and 20 wounded by 14:55, Donetsk Oblast head Vadym Filashkin said. Across Donetsk Oblast, Russian attacks killed 33 people that day, including the 30 in Kramatorsk and three in nearby Bilenke, the State Emergency Service said. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the strike would not go unanswered.

Buses pulled off the roads

Filashkin ordered the Kramatorsk and Sloviansk city military administrations to suspend public transport, citing the sharp deterioration in security. Buses had become an attractive target for Russian forces, he said, and the authorities could not risk the lives of passengers and drivers. He also urged everyone still in Donetsk Oblast to leave for safer parts of Ukraine. Kramatorsk is a frequent target of Russian attacks. Russia had not commented on the strike as of publication.

The city has been under daily fire. On 5 October, Russian FPV drones hit ambulances and an apartment block in Kramatorsk, killing a woman and wounding four, the prosecutor's office reported. Over the previous day, Russian forces shelled Donetsk Oblast settlements 31 times and 256 people left the front line, Filashkin said.

More than 30 people were killed and several dozen others injured after a Russian attack on two passenger buses in Kramatorsk, according to Ukrainian authorities. Two buses were destroyed in the strike and public transportation was suspended.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Trying to pin the blame for the depletion of U.S. military stockpiles on something other than the war in Iran, President Donald Trump fell back on a usual scapegoat last week: Ukraine. “The Biden administration gave far more munitions away to Ukraine, at no cost to them whatsoever, than we have used in Iran,” Trump wrote on Truth Social.

This is a familiar refrain. Trump loves to remind his audience that because of him, Americans are “not spending on Ukraine anymore” and instead, Europe is footing the bill. In truth, most people in the United States don’t think about Ukraine much these days. But since Trump himself brought it up, it’s worth asking: What exactly is going on with U.S. military support to Ukraine?

The answer might surprise you. Despite Trump’s rhetoric, the United States remains deeply embroiled in Ukraine’s ongoing conflict with Russia in ways that create national security risks and run counter to Trump’s own foreign policy goals.

It is true that Trump has reduced U.S. support to Ukraine compared to its high mark under his predecessor, Joe Biden. First, his administration has stopped the use of Presidential Drawdown Authority to transfer weapons from U.S. stocks directly to Ukraine. The Biden administration used this mechanism to give Ukraine almost $35 billion in weapons free of charge. Second, the Trump administration has not requested additional funds for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), which uses U.S. financing to purchase new weapons for Ukraine.

But Trump has not cut off all assistance to Ukraine. Several important channels remain. First, there are about $13 billion in outstanding USAI contracts as of June 2026, down from $20 billion in January 2025. These contracts, signed by Biden and now implemented by Trump, will procure weapons for Ukraine through about 2028. Weapons in the pipeline include longer-lead time systems like NASAMs, Patriot missiles and components (Ukraine is reportedly receiving at 10-20 PAC-3s per month under these contracts), counter-drone systems, artillery rockets, and ammunition.

These continuing deliveries are not new awards, but they are still taxpayer-funded military aid to Ukraine that will add up to about $20 billion in aid over the 4 years of Trump’s term. Weapons produced under these contracts come off overburdened U.S. production lines. This has a high opportunity cost given the limits of U.S. defense industrial capacity. Without obligations to Ukraine, industrial resources could shift to different weapons or systems that the United States needs more.

If the Trump administration were serious about ending U.S. spending on the Ukraine war, it could still recoup these funds and reallocate the money to support U.S. defense production needs. It has instead allowed the aid to continue.

There has also been some new funding approved since Biden left office. Congress included about $800 million of USAI funding in the 2026 and 2027 NDAAs. We can expect more in future bills as well.

And the State Department has continued to send military aid of its own. A portion of this aid goes through the Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior, including drones, armored vehicles, guns, grenade launchers, and similar equipment. Since this equipment ends up with Ukraine’s National Guard and border police it is often counted as non-military and intended for things like counterdrug operations, but today these personnel serve as combat units.

The State Department has also approved $3 billion of new arms sales to Ukraine in 2025 and 2026 that will be at least partially funded from foreign military financing (FMF), which means U.S. dollars supporting foreign government purchases of U.S. weapons. Some of these funds may come from money allocated but not spent under President Biden, but much of the funding will be new, coming from the State Department’s budget.

The bottom line is that U.S. weapons transfers to Ukraine continue under Trump, amounting to, on average, as much at $5 billion per year. But this is no longer the most important, or expensive, type of support that the United States gives to Ukraine.

For example, the United States gives Ukraine real-time targeting information, including on the movement of Russian troops and the location of key command centers. This information has been important to Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign on Russian logistics as well as its deep strikes against military and energy targets inside of Russia. In addition, U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance assets in countries on the NATO border (including routine E-3 flights) are integrated with Ukraine’s air defense network, improving the accuracy and speed of Ukraine’s response.

Beyond intelligence, the United States also provides logistical and maintenance support, including forward and remote assistance to repair American-made equipment, necessary spare parts to keep older systems running, and training. It also facilitates the expensive transfer of European purchases of U.S. weapons.

The cost of the intelligence, logistics, and other operational support the United States provides to Ukraine does not show up anywhere as an itemized bill, even as U.S. assistance increases. But we can use available public information to draw some conclusions about the expenses incurred.

The 2024 defense supplemental bill, for instance, allocated about $15 billion to “military training, intelligence sharing, increased presence, and other support activities.” In theory, these funds are intended to cover activities conducted in support of Ukraine that would not occur if the United States remained uninvolved in that conflict. Some portion of this money will go to the salaries of military personnel who would be paid no matter where they work.

Since about a third of each military service’s budget is personnel costs, we could estimate the cost of extra activities conducted for Ukraine, excluding baseline manpower, at about $10 billion over the course of a year or so. If Trump has truly expanded intelligence sharing with Ukraine, this price tag may have increased over time.

The money included in the bill is likely only a portion of the actual burden the U.S. military and intelligence community have shouldered to support Ukraine’s war. Many intelligence activities, like tasking and analyzing satellite data and collecting signals intelligence, might be covered in classified national security budgets. Starting in 2023, in fact, the classified intelligence budget increased by 10%, a large jump over the 2022 total. The increase was justified by intelligence community leaders as resulting from shifts in the national security landscape, including especially concern about China’s rise and spillover from conflict in Ukraine. Since the total increase in funding was about $10 billion, we can guess that Ukraine-related expenditures might amount to $3-$5 billion per year, or about one-third to one-half of the total increase.

All told, then, U.S. taxpayers are still spending roughly $20 billion per year on Ukraine. Today, assistance to Ukraine comes primarily in the form of direct operational support, not weapons. But the shift in type of aid increases the risk of U.S. support to Ukraine to average Americans.

First, assisting Ukraine in striking energy targets inside of Russia has a perverse effect on the Trump administration’s efforts to keep gas prices low. As Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent acknowledged, Ukraine’s strikes inside Russia push global oil prices up, imposing higher costs of living on Americans.

Second, U.S. intelligence support deepens U.S. involvement in Ukraine’s war, making it an all-but-direct combatant. Russian assistance to Iran, both in terms of weapons and intelligence sharing, is a reaction to the comparable U.S. role in Ukraine, and it leaves U.S. servicemembers in the Middle East and elsewhere less safe. Growing U.S. participation in Ukraine also increases the risk that miscalculation leads to a direct U.S.-Russia confrontation, a nightmarish possibility given the degraded state of U.S. military readiness.

Trump promised to end the war in Ukraine in 24 hours. He has instead deepened U.S. entanglement in ways that create real risks and new fiscal costs for the United States. American interests would be best served if the United States were to walk away entirely, but if Trump instead opts for the status quo, he should at least be honest about it.

Original article: responsiblestatecraft.org

A Russian missile strike on an apartment building in Pryluky, a town in northern Ukraine's Chernihiv Oblast, killed 22 people on 7 October, regional police reported on the morning of 8 October. Five of the dead were children: three one-year-old boys, an eight-year-old boy, and a 13-year-old girl, police said.

Russian strikes on Pryluky, Kremenchuk, Oleksandriia, and Kyiv killed 28 people on 7 October, Interior Minister Ivan Vyhivskyi said. For the town, it was the second deadly missile strike since May. Behind the toll are families like this one: three generations hit by a single strike.

A family visit that ended under rubble

Three-year-old Zlatoslava is now in the Chernihiv Oblast children's hospital, Pryluky district police chief Vladyslav Stoianov told. Her mother, Kateryna, is hospitalized too. The two had come on the evening of 6 October to visit Kateryna's sister, police officer Yuliia Malysh. The girl's father stayed home in Lynovytsia, a village 15 km away.

Yuliia was wounded and is in hospital, Stoianov said. Her husband, Oleh Malysh, was killed. Until recently, Oleh had fought at the front in the Chernihiv Oblast police rifle battalion. The sisters' mother, Liudmyla, had also come over that evening, and she died too. All the family details come from Stoianov, who was describing a colleague's family.

Footage of an emergency worker carrying a little girl from the ruins reached almost all media, Vyhivskyi wrote in the same post. Suspilne first reported that the filmed rescuer had carried Zlatoslava. It then corrected itself: he had carried a different child, five-year-old Zoriana. Vyhivskyi also gives the girl's age as five, and he named the rescuer as State Emergency Service section commander Pavlo Levchenko. With colleagues, Levchenko freed the girl and her mother after the blast threw them out of the building.

Moldova saw more Russian drones crash on its territory in August than it did over all of 2025. Moldovan authorities are increasingly rattled—but there’s little a cash-strapped government can do beyond complaining diplomatically.

Dozens of people were killed in a Russian strike on the Ukrainian city of Kramatorsk on October 8, according to local authorities, a day after another deadly barrage killed at least 25 people across Ukraine.

At least 30 people have been killed and 18 injured after Russian forces struck two passenger buses in Kramatorsk, eastern Ukraine, on Thursday morning, according to updated figures released by Ukrainian prosecutors. The attack comes amid continuing Russian strikes on Ukrainian cities.

Russian forces attacked Kramatorsk, in Ukraine’s Donetsk region, at approximately 10am local time on 8 October, hitting an area where two scheduled passenger buses were carrying civilians.

The Donetsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office initially reported 12 fatalities and 14 injuries. In a subsequent update, prosecutors raised the death toll to 30 and the number of injured to 18.

The attack was also confirmed by the Kramatorsk City Council and Vadym Filashkin, head of the Donetsk Regional Military Administration.

According to preliminary findings from Ukrainian investigators, Russian forces may have used a UMPB D-30SN guided aerial munition. The precise weapon and circumstances of the attack remain under investigation.

Passenger buses caught in Russian bombardment

The two buses were operating regular passenger services when the strike occurred. Ukrainian authorities said passengers were on board, although detailed information about the victims, including their ages and identities, has not yet been released.

Photographs published by the regional prosecutor’s office show the aftermath of the attack, including severely damaged passenger vehicles. Emergency personnel and law enforcement officers were dispatched to assist the wounded, recover victims and document evidence.

The strike raises questions about the selection of the target and precautions taken to protect civilians. Under international humanitarian law, civilian vehicles and their passengers are protected from deliberate attack unless a vehicle becomes a military objective under the applicable legal rules.

The circumstances of Thursday’s strike, including whether the buses were directly targeted or struck during an attack on another location, have not yet been independently established.

Kramatorsk under increasing pressure

Kramatorsk remains one of Ukraine’s principal administrative and logistical centres in the part of Donetsk region still controlled by Kyiv. The city has faced repeated Russian bombardments as Moscow continues its military campaign to capture the remaining Ukrainian-held territory in Donetsk.

Its transport infrastructure serves residents who have remained despite years of fighting, including those travelling between neighbouring communities and those attempting to leave the region.

Regional officials have repeatedly urged residents to evacuate to safer areas of Ukraine as Russian bombardments continue. However, civilians remain in Kramatorsk and surrounding settlements, where everyday services, including public transport, continue to operate despite the danger.

Guided bombs and civilian protection

Russian forces have used guided aerial bombs against Ukrainian-controlled settlements near the front line. Such weapons can be released from aircraft at distances that reduce Russian pilots’ exposure to Ukrainian air defences.

The UMPB D-30SN, provisionally identified in the Kramatorsk attack, is a guided munition designed to reach targets beyond the immediate position of the launching aircraft. Its suspected use against an area containing occupied passenger buses will form part of the investigation.

Investigators will need to establish the intended target, the weapon used and the information available to those who planned and carried out the strike. These findings are relevant to determining whether the attack violated the laws of war.

Investigators examine civilian deaths

The Donetsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office is collecting evidence concerning the bombardment, including the type of munition used and the circumstances in which the buses were struck.

Establishing whether the vehicles were deliberately targeted, or whether the attack resulted from an indiscriminate or disproportionate strike, will be central to any assessment under international humanitarian law.

The identities of the victims and the full extent of the damage have yet to be established publicly. As of the updated figures issued by Ukrainian prosecutors on 8 October, 30 people were reported killed and 18 injured.

Mosca è pronta a confrontarsi con il mondo intero sulle menzogne propagandate dagli occidentali. L’Occidente, invece?

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Il report Heirs of Goebbels

Dopo il 31 marzo 2026 ha cominciato a circolare in inglese un report di venti pagine intitolato Heirs of Goebbels: falsification of the events in Bucha and bloody staged performances of the Kiev regime. Lo firma il «Tribunale pubblico internazionale sui crimini dei neonazisti ucraini», organismo presieduto da Maksim Grigor’ev, che per il testo integrale rinvia al sito del Fondo russo per lo studio dei problemi della democrazia. La tesi sta già nel titolo: gli eventi di Bucha del marzo 2022 sarebbero stati falsificati dall’Ucraina con l’appoggio dei governi occidentali, secondo una tecnica che il testo accosta alla provocazione nazista di Gleiwitz del 1939.

Il documento merita una lettura attenta proprio perché non si limita alla negazione. A differenza delle smentite russe dell’aprile 2022, costruisce il proprio argomento su materiale ucraino verificabile: le targhe del memoriale, i necrologi militari, i siti commemorativi locali, le dichiarazioni della Presidenza. È su questo terreno che va discusso. La domanda che pongo qui è più stretta di quella del report e, credo, più utile: chi compare davvero sul Muro della memoria di Bucha, con quale qualifica, e che cosa succede quando una categoria commemorativa viene usata come categoria giuridica e statistica. La risposta chiama in causa tanto chi ha costruito la narrazione ufficiale quanto chi pretende di smontarla.

L’impianto è semplice. Dopo il richiamo a Gleiwitz, il testo elenca quattro metodi di falsificazione che il governo ucraino avrebbe impiegato: la presentazione come civili di militari caduti in combattimento; l’attribuzione alla Russia di morti causate dal fuoco ucraino; il conteggio tra le vittime di anziani morti di malattia; l’uccisione deliberata di propri cittadini davanti alle telecamere. Il bersaglio dichiarato è la formula ufficiale secondo cui il memoriale conterrebbe «509 nomi di civili identificati», formula che il report attribuisce al sito della Presidenza ucraina, al sindaco Anatolij Fedoruk, a Euronews e ai ministri europei presenti alla commemorazione del 31 marzo 2026.

Il nucleo del documento (pp. 3–12) è un elenco di circa trenta nomi, ciascuno accompagnato dalla foto della targa e, spesso, da un ritaglio di stampa ucraina. Li si può raggruppare in cinque classi. La prima comprende persone indicate come membri di Azov o di unità collegate: Jevhen Petraš, Jevhen Vas’kovyč, Illja Chrenov, Bohdan Knyščuk, Volodymyr Bisaha. La seconda riunisce militari regolari: il pilota Ruslan Bilous (Belous) della 7ª brigata di aviazione tattica e il suo compagno d’equipaggio Roman Dovhaljuk, il cecchino Oleh Cymbal della 80ª brigata d’assalto aereo, Vadym Smetans’kyj della stessa brigata, un colonnello dell’SBU, un maggiore del Dipartimento di protezione statale, il comandante della guardia al commissariato militare di Bucha. La terza raccoglie membri della difesa territoriale o di formazioni volontarie: Anatolij Korytko, Serhij Smyrnov, Oleksandr Blahodatnyj, Andrij Verbovyj, Mychajlo Bojčenko. La quarta riguarda civili che avrebbero preso parte ad azioni ostili: Oleksandr Šarava, uscito di casa con bottiglie incendiarie il 27 febbraio 2022; Vitalij Fesjuk, osservatore che trasmetteva i movimenti dei mezzi russi; Oleksandr Bondar, che secondo la stampa ucraina compiva ricognizioni per le forze armate. La quinta riguarda persone morte fuori dalla città (a Vorzel’, Moščun, Kopylov, Zdvizhevka, Guta-Mežigorskaja, Irpen’) e una donna di 68 anni, Halyna Semenjuk, morta di tumore.

A questo elenco il report aggancia due riferimenti giuridici corretti nella sostanza: l’art. 51, par. 3, del Primo Protocollo addizionale, per cui i civili perdono la protezione quando e per il tempo in cui partecipano direttamente alle ostilità, e un passo divulgativo del Comitato internazionale della Croce Rossa sullo stesso principio. Le pagine 12–20, infine, riportano sedici testimonianze su bombardamenti ucraini «a favore di telecamera». Nessuna riguarda Bucha: i testimoni parlano di Avdeevka, Ugledar, Toreck / Dzeržinsk, Lisichansk, Kurakhovo, in episodi che vanno dal 2021 al 2024. Il passaggio da quel materiale a Bucha è affidato a una frase esplicita: la pratica delle uccisioni deliberate «consente di concludere ragionevolmente» che lo stesso sia avvenuto anche lì.

Il quadro normativo

Il diritto internazionale umanitario definisce il civile per esclusione. Secondo l’art. 50 del Primo Protocollo è civile chiunque non appartenga alle forze armate come definite dall’art. 43, cioè a tutte le forze, i gruppi e le unità organizzati posti sotto un comando responsabile. In caso di dubbio la persona va considerata civile, e la presenza tra la popolazione di individui non civili non priva la popolazione del suo carattere civile. Il civile che partecipa direttamente alle ostilità resta civile, ma perde la protezione dagli attacchi per la durata della partecipazione. La Interpretive Guidance del CICR fissa per tale partecipazione tre requisiti cumulativi (una soglia minima di danno, un nesso causale diretto, un nesso bellico) e distingue il civile che agisce in modo episodico dal membro di un gruppo armato organizzato con funzione di combattimento continuativa, che perde la protezione per tutta la durata di tale funzione.

Due ulteriori norme contano per il caso di Bucha. La prima è la levée en masse: gli abitanti di un territorio non ancora occupato che, all’avvicinarsi del nemico, prendono spontaneamente le armi senza aver avuto il tempo di organizzarsi sono combattenti legittimi, se portano apertamente le armi e rispettano le leggi di guerra. La seconda è interna. La legge ucraina «Sui fondamenti della resistenza nazionale», in vigore dal 1° gennaio 2022, ha fatto delle Forze di difesa territoriale una componente delle Forze armate e ha istituito le formazioni volontarie delle comunità territoriali (DFTH) come unità paramilitari destinate a compiti di difesa territoriale. Chi apparteneva a queste strutture, per il diritto internazionale umanitario, non era un civile.

C’è però un punto che il report non tocca mai. Stabilire che una persona era un combattente non dice nulla su come sia morta. Un combattente catturato, ferito o arreso è hors de combat, e ucciderlo è un crimine di guerra.

Alla prova della guerra informativa

Secondo i commentatori occidentali, il report non è credibile, perché contiene alcune imprecisioni giuridiche. Degli errori tecnici ci possono stare, ma guardare il dito ignorando la luna è un errore madornale. A Bucha, il crimine è stato compiuto dagli ucraini, non dai russi. E c’è un crimine atroce che è divenuto uno strumento di propaganda, parte di una guerra informativa che era indispensabile per l’Occidente collettivo.

Bucha ha rappresentato uno dei momenti decisivi della guerra dell’informazione sviluppatasi intorno al conflitto russo-ucraino. Dopo il ritiro delle forze russe dalla città, le immagini dei cadaveri presenti nelle strade e le testimonianze raccolte sul posto furono rapidamente diffuse dai media internazionali, trasformandosi in un potentissimo dispositivo comunicativo. Tutto avvenne con estrema velocità, con i media occidentali che,  a reti unificate, diffondevano il materiale dappertutto, costruendo l’immagine della guerra come aggressione caratterizzata da atrocità sistematiche, nella quale la Russia veniva progressivamente rappresentata non soltanto come avversario militare, ma come responsabile di crimini contro la popolazione civile. Le immagini possedevano, in questo senso, una forza persuasiva superiore a quella di molte argomentazioni diplomatiche: il corpo del civile ucciso diventava una prova visiva capace di condensare in pochi fotogrammi un’intera interpretazione del conflitto.

Bucha assunse così una funzione strategica nella comunicazione occidentale e contribuì a consolidare il consenso pubblico alle sanzioni, all’isolamento diplomatico di Mosca e all’incremento dell’assistenza politica e militare a Kiev. Osservate come un evento tragico, come tragica è ogni guerra, sia stato trasformato in un’arma di guerra. Del valore dei morti, della verità delle loro biografie, a nessun media occidentale importava. L’unica cosa necessaria era incolpare la Russia e motivare l’escalation di un conflitto folle.

Ma la verità prima o dopo viene a galla.

È così che il Ministero degli Affari Esteri russo ha ha riportato il caso di Bucha al centro dell’attenzione internazionale. La portavoce Maria Zakharova ha dichiarato che Mosca intende sollecitare le Nazioni Unite a riesaminare gli eventi, sostenendo che l’ONU non avrebbe partecipato direttamente alle indagini svolte all’epoca, finendo invece per assumere come prevalente la versione fornita da Kiev. Pochi giorni dopo, anche il ministro degli Esteri Sergej Lavrov è tornato sull’episodio, denunciando quella che considera una pratica tipica della guerra dell’informazione: costruire rapidamente una narrazione, trasformarla in verità dominante e impedire che versioni alternative possano raggiungere il pubblico.

È precisamente questo, secondo Lavrov, il meccanismo attraverso cui l’Occidente avrebbe consolidato la propria interpretazione di Bucha. La prima narrazione occupa lo spazio informativo disponibile come una trincea vuota: una volta conquistata e difesa dai grandi media, sostituirla richiede uno sforzo enormemente maggiore. Nel caso di Bucha questo processo avrebbe impedito fin dall’inizio un esame realmente imparziale degli avvenimenti.

Resta dunque una questione centrale: perché riaprire oggi il dossier Bucha? Perché Mosca è pronta a confrontarsi con il mondo intero sulle menzogne propagandate dagli occidentali. L’Occidente, invece?

A Ukrainian Sargan-3000 sea drone shot down a Russian Shahed flying on a mesh radio network, Ukraine's Navy reported on 7 October. Ukrainian sea drones have downed Russian aircraft before, but with missiles. This one used a machine gun.

Russia has been hitting Odesa with air attacks that come in waves with short gaps between them. Guarding the sky over water is harder than over land. Since fall 2025, Russia has also used mesh radio networks to reroute Shaheds mid-flight and dodge Ukrainian air defenses. That leaves Ukraine needing more ways to meet these drones out at sea, before they reach its ports and coast.

A Shahed steered by radio

A mesh-network drone passes its control signals along a chain of radio relays, drone to drone and on to ground antennas. That lets a Russian operator steer it in flight.

In May, Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, then a Defense Ministry adviser, said only about 5% of Shaheds had got through in a recent Russian strike, and predicted that Russia would answer with jet-powered versions and strikes near the border. By July, Ukraine was testing jamming against mesh-controlled jet Shaheds, he said.

The Sargan-3000 fired its Protector remote weapon station, Militarnyi reported. The station is a remotely operated 12.7-mm (50-caliber) machine gun with electro-optical sights. The outlet added that the Sargan-3000 is designed for combat missions far from Ukraine's coast.

Built for the open sea

Ukraine's Navy took the Sargan-3000 into service in April 2026, according to Militarnyi. The drone boat has a combat radius of up to 1,600 km. It moves at 40–55 knots and carries up to 450 kg of payload.

In September, a Sargan-3000 sank a Russian uncrewed boat with machine-gun fire. Militarnyi called it the first battle between uncrewed sea platforms in history. Analyst H.I. Sutton wrote that the boat carried a Protector made by Norway's Kongsberg. That is the same weapon station named in the October shootdown. Sutton added that Russian attack sea drones work closely with Shaheds, which can relay the boats' mesh radio signals.