Abandoning racial justice won’t save our democracy — reimagining elections will





Frédéric DELORCA
Avec son climat subtropical qui permet d’avoir plusieurs récoltes de fruits par an et ses plages de sable fin sur les bords de la Mer Noire, et ses chemins de randonnée à travers les forêts profondes et les sommets enneigés du Caucase, l’Abkhazie, ancien lieu de villégiature de la nomenklatura soviétique, pourrait être un paradis touristique inscrit au catalogue de toutes les agences de voyage comme la Thaïlande et Acapulco.
Elle l’est chaque année pour plus d’un million de touristes russes (surtout depuis que la guerre d’Ukraine complique leurs voyages à travers le monde). Mais pour les médias mainstreams d’Europe occidentale, ce petit pays de 250 000 habitants, qui a fait sécession de la Géorgie en 1993 au terme d’une guerre de libération de David contre Goliath, n’est qu’une enclave qui serait purement et simplement annexée par les Russes et vouée à l’isolement et à l’embargo, jusqu’à ce qu’il ait retrouvé le giron de ses anciens maîtres à Tbilissi.
Pourtant l’hypothèse d’une réunification relève de la pure politique fiction. Ni les 50 % d’abkhazes ethniques qui ont payé le prix du sang pour s’opposer à la politique assimilationniste des Géorgiens, ni les autres communautés (Arméniens, Russes, Grecs, Mingréliens) n’aspirent au retour de la Géorgie. Plus de trente ans de séparation entre les deux pays, l’Abkhazie s’est habituée à vivre loin de Tbilissi. Et les fièvres anti-russes attisées par l’Union Européenne et l’Amérique qui périodiquement enflamment Tbilissi (comme lorsqu’en 2008 le nationaliste Saakachvili, l’ex-patron de Raphaël Glucksman, avec le soutien de Washington, avait lancé ses troupes contre l’Ossétie du Sud, une autre entité qui s’était séparée de son pays) ne sont pas de nature à combler le fossé.
La question aujourd’hui pour le peuple abkhaze est de savoir comment construire un avenir pour soi-même quand on n’est reconnu que par quatre Etats : la Russie, le Nicaragua, le Vénézuéla et la Syrie… Si Taiwan n’est pas membre de l’ONU, cela n’empêche pas les Taiwanais de voyager à travers le monde, de même les Kosovars dont le pays n’est pas reconnu par l’Espagne ou par la Roumanie peuvent quand même se rendre dans l’Union européenne. Les Abkhazes ne bénéficient pas de ce genre de facilité. Car à l’absence de reconnaissance de leur Etat au niveau international s’ajoute une double peine liée au fait qu’ils sont assimilés par la propagande occidentale à une sorte d’axe du mal pro-russe. Du coup, non seulement leurs passeports ne sont pas reconnus (à tel point qu’ils ne peuvent même pas se rendre dans la Turquie voisine), mais ils subissent de plein fouet les sanctions économiques ciblées vers leur grand frère du Nord.
L’équation sommaire « Abkhazes = alliés des Russes », est pourtant plus complexe qu’il n’y paraît. En 1996 Eltsine avait placé l’Abkhazie sous embargo, et si Poutine se pose plutôt en protecteur, les Abkhazes veillent à ce que cela ne se fasse pas au détriment de leur souveraineté. En novembre 2024 par exemple, les manifestants à Soukhoumi étaient parvenus, en mode « gilets jaunes » à renverser le gouvernement jugé trop pro-Russe en envahissant le siège de ses institutions. Dans ce pays où tout le monde est prêt à défendre sa liberté avec les armes, l’achat des terres reste interdit aux étrangers, ce qui le préserve aussi de la spéculation et des excès du capitalisme cynique qu’il soit russe ou globalisé.
Avant de définir quel degré de proximité les Abkhazes doivent entretenir avec leur protecteur russe et avec les autres pays de la région, l’urgence première pour ce peuple est de desserrer sur un plan strictement humanitaire l’étau qui les étrangle, et qui fait que, par exemple, même le fait d’aller se faire soigner à l’étranger pour des soins médicaux (quand le système sanitaire local est largement défaillant) peut relever du casse-tête (car même la détention d’un passeport russe ne vous garantit pas un droit d’être soigné gratuitement à Sotchi).
D’une façon très significative, l’initiative pour desserrer cet étau a été prise par un collectif citoyen ancré dans la diaspora abkhaze en Turquie, une communauté issue de l’exil d’Abkhazes qui ont fui au XIXe siècle les massacres tsaristes. Cette communauté, qui compte environ 500 000 membres a progressivement repris conscience de ses racines caucasiennes dans les années 1990. En son sein l’avocat communiste Anit Baba a lancé en juin dernier une pétition pour convaincre le gouvernement turc d’autoriser les ressortissants d’Abkhazie à venir dans ce pays, et en vue du rétablissement de la liaison maritime entre Soukhoumi et les ports turcs.
Cette campagne a connu un succès immédiat dans les partis de gauche turcs, et même au sein de mouvements de droite, ainsi que dans les diverses communautés ethniques minoritaires comme les Kurdes et les Arméniens. Même la parti kémaliste qui dirigeait le pays dans les années 1990 a signé son soutien, sans oublier des organisations professionnelles comme l’union des barreaux de Turquie (les avocats), divers intellectuels et artistes etc.
Le succès de cette campagne est tel que le collectif « Fin de l’Isolement de l’Abkhazie » souhaite aujourd’hui étendre sa dynamique au monde entier en lançant un appel international contre l’enclavement de l’Abkhazie. Des comités en ce sens se constituent en Europe, en Asie, en Afrique, aux Etats-Unis. Le soutien à la pétition Ouvrez les portes verrouillées de la Mer Noire – mettez fin à l’isolement ! doit être l’occasion à la fois de tendre la main à ce courageux petit peuple qui depuis des siècles a résisté à toutes les tentatives d’asservissement et d’assimilation, et un moyen de dénoncer la politique occidentale qui applique un deux poids deux mesures entre les peuples « alliés » et les peuples « ennemis », en condamnant sans état d’âme ces derniers à l’oubli et à l’étranglement. Plutôt que de servir de supplétif à l’impérialisme de l’Union européenne en Géorgie, la France et les autres pays francophones s’honoreraient de plutôt choisir dans le Caucase le non-alignement et aider les Abkhazes à sortir du blocus économique et administratif. C’est ce que les citoyens doivent demander en signant cette pétition.
Lien pour la pétition (en français) : https://atlasalternatif.over-blog.com/2026/10/petition-pour-la-fin-de-l-isolement-de-l-abkhazie.html
Publié à l’origine par Le Grand Soir

© Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

© Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

© Ashley Wu/The New York Times
The Georgia officer responsible for killing a 1-year-old miniature donkey, HeeHaw, has filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit against him, claiming the body camera footage proves he "reasonably believed the donkey posed an imminent threat to a fellow officer." But even if it doesn't, the officer argues he is immune from liability.
In the early morning hours of August 30, Hannah Michelle Israel was at her Cedartown home in western Georgia when she received a distressing phone call. A supervisor with the Cedartown Police Department "tersely informed [Israel] that a donkey on her property had been 'dispatched,'" according to her federal lawsuit. After some clarification, she learned that police had not only entered her enclosed private property in the middle of the night without permission while looking for a missing person, but also shot and killed her miniature donkey in the process.
Israel immediately set out to search for her beloved pet, HeeHaw, only to find her bottle-raised donkey's lifeless body alone in her field. Israel told ABC7 News the incident has left her "traumatized and shocked." She continued, "I honestly can't even believe he's not here…There's no words."
Demanding accountability, Israel filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in September against the shooting officer, Officer Trenton Ryan Garner, for violating her Fourth Amendment rights and submitted a separate demand for $1 million from the City of Cedartown.
Last week, Garner responded by asking the court to dismiss the case, arguing in part that he did not violate Israel's constitutional rights when he entered her property. Under the open fields doctrine, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in one's pastureland, even if enclosed. Further, the motion argues, exigent circumstances existed in the search for a missing 12-year-old girl.
As far as HeeHaw is concerned, Garner claims he acted reasonably by using deadly force and argues the footage clearly shows HeeHaw "charging" and posing an "imminent threat to a fellow officer."
However, the footage, posted by the Civil Rights Lawyer Raw, may not be so clear-cut. Garner's body camera was off at the time of the shooting but had a "rolling buffer of video," a recording without audio of the 30 seconds preceding activation of the camera, according to court documents. During the silent portion, two officers and a bloodhound are in front of Garner with flashlights in a dark field. A small donkey, roughly 3 feet tall, appears and slowly moves toward one of the officers. The officer backs away slowly, but the donkey moves closer and picks up speed. Garner pulls his gun and fires. The donkey turns and runs before falling over.
Whether Garner reasonably believed HeeHaw posed an imminent threat to his fellow officer may be up for debate.
When the audio kicks in, a fellow officer asks, "Why'd you shoot it up?" "I don't know," Garner responds rather nonchalantly before telling dispatch he had to shoot a donkey because "it was trying to attack." If another officer on the scene wasn't sure why Garner used deadly force, perhaps the decision wasn't so reasonable after all.
In her lawsuit, Israel accuses Garner of needlessly killing HeeHaw "maliciously…and recklessly, with deliberate indifference…for [Israel's] constitutional rights." The suit continues: "No reasonable officer in…Garner's position would have believed that such force was necessary or justified."
But whether Garner acted reasonably or not by shooting HeeHaw, qualified immunity may still shield him from accountability. Qualified immunity is a legal doctrine that protects government actors from lawsuits alleging rights violations, unless the right is clearly established. In practice, that means plaintiffs must be able to point to a previous court ruling in a case with the same circumstances to show that the right was obvious to government officials.
The bar can be quite high to show a right is clearly established. For example, in March, the Supreme Court reversed a 2nd Circuit decision in a case involving an officer who was sued for using a rear wristlock to arrest a protester. The 2nd Circuit denied qualified immunity, reasoning that a previous case from 2004 clearly established that rear wristlocks used to arrest anti-abortion protesters constitute excessive force. But the Court disagreed, stressing that "principles stated generally, such as that 'an officer may not use reasonable and excessive force,' do not suffice."
And while there may be ample cases involving officers shooting pet dogs, cases involving miniature donkeys are in short supply. If the court finds that there is no clearly established rule that specifically prohibits officers from shooting a miniature donkey moving toward a fellow officer in the dark, the court may end up dismissing the case and sidestepping both the reasonableness and constitutional questions entirely.
The post Georgia Cop Who Shot a Miniature Donkey Says Body Camera Footage Shows an 'Imminent Threat' appeared first on Reason Magazine.







By rejecting the transformation of their country into a new front against Russia, Georgians preserved their strategic autonomy.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
In recent years, Georgia has become the stage for a struggle whose implications extend far beyond its borders. The political conflict, often presented as a debate over democracy, European integration, and civil rights, should in fact be understood as another chapter in the delicate geopolitical game unfolding across the Caucasus.
It is against this backdrop that Tbilisi’s decision to distance itself from the confrontational policies promoted by its Western partners takes on particular significance.
The fundamental question is not whether Georgia should be “European” or “Russian.” Such a framework is excessively simplistic. The real issue is whether a small state situated between major centers of power should be free to determine its own foreign policy or whether its international position should be dictated by the strategic interests of outside actors.
The Georgian government chose the first option.
The rise of Georgian Dream brought about a significant shift in the country’s foreign policy. Rather than automatically echoing the anti-Russian rhetoric prevailing in Brussels, Tbilisi adopted a more pragmatic approach. Its priority became avoiding another war while preserving economic relations with its neighbors.
For Georgia, this is no abstract matter. Russia remains an important economic partner. Trade, tourism, energy, and the movement of people create realities that cannot simply be erased by political decisions. Fully adopting the Western sanctions regime against Moscow would have particularly serious consequences for an economy far smaller and more vulnerable than those of Europe’s major powers.
This is where Tbilisi’s policy fundamentally diverges from the strategy advocated by Brussel’s hawks. Brussels wants Georgia to become increasingly integrated into European political structures. The Georgian government, however, has insisted that integration cannot mean automatically submitting to the European Union’s geopolitical priorities.
The adoption of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence became the main symbol of this dispute. Its critics regard the legislation as a democratic setback. Its supporters see it as a legitimate attempt to limit the political influence of organizations financed from abroad.
The same divide is evident in cultural matters. Georgian legislation concerning LGBT propaganda provoked a strong European reaction and reinforced the perception among its critics that Tbilisi was abandoning the liberal values promoted by the European Union.
Yet one question rarely receives the same attention: who should determine Georgia’s political and cultural rules?
For Georgian Dream, the answer is the Georgian state itself. It was precisely this insistence on autonomy that made the government the target of increasingly intense international pressure.
Recently, Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze openly accused Brussels of financing an attempted coup in Georgia during last year’s protests. He claims that European actors funded groups involved in the demonstrations and supported efforts to bring about a change of government. According to Kaladze, the objective was to install political forces more closely aligned with the interests of the European Union.
In fact, such allegations should come as little surprise in the current geopolitical environment. Brussels is now discussing the possibility of imposing sanctions on most Georgian Dream leaders and government officials. These developments nevertheless reveal the broader geopolitical dimensions of the crisis. The dispute is not merely a controversy over domestic legislation, but a genuine struggle over the country’s strategic orientation.
Here lies the principal danger facing Georgia. The Caucasus is not a neutral space. The region lies between Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the Euro-Atlantic world. Any attempt to turn Georgia into a platform for confrontation with Moscow would have far greater consequences for Georgians themselves than for the powers supporting such a policy from a distance.
The experience of Ukraine has made this reality even more obvious. A state can receive political, financial, and military support from foreign powers while ultimately paying the highest price when rivalries between those powers escalate into open conflict. For a small country such as Georgia, avoiding this fate is a fundamental strategic consideration.
It was precisely on this point that Tbilisi projected a different course from Kiev. Rather than accepting the transformation of the country into another frontline state, the Georgian government sought to preserve workable relations with Moscow. This does not mean that Georgia has formed an alliance with Russia. The two countries still lack formal diplomatic relations, and Tbilisi maintains its own disagreements with the Kremlin. The national priority, however, is to safeguard strategic autonomy, peace, security, and development.
By avoiding direct confrontation with Moscow, Georgia reduces the risk of opening another military front near Russia’s borders. It also preserves economic ties with neighboring countries and retains greater freedom to engage with different centers of power simultaneously.
What is at stake is the sovereignty of a small state amid competition between major powers. In a region increasingly shaped by geopolitical rivalry, the most important question may not be which side Georgia belongs to, but how the country intends to protect itself amid the confrontation between opposing external forces.
The Georgian people have shown that Georgia’s interests come first. And they were right to make that choice.
Ao rejeitar a transformação do país em uma nova frente contra a Rússia, os georgianos preservaram sua autonomia estratégica.
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Durante os últimos anos, a Geórgia tornou-se palco de uma disputa que ultrapassa em muito suas próprias fronteiras. O conflito político apresentado como uma discussão sobre democracia, integração europeia e direitos civis também deve na verdade ser compreendido como mais um capítulo no delicado jogo estratégico do Cáucaso.
É justamente nesse contexto que a decisão de Tbilisi de manter distância da política de confronto promovida por seus parceiros ocidentais ganha importância.
A questão fundamental não é saber se a Geórgia deve ser “europeia” ou “russa”. Essa formulação é excessivamente simplista. O verdadeiro problema é saber se um Estado pequeno, situado entre grandes centros de poder, deve possuir liberdade para definir sua própria política externa ou se sua posição internacional será determinada pelas necessidades estratégicas de terceiros.
O governo georgiano optou pela primeira alternativa.
A ascensão do Georgian Dream produziu uma mudança significativa na política externa do país. Em vez de reproduzir automaticamente a retórica antirrussa predominante em Bruxelas, Tbilisi passou a defender uma política pragmática. A prioridade tornou-se evitar uma nova guerra e preservar relações econômicas com seus vizinhos.
Para a Geórgia, isso não é uma questão abstrata. A Rússia continua sendo um importante parceiro econômico. Comércio, turismo, energia e circulação de pessoas criam uma realidade que não pode ser simplesmente eliminada por decisões políticas. Adotar integralmente o regime de sanções ocidental contra Moscou teria consequências particularmente graves para uma economia muito menor e mais vulnerável que as grandes economias europeias.
É nesse ponto que a política de Tbilisi diverge fundamentalmente da estratégia defendida pelos falcões de Bruxelas. Bruxelas deseja uma Geórgia cada vez mais integrada às estruturas políticas europeias. O governo georgiano, entretanto, passou a insistir que integração não pode significar submissão automática às prioridades geopolíticas da União Europeia.
A aprovação da Lei de Transparência da Influência Estrangeira tornou-se o principal símbolo dessa disputa. Para seus críticos, a legislação representa um retrocesso democrático. Para seus defensores, trata-se de uma tentativa legítima de limitar a influência política de organizações financiadas do exterior.
A mesma divisão aparece nas questões culturais. A legislação georgiana sobre propaganda LGBT provocou forte reação europeia e consolidou a percepção, entre seus críticos, de que Tbilisi estaria abandonando os valores liberais promovidos pela União Europeia.
Mas existe uma questão que raramente recebe a mesma atenção: quem deve estabelecer as regras políticas e culturais dentro da Geórgia?
Para o Georgian Dream, a resposta é o próprio Estado georgiano. Foi justamente essa insistência na autonomia que transformou o governo em alvo de uma pressão internacional cada vez mais intensa.
Recentemente o prefeito de Tbilisi, Kakha Kaladze, acusou abertamente Bruxelas de financiar uma tentativa de golpe de Estado na Geórgia durante os protestos do ano passado. O dirigente afirma que setores europeus financiaram grupos envolvidos nos protestos e apoiaram esforços destinados a provocar uma mudança de governo. Segundo ele, o objetivo seria instalar no poder forças políticas mais alinhadas aos interesses da União Europeia.
De fato, não há qualquer novidade nisso. Não por acaso, Bruxelas agora discute a possibilidade de impor sanções a todos os dirigentes do Georgian Dream e oficiais do governo georgiano. Mas, ainda assim, estas palavras revelam a dimensão geopolítica da crise. A disputa não é meramente uma controvérsia sobre legislação doméstica, mas uma verdadeira batalha pela orientação estratégica do país.
E aqui aparece o principal risco para a Geórgia. O Cáucaso não é um espaço neutro. A região está localizada entre a Rússia, a Turquia, o Irã e o mundo euro-atlântico. Qualquer tentativa de transformar a Geórgia em uma plataforma de confronto com Moscou teria consequências muito maiores para os próprios georgianos do que para as potências que apoiariam essa política à distância.
A experiência ucraniana tornou essa questão ainda mais evidente. Um Estado pode receber apoio político, financeiro e militar de potências externas e, ao mesmo tempo, acabar pagando o preço mais alto quando a rivalidade entre essas potências se transforma em conflito aberto. Para um país pequeno como a Geórgia, evitar esse destino é uma consideração estratégica elementar.
Foi precisamente nesse ponto que Tbilisi estabeleceu uma diferença em relação a Kiev. Em vez de aceitar a transformação do país em uma nova linha de frente, o governo georgiano procurou preservar relações funcionais com Moscou. Isso não significa uma aliança com a Rússia. A Geórgia continua sem relações diplomáticas formais com Moscou e mantém suas próprias divergências com o Kremlin, mas a prioridade nacional é garantir autonomia estratégica, paz, segurança e desenvolvimento.
Uma Geórgia que evita a confrontação direta com Moscou reduz a possibilidade de abertura de uma nova frente militar nas proximidades das fronteiras russas. Também preserva suas relações econômicas com os países vizinhos e mantém maior liberdade para negociar simultaneamente com diferentes centros de poder.
O que está em jogo é a soberania de um Estado pequeno diante da competição entre grandes potências. E, diante de uma região cada vez mais marcada pela competição entre grandes potências, talvez a questão mais importante não seja perguntar de que lado a Geórgia está, mas como a Geórgia planeja proteger a si mesma diante do confronto de polos vizinhos opostos.
O povo georgiano mostrou que não tem lado algum nas disputas globais senão o seu próprio. E agiu corretamente ao fazê-lo.

