An Ecuadorian judge ordered the immediate release of nearly 30 fishermen whose two boats were destroyed by the US military in the Pacific Ocean. The Ecuadorian prosecutor’s office had charged them with alleged illegal activities.

The sequence of events is telling.

In two separate instances between late August and early September, the fishing boats Conquista II and María Candelaria were boarded by US military forces while on the high seas. The US forces, after transferring the fishermen to other vessels, destroyed and sank their boats.

The fishermen’s families quickly reported that they had lost communication with their loved ones. Only after prolonged uncertainty were the crew members handed over at Ecuadorian ports and placed under the control of Ecuadorian authorities.

In other words, the crew members were not charged with any crime before their vessels were destroyed, but rather afterward. This move has drawn heavy criticism from criminal defense attorneys (who argue that these actions violate due process) and caused anxiety among Ecuadorian fishermen, who have expressed their fear of fishing on the high seas and suffering the same fate as their compatriots. Several other boats have been intercepted and sunk in the Pacific by US forces in recent months, only increasing fears about transiting there at all.

The US military, for its part, claims that the destroyed vessels serve as fuel refueling points for other boats involved in drug trafficking. Under this strategy, US Southern Command intercepted at least eight Ecuadorian vessels between August and September 2026.

Foreign military actions on Ecuadorian soil have been defended by the government of right-wing President Daniel Noboa, who has aligned himself with Donald Trump’s hemispheric security policy embodied in the Shield of the Americas. During a recent visit to the South American country, Marco Rubio defended the military operations as necessary to dismantle drug trafficking routes.

But why destroy a vessel that has already been evacuated of its crew? 

Defense Minister Giancarlo Loffredo, who defends US military operations against Ecuadorian fishermen based on alleged “prior intelligence,” said that destroying a vessel that has already been evacuated of its crew is justified because it is too risky to tow the vessels to shore. He also said that seizing the fuel on board is dangerous.

However, the minister’s justifications have not convinced everyone. Human Rights Watch stated that both the United States and Ecuador must present evidence justifying the destruction of the vessels: “Of the detained crew members, 90 are facing criminal investigations in Ecuador, 56 were released because Ecuadorian judges ruled that their detention was illegal, and another 14 were not brought before a judge.”

In addition, Juanita Goebertus, director of the Americas division at Human Rights Watch, said: “Intercepting fuel trafficking at sea can be an important step in stopping criminal groups, but that does not give security forces the right to detain people without evidence, destroy their boats, and commit abuses.”

The fact is that the Ecuadorian fishermen deny any involvement in the crimes of which they are accused. For now, the Ecuadorian courts have ruled in favor of nearly 30 fishermen from the Montecristi and the Don Rufo, stating that the prosecution failed to present evidence to support its accusations. With them, the total number of acquitted crew members stands at 56. Another 32 fishermen are on probation while investigations into alleged criminal association continue.

Russia’s demands for the extradition of International Criminal Court judges and Washington’s sweeping sanctions against the institution have converged within days. The two governments have different grievances, but the consequences of their actions increasingly overlap, raising questions about the political relationship between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and the future of international criminal justice.

Russia and the United States have intensified their campaigns against the International Criminal Court (ICC) almost simultaneously, exposing an increasingly consequential convergence between the policies of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump.

On 8 October, Moscow demanded the extradition of ICC President Tomoko Akane and eight other current and former officials. The following day, Washington announced sanctions against the court as an institution, extending earlier measures against individual judges and prosecutors.

The timing raises an obvious question: are these independent campaigns arising from different disputes with international justice, or do they reflect a broader political understanding between Washington and Moscow?

There is no publicly established evidence of a coordinated operation or an agreement between Trump and Putin to undermine the ICC. Nevertheless, the strategic consequences of their respective actions are remarkably similar. Both weaken an institution pursuing criminal proceedings against political leaders whom the two governments seek to protect.

Different grievances, overlapping interests

Russia’s hostility towards the ICC is directly connected to the arrest warrant issued against Putin in March 2023 over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied territories.

The court subsequently issued warrants against senior Russian military commanders, including Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, over alleged crimes involving attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.

Moscow’s response has been to pursue ICC personnel through its own criminal justice system. The latest extradition demands follow convictions handed down in absentia by a Russian court in December 2025.

Washington’s confrontation with the ICC has a different immediate origin. The Trump administration objects to the court’s jurisdiction over American nationals and Israeli officials, particularly following the arrest warrants issued against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has presented the American campaign as a defence of US sovereignty. Yet the sanctions announced on 9 October are not confined to the Israeli proceedings or any investigation involving American personnel.

They target the institution itself, potentially disrupting financial transactions and commercial relationships essential to its operation. This distinction matters because a court-wide restriction necessarily affects investigations beyond those cited by Washington. That includes Ukraine.

The Anchorage question

The political context cannot be separated from the relationship between Trump and Putin, including their meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, in August 2025.

The summit formed part of Trump’s efforts to negotiate directly with Moscow over the war in Ukraine. The American president has repeatedly treated relations with Putin as a question of diplomatic bargaining, seeking arrangements that might produce an agreement where conventional Western pressure has failed.

Against this background, suggestions that pressure on the ICC might form part of a wider accommodation with Moscow warrant scrutiny. However, the proposition that Trump specifically offered Putin assistance in neutralising the court during their Anchorage discussions remains unsubstantiated. There is no verified public account establishing such a commitment.

A more defensible conclusion is that Washington’s independently declared campaign against the ICC also advances an important Russian interest. For Putin, the benefit is clear. Measures designed to restrict the court’s financial and administrative capacity could complicate investigations into Russian conduct, irrespective of the American administration’s stated intentions.

The relationship therefore need not involve explicit coordination to produce politically significant results.

Why sanctions against the institution matter

The escalation from targeting individual prosecutors to sanctioning the entire ICC represents a substantial change. Previous American measures imposed personal and financial restrictions on selected officials. The latest approach threatens the broader infrastructure upon which international criminal proceedings depend.

The court requires banking facilities, secure communications, technology services and commercial suppliers. American sanctions can reach beyond US territory because of the international financial system’s dependence on dollar transactions and American service providers.

The ICC had already anticipated this vulnerability. According to details disclosed in September, the institution has pursued alternatives to American software and financial services to reduce its exposure.

Nevertheless, operational continuity and investigative effectiveness are not necessarily the same thing. The court may remain formally functional while facing additional costs, delays and restrictions affecting prosecutors, investigators and international cooperation.

For Ukraine, this is particularly significant. The ICC holds and evaluates evidence connected to alleged Russian war crimes, including the deportation of children and attacks on civilian infrastructure. Its proceedings preserve a judicial process independent of whatever diplomatic settlement Washington and Moscow might eventually negotiate.

Weakening that capacity would not invalidate existing warrants or automatically destroy evidence, but it could make the pursuit of accountability more difficult.

Europe’s response and its limitations

The European Union now faces a dispute with Washington over an institution that European governments have spent decades supporting.

On 9 October, eight governments issued a joint statement, reaffirming their support for the ICC and rejecting the American sanctions. The signatories included Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain, Japan and Canada.

The European Commission also indicated that the EU was prepared to take measures necessary to preserve the court’s operations. Such assurances are politically important, but they do not automatically resolve the practical consequences of American restrictions.

European financial institutions and technology suppliers must consider their own exposure to US sanctions. Sustaining the court may require alternative payment arrangements, commercial protections and potentially further European regulatory intervention.

The EU has discussed extending its blocking statute to shield European operators from the effects of American sanctions. Whether that mechanism can provide sufficient protection remains uncertain.

The dispute also extends beyond the ICC’s current investigations. Ukraine and the Council of Europe are developing a separate Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, designed to address jurisdictional limitations preventing the ICC from prosecuting Russia’s leadership for the decision to launch the invasion.

The two institutions have distinct legal mandates, although cooperation between them is envisaged. Undermining the ICC would not automatically prevent the special tribunal from operating, but it would weaken an important part of the wider international accountability framework.

A convergence with consequences for Ukraine

Washington and Moscow have not adopted identical positions towards the ICC. Russia seeks to discredit and punish the officials responsible for pursuing Putin. The Trump administration is attempting to restrict the court’s authority and operational capacity, principally in response to proceedings involving Americans and Israelis.

Yet their actions converge at precisely the point where the ICC’s independence becomes politically inconvenient. The distinction between motive and consequence is essential. It would be premature to describe the American sanctions as evidence of a secret bargain struck in Anchorage. It would be equally mistaken to overlook the assistance these measures could provide to Moscow.

The broader concern is that the United States, traditionally central to Western efforts to hold Russia accountable for its invasion of Ukraine, is now applying pressure to one of the principal institutions carrying out that work.

For European governments, the immediate question is no longer simply whether they support the International Criminal Court. It is whether they are prepared to protect its practical independence when the political and financial pressure comes not only from Russia, but also from Washington.