Following the attack on the King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the usual suspects emerged from the social media muck to condemn Ansarallah. “These reprehensible attacks demonstrate a blatant disregard for innocent civilian life. They must stop now,” demanded Trump’s secretary of state, Marco Rubio.
Bibi Netanyahu, “on behalf of the people of Israel,” condemned the attack and declared the Zionist state “looks forward to a strong Middle East—one that stands united against threats, protects its people, and builds a future of security, cooperation, and prosperity for all the peoples of our region,” never mind the 200,000-680,000 people of the region he butchered over the last three years.
Kaja Kallas, the former president of Estonia and current High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, denounced the airport attack. “The Houthi attack on Riyadh’s international airport is an appalling act of terror. There can be no justification for indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure,” she said.
Kallas, like most European leaders, insists Israel has a “right to defend itself” against Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, and yet “self-defense” is not a legitimate response for the people of Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, all victims of Israeli and US aggression.
António Guterres, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, is “deeply shocked” by the Yemeni retaliation, and criticized the attack on the Saudi airport as a violation of international law.
If Guterres is concerned about international law and the bombing of civilian infrastructure, why hasn’t the UN invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter in regard to Gaza? “The UN’s member states collectively have a bad track record when it comes to preventing genocide,” writes Sean Matthews. “In the case of genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia, the UN only declared officially that genocides took place after the fact.”
G7 foreign ministers also weighed in on the attack, declaring the response to Saudi attacks poses an “unacceptable threat to regional stability and security, to global energy security,” as well as to security in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
In June, during a globalist conclave in Évian, the G7 issued a dilatory statement calling for an acceleration of “humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and the swift implementation of relevant political and security measures” in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon, while knowing full well Zionist Israel will ignore international law and continue to murder and starve Palestinians while ethnically cleansing the Shi’a in southern Lebanon.
The official censure by the United States, the EU, UN, and G7, as well as the skewed reportage of the corporate media, overlooks the reason why Ansarallah is bombing Saudi airports and oil infrastructure.
Forgotten, or ignored, are the crimes of the Saudi coalition during and after the Yemen War of 2015. The coalition included the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Sudan.
The Sunni coalition attacked after President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi fled house arrest into exile in Saudi Arabia. Hadi, who died earlier this year, stood accused of secretly working with al-Islah, described as the Muslim Brotherhood’s Yemeni branch. The former president was also accused of being a Saudi puppet. Saudi Arabia views Ansarallah—followers of the Shi’a branch of Zaydism—as a threat to its national security.
A detailed United Nations report estimated approximately 377,000 deaths by the end of 2021 from the Saudi-led campaign. This total includes direct losses from combat and indirect deaths linked to malnutrition, disease, and the decline of health care and essential services.
The United States was involved in the Yemen humanitarian crisis. US personnel provided logistical support, information, training, and advisers after the Saudi-led intervention. US tankers refueled coalition aircraft, increasing their range over Yemen. Saudi forces relied heavily on US-supplied aircraft, munitions, spare parts, maintenance, and technical support.
Jeff Bachman, a professor and genocide scholar at the School of Information Services, said during an interview with the American University in Washington that the Saudi-led coalition has been able to engage violence against Yemenis thanks to the complicit material and political support of the United States.
UN Security Council Resolution 2216 established a UN arms embargo. The restrictions implemented delayed or curtailed commercial imports and humanitarian shipments of food, fuel, medicines, and medical supplies. Because Yemen is dependent on imports, disruptions to port and airport operations rapidly worsened hunger, health-system strain, water and sanitation breakdowns, and prices, according to Human Rights Watch.
“The Saudi-led coalition’s military strategy in Yemen has been increasingly built around preventing desperately needed aid and essential goods from reaching civilians, risking millions of lives,” said James Ross, legal and policy director at Human Rights Watch. “The Security Council should urgently sanction Saudi and other coalition leaders responsible for blocking food, fuel, and medicine, causing hunger, sickness, and death.”
During a full closure in November 2017, UN agencies noted that aircraft and ships delivering aid could not secure clearance, while commercial cargo encountered major hurdles. Human Rights Watch stated that the coalition had maintained a naval and air blockade since March 2015, with restrictions producing a disproportionate impact on civilians in direct violation of international law.
Yemen remains one of the world’s most serious humanitarian emergencies. As of 2026, more than 22 million people need assistance or protection and 18.3 million people are acutely food insecure. Malnutrition levels remain critically high, with over 2.2 million children under five acutely malnourished, including 516,157 suffering from malnutrition, according to the United Nations. “Even before the latest escalation, an estimated 12.2 million children in Yemen needed humanitarian assistance,” UNICEF reported in September.
Article 51 of the UN Charter is a determining provision that addresses the right of self-defense for member states. It represents an exception to the general prohibition on the use of force outlined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which mandates that all member states refrain from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, as the Saudis did in 2015 in Yemen.
On October 10, following the Ansarallah attacks, Trump announced the US may rejoin the latest Saudi onslaught on Yemen. “We’re going to look at it,” he told reporters. “We just found out about the recent attack. We will make a decision. We move very quickly.”
Prior to Trump’s announcement, Democrat Ro Khanna, who was detained during a visit to Israel in July, introduced a joint Yemen War Powers Resolution along with Republican Representative Thomas Massie on October 9. The resolution directs “the President pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities against the Houthis in Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress.”
Congress is unable to decide whether to rejoin the Saudi effort to destroy Ansarallah and maintain the illegal war on the people of Yemen. In addition to debate on the constitutional legality of the Trump administration’s military assistance to the Saudis without a congressional consultation, members of Congress are concerned about the continued slaughter of civilians and the ongoing humanitarian crisis, considered one of the worst in the world, with around 24 million people, or nearly 80% of the population, needing assistance and protection.
Si l’Allemagne désirait interrompre les aéroports français, elle pourrait équiper ses Typhoon de missiles et créer une bulle de supériorité aérienne au-dessus du sol français. L’affirmation sonne-t-elle ridicule ? C’est exact, elle est pourtant l’exact miroir de l’alerte qu’El Mundo prête à la CIA selon laquelle les Russes pourraient équiper un navire de drones pour désactiver des aéroports occidentaux1. Comprendre pourquoi l’une sonne comme folle alors que l’autre paraît terrifiante suppose de saisir les méthodes d’analyse sur lesquelles elles reposent, avant d’analyser justement les présupposés des intentions.
Celles-ci étant un peu complexes, commençons par la doctrine, qui aura le mérite de clarifier le brouillard mental actuel. Un peu comme le brouillard de guerre auquel les militaires sont confrontés. Deux méthodes offrent un moyen de le briser : la méthode des moyens et celle des intentions.
La première repose sur un inventaire des ressources connues de l’adversaire pour évaluer l’ensemble des points qu’il peut toucher. C’est aujourd’hui l’exercice de la CIA : les Russes disposent de drones, ceux-ci peuvent être basés sur un navire, donc les Russes peuvent équiper un navire. L’exercice en début d’article relève de la même logique : prendre le nombre de chasseurs de la Bundeswehr, le nombre de Taurus en stock, puisque contrairement à nos SCALP ces armes n’ont pas été envoyées en Ukraine, et établir que cette combinaison a la capacité de mener une attaque surprise au-dessus de la France.
Le problème de cette méthode est de livrer un arc de menace souvent inutilisable, car il existe trop d’axes de vulnérabilité pouvant être exploités. L’automne 1944 en offre l’illustration2. Les Allemands retirent alors plusieurs divisions du front. La reconnaissance aérienne alliée photographie, à partir de la mi-novembre, un trafic ferroviaire intense autour de Cologne, de Coblence et dans l’Eifel : gares de triage saturées, locomotives sous pression, une vingtaine de wagons plats chargés de chars Tigre sur la ligne d’Euskirchen. Début décembre, cent soixante-dix wagons plats chargés de blindés et de véhicules roulent entre Cologne et Limbourg. La nuit, les chasseurs de nuit repèrent des convois aux phares masqués. Des dépôts de ravitaillement apparaissent à Rheinbach et à Schleiden, des piles de bois propres à jeter des ponts près d’Echternach, des trains sanitaires à l’ouest du Rhin. Les écoutes radio identifient une armée blindée nouvelle, la 6e Panzerarmee. À la mi-décembre, face aux Ardennes, le VIIIe corps américain signale une activité d’artillerie inhabituelle, aucun mouvement visible et presque plus de prisonniers. Cette force, dont la valeur combative était connue, pouvait être engagée de bien des manières.
Une seconde méthode doit alors entrer en jeu : celle des intentions. En fonction des moyens connus, on établit ce que l’ennemi voudra toucher. Plus précise, celle-ci possède l’inconvénient de reposer sur des déterminants bien moins solides, puisque liés à la compréhension de la psychologie de l’adversaire.
Ces indices remontent à tous les états-majors alliés, et chacun les interprète selon le tempérament de son chef. Au quartier général d’Eisenhower, commandant suprême des forces alliées, homme de coalition et de logistique, domine une conviction : les Allemands sont trop fatigués pour attaquer. Les divisions retirées sont donc évaluées comme des rotations de repos et une reconstitution de réserve. Le 15 décembre encore, son bureau des opérations n’a rien à signaler dans les Ardennes. Patton, chef de la Troisième Armée, passe pour le plus offensif des généraux américains : il ne conçoit la guerre qu’en mouvement et à l’attaque. Son état-major projette cette volonté offensive sur l’ennemi allemand. Elle reflète en réalité la psychologie des analystes, elle-même dérivée de la psychologie des chefs. Son chef du renseignement, le colonel Oscar Koch, lit les mêmes indices comme la préparation d’un coup et présente à Patton, le 9 décembre, sa conclusion : une contre-offensive allemande est possible dans les Ardennes. Patton fait aussitôt préparer les plans qui permettront à la Troisième Armée de pivoter vers le nord. Le lendemain du rapport rassurant d’Eisenhower, l’offensive allemande éclate. Autrement dit, la méthode des intentions en dit souvent plus sur la manière de penser des analystes que sur leur compréhension fine de l’adversaire. Bien conscients de ces défauts, les militaires appliquent les méthodes classiques d’analyse stratégique pour filtrer l’ensemble. La première d’entre elles est le rapport coût-avantage : qu’est-ce que l’adversaire a à gagner ? Pour quel coût ?
Ici, vous constatez par exemple la différence de pensée entre Eisenhower et Patton. Pour le premier, le coût est en carburant ; le second pense en termes d’avantage moral de l’offensive. D’où la divergence d’analyse. Si nous prenons notre exemple d’avions allemands équipés de Taurus, le coût est une guerre franco-allemande, voire OTAN-Allemagne si l’article 5 venait à jouer. Aucune attaque, même couronnée de succès, ne pourrait provoquer des dégâts suffisants pour compenser les coûts d’un conflit avec une puissance nucléaire. En pratique, l’Allemagne aurait beaucoup à perdre et peu à gagner, puisque son influence dans l’appareil d’État et l’UE lui permet d’obtenir satisfaction dans des domaines cruciaux, telle la fermeture de Fessenheim.
Alors, la Russie ?
La CIA vient de nous gratifier d’un de ces mémos qui relèvent à la fois de la plus pure vérité et du plus pur mépris du public destiné à recevoir la fuite. Voici la menace : «Le point faible de l’Europe» : la menace d’une attaque russe contre la France et l’Espagne est réelle, selon la CIA.
Le scénario de l’attaque impliquerait des drones Gerbera3, de petits appareils à la charge explosive réduite dont l’intérêt est perturbateur et non de faire des victimes : fermer un aéroport, par exemple. Ils seraient lancés depuis des navires marchands déguisés en trafic commercial ordinaire et postés en Méditerranée.
Je vous avouerai qu’en ouvrant ce mémo, je m’étais attendu à un scénario sérieux, pas à cela. À la découverte du propos, son outrance m’a fait passer à la limite de l’insulte. Voilà une proposition d’attaque étatique dont le but serait de «perturber» ? Se rend-on compte du terme ? Une attaque pour perturber ? Schlieffen se retourne dans sa tombe, Napoléon s’étrangle avec sa bataille décisive, Manstein est fort heureusement mort. Car, hélas, un État ne gaspille pas la surprise en lançant un tapotage gentil. S’il faut recourir à la violence, alors il faut d’emblée prendre un avantage définitif pour maintenir au plus court la durée de la campagne. Sun Tzu le notait déjà : aucun pays n’a jamais tiré profit d’une guerre prolongée.
Le projet proposé contredit tous ces principes et, dès lors, il ne pose qu’une seule question : le code militaire russe a-t-il supprimé la peine de mort pour les traîtres ? Eh oui, désolé de décevoir ces intervenants de plateaux qui se prétendent experts malgré leurs abus propagandistes, mais ce que la CIA nous propose est de lancer une attaque inefficace pour ruiner la réputation que les Russes ont acquise auprès du reste du monde. Nous parlons bien sûr des pays sérieux, hors de l’Occident malade où les journalistes reprennent ce scénario comme un sujet sérieux.
En clair, une balance coût-bénéfice où il n’y aurait que des coûts pour la Russie et aucun bénéfice. Eh oui, car fermer un aéroport fait peut-être perdre quelques millions à des entreprises, mais cela n’a AUCUN impact stratégique. Pire, il est inutile de mobiliser un drone Gerbera, un navire ou tout autre moyen militaire : un coup de fil d’un gamin pour annoncer une bombe suffit. Ou bien une voiture piégée.
Bref, l’aventure proposée n’apporte aucun bénéfice stratégique et se fait avec des moyens disproportionnés qui coûteraient énormément à la Russie. Seul un traître à la Russie peut avoir cette idée. Je sais, en Occident, nous sommes habitués avec les relais US, mais plus en Russie : les réseaux qui ont soutenu V. Poutine après son arrivée au pouvoir s’en sont assurés. Ou en tout cas, ils ont fait monter le prix de la passe. Un officier russe réclamerait une méga-malle de billets pour seulement proposer cela à ses chefs, vu qu’il sait que ce serait (si ses chefs sont gentils) la fin de sa carrière. Quant à le mettre en œuvre sans validation politique, il aurait intérêt à avoir le bon billet d’avion pour s’éclipser au plus vite.
Car là est le point qui permet aux individus tarés que l’Occident nomme journalistes de procéder à cette propagande goebbelsienne (enfin, je m’excuse auprès du docteur Goebbels pour cet amalgame insultant) : les moyens existent. Exact, la Russie possède les drones, les navires. Elle aligne même un porte-avions et surtout un arsenal de missiles de toute première qualité. Depuis les années cinquante, l’URSS dispose de bombardiers stratégiques et de missiles capables de frapper le territoire français. La menace n’a donc rien de nouveau, puisque la Russie peut transformer la France en parking si elle le désire.
L’alerte de la CIA ajoute-t-elle de nouvelles capacités ? La réponse est non, une fois, deux fois, mille fois NON !
Héritière, État successeur de l’URSS, la Russie dispose depuis sa naissance des moyens de nous mettre à terre si elle accepte les millions de morts qu’exigera l’absorption de la salve nucléaire française. Une poignée de drones n’y ajoute rien, n’y retranche rien. D’autant plus que la Russie dispose de missiles hypersoniques Orechnik en mesure d’infliger de douloureux dégâts à notre territoire. Par exemple, mais je ne voudrais pas exciter LCI, par une frappe d’Orechnik contre des centrales nucléaires ou, en non nucléaire, contre nos barrages. Nous n’aurions aucun moyen de riposte non nucléaire.
Dès lors, oui, les Russes peuvent monter des drones sur un navire, ils peuvent monter des Grad aussi, ou toute autre arme à plus ou moins grande portée. Dans un tel scénario, l’élément coûteux est le navire sacrifié, pas les munitions embarquées. L’alerte donnée, qui n’est que l’une des alertes autour desquelles on nous a fait résonner tambours et trompettes, n’apporte rien de structurellement nouveau. Un bricolage de drones pour frapper notre territoire n’a rien de complexe. Après tout, le gouvernement de Kiev a bien réussi à introduire des drones sur le territoire russe pour frapper des bombardiers stratégiques.
Seulement, à ce jeu, tout le monde peut jouer ou presque. Il faut le restreindre : l’équipe Le Maire, Breton ne peut pas jouer, mais c’est lié à l’incompétence des joueurs. La France, par exemple, possède encore quelques officiers de valeur capables d’organiser l’affaire. (Non, pas le colonel monté hors de propos en lui accrochant des étoiles comme des guirlandes de Noël, et qui fait aujourd’hui comme s’il dirigeait l’armée française.)
Le problème est que ces gens refuseraient de monter une telle opération. Frapper la Russie, comme frapper la France pour la Russie, exige que la première balle soit mortelle. On tire au cœur ou on ne tire pas, et dans ce cas, entre puissances nucléaires, la question n’est pas celle des moyens, mais celle de la volonté. Même si nous avons TOUT fait, par une politique irresponsable, pour irriter les Russes, ils n’ont nullement annoncé leur intention de répondre à la hauteur de notre bêtise.
Reste l’intention : les Russes peuvent nous frapper, c’est acquis, ils peuvent le faire depuis des décennies pour un coût fixé. Resterait le gain d’une frappe : faire cesser l’appui français à l’Ukraine. Dans ce domaine, hélas, hormis l’agacement entre les oreilles d’entendre les rodomontades et pseudo-discours d’Emmanuel Macron, qui justifient toute envie de retourner une paire de claques justement méritée, la vérité commande de constater l’épuisement de nos moyens : la macronie a déjà envoyé à peu près tout ce qu’elle pouvait racler dans les fonds de tiroirs ; quant à l’argent, l’Allemagne ou la Grande-Bretagne peuvent le fournir. Les véritables acteurs sont les Anglais, par l’usage des moyens de leurs services secrets très actifs dans la guerre des drones, et les Allemands pour la livraison de munitions. Pour peser sur les opérations en Ukraine, une frappe russe devrait cibler en priorité ces deux pays.
Sauf à vouloir faire de l’éducation prioritaire, mais dans ce cas, l’ambassade de Russie peut se contenter d’engager un professeur de SEGPA pour l’envoyer à l’Élysée. Pour la fessée, il serait même inutile d’engager : Montjoie Saint-Denis a fait des petits.
Prise sous un angle militaire, l’information n’apportait rien, et si les journalistes en avaient fait une lecture correcte, ils l’auraient classée verticalement.
Ce n’était bien évidemment pas le but, mais au contraire d’avoir un thème pour parler de menace russe afin de poursuivre la propagande par martèlement, qui vise à abrutir les téléspectateurs de menaces pour leur faire admettre le concept sans esprit critique. Ça marche avec les résidents de maison de retraite au stade pré-Rivotril.
Tel est le problème de nos gouvernants. Faute d’agression russe, il faut créer le sentiment d’une agression, ce qui est le but de ces annonces : entretenir l’hystérie et donner un prétexte pour prononcer les mots agression, guerre, menaces, puissants générateurs d’un sentiment d’insécurité dans la population soumise à ce discours anxiogène.
Ça n’a qu’un défaut : messieurs les journalistes, vous avez repris en connaissance de cause une publication des services américains pour engager notre pays sur une trajectoire fausse et dangereuse pour sa sécurité.
Soit vous êtes des idiots congénitaux, ce que la CIA n’exclut peut-être pas, et je vais m’offrir de partager le soupçon. Soit vous le faites délibérément. Même en tenant compte de votre bêtise, tous les journalistes français ne peuvent pas être aussi désavantagés par la nature ; il aurait donc dû en rester assez pour faire échouer la manipulation.
Cela fait de vous, en tant que catégorie, des traîtres à votre nation, susceptibles de subir les foudres judiciaires au moment où le pouvoir changera de main et cessera de couvrir vos abus. Il ne s’agit pas de menaces, mais d’une évaluation juridique. VOUS mettez objectivement notre nation en danger !
La méthode marcherait si, justement, conscients de la menace sur leur esprit, beaucoup de citoyens ne s’étaient pas dirigés vers internet.
Según revela Instituto Alemán de Economía (IW), durante la primera mitad de la década de 2020-2025, la economía germana creció un 0,2% anual y esa tasa se debió mayormente al gasto público, el cual, solamente en el segundo trimestre del 2026, fue superior a la media anual de 2019.
Lo que significa que se diluye la “Alemania como motor económico europeo” de la que tanto se habló en el último medio siglo.
El empresariado invirtió muy poco en estos años y en el entorno productivo y de realce económico nacional ha caído drásticamente.
El mismo gobierno federal reconoció, a principios de este mes, que la situación de crecimiento es “precaria” y, en los círculos cerrados del empresariado escasean los vaticinios halagueños para el 2027 y 2028.
Creditreform informó que 1 de cada 3 empresas está muy endeudada y que las inversiones retrocedieron a su rango de 2013.
Durante el pasado mes de abril, más de 2 mil empresas quebraron, destacándose entre estas empresas las abocadas al transporte, la logística, la hotelería y la cervecería.
Klaus Wohlrabe, jefe de estudios del Instituto Ifo de Investigación Económica, declaró que todavía no se vislumbra una recuperación real para el mercado laboral y “Los despidos continúan en la industria manufacturera y el comercio”.
Por su parte, Rolf Bürkl, experto en consumo del NIM, dijo que “La mayoría de los hogares prevé que los altos precios de la energía reduzcan su poder adquisitivo” y, en consecuencia, “se muestran más escépticos sobre sus perspectivas de ingresos para los próximos doce meses”.
El agricultor e influencer, Hannes Kuhnwald («Landwirt aus MV»), pronosticó que se avecina una crisis en la agricultura ya que “Cada vez cierran más explotaciones. Y las pequeñas son las primeras en verse afectadas. Ahora, las grandes empresas se benefician de ello. Y muchas corporaciones también”, afirmando que las explotaciones pequeñas y medianas no pueden competir con las compañías grandes y que, por lo tanto, la clase política debería aplicar medidas sensatas para proteger de la pauperización, la quiebra y la exclusión económica a los pequeños y medianos productores agrícolas.
Dentro de la misma Alemania hay quienes se quejan de la forma en que llegan los fondos provenientes de la UE, pidiendo, como una de las soluciones más rápidas, que dichos fondos lleguen hacia abajo de una forma más equitativa.
Simultáneamente, se produce, en esta segunda mitad del 2026, un descenso pronunciado en las ventas del sector minorista, cuyos niveles son, según consignas las estadísticas más fiables, de mayor caída en los últimos cinco años.
Hay negocios de los más consolidados que, debido a la situación, están llegando al límite.
El Grupo Theo Müller -líder de la industria alimentaria- anunció, en esta semana, que cerrará dos de sus plantas más importantes con la consecuencia de cientos de empleados que serán despedidos.
Asimismo, en entorno de Volkswagen seguirá convulso en lo que resta de este año y en 2027.
A friend visited Germany recently and told a story how a delayed train caused him to miss the flight home.
I was shocked since you could set your watch by the Deutsche Bahn when I was living in Germany back in 1997.
I was doing an internship at Mercedes Benz in Stuttgart in those days. I could time my walk from the apartment to the bus stop, then connect with a train to the office with less than 5 minutes in total waiting time.
The bus and train schedules were synced so perfectly that you could count on a two-minutes’ walk and exactly 2 minutes wait in between. Both buses and trains were on time to a fault.
I had a particular fondness for DB since I traveled around Germany almost every weekend with its 35 Mark Schones-Wochenende Ticket (happy weekend ticket). Unfortunately that service was discontinued in 2019.
In the winter of 1997, I got lost on a hike with several friends in the Black Forest near Baden-Baden.
We were only able to walk out of the cold night after stumbling upon a rail track that led us to a small rural train stop. I can still remember the warm platform light to this day.
I’ve held German rail in high regard ever since.
So you can imagine how incredulous I was about the delay and bad service my friend complained about.
This prompted me to read about what happened to Deutsche Bahn over the last 30 years. In a nutshell, things certainly have changed for the worse.
Deutsche Bahn today defines an on-time train as one arriving less than 6 minutes behind schedule – a long cry from the clock-setting punctuality of the late 90s.
Even by such a low bar, punctuality hovers around 50 to 60%, well below DB’s own target of 70%.
The official explanation is aging infrastructure, heavy construction, and overloaded tracks.
However, as I dig a bit deeper, the decline of the German rail efficiency seems to stem from a deeply flawed privatization in 1994 which led to decades of extreme infrastructure underinvestment.
The 1994 Bahnreform merged the old East and West state railways with a clear mandate: DB was supposed to operate as a profit-seeking private corporation to prepare for an eventual stock market IPO.
To attract investors, DB prioritized extreme cost-cutting over public service.
They aggressively cut staff, outsourced maintenance, and began divesting into global logistics companies (like DB Schenker) rather than focusing on domestic rail.
Under the guise of maximizing efficiency, DB severely downsized its physical network to save money.
Nearly 8,000 kilometers of secondary rail lines were completely dismantled. Thousands of track crossovers, passing loops, and spare sidetracks were removed.
In 1997, if a train broke down or was delayed, a dispatcher could easily reroute it around the problem using these spare tracks.
Today, the network is stripped of its buffers. If one commuter train stalls near Frankfurt, it acts like a broken-down car on a single-lane highway, causing immediate, cascading delays across the entire country.
The problem is compounded by a mixed-rail system where fast Intercity Express (ICE) trains share the same physical tracks with slow regional commuter trains and heavy freight cargo.
In comparison, Chinese high-speed rail or France’s TGV networks mostly operate on dedicated high-speed tracks.
As the DB physical network was drastically thinned out, annual passenger numbers went up from 1.5 billion passengers in 1994 to 2.4 billion today.
Back in the 90s, it was still very common to live near where you worked in Germany. Over the last 30 years, skyrocketing housing costs in major hubs like Frankfurt, Munich, Berlin, and Hamburg forced a massive portion of the workforce to move further out into surrounding suburban regions and smaller towns.
As a result, Germany experienced a commuter explosion, with millions of people traveling significantly longer distances back and forth every single day.
Now, the Deutsche Bahn system runs at 100% capacity nearly constantly. Any small delays can quickly snowball into network chaos.
To make things even harder, Germany’s strict structural debt limits have restricted state spending.
For years, Germany spends only a fraction of what its neighbors do on rail. For example, Switzerland invests over €400 per citizen annually into rail infrastructure. Germany routinely spends around €100.
DB’s disastrous experience with privatization mirrors what happened with other similar projects such as the Thames Water in the UK.
When Margaret Thatcher’s government privatized the UK water sector in 1989, Thames Water was handed to private investors with a clean slate and zero debt.
However, successive private owners treated the utility—which serves 16 million customers across London and southern England—as a corporate cash cow.
Private investors – Wall Street banks and hedge funds – loaded the utility with a mountain of debt and extracted hundreds of millions in management fees and dividends.
Instead of using revenue to upgrade Victorian-era pipes and treatment centers, money was funneled to shareholders and executive bonuses. By 2026, that debt has ballooned to roughly £20 billion.
While the financial engineering generated short-term returns for private equity, the physical infrastructure rotted.
Thames Water has become a national scandal as it has spilled billions of liters of raw sewage directly into the River Thames and local waterways.
Due to aging infrastructure, 25% of all treated water leaks straight out of the pipes before ever reaching customer homes.
Amid severe dry spells and record temperatures, Thames Water repeatedly implements prolonged hosepipe bans because the system lacks structural resilience to manage the region’s water security.
Most privatization projects of public utilities have witnessed a similar pattern of chronic underinvestment, extreme operational cost cutting, and unsustainable debt leverage while enriching financial investors.
Deutsche Bahn and Thames Water are symbols of public goods degradation for private investor gains in rentier capitalist economies.
In stark contrast, Chinese infrastructure remains firmly in the domain of public ownership.
While Europe and the US follow a policy of reactive, austerity-driven, rent-collecting management of their nations’ infrastructure, China has adopted a strategy of anticipatory, supply-led construction – often years ahead of demand.
Back in the 90s, China still was heavily reliant on decades-old, technically backward rail networks that suffered regular breakdowns.
I still remember sitting in rail cars with no air-conditioning in the height of summer for hours when the train from Beijing to Chongqing broke down due to an engine failure during a trip home from college.
The ride used to take 40 hours by scheduled timetable. Today the same trip takes less than 7 hours on highspeed rail.
When China started building its national highspeed rail network in 2004, there was an avalanche of negative press from the West.
Western “experts” eagerly called out how wasteful the project was and how the rail would never generate a positive return on investment.
Despite the nay-sayers, the country has built over 50,000 kilometers of highspeed rail in the last 20 years, over 70% of the world’s total capacity.
Just today, China announced the completion of 4 new highspeed rail lines in 4 provinces, adding another 1,142 kilometers to the network.
One of the lines is the 318-km Harbin–Yichun Line, which is now China’s northernmost highspeed rail traversing alpine permafrost.
The network now covers 97% of all cities with over 500,000 residents. It operates on dedicated rail lines and achieves 98% departure punctuality and 95% arrival punctuality.
Rather than aiming to achieve profitability and high return for every single line, the Chinese highspeed rail system serves as a public good that generate system-level benefits for the entire economy and the public.
Deutsche Bahn and China Rail represent two systems that operate on completely opposite philosophies, leading to radically different outcomes in rail performance and economic impact.
Building ahead of demand vs. Managing declining assets
China’s infrastructure strategy rests on the philosophy that building massive, high-capacity transport networks creates economic growth and future demand, rather than just responding to it.
By constructing the world’s largest highspeed rail network, largely ahead of full demand saturation, China bypassed the bottleneck phase entirely.
On the other hand, Germany operates on a strict “just-in-time” for-profit corporate framework.
Investments are only approved if existing capacity is mathematically proven to be completely exhausted.
This means that by the time a project is planned, funded, and built, the demand has already vastly outpaced the upgrade, leaving the network perpetually lagging behind.
China recognized early on that mixing slow freight and fast passenger trains limits a network’s ultimate capacity. Beijing built an entirely separate, dedicated network for the high-speed Fuxing and Hexie trains.
On the other side, because Germany tried to save money by avoiding the construction of entirely new corridors, they forced ultra-fast commuter trains to share the exact same physical tracks with heavy cargo trains.
When one slow freight train breaks down, the entire national express system grinds to a halt.
Economic Multiplier vs. Direct Profit
The Chinese state views high-speed rail as a public utility and an economic multiplier.
Even if individual rail lines operate at a financial loss or carry high debt, the investment is justified by the massive economic productivity, regional integration, and urban development it unlocks.
As part of the 1994 privatization, the German government treated Deutsche Bahn like a standard commercial enterprise.
Success was measured by cutting operational costs and generating a direct financial profit, which directly starved the physical tracks of preventative maintenance.
One would probably think the German model at least achieved higher ROI for investors even though China achieves higher total societal benefits.
Yet, reality has an ironic twist – the German model ultimately failed the investors, too.
Deutsche Bahn ended up in a financial worst-of-both-worlds scenario.
In a standard capitalist system, starving an asset of maintenance to boost short-term balance sheets usually generates high dividends for investors or pushes stock prices up.
But because DB’s privatization was half-baked, it achieved neither. The only investor in Deutsche Bahn is still the German Federal Government as its IPO plan was abandoned 2 decades ago.
Because the network was run into the ground to cut short-term corporate costs, the long-term liabilities eventually caught up.
Rather than paying rich dividends, DB has cost taxpayers billions in bailouts. The company recently reported a €2.3 billion net loss.
To manage its staggering debts, DB was forced to sell off its highly profitable global logistics subsidiary, DB Schenker, just to artificially steady its balance sheet.
By treating a core public monopoly like a private business, Germany didn’t create a highly profitable enterprise; they created an operational bottleneck that costs the broader German economy billions in lost corporate productivity every year.
China’s model operates on the opposite financial wavelength.
In a socialist market economy, critical infrastructure is heavily state directed through State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).
While China Rail carries a massive debt load from building its expansive high-speed network, the losses are directly absorbed by the state.
From Beijing’s perspective, the direct financial return on investment of the railway itself is secondary. The real payoff is the societal and macroeconomic ROI.
By connecting far-flung cities, the state slashes shipping friction, drives real estate value, unlocks regional labor markets, and creates economic mobility.
The state effectively subsidizes the train ticket to capture a massive tax and economic growth harvest across the rest of society.
A prime example is the Greater Bay Area in Guangdong, where 7 metropolises, including Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong, are connected into an integrated web via highspeed rail, metro subways, and a network of highways.
The region enjoys unprecedented supply chain density and is ranked as the No. 1 most innovative cluster of cities in the world by the UN’s World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), ahead of Silicon Valley.
The same formula is repeated in nearly every natural monopoly domain – telecom, electric and water utilities, national highway network, and banking.
Rather than allowing private capital to derive rentier-income from such assets, as what happens in capitalist societies, Beijing firmly controls these commanding-heights of the economy in the public hands.
The German capitalist model tries to draw a neat box around Deutsche Bahn and demand that the box itself be profitable. China’s state-led model views the railway as just one cog in a larger national engine.
Ultimately, Deutsche Bahn’s 30-year experiment has proved that for critical public monopolies like rail, trying to squeeze out the last penny of corporate micro-profits usually breaks the system entirely.
We remember Nokia as the company behind some of the most popular mobile phones of the past, as well as its famous slogan, “Connecting people.”
Founded in Finland in 1865 and now operating as a multinational company in telecommunications and information technology, Nokia continues to work in the field of communications – that is, to “connect people.” But with its latest project, it appears that the company is now preparing to connect people in uniform.
Nokia has teamed up with ICEYE, another Finnish company specializing in the production of microsatellites that provide high-resolution Earth observation data day and night and in all weather conditions.
The two companies have partnered to develop secure and sovereign satellite communications systems for governments and defense customers, with the first communications satellites planned for launch in 2028.
Defense, border security, emergency response…
Announced on October 1, the project envisages satellite systems operating in low Earth orbit (LEO) for use in areas including defense, border security, emergency services and disaster response.
Under the project, governments will be able to own and control not only the satellites themselves, but also the ground infrastructure and user terminals.
Rafal Modrzewski, co-founder and CEO of ICEYE, said countries should not leave control over their communications infrastructure in the hands of foreign commercial satellite operators, emphasizing that the project is ultimately aimed at reducing external dependence.
As part of the partnership, Nokia will contribute its expertise in secure networking technologies and network management, while ICEYE will provide its experience in satellite platforms, satellite constellation operations and ground infrastructure.
The cooperation between Nokia and ICEYE is not entirely new. Nokia was among the companies that participated in an investment round announced by ICEYE in June 2026, through which the company secured more than €1 billion in financing.
First satellites planned for 2028
The first satellites are scheduled to be launched in 2028. If the project is implemented, ICEYE will expand its activities in government-controlled satellite intelligence into the communications sector, while Nokia will strengthen its presence in Europe’s rapidly growing defense and space communications market.
Europe’s “strategic autonomy”: the militarization of civilian technology
The new partnership between Nokia and ICEYE is a striking example of where the concepts of “strategic autonomy” and “technological sovereignty,” which Europe has increasingly embraced in recent years, are actually heading.
The satellite communications systems being developed by the two Finnish companies may initially appear to be nothing more than a technological investment. Yet the companies themselves explicitly list defense, border security and government operations among the project’s intended areas of use. With the first satellites planned for launch in 2028, the system is also designed to remain under government control, including its satellites, ground stations and terminals.
What is significant here is not simply that two companies are entering the defense sector. The boundary between civilian and military technology is increasingly disappearing in Europe.
Companies operating in telecommunications, artificial intelligence, satellite technology, data analysis and digital infrastructure are being turned into direct components of European states’ rearmament and security policies.
This transformation is being marketed under the rhetoric of “European independence.” Yet what is emerging is not a Europe moving away from militarism. On the contrary, Europe is building its own militarized infrastructure.
Reducing dependence on the U.S. does not eliminate militarism
Europe’s basic argument is that it should not remain dependent on U.S.-based companies for its security and communications infrastructure. That is why European states are seeking to develop their own satellite systems, defense technologies and secure communications networks.
But there is a serious contradiction here.
The infrastructure being developed to reduce dependence on U.S. companies is being used to expand the military capabilities of European states. In other words, the question of “militarism or peace?” is being reduced to a choice between “American militarism or European militarism.”
The EU’s IRIS² program is a larger-scale example of this transformation. Although the system was initially presented as a secure communications and digital infrastructure project, the program was expanded in August 2026 to include 66 additional LEO satellites for defense, security and emergency services, bringing the total planned core constellation to 348 satellites. The European Commission has also explicitly identified defense and security applications as among the main drivers behind the changes.
What we are therefore witnessing is not simply a European space program designed to “improve internet access.” Space infrastructure is being transformed into a component of Europe’s security and defense architecture.
Companies are becoming part of the war economy
More importantly, this transformation is not taking place solely through state institutions.
The European model places private companies at the center of this process. As in the case of Nokia and ICEYE, private technology companies are developing infrastructure designed to meet the defense and security needs of governments. Public-private partnerships are also at the heart of the IRIS² model.
The program’s total cost over 12 years has been set at €10.6 billion, with €6 billion expected to be provided by the EU and more than €4 billion by the private sector.
Thus, the expansion of Europe’s “defense capacity” does not simply mean larger state budgets. Private capital is becoming a direct partner in Europe’s emerging security economy.
This transformation is also changing the fields in which technology companies operate. Technologies once associated primarily with consumer communications, the internet, software or civilian infrastructure are now becoming integrated into border surveillance, military communications, intelligence and crisis-management systems.
This is not the neutralization of Europe’s technology sector. It is its militarization.
The technological infrastructure of “Fortress Europe”
All of these developments cannot be considered separately from the increasingly powerful concept of “Fortress Europe.”
Tighter border controls, the treatment of migration as a security issue, increased military spending and the expansion of Europe’s own defense industry are different components of the same political direction.
Satellite technology is no exception. Indeed, border surveillance is explicitly listed among the intended uses of IRIS² in EU documents.
In this way, seemingly positive concepts such as “digital sovereignty,” “technological independence” and “strategic autonomy” are, in practice, becoming technological instruments for building a stronger European security apparatus.
The fundamental issue here is not that Europe is reducing its dependence on the United States. There is nothing inherently wrong with any country developing its own technological capabilities. The question is what those capabilities are being developed for.
If the result of technological independence is more military satellites, more sophisticated border surveillance systems, stronger military communications networks and larger defense budgets, then what is being created is not simply independence. It is the expansion of the militarist capacity of European states and European capital.
From this perspective, the Nokia-ICEYE agreement represents more than a technological partnership.
As Europe seeks to create an alternative to the United States’ military and technological dominance, it is simultaneously building its own military-technological complex.
And perhaps the most important feature of this process is that the war economy is no longer built solely in arms factories.
Telecommunications companies, satellite companies, artificial intelligence firms and other high-tech corporations are becoming increasingly important actors in this economy.
Europe’s “strategic autonomy” therefore cannot be understood merely as a project to become independent from Washington. It is also a project through which Europe is rebuilding its own imperial and militarist capabilities.
L’approvazione definitiva della nuova legge elettorale, prontamente ribattezzata Melonellum, ha offerto al centrosinistra l’occasione per mettere in scena questo straordinario esercizio di equilibrismo: una mano alzata in difesa della democrazia, l’altra impegnata a sistemare le liste per il 2027.
C’è un momento, nella vita politica italiana, in cui le grandi questioni della democrazia finiscono curiosamente per assomigliare alle piccole questioni della sopravvivenza parlamentare. È il momento in cui i partiti cominciano a parlare di rappresentanza, pluralismo, partecipazione e diritti costituzionali, mentre, sotto il tavolo, qualcuno conta i seggi, qualcun altro le firme e quasi tutti cercano di capire come assicurarsi un posto nella prossima legislatura. L’approvazione definitiva della nuova legge elettorale, prontamente ribattezzata Melonellum, ha offerto al centrosinistra l’occasione per mettere in scena questo straordinario esercizio di equilibrismo: una mano alzata in difesa della democrazia, l’altra impegnata a sistemare le liste per il 2027.
La prima reazione è stata quella di annunciare la prosecuzione della battaglia davanti alla Corte costituzionale. Il campo largo, sconfitto sul terreno parlamentare, intende trasferire il confronto su quello giurisdizionale, affidandosi a un arsenale di contestazioni che comprenderebbe la parità di genere, le sottoscrizioni necessarie per presentare le liste e il premio previsto per il Senato. La staffetta tra parlamentari e società civile, annunciata sul modello della mobilitazione contro la riforma della giustizia, dovrebbe garantire continuità alla protesta. Del resto, quando i numeri in Parlamento non sono sufficienti, resta sempre la possibilità di cercare una maggioranza altrove: nelle piazze, nei tribunali o, più precisamente, nelle pieghe della Costituzione.
Naturalmente, il ricorso alla Consulta è uno strumento pienamente legittimo in uno Stato di diritto. Una legge elettorale deve rispettare i principi costituzionali, e nessuna maggioranza parlamentare può considerarsi immune dal controllo dei giudici. Il problema, semmai, è la facilità con cui il confronto politico italiano scivola dalla discussione sulle regole alla speranza che siano le istituzioni di garanzia a risolvere ciò che i partiti non riescono a risolvere attraverso il consenso parlamentare. La Corte costituzionale non è un secondo Parlamento, né una commissione elettorale incaricata di correggere le strategie dei partiti. È chiamata a giudicare la legittimità delle norme, non a restituire ossigeno a chi non ha trovato i voti necessari per contrastarle.
Eppure, proprio mentre si denuncia la presunta natura antidemocratica della riforma, il centrosinistra si è immediatamente dedicato a una questione assai concreta: come consentire alle forze minori di partecipare alle prossime elezioni senza dover affrontare integralmente gli oneri previsti per la raccolta delle sottoscrizioni. Qui la difesa dei principi incontra la ragion pratica, e la retorica costituzionale comincia a fare i conti con la matematica elettorale.
Il caso più emblematico è quello del Movimento 5 Stelle, che ha promosso il passaggio del senatore Luigi Nave alla componente di Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra nel gruppo misto di Palazzo Madama. L’operazione, secondo la ricostruzione riportata, dovrebbe favorire la nascita di una nuova componente collegata al Nuovo PSI di Enzo Maraio e al Progetto civico Italia di Alessandro Onorato, permettendo alla futura lista centrista di beneficiare di una soglia di raccolta delle firme più favorevole: 1.500 anziché 6.000 per circoscrizione.
La spiegazione ufficiale è edificante: Nave rimarrebbe del Movimento 5 Stelle, pur cambiando collocazione parlamentare, e il suo sarebbe un gesto al servizio della democrazia e della partecipazione. Non una manovra di palazzo, assicurano, ma un’azione contro una legge definita liberticida e antidemocratica. È una distinzione che merita di essere accolta con attenzione, perché la politica italiana ci ha abituati a scoprire che le manovre di palazzo, quando vengono compiute dagli avversari, sono il segno della degenerazione istituzionale, mentre quando servono ai propri alleati diventano improvvisamente raffinati strumenti di ingegneria democratica.
Il punto, tuttavia, non è stabilire in astratto se agevolare le forze minori sia giusto o sbagliato. Un sistema elettorale dovrebbe effettivamente evitare che gli adempimenti burocratici diventino barriere sproporzionate all’accesso alla competizione politica. Il pluralismo non può essere un privilegio riservato a chi dispone di una macchina organizzativa imponente, di risorse economiche abbondanti e di una rete capillare di militanti. Ma se si ritiene che le soglie di sottoscrizione siano eccessive, la soluzione più lineare sarebbe discuterne apertamente e promuovere una modifica generale delle regole. Costruire invece una particolare architettura parlamentare per consentire a una determinata formazione di accedere a condizioni più vantaggiose solleva inevitabilmente una domanda: si sta correggendo un ostacolo alla partecipazione oppure si sta individuando una scorciatoia per un alleato?
La differenza non è secondaria. Nel primo caso si interviene su una regola nell’interesse generale; nel secondo si sfrutta la configurazione del Parlamento per ottenere un vantaggio specifico. Anche quando un’operazione risulta formalmente legittima, resta possibile interrogarsi sulla sua coerenza con la denuncia di una legge che si vorrebbe contestare proprio in nome della trasparenza e dell’uguaglianza politica.
Il Partito Democratico, dal canto suo, si è detto disponibile ad aiutare le formazioni più piccole che intendono contribuire alla costruzione di un’alleanza di centrosinistra. Una dichiarazione comprensibile, se considerata dal punto di vista della costruzione di una coalizione; meno sorprendente se si ricorda che ogni alleanza elettorale è anche un sistema di interessi reciproci. I partiti maggiori hanno bisogno di alleati, quelli minori di condizioni che rendano possibile la loro partecipazione, mentre i gruppi centristi cercano lo spazio necessario per trasformare il proprio peso politico in una presenza parlamentare. Tutti parlano di rafforzare il progetto comune. Nessuno, naturalmente, rinuncia a fare i propri conti.
Il campo largo assomiglia così a un condominio nel quale tutti invocano la ristrutturazione dell’edificio, ma ciascuno pretende di scegliere l’amministratore, decidere la ripartizione delle spese e assicurarsi il posto migliore sul terrazzo. La casa comune è evocata continuamente; la questione di chi debba abitarne il piano attico rimane, invece, irrisolta.
Ed eccoci al secondo atto della commedia: la scelta del candidato alla guida della coalizione. La nuova legge elettorale ha reso ancora più urgente il confronto sulle primarie, ma non ha certo prodotto una soluzione alle rivalità che attraversano l’opposizione. Giuseppe Conte vorrebbe arrivare rapidamente alla consultazione, dopo aver definito un programma unitario. Il Partito Democratico procede con maggiore cautela, anche in vista dell’assemblea del 18 ottobre, appuntamento delicato per Elly Schlein e per gli equilibri interni al partito. Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra, invece, guarda con diffidenza alle primarie e preferirebbe una figura terza capace di sintetizzare le diverse anime della coalizione. Nel frattempo, il nome di Silvia Salis circola nel dibattito, mentre lei stessa invita a non attribuirle dichiarazioni che non ha fatto.
La situazione è quasi didascalica: il centrosinistra vuole presentarsi agli elettori come un’alternativa unitaria, ma non ha ancora stabilito chi debba rappresentarla, con quale programma e attraverso quale meccanismo di selezione. La discussione sulle primarie, che in teoria dovrebbe servire a dare voce agli elettori, rischia così di diventare una trattativa preventiva tra apparati, nella quale il corpo elettorale viene chiamato a ratificare equilibri che i gruppi dirigenti non sono riusciti a definire autonomamente.
Il dilemma Conte-Schlein, in fondo, è soltanto la manifestazione più visibile di una questione più profonda. Che cosa tiene insieme il campo largo, oltre alla comune opposizione al governo? Quale idea di economia, politica estera, lavoro, welfare, istituzioni e collocazione internazionale potrebbe trasformare una somma di sigle in un progetto riconoscibile? Senza risposte convincenti, le primarie rischiano di scegliere il volto di una coalizione che non ha ancora deciso quale volto mostrare al Paese.
Ecco perché il monito di Massimo D’Alema, secondo cui l’opposizione dovrebbe evitare divisioni utili a mantenere l’attuale assetto di potere, coglie un problema reale, pur senza risolverlo. L’unità non può essere soltanto un imperativo pronunciato quando incombe il rischio di perdere. Deve essere il risultato di una sintesi politica, non il nome elegante attribuito a un accordo provvisorio tra gruppi che continuano a contendersi leadership, candidature e condizioni di accesso alle liste.
In questo scenario, la battaglia contro il Melonellum rischia di diventare il contenitore simbolico nel quale far confluire tutte le difficoltà del centrosinistra: la contestazione della legge, la protezione dei piccoli alleati, la ricerca di una leadership condivisa e il tentativo di arrivare al 2027 senza che le contraddizioni interne esplodano prima del voto. La riforma elettorale può certamente presentare profili da sottoporre a un serio scrutinio costituzionale. Ma sarebbe riduttivo immaginare che la soluzione delle difficoltà dell’opposizione possa arrivare esclusivamente da una sentenza o da un aggiustamento tecnico delle regole.
La democrazia, dopotutto, non coincide con la possibilità di presentare una lista, così come la partecipazione non si esaurisce nella riduzione delle firme da raccogliere. Questi elementi sono importanti, ma la qualità di un sistema politico dipende anche dalla capacità dei partiti di offrire alternative comprensibili, programmi coerenti e una classe dirigente disposta ad assumersi responsabilità. Si può facilitare la presentazione di una lista senza rendere più credibile il progetto che quella lista rappresenta. Si può ottenere una pronuncia favorevole della Consulta senza risolvere una crisi di identità. E si può organizzare una primaria impeccabile senza riuscire a spiegare perché gli elettori dovrebbero riconoscersi nella coalizione che ne uscirà.
Il paradosso finale è proprio questo: mentre il centrosinistra denuncia una legge che considera costruita per ostacolare la propria partecipazione, si trova impegnato a costruire, al proprio interno, le condizioni minime per partecipare senza inciampare nelle sue divisioni. Da una parte si contestano le regole del campo di gioco; dall’altra si discute su chi debba indossare la fascia di capitano, quali compagni ammettere in squadra e chi debba pagare l’iscrizione al torneo.
La Consulta farà il suo lavoro, se e quando sarà chiamata a pronunciarsi. I partiti, invece, dovranno fare il proprio: spiegare agli italiani che cosa intendono cambiare, con quali strumenti e a vantaggio di chi. Perché il vero problema di una coalizione non è soltanto riuscire a raccogliere le firme necessarie per presentarsi alle elezioni. È riuscire a raccogliere, prima ancora, ragioni sufficienti per essere votata.
E su questo terreno, purtroppo per chi preferisce le alchimie parlamentari alle sintesi politiche, non esistono scorciatoie burocratiche. Nessuna componente del gruppo misto può sostituire un progetto comune, nessuna deroga alle sottoscrizioni può fabbricare una leadership condivisa e nessuna sentenza può dispensare i partiti dal compito di convincere i cittadini. La democrazia non è un modulo da compilare: è una responsabilità da assumersi. E non basta dichiararsi pronti a difenderla, se poi si trascorre metà del tempo a cercare il modo più conveniente per aggirarne gli ostacoli e l’altra metà a discutere su chi debba guidare la protesta.
In recent years, Georgia has become the stage for a struggle whose implications extend far beyond its borders. The political conflict, often presented as a debate over democracy, European integration, and civil rights, should in fact be understood as another chapter in the delicate geopolitical game unfolding across the Caucasus.
It is against this backdrop that Tbilisi’s decision to distance itself from the confrontational policies promoted by its Western partners takes on particular significance.
The fundamental question is not whether Georgia should be “European” or “Russian.” Such a framework is excessively simplistic. The real issue is whether a small state situated between major centers of power should be free to determine its own foreign policy or whether its international position should be dictated by the strategic interests of outside actors.
The Georgian government chose the first option.
The rise of Georgian Dream brought about a significant shift in the country’s foreign policy. Rather than automatically echoing the anti-Russian rhetoric prevailing in Brussels, Tbilisi adopted a more pragmatic approach. Its priority became avoiding another war while preserving economic relations with its neighbors.
For Georgia, this is no abstract matter. Russia remains an important economic partner. Trade, tourism, energy, and the movement of people create realities that cannot simply be erased by political decisions. Fully adopting the Western sanctions regime against Moscow would have particularly serious consequences for an economy far smaller and more vulnerable than those of Europe’s major powers.
This is where Tbilisi’s policy fundamentally diverges from the strategy advocated by Brussel’s hawks. Brussels wants Georgia to become increasingly integrated into European political structures. The Georgian government, however, has insisted that integration cannot mean automatically submitting to the European Union’s geopolitical priorities.
The adoption of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence became the main symbol of this dispute. Its critics regard the legislation as a democratic setback. Its supporters see it as a legitimate attempt to limit the political influence of organizations financed from abroad.
The same divide is evident in cultural matters. Georgian legislation concerning LGBT propaganda provoked a strong European reaction and reinforced the perception among its critics that Tbilisi was abandoning the liberal values promoted by the European Union.
Yet one question rarely receives the same attention: who should determine Georgia’s political and cultural rules?
For Georgian Dream, the answer is the Georgian state itself. It was precisely this insistence on autonomy that made the government the target of increasingly intense international pressure.
Recently, Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze openly accused Brussels of financing an attempted coup in Georgia during last year’s protests. He claims that European actors funded groups involved in the demonstrations and supported efforts to bring about a change of government. According to Kaladze, the objective was to install political forces more closely aligned with the interests of the European Union.
In fact, such allegations should come as little surprise in the current geopolitical environment. Brussels is now discussing the possibility of imposing sanctions on most Georgian Dream leaders and government officials. These developments nevertheless reveal the broader geopolitical dimensions of the crisis. The dispute is not merely a controversy over domestic legislation, but a genuine struggle over the country’s strategic orientation.
Here lies the principal danger facing Georgia. The Caucasus is not a neutral space. The region lies between Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the Euro-Atlantic world. Any attempt to turn Georgia into a platform for confrontation with Moscow would have far greater consequences for Georgians themselves than for the powers supporting such a policy from a distance.
The experience of Ukraine has made this reality even more obvious. A state can receive political, financial, and military support from foreign powers while ultimately paying the highest price when rivalries between those powers escalate into open conflict. For a small country such as Georgia, avoiding this fate is a fundamental strategic consideration.
It was precisely on this point that Tbilisi projected a different course from Kiev. Rather than accepting the transformation of the country into another frontline state, the Georgian government sought to preserve workable relations with Moscow. This does not mean that Georgia has formed an alliance with Russia. The two countries still lack formal diplomatic relations, and Tbilisi maintains its own disagreements with the Kremlin. The national priority, however, is to safeguard strategic autonomy, peace, security, and development.
By avoiding direct confrontation with Moscow, Georgia reduces the risk of opening another military front near Russia’s borders. It also preserves economic ties with neighboring countries and retains greater freedom to engage with different centers of power simultaneously.
What is at stake is the sovereignty of a small state amid competition between major powers. In a region increasingly shaped by geopolitical rivalry, the most important question may not be which side Georgia belongs to, but how the country intends to protect itself amid the confrontation between opposing external forces.
The Georgian people have shown that Georgia’s interests come first. And they were right to make that choice.
“Our Earth is dying. Even NOAA admits that the super El Niño — a product of geoengineering — can alter the global climate and that the planet’s life-support system has reached a catastrophic tipping point. Global climate terrorists within the US military are intensifying their warfare operations.”
So begins a brief investigation by American Dr. Ana Maria Mihalcea(Source 1)—work that has been suppressed by mainstream media, even though the articles she publishes on her Substack are consistently based on official papers. It was she who published a confidential US Air Force dossier titled “Weather as a Force Multiplier”(link at the bottom of the article).
This document confirms, beyond any reasonable doubt, the military use of weather—a history traced back to Operation Popeye in Vietnam by our geopolitics and intelligence contributor at Gospa News International, Dr. Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, an academic at the University of Colombo (Sri Lanka)…
Mihalcea adds: “Not only does ball-sized hail constitute an act of terrorism against civilians, but the toxic substances being sprayed—toxic metals, graphene, and polymers—are killing humans, plants, and animals. For years, I have maintained that it is pointless to stop biological weapons linked to COVID-19 if we do not put an end to geoengineering.“
Hailstones that fell in Pavone Canavese. (Andrea Vuolo – Meteo in Piemonte), source: RAI News – August 2025 – see HAARP DOSSIER -7.
Today, we were supposed to focus specifically on the potential correlation between the HAARP station in Alaska and the alarming intensification of El Niño; however, we will cover this in the next episode because, while searching for documentation on the subject, we uncovered other detailed “scientific scoops”!
El Niño is a periodic warming phenomenon occurring between March and February at intervals of two to seven years; it stands in contrast to La Niña, which causes cooling. This year, the phenomenon is being intensified by equatorial Pacific Ocean temperatures that are already above average.
HEAVY FLOODING! Nature is Unleashing its Full Power in Italy and in Nepal
More details in the descripyion of the VIDEO
BREAKING – Four dead and thousands without power after Hurricane Isaias lashes US
Hurricane Isaias leaves hundreds of thousands of people without power in Alabama, Georgia and Florida, with all three states declaring emergencies Flooding is a continuing risk, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis says as he warns of a “very hazardous situation”, according to BBC.
Winds peaked at 120mph (193km/h) before Isaias made landfall in Florida late on Friday – images show houses battered by winds and felled trees.
Two people are dead in Alabama, according to the governor, while two more have been killed in separate incidents in Florida. Isaias peaked as a category three hurricane, bringing heavy rain and powerful wind, but has since been downgraded
Video of the recent floods in Chile
Pentagon-funded electromagnetic bombardment: as dangerous as geomagnetic storms
While researching geoengineering, we uncovered scientific studies that—when viewed together—suggest a potential link between the activity of the High-frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) and alterations to the ionosphere, space weather, and the Earth’s climate…
By synthesizing the astrophysical data gathered, we can state that artificial electromagnetic bombardment generated by the Alaska station can produce dangeorous effects similar to geomagnetic storms originating from the Sun or other planets.
“The ionosphere stretches roughly 50 to 400 miles above Earth’s surface, right at the edge of space. Along with the neutral upper atmosphere, the ionosphere forms the boundary between Earth’s lower atmosphere — where we live and breathe — and the vacuum of space.” (NASA)
As this is a program funded and utilized by the US Pentagon, we are unaware of any scientist ever publishing research on the risks associated with these activities.
With each of our investigations, however, we uncover new, unsettling secrets hidden within the many communications—ostensibly about safety—regarding geoengineering activities; activities described by them as mere study and research, but which we—along with certain European scientists who urged caution—interpret as manipulation.
Indeed, those scientists’ calls for prudence were significant enough to prompt the Pentagon (the US Department of Defense) to relinquish control of the controversial facility in 2015.
«The HAARP facility can generate artificial heating in the atmosphere to enable the study of the variability of the atmosphere, the energetic electron distribution, and how the HF radio wave propagation would be affected. The HAARP HF heater is currently the only available source of controlled ELF/VLF waves available to scientists for magnetospheric wave injection» reads on the official website as we reported in a previous investigation.
The HAARP station’s Ionospheric Research Instrument (IRI) is a massive array of 180 radio antennas spread across a 33-acre site; last August, it conducted PARS (Polar Aeronomy and Radio Science) tests for the third consecutive year prior to the onset of the flood season in Europe and across the globe, a topic we covered in our previous article, *HAARP DOSSIER – 9*.
That is not all. It conducted other tests that were not publicized as part of the official research campaigns and can only be tracked on the website by experts; this is because the UAF is required to issue a “transmission notice” to amateur radio operators, given that electromagnetic tests alter radio frequencies—and much else besides…
Today, we reveal two highly technical yet fundamental points regarding the dangerous HAARP activity—though we hope to present them in a more accessible way, even at the risk of minor scientific inaccuracies:
the antennas can generate a devastating electromagnetic power output of 3.6 gigawatts—equivalent to a small power plant or the electricity consumption of 12,000 homes
high-frequency transmissions can “exceed f0F2” that is “the critical frequency of the Earth’s ionospheric F2 layer”
a study conducted by university physicists and NASA researchers analyzed “space weather modeling capabilities” regarding “geomagnetic storms,” focusing specifically on the critical nature of the f0F2 factor
other studies highlight the dangerous impacts of geomagnetic storms on Earth
«The High-frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) will be conducting a research campaign August 25-27 UTC, with operating times specified in the table below. Operating frequencies will vary, but all HAARP transmissions will be between 2.8 MHz and 10 MHz».
This is what was stated in a “transmission notice” dated August 24, 2026 (following our Investigation No. 9) a notice that is effectively hidden from anyone unfamiliar with the website (Source 2).
But the “Research Campaigns”section has not been updated since the PARS campaign of August 2024. How can such secrecy be explained?
Blatant screenshots from the official HAARP website.
This is because, as revealed in a world exclusive by Gospa News, the geomagnetic bombardment experiments of May 2024 coincided with the appearance of dazzling, anomalous aurorae borealis visible across much of the Northern Hemisphere.
However, UAF management blamed an ongoing solar storm and denied that their tests had triggered or intensified the auroras or that, by interfering with the solar storm, they might be linked to subsequent atmospheric disasters. Since then, transparency regarding the HAARP station has become optional…
I reiterate—for the umpteenth time—that the danger inherent in these electromagnetic bombardments of the ionosphere lies in the fact that no scientific study has ever been conducted on potential short-, medium-, or long-term adverse effects.
At present, Gospa News’ investigations represent the only source of scientific analysis regarding the temporal coincidences between HAARP experiments and anomalous—sometimes even catastrophic—atmospheric events occurring in the weeks and months immediately following them.
Electromagnetic power equivalent to that of 12,000 homes can be unleashed from Alaska.
Now, however, we have identified a study highlighting the critical nature of the foF2 factor as altered by tests conducted at the Alaska station.
“Operating frequencies will vary, but all HAARP transmissions will be between 2.8 MHz and 10 MHz. Actual transmit days and times are highly variable based on real-time ionospheric and/or geomagnetic conditions. All information is subject to change.” reads the official notice dated August 24, 2026 (screenshot above).
“Note that due to the number of experiments and the need to make real-time schedule adjustments based on ionospheric conditions, no frequencies are specified in the table below. The included transmission notice supplement contains information on the frequencies HAARP is authorized to transmit. HAARP transmissions will only occur on our authorized frequencies”.
The communication appears quite generic, yet the notes below specify that “The emission bandwidth may be up to 46 kHz; the actual value depends on the frequency, modulation and experiment requirements”
So far, so good — given that this electromagnetic emission is well below that of a 5G installation (700 MHz, or 700,000 kHz) — but that is not the alarming indicator…
The powerful HAARP radio-wave transmitter in Alaska
At the point 3 we read: “The authorized Effective Radiated Power (ERP) varies from 457 MW at the lower frequencies up to 3.6 GW at the higher frequencies; the actual power depends on the experiment requirements but will be ≤ authorized limit”
“3.6 GW—or 3,600 megawatts (MW)—represents an enormous amount of power, potentially very dangerous if not managed correctly through industrial infrastructure and specific safety systems.”
Google Gemini’s AI issues this warning, reminding us that this is equivalent to 36 million watts (or 36,000 kilowatts) “the power generated by a medium-sized power plant (such as a large wind or solar farm), capable of powering approximately 12,000 homes simultaneously.”
The note attached to the “transmission notice” of August 24, 2026, highlighting the maximum radiated power (ERP) of 3.6 GW – Source 2
The Space Weather Modeling by Ionosphere “Critical foF2 Frequency” Altered by HAARP
Let us look at the explanation provided in the caption of the image from the University of Alaska Fairbanks regarding the August experiment (Source 2):
The table for the test announced by HAARP on August 24, 2026—the day before the activity began
In short, this means interference with satellites and all forms of satellite communication.
It is essentially a “Star Wars”-style tool, given that without Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite network, Ukraine—which lacks its own space-based spy stations—would be left blind…
However, the issue of alterations to this foF2 factor is clearly explained in an older study published by the scientific journal *AGU Advancing Earth and Space Science* in its “Space Weather” section.
The study—authored by J. S. Shim of The Catholic University of America and NASA GSFC (Greenbelt, MD, USA), along with other NASA scientists—is titled “Validation of Ionospheric Specifications During Geomagnetic Storms: TEC and foF2 During the March 2013 Storm Event”(Source 3).
Abstract of the 2018 Shim et al. study – link between sources – Source 3
That study, published in 2018, makes no reference whatsoever to the HAARP activity in Alaska—given that operations had only just resumed at the time following the transfer from the US Air Force to the University of Alaska Fairbanks—yet it helps mere mortals like us (laypeople when it comes to physics) to at least grasp the importance, and therefore the potential danger, of the foF2 factor.
Let us look at the research abstract:
«To address challenges of assessing space weather modeling capabilities, the Community Coordinated Modeling Center is leading a newly established International Forum for Space Weather Modeling Capabilities Assessment» and this in itself is a curious news item containing alarming words that smack of geoengineering a thousand light-years away…
But it continues:
«This paper presents preliminary results of validation of modeled foF2 (F2 layer critical frequency) and TEC (total electron content) during the first selected 2013 March storm event (17 March 2013)». In this study, we used eight ionospheric models ranging from empirical to physics-based, coupled ionosphere-thermosphere and data assimilation models. The quantities we considered are TEC and foF2 changes and percentage changes compared to quiet time background, and the maximum and minimum percentage changes. In addition, we considered normalized percentage changes of TEC».
A Gigantic Space-Warfare Jammer Capable of Altering Electrons (TEC), Satellites, and GPS
Therefore, if foF2 levels rise during a geomagnetic storm, then—by a simple, self-evident philosophical syllogism—artificially exceeding that threshold (as HAARP admitted in the notes regarding its latest test on August 24, 2026) should or could trigger a similarly dangerous space weather event!
To better understand the study’s findings, let us consult the Space Weather website of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)—the U.S. Department of Commerce agency that studies and attempts to forecast weather events.
«The Total Electron Content (TEC) is the total number of electrons present along a path between a radio transmitter and receiver. Radio waves are affected by the presence of electrons. The more electrons in the path of the radio wave, the more the radio signal will be affected. For ground to satellite communication and satellite navigation, TEC is a good parameter to monitor for possible space weather impacts» states NOAA’s Space Weather service (Source 4).
NOAA Space Weather – Real-time TEC monitoring (Source 4).
“The TEC in the ionosphere is modified by changing solar Extreme Ultra-Violet radiation, geomagnetic storms, and the atmospheric waves that propagate up from the lower atmosphere. The TEC will therefore depend on local time, latitude, longitude, season, geomagnetic conditions, solar cycle and activity, and troposphere conditions. The propagation of radio waves is affected by the ionosphere. (..) The change in the path and velocity of radio waves in the ionosphere has a big impact on the accuracy of satellite navigation systems such as GPS/GNSS”. states the US government website.
From these few lines, two definitive concepts emerge:
TEC can be altered by “upward-propagating atmospheric waves” and thus also by HAARP’s geomagnetic bombardments;
with near-absolute certainty, the HAARP station, powerful enough to exceed the foF2 critical frequency, thereby influencing TEC and “impacting space weather” is at the very least a geospatial weapon capable of acting as a “gigantic” jammer (the frequency-disrupting device used by terrorists and intelligence agencies to interfere with mobile phone and other digital device communications).
The Dangerous Impacts of Space Weather on Earth
Here is what the AI Gemini writes on the subject:
Space weather—driven primarily by solar activity (flares, solar wind, and coronal mass ejections, or CMEs)—directly affects the geospace environment and terrestrial technologies.
The interaction of solar plasma with Earth’s magnetic field generates spectacular auroras—both the *borealis* and *australis*—which are sometimes visible even at mid-latitudes during peak storm activity.
We return to the subject of auroras, the “core mission” of HAARP, which states that “high-frequency transmissions often rely on the critical plasma frequency for the F2 region (foF2), as measured by the Gakona ionosonde.”
For someone like me—having written 96 investigative reports on the lab-engineered SARS-CoV-2—reading these statements about the interaction between immense electromagnetic power (3.6 megawatts) and solar activity is truly terrifying.
Google AI Gemini also warns that geomagnetic storms can cause many damages to out planet:
Power grids: Geomagnetic storms induce electric currents in the ground that can overload and damage distribution grid transformers.
Satellites and telecommunications: High-energy charged particles damage onboard electronics, cause temporary or permanent malfunctions, and disrupt GPS signals and radio communications.
The Damage Caused by Geomagnetic Storms
But I am not the only one pointing out the danger of space weather impacts on Earth…
In recent days, we debunked a sensational piece of fake news regarding the explosion of an American spy satellite—a story hastily published by the website *Sorvegliati Spaziali (Space Checks)*after it was misled by Gemini AI. We feel somewhat indebted to them, given the exceptional work they usually do as partners of the National Institute for Astrophysics (INAF) of Rome (Italy); today, we cite them to provide a detailed scientific explanation of the phenomena that the AI had previously reported in a crude and inaccurate manner.
“Space weather refers to the physical state of the space occupied by Earth and the planets of the Solar System—a region permeated by the solar wind, a continuous stream of electrically charged particles (in a state known as plasma) confined by the analogous ‘interstellar wind’ within a massive bubble called the heliosphere,” reads the entry on Space Meteorology (Source 5).
For the sake of brevity, we will skip the lengthy section explaining magnetic field activity linked to the Sun’s rotation and sunspots, which “can release magnetic energy during chromospheric eruptions (so-called flares), resulting in particle acceleration and the emission of electromagnetic radiation.”
“Enormous ‘plasma bubbles’—known as CMEs or Coronal Mass Ejections—can be accelerated toward the planets. When a planet possesses a magnetic field that acts as a genuine shield against incoming space particles, this field becomes compressed, triggering magnetic storms.“
Shortly after the CME struck, the sky above Kiruna, Sweden, exploded with auroras after a strong (G3) geomagnetic storm is in progress on Oct. 10th, 2026 with a chance of escalating to severe (G4) if current trends continue. A dense CME hit Earth earlier in the day, sparking this significant event. Mid-latitude observers with dark skies should be alert for naked-eye auroras – SpaceWeather.com
“On Earth, polar auroras appear as delicate, multicolored curtains; their luminosity is generated in the ionosphere by atoms and molecules excited by solar particles that manage to penetrate the magnetic shield. (…) A disturbed ionosphere affects the quality of radio communications—for instance, by making GPS-based positioning problematic.Furthermore, intense ionospheric electric currents can induce significant additional currents in power lines, thereby triggering blackouts.”
VIDEO – Space Weather: The Geomagnetic Storms of 2024–2025
Rosanna Rispoli, a researcher at the National Institute for Astrophysics (INAF) of Rome, explains space weather and the solar geomagnetic storms that give rise to the aurora borealis and aurora australis in a video released on YouTube.
In the video, she highlights the intensity of these phenomena between 2024 and 2025; it is worth noting that these are precisely the years during which HAARP conducted the highest number of experiments.
The video also refers to the intense aurora borealis—”visible at an unusual latitude”—of May 2024; this occurred at the peak of a solar storm but also during one of the most controversial tests conducted by the Alaska station, forcing UAF management to deny a correlation that seemed obvious even to laypeople…
It is baffling that experts fail to even hypothesize a possible link between these exceptional space events and HAARP experiments; yet, this can only be explained by the fear of challenging a Pentagon project.
NASA Scientist: “Turbulence and the Impact of Geomagnetic Storms on Earth”
However, there is a striking new development regarding the impact of space weather on our planet.
“According to a new statistical study published today in *Nature* (July 15, 2026 – Ed.),we are underestimating the potential consequences of severe geomagnetic storms on Earth. The cause appears to be a combination of measurement errors regarding the solar wind—which drives these storms—physical inferences, and a statistical phenomenon known as ‘regression to the mean,'” summarizes Valentina Guglielmo in an article published by INAF’s online news outlet(Source 6).
«Several processes occur between the point where we measure solar wind intensity—the Lagrange L1 point—and the magnetopause, the point where the solar wind strikes Earth’s outer atmosphere,» explains Nithin Sivadas, a researcher in the Department of Physics at the Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., and the paper’s lead author, speaking to *Media INAF* (Gospa News translation from Italian).
The article published by the National Institute for Astrophysics (INAF) in Rome – Source 6
«Some of these processes can have a systematic effect on reducing intensity, while others—such as turbulence—can have a random effect, causing stochastic variations in solar wind intensity. We focus exclusively on the processes that cause random variations. Phenomena driving random fluctuations in solar wind intensity measured between L1 and Earth’s vicinity include, for example, the solar wind’s direction, its variable structure, and turbulence closer to Earth.»
«Since these factors introduce random variations, scientists previously hypothesized that, on average, underestimations would cancel out overestimations, allowing us to relate the measured average solar wind intensity to its effects on Earth without worrying about random fluctuations. However, our paper argues that this is not entirely true.»
In the study’s abstract, astrophysicist Sivadas—who also works at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland—and his colleagues write an even more unsettling sentence regarding “statistical bias”:
“Our results reveal that the data analysis underpinning saturation theories is affected by a non-linear bias, thereby calling the validity of such theories into question. When uncertainties are corrected, it emerges that Earth’s response to solar wind forcing is consistently linear and that the impact of extreme geomagnetic storms can be double what was previously believed (Source 7).”
Abstract of the study by Sivadas et al. – link below – Source 7
We refer astrophysics enthusiasts and professionals to the complex scientific paper itself; we cite it here solely to refute the mainstream “mantra” claiming that extreme climate changes are driven exclusively by human behavior (certainly a contributing factor) rather than by solar activity—and, by extension, the military geoengineering that mimics it...
Just as with mRNA Covid vaccines, when science truly gets serious and rigorously tests every hypothesis, “politically convenient” certainties begin to crumble…
This “scientific scoop” emerges at a time when HAARP is altering space weather by toying with solar storms—much like “sorcerer’s apprentices” enhancing lethal viruses in a lab—and bombarding the ionosphere, whose primary function is to reflect long-distance radio waves and protect Earth by shielding it froma portion of solar radiation.
Study by STEREO Researchers (EU project): “Impacts Surrounding the Clouds Need to Be Studied”
Confirming our suspicions and the many unknowns inherent in space weather, here is a final key insight from another study published on the European Commission’s CORDIS website. For the sake of brevity, we cite only the conclusions, which refer to a solar eruption and “Coronal Mass Ejections” (CMEs).
Research funded and published by the European Commission – Source 8
«Light associated with an eruption takes eight minutes to reach Earth’s magnetosphere. However, CMEs can take up to five days to cover the distance to our planet. The solar wind acts on these clouds of superheated plasma like a current opposing a boat’s motion, slowing down the faster ones. STEREO scientists have discovered that the impacts occurring around these clouds must be taken into account to “predict” arrival times with greater accuracy (Source 8)».
«From the constant stream of electrically charged particles known as solar wind to unpredictable CMEs, Earth feels the impact of our stellar companion—an influence that extends far beyond mere light and heat».
This is what scientists from the European Commission-funded STEREO (Solar Terrestrial Relations Observatory) mission report (Source 8), implicitly confirming that solar electromagnetic emissions impact Earth’s atmosphere; an effect that, however, can also be artificially replicated by HAARP during Pentagon-funded tests through the alteration of the ionosphere’s “foF2 critical frequency” (as seen in the 2018 Shim et al. study cited above).
The defense strategy of the Alaska station’s proponents has consistently been the same: solar geomagnetic storms are far more powerful—measured in terawatts—and thus vastly exceed the 3.6-gigawatt limit imposed on the UAF.
Yet this remains merely a hypothesis—just like our own—given that until recently (prior to the STEREO and Sivada studies), the prevailing view was that solar flares could not dangerously impact Earth’s atmosphere and clouds…
True science ought to analyze both possibilities; however, were an astrophysicist to discuss the safety of the Pentagon’s projects in Alaska, they would—at the very least—lose their job.
Japanese Scientists: “Connection Between Geomagnetic Storms and Earthquakes”
And finally…the kicker: Amarus in Fundo!
A group of researchers from a Japanese university has proposed a theoretical model exploring a possible link between solar storms and earthquakes. They suggest that, under specific conditions, ionospheric disturbances could help trigger seismic events that are already “on the brink” of occurring.
We are not providing details on this study here, as it will be the main topic of the next Gospa News investigation (subscribe to the newsletter), especially in light of the now-alarming seismic activity along the Pacific Ring of Fire…
In this specific context, we move from HAARP to HARP—the Alaska Earthquake Center—which is based right inside the UAF station in Gakona that we discussed in our previous investigation.
Could it be that the “crazy conspiracy theorists”—who blamed earthquakes on those dangerous, mysterious antennas on the American Arctic peninsula—actually had a scientifically valid point?
A curious coincidence in timing… between earthquakes, auroras, and HAARP experiments
If that turns out to be the case, Gospa News will aim to prove it—relying, as always, on credible international scientific studies, just as we did for all the “Wuhan-Gates” investigations into lab-engineered SARS-CoV-2 and the harms associated with mRNA vaccines.
Fabio Giuseppe Carlo Carisio – Gospa News founder and director
Login
