Da un lato c’è un paese che prosegue coerentemente nella strada del laicismo, imboccata costituzionalmente. Dall’altro ce n’è un altro che si mostra sordo ad un principio di libertà, evocato dai paesi progressisti e da cittadini e cittadine desiderosi di diritti.

Azerbaigian e Turchia sono agli antipodi, sotto questo aspetto. Baku sta lavorando con profitto per una scuola laica in un Paese musulmano: lo scorso 21 settembre infatti è stato deciso dal governo con un decreto di fissare un unico standard di abbigliamento per gli alunni delle scuole statali: l’hijab non è contemplato. La Costituzione azera definisce il paese “laico”, anche per questa ragione i principi del carattere nazionale e laico dell’istruzione sono stati recentemente inseriti nella legge sull’istruzione generale e le nuove norme sulle divise rispondono essenzialmente a quell’impulso riformatore.

Di diverso avviso il governo turco, che ha promosso una protesta dinanzi al consolato azero di Istanbul, supportata da deputati del partito di governo. Non tutti, però, in Turchia sostengono la vulgata governativa: è il caso della parte laica del paese, che dal Bosforo vede la decisione azerbaigiana come un modello da seguire.

Tra queste voci libere spicca quella del teologo e opinionista Cemil Kılıç, noto critico dell’islam politico, che pochi giorni fa ha osservato: “Se l’Azerbaigian farà concessioni agli islamisti politici, in futuro andrà incontro a seri problemi. Non bisogna cedere in alcun modo. Occorre custodire con cura la propria identità laica”. Sulla stessa lunghezza d’onda anche il giornalista Ardan Zentürk, editorialista del quotidiano Star ed ex direttore di Star TV, che ha dichiarato: “Non possiamo consegnare i giovani nelle mani delle comunità religiose. I giovani, naturalmente, devono essere laici”. Ma cosa ne pensa Baku? Ha semplicemente ricordato che la laicità è scritta nelle costituzioni di entrambi i Paesi e che le scelte interne di ciascuno restano affar suo.

Interessante la chiave di lettura offerta dall’editorialista del quotidiano Akşam Oğuzhan Bilgin, che si è domandato se ci sia qualcuno intenzionato a sabotare la fratellanza turco-azerbaigiana, rispondendo che nessuno ci riuscirà. Ecco un altro aspetto che presenta una coloritura anche geopolitica della questione.

Infatti vi sono altri Stati musulmani che adottano la scuola laica, come il Kazakistan dove i requisiti per l’uniforme scolastica obbligatoria, che escludono elementi religiosi, sono stati approvati nel 2016; o come l’Uzbekistan dove da otto anni è in vigore l’uniforme unica; o come il Tagikistan che nel giugno di due anni fa ha fatto di più, vietando per legge di indossare nei luoghi pubblici abiti “estranei alla cultura nazionale”. Tra le altre cose, Azerbaigian, Kazakistan e Uzbekistan sono membri dell’Organizzazione della cooperazione islamica, e nel 2027 Baku dovrebbe ospitare il suo prossimo vertice.

Del resto, la scuola laica è la regola anche in Europa. In Francia, dal 2004, la legge vieta nelle scuole pubbliche i “simboli religiosi ostentati”, con l’avallo della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo. In Austria, da questo settembre, le alunne sotto i 14 anni non indossano l’hijab a scuola. Nessuno di questi Paesi è ritenuto, per questo, meno libero. Baku ha semplicemente scelto la stessa strada.

L'articolo Azerbaigian e Turchia agli antipodi sulla laicità scolastica. Anche sulla questione hijab proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

Riflessioni sui confini tra laicità, sovranità e stabilità sociale

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La controversia relativa all’uso dell’hijab nelle scuole azere ha assunto nuove dimensioni nel mese di ottobre, in seguito all’attuazione di norme sul codice di abbigliamento che hanno comportato il divieto di accesso alle istituzioni pubbliche per studentesse e insegnanti. L’episodio ha scatenato manifestazioni, arresti e critiche da parte delle organizzazioni internazionali, suscitando al contempo reazioni anche da parte della Turchia. Il dibattito si estende ben oltre l’ambito scolastico, coinvolgendo questioni di sovranità, identità religiosa e stabilità regionale.

L’Azerbaigian ha ragioni storiche per mantenere un modello di Stato laico. L’esperienza sovietica, la formazione delle sue istituzioni dopo l’indipendenza e la necessità di governare una società religiosamente diversificata in un contesto regionale teso hanno contribuito al consolidamento di un sistema in cui lo Stato mantiene un controllo rigoroso sul funzionamento delle istituzioni pubbliche. Le autorità azere hanno la prerogativa di determinare le proprie politiche educative, stabilire standard per le scuole e decidere in che modo debbano essere attuati i principi costituzionali.

Tuttavia, il modo in cui tali politiche vengono attuate può produrre conseguenze che vanno oltre i loro obiettivi originari. Nel caso dell’hijab, l’applicazione dei regolamenti scolastici ha suscitato resistenze tra le famiglie e le comunità religiose, mentre gli arresti legati alle proteste hanno amplificato la controversia. La sfida principale del governo sarà quella di gestire questa reazione senza permettere che una disputa sulle uniformi scolastiche si trasformi in un conflitto più ampio tra le autorità statali e le comunità religiose.

La situazione presenta inoltre importanti implicazioni internazionali. Ankara, principale partner strategico di Baku, ha espresso preoccupazione per le restrizioni relative al velo islamico. La vicinanza politica, culturale e linguistica tra i due Paesi rende la questione particolarmente delicata. Sebbene questo disaccordo non equivalga necessariamente a una crisi bilaterale, dimostra come le decisioni interne possano creare attriti anche tra governi che intrattengono relazioni strette. Ankara deve tenere conto delle proprie considerazioni sociali e politiche, mentre Baku cerca di preservare la propria autonomia nella gestione degli affari interni.

Merita attenzione anche la dimensione iraniana. L’Azerbaigian intrattiene un rapporto complesso con l’Iran, caratterizzato da legami storici e religiosi, nonché da divergenze strategiche. Come l’Iran, l’Azerbaigian ha una popolazione prevalentemente sciita, mentre la Repubblica Islamica ospita una consistente minoranza azera. Sia la Guida Suprema, l’Ayatollah Khamenei, sia il presidente Masoud Pezeshkian hanno origini etniche azere. In questo contesto, le politiche di secolarizzazione potrebbero essere interpretate da attori esterni come parte di una più ampia lotta per l’influenza religiosa e politica all’interno dell’Azerbaigian. Tale interpretazione, tuttavia, non dimostra che i regolamenti scolastici siano stati adottati esclusivamente per contrastare l’influenza iraniana.

Esiste inoltre un rischio interno che merita di essere preso in considerazione. Le restrizioni religiose applicate in modo troppo rigido possono produrre effetti contrari a quelli desiderati. Quando alcuni segmenti della popolazione percepiscono determinate misure come imposizioni alle proprie pratiche religiose, i gruppi radicali potrebbero sfruttare il malcontento che ne deriva, dipingere lo Stato come un avversario della religione ed espandere la propria capacità di mobilitazione. Per comprendere questa questione è necessario prendere in considerazione altre esperienze, come quella della Siria sotto il governo di Assad, dove la laicità coesisteva con la proliferazione dell’estremismo. Questo esito non è inevitabile e l’opposizione alle norme non dovrebbe essere automaticamente equiparata all’estremismo. Tuttavia, l’esperienza internazionale suggerisce che tale possibilità debba essere esaminata con attenzione.

Per l’Azerbaigian, la questione va quindi oltre la semplice definizione di un’uniforme scolastica. Il Paese ha il diritto di organizzare le proprie istituzioni secondo le proprie priorità, senza che governi stranieri ne dettino le scelte. Allo stesso tempo, il mantenimento della stabilità richiede che si eviti che le decisioni amministrative alimentino una polarizzazione duratura o creino nuove opportunità per gli attori che cercano di intensificare le tensioni religiose.

L’evoluzione di questo caso avrà implicazioni per le relazioni di Baku con Ankara e Teheran, nonché per le dinamiche politiche interne del Paese. L’esito dipenderà non solo dalle norme stesse, ma anche dalla loro attuazione pratica e dalla risposta delle autorità alle preoccupazioni sollevate da studenti, famiglie ed educatori. Nel Caucaso meridionale, dove identità, sovranità e sicurezza rimangono strettamente intrecciate, anche una controversia apparentemente circoscritta può avere gravi ripercussioni a livello regionale.

Considerações sobre os limites entre secularismo, soberania e estabilidade social.

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A controvérsia envolvendo o uso do hijab nas escolas do Azerbaijão ganhou novas dimensões em outubro, após a aplicação de regras de vestimenta que resultaram no impedimento de entrada de alunas e professoras em instituições públicas. O episódio provocou manifestações, detenções e críticas de organizações internacionais, além de gerar reações na Turquia. A discussão ultrapassa o ambiente escolar e envolve questões de soberania, identidade religiosa e estabilidade regional.

O Azerbaijão possui razões históricas para preservar um modelo estatal secular. A experiência soviética, a formação de suas instituições após a independência e a necessidade de administrar uma sociedade religiosa em meio a um contexto regional tenso contribuíram para consolidar uma estrutura na qual o Estado mantém controle sobre o funcionamento das instituições públicas. Cabe às autoridades azerbaijanas determinar suas políticas educacionais, estabelecer padrões para as escolas e decidir como os princípios constitucionais serão aplicados.

Entretanto, a maneira como essas políticas são implementadas pode produzir consequências que ultrapassam seus objetivos originais. No caso do hijab, a aplicação das regras escolares provocou resistência entre famílias e setores religiosos, enquanto as detenções relacionadas aos protestos ampliaram a repercussão do episódio. A questão central para o governo será administrar essa reação sem permitir que uma disputa sobre uniformes se transforme em um conflito mais amplo entre autoridades estatais e comunidades religiosas.

O cenário possui implicações internacionais importantes. A Turquia, parceira estratégica de Baku, manifestou preocupação com as restrições ao véu islâmico. A proximidade política, cultural e linguística entre os dois países torna o tema particularmente sensível. Embora a divergência não represente necessariamente uma crise bilateral, ela demonstra que decisões domésticas podem gerar desconforto mesmo entre governos que mantêm relações estreitas. Ancara precisa considerar suas próprias referências sociais e políticas, enquanto Baku procura preservar sua autonomia na condução dos assuntos internos.

A dimensão iraniana também merece atenção. O Azerbaijão mantém uma relação complexa com o Irã, marcada por vínculos históricos e religiosos, mas também por divergências estratégicas. Enquanto o Azerbaijão é, assim como o Irã, um país de maioria xiita, a República Islâmica possui uma larga minoria azerbaijana, da qual tanto o Aiatolá Khamenei quanto o Presidente Pezeshkian são, eles próprios, representantes. Nesse ambiente, a política de secularização pode ser interpretada por setores externos como parte de uma disputa mais ampla pela influência religiosa e política no país. Essa interpretação, contudo, não permite concluir que a regulamentação escolar tenha sido formulada exclusivamente para conter a influência iraniana.

Existe ainda um risco interno que merece consideração. Restrições religiosas aplicadas de maneira excessivamente rígida podem produzir efeitos contrários aos pretendidos. Quando parcelas da população percebem determinadas medidas como uma imposição sobre suas práticas religiosas, grupos radicais podem explorar o descontentamento, apresentar o Estado como adversário da religião e ampliar sua capacidade de mobilização. Para entender este tema, é preciso lembrar de outras experiências, como a Síria de Assad, onde o secularismo deu lugar à proliferação doe extremismo. Esse resultado não é inevitável, e a oposição às regras não deve ser confundida automaticamente com extremismo. Ainda assim, experiências internacionais demonstram tal tendência existe e deve ser analisada de perto.

Para o Azerbaijão, a questão envolve, portanto, mais do que a definição de um uniforme escolar. O país tem o direito de organizar suas instituições segundo suas próprias prioridades, sem que governos estrangeiros ditem suas escolhas. Ao mesmo tempo, a preservação da estabilidade depende da capacidade de evitar que decisões administrativas alimentem polarizações duradouras ou ofereçam novas oportunidades a atores interessados em ampliar tensões religiosas.

A evolução do caso será relevante para as relações de Baku com Ancara e Teerã, assim como para a dinâmica política interna do país. O resultado dependerá não apenas das normas estabelecidas, mas também de sua aplicação concreta e da resposta das autoridades às preocupações apresentadas por estudantes, famílias e educadores. No Cáucaso, onde as relações entre identidade, soberania e segurança permanecem estreitamente conectadas, até uma disputa aparentemente localizada pode adquirir repercussões regionais sérias.

Ehsan MOVAHEDIAN

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La advertencia de Aliyev contra la influencia extranjera llega en medio de una disputa con los círculos políticos turcos sobre la religión, Karabaj y las relaciones de Azerbaiyán con Israel.

En el octavo congreso del Partido del Nuevo Azerbaiyán, celebrado en Bakú el 2 de octubre, el presidente Ilham Aliyev ofreció una descripción inusualmente directa de lo que denominó la «seguridad ideológica» de Azerbaiyán. Era tan importante como la seguridad física, afirmó, ya que las amenazas ideológicas podían traspasar las fronteras a través de Internet, los ciberataques y la inteligencia artificial (IA).

Hizo un llamamiento a la educación y al patriotismo para defender el espacio político del país, al tiempo que insistió en que Azerbaiyán no necesitaba «ayuda ni patrocinio» extranjeros. Añadió que otros Estados no debían interferir en sus asuntos ni decirle cómo vivir.

Estas declaraciones las realizó el presidente y líder del partido gobernante en un congreso en el que se definió su rumbo político. Aliyev situó el control de la esfera ideológica de Azerbaiyán al mismo nivel que el poder militar, la independencia económica y la toma de decisiones soberana.

No mencionó a Turquía como fuente de ninguna amenaza. Sin embargo, sus palabras se produjeron en medio de críticas en los círculos políticos y mediáticos turcos hacia las políticas internas de Azerbaiyán, especialmente su trato a las estudiantes que llevan hiyab. El 26 de septiembre, el Consejo de Medios de Comunicación y Radiodifusión de Azerbaiyán acusó a círculos no identificados de llevar a cabo una campaña contra el país en los medios turcos y en las redes sociales.

Ese enfrentamiento agudiza aún más la fórmula «una nación, dos Estados». La proximidad política nunca ha eliminado las diferencias en los intereses nacionales. A medida que Ankara y Bakú se han ido acercando, la cuestión de quién define su identidad común —y qué influencia permite— se ha vuelto más difícil de eludir.

Los analistas que hablaron con The Cradle consideran que el discurso de Aliyev es un intento de renegociar la relación, más que de romperla. Azerbaiyán no tiene ninguna intención aparente de renunciar a su asociación militar, económica y cultural con Turquía. Sin embargo, Bakú quiere dejar claro que el parentesco no otorga a Ankara ninguna autoridad sobre la política interna azerbaiyana.

Una advertencia que se ha escuchado en Ankara

Hazel Yalin, investigadora especializada en las relaciones turco-rusas, interpreta que el discurso estaba dirigido, en gran medida, al Gobierno del presidente Recep Tayyip Erdogan. El analista turco Aydin Sezer también percibe un mensaje diplomático indirecto. Según Sezer, Aliyev se dirigió a varios públicos, entre ellos Occidente, Armenia, Rusia e Irán, pero es posible que Ankara se encontrara entre sus principales destinatarios.

El contexto inmediato es la controversia sobre la religión en las escuelas de Azerbaiyán. Una enmienda de septiembre a las normas de vestimenta de las escuelas públicas prohíbe prendas adicionales consideradas incompatibles con la educación laica. La decisión no menciona el hiyab por su nombre, pero las noticias de que se ha impedido a algunas niñas asistir a clase por llevar pañuelo en la cabeza han suscitado objeciones por parte de críticos turcos.

Ankara no ha abordado públicamente el tema con Bakú. Sezer interpreta la exhortación de Aliyev a que otros países se ocupen de sus propios asuntos como una advertencia contra convertir el lenguaje de la hermandad en un derecho a supervisar a Azerbaiyán.

La propia alianza reconoce este límite. La Declaración de Shusha de 2021 celebra «una nación, dos Estados» y formaliza una amplia cooperación, pero también compromete a Ankara y Bakú a respetar la soberanía y la no injerencia en los asuntos internos de la otra parte. La disputa actual ha puesto en contacto esas dos partes de la declaración.

Si los actores políticos turcos reclaman voz en la política religiosa y educativa de Azerbaiyán alegando una nacionalidad compartida, el margen de soberanía ideológica de Bakú se reduce. Si esas cuestiones pertenecen exclusivamente a Azerbaiyán, el lema sigue siendo una expresión de afinidad cultural y solidaridad política, sin otorgar a ninguna de las dos capitales un mandato sobre la otra.

¿A quién pertenece la victoria en Karabaj?

Yalin afirma que los canales de noticias y las cuentas en redes sociales pro-Erdogan han acusado a Bakú de presionar a los musulmanes en materia de prácticas y organización religiosas. Algunos también han presentado la victoria de Azerbaiyán en la Segunda Guerra de Karabaj como algo que debía a Turquía, calificando las políticas laicas de Aliyev de ingratas y exigiendo respeto por las sensibilidades religiosas turcas.

«Este argumento también se ha esgrimido basándose en el lema “dos Estados, una nación”: si los turcos y los azerbaiyanos son miembros de la misma nación, entonces, según este razonamiento, el Gobierno azerbaiyano también debería tener en cuenta la voz de esa nación».

El discurso de Aliyev en el congreso apuntaba en la dirección opuesta. Afirmó en repetidas ocasiones que Azerbaiyán había actuado por su cuenta, había pagado sus armas y se había impuesto sin ningún patrocinador externo. Esta fue su interpretación política de la guerra; no debe interpretarse como una conclusión de que el apoyo turco no desempeñó ningún papel.

De hecho, la Declaración de Shusha recoge explícitamente el agradecimiento de Bakú por el apoyo moral y político de Turquía. La controversia gira en torno a quién puede atribuirse el mérito político del resultado y qué derechos podría otorgarles ese mérito para exigir algo posteriormente.

Para Aliyev, la victoria militar forma parte de un proyecto más amplio de construcción del Estado. Describió la independencia, la fortaleza económica, el poderío militar y la confianza en las capacidades azerbaiyanas como la línea de actuación duradera de su Gobierno. Cuanto más se convierte esa narrativa en el eje central de su legitimidad, menos margen queda para que otra capital se presente como la artífice del éxito de Azerbaiyán.

La implicación es significativa: no se puede permitir fácilmente que un actor externo —ni siquiera uno amigo— se convierta en el artífice político del éxito de Azerbaiyán.

Jafar Haghpanah, profesor de la Universidad de Teherán, sostiene que Bakú ya no quiere ser tratado como un socio subordinado de Turquía. Yalin identifica tres elementos en la postura de Aliyev.

El primero es la preocupación por la presión ideológica: según la interpretación de Yalin, el intento de golpe de Estado de 1995 contra el padre de Aliyev, Heydar Aliyev, dejó una advertencia duradera sobre las posibles consecuencias de la actividad política vinculada a Turquía.

El segundo es la resistencia a las descripciones nacionalistas turcas de Azerbaiyán como un «hermano pequeño». El tercero es la creciente confianza de Aliyev en que Azerbaiyán puede ejercer su propia influencia política en toda la región. Las acusaciones relativas a figuras turcas en el episodio de 1995 no deben confundirse con la responsabilidad por parte del actual Gobierno turco.

Bakú tiene ahora un mayor peso militar y económico que a principios de la década de 2000. La Compañía Estatal de Petróleo de la República de Azerbaiyán (SOCAR) ha ampliado el alcance energético de Azerbaiyán; el país ha establecido profundos lazos con Israel, relaciones estratégicas con China y Estados Unidos, y ocupa un lugar destacado en la Organización de Estados Turcos (OTC). Esas conexiones le dan más margen para rechazar una jerarquía dentro de su alianza más estrecha.

Yalin cita el respaldo de Sinan Ogan a Erdogan en la segunda vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales de Turquía de 2023 como ejemplo de cómo la influencia azerbaiyana podría convertirse en un tema de debate en la política turca. A Ogan se le preguntó si Aliyev había influido en su decisión y lo negó explícitamente, afirmando que Aliyev no le había llamado. La acusación no puede demostrar que Bakú dirigiera su elección. No obstante, su difusión muestra la rapidez con la que la cuestión de la influencia funciona en ambos sentidos.

El alcance de la seguridad ideológica

La advertencia de Aliyev fue más allá de la controversia sobre los uniformes escolares. Su respuesta consistió en reforzar la educación y el patriotismo y, con ellos, el control del Estado sobre cómo se interpretan su historia y sus victorias.

Turquía dispone de medios inusualmente potentes para llegar a ese público: la televisión, las redes sociales, las universidades, las redes religiosas, la cultura popular, las empresas y las instituciones del mundo turco en general. Esas conexiones han ayudado a mantener la alianza. También pueden inquietar a Bakú cuando los debates políticos turcos comienzan a moldear las expectativas sobre el orden interno de Azerbaiyán.

El problema para Aliyev no es que la influencia turca sea uniformemente hostil. Es que incluso una influencia amistosa puede seguir desafiando la autoridad de un Gobierno para definir la identidad y la política nacionales. Su énfasis en la seguridad ideológica sugiere que pretende proteger esa autoridad incluso dentro de la asociación más estrecha de Azerbaiyán.

El lugar de Israel entre los aliados

La relación de Azerbaiyán con Israel añade otra fuente de tensión. Ankara ha condenado la guerra de Israel contra Gaza, mientras que Bakú ha mantenido estrechos vínculos en materia de seguridad y energía con Tel Aviv. Las armas israelíes han constituido una parte importante del arsenal de Azerbaiyán, y el crudo azerbaiyano ha seguido llegando a Israel a través del puerto de Ceyhan, en Turquía, a pesar de las restricciones comerciales declaradas por Ankara. The Cradle ha informado sobre la relación en materia de armas y petróleo y sobre los continuos flujos de petróleo.

El analista del Cáucaso Ahmad Kazemi no considera que las diferencias entre Ankara y Bakú sean lo suficientemente profundas como para amenazar su alianza. No obstante, cree que la confianza de Aliyev se basa en parte en el apoyo israelí.

Según la valoración de Kazemi, «si Bakú se viera obligada a elegir entre Ankara y Tel Aviv, elegiría a Israel». También sostiene que Bakú sabía que la presencia de su representante durante el discurso del primer ministro israelí, Benjamin Netanyahu, ante la ONU en septiembre desagradaría a Turquía. Un análisis de la Agencia Anadolu reveló que Turquía se sumó a la protesta contra el discurso, mientras que Azerbaiyán siguió estando representado.

Kazemi ve otra consecuencia para el Cáucaso. Sostiene que la preocupación compartida por Turquía e Irán respecto a la posición de Israel en Azerbaiyán podría acercar a Ankara y Teherán en algunas cuestiones, incluidos los corredores de transporte regionales. Dicha convergencia tendría que lidiar con la amplia cooperación estratégica y de defensa de Turquía con Bakú.

Haghpanah ofrece una interpretación más contundente del discurso pronunciado en el congreso:

«Aliyev pretendía con su discurso indicar a Turquía que Azerbaiyán es el principal aliado de Israel y que Ankara debería moderar su tono hacia Tel Aviv y evitar adoptar una postura dura contra este país. Predice que Turquía e Israel entrarán en conflicto por los recursos energéticos del mar Mediterráneo, así como por sus intereses geoeconómicos y geopolíticos».

Yalin interpreta de manera similar las referencias de Aliyev a la producción y venta de petróleo de Azerbaiyán como una respuesta a las críticas a su comercio con Israel. Esas observaciones por sí solas no permiten determinar las intenciones de Bakú. Por su parte, Dariush Safarnejad, un destacado experto en el Cáucaso, señala la relación «petróleo por armas», pero espera que la influencia israelí en Azerbaiyán se reduzca en cierta medida si la cooperación directa de Bakú con Washington se intensifica tras la iniciativa de paz con Armenia. También hace referencia al debate sobre unos lazos más estrechos con la OTAN.

Los demás socios de Bakú

Aliyev aprovechó el congreso para describir a China y a EE. UU. como las dos superpotencias mundiales y para destacar las alianzas estratégicas de Azerbaiyán con ambas. El esfuerzo de Bakú por establecer vínculos con centros de poder rivales le proporciona alternativas a la dependencia de un único socio, ya sea turco, ruso, chino u occidental.

Sus comentarios sobre Armenia y Rusia encajan en ese contexto. Yalin llama la atención sobre la afirmación de Aliyev de que Armenia reconoció la integridad territorial de Azerbaiyán en octubre de 2022, con el consiguiente reconocimiento de la soberanía azerbaiyana sobre Karabaj.

Aliyev presentó el restablecimiento del control azerbaiyano como un logro conseguido frente a la presión de las grandes potencias. Yalin considera que esto forma parte del intento de Bakú de reposicionarse tras la guerra.

Azerbaiyán y Armenia rubricaron un borrador de acuerdo de paz en Washington en agosto de 2025, aunque aún no se ha firmado el tratado definitivo. Safarnejad sostiene que unos lazos más estrechos con Washington podrían dar a Bakú más margen para tratar directamente con EE. UU. y, con el tiempo, reducir su dependencia de Israel.

Hermandad sin un socio dominante

Ninguno de los cinco analistas sugiere que sea inminente una ruptura entre Ankara y Bakú. Safarnejad destaca la profundidad de su interdependencia: la cooperación militar, las infraestructuras energéticas, los corredores de transporte, la inversión, las industrias de defensa y las instituciones culturales confieren a la alianza una base sólida.

La OTS refuerza esos lazos. En septiembre, funcionarios turcos y azerbaiyanos seguían debatiendo una cooperación más profunda en materia de defensa y seguridad.

Azerbaiyán sigue queriendo a Turquía a su lado en materia de seguridad, comercio y diplomacia regional. Aliyev marca el límite en lo que respecta a la influencia de Ankara sobre la política religiosa de Bakú, sus vínculos con Israel y sus relaciones exteriores en general. Para él, el lema «una nación, dos Estados» otorga a Azerbaiyán la última palabra sobre sus propios asuntos.

Hasta qué punto Bakú podrá hacer valer esa reivindicación dependerá, en parte, de la política interna de Turquía tras Erdogan, de la durabilidad de la relación de Azerbaiyán con Israel y de su capacidad para gestionar las relaciones con Washington, Moscú, Pekín y Teherán sin perder el apoyo de Ankara.

Para Irán, un Bakú más seguro de su independencia pero más dependiente de Israel difícilmente resultaría tranquilizador. La alianza puede perdurar; la discusión sobre quién establece sus límites ya está en marcha.

The realities obscured by the “One Nation” narrative intersect with broader imperialist power struggles, extending from the energy resources of the Caspian Basin to the trade routes of Eurasia.

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Although Ankara and Baku maintain a strong partnership spanning Karabakh, energy corridors, the defence industry and the Organization of Turkic States, the 2009 rapprochement with Armenia, the natural gas dispute of 2010 and the political tensions that have resurfaced today show that the two countries have long been engaged in a relationship marked by rivalry as well as cooperation.

Relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan have evolved since the dissolution of the Soviet Union through numerous partnerships in the political, economic and security spheres.

Turkey was the first country to recognise Azerbaijan’s independence. Its support for Baku during the Karabakh conflicts, joint oil and natural gas projects, and increasingly close military cooperation in recent years have all been presented through the political slogan “One Nation, Two States.” Yet several episodes have demonstrated that the two states do not necessarily interpret this supposed unity in the same way.

The tensions that have recently emerged over dress regulations and debates about secularism in Azerbaijan are particularly revealing in this respect. The responses from senior Azerbaijani officials to criticism originating in Turkey have exposed significant differences in how the two countries perceive their relationship.

While the Turkish side has promoted a vision of a “Greater Turkic World” under Ankara’s leadership through the “One Nation, Two States” narrative, the Azerbaijani side has responded with a different emphasis: “One nation, but two states.”

From 1991 to the present: How the foundations of the relationship were laid

Turkey recognised Azerbaijan’s independence on 9 November 1991, becoming the first country to do so. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on 14 January 1992. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a new era of interstate relations between Ankara and Baku began.

For Turkey, Azerbaijan was more than a country linked to it through a shared Turkic identity. The relationship also provided a strategic gateway to the Caspian Basin, Central Asia and the South Caucasus—an objective that aligned with the broader strategic interests of the United States as well. For Azerbaijan, meanwhile, Turkey was an important partner capable of providing political support on the international stage, facilitating access to Western markets and cooperating on security matters.

The famous slogan “One Nation, Two States,” popularised by former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, came to express a degree of closeness that went beyond ordinary diplomatic relations between the two countries.

One of the most important issues on the agenda in the early 1990s was the Karabakh conflict. In 1993, Turkey closed its land border with Armenia after Armenian forces took control of the Kelbajar district. This decision marked a defining moment in Ankara’s diplomatic position on the Karabakh conflict.

Turkish-Armenian relations thus became an integral part of Ankara’s relationship with Baku. Turkey’s policy towards Armenia began to be shaped not only by the dynamics of bilateral relations but also by its strategic partnership with Azerbaijan.

The first major tension: The rapprochement with Armenia

The problems that have periodically emerged in Turkey–Azerbaijan relations are not new. A closer look at the 2008–2010 period reveals how disagreements in both diplomacy and economics brought underlying tensions between the two countries into the open for the first time.

In 2008, Turkey and Armenia launched a renewed initiative to normalise relations. On 6 September 2008, then-Turkish President Abdullah Gül travelled to Yerevan at the invitation of Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan to watch a football match between the national teams of the two countries. The visit became one of the symbolic moments in the normalisation process between two countries pursuing different paths towards transatlantic integration. The initiative would subsequently become known as “football diplomacy.”

Following negotiations, Turkey and Armenia signed protocols in Zurich in October 2009 aimed at establishing diplomatic relations and developing bilateral ties.

The Azerbaijani leadership, however, viewed the process with considerable reservations. Baku regarded any normalisation between Ankara and Yerevan conducted independently of the Karabakh issue as contrary to its core foreign policy interests. Such moves raised concerns in Azerbaijan that Turkey’s political support could weaken.

The protocols signed by Turkey and Armenia never entered into force. The process failed to advance through the parliamentary ratification stages and eventually came to a standstill. Lobbying efforts by pro-Baku circles, drawing heavily on Azerbaijani financial resources, are also understood to have influenced the process.

This first major test therefore became an illustration of Azerbaijan’s ability to exert influence over Turkish policy.

Partnership and bargaining

During the same period, the two countries experienced a serious dispute over natural gas prices and energy transportation.

Natural gas produced at Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field was becoming an important source of supply for Turkey. However, when negotiations to renew earlier agreements began in 2008, disagreements emerged over gas prices, the recalculation of past purchases, Turkey’s ability to resell the gas to third countries, and transit fees.

At this point, Ankara’s ambition to establish itself as a central energy corridor to Europe intersected with Baku’s efforts to secure more direct commercial arrangements for its natural gas exports.

The dispute between the two supposed partners lasted approximately two years. Azerbaijan sought to strengthen its bargaining position against Ankara by drawing on its relations with alternative partners, including Russia and Iran.

Agreements signed in June 2010 ultimately resolved the disagreements over natural gas prices, sales and transit conditions.

This dispute was a clear indication that relations between the two countries were shaped by far more complicated dynamics than the rhetoric of “brotherhood” suggested.

Turkey offered a critical transit route for Azerbaijan’s access to European markets, while Azerbaijan used its energy resources to gain leverage over Ankara’s strategic objectives.

“Blood brothers” or energy partners?

Energy cooperation can be seen as one of the most important long-term foundations of Turkey–Azerbaijan relations. Energy projects have not only tied the two countries’ economic interests together; they have also influenced Turkey’s position in the European energy market and Azerbaijan’s ability to bring Caspian resources to international markets.

From the Caspian to the Mediterranean: The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline

One of the clearest manifestations of this partnership is the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. Beginning full-capacity operations in 2006, the pipeline transports Azerbaijani oil through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean terminal at Ceyhan. The project was implemented under agreements signed by Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 1999.

The significance of BTC extends beyond oil transportation. Most importantly, it enables Caspian energy resources to reach global markets through routes that bypass Russia. Azerbaijan has thus expanded its export options, while Turkey has become a major energy transit hub. At the broader geopolitical level, the project also represented an important step in the Atlantic alliance’s strategy to reduce Russia’s influence over regional energy routes.

Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum and TANAP

Natural gas cooperation between the two countries developed along similar lines. The Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum pipeline began transporting gas in 2007, facilitating the delivery of Azerbaijani natural gas to the Turkish market.

The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) subsequently became one of the most important projects in the bilateral partnership. The first gas flowed through TANAP in June 2018. The pipeline delivers Azerbaijani natural gas to Turkey and contributes to its transportation to European markets through the Southern Gas Corridor.

A turning point for Azerbaijani capital: SOCAR

Energy relations are not limited to pipelines. Investments by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) in Turkey have become one of the largest components of the two countries’ economic relationship.

SOCAR Turkey operates in sectors including refining, petrochemicals, logistics and port management. In a statement concerning 2024, the company said its total investments in Turkey had exceeded $18 billion and described itself as the country’s largest foreign direct investor. The STAR Refinery in Aliağa, İzmir, is another major Azerbaijani investment in Turkey.

The economic relationship, therefore, is not simply a matter of Turkey gaining access to Azerbaijan or Azerbaijan reaching European markets through Turkey. Azerbaijani capital has also established a significant presence in Turkey’s industrial and energy infrastructure.

Why is bilateral trade falling short of its target?

Despite close political ties and major investment projects, bilateral trade remains below the target set by the two countries’ leaders.

According to figures published by the Azerbaijani Embassy in Turkey, bilateral trade reached $5.72 billion in 2025. Of this total, $3.38 billion consisted of Azerbaijani exports to Turkey, while $2.34 billion represented Turkish exports to Azerbaijan.

The two governments aim to increase bilateral trade to $15 billion. Achieving this target would require the current volume to grow by approximately 2.6 times.

Although energy, defence industry cooperation and major infrastructure projects keep bilateral relations at a strategic level, a comparable leap in trade has yet to materialise.

Transport corridors, Eurasia and rivalry within the OTS

Following the development of energy corridors, transport projects became another major dimension of relations between the two countries.

The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railway, inaugurated on 30 October 2017, connected Azerbaijan to Turkey’s railway network through Georgia. The project forms an important part of a route through which goods from China and Central Asia can travel across the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus towards Turkey and Europe.

These interests have gained further importance in recent years within the framework of the international transport route known as the Middle Corridor.

The 2020 Karabakh War

One of the most important turning points in Turkey–Azerbaijan relations was the Second Karabakh War in 2020.

During the 44-day war, Turkey emerged as one of Azerbaijan’s most important political and military supporters. Military training, defence industry cooperation and security ties between the two countries had deepened considerably. For Turkey, the conflict also provided an environment in which its defence industry—regarded in recent years as one of the country’s most important export sectors—was put to the test on the battlefield.

Azerbaijan’s use of Turkish-made unmanned aerial vehicles, including the Bayraktar TB2, and the depth of military cooperation between the two countries were among the key issues highlighted in assessments of the war.

The Shusha Declaration: Relations elevated to an alliance

It was in 2021 that relations between the two countries were formally elevated to the level of an alliance. On 15 June 2021, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed the Shusha Declaration on allied relations in Shusha.

The declaration provided a more comprehensive political framework for the strategic partnership, incorporating military and security cooperation.

It stipulates that the parties will hold consultations if either country faces a threat or attack by a third state against its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity or security. The document also provides for expanded defence cooperation, modernisation of the armed forces, joint military exercises and coordination between security institutions.

In other words, the agreement further facilitated access for Turkish defence companies to the Azerbaijani market and for Azerbaijani capital to the Turkish economy.

The Karabakh victory and shifting balances of power

Azerbaijan’s re-establishment of control over Karabakh in September 2023 did more than alter the course of the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. It also ushered in a new phase in the political psychology of relations between Ankara and Baku.

Turkey continued to support Azerbaijan’s position on territorial integrity. But the picture in Baku began to change. Having strengthened its military and diplomatic position, Azerbaijan increasingly pursued regional policies independently of Ankara, including in areas where its preferences might diverge from those of Turkey.

Both sides continued to tell their own story of “brotherhood,” but their relative leverage varies depending on the issue. Turkey has greater overall military and economic capacity, yet Azerbaijan possesses instruments of influence—particularly in the energy sector—that can affect Ankara’s decisions.

Nakhchivan and the Zangezur issue

Transport connections and the status of Nakhchivan are becoming increasingly important to the future of Turkey–Azerbaijan relations.

The absence of a direct land connection between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is one of the region’s fundamental transport challenges. Turkey’s border with Nakhchivan and its connections to the exclave therefore occupy a special place in Ankara–Baku relations.

The Iğdır–Nakhchivan natural gas pipeline, inaugurated on 5 March 2025, contributes to diversifying Nakhchivan’s energy supply. With an announced initial capacity of 730 million cubic metres per year, the pipeline delivers natural gas to Nakhchivan through Turkey.

The main dispute, however, concerns road and railway routes that would connect mainland Azerbaijan directly to Nakhchivan.

The joint declaration signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Washington on 8 August 2025 included efforts to establish unimpeded connectivity between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. Subsequently, the United States and Armenia developed an implementation framework for a project known as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).

This route is not merely about Azerbaijan gaining access to Nakhchivan. For Turkey, it also promises easier access to the Caspian Basin, Central Asia and other countries in the Turkic world.

This is precisely where Turkish, Azerbaijani and Armenian companies are preparing for new battles over contracts and tenders associated with the Trump corridor.

As of October 2026, however, a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan has yet to be formally signed. Despite significant progress in the process, the final text remains to be brought into force.

Although Ankara’s and Baku’s interests appear to overlap substantially on this issue, competition over contracts, commercial opportunities and the distribution of the spoils could generate new sources of tension.

The Organization of Turkic States: Partnership or rivalry?

Another source of tension in Turkey–Azerbaijan relations is the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).

The organisation aims to strengthen transport connectivity, expand trade, promote economic cooperation and improve coordination on security issues. For Turkey, however, it also represents a means of expanding access to Central Asia and projecting an image of leadership over the “Turkic world” to its domestic audience. For Azerbaijan, the critical objective is to preserve its dominant position along the Trans-Caspian route.

The adoption of the Karabakh Declaration at the OTS informal summit held in Shusha on 6 July 2024 was also followed by an increase in Azerbaijani media narratives promoting Baku’s leadership of the “Turkic world.”

In other words, political leadership within the Turkic world, the form of economic integration and the distribution of influence among member states are all arenas of ongoing competition concealed beneath the rhetoric of a “single nation.”

The OTS summit that Turkey is expected to host in Ankara on 29–30 October 2026 is significant in this context. Ankara and Baku can be expected to emphasise the language of “brotherhood” at the summit, but it remains unclear whether they will offer concrete solutions to the issues dividing them.

The Israel question: Do Ankara and Baku have different priorities?

Relations with Israel are sometimes described as a major point of disagreement between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Contrary to this assumption, however, cooperation with Israel is one of the areas in which the two countries’ interests overlap most significantly.

Turkey continues to express opposition to Israel in its public rhetoric while also making statements about having halted trade with the country. Yet the continuation of trade through other channels is no secret. On the Azerbaijani side, critics of Baku among supporters of the ruling AKP in Turkey are accused of hypocrisy over the issue.

In a statement dated 10 November 2024, Turkey’s Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources argued that BOTAŞ International had no authority over the buying and selling of oil transported through BTC and maintained that no cargoes destined for Israel were being loaded. According to the ministry, the oil companies using the pipeline were complying with Turkey’s decision to halt trade with Israel.

In contrast, a Reuters report published in January 2026, citing data from the ship-tracking company Kpler, stated that Israel’s imports of Azerbaijani crude oil from Ceyhan averaged 94,000 barrels per day in 2025, a 31 per cent increase compared with the previous year.

Why did the headscarf debate become a diplomatic issue?

The immediate trigger for the latest tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan was a set of dress regulations governing state schools in Azerbaijan.

On 21 September 2026, Azerbaijan’s Cabinet of Ministers amended the dress code rules for state schools. Although the regulation did not explicitly mention headscarves, reports and footage showing students wearing headscarves being denied entry to schools provoked a backlash in Turkey.

Oktay Saral, a chief adviser to President Erdoğan, and several AKP lawmakers spoke out against the obstruction of headscarved students’ right to education. The debate quickly expanded beyond school regulations in Azerbaijan to encompass the two countries’ differing understandings of secularism and the limits of one state’s right to comment on another’s domestic affairs.

On 13 October, the ruling New Azerbaijan Party (YAP), led by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, issued a statement directly targeting the AKP. YAP described the statements coming from Turkey as irresponsible and argued that the principle of “One Nation, Two States” could not legitimise interference in the domestic affairs of one country by the other.

The controversy thus brought tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan into the open, with the headscarf issue serving as the immediate point of contention.

While Azerbaijan has delivered particularly strong messages on the matter, Ankara has maintained institutional silence, despite statements from individual figures.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s remarks during his visit to Baku on 15 October emphasised that the two countries had weathered numerous tests in the past, that the relationship between their leaders remained strong, and that the “Two States, One Nation” principle continued to manifest itself across all areas of cooperation.

What does the overall picture reveal?

Relations between the two countries have long been shaped by a combination of rivalry and cooperation. Yet the relationship is generally treated as an almost untouchable domain, with both sides behaving as though no tensions exist.

The slogan “One Nation, Two States” does less to explain the actual nature of Turkey–Azerbaijan relations than to conceal the conflicts of interest embedded within them. It functions as a nationalist political narrative that obscures the competing interests of the two states.

The decisive factors in bilateral relations, however, are energy resources, transport corridors, the defence industry, capital investments and the struggle for influence within the Organization of Turkic States.

Despite the many sources of tension, the economic ties and agreements established between the two countries’ business interests have helped sustain the rhetoric of “brotherhood.” This is because nationalist discourse can place these relationships behind a shared identity narrative, rendering the interests of big capital operating in the name of “Turkic unity” and serving US strategic interests largely immune from scrutiny.

Moreover, this partnership is not confined to the independent choices of the two countries. The realities obscured by the “One Nation” narrative intersect with broader imperialist power struggles, extending from the energy resources of the Caspian Basin to the trade routes of Eurasia.

Considerations on the boundaries between secularism, sovereignty, and social stability\

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The controversy surrounding the wearing of the hijab in Azerbaijani schools took on new dimensions in October, following the implementation of dress code rules that resulted in female students and teachers being denied entry to public institutions. The episode sparked demonstrations, arrests, and criticism from international organizations, while also drawing reactions from Turkey. The debate extends far beyond the school environment, involving questions of sovereignty, religious identity, and regional stability.

Azerbaijan has historical reasons for maintaining a secular state model. The Soviet experience, the formation of its institutions after independence, and the need to govern a religiously diverse society amid a tense regional environment have contributed to the consolidation of a system in which the state maintains strict control over the functioning of public institutions. Azerbaijani authorities have the prerogative to determine their educational policies, establish standards for schools, and decide how constitutional principles are to be implemented.

However, the way these policies are implemented can produce consequences that extend beyond their original objectives. In the case of the hijab, the enforcement of school regulations has provoked resistance among families and religious communities, while arrests related to the protests have amplified the controversy. The government’s central challenge will be to manage this reaction without allowing a dispute over school uniforms to develop into a broader conflict between state authorities and religious communities.

The situation also has important international implications. Ankara, Baku’s main strategic partner, has expressed concern over restrictions on the Islamic headscarf. The political, cultural, and linguistic proximity between the two countries makes the issue particularly sensitive. Although this disagreement does not necessarily amount to a bilateral crisis, it demonstrates how domestic decisions can create friction even between governments that maintain close relations. Ankara must take its own social and political considerations into account, while Baku seeks to preserve its autonomy in managing domestic affairs.

The Iranian dimension also deserves attention. Azerbaijan maintains a complex relationship with Iran, shaped by historical and religious ties as well as strategic disagreements. Like Iran, Azerbaijan has a predominantly Shiite population, while the Islamic Republic has a substantial Azerbaijani minority. Both Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian have Azerbaijani ethnic backgrounds. In this environment, secularization policies may be interpreted by external actors as part of a broader struggle for religious and political influence within Azerbaijan. This interpretation, however, does not establish that the school regulations were adopted exclusively to counter Iranian influence.

There is also a domestic risk worth considering. Religious restrictions implemented too rigidly can produce effects contrary to those intended. When segments of the population perceive certain measures as impositions on their religious practices, radical groups may exploit the resulting discontent, portray the state as an adversary of religion, and expand their capacity for mobilization. Understanding this issue requires consideration of other experiences, such as Syria under the Assad government, where secularism coexisted with the proliferation of extremism. This outcome is not inevitable, and opposition to the regulations should not automatically be equated with extremism. Nevertheless, international experience suggests that this possibility needs close examination.

For Azerbaijan, the issue therefore involves more than the definition of a school uniform. The country has the right to organize its institutions according to its own priorities, without foreign governments dictating its choices. At the same time, maintaining stability requires preventing administrative decisions from fueling lasting polarization or creating new opportunities for actors seeking to intensify religious tensions.

The evolution of this case will have implications for Baku’s relations with Ankara and Tehran, as well as for the country’s domestic political dynamics. The outcome will depend not only on the regulations themselves but also on their practical implementation and the authorities’ response to concerns raised by students, families, and educators. In the South Caucasus, where identity, sovereignty, and security remain closely intertwined, even a seemingly localized dispute can have serious regional repercussions.

Sembrano lontani i tempi in cui il presidente dell’Azerbaigian Ilham Aliyev faceva proprio il motto coniato dal padre Heydar per descrivere la fraterna relazione con la Turchia: “Una nazione, due Stati”. Lontani perché il logorio che negli ultimi mesi ha interessato il rapporto bilaterale sembra arrivato al suo culmine. A scatenare la reazione turca è stata l’entrata in vigore di una legge che da qualche settimana vieta di indossare l’hijab nelle scuole primarie azere. Una mossa a cui sono seguite durissime prese di posizione da parte di esponenti di primo piano del partito del presidente turco Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Un esempio su tutti: il suo consigliere capo, Oktay Saral, ha parlato di una mossa inaccettabile. Altrettanto incisiva è stata la risposta di Baku. Sul fronte interno, sono arrivate decine di arresti di manifestanti che protestavano contro la misura e una limitazione temporanea dell’accesso ai social network. Alla Turchia invece ha risposto direttamente il presidente Aliyev, invitandola a chiare lettere a non immischiarsi nelle scelte interne del Paese.

A prima vista appare un braccio di ferro sul tema della laicità dello Stato, un campo in cui negli ultimi anni la Turchia di Erdogan ha compiuto passi molto decisi per aumentare il peso della religione nella vita sociale e politica. In realtà, dietro al velo si cela una dinamica ben più profonda che sta facendo apparire delle crepe in un’alleanza storica tra due Paesi affini dal punto di vista etnico. A pesare, e molto, in tal senso è l’atteggiamento conciliante che l’Azerbaigian ha nei confronti di Israele. Lo Stato ebraico è visto da Ankara come il principale rivale strategico regionale, se non un vero e proprio nemico, e la vicinanza a Baku è fumo negli occhi. Gli stessi occhi che qualche settimana fa hanno notato come i rappresentanti diplomatici azeri alle Nazioni Unite non abbiano lasciato l’Assemblea generale durante il discorso del primo ministro israeliano Benjamin Netanyahu, come invece fatto da quelli di decine di Paesi per protestare contro le azioni del governo di Tel Aviv in Palestina, Libano e Siria.

Alla vicinanza diplomatica si associa quella sul fronte militare. La notizia più recente in tal senso ha visto il Paese caucasico cominciare a produrre sul proprio territorio fucili con tecnologia occidentale grazie a un accordo con l’israeliana Ari Arms. Secondo alcune indiscrezioni ben documentate, per quanto smentite con forza da Baku, lo Stato ebraico ha inoltre inviato in segreto in Azerbaigian, Paese che confina con l’Iran e che quindi rappresenta un avamposto dal grande peso strategico, diverse decine di militari e agenti dell’intelligence, tra cui membri delle forze speciali israeliane e del Mossad. Il consolidamento della relazione di sicurezza è però avvenuto nel corso degli anni, basti pensare che tra il 2016 e il 2020 circa il 70% delle importazioni di armamenti da parte dell’Azerbaigian proveniva da Israele.

Di contro, oltre che per la vicinanza geografica all’Iran, il Paese mediorientale guarda a quello caucasico anche per ottenere forniture sicure e costanti di energia: nel 2025 il greggio azero ha rappresentato quasi il 50% delle importazioni petrolifere israeliane, la quota più alta degli ultimi dieci anni e molto più elevata di quella di un gigante degli idrocarburi come la Russia, che si è fermata al 28%. Ironia della sorte, la quasi totalità di questo flusso raggiunge Israele dopo essere stato immesso nelle petroliere che si riforniscono nella città turca di Ceyhan, punto di approdo dell’oleodotto Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. Ankara, infatti, non è in grado di controllare dove viene diretto il petrolio azero caricato nelle navi sulle sue coste.

L’irritazione turca è legata anche alla vicenda relativa al Nagorno Karabakh, regione riconquistata nel 2023 dall’Azerbaigian dopo una guerra lampo con l’Armenia. Per quanto la stessa Israele abbia supportato Baku dal punto di vista militare, fornendo equipaggiamento ad hoc nelle settimane precedenti alla trionfale offensiva azera, la Turchia è stata da sempre al fianco del Paese caucasico nella sua rivendicazione rispetto alla regione un tempo nelle mani dell’Armenia. Questa vicinanza si è tradotta nel corso degli anni in un fondamentale supporto politico, diplomatico e militare alla causa azera. Un impiego di risorse di varia natura che ora dalle rive del Bosforo viene considerato da molti uno spreco.

L'articolo Gli alleati Turchia e Azerbaigian litigano per il divieto di indossare l’hijab a scuola. Ma dietro si nasconde l’avvicinamento di Baku a Israele proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

A new dress-code dispute in Azerbaijan’s public schools has sparked protests by parents and students after reports that girls wearing hijabs, or Islamic headscarf, were turned away from classes. The protests come after a new ban on clothing deemed incompatible with the secular nature of education.

Azerbaijan’s new school-uniform rules have sparked protests after reports emerged of schools turning away girls wearing hijabs, renewing debate over religious freedom and secular education.

Germany’s espionage investigation into former intelligence chief August Hanning has widened, with the Federal Interior Ministry examining possible breaches of secrecy regulations during his time as a senior government official. The development raises further questions about the handling of classified intelligence, including material supplied by Germany’s international security partners.

Germany’s Federal Interior Ministry confirmed on Thursday, 8 October, that it was examining whether confidentiality regulations may have been breached during August Hanning’s tenure as state secretary between 2005 and 2009. The examination follows his arrest on suspicion of espionage and attempted treason, and the discovery of a suspected network supplying sensitive intelligence documents from within Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND).

According to the latest information on the ministry’s examination, officials have ordered an immediate review. The ministry has not disclosed its scope or whether investigators have identified any additional security breaches during Hanning’s government service.

Hanning, 80, headed the BND from 1998 until 2005 before moving to the Interior Ministry, where he remained until 2009. An investigating judge at Germany’s Federal Court of Justice subsequently ordered his continued detention following his arrest on Tuesday.

His former chief of staff, identified under German privacy rules as Manfred D., has also been remanded in custody. Prosecutors suspect that the two men maintained an arrangement through which confidential intelligence documents were obtained in exchange for payment.

Thousands of intelligence documents under investigation

Federal prosecutors believe the arrangement began around 2010, several years after Hanning left the BND, and continued until June 2022.

Investigators suspect that approximately 2,000 documents were obtained through Hanning’s former colleague, who remained in senior administrative positions at the intelligence service under successive directors.

The material reportedly included assessments of Russia’s military activities, information concerning Iran’s nuclear programme and intelligence originating from foreign partner services. Some documents were intended for senior German government officials, including the chancellery.

Prosecutors suspect that Hanning used confidential material in his private security consultancy and prepared at least one analysis for a foreign intelligence contact. Whether the analysis was ultimately delivered remains unclear.

The investigation consequently extends beyond the suspected unauthorised removal of German state documents. Intelligence supplied by foreign governments is frequently shared under restrictions governing its subsequent distribution. Any compromise of such material could require Germany to assess whether sensitive foreign sources, methods or assessments were exposed.

BND president Martin Jäger has confirmed that the service initiated extensive internal investigations after suspicions emerged. The affair has also drawn attention from the Bundestag’s parliamentary intelligence oversight body, whose chairman, Marc Henrichmann, has called for a comprehensive investigation.

Hanning acknowledges possession of confidential files

Hanning’s lawyer, Leon Kruse, has rejected the accusations while acknowledging that his client possessed confidential documents.

In a statement released following the court hearing, Kruse denied that Hanning had passed information to the detriment of Germany or received payment for doing so. He maintained that further investigations would establish that his client was being wrongly prosecuted.

The defence statement establishes an important point in the proceedings: possession of confidential material is acknowledged, but its alleged commercial exploitation and transfer to foreign intelligence services remain disputed.

Investigators must establish how the documents were acquired, whether payments were made and what classified information, if any, reached foreign recipients.

Azerbaijan rejects alleged intelligence connection

The identity of the foreign intelligence service involved remains another unresolved question.

German reporting has raised the possibility of a connection to Azerbaijan, although federal prosecutors have not publicly identified the foreign service concerned.

Azerbaijan has rejected suggestions that its intelligence authorities were involved. Baku reportedly lodged a diplomatic protest with the German government, challenging the allegations and their potential consequences for bilateral relations.

The possibility of a Russian connection has also attracted attention because of Hanning’s international business contacts and his association with former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. However, no evidence establishing Russian involvement has been publicly presented by German prosecutors.

Hanning’s foreign commercial relationships alone do not establish that classified information was transferred to any particular government.

Investigation originated in separate kidnapping case

The circumstances that brought Hanning to investigators’ attention have added another dimension to the affair.

The suspected intelligence breach emerged during an investigation connected to German businesswoman Christina Block, who is facing criminal proceedings over allegations concerning the abduction of her children.

Hanning had reportedly provided advisory services connected to the affair. Searches conducted in September 2025 led investigators to confidential BND material, prompting a separate examination of how the documents had been obtained.

The discovery subsequently developed into an intelligence investigation involving federal prosecutors and Germany’s domestic criminal investigation authorities.

German government faces questions over intelligence safeguards

The investigation comes as Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s government seeks to strengthen Germany’s intelligence capabilities in response to mounting security threats.

The BND’s ability to obtain and exchange intelligence depends partly on the confidence of partner organisations. Concerns now centre on whether documents supplied by allied services were included in the material allegedly transferred, and whether Germany must inform partners about potential exposure.

The case is also prompting scrutiny of restrictions placed on former senior intelligence officials who subsequently enter private consultancy work.

At the German government’s press briefing on 7 October, a spokesman acknowledged the seriousness of the allegations but declined to discuss the proceedings, referring questions to federal prosecutors and the courts.

The Interior Ministry’s decision on 8 October to examine Hanning’s earlier government service potentially broadens the inquiry beyond the suspected transfer of BND documents between 2010 and 2022.

Investigators must now determine the extent of any unauthorised disclosure, identify any foreign recipients and assess whether information supplied by Germany’s security partners was compromised.

Both men remain presumed innocent unless convicted.

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