Drones struck the seized Ukrtelecom building in occupied Luhansk overnight on 21 October, hitting the mobile operator Russia’s occupation authorities run there under the name “Lugacom,” Russian Telegram channel Astra and Ukrainian monitoring channels reported. The strike came a night after drones hit “Ugletelecom,” the occupation’s telecom operator in Donetsk, which reportedly runs on equipment seized from Ukrainian companies. Footage posted by Ukrainian monitors shows heavy fire damage inside the Luhansk building. Ukraine has not officially commented.

Ukraine has spent months hitting the supply lines, depots, and infrastructure that sustain Russia’s occupation of southern and eastern Ukraine, with mid-range drones striking trucks, trains, and communications towers well behind the front. This spring the commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert “Madyar” Brovdi, promised Russian troops in occupied territory a “stone age.” This time the targets were the networks the occupation runs on.

A burned-out Ukrtelecom building in Luhansk

Residents reported explosions in Luhansk overnight, and the former Ukrtelecom building was attacked by a drone, Astra reported, citing its readers. The occupation runs its mobile operator, “Lugacom,” from the seized building, and built its network on equipment taken from Ukraine’s Kyivstar, according to dev.ua. The building also houses an occupation-run telecom services center. Luhansk is situated in the easternmost Ukrainian region and has been occupied since 2014.

Ukrainian monitoring channel Exilenova+ said Ukraine’s Defense Forces struck the building, which also hosts an information technology and technical support center. A video it posted shows extensive burning inside. Petro Andriushchenko, head of the Center for the Study of Occupation, said the drones hit a data center in the building.

Occupation officials had not commented, according to NV. In September, drones hit a hardware store in Luhansk, sparking a large fire. Earlier this month, fires broke out at a Russian supply base in Khrustalnyi, also in occupied Luhansk Oblast.

Donetsk’s occupation telecom operator hit the night before

The night before, drones struck “Ugletelecom,” one of the key communications operators in occupied Donetsk Oblast, Exilenova+ reported. It operates from an office building at 60 Postysheva Street, where Ukraine’s state holding company Donbasugleobespechenie was registered before the occupation, according to RBC-Ukraine. Astra found about 27 organizations registered at the address, including internet provider Fticom, and damage on four floors.

Ugletelecom runs on equipment seized from Ukrainian companies, Donetsk-focused outlet Kochegarka reported, citing local sources. The occupation also moved local businesses that had used Ukrtelecom over to it, according to dev.ua. Residents had reported powerful explosions in the city.

Power cuts across the occupied territories

In occupied Donetsk Oblast, drones attacked the 330 kV Pivdenna substation in Chystiakove, and locals reported outages, Telegram channel DroneBomber said, calling the report preliminary. Occupied Donetsk went into a blackout on the evening of 20 October after strikes on its power supply, Andriushchenko said. He also reported air defense activity and hits in the Mariupol area.

In occupied Crimea, residents of Krasnoperekopsk reported explosions and hits near the railway station, then partial power cuts, monitoring channel Crimean Wind said. In occupied Melitopol, drones tried to attack the city’s power facilities at around 03:30 but missed, Russian senator Dmitry Rogozin claimed.

French mapper Clément Molin counted 770 confirmed Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian trucks in the logistics zone 10 km behind the front line in September, up from 630 in August.

European Union governments are seeking greater flexibility over plans to remove equipment supplied by companies considered a security risk from Europe’s telecommunications networks, potentially extending the timetable for replacing Chinese technology already embedded in 5G infrastructure.

A Council draft dated 22 September removes the fixed 36-month phase-out period proposed by the European Commission, according to a document reported on 29 September. Instead, member states want the timetable to take account of the level of identified risk, product and infrastructure lifecycles, normal equipment replacement cycles, interoperability requirements and the availability of suitable alternatives.

The change would not abandon the EU’s attempt to reduce reliance on suppliers considered high risk. It would, however, remove a uniform deadline and give considerably more weight to the practical and financial consequences of replacing equipment already installed across European networks.

The Commission proposed a revision of the EU Cybersecurity Act on 20 January, seeking to establish a common European framework for addressing security risks in information and communications technology supply chains rather than relying principally on separate national measures.

For mobile telecommunications, the practical effect would fall particularly heavily on Chinese suppliers Huawei and ZTE. Under the Commission’s proposal, mobile operators would have three years to remove equipment from suppliers formally classified as high risk.

As EU Today reported when the proposal was unveiled, the measure represented a significant shift from the EU’s existing 5G security framework. Restrictions on Huawei and ZTE have previously depended heavily on decisions taken by individual member states, producing markedly different timetables across the Union.

Operators put replacement cost at €40bn

The pressure to change the timetable follows warnings from Europe’s largest telecommunications groups over the cost of removing existing equipment.

Seventeen industry executives, including senior figures from Deutsche Telekom, Orange and Telefónica, warned earlier this month that replacing equipment affected by the proposed restrictions could cost the sector as much as €40 billion.

The operators argued that such expenditure would draw investment away from fibre networks, further 5G deployment and preparations for 6G. The issue is particularly significant in Germany, Italy and Spain, where Huawei equipment remains extensively used in parts of existing telecommunications infrastructure.

Replacing one supplier’s equipment is not simply a matter of purchasing alternative hardware. Mobile networks contain generations of interconnected equipment installed over many years, while operators must continue providing services during any transition.

The Council’s proposed approach would allow these factors to influence how quickly individual components are removed. Equipment judged to present an immediate or particularly serious risk could face a shorter deadline, while other infrastructure could potentially remain in operation until a scheduled replacement becomes technically and economically practical.

From Huawei to wider supply-chain security

The dispute is broader than Huawei or mobile networks.

The revised Cybersecurity Act is intended to establish an EU-wide framework for dealing with dependence on third-country suppliers across critical ICT infrastructure. The Commission says the legislation would introduce a harmonised and risk-based approach to supply-chain security, including risks associated with foreign interference.

In February, the EU also introduced an ICT Supply Chain Security Toolbox, setting out measures for identifying and mitigating risks associated with critical suppliers. These include multi-vendor strategies and measures intended to reduce dependence on suppliers considered high risk.

The Commission’s January proposal goes considerably further. It covers a range of critical sectors beyond telecommunications, including connected vehicles, electricity infrastructure, water systems, drones, cloud services, medical devices, surveillance technology, space services and semiconductors.

Under the proposed system, restrictions would follow a formal risk assessment initiated by the Commission or at least three member states, accompanied by market and impact assessments.

Huawei has consistently rejected claims that its equipment represents a security threat and has opposed measures that it argues discriminate against suppliers on the basis of their country of origin.

The Commission has taken a different position. Its approach to the security of Europe’s ICT supply chains is increasingly focused not only on technical vulnerabilities but also on strategic dependence on suppliers from third countries.

Deadline now part of negotiations

The Council changes are not final. Member states must agree their negotiating position, while the revised Cybersecurity Act will ultimately require agreement with the European Parliament before becoming law.

The emerging position nevertheless points towards a significant change from the Commission’s original model.

Rather than requiring mobile operators across the EU to remove high-risk equipment within the same 36-month period, governments want deadlines to reflect the risk associated with particular equipment, its remaining operational lifetime and whether suitable replacements are available.

That could leave the EU with the same strategic objective — reducing dependence on suppliers considered a security risk — but a considerably longer and more differentiated timetable for achieving it.