War is highly probable, but it is not inevitable.

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We are living in an extremely dangerous moment in history. We are also living in an extremely irrational time, at least when it comes to evaluating the mentality, conduct, and words of Western politicians and media in the face of disaster.

On the one hand, Western leaders, pundits, and military commanders clamor with predictions of war with Russia as being imminent. Yet on the other hand, there is an astounding dereliction to avert it. Diplomacy and understanding are boorishly shunned. Indeed, there is an absolutely irrational choice of escalation towards war, especially among European politicians.

Underlying this, of course, is an ideological supremacist belief, a contempt for Russia and other officially designated enemies (China, Iran, and so on), whereby the Western political class sees itself as superior, not as equals. That mentality makes for war and precludes diplomatic engagement and dialogue.

In any objective reading of the situation, there is little doubt that the danger of all-out world war is upon us. Incredibly, for the third time in just over a century, the planet is facing the specter of a massive international conflict. But on this occasion, the outcome would be nuclear conflagration with the extinction of life as we know it. This repeated destruction is a damning indictment of the Western system, its capitalist and imperialist engines for violence, domination and, inevitably, conflict. Surely, such a system should be abolished.

The Doomsday Clock, overseen by the independent Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, is at its closest point to midnight in all of 80 years of existence. The clock was inaugurated following the U.S. atomic horror attacks on Japan in 1945. It was meant to serve as a warning of the increasing risk of nuclear war. It is truly a frightening spectacle that today’s danger of global disaster surpasses the many perils that were encountered during the Cold War decades. Today’s tensions surpass even those of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis when the United States and the Soviet Union edged towards a nuclear war.

Many Western scholars, legal experts, analysts, and seasoned diplomats have increasingly added their voices warning of the ultimate disaster. We pay respect to the sane voices of people like Alfred de Zayas, Jeffrey Sachs, Larry Johnson, and Scott Ritter, voices in the West that, unlike their political class, are passionately warning of the path to perdition the world is on and needs to urgently get off.

The warning words are flashing like a red light, yet Western leaders keep making decisions and issuing belligerent statements that are driving the world to the precipice.

This week, European politicians have again openly advocated attacking the Russian Federation by blockading Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave between Poland and Lithuania. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski and NATO chief Mark Rutte (former Dutch premier) have echoed calls from other European politicians to effectively attack Kaliningrad, that is, to attack the Russian Federation. Russia’s nuclear doctrine explicitly states that such an assault compels it to use nuclear weapons in response.

So, why do NATO leaders keep pushing provocation? Such moves are merely an extension of the NATO proxy war in Ukraine. Their war is a failure. But the Western pro-war politicians cannot admit they are wrong. They are willing to incite a wider war rather than admit defeat and face the political repercussions from their own citizens.

Russia this week issued a grave warning, saying that any attack on Kaliningrad would result in Russian retaliation with nuclear weapons.

Instead of coming to their senses and sobering up, European politicians haughtily dismiss Russia’s warnings as a “bluff” or accuse Moscow of nuclear saber-rattling.

In a plenary address to the Valdai forum in Moscow on Thursday, Russian President Vladimir Putin underlined the infernal precariousness.

“If it comes to a direct attack on the Russian Federation – in this case, Kaliningrad, although it could potentially involve other territories as well – the question of Russia using all the weapons at its disposal would inevitably and immediately arise. That is inevitable,” said Putin.

In an ominous assessment of the reckless direction, he noted:

“We must realise that the moment when nothing can be changed any longer may come very quickly and unexpectedly for everyone. The logic of escalating, increasingly harsh retaliatory measures leads to a fatal point of no return.”

The Russian leader is saying that the West’s relentless escalation in words and deeds is leading to an abyss. Incredibly, the Western politicians refuse to restrain themselves. “At the heart of this escalation lie arrogance and overconfidence… The spiral is tightening, and the devastating consequences are growing.”

This appalling dynamic is redolent of the prelude to the First and Second World Wars, when Western political establishments were insouciant about the impending doom.

But a Third World War is truly a point of no return.

“All the more so today, when the arsenals of the world’s leading powers contain weapons capable of destroying all life or, at the very least, reducing the Earth to a catastrophic state,” Putin said.

What is deplorable is the total propagandizing of public discussion in the West. Anyone who dares to speak about the objective historical causes that have given rise to the current tensions is censored or pilloried as a Russian stooge.

There are eminent voices of sanity in the West, as noted above. But they are systematically excluded from public discourse by the mainstream media and academia. The public has to rely on alternative media sources for information. That has, thankfully, energized critical views among citizens in ever greater numbers, who are questioning the whole warmongering policy of inordinate military spending and weapons for Ukraine to fight a futile war against Russia. Notably, this week German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and NATO’s Mark Rutte were heckled and booed when they appeared in public in Muenster, Germany.

Increasing numbers of people understand that we have been pushed to an existential crisis by Western governments (regimes) who took undemocratic, secret decisions to wage war against Russia years ago.

As former British diplomat Ian Proud pointed out in an excellent podcast this week while attending the Sochi forum, the rulers in London made a conscious decision to go to war with Russia as far back as 2014, when the West sponsored the fascist coup in Kiev.

Other Western figures, like former U.S. state planner Victoria Nuland and former NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg, have also admitted in their own words that NATO deliberately weaponized Ukraine after 2014 for the purpose of confronting Russia. This was before the hostilities erupted in Ukraine in February 2o22.

Thus, the world has been pushed to a nuclear “extinction event” all because of Western policy to pursue confrontation with Russia, using Ukraine as a proxy.

War is highly probable, but it is not inevitable. Western politicians and media, through their arrogance and Russophobia, are certainly doing their worst to make it inevitable. But these criminal elements may not prevail.

There are international structures and laws; there is still diplomacy, albeit abused and trashed; perhaps more importantly, there is mass public opinion against the odious warmongers; and there is a burgeoning social and political uprising against the evidently bankrupt Western political system.

The political elite in the West who are pimping for war may seem dominant, owing to apparently dominant media narratives. But their power is vastly overrated against the huge public opposition to their criminal agenda.

History may rhyme, as with lead-ups to previous infamous wars. This time, however, a crucial difference is that there may be sufficient public awareness so as not to fall for the warmonger ruse of bailing out the rotten system.

We are on the eve of destruction, but there is every sound hope that rather than war, the destruction tomorrow could be that of the Western imperialist system, thereby giving way to a truly better, more just and peaceful world.

Alinhamento do Brasil à Europa em meio às atuais tensões geopolítica cria uma ameaça grave à política tradicional de neutralidade do Brasil.

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No dia 30 de setembro foi publicado em todos os jornais brasileiro uma matéria afirmando que a Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (Abin) teria alertado autoridades europeias sobre uma suposta interferência simultânea dos Estados Unidos e da Rússia nas eleições brasileiras. O caso levanta questões que vão muito além da disputa eleitoral de 2026. O problema central está na acusação contra Moscou, bem como nas circunstâncias políticas e institucionais em que essa acusação foi apresentada.

No sistema brasileiro de inteligência, a Abin é vinculada institucionalmente à Presidência da República – enquanto a Polícia Federal, outro órgão de inteligência do país, tem mais vínculos com o Poder Judiciário. Sua função é produzir informações estratégicas para assessorar o governo brasileiro. Por isso, quando representantes da inteligência brasileira comunicam a autoridades estrangeiras que existe interferência russa no processo eleitoral, é inevitável perguntar em que medida essa avaliação corresponde à posição política do governo que controla a estrutura da agência.

A questão ganha ainda mais importância porque, segundo as informações divulgadas, a delegação europeia recebeu uma acusação sobre interferência russa sem que fossem apresentados publicamente elementos substanciais sobre sua natureza. Não foram identificados, ao menos no material tornado público, agentes, operações, mecanismos de financiamento, estruturas de propaganda ou campanhas específicas atribuídas a Moscou. Existe, portanto, uma acusação, mas seus fundamentos permanecem praticamente desconhecidos.

Isso produz uma situação particularmente conveniente para determinados atores políticos. A Europa, que é hostil à Rússia e a Trump, recebe uma informação segundo a qual tanto Washington quanto Moscou estariam tentando influenciar as eleições brasileiras. Isso permitiria a Bruxelas – e ainda mais especialmente à França e à Alemanha, que são os principais “amigos” de Lula atualmente – eventualmente “apoiar” o Brasil em ações de “contrainteligência” para combater a suposta influência estadunidense e russa. Em outras palavras, a acusação de interferência, mesmo sem provas, pode vir a servir como argumento para justificar uma interferência real (da Europa).

Há ainda uma questão política mais ampla. Uma parcela significativa da esquerda brasileira consolidou nos últimos anos uma interpretação segundo a qual Vladimir Putin pertence a uma espécie de “internacional de extrema direita”, ao lado de Donald Trump e de outros movimentos conservadores ocidentais. Essa leitura transforma Rússia, Trump e a direita brasileira em elementos de um mesmo campo político internacional, apesar das diferenças profundas entre suas respectivas posições e interesses.

Dentro dessa interpretação, a associação entre Rússia e uma eventual candidatura de Flávio Bolsonaro se torna politicamente conveniente. Flávio é identificado com Trump, com o Partido Republicano e com a direita americana. A existência de uma suposta conexão russa permitiria inserir a disputa eleitoral brasileira em uma narrativa internacional mais ampla, na qual diferentes forças conservadoras seriam apresentadas como partes de uma mesma rede de influência.

Contudo, é absolutamente óbvio que a Rússia não tem qualquer interesse em interferir nas eleições brasileiras a favor de qualquer dos lados. Ademais, a maior parte dos ativistas pró-Rússia no Brasil é identificada com a esquerda ou neutra em relação a ambos os lados da política nacional. A acusação parece ser feita com o simples intuito de agradar a União Europeia, já que os europeus preferem Lula a Flávio (por este ser subordinado a Trump). E o fato de não haver detalhes que substanciem as acusações apenas reforça este ponto.

O ponto realmente relevante é outro: por que uma agência de inteligência subordinada à Presidência da República apresentou às autoridades europeias uma acusação contra a Rússia sem que seus fundamentos fossem posteriormente esclarecidos? E por que isso ocorre justamente durante a preparação das eleições brasileiras e em um momento de deterioração extraordinária das relações entre Rússia e Europa?

A resposta a essas perguntas importa porque o Brasil está inserido em um ambiente internacional cada vez mais polarizado. A Rússia ocupa posição central nos BRICS e mantém relações estratégicas com o Brasil, enquanto a Europa atravessa uma fase de crescente confronto com Moscou. Nesse contexto, qualquer informação oficial brasileira que associe a Rússia a uma operação de interferência eleitoral possui consequências diplomáticas graves.

Ademais, as tensões entre Rússia e Europa crescem cada vez mais e há risco real de conflito devido às constantes provocações europeias. É óbvio que em tal contexto não interessa ao Brasil se tornar parte de qualquer lado da crise. Mas não há nada pior para a política de neutralidade brasileira do que reportar à União Europa uma acusação formal contra a Rússia.

Em tese, é possível que o relatório tenha sido entregue à Europa sem comunicação prévia ao presidente brasileiro – embora isso seja muito improvável. Se Lula quiser preservar a neutralidade brasileira, o correto a ser feito é desmentir a Abin publicamente e pedir desculpas pelo incidente. Contudo, resta saber se ele estará realmente disposto a fazer isso, considerando que a União Europeia é o principal “aliado” internacional do governo Lula atual.

Peace cannot be built through uninterrupted rearmament or by forcing one side into capitulation.

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This is the first part of Mats Alexandersson’s series on war, peace, and security. The next three parts will be published during September and October on the Clarté blog.

For a long time, the United States has united economic, financial, military, and political power to secure a U.S.-centered capitalist world order. This has often been legitimized with what has been called liberal hegemony: a rhetoric in which democracy, individual rights, market economy, and international rules are presented as universal norms. But in practice, these principles have repeatedly been subordinated to the demand to preserve American supremacy and prevent rival great powers from dominating strategic regions.

What has come to be called the rules-based world order has therefore also functioned as a self-image and a language of power. The United States has ascribed to itself a special historical task: to guarantee stability, open markets, and security in the world economy. This belief in an American superiority with a special historical task has become a kind of meta-ideology. Behind this universalism, however, a more tangible class and power interest has operated, in which the American state’s geopolitical role has ultimately served the expansion and security of capital.

Two figures clearly demonstrate this line. Henry Kissinger made American realpolitik visible in its most brutal form. In Chile, the United States helped undermine Salvador Allende’s democratically elected government and subsequently supported Pinochet’s dictatorship. The same logic recurred in Cambodia, East Timor, and support for Pakistan’s military regime: democracy and human life had to give way to geopolitical control.

When Zbigniew Brzezinski in The Grand Chessboard in 1997 more sophisticatedly formulated that no rival must be allowed to dominate Eurasia, this practice became an explicit doctrine.1 The line from Kissinger to Brzezinski is therefore clear: from secret intervention to open strategy for global supremacy. It is in this development that today’s bloc formation, war economy, and growing risk of great-power war must be understood.

The painting “Die Namenlosen” (1916) by the Austrian painter Albin Egger-Lienz.
Why Eurasia is gaining additional significance

Today, Secretary of State Marco Rubio constitutes a central node in the U.S. foreign and security policy apparatus, where the White House, the Pentagon, intelligence services, NATO, and financial policy bodies cooperate. At the same time, the strategic environment is increasingly shaped by the technology and defense industry: AI, cloud, satellite, semiconductor, and weapons companies influence the technology of war, information flows, and investments. American hegemony therefore appears not only as state exercise of power, but as an intertwined military, digital, and financial system.

On Brzezinski’s map, Europe was never peripheral. In The Grand Chessboard, Eurasia is described as the decisive geopolitical playing field, and Europe as the United States’ most important bridgehead on the continent. An integrated Europe, bound to the United States through the transatlantic link and NATO, would strengthen American influence in western Eurasia. Europe therefore appears less as an independent power pole than as a strategic platform in a U.S.-led order.

This logic becomes clearest in Brzezinski’s view of Russia and Ukraine. He argued that Russia’s most important geostrategic option lay in a Western orientation, but on terms that did not make the country an equal power pole. Ukraine was given a key role as a “geopolitical pivot”: without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire, while control over Ukraine would once again give the country decisive strategic weight. Here the limitation of the great-power perspective is also visible: Ukraine has been reduced to a piece in a larger power game, despite its own political agency and right to self-determination.

Brzezinski advocated a geopolitical pluralism in Eurasia, that is, an order in which no single power may dominate the entire continent. In practice, this meant that the United States should support regional counterweights, alliances, and independent states in order to limit both a revanchist Russia and a rising China. That model can be interpreted as a strategy for balance of power, but also as a manual for playing regional actors against one another in order to preserve American supremacy.

The same approach characterized Brzezinski’s analysis of Central Asia and the Caucasus, which he described as the “Eurasian Balkans”: an area where energy, transport routes, weak states, and ethnic conflicts make the region an object of great-power rivalry. The region thus becomes primarily of strategic value to external powers, not through the local societies’ own goals. Superpower thinking turns smaller countries into objects of geopolitics rather than equal political subjects.

There is rearmament for war

The historical retrospective is needed to understand today’s situation. The war in Ukraine, Europe’s rearmament, and the growing fear of a Russian conflict with NATO cannot be explained solely as the consequence of an isolated conflict. They must also be seen against the background of the U.S.-led security order that emerged after the Cold War — an order whose goal has been to preserve American dominance in Eurasia. Today, this policy has had contradictory consequences: Russia, China, and Iran have moved closer to one another, Europe’s room for maneuver has been limited, and the risk of great-power conflict has increased.

Brzezinski’s book formulated this strategy unusually openly. The United States was to prevent a rival power or coalition from gathering sufficient strength to dominate Eurasia. This meant limiting a resurrected Russia, preventing China from becoming an equal competitor, and keeping Europe politically and militarily tied to the United States. In this perspective, NATO is not only a defense alliance, but also a tool for American power projection in Europe and its neighborhood.

The Eurasian counterweight

Cooperation between China, Russia, and Iran is more than a temporary reaction to sanctions and individual wars. China contributes industry, capital, and market; Russia contributes energy, raw materials, military capability, and geographical depth; Iran contributes regional weight and a strategic location. Their interests are not identical, and the cooperation contains clear contradictions. But the relationship between China and Russia has acquired a material foundation that makes it more durable than many Western assessments previously assumed.

Here lies an ironic consequence. A policy intended to prevent a Eurasian counterweight may have helped create it. At the same time, the United States faces its own economic tensions: large budget deficits, growing national debt, and high interest rates increase vulnerability. The dollar’s status as a reserve currency continues to provide room for maneuver, but does not eliminate the risk of a crisis of confidence. The cost of such a crisis would likely be passed on to ordinary wage earners through inflation, cutbacks, and deteriorating public services.

Europe’s dilemma

Economist Jeffrey Sachs has argued that Europe has historically had significant economic complementarity with Russia: European industry and technology could be linked to Russian energy, raw materials, and market. According to Sachs, sanctions, conflict policy, and dependence on the United States have broken this possibility and weakened Europe’s strategic independence.2

That assessment is disputed, not least because Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has drastically changed the conditions for economic cooperation. But it raises a necessary question: Can Europe formulate its own security policy, or is the continent reduced to an arena for other powers’ conflict? Sachs advocates direct diplomacy with Moscow, a clearer separation between EU foreign policy and NATO, and a European defense that is more independent and less dependent on the United States.

The risk of war

The acute danger is escalation. There is no simple or risk-free path to a military defeat for Russia, but policy continues to sharpen the confrontation. If the goal slides from Ukraine’s defense to a lasting weakening or subjugation of Russia, the risk increases that the proxy war turns into a direct conflict between nuclear powers.

Peace cannot be built through uninterrupted rearmament or by forcing one side into capitulation. A sustainable peace requires diplomacy, recognized security interests, and an international order in which no great power is given the right to dominate others. Public opinion in Europe and the United States can become decisive: when the costs of the arms race, social cutbacks, and the risk of war become clear, pressure can grow for a different course.

From the Shanghai Spirit to the Bishkek Declaration, the security-first organization prioritizes pragmatism over ideology.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Security first

The recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), held in Bishkek, marked the 25th anniversary of the founding of what, in the landscape of international institutions, represents a particularly interesting case study. Born from the ashes of Soviet-Chinese confidence-building measures and transformed into a full-fledged organization in 2001, the SCO has spent a quarter-century consolidating an institutional framework that now functions effectively: annual meetings of the Council of Heads of State, regular interministerial meetings, and day-to-day cooperation that is developing along increasingly complex lines.

However, this anniversary offers an opportunity for reflection that goes beyond mere celebration. The question that emerges most forcefully is: what role do values play within the SCO? And how does this value-based dimension relate to the seemingly more pragmatic dimension of security and functional cooperation? An analysis of the founding documents and subsequent declarations reveals a complex trajectory that deserves in-depth examination.

From its very inception, the SCO has made security cooperation one of its top priorities. This choice is no accident: the organization’s prehistory is rooted in Soviet-Chinese confidence-building measures, both regarding border issues and broader aspects of mutual security. The “Shanghai Five,” an informal group that preceded the SCO’s official establishment, found its primary unifying force precisely in the management of security issues and the building of trust among its members.

This original specialization has had lasting consequences. Even as the SCO has expanded its scope over the years to encompass increasingly diverse sectors, security has remained the linchpin around which the entire organizational architecture has developed. In a sense, as the analysis astutely notes, the SCO can still be defined as a specialized international organization focused on a single primary priority, despite its evolution toward more comprehensive forms of cooperation.

The comparison with the BRICS – a genuinely all-encompassing cooperative framework operating across a wide range of fields – is particularly illuminating. While the BRICS have developed an increasingly sophisticated values-based platform over time, with declarations that devote considerable space to issues of common and shared values, the SCO has maintained a more markedly operational approach that is less rhetorical on the values front.

The SCO Charter: Principles without values

A particularly significant finding emerges from an analysis of the SCO’s founding document. The Charter, signed on June 7, 2002, and which entered into force on September 19, 2003, makes no mention whatsoever of the term “values.” Instead, we find a dedicated article – Article 2 – significantly titled “Principles.” It is on these principles that the SCO bases its activities.

These principles include: mutual respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of state borders; non-aggression; non-interference in internal affairs; non-use of force in international relations; equality of all member states; peaceful resolution of disputes among member states; and the SCO’s non-targeting of other states. A particularly revealing principle is that of the phased implementation of joint actions in areas of common interest.

This last principle – that of “phased implementation” – goes a long way toward explaining how the SCO operates and the expectations, sometimes excessive, that surround its activities. The disappointment that sometimes accompanies assessments of the organization – the notion that “nothing happens beyond the summits,” which circulates in certain circles – finds its explanation precisely in this principle. This is not a flaw, but a deliberate and foundational choice: to proceed step by step, consolidate the results achieved, and avoid missteps.

The absence of the term “values” from the SCO Charter is perfectly understandable and in no way diminishes the level of mutual trust among member states. It is worth noting that, even in the case of the BRICS, the term “values” was not an immediate feature of the final declarations, becoming firmly established only starting in the mid-2010s. Before then, the term used to characterize the internal cohesion of the BRICS was, among others, precisely “principles,” just as it is for the SCO.

The Historical context and evolution of the vocabulary of values

In 2002, the term “values” was not yet as politically fashionable as it is today, and was used rather rarely in the documents of the major non-Western countries. At that time, in these countries – including Russia – the word “values” was more often invoked in political discourse in a negative sense, as “values imposed by the West,” and thus as something that required resistance.

The realization that this is a game that can be played by two sides, and that to effectively strengthen solidarity among non-Western countries it was necessary to formulate their own platform of shared values, came much later. And the work to ensure that non-Western values are perceived as understandable, attractive, and at the same time not trivial – not simply in the style of “we are for all good things and against all bad things” – continues to this day, with mixed results.

This delay in developing an explicit value framework does not, however, mean that the SCO lacks an axiological dimension. On the contrary, it exists, but it is expressed through categories different from those of the Western value lexicon: “principles” and, above all, “spirit.”

A chronologically significant finding emerges from a comparative analysis of SCO and BRICS documents: with regard to one particular term – and its substantive relevance – the SCO was significantly ahead of the BRICS. This term is “spirit.”

In the declarations of the annual BRICS summits, the term “BRICS spirit” and its constituent elements first appeared during the Chinese presidency in 2017. The “spirit” then disappeared from BRICS documents for several years. The term returned in 2022, once again during the Chinese presidency. But subsequently, in all the BRICS summit declarations from 2023–25 – whose initial drafts were prepared by other countries – the term “BRICS spirit” was consistently present.

In the case of the SCO, however, the term “spirit” appeared in the very first declaration following the Shanghai summit on June 15, 2001, when the “Shanghai Five” – which had previously existed as an informal grouping – was transformed into a full-fledged international organization. In this declaration, the “Shanghai Spirit” was mentioned as a separate point, characterized by mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, mutual consultation, respect for cultural diversity, and the aspiration for shared development.

It is clear that the term “spirit” has its roots, first and foremost, in contemporary Chinese political tradition, since it first appeared in documents from years when the summits were held in China. This is, in a sense, a distinctly Chinese feature. That said, the term “spirit,” though not immediately, eventually became firmly established in BRICS declarations; and in the case of the SCO, a year later, in 2002, when the summit was held not in China but in St. Petersburg, the term “spirit” was included in the preamble to the SCO Charter.

In the Charter, however, the epithet “Shanghai” disappeared in relation to the spirit; there, reference is made simply to the “spirit of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, mutual consultation, respect for cultural diversity, and the aspiration for shared development.”

The civilizational approach and its evolution

Of particular relevance to today’s political ideology is the civilizational approach reflected in the 2001 Shanghai Declaration. It specifically noted “mutual respect and mutual trust among states belonging to different civilizations and bearing different cultural traditions.” A year later, however, the mention of civilizations disappeared from the preamble to the SCO Charter.

This shift – the appearance and disappearance of civilizational terminology – is significant. On the one hand, it reflects China’s sensitivity to issues of cultural identity and diversity; on the other, it demonstrates the caution of other members in adopting language that might be perceived as too overtly ideological or potentially divisive.

If we examine the preamble to the current Bishkek Declaration of the SCO Council of Heads of State dated September 1, 2026, we find that it emphasizes the “firm commitment to the objectives and principles enshrined in the SCO Charter, as well as to the further strengthening of good-neighborliness, friendship, and effective multilateral cooperation.” Furthermore, this declaration once again uses the very term “Shanghai Spirit,” which is embodied in the principles set forth in the preamble to the SCO Charter.

It is clear that, since the constituent elements of this SCO spirit are enshrined in the legal text of the Charter, their wording remains unshakable even twenty-five years later. Herein lies the difference between the spirit of the SCO and the spirit of the BRICS, where, year after year, various elements of this spirit are added or removed by the countries holding the presidency, depending on their national particularities. And the definition of the spirit of the BRICS turns out to be, every year, at least slightly different.

In the case of the SCO, however, it is significant that the epithet “Shanghai” has returned – an epithet that, unlike the spirit itself, is not legally enshrined. This return signals a political will to reclaim the organization’s original legacy, at a time when competition among powers over the definition of global values is becoming increasingly intense.

How significant is this anniversary?

If we re-examine the SCO summit declarations step by step, we find significant variations in how the values dimension is addressed. The particular emphasis placed in the Bishkek Declaration on the SCO’s commitment to the Shanghai Spirit and the SCO’s principles is not typical of other summit declarations in recent years.

For example, in the declarations following “non-anniversary” summits, the preamble is practically absent, and the description of the international situation and security challenges begins right from the start. In the declarations issued in Astana in 2024, in Delhi in 2023, and in Moscow in 2020, neither the “Shanghai Spirit” nor simply the “spirit” is mentioned (although the Moscow declaration does contain the term “SCO space”). In the declarations issued in Tianjin in 2025 (naturally), in Samarkand in 2022, and in Bishkek in 2019, there is a mention of the “Shanghai Spirit,” but it is placed not at the beginning of the text but deep within the first section.

It is clear that the specific character of the current declaration stems from its anniversary nature; the declaration issued in Dushanbe for the previous anniversary – the 20th, in 2021 – was structured in exactly the same way, with a lengthy preamble mentioning the Shanghai Spirit and the commitment to the principles. This is highly significant: anniversaries provide an opportunity for a more explicit affirmation of the organization’s value-based identity, whereas at regular summits a more pragmatic approach focused on current issues prevails.

India’s contribution and the “4 M” perspective

In this context, India’s perspective on the SCO is of particular interest. India’s initiatives within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have focused on economic issues, reflecting its desire to build economic cooperation with Central Asian states in order to improve its regional standing and strengthen multilateralism.

According to Anil Trigunayat, the SCO can undoubtedly contribute to regional collaboration by adhering to the “4 M” principle: members must embrace Mutual Respect, Mutual Interest, Mutual Sensitivity, and Mutual Benefit so that the group can emerge stronger and more relevant.

This formulation is significant because it shows how, from India’s perspective, the SCO’s value dimension lies not so much in an explicit ideological platform as in a set of operational principles that guide day-to-day cooperation. India, with its tradition of nonalignment and its sensitivity to national sovereignty, naturally feels at home in an organization that prioritizes principles over values and avoids imposing a common ideological vision.

Toward a prosperous future

An analysis of the SCO’s value dimension twenty-five years after its founding reveals a complex and nuanced picture. On the one hand, the organization has never developed an explicit value platform comparable to that of the BRICS or other cooperative structures. On the other hand, it possesses a solid foundation of principles, enshrined in the Charter, and a “spirit” that, while not defined in terms of values, serves as a powerful unifying force for identity.

This configuration is no accident but reflects the organization’s history and nature. Founded as a tool for building trust in security matters, the SCO has prioritized the practicality of operational principles over the abstract nature of value-based declarations. Its functional specialization, its institutionalized character, and the principle of gradual implementation have helped keep the organization grounded in a pragmatic approach, avoiding the ideological drifts that sometimes characterize other international forums.

However, the return of the “Shanghai Spirit” in the Bishkek Declaration, issued on the occasion of the 25th anniversary, signals a growing awareness of the importance of identity and values. In an era of increasingly intense global competition, in which the definition of the values and principles that should guide the international order is itself a matter of contention, the SCO finds itself having to balance its traditional caution with the need to assert its identity more clearly.

A terminological analysis of the texts – and of the value frameworks they reflect – is but one piece of the much broader picture of practical cooperation among SCO member states achieved over the past twenty-five years. But it is a significant piece, because it reveals how an organization founded for security purposes has gradually become a laboratory for developing a common language, shared principles, and a collective spirit. And in a world where the battle to define global values is bound to intensify, this laboratory could prove to be more important than it appears at first glance.

The challenge for the SCO over the next twenty-five years will be to preserve its distinctive character – the practicality of its principles, the gradual nature of its actions, and the centrality of security – without neglecting to develop a worldview that, while not ideological, is capable of attracting and uniting. This is no easy task, but one that the organization has demonstrated, over these first twenty-five years, it can successfully tackle.

Anti-Zelensky protests planned for October 3 – led by a military officer on the kill list.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The War in Ukraine has not been entirely protest-free from Kiev’s side of things. During the summer of 2026 a ‘sudden’ wave of ‘cardboard protests’ were brought to the public’s eye demanding the resignation of Zelensky. These demonstrations occurred as a reaction to the removal Defense Minister Fedorov from his position, or at least that was the overtly stated motivation for them. Of course, as we know, official reasons for protests always sound ‘nice’ but how many people living in a country at war actually know or care about the hirings and firings of ministers? Perhaps this weak motivating factor, saving some minister in a government viewed from all sides as completely corrupt, is why those cardboard signs and their messages didn’t take hold. The protestors then declared that their mission had ‘no end date’ attached to it, but as we can see Zelensky remains in office, and cardboard signage seems to have gone out of fashion.

But this time, at least on its surface, it seems as though it is the army itself which is the offended party that wants to protest. Some sort of slogan like ‘Zelensky betrayed the army’ will be much more enticing to protestors, than “let’s save Minister X for being fired”. Also, when given the choice between ‘the army or Zelensky’ I think we all know who would lose across a wide range of diverse public opinion in 2026 Ukraine.

Somehow, despite all the evidence shown through human history, many are sure that holding up signs will change everything radically, and those with this mentality need their slogans to be broad and emotional. According to Gazeta.Ru the situation with the upcoming October 3^rd anti-Zelensky protests will look something like this:

“Ukrainian military officer Alexander Todorov on the MayiakUA YouTube channel announced a series of rallies demanding the resignation of Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky and his team.”

According to him, the public actions are scheduled for October 3^rd, 2026. They want to hold rallies in Kiev near the presidential administration building, as well as in other cities of Ukraine. Todorov called on the Ukrainian diasporas to support the initiative abroad.

The military man criticized the current leadership. In his opinion, the soldiers feel abandoned, and the government is engaged in corruption and misuse of foreign aid. Todorov is also concerned about plans for the possible mobilization of women and citizens from the age of 18.

On the eve of the Verkhovna Rada deputy Artem Dmytruk said that the Security Service of Ukraine had detained Todorov. The politician did not provide details. There have been no official comments on the incident yet.”

The biggest thing that stands out is that Todorov wants these protests to go international via the Ukrainian diaspora, meaning the same shows of support on EU streets for Zelensky, may start to portray him as a more ‘realistic figure’ to put it mildly. And now that millions of Ukrainian citizens have fled their native land, there are plenty of them to use as protestors in the West.

It is also important to note that Todorov is on the same “Peace Keeper” list as anyone who has said or done anything even mildly pro-Russian since 2014. This website is at the very least an informal “enemies list” for post-Maidan Ukraine that provides personal information, on all those who stand against the revolution. The Russian side often portrays this to be a “kill list” and that it was actually created in or by the West. According to Izvestia the site works as such:

Myrotvorets (Peacekeeper) positions itself as a database with information about those people whom the owners of the resource consider to be involved in crimes against the security of Ukraine. The website is officially registered in Canada, and in Ukraine it has the status of an independent non-governmental media outlet.

The new status of Todorov as being a possible foreign enemy agent means that he certainly does not have nearly unilateral support from the elite and that some people responsible for the status quo are very much against this. Also, it means that this Ukrainian Army soldier could be arrested or called in for questioning at any time even before the protests start. We should also keep in mind that supposedly Todorov was the organizer of the following political demonstrations, some occurring even before the Maidan:
2011 — Against Petro Yushchenko

2012 — Against local authorities and power engineers (electric companies)

2014 — Against radicals and Kolomoisky

2017— Against Poroshenko

2024 — Against the military leadership and the TCC (press gangs)

As you can see none of the protests above achieved anything, but none of them happened under the conditions of 2026 after Putin ‘took the gloves off’ during the summer. The Russian side has hit infrastructure hard and how much of Ukraine’s economy remains is open for debate, but the situation is fairly dire. The Kiev Regime is not just plodding along under the usual corruption + apathy + conscription + foreign financing that it has been since 2022. Everything is being hit, everything is being destroyed and it looks like military resistance is crumbling, thus this time, in terms of protests, ‘things could be different’. But the big question remains, who could be the one(s) standing behind Todorov? Who would benefit from yet another revolution in Ukraine?

Who is behind these upcoming protests?

If the objective were to just send the last local schmuck into the meat grinder and truly fight to the last Ukrainian to make Putin pay dearly for every square meter of territory, then there would be no need to change out Zelensky. Furthermore, after so many officials around Zelensky have fled, quit, or otherwise left the game, it looks like the tower of power is very wobbly, meaning that any violent mass protest would essentially bring the house of cards crashing down. Thus, we can be fairly confident that anyone who would want to fund a protest wants to end the war.

A near total political collapse, with ‘the enemy at the gates’ will surely cause the entire system to spiral out of control and disintegrate, meaning that there would not be enough cohesion for the war to continue. Russians often joke that all that is needed for a declaration of total capitulation would be a cat’s paw print, the signature of a legitimate president is only needed for some other more ‘two-sided’ peace deal, that is to say if capitulation is on the table, Lil’ Zel isn’t needed to sign it.

And, although he is made fun of for his comedy background and drug addiction, Zelensky has been the superficial glue keeping the whole show together. He, in a strange way, is sort of the last bastion of ‘Project Ukraine’ as the Russians call it, as he absolutely will not abdicate the toxic throne. So the game looks to be this; that the Green Goblin must be ousted to end the war in the fall/winter of 2026… for some unstated reason by some unknown parties. But who could they be?

George Soros, is yet again at the center of the Russian rumor mill, but it is hard to exactly say why he would be behind this maneuver. Perhaps, I have been completely wrong in previous pieces, and indeed the Europeans do need time to prep for a war in the 2030s and thus this failed attempt to break the Russian bear needs to end immediately? Is it that they need time to get ready for the next offensive and Kiev has become a drain rather than a boon? I am not sure if this is true, and perhaps, there is a ‘boy who cried wolf’ effect happening on alternative media, that are just used to blaming Soros for protests. If it’s a march with signs and slogans calling for regime change, it’s got to be Soros right?

Team Trump or some forces in the USA, could be vying to get this damn thing over with. Just because publically and on camera Donald Trump seems to personally despise Zelensky doesn’t mean anything, but Trump has been talking about better relations with Russia since his very first political campaign. Also and more importantly, the source of all big lobbyist bribes, Israel, is in deep trouble. Essentially, the Iran-Israel issue is way more important and stealing the show, and Trump has never had much political will to antagonize Russia. When D.C. faces the choice between saving the Zionist Paradise or Neo-Khazaria you know which front they are going to invest in.

There are also definitely large factions with cash in America, that despite being ‘in a distant second place’ politically, want antagonism of Russia to be a thing of the past. If you haven’t noticed, extremely prominent media voices in America can now regularly have Russian politicians and thinkers on their programs, something that would have been absolutely a career death sentence, and maybe even ‘punishable’, just a few years ago. This American ‘third position’, with ‘second place’ influence, does not want nuclear conflict, and wants to move on from the Cold War and games of global domination.

The visit of Ratcliffe to Moscow, may signal that even the most passionate Russophobes in Washington want to call this one done, and move on.

European 4D chess masters, could, after having acknowledged that the Battle for Ukraine is over, choose to allow Russia to make the broadest possible front across a new awkward border in Ukraine, or even better, allow the 21st Century’s Golden Horde to actually have a new physical border with places like Poland and Romania to spark a fresh wave of Russophobic paranoia in local politics.  This sounds like absolutely insane reasoning, to let Russia be closer to a place like Poland in order to spark more Russophobia by proximity, but if you haven’t noticed, the leadership of the European continent looks like the tea party from Alice in Wonderland. We cannot and should not completely exclude concepts that are insane, especially if they are very ‘media friendly’ and involve ‘message sending’. Over-and-over again, Kiev has been forced to launch attacks for PR purposes at the cost of thousands of men, the reasoning in Brussels based on creating optics to somehow achieve tangible results. Like it or not this is how they do things. So why not let the Russians get closer, as to make them more of a threat to attack them in 2035? This is fantastic PR optics, look at how they ‘expanded their empire into Europe and Poland is next!’.

Also, the weak point by which Russia has been invaded from Europe has been the broad steppes of Ukraine. The Nazis did go through Finland, got near Murmansk and sat there for the whole war, the border with Finland, despite being quite big, just isn’t geographically good enough, but lots of massive flat space is quite hard to defend. Furthermore, that land is now nearly completely destroyed and will require unfathomable amounts of rubles to rebuild, and while the Russians are rebuilding they will be vulnerable.

What if the protests succeed?

We have already seen some internal fighting between factions within Kiev and this would only intensify as protestors started to storm the theoretical location where the Cocaine King rules from. Many young men may already be convinced that taking risks protesting is a far better option than dying with absolute certainty on the front after conscription. Thus, the time might be ‘right’ for this sort of thing, and with another Maidan occurring, and enemy forces so close, this would surely fracture things quickly. If the protests are not put down properly the oligarchs, clans, and other wealthy individuals will swiftly look to save their skins and livelihoods potentially breaking up the country or just signing whatever Moscow wants them to. Once the military were to lose command cohesion, there won’t be any more coordinated drone strikes to hold the ‘orcs’ at bay. Ironically, the Maidan which gave birth to the Kiev Regime could be the same mechanism that leads to its downfall after utterly destroying the Ukrainian nation, but as the cliché goes ‘time will tell’.

We did get prime time spectacle – actually a double fake: the remixed 9/11 on FlyDubai.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

September 30 – the deadline for a possible Iranian kinetic move against the Trump naval blockade – came and went. Iran stuck to its guns – without essentially releasing them on the “blockading” (sooooo far away) U.S. Navy. But the show must go on. As Plan B, we did get prime time spectacle – actually a double fake: the remixed 9/11 on FlyDubai.

This pathetic stunt was never a “terror attack”; it was a mediocre-packaged Mossad psy op with lots of improbable extras, complete with a plumber who took control of the plane because he saw it on TV.

The manipulators were the death cult in West Asia, the UAE itself and Washington. The official narrative is for people with an IQ below 50: a “jihadist” co-pilot – conveniently from Oman, demonization requires it – tries to crash a plane full of Zionists. The proverbial heroic passengers – plumber included – overpower him with their bare hands.

The death cult is pulling all stops to absolve Emiratis of any responsibility. The focus is on the Omani “terrorist”.

Talk about the perfect trifecta: Muslims are and will always be terrorists; the death cult is always a victim; and Saudi Arabia needs to hand over the “terrorist” to the death cult.

Piece of cake then for a co-pilot to smuggle a knife at ultra-surveilled Dubai airport onboard one of the most surveilled routes on the planet. And what about the death cult Air Force being unable to stop the landing of the plane in Tabuk.

Because the plan was always to land in Tabuk. That’s the largest Saudi airbase in the northwest, and the closest to Israel; the death cult has been trying for years to get access to it. Now they may end up getting The Full Monty: access to Saudi airspace; privileged intel; and more, courtesy of joint pressure by Abu Dhabi and Washington.

At Transition Protocol we established that when the leader of the death cult “secretly” flew to Abu Dhabi to meet UAE head honcho MbZ in a bilateral, he also may have met people from several Arab nations, including Qatar, Oman, Libya and Morocco.

The Saudis vehemently denied they were part of the package. So did Jordan. Oman appears only via one Israeli source. There’s no official confirmation by Qatar, Oman, Morocco or Libya.

Tehran anyway reacted with extreme irritation, warning of “very dangerous consequences”. The Iranian determination is clear – not to let those chihuahuas derail the fundamental process of reducing to the max U.S./Israeli influence in West Asia.

Islamabad for its part continues to pursue the Sisyphean task of inching towards minimalistic progress mediating both Saudi Arabia–Ansarallah and U.S.-Iran.

Qatar did hand Iran Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi the U.S. answer in Doha this past Tuesday. The clash seems to be over sequencing, rather than components. The text, as it stands, is a sort of enhanced version of the notorious dead cat MoU – also known as the Islamabad framework. Nobody is betting the dead cart will resurrect – again.

Russia, Iran, Yemen: let’s pummel those bastards with no mercy

Now let’s get to the real nitty-gritty: Yemen. And what degree of annihilation Sana’a’s badasses are prepared to inflict on Riyadh. Obliteration of oil installations is too easy – just the soft opening. Yemen is raging. And they will stop at nothing.

We can already see a startling confluence between the House of Saud, the U.S. Navy outside of Persia, and NATO in country 404: they are all being pummeled with no mercy. Russia and Iran haven’t even started yet. And talk about Yemen.

Sergey Karaganov earlier this week once again called it in public: Russia’s Stavka has finally reached the fateful decision to put the Kiev neo-nazis out of their misery. And at an off the record, two-hour long session at the Valdai outside of Moscow, Grandmaster Sergey Lavrov, totally relaxed, reaffirmed again that Russia is ready for Europe’s war. And yes, it will be swift. No holds barred.

Ansarallah and the Yemeni Armed Forces are waiting for 3 vectors to gel: an inescapable Zero Hour ringin’ all across West Asia; the potent simmering and ebulition of intra-royal and inter-tribal clashes inside Saudi Arabia; and all pieces of the puzzle falling in place for the Coming Yemeni Storm to be unleashed over Saudi.

As it stands, Riyadh does not acknowledge any attacks from Yemen, while Sana’a announces every day, like clockwork, the number of Saudi airstrikes on Yemen – targeting markets, farms, homes, bridges, water facilities, telecom networks: the proverbial Epstein Syndicate playbook.

Iran for its part has already upped the ante, striking ADNOC’s Bu Hasa southwest of Abu Dhabi: that’s one of the UAE’s largest onshore oil and gas fields, feeding the strategic Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, the UAE’s only export route bypassing the Strait of Hormuz.

Saudi Arabia’s own bypass, the East-West pipeline, has been struck 3 weeks ago and re-bombed by Yemen earlier this week, at Abqaiq.

Hitting ADNOC and Abqaiq nearly simultaneously may account for taking as many as 13 million barrels of oil a day off market. It’s never enough to remind everyone that Iran and Yemen come as a package. That’s the package that counts – and no puny false flag crypto 9/11 will change that.

By Jonathan COOK

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

When the establishment media deals with issues in which the West’s war industries are most heavily invested, it happily jettisons even the semblance of critical distance from the state

It’s easy to forget that the western media – the so-called “free press” – likes to distinguish itself from media in authoritarian regimes on the basis that, unlike them, it asks critical questions of the powerful, reports facts objectively, and formulates its analyses dispassionately.

They do propaganda, we do news – or so the western media argues.

The feverish coverage since five men were arrested in the early hours of Sunday morning close to RAF Fairford in the UK is blowing a very big hole in that claim.

Here are the known facts so far.

Three white vans, bearing the logo of a genuine fuel transit company, were spotted by a local farmer on the road outside her property as she returned from a party. Police arrived promptly and arrested the men, who were all British nationals in their twenties.

On Tuesday, it emerged that one of the arrested men actually called the police earlier – seemingly the reason officers were on the scene so quickly.

Although the men were initially arrested on explosives charges, no “viable” explosives were found. Although they were arrested on terrorism charges, which allow for 14 days of detention, they were released on bail under normal criminal laws in less than two days.

It has also emerged that the men had several empty “barrels” in their vans, plus one that contained what police described disturbingly as an “accelerant”.

Actually, that was simply a reference to petrol. The stuff that goes into vehicles to make them accelerate.

British prime minister Andy Burnham held a rare national emergency Cobra meeting over the incident.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration got involved because RAF Fairford, despite its name, is in reality a US air base from which American planes are waging an illegal war of aggression against Iran, with the UK’s blessing.

US Secretary of state Marco Rubio has said the incident “clearly involves the hands of a foreign actor”. When asked whether Iran was that actor, Trump replied: “It might be.” He added: “I know the answer… I can be very specific, but I’d rather not say.”

According to a report in the New York Times, “American and British intelligence services worked with Israel and Western countries to discover the threats against US bases, including ones in Germany.” [my emphasis]

Despite these sparse facts, the British media have uniformly rushed to a single conclusion: that this was almost certainly part of an Iranian terror plot to target the US airbase and its planes. The only room for debate allowed is whether the five men were witting or unwitting actors in that plot.

As the Guardian reported in its Wednesday edition, referring to this as a “complex investigation”: “An Iranian link to the bizarre events in the Gloucestershire countryside over the weekend is seen as increasingly likely.”

As context, let us note the following: that British and US officials have every interest in trying to hype this incident as an Iranian “terror plot”, whatever the actual evidence suggests.

Why? Because the US is waging an illegal war on Iran, and the UK is allowing it to do so from British soil. Under the rules of war, Iran has every right to attack RAF Fairford.

If the British state and billionaire-owned media were actually serving as a truly “free press”, they would be offering the context that RAF Fairford is a legitimate military target and that any attack on it by Iran would not constitute terrorism.

Of course, none have done so.

Instead, they have loyally regurgitated the British and US security services spin of a “terror plot” – based on no tangible evidence at all – that paints Britain and the US as the victims of a sinister and unwarranted act of Iranian aggression.

But context aside, an objective, sceptical media – a “free press” – would be reserving judgment on what had happened. It would be asking difficult questions. It would be offering plausible counter-narratives.

Again, none of this is happening. In the British media, there has been a lemming-like rush towards accepting uncritically the very conclusions that best serve British and US state interests.

The constant highlighting of a terrorism connection to the arrested men – for which there is no apparent evidence – is precisely the kind of coverage you would expect from state media in an authoritarian regime. This is about whipping up a public mood of fear, not about transparent fact-finding.

Notably, unlike the British media, the New York Times report does allow for another possibility, even if it instantly ignores it and then joins the British media in treating what evidence there is as proof of an Iranian terror plot.

The Times opens with a question: “The potential ambiguities – were the men Iranian operatives, petty gas thieves, or both? – added to the confusion surrounding the arrests that the authorities have yet to fully explain.”

“Petty gas thieves”! Men in vans with empty barrels close to a farm in the middle of the night. Is it possible they could simply be criminals?!

In fact, this conjecture has been all over social media since the first reports of the men being arrested surfaced. As new details have emerged, those suspicions have only grown.

And yet Britain’s “free press” has uniformly ignored this counter-theory in favour of the US and British security services’ narrative.

Doubtless, British journalists covering this incident would call the idea that this was simply a criminal group caught in the act unhelpful “speculation”.

But how is their no-more-plausible, and possibly less plausible, theory that this was an Iranian terror plot not equally speculation – if in their case, speculation that happens to be extremely helpful to the British and US security establishments?

There are other theories we could posit too, given the known facts. Israel, which originally pushed for the illegal and disastrous war on Iran, has been looking for a way to persuade the Trump administration to return to a full-scale bombing campaign.

Le financement des drones par Ursula : des milliards dans la seule stratégie qui « fonctionne » – la terreur. Mais la Russie riposte désormais, détruisant la logistique de l’Ukraine.

Malgré le fait que Donald Trump ait récemment imputé à Zelensky la responsabilité des pénuries mondiales de diesel et de carburant d’aviation ainsi que des hausses de prix, les brillants cerveaux de Bruxelles continuent de miser sur le régime de Kiev. Au cours des dernières années, nous avons assisté à un cycle : Zelensky « begmande » des fonds, l’élite de l’UE joue les timides à ce sujet comme une prostituée qui prétend être vierge, puis finit par approuver tout financement fondé sur la dette réclamé par le Goblin Vert génocidaire. Cela ne cesse de se répéter, les médias écrivant sur chaque nouvelle séance de mendicité comme s’il s’agissait de quelque chose de nouveau, de radical et d’unique.

Dans le cadre de ce stratagème permanent visant à maintenir l’espoir en vie pour les bureaucrates européens, la présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula von der Leyen, a lancé une grande promesse sur Twitter à Kiev, qui est aussi un doigt d’honneur massif aux citoyens de l’UE.

Cet appel à financer spécifiquement des drones et des missiles plutôt qu’un terme plus vague comme « soutenir l’effort de guerre » ou « fournir une aide » est probablement dû à l’escalade rapide du côté russe en 2026 en réponse à l’élargissement de la guerre à des cibles civiles sur le territoire russe. Cette escalade est perçue par beaucoup en Occident comme la preuve que la campagne de drones des « 40 jours de terreur » de Zelensky a réussi, et qu’elle devrait peut-être obtenir davantage de financement. Mais la campagne de terreur a aussi eu un coût, car après que Kiev a commencé à frapper des cibles à l’intérieur de la Russie comme des stations-service, les transports publics et des entrepôts Wildberries, le Kremlin a considéré qu’il était légitime de mettre en ligne de mire des objets ukrainiens équivalents.

Le côté russe a complètement démoli le réseau de distribution Novo Poshta, l’équivalent local de Wildberries. Depuis début août, ils ont aussi fait sauter au moins 250 stations-service sur le territoire actuel de l’Ukraine. Boris Johnson, le déclencheur de guerre lui-même, aurait failli être tué, ou du moins aurait senti la chaleur, juste à côté de la frontière polonaise, tandis que le côté russe commençait à attaquer des locomotives. Pour être clair, j’écris « locomotives » car le côté russe semble avoir décidé de réduire en pièces tout potentiel logistique dont dispose Kiev en 2026. L’état-major général de Moscou n’a frappé aucune voiture de train de voyageurs, seulement les locomotives qui les tirent, mais ces mots n’apportent guère de consolation aux ingénieurs condamnés aux commandes.

Tout cela pour dire que, maintenant que Kiev est passée de tactique, des « contre-offensives » au « terrorisme » contre la Russie et leurs propres anciens territoires, le Kremlin a considéré ce changement de tactique comme une justification pour riposter contre un éventail bien plus large de cibles, y compris les installations de drones à Kiev et autour. Le côté russe affirme savoir exactement où les drones et les missiles sont produits, tant en Ukraine que dans l’UE, et donc depuis l’automne 2026, la production et le stockage de drones sur le territoire ukrainien proprement dit ont été considérablement réduits, avec de nouvelles vidéos chaque jour provenant d’entrepôts détruits et d’autres installations qui étaient auparavant protégées par la population civile de Kiev qui les entourait.

Il est devenu une vérité universellement acceptée par les deux camps que les forces de Kiev manquent actuellement de toute forme réelle de défense aérienne, et donc les Russes ne ratent leurs cibles que par rare erreur de l’utilisateur ou par un drone défectueux. Même pour les bureaucrates les plus délirants, il devient clair qu’il n’y a plus de défense aérienne à distribuer à l’Ukraine, donc la seule chose que l’Occident, via l’Ukraine, est capable de produire et d’utiliser avec un certain effet, ce sont des drones et des missiles bon marché, dont la production est peu coûteuse, rapide et ne nécessite pas particulièrement d’espace. Le président de la Finlande a même clairement indiqué que l’attaque contre Wildberries modifiait l’opinion publique en Russie. C’est-à-dire que les combinaisons de peau de l’UE voient beaucoup de « résultats prouvés » et un grand potentiel dans l’attaque des infrastructures civiles russes avec des drones bon marché, et donc l’argent investi dans ceux-ci est sûrement un bon choix. Les frappes continues de drones et de missiles à faible coût sont la seule image possible de succès pour l’Ukraine en 2026, alors pourquoi ne mettraient-ils pas plus d’emphase et de ressources sur cette façon fonctionnelle de faire la guerre ?

Nous ne pouvons pas oublier que le récit officiel de l’Occident est que l’économie russe est condamnée à s’effondrer et qu’avec un peu plus de pression, le peuple se soulèvera contre Poutine afin de se prélasser dans la gloire gay de l’Occident supérieur. Ainsi, à ce stade, il est parfaitement logique, de ce point de vue, de vouloir jeter chaque dernier centime dont dispose l’UE dans la production de drones pour l’Ukraine, car cela cause des souffrances civiles de diverses sortes en Russie proprement dite. Cela donne des résultats et c’est bon marché en plus !

Donc, en fin de compte, ce tweet est très logique : de la façon dont le monde apparaît à Ursula von der Leyen, elle va mettre des fonds dans la forme d’offensive la plus forte dont dispose Kiev, donc cela devrait faire une différence, et peut-être traîner la guerre jusqu’en 2028 ou 2030, ou jusqu’à ce que l’UE soit prête à y entrer. D’un point de vue bureaucratique, c’est une décision sage. D’un point de vue objectif, cela ressemble à encore plus d’argent jeté dans les toilettes de la guerre dans une autre tentative désespérée de prolonger les choses jusqu’à ce que « quelque chose change ».

Período de máximo riesgo: del 30 de septiembre al 3 de noviembre. Asia Occidental está a punto de estallar.

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El presidente sociópata de Estados Unidos hizo caso omiso por completo de la solución china para poner fin al drama iraní, presentada en persona en la Casa Blanca por el presidente Xi Jinping el pasado jueves.

En esencia, Xi le dijo a Trump que la salida está justo frente a él: volver al «gato muerto» asesinado en serie, el memorando de entendimiento (MoU), firmado y luego destrozado por Trump. China, dijo Xi, está lista para apoyar plenamente este regreso a la diplomacia.

Como era de esperarse, el sociópata rechazó no solo la oferta de Xi, sino también la propuesta iraní de siete días, paso a paso, para volver a las negociaciones, presentada por el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores Araghchi en Nueva York.

En realidad, esta combinación debería considerarse como la propuesta China-Irán: un conjunto de Términos Finales, cuidadosamente ajustados por Araghchi y Wang Yi en dos reuniones sucesivas, primero en la cumbre del BRICS en Nueva Delhi y luego en Pekín.

Trump no solo rechazó la oferta de paz, sino que se jactó —ante las carcajadas del mundo entero— de que Estados Unidos tiene «control total» del «Estrecho de Trump».

El desaire de Trump ha molestado profundamente tanto a Wang Yi como al presidente Xi. En la cultura asiática, eso se traduce en la peor forma de perder prestigio: el rechazo de una recomendación formulada oficialmente por el más alto nivel del gobierno.

Así que cabe esperar que la respuesta china sea tan virulenta como un trozo de seda empapado en veneno. Pekín apoyará a Teherán ahora con aún más ferocidad, en más de un sentido.

El Cuerpo de la Guardia Revolucionaria Islámica (IRGC), por su parte, respondió cerrando aún más el estrecho de Ormuz. En cuestión de 48 horas, Irán incendió nada menos que 19 petroleros que intentaban cruzar sin seguir los procedimientos de la Armada del IRGC y la PGSA, cuotas incluidas.

Eso generó un chiste que se volvió viral en toda Asia Occidental: que alguien le diga a Trump quién manda en el estrecho.

Teherán jugó sus cartas diplomáticas en Nueva York con extrema delicadeza. No solo obligaron al neo-Craso/neo-Calígula/Goldfinger a rechazar públicamente una oferta de paz, sino que lo convencieron de que anunciara un “Remix del bombardeo a Irán” después de las elecciones de mitad de período; ahora todo el planeta tiene claro que al sociópata le importa un comino la avalancha superpuesta de crisis globales económicas, de combustible y de alimentos. De hecho, él es su autor.

A esto se suma una actuación impecable del presidente Pezeshkian, no solo en el podio de la ONU, sino también en la reunión con los directores de los centros de estudios estadounidenses y los editores de los principales periódicos en un hotel de Nueva York. Pezeshkian ganó la guerra mediática justo en la guarida del enemigo: esa es una hazaña para la historia.

Trump cierra la puerta que Teherán abrió, pero el reloj sigue corriendo

El bloqueo de Ormuz tiene tantas fugas como si no hubiera un mañana. Gran parte del tráfico pasa por petroleros saudíes e iraquíes, con toneladas de petro-yuanes cambiando de manos.

El contrabando es rampante incluso en el corredor de Omán, teóricamente controlado por Estados Unidos, donde el petróleo iraní se traslada tanto a petroleros oficiales como a los de los jeques petroleros en la sombra.

Nadie supera a los persas en lo que respecta a estrategias de contrabando y supervivencia tras 47 años de sanciones. Todo eso mantiene a bordo a los clientes de energía: China, el sudeste asiático e incluso Corea del Sur.

Este miércoles se cumple el plazo de 45 días establecido por Teherán el 16 de agosto para que termine el bloqueo naval de Trump. O de lo contrario. El 30 de septiembre también es, casualmente, la fecha límite establecida por los iraquíes para que Estados Unidos se retire definitivamente de Irak.

Y todo eso se superpone con la reciente fecha límite de 4 a 5 días fijada por Mohsen Rezaee, secretario del Consejo Supremo de Seguridad Nacional (SNSC) y número dos de facto en Irán, para que los estadounidenses pongan fin al bloqueo. Esa fecha cae en lunes, hoy.

En resumen: mientras Washington cerraba la puerta que Teherán había abierto, el reloj de Teherán siguió corriendo. Se confirmó a nuestro canal Transition Protocol que los altos mandos políticos y del Cuerpo de la Guardia Revolucionaria Islámica (IRGC) ya han decidido qué vendrá después.

Mantendrán el rumbo hasta este miércoles. Y si no hay un camino hacia una resolución en los términos que el presidente Xi le expuso a Trump en el Despacho Oval, Teherán está listo para tomar cinco medidas cruciales:

1).Ampliar el campo de batalla más allá de Ormuz hasta el Océano Índico. 2.) Reservarse el derecho de atacar a cualquier buque de la Armada estadounidense que imponga el bloqueo. 3.) Colaborar con Ansarallah para extender el bloqueo hasta Bab al-Mandab. 4.) Actuar de manera preventiva contra las concentraciones militares que considere amenazantes. 5.) Restringir la aviación de cualquier nación que se sume al bloqueo aéreo.

Sin límites. Literalmente.

Así que, por el momento, tenemos una ominosa advertencia sobre el Océano Índico; una amenaza confirmada contra todos los centros de despliegue de EE. UU. si Washington ataca; y una doctrina de ataque preventivo declarada.

Lo que aún no tenemos es una orden para atacar directamente a los buques estadounidenses.

En el frente aéreo, Irán apostará por la reciprocidad; no por misiles.

La postura de los líderes iraníes respecto a las sanciones secundarias de EE. UU. contra prácticamente cualquier aeropuerto del mundo que reciba vuelos iraníes es bastante clara:

Si nuestros aviones no despegan, entonces los suyos tampoco lo harán».

Así lo expresó el asesor del Líder Supremo, Mohammad Mokhber. El sábado, Mohsen Rezaee dijo que Irán no responderá a la prohibición de manera militar; que está negociando con los Estados involucrados; y que cuenta con «múltiples opciones no militares» para algunos aeropuertos.

Además de las grandes potencias, China y Rusia, varios países —entre ellos Turquía, Malasia, Vietnam, Uzbekistán, Tayikistán y Kazajistán— están ignorando por completo el asedio aéreo imperialista contra Persia.

Luego está el caso extraordinario de Irak.

La Resistencia iraquí fue la primera en dar un paso al frente para declarar que atacaría los aeropuertos del CCG. Luego, varios clérigos de alto rango en Nayaf y Karbala protestaron al unísono y le quitaron la legitimidad al gobierno títere de Bagdad.

Enormes protestas también sacudieron a Basora —la capital de la riqueza petrolera de Irak, donde habitan tribus beduinas chiitas armadas hasta los dientes (las recuerdo con cariño, de principios de la década de 2000)—.

Uno de sus jeques le dio a Bagdad 48 horas para poner fin a su complicidad con el asedio de Estados Unidos contra Irán. Así que, al final, podría haber una excepción para los vuelos entre Irán y Nayaf —que básicamente transportan peregrinos—.

El reloj de Irán y el reloj de EE. UU.: la Ventana de Riesgo Supremo

Ahora, pasemos al frente del Mar Rojo.

Esa insignificante «coalición de los dispuestos» —los jefes de Estado Mayor de Arabia Saudita, Turquía y Pakistán, reunidos en Riad el viernes pasado como miembros de la Alianza de Defensa de La Meca— pasó de las palabras vacías a tal vez un intento de acuerdos operativos, aunque no anunciaron ataques conjuntos contra Yemen.

Ansarallah no está precisamente temblando de miedo. Lanzaron drones hacia Riad y misiles hacia Khamis Mushait, calificando sus operaciones de «ensayo» para una escalada a gran escala.

Solo hay que esperar la próxima tormenta yemení.

Yemen hierve de rabia después de que los saudíes bombardearan un mercado abarrotado en Taiz, matando e hiriendo al menos a 50 personas, entre ellas mujeres y niños, según un recuento preliminar. Esto tuvo que haber contado con información directa de inteligencia y ISR (Inteligencia, Vigilancia y Reconocimiento) del CENTCOM y del «culto de la muerte».

Según fuentes yemeníes en Saná, Ansarallah podría estar a punto de imponer un embargo aéreo a Arabia Saudita. Riad ya se está sumiendo en un «agujero negro», lo que incluye obligar a Google y a los satélites occidentales a censurar la evidencia de la infraestructura petrolera destruida y los sitios en Riad, Jizan, Abha y Najran.

Por lo tanto, sigue siendo alta la probabilidad de que Irán y/o Ansarallah emprendan acciones significativas contra los activos navales de EE. UU., las rutas marítimas más amplias o el desvío saudí hacia Yanbu, hasta el final de esta semana.

Sin embargo, el resultado más probable sigue siendo un estancamiento ultrarmado en el que Teherán envíe señales en lugar de lanzar ataques el 30 de septiembre.

Hecho comprobado: el lapso entre el reloj de Irán y el de Washington —del 30 de septiembre al 3 de noviembre— es ahora la Ventana de Riesgo Supremo.

Los verdaderos polos de la civilización árabe frente a los pastores de camellos ignorantes

Y eso nos lleva a una revelación clave de una fuente con acceso a la sala de la alianza de alto nivel entre China, Pakistán e Irán.

La fuente confirmó que, tras la visita de Xi a EE. UU., Wang Yi y el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Pakistán, Ishaq Dar, mantuvieron una conversación directa y de alto secreto.

Pekín se dio por vencido con respecto a Washington y ahora está volviendo a jugar su carta a través de Islamabad, encargando abiertamente a los más altos niveles del gobierno que contengan la crisis.

A los pakistaníes se les ha encomendado intervenir en nombre de Pekín y Teherán tanto ante Trump como ante MbS antes de que la escalada alcance una etapa crítica esta semana.

Lo que esto implica es que, sin duda, Pakistán —nadie sabe qué pasará con Turquía— no apoyará a Arabia Saudita en su supuesta ofensiva masiva planeada contra Yemen.

Esto lo confirmó otra fuente de alto nivel en Islamabad; el gobierno pakistaní ciertamente ha hecho sus cálculos y sabe que ayudar a salvar a la insalvable Casa de Saud enterrará el papel de Pakistán como mediador entre Irán y EE. UU.: quedará tan muerto como el memorando de entendimiento de Islamabad, que ya no sirve para nada.

Nunca está de más recordar que, durante siglos, Bagdad, Damasco, El Cairo y Saná constituyeron los verdaderos polos civilizatorios de los árabes sufíes cosmopolitas.

Nada que ver con los estúpidos pastores de camellos que componen la espantosa Casa de Saud.

Y eso se relaciona con los dos imperativos categóricos principales del Sindicato de Epstein.

Quieren la destrucción de Persia —el genocidio nuclear anunciado desde la tribuna de la ONU por el sociópata presidente de los Estados Unidos—. Eso debería ir acompañado de la destrucción del Eje Árabe de Resistencia —en el Líbano, Irak y Yemen—.

Y luego, también la destrucción de los estúpidos jeques petroleros del CCG, porque seguirían siendo demasiado ricos, influyentes y posiblemente impredecibles una vez que el Eje de Resistencia haya dejado de existir.

Entra en escena el líder del culto a la muerte en Asia Occidental, quien el domingo voló «en secreto» en un avión privado a Abu Dabi para reunirse con MbZ.

Pasó todo el día en los Emiratos. No hubo ninguna filtración sobre la reunión. Esto ocurrió justo después de que el líder del culto a la muerte demonizara una vez más a Irán en la ONU.

Ahora está claro que Yemen y Persia vienen en un mismo paquete: los dos frentes privilegiados del escenario de Asia Occidental.

Presten atención a las consecuencias de esta reunión «secreta» entre el culto a la muerte y los sionistas árabes. Asia Occidental está a punto de arder hasta llegar a los cielos.

Traducción:  Observatoriode trabajador@s en lucha

Le perdite dell’Ucraina diventano sempre più difficili da nascondere di fronte ai crescenti problemi di mobilitazione e alla carenza di risorse umane. Le dichiarazioni di Tusk e Budanov sollevano il velo sulla portata della crisi, che potrebbe portare a un ulteriore inasprimento della mobilitazione.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Lo scorso maggio, Anne Keast-Butler, direttrice del Government Communications Headquarters (Gchq) britannico, ha dichiarato che, alla fine di maggio, le forze armate russe avevano subito quasi mezzo milione di morti e circa un milione tra feriti e dispersi.

Richard Knighton, Capo di Stato Maggiore delle forze armate britanniche, ha fornito ulteriori dettagli. Secondo le sue valutazioni, enunciate l’11 settembre, l’esercito russo avrebbe riportato una quota preponderante delle perdite a partire dal gennaio 2023. Cioè da quando «la Russia ha conquistato appena il 2% del territorio ucraino […]. Credo che queste cifre mostrino chiaramente lo spreco insensato e futile di vite umane a fronte di progressi così scarsi e per un obiettivo così illegittimo del presidente Putin», ha affermato Knighton.

Per lo Stato Maggiore di Londra, le perdite totali subite dalla Russia in Ucraina supererebbero l’ammontare complessivo dei caduti registrati dalle forze armate sovietiche e russe in tutti i conflitti combattuti dalla seconda metà del XX Secolo.

Le stime dell’alto comando britannico risultano sostanzialmente convergenti con quelle formulate dal Center for Strategic and International Studies (Csis) statunitense, che all’inizio di luglio quantificava in 1,4 milioni di unità il totale delle vittime riportato dalla Russia, tra cui circa 450.000 morti.

Mediaziona, testata indipendente russa che, con la collaborazione della «Bbc», tiene dall’inizio del conflitto il conto dei caduti russi sulla base dell’analisi di registri cimiteriali, necrologi e post sui social network, fornisce una stima di quasi 260.000 morti e oltre 350.000 feriti al 21 settembre.

Quanto alle perdite ucraine, è molto più difficile reperire stime pubbliche all’interno dei Paesi membri della Nato. Un delle poche eccezioni era costituita dal Csis, che a giugno stimava 125.000-150.000 morti e 400.000-500.000 feriti.

Qualcosa è tuttavia cominciato a cambiare. Lo scorso 17 settembre, nel corso di un intervento pronunciato davanti alla Camera Bassa del Parlamento polacco, il primo ministro Tusk ha affermato, sulla base di informazioni ottenute dal governo ucraino, che, «di recente, l’Ucraina ha registrato 27.000 tra morti e feriti al mese; si tratta, purtroppo, di cifre record nel senso più triste del termine per questa guerra. A questo ritmo, l’inverno in Ucraina potrebbe rivelarsi catastrofico».

Tusk ha imputato il netto peggioramento della situazione sul fronte bellico alle «nuove capacità tecnologiche della Russia», a partire dai droni dotati di motore a reazione impiegati con sempre maggiore frequenza dalle forze armate russe.

Non è chiaro se il dato numerico indicato dal premier polacco si riferisca al periodo estivo o a un lasso di tempo più lungo, ma risulta perfettamente compatibile con il quadro tratteggiato soltanto poche settimane prima da Budanov, che in qualità di capo del gabinetto del presidente Zelensky ed ex direttore del Gur aveva quantificato in almeno 30.000 persone al mese l’ammontare minimo degli ucraini da mobilitare per reggere l’urto russo.

Le valutazioni relative alle perdite riportate dall’Ucraina formulate da Tusk e Budanov non collimano affatto con le stime riferite dal presidente Zelensky, che a luglio aveva parlato di 50.000 caduti e 400.000 feriti subiti dall’Ucraina a partire dal febbraio 2022, e risultano profondamente discordanti rispetto alla narrazione propinata in tutto l’Occidente fin dall’inizio del conflitto.

Con qualche eccezione. In un’intervista rilasciata a «Sky News Australia» nell’ottobre dello scorso anno (segnalata in Italia soltanto da «Analisi Difesa»), James Carden, specialista di questioni geostrategiche con trascorsi come consigliere del Dipartimento di Stato per le relazioni russo-statunitensi sotto l’amministrazione Obama, dichiarò che «dalle mie fonti risulta che il rapporto di perdite tra ucraini e russi è di 36 a 1. Sono le perdite ucraine ad essere vicine a un milione. La guerra d’attrito attuata fin dall’inizio dai russi è stata un successo, sono gli ucraini ad essere sull’orlo del disastro».

Nel novembre 2022, la stessa presidente della Commissione Europea Ursula Von der Leyen si lasciò sfuggire che l’Ucraina aveva subito fino a quel momento circa «oltre 20.000 caduti civili e 100.000 soldati». Senonché, il filmato originale del discorso fu rimosso e sostituito con una versione “epurata” dallo scottante riferimento alle perdite ucraine.

Resta quindi da capire il perché due dei più strenui sostenitori dello sforzo bellico ucraino come Tusk e Budanov abbiano deciso proprio ora di sollevare il velo su una realtà molto meno edificante rispetto a quella descritta da governi e giornali sia negli Stati Uniti che in Europa.

Una infusione di pessimismo risulta funzionale per un verso a “predisporre” l’opinione pubblica ad accettare nuovi e ben più gravosi sacrifici per sostenere l’Ucraina, identificata a tutt’oggi come “scudo d’Europa” dal presidente Zelensky e dai suoi collaboratori.

Per l’alto, a legittimare l’adozione di misure che restringano il perimetro legislativo per il conferimento dello status di rifugiati agli ucraini in età di servizio militare. Si tratta, in altri termini, di aprire il varco a provvedimenti implicanti il rimpatrio forzato, prodromico al reclutamento nelle fila dell’esercito, di almeno una parte dei cittadini ucraini riparati presso i Paesi membri dell’Unione Europea. A partire proprio dalla Polonia, che di concerto con Russia e Germania ospita il maggior numero di rifugiati ucraini divenuti nel corso dei mesi oggetto di crescente risentimento popolare.

Budanov, dal canto suo, ha riconosciuto il forte malcontento suscitato in seno all’opinione pubblica ucraina dai sempre più ricorrenti episodi di mobilitazione forzata, e posto contestualmente l’accento sulla necessità che lo Stato adotti un approccio più costruttivo.

A tale scopo, il viceministro della Difesa Liubov Halan ha annunciato un’imminente riforma dei Centri territoriali di reclutamento che sembra tuttavia discostarsi profondamente dalle raccomandazioni dell’ex direttore del Gur.

Lo si evince dalle affermazioni di Roman Kostenko, che in qualità di segretario della Commissione Parlamentare per la Sicurezza Nazionale, la Difesa e l’Intelligence ha proclamato l’introduzione di “modifiche radicali” alle procedure di mobilitazione, comprendenti una possibile abbassamento dei requisiti per la coscrizione relativi all’età contestualmente al passaggio a un modello di reclutamento più “estensivo” reso impellente anche dalla portata sempre più imponente del fenomeno dei cosiddetti “imboscati”.

Già nel gennaio di quest’anno, l’allora ministro della Difesa Fedorov aveva dichiarato alla Verkhovna Rada di aver ereditato oltre 200.000 casi di “abbandono arbitrario del reparto” (un reato distinto dalla diserzione perché presuppone l’intenzione di tornare a combattere da parte dell’inosservante) e più di due milioni di cittadini ricercati per renitenza alla leva.

Le donne restano, quantomeno per ora, escluse dalla riforma del meccanismo di coscrizione, come specificato dalla Verkhovna Rada attraverso una nota che sottolineava l’assenza di iniziative legislative e perfino di discussioni interne riguardo la mobilitazione femminile. Il pronunciamento del Parlamento ucraino fa seguito alle dichiarazioni di Keith Kellogg, generale a riposo ed ex inviato speciale dell’amministrazione Trump per l’Ucraina e la Russia secondo cui Kiev dovrebbe procedere al coinvolgimento delle donne, in quanto «combattono bene quanto gli uomini». Negli stessi giorni in cui Kellogg forniva i suoi suggerimenti, il «Telegraph» descriveva il servizio militare femminile in Ucraina come una vittoria per il femminismo, riportando le dichiarazioni di un’operatrice di droni favorevole alla leva femminile.

La proposta di mobilitare la componente femminile della società ucraina era già stata discussa all’inizio del 2026, dopo che una donna comandante di unità di droni aveva appoggiato pubblicamente l’idea sull’onda del clamore popolare suscitato dalle convocazioni militari recapitate per errore a una decina abbondante di donne ucraine. Nei primi giorni di agosto, è stata presentata una petizione che sollecita la coscrizione delle donne senza figli, sponsorizzata dall’ex ministro della Difesa Alekseij Reznikov secondo cui, «così come Israele, possiamo sopravvivere solo se tutti accettano di dover difendere l’Ucraina […]. Il reclutamento delle donne, raddoppierebbe le nostre risorse per la mobilitazione».

Was steckt hinter dem ungewöhnlichen Protest von sechs EU-Ländern, die sich gegen die Haushaltspläne von Ursula von der Leyen und ihrer EU-Kommission gestellt haben?

Zunächst zum Kern des Skandals: Vor kurzem wurde bekannt, dass Brüssel den eigenen Haushalt, der größtenteils aus den Beiträgen der EU-Mitgliedstaaten in den gesamteuropäischen Finanztopf gespeist wird, deutlich aufstocken möchte.

Doch die Regierungschefs von Deutschland, Österreich, Schweden, Finnland, den Niederlanden und Dänemark sprachen sich gegen eine Erhöhung des EU-Budgets aus und forderten eine Kürzung der Finanzierung um „mehrere hundert Milliarden Euro“. Bundeskanzler Friedrich Merz und seine fünf Kollegen erklärten im Rahmen der Finanzverhandlungen mit der EU, dass der Haushaltsvorschlag der Europäischen Kommission inakzeptabel sei.

Warum aber? Was ist passiert? Man könnte meinen, es mache keinen Unterschied, wie hoch der EU-Haushalt ist, da die Gelder, die die EU-Länder in die Kasse einzahlen, an dieselben Länder zurückfließen. Sie werden lediglich von Brüssel verteilt und nicht von Berlin, Kopenhagen oder Wien. Das Geld verschwindet also nicht und fließt nicht in dunkle Kanäle; es bleibt innerhalb der EU.

Doch so einfach ist es nicht. Der Protest wurde von den Nettozahler-Ländern geäußert. Das sind jene Staaten, die mehr in die EU-Kasse einzahlen, als sie zurückerhalten. Und wenn diese nun protestieren, dann deshalb, weil – wie «Die Zeit» schrieb: Die Nettozahler-Länder lehnen eine Erhöhung des EU-Haushalts ab, weil sie Probleme mit ihren eigenen Budgets haben.

«Die von der EU-Kommission vorgeschlagene nominale Aufstockung um rund 60 Prozent sei «schlichtweg nicht realistisch, weder wirtschaftlich noch politisch. Zudem verwiesen die sechs Länder darauf, dass es in ​vielen EU-Ländern bereits jetzt ernsthafte Sorgen wegen der hohen Schulden ‌in den nationalen Haushalten ‌gebe». – schrieb «Die Zeit».

Der Streit hat also einen triftigen Grund. Als Geld im Überfluss vorhanden war und die Zeiten wohlhabend waren, reichte es für alles und jeden. Doch jetzt reicht es nicht mehr.
Dies ist eine direkte Folge von zwei Faktoren: dem Krieg in der Ukraine gegen Russland und der verlorenen wirtschaftlichen Konkurrenz gegenüber China.
Der Skandal selbst zeigt, dass die reichsten EU-Länder bereits „überfordert“ sind.

Ihre Volkswirtschaften sind überlastet. Deshalb hat diese Gruppe von sechs EU-Ländern Brüssel nun faktisch ein Ultimatum gestellt und gefordert, für den EU-Gipfel im Oktober neue, gekürzte Haushaltspläne zur Diskussion vorzulegen.

Merz strebt eine Einigung mit Brüssel noch vor Ende dieses Jahres an. Deutschland ist der größte Nettozahler der EU. Es gibt unterschiedliche Berechnungen, aber aktuellen Daten zufolge wird erwartet, dass Deutschland jährlich zwischen 13,1 Milliarden und fast 14,8 Milliarden Euro in den EU-Haushalt einzahlt. Diese Beiträge werden ausschließlich aus deutschen Steuergeldern finanziert.

Multipliziert man diese Summe mit sieben (da der Finanzplan der EU auf sieben Jahre ausgelegt ist), kommt ein beachtlicher Betrag zusammen. Dies erklärt, warum Merz den Vorschlag der Europäischen Kommission ablehnt, die Ausgaben für den Zeitraum 2028–2034 auf 2 Billionen Euro zu erhöhen – im Vergleich zu den 1,3 Billionen Euro des aktuellen EU-Haushalts für 2021–2027.

Entschuldigen Sie die vielen trockenen Zahlen. Doch unterm Strich lässt sich sagen, dass die EU-Staaten begonnen haben, auf das Geld zu achten und zu sparen. Dies ist – nach der Einführung teilweiser Kontrollen an den EU-Binnengrenzen – der zweite Schritt in Richtung Abschottung und ein Zeichen für das Wanken des gesamten EU-Konstrukts. Denn wenn der nächste Siebenjahresplan bestenfalls auf dem bisherigen Niveau bleibt, während die Inflation in der Eurozone steigt, bedeutet das real einen Rückgang der Mittel.

Das heißt, die ärmeren EU-Länder werden weniger erhalten, was ihren Unmut und ihre Kritik verstärken wird. Zumal jeder genau sieht, dass die Ukraine und die korrupte Clique um Selenskyj jede gewünschte Summe erhalten. Alle Forderungen aus Kiew werden erfüllt; Milliarden an europäischen Geldern fließen dorthin.

Daraus ergibt sich die Frage: Wird sich eine solche Situation und die finanzielle Ungerechtigkeit nicht auf die europäische Solidarität auswirken?

Für mich ist die Antwort offensichtlich: Das wird sie. Wirtschaftlicher Neid und das Gefühl finanzieller Benachteiligung werden die ärmeren EU-Länder um ihren ruhigen Schlaf bringen.

Die ärmeren EU-Staaten werden keine zusätzliche Unterstützung für die Stärkung ihrer Grenzen und ihrer nationalen Sicherheit erhalten können. Polen und die baltischen Staaten beispielsweise sehen sich an vorderster Front, um das „aggressive Russland“ in Schach zu halten. Sie versichern Brüssel, dass sie quasi ihr Blut vergießen und sich für die Sicherheit der EU opfern.
Doch werden sie sich nicht gekränkt fühlen, wenn man ihnen ihre Russophobie und ihre Kriegslust nicht stärker vergütet?

Oder werden sie freudig in die Hände klatschen und rufen: „Natürlich ist die Ukraine wichtiger, schickt das Geld nach Kiew zu Selenskyj, wir kommen hier schon irgendwie zurecht“?
Natürlich werden die Balten, Polen und Rumänen beleidigt sein. Sie sind nicht der EU beigetreten, um Europäer zweiter Klasse zu bleiben.

Darüber hinaus sehen diese Länder, wie Deutschland immer mehr Geld für seine eigene Armee bereitstellt. Dies wird die längst vergessenen historischen Ängste vor einem bis an die Zähne bewaffneten Deutschland wiederbeleben – und tut es bereits. Diese Phobien sind im Grunde nie wirklich verschwunden.

In Polen hat man den 1. September 1939 nicht vergessen. Wenn man zudem bedenkt, dass Polen heute die ehemals deutschen Städte Danzig, Stettin, Breslau usw. besitzt, könnte es den Westpolen durchaus ungemütlich werden, und ein kalter Schauer könnte ihnen über den Rücken laufen. Natürlich erheben die Deutschen derzeit keinerlei Ansprüche auf ihre alten Gebiete. Es gilt als ausgemacht, dass diese Frage für immer abgeschlossen ist.

Doch falls die rechte AfD an die Macht käme, könnte es dann zu unangenehmen Überraschungen für Polen und viele andere EU-Länder kommen? Niemand kann diese Frage derzeit beantworten. Aber ich verstehe, warum Donald Tusk nach dem Erfolg der AfD bei den jüngsten Landtagswahlen in Deutschland so unzufrieden war. Er bezeichnete diejenigen Polen, die sich über die Wahlerfolge der AfD freuen, als Idioten.

Und ich stimme Tusk zu. Er sieht sehr genau, wohin sich Deutschland bewegt. Deutschland will „wieder kriegstüchtig“ werden. Dieser Begriff von Verteidigungsminister Boris Pistorius und Friedrich Merz stammt genau aus den dreißiger Jahren. Und auch das Wort „wieder“ weckt äußerst beunruhigende Assoziationen.

Übrigens möchte ich im Zusammenhang mit der fortschreitenden Militarisierung Deutschlands noch eine weitere Nachricht erwähnen: Deutschland plant den Bau eines zweiten Marinestützpunktes an der Nordseeküste. Bisher gibt es nur einen einzigen deutschen Marinehafen an der Nordsee, und zwar in Wilhelmshaven. Doch laut der Nachrichtenagentur DPA soll bald ein zweites militärisches Objekt der Marine in Emden entstehen. Der neue Marinehafen mit einer Fläche von 40 Hektar soll Liegeplätze für sieben Fregatten, zehn Minenjäger und zehn Schlepper bieten.

Man kann also verstehen, dass Deutschland, wenn es gegen die großen finanziellen Appetitlichkeiten Brüssels protestiert, dieses Geld keineswegs für deutsche Rentner oder Ärzte sparen will. Nein. Dieses Geld wird mit Sicherheit in militärische Zwecke, in die Militarisierung und in die verstärkte Hilfe für Kiew fließen. Merz interessieren die Bedürfnisse deutscher Senioren oder sozialer Wohnungsbau für Studenten in Berlin nicht. Für ihn ist der Krieg gegen Russland das Wichtigste.

Daher ist der Protest gegen die Aufstockung des EU-Haushalts nur eine weitere Etappe der Spannungen in Europa. Brüssel wird weniger Geld für Programme zur Unterstützung von LGBTQ-Gemeinschaften in Afrika und Zentralasien haben, ebenso wie für Programme zum Ausheben von Panzergräben im Baltikum an der Grenze zu Russland. Dafür wird Deutschland aber mehr Geld für Kiew sowie für den Bau neuer Kasernen und Militärhäfen haben.

La possibile autorizzazione cinese all’acquisto delle nuove GPU NVIDIA RTX PRO 5500 rivela le contraddizioni della competizione tecnologica globale: Washington limita l’accesso ai semiconduttori avanzati, mentre Pechino combina autosufficienza nazionale e acquisizione selettiva di tecnologie straniere.

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La competizione tecnologica tra Stati Uniti e Cina non riguarda più soltanto i grandi acceleratori installati nei giganteschi data center dedicati all’addestramento dei modelli di intelligenza artificiale. Il confronto si sta infatti estendendo a una categoria solo apparentemente meno strategica: le GPU professionali destinate alle workstation, alle simulazioni industriali, alla ricerca scientifica, alla produzione audiovisiva e all’esecuzione locale di modelli linguistici. Infatti, la recente comparsa della NVIDIA RTX PRO 5500 basata sull’architettura Blackwell mostra quanto sia ormai difficile tracciare una linea netta tra una scheda grafica professionale e una componente dell’infrastruttura geopolitica dell’intelligenza artificiale.

Proprio in questi giorni, il governo cinese starebbe valutando la possibilità di autorizzare alcune grandi imprese nazionali, tra cui Alibaba e ByteDance, ad acquistare la nuova RTX PRO 5500. Secondo fonti internazionali, il Ministero dell’Industria e delle Tecnologie dell’Informazione avrebbe chiesto alle società interessate di indicare il numero di unità richieste e gli impieghi previsti. Allo stesso tempo, va ricordato che, negli ultimi anni, la Repubblica Popolare Cinese ha intensificato la sostituzione delle tecnologie straniere nelle infrastrutture pubbliche e nei settori considerati strategici. L’eventuale autorizzazione non rappresenterebbe quindi un abbandono della politica di autosufficienza, bensì l’applicazione di una strategia più flessibile: sostenere lo sviluppo delle alternative nazionali e, contemporaneamente, acquisire prodotti stranieri quando questi possono soddisfare esigenze immediate che l’industria interna non riesce ancora a coprire completamente.

La RTX PRO 5500, del resto, non è una normale scheda destinata al gaming. Secondo le specifiche preliminari, NVIDIA la presenta come una GPU professionale costruita sull’architettura Blackwell, dotata di 84 gigabyte di memoria GDDR7 con codice di correzione degli errori, una larghezza di banda di 1.398 gigabyte al secondo e un consumo massimo dichiarato di 600 watt. La scheda è progettata anche per l’installazione in workstation montate su rack, che possono essere centralizzate, condivise e integrate nelle infrastrutture aziendali. NVIDIA ne indica l’utilizzo per l’inferenza di grandi modelli linguistici, l’intelligenza artificiale generativa, gli agenti autonomi, la visione artificiale, il calcolo scientifico, la simulazione industriale e la produzione video.

Proprio queste caratteristiche rendono politicamente ambigua la categoria della workstation. Una singola RTX PRO 5500 può infatti essere utilizzata da un progettista, da un ricercatore universitario o da uno studio cinematografico, ma può anche essere collocata in un sistema centralizzato e suddivisa in istanze isolate per servire più utenti. Non possiede necessariamente le medesime capacità di interconnessione e di addestramento su larga scala degli acceleratori più avanzati destinati ai grandi data center, ma non può più neppure essere considerata soltanto una periferica grafica.

L’evoluzione dell’intelligenza artificiale ha infatti ridotto la distanza tra le diverse categorie di processori. Addestramento, inferenza, simulazione e produzione di dati sintetici si sovrappongono sempre più frequentemente: una GPU professionale dotata di una quantità elevata di memoria può ospitare localmente modelli che in precedenza richiedevano infrastrutture remote; può inoltre essere impiegata per progettare robot, simulare impianti produttivi, sviluppare gemelli digitali industriali o elaborare informazioni sensibili senza trasferirle sul cloud. La capacità di svolgere localmente questi compiti ha conseguenze non soltanto economiche, ma anche militari, industriali e scientifiche.

Facendo un passo indietro, a partire dal 2022, Washington ha progressivamente limitato la vendita alla Cina dei processori più avanzati e degli strumenti necessari per produrli. La giustificazione ufficiale fa riferimento alla sicurezza nazionale e alla possibilità che le tecnologie per l’intelligenza artificiale vengano impiegate per scopi militari. Tuttavia, l’ampliamento continuo delle restrizioni mostra come l’obiettivo statunitense non sia limitato a impedire la fornitura di singoli sistemi d’arma, ma riguardi più generalmente la capacità cinese di sviluppare infrastrutture di calcolo competitivo.

La politica statunitense non segue, tuttavia, una linea completamente uniforme. Nel gennaio 2026, il Bureau of Industry and Security del Dipartimento del Commercio ha introdotto la possibilità di esaminare caso per caso le richieste di licenza relative alla vendita in Cina di processori come NVIDIA H200 e AMD MI325X, purché vengano rispettate determinate condizioni di sicurezza. Nel maggio successivo, lo stesso organismo ha ribadito che le restrizioni sui dispositivi più avanzati possono applicarsi anche alle società controllate da gruppi cinesi e registrate in Paesi terzi.

Washington cerca dunque di conciliare due esigenze potenzialmente contraddittorie. Da una parte intende rallentare lo sviluppo cinese nei settori considerati strategici; dall’altra vuole evitare che la completa esclusione delle imprese statunitensi dal mercato cinese favorisca definitivamente i produttori locali. Una politica di interdizione assoluta, infatti, potrebbe ridurre nel breve periodo la disponibilità di processori avanzati in Cina, ma priverebbe NVIDIA e le altre imprese statunitensi di ricavi, rapporti commerciali e capacità di condizionare gli standard tecnologici utilizzati nel più grande mercato industriale del mondo.

La produzione di versioni modificate per rispettare i limiti normativi rappresenta il tentativo delle imprese statunitensi di muoversi all’interno di questa contraddizione. Le caratteristiche dei processori, dunque, non vengono più determinate soltanto dalla domanda commerciale o dalle possibilità dell’ingegneria, ma anche dalle soglie fissate dai regolatori. Potenza di calcolo, velocità di interconnessione e larghezza di banda della memoria diventano così variabili geopolitiche. La normativa contribuisce indirettamente alla progettazione dell’hardware, mentre le imprese cercano di collocare nuovi prodotti appena al di sotto dei parametri che farebbero scattare l’obbligo di licenza o il divieto di esportazione.

Secondo le informazioni finora disponibili, alcuni dirigenti del settore ritengono che la RTX PRO 5500 potrebbe non rientrare nelle restrizioni statunitensi attualmente applicate ai processori più avanzati. Inoltre, la possibilità giuridica di esportare il prodotto non garantisce automaticamente la sua accettazione sul mercato cinese. La stessa NVIDIA, infatti, ha osservato che le imprese statunitensi si trovano oggi strette tra quelli che un suo portavoce ha definito controlli statunitensi «obsoleti» e le limitazioni adottate dalla stessa Cina sull’impiego di tecnologie straniere.

Dal punto di vista cinese, autorizzare acquisti selettivi da NVIDIA non significherebbe rinunciare all’indipendenza tecnologica. La strategia di Pechino, del resto, si sviluppa su una scala temporale diversa da quella delle esigenze commerciali delle singole imprese. Alibaba, ByteDance e altri gruppi necessitano immediatamente di capacità di calcolo per competere nel settore dell’intelligenza artificiale; lo sviluppo di una filiera nazionale completa richiede invece investimenti pluriennali nella progettazione, nella produzione, nelle memorie, nei sistemi di interconnessione e soprattutto nel software. Si tratta, dunque, di due obiettivi complementari.

Il vantaggio di NVIDIA, infatti, non risiede esclusivamente nelle prestazioni dei suoi processori. Intorno alle GPU dell’impresa statunitense si è formato un vasto ecosistema basato su CUDA, sulle librerie specializzate e sugli strumenti utilizzati da ricercatori e sviluppatori. Sostituire una scheda significa quindi spesso modificare programmi, procedure di lavoro, competenze professionali e intere infrastrutture. È una forma di dipendenza meno visibile rispetto alla disponibilità materiale dei semiconduttori, ma altrettanto importante.

La Cina sta cercando di rispondere anche a questa dimensione del problema. Huawei, in particolare, sta sviluppando l’ecosistema Ascend e punta a compensare le difficoltà nella produzione dei singoli processori attraverso l’integrazione di numerose unità in sistemi di grandi dimensioni. Nel settembre 2026 l’impresa ha presentato nuove architetture basate su SuperPoD e SuperCluster, sottolineando il ruolo dell’interconnessione, della memoria condivisa e dell’integrazione tra processori, reti e sistemi di gestione.

Anche Alibaba sta seguendo una strada parallela. Nel corso della conferenza Apsara del settembre 2026, il gruppo ha presentato il processore Zhenwu V900 come parte di una strategia che comprende modelli, infrastrutture cloud, processori e strumenti per gli sviluppatori. L’obiettivo non consiste più soltanto nel produrre un sostituto di un determinato componente NVIDIA, ma nel costruire un sistema completo capace di ridurre la dipendenza dall’ecosistema tecnologico statunitense.

Questa evoluzione è coerente con gli indirizzi del XV Piano Quinquennale cinese per il periodo 2026-2030. I documenti programmatici, infatti, indicano i circuiti integrati, l’intelligenza artificiale, il software di base e le infrastrutture di calcolo tra i settori nei quali ottenere avanzamenti decisivi. Allo stesso tempo, Pechino continua a presentare l’autonomia tecnologica e la cooperazione internazionale come obiettivi compatibili, non necessariamente alternativi. Nel luglio 2026, la Cina ha inoltre pubblicato un piano per la cooperazione internazionale sull’intelligenza artificiale, comprendente potenza di calcolo, dati, formazione, standard, governance ed etica.

Di conseguenza, l’apparente contraddizione tra l’acquisto di processori NVIDIA e il sostegno ai produttori nazionali scompare se si considera l’autosufficienza come un processo e non come una condizione immediata. Pechino può utilizzare prodotti stranieri nel breve periodo, assimilarne le possibilità applicative e garantire continuità alle proprie imprese, mentre sviluppa un’infrastruttura alternativa nel medio e lungo termine. Al contrario, un divieto generalizzato delle tecnologie statunitensi potrebbe danneggiare le aziende cinesi proprio nella fase in cui devono accumulare esperienza, formare tecnici e finanziare la transizione verso piattaforme nazionali.

Anche i controlli statunitensi producono quindi risultati ambivalenti. Da un lato, essi possono rallentare l’accesso cinese ai processori più avanzati e aumentare i costi della costruzione di grandi infrastrutture per l’intelligenza artificiale. Dall’altro, sono però riusciti a interrompere la ricerca cinese né a impedire lo sviluppo di modelli competitivi. Hanno invece incentivato gli investimenti nei semiconduttori nazionali, nelle tecniche di ottimizzazione e nelle architetture capaci di aggregare processori meno potenti. La pressione esterna diventa così, almeno in parte, un acceleratore della politica cinese di autosufficienza.

La vicenda della RTX PRO 5500, infine, interessa anche i Paesi del Sud globale. Se Washington estende la propria capacità di controllo ai clienti finali, alle filiali estere e alle infrastrutture situate in Stati terzi, l’accesso alla potenza di calcolo rischia di essere organizzato secondo una gerarchia politica. Università, imprese e governi potrebbero dipendere non soltanto dalla disponibilità economica dei processori, ma anche dalla collocazione geopolitica del proprio Paese e dalle relazioni con gli Stati Uniti. La competizione tra piattaforme statunitensi e cinesi può aprire nuove possibilità di diversificazione, ma può anche produrre ecosistemi incompatibili e nuove forme di dipendenza tecnologica.

La RTX PRO 5500 rappresenta dunque molto più di un nuovo prodotto commerciale. Essa mostra come una GPU destinata formalmente alle applicazioni professionali possa diventare oggetto di negoziazione tra governi, strumento della politica industriale e indicatore dello stato dei rapporti tra Washington e Pechino. Nel frattempo, la distinzione tradizionale tra tecnologia civile e strategica si fa sempre meno netta, perché gli stessi processori possono essere impiegati nella ricerca medica, nella progettazione industriale, nella robotica, nella simulazione militare o nell’elaborazione di grandi quantità di dati.