Two Iranian nationals have been charged with terrorism offences over an alleged plot targeting the Jewish community in Manchester, with investigators accusing them of researching potential targets and obtaining instructions and materials for an improvised explosive device.

Rahman Salehi, of Salford, and Salam Ahmadyan, 36, of Liverpool, were charged on Friday, 2 October, with engaging in conduct in preparation for terrorist acts, contrary to Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006.

According to the Metropolitan Police announcement detailing the charges, both men are Iranian nationals and were arrested in Manchester on Sunday, 20 September.

They have been remanded in custody and are due to appear at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on Saturday, 3 October.

The arrests followed what police described as a long-running counter-terrorism investigation into a suspected plot directed against the Jewish community in the Manchester area.

Police allege that the two men were communicating with a third person overseas who may have been in Iran. No allegation has been made in the charges released so far that the Iranian government directed the suspected plot.

The particulars published by Counter Terrorism Policing allege that Salehi and Ahmadyan used encrypted communications and obtained material containing instructions for manufacturing an explosive device.

Investigators say the men acquired instructions relating to a device using powdered chlorine and vehicle brake fluid, along with video material concerning the manufacture or assembly of an improvised explosive device.

They are further accused of acquiring liquids, components and equipment, researching potential targets, obtaining images, maps and plans, and carrying out reconnaissance at locations considered as possible targets.

The Crown Prosecution Service confirmed that prosecutors had authorised charges after reviewing evidence gathered during the investigation.

Frank Ferguson, Chief Crown Prosecutor for the CPS Special Crime and Counter Terrorism Division, said prosecutors had concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the case to be put before a court.

The CPS stressed that the proceedings are now active and that both men have the right to a fair trial. The charges are allegations and no finding of guilt has been made.

Arrests during Jewish High Holy Days

The arrests took place shortly before Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, and came amid heightened security surrounding Jewish institutions in Britain.

Deputy Assistant Commissioner Vicki Evans, Senior National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism Policing, said the investigation had disrupted what police believed to be a plot targeting Manchester’s Jewish community.

The timing is particularly sensitive because it comes one year after the terrorist attack at the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Manchester on 2 October 2025.

Two worshippers were killed in that attack, which took place on Yom Kippur. EU Today reported at the time on the Manchester synagogue attack and the security concerns facing Britain’s Jewish population.

The latest case also comes against the background of a series of alleged Iranian-linked threats and attacks involving Jewish and Israeli targets in Britain.

British security agencies have repeatedly warned about Iranian activity on UK territory. The government said earlier this year that more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots had been tracked by British security agencies over the preceding year.

Concerns intensified following attacks on Jewish-linked premises during 2026. In July, the government imposed sanctions on an Iran-linked organisation that had claimed responsibility for attacks on Jewish and Israeli-linked locations.

The group, the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, was subsequently designated under Britain’s new state-threat legislation alongside Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

EU Today has previously examined Iran-linked security threats in Britain following counter-terrorism arrests involving Iranian nationals, as well as alleged Iranian-linked plots targeting Jewish institutions elsewhere in Europe and North America.

Britain expands protection for Jewish communities

The Manchester case comes as the British government increases security around synagogues, Jewish schools and community centres.

In July, ministers announced more than £250 million in additional funding over three years to strengthen protection for Jewish communities.

The package includes funding for more than 500 additional police officers across England and Wales, including around 80 officers in Greater Manchester, as well as additional resources for Counter Terrorism Policing.

The UK’s national terrorism threat level was raised to severe in April, meaning that an attack is considered highly likely. The government said the decision reflected both an increased threat from Islamist and extreme-right terrorism and a wider background of state-linked physical threats against the Jewish community.

EU Today has also reported on the government’s £250 million programme to strengthen Jewish community security and the broader increase in antisemitic incidents and violence affecting Jewish communities across Britain.

The allegations against Salehi and Ahmadyan will now be considered by the courts. Prosecutors have warned against publishing material that could prejudice the proceedings.

Nearly half of voters in the United Kingdom support rejoining the European Union, according to a survey released as Prime Minister Andy Burnham reviews the country’s options for its long-term relationship with the bloc.

The Messina Group polled 11,461 people between 12 and 24 September. It found that 49 per cent supported EU membership and 28.5 per cent opposed it. The findings were weighted by respondents’ votes in the 2016 referendum, according to the survey results.

Several other options for closer cooperation also received more support than opposition. Retaining the current relationship while removing as many trade barriers as possible was backed by 48.2 per cent, with 20.9 per cent against. A customs union was supported by 47.1 per cent and opposed by 20.7 per cent.

Joining the single market was supported by 45.1 per cent, while 45.5 per cent backed associate membership. The existing relationship without further changes received 42 per cent support. Moving further away from the EU was the least popular option tested: 27.9 per cent supported it and 41.2 per cent opposed it.

The figures show support for a range of possible arrangements, but do not establish agreement on what Britain should seek or on the terms it should accept.

On timing, 25.9 per cent said the UK should rejoin immediately, 22.9 per cent favoured doing so within three years and 8.4 per cent within the next decade. A further 23 per cent said they did not want closer relations with the EU.

Respondents were also asked whether leaving the bloc had been the right decision. Some 52.4 per cent said it was wrong, compared with 29.7 per cent who said it was right; 17.9 per cent were undecided. Asked whether Brexit had been a success or failure, 54.9 per cent called it a failure and 12.2 per cent a success. Nearly a quarter, 23.2 per cent, said neither, while 9.7 per cent did not know.

The poll tested the possible electoral effects of different Labour positions on Europe. It found that scenarios involving closer ties could increase the party’s vote share by between 4.3 and 7.4 percentage points. The largest potential rise was linked to a proposal for a referendum in which Burnham campaigned for Britain to rejoin.

Burnham has said Labour will review the choices available, including keeping current arrangements, joining a customs union, returning to the single market or seeking EU membership. He plans to set out the options around the next UK-EU summit, expected in November. In recent remarks, he said the government would assess “what is doable” and the “pros and cons” of each option.

The review marks a shift from Labour’s 2024 election manifesto, which ruled out rejoining the EU, single market or customs union. Burnham has not proposed an immediate application or referendum. A UK bid for membership would require negotiations with the EU and unanimous agreement from member states.

The question of whether a referendum should come first also remains open. Almost a third of respondents said a vote would be needed before rejoining. More than one in six thought a general-election mandate would be sufficient, with a similar proportion saying Parliament could make the decision.

French President Emmanuel Macron and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez have said the EU would welcome a British return. Their comments followed Burnham’s call for a review of Britain’s options, as EU Today reported this week. Earlier EU Today coverage also examined British and EU public support for a possible return.

A 2,500-seat stadium in suburban Nagoya has become the unlikely setting for one of sport’s most combustible rivalries — and a glimpse of cricket’s growing reach beyond its traditional heartlands.

There are few sporting rivalries capable of transporting an entire stadium thousands of miles away from home. On Saturday, India and Pakistan managed precisely that — turning a modest Japanese baseball facility into an arena charged with all the anticipation, colour and emotion normally associated with the great cricket grounds of South Asia.

The setting could hardly have been more incongruous. The Asian Games final was being staged at Korogi Athletic Park in Nisshin, near Nagoya, a purpose-built cricket venue with capacity for only about 2,500 spectators. Beyond the boundary stood the unmistakable features of a Japanese baseball ground, including a pitcher’s mound.

Yet for those inside, this was no novelty fixture.

Hours before the first ball, Indian and Pakistani supporters were queuing to enter. Flags were draped over shoulders, shirts provided the national colours and tickets had become sufficiently scarce to generate reports of inflated resale prices. For many members of the South Asian communities living in Japan, the occasion represented a rare chance to see the two countries meet in person.

That matters because India-Pakistan cricket is not simply another international sporting contest. Political tensions mean that the teams generally encounter each other only in major tournaments, making every meeting an event in its own right. Their February T20 World Cup encounter in Sri Lanka was played before a sell-out crowd of 35,000; television audiences in the two countries routinely run into the hundreds of millions.

Japan therefore found itself hosting one of cricket’s most valuable commodities: scarcity.

For Japanese spectators, meanwhile, the spectacle offered an introduction to a sport that remains distinctly niche in the country. Some had attended earlier matches simply out of curiosity. Teachers from nearby Gifu admitted that they knew virtually nothing about cricket, but found themselves enjoying the experience after reading explanatory material and watching the action.

The comparison with baseball is inevitable. Japan possesses one of the world’s great baseball cultures, while cricket remains a relative outsider. But the recent arrival of India has provided an intriguing bridge between the two.

Last week, Japan played India in its first-ever T20 international against a full-member cricket nation. The hosts came within two runs of a remarkable victory in a rain-shortened five-over contest, giving Japanese cricket precisely the sort of exposure its administrators could scarcely have manufactured themselves.

The significance extends beyond the scoreboard.

India’s appearance in Japan was linked to the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the countries, while the Asian Games have provided an unusually prominent platform for cricket. The sport is already established among expatriate communities, but encounters involving India’s global stars can introduce it to an entirely new audience.

That is perhaps the most interesting aspect of Saturday’s extraordinary scene. Cricket did not need to conquer Japan overnight. It merely needed to persuade a few thousand people to come and watch.

And India versus Pakistan is perhaps the ultimate sales pitch.

The match was always going to generate passion. What nobody could have guaranteed was that the passion would survive the journey from the packed stadiums of Colombo and Mumbai to a small baseball field outside Nagoya.

It did.

The geography changed. The rivalry did not.

Main Image: By 運動会プロテインパワー – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=112511600

Latvians are voting for a new parliament on Saturday after an election campaign dominated by security, repeated drone incidents, support for Ukraine and mounting pressure on household finances.

Latvians went to the polls on Saturday, 3 October, to elect the country’s 100-seat Saeima in an election taking place against an unusually tense security backdrop on NATO’s eastern frontier.

Fourteen parties and electoral alliances are contesting the election, with 1,428 candidates seeking seats in parliament, according to Latvia’s Central Election Commission. Voting takes place across five constituencies — Riga, Vidzeme, Latgale, Kurzeme and Zemgale — with polling stations open until 20:00 local time.

Security has occupied a prominent place in the campaign after a series of drone incidents brought the consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine directly into Latvian airspace.

Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs, who took office in May after the previous coalition collapsed during a political crisis over the handling of drone incursions, is seeking a new mandate for his centrist United List. EU Today reported at the time that Prime Minister Evika Siliņa resigned after her coalition fractured amid criticism of Latvia’s response to repeated unmanned aircraft incidents along the Russian border. The collapse followed a succession of drone-related security incidents.

Kulbergs has campaigned on continued support for Ukraine and stronger Latvian defences, including additional counter-drone capabilities. His party entered election day ahead in the opinion polls, although the fragmented political landscape means coalition negotiations are likely to determine the eventual composition of the government.

An SKDS poll conducted between 4 and 16 September put United List on 14.4 per cent. Sovereign Power/Alliance of Young Latvians followed on 9.4 per cent, while Latvia First stood on 9.2 per cent. The Progressives recorded 6.2 per cent and the National Alliance 5.6 per cent. When only voters who had decided how they intended to vote were counted, seven political forces were projected to cross the 5 per cent threshold for representation in parliament.

The survey also showed a substantial pool of undecided or disengaged voters shortly before polling day, leaving considerable uncertainty around the final distribution of seats.

Russia and the war in neighbouring Ukraine have also produced sharper divisions between the competing parties.

Kulbergs has maintained Latvia’s strong support for Kyiv, while Sovereign Power has opposed military assistance to Ukraine and called for greater emphasis on negotiations. Latvia First has also sought votes among parts of the country’s Russian-speaking population, particularly in eastern Latvia, where questions surrounding language policy, relations with Moscow and the economic consequences of the war remain politically sensitive.

Latvia’s geographical position gives those arguments a significance extending beyond domestic politics. The country shares a border with Russia and Belarus and hosts allied troops as part of NATO’s reinforced eastern presence.

Earlier this year, drones crossed into Latvia from Russian territory, including incidents that exposed weaknesses in detecting and intercepting relatively small unmanned aircraft. EU Today reported in March that Latvia’s defence minister cut short a visit to Kyiv after another drone crossed the border from Russia. Further incidents followed in May.

Latvian intelligence has meanwhile warned about the changing nature of Moscow’s approach towards the country. In January, the Constitution Protection Bureau said Russia’s perception of Latvia was becoming increasingly similar to its view of Ukraine before the full-scale invasion, while stressing that it did not assess Russia as posing an immediate direct military threat at that stage. The warning was examined by EU Today earlier this year.

Riga has responded with one of NATO’s highest levels of defence expenditure.

Latvia’s Ministry of Defence says the country will spend about €2.16 billion on defence in 2026, equivalent to approximately 4.7 per cent of GDP under its updated calculation, as it moves towards a target of 5 per cent. Priorities include strengthening the armed forces, developing military infrastructure and improving defences along the eastern border. The Latvian defence ministry’s budget programme places additional emphasis on domestic defence production and military innovation.

Security is not the only issue facing voters. The cost of living, pensions, public services and regional economic disparities have also featured heavily during the campaign, particularly outside Riga.

The security debate, however, has given this election a wider European dimension. Latvia’s next government will take office while Russia’s war against Ukraine continues immediately beyond NATO’s eastern frontier and while the Baltic states are investing heavily in air defence, border protection and military readiness.

The official result will determine the composition of the 15th Saeima for the next four years. With several parties competing around the parliamentary threshold and no single force close to a majority, the subsequent coalition negotiations are likely to be almost as consequential as Saturday’s vote itself.

France has seen plenty of street protests. What is striking about the latest unrest is not that French students have discovered the barricade, but that a dispute over school conditions has spread with extraordinary speed, drawing hundreds of schools into a confrontation between teenagers, teachers, police and the government.

About 400 schools and other educational establishments were expected to remain closed on Friday, while more than 560 schools were reported to have experienced protests or disruption. The movement, which began in the Paris region, has spread across the country. What started as complaints about overcrowded classrooms, teacher shortages and dilapidated buildings has now included fires, property damage, clashes with police and thousands of arrests.

There is a temptation, particularly in Paris, to treat every eruption of street anger as another instalment in France’s long tradition of protest politics. But there is something more revealing here. These are not principally pensioners defending their retirement age or trade unionists protecting established privileges. Many of the demonstrators are teenagers complaining that the institutions preparing them for adulthood are failing to provide the basics.

That complaint is not entirely without evidence. France’s education system has faced persistent staffing difficulties. During the 2024-25 school year, almost 10 per cent of teaching hours in public secondary schools went untaught, according to education ministry data cited by Time. Roughly 7.5 per cent of those lost hours resulted from difficulties finding replacement teachers.

The students’ demands consequently deserve to be distinguished from the violence that has accompanied some of the demonstrations. A teenager asking why there are 35 pupils in a classroom is making a fundamentally different argument from someone setting fire to a school entrance.

That distinction is becoming increasingly important as the authorities attempt to regain control. Education Minister Édouard Geffray has said the original grievances were legitimate but argued that violent groups have taken the movement hostage. The government has also alleged that politicians from the hard-left La France Insoumise helped initiate or politicise the protests. LFI figures have rejected that accusation.

The evidence therefore needs to be treated with care. France clearly has genuine educational grievances, but it is also clear that organised political actors are seeking to influence the atmosphere around the demonstrations. Those two propositions are not mutually exclusive.

Nor is the police response a simple story of heroes and villains. Riot police have been deployed amid reports of fires, attacks and damage, but students and rights organisations have accused officers of excessive force. More than 300 police officers, gendarmes and firefighters were reported injured on Thursday, while scores of students and education staff have also been injured.

This creates precisely the sort of vicious circle that governments find difficult to escape. Violence demands a security response; a heavy security response can generate further anger; that anger can then be used as evidence that the original security response was necessary.

The danger for the government is that the school gates become another national political battlefield.

France is already wrestling with severe fiscal pressures. The proposed 2027 budget has become politically contentious, while the education ministry is simultaneously facing demands for greater investment. Reuters reported that the planned education-budget increase is only 1.7 per cent, below the rate of inflation, while debt-servicing costs are expected to become the largest item in the national budget.

That makes the students’ complaints politically awkward. Governments can promise more teachers, better buildings and improved facilities. Delivering them costs money. And money is precisely what the French state increasingly lacks.

The approaching presidential election adds another layer. President Emmanuel Macron cannot seek a third consecutive term, and parties on both the left and right are already positioning themselves around the unrest. A movement involving large numbers of teenagers therefore risks becoming a proxy battle for France’s much wider argument about the direction of the country.

The immediate priority is consequently straightforward: keep pupils and staff safe, protect schools from damage, preserve the right to peaceful protest and establish whether the educational grievances can be addressed within the financial constraints facing the state.

France has considerable experience of protest. It has less experience of resolving the underlying problems once protest becomes the political system’s principal language.

The teenagers now filling French streets are demanding to know whether their country is investing in their future. The government’s answer cannot ultimately be delivered through tear gas or barricades. Nor can it be financed by promises detached from France’s deteriorating public finances.

That is the uncomfortable equation confronting Paris: a generation demanding better schools, a state struggling to pay for them, and a protest movement increasingly escaping the boundaries of the classroom.

Paris Attack: Europe Must Not Allow Ideological Violence to Become the New Normal

Seventeen EU governments have joined forces to defend agricultural and regional funding in the bloc’s next seven-year budget, setting up a confrontation with Germany and five other countries demanding substantial reductions to the European Commission’s proposed €2 trillion spending plan.

Seventeen European Union countries have called for agriculture and cohesion funding to be protected from further cuts as negotiations over the bloc’s 2028–2034 budget enter a decisive phase.

In a letter dated 2 October to Irish Taoiseach Micheál Martin, whose government currently holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, the countries said the overall financing of Cohesion Policy and the Common Agricultural Policy should be maintained in the next Multiannual Financial Framework.

The signatories are Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.

The initiative follows months of coordination by the so-called Friends of Cohesion. In an earlier joint position published by the Spanish government, members argued that cohesion, agriculture and fisheries remained central EU policies and called for new EU revenue sources to be “genuine, fair, simple and non-regressive”.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Romanian President Nicușor Dan have been coordinating the group at leaders’ level. They are expected to convene another informal meeting alongside the European Council on 15–16 October. The two leaders previously brought the group together ahead of the June European Council as governments sought to coordinate their positions on the budget.

The intervention places the group in direct opposition to Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden.

Those six governments have argued that the Commission’s near-€2 trillion proposal should be reduced by several hundred billion euros. In their joint statement on the 2028–2034 budget, they said national governments were already undertaking fiscal consolidation and that the EU budget could not be exempt from similar pressure. They called for reductions across all spending headings while giving greater weight to security, defence, competitiveness, migration and sovereignty.

EU Today previously reported on the growing pressure from net-contributor countries for deep reductions to the Commission proposal as negotiations moved towards the Irish presidency’s attempt to secure an agreement before the end of the year.

The Commission’s original proposal for the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework amounts to almost €2 trillion in current prices, equivalent to 1.26 per cent of the EU’s average gross national income over the seven-year period. It substantially restructures the budget, bringing agriculture, cohesion, fisheries, migration and internal security into national and regional partnership plans while allocating more money to competitiveness, research, defence and other emerging priorities.

Agriculture and regional development have consequently become two of the most sensitive parts of the negotiations.

The Council has already backed the principle of the new national and regional plans, but financial allocations remain unresolved. Its negotiating position specifically leaves the money to be settled as part of the overall MFF talks.

EU Today has followed the dispute since the Cyprus presidency produced a negotiating framework in June that proposed reducing the Commission’s plan by about €32.8bn. The disagreement has since widened as governments attempt to reconcile traditional spending on farmers and poorer regions with growing demands for defence, industrial competitiveness and security.

Revenue is another source of disagreement.

The Commission has proposed five new EU own resources, including revenue connected to the Emissions Trading System and Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, a contribution based on uncollected electronic waste, a tobacco excise resource and a contribution from large companies operating in the EU. The proposals are intended partly to reduce reliance on national contributions and help finance repayment of pandemic-era borrowing.

EU Today previously examined the dispute over new sources of EU revenue after leaders asked the Irish presidency to develop financing options alongside negotiations over expenditure.

The Friends of Cohesion have also called for a more gradual repayment schedule for NextGenerationEU borrowing and oppose retaining contribution rebates for wealthier member states. Under the Commission proposal, repayments of principal and interest would amount to a fixed €24bn annually between 2028 and 2034, or €168bn across the seven-year budget period.

Ireland now faces the task of narrowing the gap.

The Council’s timetable for the negotiations envisages the Irish presidency advancing the next negotiating framework ahead of the October European Council, with governments seeking a political agreement before the end of 2026. That would leave 2027 for adoption of the legislation required before the new budget takes effect on 1 January 2028.

An agreement among governments will require unanimity. The European Parliament must then give its consent, while the separate decision governing the EU’s own resources also requires unanimous approval by member states and ratification according to their national constitutional procedures.

With 17 governments now explicitly defending agriculture and cohesion spending and six major contributors demanding substantial reductions, the October summit will bring the central budget dispute directly before EU leaders.

Oil prices fell on Friday after European governments backed the release of emergency diesel stocks as part of a wider G7 intervention intended to ease pressure on fuel markets and avert possible US restrictions on diesel exports.

Oil prices fell on Friday after European governments agreed to release emergency diesel reserves, bringing additional supplies onto a market strained by disruption in the Middle East and shortages of refined fuel.

Brent crude futures fell $1.80, or 1.76 per cent, to $100.50 a barrel during trading on 2 October, while US West Texas Intermediate dropped $2.02, or 2.18 per cent, to $90.85, according to market data reported during Friday’s trading.

The fall came as the Group of Seven agreed to release 100 million barrels of oil and petroleum products from emergency stocks over four months. The package includes a substantial release of diesel during the first 20 days.

The G7 leaders’ statement on energy security and market stability said the releases would be co-ordinated through the International Energy Agency and would take account of commitments already made earlier this year. G7 governments will also discuss whether additional diesel releases are required.

The agreement marks a rapid development from the negotiations reported earlier on Friday. As EU Today reported before the G7 meeting, Washington had been pressing European governments, particularly France and Germany, to make more of their strategic diesel stocks available.

President Donald Trump had also raised the possibility of restricting US diesel exports as his administration sought to reduce domestic fuel prices. Such a restriction would have had significant consequences for Europe because the United States has become an important supplier of diesel to the European market.

A French proposal discussed by EU governments earlier on Friday envisaged European countries releasing around 50 million barrels of diesel, alongside another 50 million barrels of crude oil from International Energy Agency members.

The eventual G7 agreement also addresses the risk of export restrictions directly. The seven governments committed themselves to avoiding restrictions on energy and energy-product exports between G7 countries and called on other producers to refrain from measures that could worsen market shortages.

For Europe, the intervention comes as diesel supplies remain physically available but prices are being pushed higher by tight conditions on international markets.

The European Commission’s Energy Union Task Force met on Friday to examine diesel supplies and prices. The Commission said EU diesel supplies remained stable for the time being, but acknowledged that prices were high because of tight global markets.

The latest intervention follows a much larger emergency action earlier this year. In March, the International Energy Agency agreed its largest-ever co-ordinated stock release, making 400 million barrels available after the Middle East conflict severely disrupted international oil markets.

Europe’s contribution to that March operation consisted largely of refined petroleum products rather than crude oil, reflecting the particular pressure facing the continent’s fuel markets.

The pressure is part of a wider European energy problem. EU Today reported this week that the Middle East conflict has added more than €100 billion to Europe’s energy import bill, despite the continent receiving no corresponding increase in the physical amount of oil and gas purchased.

European governments have already committed €17.9 billion this year to measures intended to protect households and businesses from the rise in energy costs, according to an EU Today assessment of national support measures.

Diesel represents a particular vulnerability. It remains essential for road freight, agriculture, construction and large parts of European industry, meaning sustained increases in wholesale prices can feed into transport and production costs across the economy.

The present shortage also reflects changes in Europe’s refining sector. Refining capacity has fallen over the past two decades as plants have closed, increasing dependence on imported diesel and other refined petroleum products. That dependence has become more visible since the EU sharply reduced purchases of Russian fuel following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The G7 nevertheless made clear that the emergency intervention would not be accompanied by a relaxation of measures against Moscow. Leaders said they would maintain sanctions against Russia while working with the IEA and other partners to limit the effect of market disruption on fuel and commodity prices.

The EU has separately continued to tighten measures targeting Russia’s energy revenues and its so-called shadow fleet, including restrictions connected with the maritime transport of Russian oil and petroleum products. The EU’s latest sanctions package targeting Russian energy revenues was adopted in July.

Friday’s fall in oil and diesel futures indicates that traders expect the additional stocks to relieve some of the immediate pressure on supplies. European gasoil futures, the main regional diesel benchmark, also fell sharply during the day as details of the proposed releases emerged.

The G7 has asked the IEA to monitor implementation and report within 20 days, including on whether further action is required and how emergency stocks should eventually be replenished.

For Europe, the immediate objective is to contain diesel prices without compromising security of supply. The broader issue remains unchanged: reduced domestic refining capacity and heavy dependence on imported fuel leave the European economy exposed when international supply routes are disrupted.

A side event held during the 63rd session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva has brought together parliamentarians, journalists and civil-society representatives to discuss terrorism, religious freedom and the European Union’s relationship with Pakistan.

The event, “Remembrance and Tribute to the Victims of Terrorism”, took place at the Palais des Nations on 1st October. Speakers included Greek MP Georgios Manous, EU Today Publisher and Editor Gary Cartwright, Stéphane Michot of Ideal International, with a contribution from Prof K. Warikoo.

Two interventions focused particularly on Pakistan and the implications for European policy.

Victims of terrorism at centre of debate

Gary Cartwright began with the victims rather than trade or institutional policy.

“Terrorism is not an abstract concept,” he told the meeting, describing a bomb exploding in a market, a child killed outside a school and families waiting for someone who will never return.

He acknowledged that Pakistan itself has suffered heavily from terrorist violence. The 2026 Global Terrorism Index ranked Pakistan as the country most affected by terrorism in 2025, recording 1,139 deaths and 1,045 incidents.

At the same time, Gary raised the record of militant organisations operating from Pakistani territory. The UN Security Council describes Lashkar-e-Tayyiba as a Pakistan-based organisation involved in terrorist activity and records its involvement in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, in which approximately 164 people were killed and hundreds injured. The same UN entry also records links to the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament.

Questions over EU education funding

Gary also questioned the safeguards surrounding European education funding in Pakistan.

In December 2024, Dutch MEP Bert-Jan Ruissen asked the European Commission whether EU money intended for education could reach Islamic religious seminaries and what controls were in place over the use of those funds.

In its February 2025 response, the Commission said EU assistance in Sindh and Balochistan was primarily directed through provincial education authorities. It also confirmed that, in selected areas of Balochistan, EU support facilitated formal education for pupils enrolled in religious seminaries through a government-recognised certification programme intended to ease their transition into state education. The Commission said projects were subject to field visits, reporting, monitoring and evaluation.

Gary stressed that he was not arguing that religious education itself constituted extremism. His argument was that European taxpayers should be able to establish where money was going, who administered programmes and what safeguards existed against extremist recruitment.

His intervention then turned to Pakistan’s GSP+ trade status.

Pakistan has benefited from GSP+ since 2014 and is currently the scheme’s largest beneficiary. According to the European Commission’s figures on EU-Pakistan trade, more than 85 per cent of Pakistan’s exports enter the EU duty and quota free. Continued participation requires Pakistan to ratify and effectively implement 27 international conventions covering human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance.

Gary called for Pakistan’s GSP+ preferences to be suspended pending an assessment of the country’s compliance with its international commitments, counter-terrorism obligations and safeguards surrounding EU-funded programmes.

The issue has been examined previously by EU Today. Its 2025 white paper on Pakistan’s GSP+ compliance argued that the evidential threshold for beginning temporary withdrawal proceedings had been reached, while a Geneva side event in March 2026 considered Pakistan’s human-rights record and the conditionality attached to GSP+ preferences.

Pahalgam attack raised by Greek MP

Greek MP Georgios Manous approached the subject through terrorism, religious freedom and European security.

He referred to the terrorist attack at Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir on 22 April 2025, in which 25 tourists and one local civilian were killed. EU Today previously examined the attack and its victims in its coverage of the Pahalgam massacre.

In December 2025, India’s National Investigation Agency filed a 1,597-page charge sheet naming Lashkar-e-Tayyiba/The Resistance Front and six other accused. The NIA said its investigation alleged that the attack had been planned, facilitated and executed with direction from Pakistan.

Pakistan rejects Indian allegations of responsibility. Islamabad has said India acted without verifiable evidence and maintains that Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif offered a transparent and independent investigation into the Pahalgam attack.

Manous also addressed Pakistan’s blasphemy legislation and the position of Christians, Hindus and Ahmadis, linking those questions to the broader problem of religious extremism. Concerns over minority rights and blasphemy laws have also featured in EU Today’s continuing coverage of the debate over Pakistan’s GSP+ eligibility.

The Greek MP then turned to Europe, arguing that extremist ideologies and networks should not be viewed solely as a South Asian security problem.

Pakistan, meanwhile, continues to present itself as both a major victim of terrorism and an international counter-terrorism partner. At the fourth US-Pakistan Counterterrorism Dialogue in Washington in August, the two governments reaffirmed cooperation against ISIS-K, al-Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Balochistan Liberation Army, while discussing border security and the disruption of terrorist facilitation networks.

The Geneva discussion therefore centred on two linked questions for European policymakers: how Pakistan’s counter-terrorism record should be assessed, and how that assessment should interact with the conditions attached to EU trade preferences and European-funded programmes.

Europe was supposed to be emerging from its inflation nightmare. Instead, the nightmare has apparently decided to return for a second act.

Eurozone inflation surged to 3.8 per cent in September, up sharply from 3.2 per cent in August and considerably above the 3.6 per cent economists had expected. It is now almost twice the European Central Bank’s 2 per cent target.

The immediate culprit is familiar: energy. Fuel and natural gas prices have been climbing sharply, while food costs are also beginning to exert pressure. Energy prices were reportedly 18.8 per cent higher than a year earlier in September, compared with a 14.3 per cent annual increase in August.

There is, however, a particularly awkward detail for the ECB. Inflation is not confined entirely to the petrol pump.

Core inflation — stripping out volatile food and energy prices — edged up from 2.4 to 2.5 per cent. Services inflation also rose to 3.2 per cent. That suggests the energy shock may gradually be finding its way into the wider economy, and that is precisely what central bankers fear.

An energy shock is unpleasant. An energy shock which becomes embedded in wages, services and business costs is considerably more troublesome. Once consumers and companies begin assuming that prices will continue rising, inflation can acquire a momentum of its own.

The ECB therefore finds itself facing the oldest monetary-policy dilemma in the book: raise interest rates and risk damaging economic growth, or hold back and risk allowing inflation to become entrenched.

It has already raised rates twice this summer. Its deposit rate currently stands at 2.5 per cent, and investors are contemplating as many as three further increases over the coming year. Yet markets are not expecting an October increase, with the next move not fully priced in until January.

That caution is understandable. Interest rates are a remarkably blunt instrument for dealing with an energy shortage. Raising the cost of borrowing cannot produce another cubic metre of natural gas or another barrel of oil. It can, however, make mortgages more expensive, discourage investment and squeeze companies already facing higher energy bills.

Europe has another problem: its public finances. Governments are under increasing pressure to cushion households and businesses from soaring energy costs. France has already seen street protests over fuel prices, while government support measures risk becoming another burden on national budgets already under considerable strain.

This creates an unpleasant feedback loop. Governments subsidise energy to protect consumers; deficits increase; bond markets demand higher yields; borrowing becomes more expensive; and households and businesses face another round of financial pressure.

France is an obvious danger point. The spread between French and German borrowing costs has risen to multi-decade highs, reflecting growing investor concern about French debt sustainability.

The ECB is consequently being asked to perform an increasingly improbable balancing act: suppress inflation without strangling growth, protect financial stability without appearing complacent, and somehow compensate for an energy shock over which it has virtually no control.

There is one reason for optimism. The underlying inflation numbers have not exploded. ECB policymaker Olli Rehn has pointed out that rising long-term interest rates themselves could restrain the transmission of higher energy prices into wages and other prices.

But that is hardly a comforting economic strategy. Europe is effectively relying on expensive money to prevent expensive energy from becoming even more expensive.

The danger is that policymakers discover they are always one crisis behind.

The eurozone’s inflation rate has already risen from 2.0 per cent at the beginning of 2026 to 3.8 per cent in September. Eurostat’s latest figures show just how rapidly the situation has changed.

If energy prices remain elevated into 2027, the ECB may have little choice but to tighten further.

Europe was promised an inflation victory. Instead, it has been handed yet another bill.

France and Germany are moving towards a possible compromise over the future of Europe’s automotive industry, linking negotiations over EU vehicle-emission rules with a separate dispute over how strongly European-made products should be favoured in subsidies and public procurement.

The negotiations bring together two issues that have divided Paris and Berlin: Germany’s demand for greater flexibility in rules governing combustion-engine vehicles and France’s campaign for stronger “Made in Europe” requirements in EU industrial policy.

Officials involved in the discussions believe a broader Franco-German agreement may now be possible, although differences remain over how European content should be defined and whether products made in countries with EU free-trade agreements should receive similar treatment.

The automotive dispute follows the Commission’s decision in December 2025 to propose significant changes to rules that had originally required a 100 per cent reduction in tailpipe CO₂ emissions from new cars from 2035.

Under the revised automotive package, manufacturers would instead face a 90 per cent tailpipe-emissions reduction requirement from 2035.

The remaining 10 per cent could be compensated through mechanisms linked to low-carbon steel produced in the EU and the use of e-fuels and biofuels.

EU Today reported before the Commission presented the package that pressure from Germany, Italy and European manufacturers was forcing Brussels to reconsider the original 2035 framework.

The subsequent proposal confirmed the shift.

In March, EU Today also examined the Commission’s decision to link low-carbon European steel directly to vehicle-emissions compliance, creating a connection between automotive climate rules and support for Europe’s heavy industry.

Germany has continued to argue for a technology-neutral approach.

Berlin wants legislation to leave scope for combustion engines operating on renewable or low-carbon fuels rather than treating battery-electric vehicles as the only route towards lower emissions.

That position is particularly important for Germany because of the scale of its automotive sector and the large industrial supply chain built around combustion-engine technology.

France’s priority is different.

Paris wants EU industrial policy to ensure that public subsidies and procurement increasingly support products manufactured inside Europe.

The argument centres on the Commission’s Industrial Accelerator Act, proposed in March as part of a wider strategy to strengthen European manufacturing.

The legislation introduces “Made in EU” and low-carbon requirements for public procurement and public support schemes covering strategic sectors including automotive manufacturing, steel, cement and aluminium.

The dispute is over what “European” should mean.

France favours a relatively strict definition focused principally on production inside the EU’s 27 member states.

Germany has advocated what Economy Minister Katherina Reiche has described as a “Made with Europe” approach, under which some products from close trading partners could qualify if those countries provide equivalent market access to European companies.

That could potentially include states such as Norway and Switzerland and partners including Canada.

Spain has been among countries seeking a middle position between the French and German approaches.

The issue matters because modern automotive supply chains do not stop at the EU’s external border.

Battery materials, semiconductors, electric motors and other components can pass through several countries before final assembly, while Britain and Turkey remain deeply integrated into European vehicle production.

The EU-UK relationship is particularly sensitive because stricter rules of origin for electric vehicles are due to apply from 2027.

EU Today previously reported that European and British manufacturers were seeking another delay to those rules because the regional battery supply chain had not developed as quickly as originally expected.

At the same time, the EU is attempting to reduce dependence on Chinese electric vehicles, batteries and critical inputs.

The Commission has committed €1.8 billion to a Battery Booster strategy intended to strengthen the European battery value chain.

European electric-vehicle demand is continuing to grow. A 16-market European survey examined by EU Today showed battery-electric cars taking more than a quarter of new registrations in July, although large differences remain between national markets.

Manufacturers must therefore make investment decisions while several important elements of the regulatory framework remain under negotiation.

Factory conversion, battery plants and new vehicle platforms require investments planned years in advance. The conditions applying after 2030 will directly affect where those investments are made.

A Franco-German understanding would not determine the final EU rules. The European Parliament, Commission and other member states remain part of both legislative negotiations.

It could, however, bridge two of the most important disputes: Germany’s demand for greater technological flexibility in the 2035 vehicle regime and France’s demand that public money be used more directly to support European production.

The negotiations now underway suggest Paris and Berlin are increasingly treating those questions as parts of the same industrial bargain.

A group of 119 members of the European Parliament is pressing the European Commission and national governments to ensure that a new EU ban on artificial-intelligence  ‘Nudifier’systems used to generate non-consensual sexual images can be enforced as soon as it takes effect.

The prohibition on so-called AI “nudifier” systems becomes applicable on 2 December 2026 following changes to the EU Artificial Intelligence Act approved earlier this year.

The legislation prohibits AI systems designed to create child sexual abuse material or realistic images, video or audio depicting an identifiable person’s intimate parts or sexually explicit activity without that person’s consent.

Providers cannot place systems intended for such use on the EU market. Systems capable of producing the material must have adequate safeguards intended to prevent it, while deployers are prohibited from deliberately using AI systems for that purpose.

The final agreement on the AI Act amendments gave companies until 2 December to bring their systems into compliance.

The latest intervention is intended to ensure that regulators are ready to enforce the prohibition rather than simply having the legislation on the statute book.

The letter supported by 119 MEPs was initiated by Green MEP Lena Schilling and Greens/EFA co-president Terry Reintke.

Its signatories include members from several political groups.

They want the Commission and member states to ensure that national authorities are designated to enforce the ban and that people targeted by non-consensual AI-generated sexual imagery know which authority to contact.

The letter also calls for stronger enforcement of the Digital Services Act against online platforms and search engines carrying or facilitating access to such material.

The initiative follows research cited by the organisers which identified 147 European politicians appearing on websites containing sexualised AI deepfakes.

Of those identified, 138 were women.

Schilling was among those affected and has used her own case to argue that the December prohibition needs an operational enforcement system from its first day.

The prohibition emerged during the EU’s broader revision of its AI legislation.

In March, the European Parliament adopted its negotiating position by 569 votes to 45, with 23 abstentions.

Parliament and Council subsequently reached agreement on the revised text, and the measure completed its formal legislative process in June.

EU Today reported at the time that the Council’s final approval combined delays to some high-risk AI requirements with new restrictions on non-consensual sexual imagery.

The issue is distinct from the wider transparency requirements applying to AI-generated content.

Under Article 50 of the AI Act, transparency obligations have applied since 2 August.

Providers of generative systems must in relevant cases make AI-generated or manipulated material machine-readable and detectable, while deployers face disclosure obligations covering deepfakes and some AI-generated material dealing with matters of public interest.

EU Today examined those changes when chatbot and deepfake disclosure rules entered into application in August.

There is, however, a transitional period for some AI systems that were already on the market before 2 August. Their machine-readable marking obligations take effect on 2 December.

That means the same date will bring both the new nudifier prohibition and the end of the transitional period for certain AI-content marking requirements.

Enforcement is divided between national regulators and EU institutions.

National market-surveillance authorities carry much of the responsibility for enforcing the AI Act. The Commission’s AI Office has direct enforcement responsibilities in more limited areas, including certain systems built on general-purpose AI models and systems integrated into very large online platforms or search engines.

The Commission’s guidance on Article 50 is intended to provide regulators and companies with a common interpretation of those transparency requirements.

The nudifier prohibition raises an additional problem because distribution of non-consensual intimate images also intersects with the Digital Services Act, national criminal and civil laws and EU legislation addressing violence against women.

The 119 MEPs are therefore seeking action beyond the AI Act itself.

Their letter asks for stricter use of the Digital Services Act against platforms and search engines, faster implementation of the EU directive combating violence against women and clearly identifiable national authorities able to respond to complaints.

The legal gap surrounding nudifier systems had previously been acknowledged by the Commission.

Its review of prohibited AI practices concluded that the original AI Act’s provisions on manipulation and exploitation of vulnerabilities did not adequately cover systems producing child sexual abuse material and non-consensual sexually explicit images.

That finding contributed to the explicit prohibition subsequently added during the Digital Omnibus negotiations.

The legislation is now settled. The immediate issue before the 2 December deadline is whether regulators across the 27 member states have the mechanisms in place to identify prohibited systems, investigate providers and respond when people report AI-generated intimate material produced without their consent.

European governments and the United States are negotiating over emergency diesel reserves as a global shortage of refined fuel places increasing pressure on transport, agriculture and industry.

The Trump administration has urged France and Germany to release diesel from their strategic stocks, while raising the possibility of restricting American diesel exports if European governments fail to put additional supplies on the market.

Washington has asked Europe to release about 120 million barrels over six months, according to people familiar with the talks.

The demand puts European governments in a difficult position. Releasing reserves could help reduce prices in the short term, but it would also reduce the emergency buffer available if disruption to Russian or Middle Eastern supplies becomes more severe.

The European Commission, France, Italy, Ireland and Britain held discussions on 1 October over possible diesel stock releases. Germany has been involved separately in discussions with Washington.

France and Germany hold a substantial share of Europe’s emergency diesel reserves.

Under the EU’s Oil Stocks Directive, member states must maintain emergency crude oil or petroleum-product stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of net imports or 61 days of domestic consumption, whichever is higher.

The requirement exists to provide a buffer against major supply interruptions rather than normal market fluctuations.

Europe’s dependence on imported oil remains substantial. Oil accounted for around 38 per cent of the EU energy mix in 2024, while approximately 95 per cent of crude oil consumed in the bloc was imported.

The latest dispute follows months of mounting pressure in the diesel market.

EU Today reported in September that President Donald Trump had urged Ukraine to reduce attacks on Russian refining infrastructure as global diesel supplies tightened.

Moscow has since extended restrictions on diesel exports. At the same time, disruption to Middle Eastern refining and shipping has constrained another major source of supply, while China moved on 1 October to suspend most fuel-product exports outside Hong Kong and Macau.

The result has been a particularly sharp problem for Europe because its refining capacity has declined over the past two decades and it has become increasingly dependent on imported middle distillates.

European dependence on outside energy supplies was already becoming more expensive before the latest diesel shortage. Recent Eurostat figures showed that the value of EU petroleum-oil imports increased by 55.8 per cent in the second quarter of 2026, even though the physical volume imported rose by only 1.2 per cent.

The United States has become an increasingly important diesel supplier since Europe sharply reduced imports of Russian refined products following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

That means a US export restriction would have an immediate impact on the European market.

EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič said after discussions with US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer that Brussels wanted a coordinated transatlantic approach to lowering diesel prices.

He said restrictions on US diesel exports would damage Europe’s economic performance and that both sides had agreed to remain in close contact.

Šefčovič also noted that the EU had exceeded its commitment to purchase US energy under the trade agreement reached at Turnberry in 2025.

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright, meanwhile, said he was “highly confident” European governments would release additional stocks.

Wright argued that coordinated action was particularly important as the northern hemisphere moved into the harvest season and towards winter, when demand for diesel and heating fuels normally increases.

Emergency releases have already been used on an exceptional scale this year.

In March, the 32 members of the International Energy Agency agreed to make 400 million barrels of oil from emergency reserves available to the market after disruption caused by the Middle East conflict.

It was the largest coordinated stock release in the organisation’s history.

A further European release would therefore come only months after governments had already drawn on strategic reserves to stabilise markets.

The pressure is increasing as oil prices again move higher. Brent crude settled above $102 a barrel on 1 October amid concerns over Chinese fuel exports and further US military deployments to the Middle East.

EU energy officials are now considering whether the immediate risk of high diesel prices outweighs the value of keeping fuel in reserve against a potentially more serious supply disruption later in the year.

European Union governments have committed €17.9 billion this year to measures intended to protect households and businesses from rising energy prices as disruption in the Middle East and global fuel markets continues to feed through into European inflation.

Twenty-five of the EU’s 27 member states have adopted some form of energy support during 2026, according to the latest assessment of the measures.

More than two-thirds of the spending consists of measures that directly suppress energy prices rather than targeted income support.

The figure has increased since the Commission’s spring economic forecast.

Measures adopted or sufficiently detailed by 4th May were then estimated to cost €14.5 billion, equivalent to around 0.07 per cent of EU GDP. The Commission calculated that extending those measures until the end of 2026 could increase their cost to €38.6 billion.

National measures include reductions in fuel taxes and excise duties, energy vouchers, direct financial assistance and support for companies facing higher production and transport costs.

The Commission has repeatedly urged governments to concentrate assistance on vulnerable households and particularly exposed industries rather than subsidising energy use across the entire economy.

Its spring assessment found that roughly three quarters of the support then in force was not targeted specifically at vulnerable consumers or energy-intensive companies.

Broad price measures can reduce household bills immediately, but they also carry a larger fiscal cost and reduce the incentive to cut consumption when supplies are constrained.

The present shock began with disruption to oil and gas supplies caused by the Middle East conflict.

The Commission responded with its AccelerateEU package of emergency and structural measures, allowing governments to use measures including income support, energy vouchers and lower electricity taxes for vulnerable households.

Brussels says Europe does not currently face an immediate security-of-supply problem for the winter of 2026–27 because supplies have been diversified and strategic reserves remain available.

Price exposure is a different matter. Europe still depends heavily on imported fossil fuels, leaving domestic businesses and consumers exposed when world-market prices rise.

Recent trade figures underline the scale of that vulnerability. EU Today reported last month that Europe’s petroleum import bill increased by 55.8 per cent in the second quarter compared with the same period of 2025, despite only a 1.2 per cent increase in the volume imported.

Natural gas presents another risk. European storage sites entered the autumn at unusually low levels, with EU Today reporting that EU gas stocks were around 67 per cent full in mid-September, leaving the bloc more exposed if winter demand rises sharply.

Pressure has now spread into refined fuel markets as well. Russian diesel exports are restricted, Middle Eastern supply remains vulnerable and China has suspended most fuel-product exports outside Hong Kong and Macau. Washington is simultaneously pressing European governments to release diesel from their strategic reserves.

The energy shock is also affecting the wider economic outlook.

The Commission’s spring forecast had already anticipated weaker growth and higher inflation. It projected EU employment growth of only 0.3 per cent in 2026 and expected the aggregate government deficit to rise from 3.1 per cent of GDP in 2025 to 3.6 per cent by 2027.

More recent Commission estimates indicate that eurozone growth in 2026 could be somewhat stronger than the earlier forecast, while expectations for 2027 have deteriorated.

Inflation is expected to remain around 3 per cent this year and to remain above earlier projections next year. That increases the fiscal problem facing governments.

Large energy subsidies can reduce the immediate impact on households but add to public borrowing and may complicate monetary policy if they support overall demand.

The European Fiscal Board has urged member states to ensure that energy measures are temporary, have clear expiry dates and are directed at vulnerable households and businesses.

The Commission is also drawing lessons from the measures adopted after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Energy support introduced during 2022 and 2023 alone had a net cost equivalent to about 2.1 per cent of EU GDP, according to Commission calculations.

Brussels wants to avoid a second prolonged cycle of broad subsidies while accelerating investment intended to reduce Europe’s structural reliance on imported fossil fuels. That includes grid investment, electrification, renewables and measures to reduce taxes on electricity relative to gas.

For national governments, however, the immediate pressure is coming from bills paid today rather than energy infrastructure planned for the next decade. With €17.9 billion already committed during 2026, further disruption in international oil, diesel or gas markets could determine whether what was designed as temporary support has to be extended into next year.

The European Union has formally adopted new rules allowing member states to establish migrant return hubs outside the bloc, completing a legislative process that significantly expands the tools available to governments seeking to remove people with no legal right to remain.

The Council gave its final approval to the Return Regulation on 1 October. The measure introduces a common European framework for returns, including a European Return Order, stronger obligations on people ordered to leave and special provisions for individuals regarded as security risks.

It also creates an explicit legal basis for member states to send people subject to return decisions to facilities established in non-EU countries.

Such arrangements can only be concluded with countries considered to respect international human rights standards and international law, including the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits returning people to places where they face persecution or serious harm.

Unaccompanied minors are excluded from transfers to return hubs.

The regulation will enter into force the day after its publication in the EU’s Official Journal. Provisions dealing with return hubs will apply immediately, while measures requiring administrative preparations will take effect one year later.

The decision moves the return-hub policy beyond the negotiating stage. In September, EU Today reported that Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Greece had begun actively seeking third countries willing to host return centres.

By the end of September, the same group was preparing a pilot system intended to begin transferring rejected asylum seekers outside the EU during 2027.

The European Commission has argued that the existing returns system has been one of the weakest parts of EU migration policy. When agreement on the legislation was reached in June, it said the effective return rate had risen to 28 per cent in 2025 but remained too low.

The Council now puts the problem more starkly: around two in every three people ordered to leave the EU do not actually leave.

A central element of the new framework is the European Return Order.

A member state issuing a return decision will enter essential information on a standard European form. That will give other member states the information required to recognise the decision if the person subsequently moves elsewhere within the Union.

Automatic recognition will not initially be compulsory. Governments will be able to recognise another country’s return decision voluntarily, with the arrangement due to be reviewed three years after the regulation enters into force.

The Commission may then propose making mutual recognition mandatory.

People ordered to leave will also face an EU-wide obligation to cooperate with national authorities. Failure to do so can lead to reduced benefits or allowances, withdrawal of incentives for voluntary departure, financial penalties and, where national legislation permits, criminal sanctions.

Separate rules apply to individuals considered security risks.

Governments may impose indefinite entry bans where justified and proportionate and may detain such individuals for periods exceeding 24 months.

The Return Regulation complements the wider EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which entered application on 12 June. That system introduced new arrangements covering border screening, asylum procedures, biometric registration and responsibility-sharing between member states.

Return hubs have nevertheless become one of the most politically significant elements of the wider migration policy.

The European Parliament approved the new returns framework in June, after Council and parliamentary negotiators had reached a provisional agreement earlier that month.

Attention subsequently moved to implementation — particularly the question of finding governments outside the EU willing to host people removed from member states.

The regulation cannot compel a third country to accept a return centre. An agreement or arrangement must first be negotiated with the country concerned, covering legal safeguards and the operation of the facility.

That requirement leaves the most difficult diplomatic question unresolved.

The five governments already working together on return hubs have discussed possible partner countries, while Greece has separately moved to create national legislation supporting transfers to centres outside the EU.

The Council’s decision gives those initiatives a common European legal framework. Whether return hubs become a significant part of EU migration policy will now depend on agreements with countries prepared to host them.

Ukraine will seek to have Russian businessmen Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman restored to European sanctions lists after the EU removed both men as part of an agreement that secured a three-year renewal of its wider individual sanctions regime against Russia.

Ukraine is preparing a new sanctions initiative targeting more than 20 Russian businessmen and intends to press for Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman to be placed back under restrictions, Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said on Thursday.

Sybiha, speaking to journalists in Kyiv on 1 October, said the Ukrainian government regarded the European Union’s decision to remove the two men from its sanctions list as unacceptable and had tried to prevent it through both public and diplomatic channels.

“Our response will be asymmetric. You removed two oligarchs, and we will add another twenty,” Sybiha said.

He said Kyiv had prepared a list containing more than 20 Russian businessmen for possible sanctions and was also working to restore restrictions against Usmanov and Fridman.

The minister did not specify which EU legal mechanism Kyiv expects to use. Ukraine cannot itself add individuals to the bloc’s restrictive-measures list, meaning any renewed designation would require action by EU member states.

The EU formally removed Usmanov and Fridman from its sanctions list on 22 September. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/2160 deleted the entries for Usmanov, Fridman and Russian businessman Andrey Falaleev, as well as Redbird Corporate Services Ltd.

At the same time, EU governments extended the remaining individual sanctions for another 36 months, until 22 September 2029. The regime covers more than 3,000 individuals and entities and provides for asset freezes, travel restrictions and a prohibition on EU citizens and companies making funds or economic resources available to those listed.

The agreement marked a significant change to the previous system under which individual sanctions were renewed every six months.

The fate of Usmanov and Fridman had become one of the principal points of dispute during negotiations. EU Today reported before the decision that Latvia opposed a compromise involving their removal while supporting a longer renewal period for the wider sanctions regime.

The eventual agreement nevertheless resulted in both men being removed. EU Today reported on 22 September that the Council had approved the three-year extension alongside their delisting.

Kyiv is now seeking to compensate for that decision through national sanctions regimes while pursuing their possible return to the EU list.

Sybiha said President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had approved the Ukrainian approach and that Kyiv was working with partner governments to ensure that restrictions against Usmanov and Fridman remained in force outside the EU framework.

According to the foreign minister, Canada has indicated that it intends to retain its restrictions. Sybiha also pointed to Britain, Japan and Australia as jurisdictions where sanctions remain in place and said Ukraine would seek similar measures elsewhere.

Britain continues to maintain a separate national Russia sanctions regime. The UK government’s current Russia sanctions framework records designations, amendments and removals independently of decisions made by the European Union.

Several EU member states have meanwhile taken or begun preparing national measures following the September decision.

Estonia moved immediately after the EU agreement. Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna signed national sanctions against Usmanov and Fridman on 23 September, saying Tallinn had opposed their removal from the EU list.

Lithuania has also begun using national legislation. Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys asked for both businessmen to be placed on Lithuania’s national entry-ban list for five years. The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry said it was also preparing legal measures that would allow the freezing of their funds and economic resources.

The dispute has exposed one of the structural features of EU sanctions policy: decisions on restrictive measures require agreement among member states, allowing individual listings to become part of wider negotiations over the continuation of an entire sanctions regime.

Moving from six-month to three-year renewals reduces the frequency with which the broader Russia sanctions list has to return to the negotiating table.

It does not, however, prevent individual names from being added again during that period. Kyiv’s new initiative is therefore likely to focus both on persuading individual governments to introduce national restrictions and on building sufficient support inside the EU for Usmanov and Fridman to be designated again.

Google has asked the European Union’s General Court to suspend an order requiring it to make search data available to competing search engines and artificial-intelligence services while its wider legal challenge proceeds.

The application for interim measures follows Google’s challenge to a European Commission decision adopted in July under the Digital Markets Act. The company argues that implementation before the court rules on the main case could cause serious harm to the privacy of European users.

The Commission maintains that its requirements already contain safeguards for privacy, security and personal data.

At the centre of the dispute is Article 6(11) of the Digital Markets Act, which requires Google to give eligible rival search services access to anonymised ranking, query, click and viewing data on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.

The Commission opened specification proceedings in January and adopted binding measures on 16 July.

The rules explicitly allow AI chatbots offering search functions to qualify for access.

Brussels argues that Google has accumulated a quantity of search information which competitors cannot readily reproduce. User queries and interactions can improve search algorithms, reinforcing the position of an established provider and creating a substantial entry barrier for newcomers.

EU Today examined the issue in April, when the Commission first set out its proposed Google search-data sharing measures.

The final July decision turned those proposals into binding requirements.

The inclusion of AI services gives the case wider significance. Generative AI products increasingly answer questions directly rather than sending users through a conventional list of search results. That is putting AI developers and traditional search engines into increasingly direct competition.

The Commission’s data-access framework is intended to reduce the advantage obtained from data accumulated by designated gatekeepers and make it easier for competing services to enter the market.

Access will not be unrestricted.

Applicants must operate a genuine online search service in the EU and satisfy eligibility requirements. Established applicants generally need at least 50,000 average monthly EU users during the previous year, while newer companies can qualify under investment criteria.

They must also comply with security and data-protection requirements and undergo independent auditing. The Commission can exclude applicants presenting public-security risks, while the data must be processed within the European Economic Area or under arrangements providing equivalent protection.

Google argues that these safeguards do not remove the underlying privacy risk.

The company has therefore asked the General Court for an interim suspension while judges consider the legality of the Commission’s decision.

The case adds another front to an increasingly difficult relationship between Google and Brussels.

In July, the Commission imposed two Digital Markets Act fines on Google totalling €890 million. As EU Today reported following the penalties, one case concerned Google’s treatment of its own services in search results while another dealt with restrictions preventing app developers from directing users towards alternative offers.

The dispute subsequently developed into a wider transatlantic issue when President Donald Trump threatened a Section 301 trade investigation in response to the EU penalties, a development examined by EU Today.

Google has meanwhile begun altering some of its European services in response to regulatory pressure. Earlier this month it changed the presentation of European search results, while warning that the new format could make searches less useful.

The present case is different because it deals with access to the underlying information generated by searches rather than only the way results are displayed.

The Commission wants qualifying competitors to obtain data that could help them improve their own services. Google says opening those datasets creates privacy and security risks which cannot simply be reversed if it eventually wins the court case.

That is why the interim application is important.

Google is not asking the court merely to overturn the Commission decision at the end of the litigation. It wants implementation halted before the full case is resolved.

Unless judges intervene, the Commission timetable continues.

The wider dispute will determine how far Brussels can require a dominant digital platform to share data accumulated through its own users in order to encourage competition — an issue that is becoming increasingly important as search and generative AI converge.

European Union countries have paid more than €100 billion extra for energy this year without receiving additional oil or gas, according to EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen, as disruption linked to the Iran war drives another energy shock through the European economy.

Speaking ahead of an informal meeting of EU energy ministers in Dublin, Jørgensen said Europe had “surpassed €100 billion” in additional spending.

“We have now surpassed €100 billion that we’ve paid extra for our energy this year without receiving one extra molecule of gas or oil,” he said in the European Commission’s recording of his remarks.

The figure puts a direct cost on the price shock which has followed disruption to oil and liquefied natural gas supplies associated with the conflict involving Iran.

The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted one of the world’s most important energy corridors. Under normal conditions, the waterway handles roughly one fifth of globally traded oil and significant LNG volumes.

Europe remains heavily exposed because most of the oil it consumes and about 80 per cent of its gas requirements come from outside the EU.

The consequences were already visible in trade figures published before the latest ministerial meeting.

Last week, EU Today reported that the EU’s oil import bill had risen 55.8 per cent in the second quarter compared with a year earlier, even though the physical volume of crude imported increased by only 1.2 per cent.

Europe was therefore paying substantially more without materially increasing the amount of energy it purchased.

The pressure has intensified as winter approaches.

EU gas storage is around 70 per cent full, roughly 12 percentage points below the level recorded at the same stage last year. Jørgensen has warned governments to continue filling storage or consider reducing demand if required.

Possible measures include limiting temperatures in public buildings, restricting outdoor heating and switching off unnecessary public lighting, according to recommendations circulated to governments ahead of the Dublin meeting.

The informal meeting of EU energy ministers focused on energy affordability, security of supply and Europe’s continuing exposure to international fossil-fuel markets.

Irish Energy Minister Darragh O’Brien described the situation as the second major fossil-fuel shock Europe had faced in four years and argued that domestic clean-energy production was essential if the EU wanted to reduce its vulnerability to future crises.

Europe is in a stronger physical position than during the 2022 energy crisis.

It has expanded LNG import infrastructure, increased renewable electricity generation and reduced gas demand. It has also sharply reduced its dependence on Russian pipeline gas.

But that restructuring has created different dependencies.

European buyers now compete more directly for LNG on global markets, meaning events in the Gulf, Asia or the United States can rapidly affect the price paid by European consumers.

EU Today reported earlier this month that reduced LNG availability and disruption around Hormuz had left European gas storage at historically weak seasonal levels.

Diesel presents another problem.

Europe became more dependent on imported refined products after reducing purchases from Russia, with the United States now supplying approximately half of EU diesel imports.

Washington has considered restrictions on diesel exports as domestic US prices rise. European officials have urged the Trump administration not to introduce such measures, warning that they would increase pressure on international markets.

Emergency reserves provide some protection.

EU countries are required to maintain strategic oil stocks, while the International Energy Agency coordinated a release of 400 million barrels from member-country reserves earlier this year.

France and Germany hold a particularly large share of Europe’s strategic diesel inventories. Further releases remain possible if international markets deteriorate, although no new coordinated decision has yet been taken.

The current crisis is also feeding into the EU’s longer-term energy debate.

Spain, Portugal and Luxembourg are now pressing for an EU renewable-energy target for 2040, arguing that increasing domestic electricity generation would reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels.

The security argument extends beyond climate policy. An EU Today Research Desk paper published in June examined how concentrated fossil-fuel supply routes and maritime chokepoints can transmit geopolitical shocks into European prices, infrastructure and industry.

The current disruption provides a practical example.

Europe has not bought substantially more fuel, but it is paying tens of billions of euros more because the international price of the energy it imports has risen.

The immediate concern is whether supplies and gas inventories will be sufficient through the coming winter without another sharp increase in prices.

The longer-term question is how much of Europe’s energy demand can be moved away from imported fossil fuels before another geopolitical crisis produces the same result.

For EU governments, Jørgensen’s €100 billion figure provides a measure of the cost of that dependency.

China has warned that it will respond if the European Union introduces new trade restrictions targeting Chinese companies or products, as France and Germany push for stronger European instruments to address what they regard as unfair commercial practices.

China’s Ministry of Commerce issued the warning after reports that several EU governments were discussing a mechanism modelled partly on Section 301 of US trade law, which allows Washington to investigate foreign trade practices and impose countermeasures.

Beijing described such an approach as protectionist and unilateral and warned that it could damage continuing negotiations between China and the EU.

“If the European side insists on introducing discriminatory restrictive measures against Chinese companies or products,” the ministry said, China would “resolutely respond” to defend the interests of its industries.

The warning comes as Europe’s trade relationship with China is moving further up the political agenda.

According to the European Commission’s latest EU-China trade figures, EU exports to China were worth €199.5 billion in 2025 while imports reached €559.5 billion.

The goods deficit stood at €359.9 billion, compared with €312.2 billion in 2024.

China remained the EU’s largest source of goods imports and its fourth-largest export market.

Brussels argues that the scale of the imbalance is connected not only to competitiveness but also to state support, market-access restrictions and other structural differences between the two economies.

China disputes that assessment and has repeatedly accused the EU of using industrial and security arguments to justify protectionism.

The argument is already visible in several industries.

The EU imposed countervailing duties on Chinese battery electric vehicles after an investigation concluded that state subsidies were giving Chinese manufacturers an unfair advantage in the European market.

Brussels has subsequently widened its attention to other parts of the automotive industry. Earlier this month, EU Today reported that the EU was considering restrictions affecting Chinese hybrid cars as policymakers looked for ways to contain the growing trade imbalance.

The automotive dispute is important because Europe is simultaneously trying to attract Chinese manufacturing investment.

France and Spain addressed that question during President Emmanuel Macron’s state visit to Madrid.

Macron and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez agreed on the need for greater European unity in responding to Chinese competition. They also discussed whether Chinese investors entering strategically important European industries should be required to provide stronger commitments on issues such as technology transfer.

Macron said that companies on both sides of the Pyrenees needed protection when they faced unfair competition and argued that “the only response that works is European.”

France has generally favoured stronger European trade defences.

Germany has traditionally approached the issue more cautiously because major German manufacturers have substantial commercial exposure to China. Increasing competition from Chinese producers, particularly in industrial sectors where German companies were once dominant, has altered the debate.

Reports that Berlin and Paris are now working together on a stronger trade instrument therefore suggest a potentially important shift.

The two countries are said to be considering a European mechanism inspired by the American Section 301 process, although no final proposal has yet been adopted by the European Commission.

EU trade law already provides several instruments.

Brussels can impose anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duties following investigations, use the Foreign Subsidies Regulation to examine state-backed investment and procurement, and deploy the Anti-Coercion Instrument where another country uses economic pressure against the EU or a member state.

The discussion now concerns whether those instruments are sufficient when governments believe a problem extends across industries rather than affecting an individual product.

The debate comes only weeks after EU Today reported that Brussels was preparing additional pressure on Chinese hybrid-car imports, demonstrating how quickly EU-China trade disputes are expanding beyond the original electric-vehicle case.

At the same time, Brussels and Beijing have established a Trade and Investment Consultations mechanism, with workstreams covering trade balances, export controls, intellectual property and World Trade Organisation reform.

China’s Commerce Ministry has warned that introducing tougher measures while those talks continue would damage trust.

That leaves the EU facing two parallel choices: continue negotiations intended to narrow the trade dispute while also developing stronger instruments in case those negotiations fail.

France and Germany are increasingly arguing that Europe needs greater leverage.

Beijing’s response is that using that leverage against Chinese companies would bring countermeasures.

The next stage will depend on whether the Franco-German proposal develops into a formal EU initiative. If it does, the dispute will move beyond duties on particular products towards a broader argument over how Europe intends to manage its economic relationship with China.

Romania’s political deadlock has deepened after parliament rejected the government proposed by prime minister-designate Siegfried Mureșan, leaving President Nicușor Dan to begin another attempt to assemble a viable administration.

The joint sitting of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies on Wednesday, 30th September, had been convened specifically to consider Mureșan’s programme and proposed Cabinet.

His government received 182 votes in favour and 15 against. It required at least 233 votes to take office.

Of Romania’s 464 MPs and senators, 321 were present and 197 valid votes were cast. PSD legislators attended but did not vote, while AUR members were absent from the chamber, according to the official result reported by Romania’s national news agency.

The result extends a crisis that has occupied Romanian politics for much of the year.

President Dan had nominated Mureșan after previous attempts to establish a stable government failed. Mureșan’s proposed coalition brought together the centre-right National Liberal Party, PNL, the Save Romania Union, USR, and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, UDMR.

Without support from the Social Democratic Party, PSD, that combination did not have the parliamentary numbers needed for investiture.

After the vote, Mureșan said his three-party grouping had presented a programme intended to end the crisis and accused the parties responsible for bringing down the previous administration of prolonging the instability.

The political breakdown began after the government of Ilie Bolojan lost a no-confidence vote in May.

Months before its collapse, EU Today had examined the growing strains inside Romania’s governing coalition, including disputes over fiscal consolidation and the position of Bolojan.

The subsequent search for a replacement has produced repeated nominations without restoring a stable majority. In June, President Dan turned to Adrian Veștea after an earlier nominee withdrew, while another confidence-vote attempt exposed the same underlying parliamentary arithmetic.

Mureșan was the latest effort to break the impasse.

The president must now decide whether another candidate has a realistic prospect of assembling the necessary 233 votes.

Romanian constitutional procedures also raise the possibility of early elections if repeated attempts to form a government fail. A review of the procedure following Wednesday’s vote notes that the president can make another nomination and that dissolution of parliament can become an option under the constitutional conditions governing failed investiture attempts.

Dan has previously warned against rushing towards another election, arguing that it could extend political uncertainty rather than resolve it.

The crisis is unfolding while Romania faces substantial fiscal pressure.

Successive governments have been required to address one of the largest budget deficits in the European Union while delivering reforms connected to EU funding and maintaining investment.

A prolonged period under an administration without a full parliamentary mandate would reduce the political room available for unpopular fiscal decisions.

Romania’s strategic position also gives the domestic crisis a wider European dimension.

The country sits on NATO’s south-eastern flank, shares a border with Ukraine and hosts allied military infrastructure. The Black Sea and Danube corridor have become increasingly important for European security and trade since Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure close to Romanian territory have repeatedly forced Bucharest to respond to drones approaching or entering Romanian airspace. The security pressure was highlighted earlier this year when President Dan addressed the threat posed by Russian drone activity around the Danube.

Foreign and defence policy has therefore remained an important consideration during the government crisis.

Dan has stressed that Romania’s pro-Western orientation will continue despite the domestic deadlock.

The most immediate political question now concerns the PSD.

Party leader Sorin Grindeanu said after the vote that Romania urgently needed a government with full powers and that his party was prepared to assume responsibility for the country’s recovery.

Any new government able to command a reliable majority may therefore require either direct PSD participation or an arrangement under which Social Democrat MPs provide parliamentary support.

The alternative would be another attempt to construct a majority without them — something the past several months have shown to be difficult.

Wednesday’s result has not changed the parliamentary numbers. It has simply returned the decision to the Cotroceni Palace.

President Dan must now determine whether another coalition can be built from the existing parliament or whether Romania is moving closer to an early election.

Main Image: Von AureliaA – Eigenes Werk, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=60676307

France and Spain have openly welcomed the prospect of Britain rejoining the European Union after British Prime Minister Andy Burnham put full membership back among the options for the country’s long-term relationship with Europe.

French President Emmanuel Macron and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez addressed the question during Macron’s state visit to Spain on Wednesday, 30 September. Asked whether Britain could return under Burnham, Macron responded in English: “Welcome back.” He added that a British decision to move in that direction would be good news for both Britain and Europe.

Sánchez was similarly positive, saying Spain would “open our arms” if Britain sought to return.

Their comments followed Burnham’s intervention at the Labour Party conference and subsequent interviews in which he argued that Britain should reconsider the full range of options for its future relationship with the EU.

Those could include remaining under the present post-Brexit arrangements, returning to the customs union or single market, or ultimately “going all the way” and applying for EU membership again.

The remarks extend a debate which had already been developing since Burnham entered Downing Street. In August, EU Today reported that he had told European Council President António Costa that Britain should be “bolder” in rebuilding relations with Brussels.

More recently, the argument has moved from diplomatic language to practical economic questions. Burnham has been pressing Brussels to ensure British companies are not disadvantaged by the EU’s emerging industrial preference rules, with access to the proposed “Made in Europe” framework becoming one of the principal issues ahead of the next EU-UK summit.

Macron nevertheless made clear in Madrid that closer relations could not become a system under which Britain selected individual advantages of EU membership while remaining outside the corresponding obligations.

“You cannot pick and choose among the Union’s freedoms,” he said during the joint press conference with Sánchez.

That question dominated much of the Brexit negotiation after the 2016 referendum. Access to the single market is built around the free movement of goods, services, capital and people, while participation also entails accepting common rules and enforcement mechanisms.

A British application to rejoin would be a separate and considerably larger process. Under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, Britain would have to apply for membership and secure unanimous agreement from the existing member states before negotiations could be completed.

A returning Britain could not assume that the special arrangements it held before Brexit would automatically be restored. The UK previously had an opt-out from the euro, remained outside the Schengen passport-free area and benefited from a budget rebate.

Any future terms would have to be negotiated.

Public opinion has also changed since the referendum. A YouGov poll in June found 55 per cent of Britons supported rejoining the EU and 34 per cent opposed it, although support falls when respondents are asked about specific membership conditions.

That shift is not limited to Britain. Polling examined by EU Today earlier this year found substantial support across EU member states for a British return.

For the moment, however, Burnham is not proposing an immediate membership application or referendum.

The next test will be the UK-EU summit expected in November. The meeting was originally planned for July but was postponed following Keir Starmer’s resignation, with EU Today reporting at the time that the political transition in London had complicated preparations.

Burnham wants the summit to advance negotiations on industry, trade and migration and has said he intends to use the period around the meeting to set out the longer-term options available to Britain.

The immediate negotiations are therefore likely to focus on economic integration rather than membership.

Greater access to European markets would almost certainly involve greater regulatory alignment. The political argument in Britain will concern how far the country is prepared to accept common European rules in return for reducing barriers created by Brexit.

Macron and Sánchez have now made clear that, if the discussion eventually moves beyond closer economic cooperation towards membership itself, two of the EU’s largest states would welcome it.