The European Union and Turkey are preparing high-level talks before the end of October in an attempt to revive negotiations over Cyprus, following an initiative by United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres.

Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides announced the planned meeting on 16 October during the European Council summit in Brussels, saying discussions would address both the resumption of negotiations over the island’s division and the possibility of improving relations between Ankara and the EU.

The initiative follows diplomatic contacts in New York involving Guterres, European institutional leaders and the Cypriot government. However, renewed differences over the conditions for negotiations have already cast doubt on whether the process can produce substantial progress.

On Sunday, 18 October, Christodoulides accused Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman of imposing preconditions before formal negotiations could resume, particularly concerning arrangements for a rotating presidency in a reunited Cyprus.

The disagreement underlines the difficulties facing an initiative intended to reconnect the UN peace process with the EU’s broader relationship with Turkey.

Brussels seeks a negotiating role

Christodoulides said the planned meeting between the EU and Turkey would examine how to establish the necessary conditions for negotiations to restart within the previously agreed UN framework.

He indicated that any improvement in EU–Turkey relations would be linked to progress over Cyprus.

The president’s announcement in Brussels follows months of diplomatic consultations involving the Commission, European Council and UN.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa have urged Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to support the renewed peace initiative.

Turkey’s relationship with the EU encompasses trade, customs cooperation, migration and regional security. Ankara remains an EU candidate country, although accession negotiations have been effectively stalled for years.

Cyprus remains one of the principal obstacles to any substantial improvement in that relationship.

The island has been divided since Turkey’s military intervention in 1974. The internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus joined the EU in 2004, but EU law remains suspended in areas where its government does not exercise effective control.

The self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is recognised only by Turkey.

Disagreement over political equality

The UN has traditionally sought a settlement based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Negotiations collapsed at Crans-Montana in Switzerland in 2017 amid unresolved disputes over security guarantees, political representation, territory and the presence of Turkish troops.

Erhürman, who became Turkish Cypriot leader in 2025, has expressed support for renewed negotiations within a federal framework. However, he wants assurances about political equality and the structure of future talks.

The latest dispute concerns whether the principle of a rotating presidency between the two communities should be accepted before negotiations resume.

Christodoulides rejected that demand on 18 October, arguing that substantive questions should be negotiated together rather than settled in advance.

The Turkish Cypriot leadership regards rotating executive power as an essential element of political equality, while the Greek Cypriot side objects to making agreement on that arrangement a prerequisite for restarting discussions.

The disagreement has emerged despite recent efforts by the United Nations to improve relations between the communities.

In a statement issued on 13 October, the UN confirmed that Christodoulides and Erhürman had met in Nicosia and agreed to continue discussions, including participation in bicommunal initiatives.

The two leaders subsequently attended a joint event in Pyla, although their public differences persisted.

Turkey’s position remains decisive

A Cyprus settlement would require agreement not only between the island’s communities but also on Turkey’s military presence and the system of security guarantees established at independence.

Ankara has long maintained that Turkish Cypriots require effective political equality and credible security arrangements.

Greek Cypriot leaders argue that the continuation of foreign intervention rights and Turkish military deployments would be incompatible with a fully sovereign and reunited state.

The EU cannot resolve those differences independently of the UN process, but it can influence the economic and institutional framework within which a settlement might operate.

A comprehensive agreement would affect property ownership, trade, customs arrangements, border administration and the application of European law throughout the island.

The European Commission has sought a greater role in supporting the UN-led peace process, reflecting Brussels’ interest in progress towards a settlement.

Negotiations face immediate test

The UN Secretary-General’s personal envoy, María Ángela Holguín, has warned that the opportunity for renewed negotiations may be narrowing.

Disagreements over diplomatic representation, contacts with foreign missions and the status of Turkish Cypriot institutions have complicated relations between the two communities.

Christodoulides has also referred to a series of proposals intended to advance discussions, including the future of the fenced-off area of Varosha. Their full contents have not been publicly disclosed.

The proposed EU–Turkey meeting offers a separate diplomatic channel through which Brussels can assess Ankara’s willingness to support renewed negotiations.

No final date, detailed agenda or list of participants had been publicly confirmed by 18 October.

The immediate test will be whether the parties can agree on the basis for formal talks without attempting to settle disputed constitutional questions before negotiations begin.

Police fired rubber bullets and tear gas during a fifth consecutive day of unrest in Tirana, as student demonstrations over corruption, employment and education developed into a nationwide challenge to the government.

Albania’s political crisis deepened on Saturday, 17th October, as violent anti-government protests continued for a fifth consecutive day, with demonstrators attacking police and public buildings in the capital, Tirana, and demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Edi Rama.

Police used tear gas, water cannon and rubber bullets to disperse protesters outside the Ministry of Education after groups of masked demonstrators threw stones, petrol bombs and fireworks at security forces. The disturbances subsequently spread through the city centre, including areas near the prime minister’s office.

According to the latest figures released by Albanian police, 167 people had been arrested and 132 officers injured during five days of unrest. Seven police officers were also suspended pending investigations into allegations of excessive force.

The demonstrations have become one of the most serious domestic challenges to Rama since his Socialist Party came to power in 2013.

Students transform an environmental protest into a political movement

The current unrest grew out of a campaign known as the Flamingo movement, which began earlier this year in opposition to a controversial luxury tourism development associated with Jared Kushner, the son-in-law of US President Donald Trump.

The development attracted objections from local residents and environmental campaigners concerned about land ownership, planning decisions and potential damage to protected coastal areas.

What began as a dispute over tourism development subsequently expanded into a wider protest against alleged government corruption, unemployment, education standards and the cost of living.

The involvement of high-school and university students has considerably increased both the scale and political significance of the demonstrations.

Students have demanded improvements to educational facilities, additional financial support and better employment opportunities for graduates. Frustration over the limited prospects available to young Albanians has also brought emigration into the debate.

During Saturday’s demonstrations, protesters burned a suitcase outside the Education Ministry, using it as a symbol of the pressure on young people to leave Albania in search of work.

The protests began peacefully before violence erupted when masked participants attacked police positions.

According to accounts from Tirana, government offices, banks and commercial premises have been damaged during several days of confrontations.

Demonstrations have also spread beyond Tirana to other Albanian cities.

Rama refuses to resign

Rama, who is serving his fourth term as prime minister, has rejected demands for his resignation and accused political opponents of encouraging violence to destabilise the government.

He has acknowledged the right of citizens to demonstrate but insisted that attacks on public institutions and private property cannot be treated as legitimate political protest.

The government has pledged to prosecute those responsible for vandalism and assaults on police officers.

National Police Chief Skender Hita has defended the security operation, arguing that officers have faced repeated attacks by masked groups. At the same time, the suspension of seven officers indicates that allegations concerning police conduct are being investigated.

The political opposition has sought to capitalise on the unrest, although the Flamingo movement initially developed outside Albania’s established party structures.

That distinction complicates the government’s argument that the demonstrations are primarily the result of opposition-party activity.

The protests have also exposed tensions between the government’s economic development policies and opposition from communities concerned about corruption, land rights and access to employment.

EU accession adds another dimension

The crisis comes at a particularly sensitive moment in Albania’s negotiations to join the European Union.

On 13th October, just as the demonstrations were gathering momentum, Brussels and Tirana provisionally closed negotiations on enterprise and industrial policy.

The agreement marked another step towards membership, bringing the number of provisionally completed negotiating chapters to four out of 33.

Albania has already opened all 33 chapters, placing it among the more advanced candidates in the Western Balkans.

However, the EU’s negotiating framework makes clear that progress on fundamental reforms, including judicial independence, democratic institutions and the rule of law, determines the overall pace of accession.

As EU Today recently reported, Brussels is considering additional safeguards designed to prevent democratic backsliding following enlargement.

The current protests do not automatically jeopardise Albania’s accession negotiations. Public demonstrations, including those directed against an elected government, are not themselves evidence of a failure to meet democratic standards.

The relevant questions for Brussels concern the authorities’ response, the independence of investigations into police conduct, the treatment of detainees and whether allegations of corruption are properly examined.

These matters fall directly within the EU’s assessment of the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions.

A political test ahead of possible EU membership

Rama has made EU membership by 2030 a central objective of his government, presenting accession as the foundation of Albania’s future economic and political development.

The acceleration of negotiations has given his administration a substantial diplomatic achievement. It has not, however, resolved dissatisfaction over domestic governance or living standards.

The growing involvement of students also means the demonstrations are no longer confined to the environmental dispute that originally triggered the movement.

For the European Commission, the immediate challenge is to maintain a credible distinction between technical progress in accession negotiations and its assessment of political developments inside the candidate country.

For Rama, the question is whether he can restore public order without intensifying opposition to a government that has been in office for more than 13 years.

Further demonstrations would place additional pressure on the authorities, particularly if the movement continues to spread beyond the capital and attracts broader support from trade unions, students and other dissatisfied groups.

Diplomats from Belgium, France and Poland were attacked by Israeli settlers during an olive-harvesting visit to the occupied West Bank, prompting calls for further European sanctions and an investigation by Israeli authorities.

The settlers attacked a delegation of European diplomats and Catholic representatives in the occupied West Bank on Saturday, 17th October, assaulting a French mayor and damaging a Belgian diplomatic vehicle during a visit intended to support Palestinian olive farmers.

The delegation included Belgium’s consul general, French and Polish diplomats and representatives of the Catholic Church. The incident occurred near the Palestinian village of Taybeh, where settlers confronted visitors accompanying local residents during the annual olive harvest.

Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot condemned the violence and announced that Brussels would press for additional European Union sanctions against those responsible. He also called on Israel to meet its obligations as the occupying power and protect Palestinians, journalists and foreign diplomatic representatives.

According to accounts of the incident, Bernard Baudoux, mayor of the French town of Aulnoye-Aymeries, was assaulted while attempting to enter a vehicle bearing diplomatic plates. The attack also involved members of a Catholic delegation, including Archbishop Vincent Dollmann of Cambrai.

Three people were reportedly injured. Belgian diplomatic personnel were confirmed to be safe.

Diplomatic incident draws Israeli condemnation

Israel’s military described the attack as a serious act of violence but said that the delegation’s visit had not been coordinated with the Israeli authorities and that soldiers had not been present when the confrontation occurred.

Israeli police subsequently opened an investigation.

Foreign Minister Gideon Saar publicly condemned the actions of the settlers and said his ministry was in contact with the ambassadors of the countries involved. The Israeli government’s response comes amid mounting international criticism of settler violence against Palestinian communities in the West Bank.

The circumstances are particularly sensitive because the victims included accredited diplomatic representatives from three EU member states. The incident therefore extends beyond the continuing disputes over land ownership and Palestinian access to agricultural areas, raising questions about the protection of foreign officials carrying out recognised diplomatic activities.

For Belgium, the attack has reinforced an existing position in favour of stronger European measures against violent settlers and organisations supporting settlement expansion.

Prévot linked the violence to Israeli settlement policy, arguing that the attacks could not be considered separately from the broader circumstances of the occupation.

A growing dispute over European sanctions

The European Union has already introduced targeted restrictive measures against individuals and organisations associated with serious abuses against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank.

In May 2026, the Council of the EU imposed additional sanctions on three individuals and four organisations, including the Nachala Settlement Movement and the Amana cooperative association.

The measures were adopted under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime and included asset freezes, prohibitions on making funds available to designated persons and travel restrictions on listed individuals.

The Council said the sanctioned organisations had supported or facilitated activities resulting in the displacement of Palestinian communities and the loss of property.

However, agreement on broader economic measures against Israel has proved substantially more difficult.

As EU Today previously reported, European governments have considered restrictions on trade involving Israeli settlements, while divisions between member states have complicated attempts to establish a common position.

The latest attack gives Belgium, France and Poland a direct diplomatic interest in the outcome of any further discussion. Whether this produces a new sanctions agreement will depend on negotiations between EU governments, rather than unilateral declarations by individual ministers.

Violence during the olive harvest

The incident occurred amid escalating attacks on Palestinian farmers during the annual olive harvest, an important source of income for communities across the West Bank.

Harvesting frequently involves access to agricultural land situated near Israeli settlements or in areas where Palestinians face movement restrictions. Local farmers have complained of intimidation, destruction of trees and attacks by settlers attempting to prevent them from reaching their property.

According to reporting from the area, the Palestinian Health Ministry said at least four people had been killed and more than 100 injured since this year’s harvest began.

The attack on the European delegation followed another serious incident involving American photojournalist Heidi Levine, who was assaulted while covering attacks on Palestinian olive harvesters.

The violence has attracted criticism from international organisations and foreign governments, including those maintaining close diplomatic relations with Israel.

Wider implications for EU–Israel relations

The diplomatic confrontation comes against a background of longstanding disagreement between Brussels and the Israeli government over settlement expansion and the legal status of the occupied territories.

The European Union does not recognise Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and regards settlements established there as contrary to international law. Israel disputes the application of this legal interpretation to the territory.

The latest incident is unlikely, by itself, to determine the future of EU–Israel relations. It does, however, strengthen demands from governments already advocating targeted sanctions and more effective measures against settlement-related violence.

For Belgium, France and Poland, the immediate questions concern the safety of their diplomatic personnel, the Israeli investigation and whether the perpetrators will face prosecution.

For the EU collectively, the matter now extends to whether its existing sanctions framework can address continuing attacks against Palestinians and, increasingly, European representatives themselves.

Ukraine was prepared to suspend attacks on Russian oil refineries if Washington supplied anti-ballistic missile systems to protect its energy infrastructure, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has revealed. The proposed compromise was not accepted, despite American pressure on Kyiv to halt its strikes.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has disclosed that Kyiv offered to suspend attacks on Russian oil refineries in exchange for temporary American anti-ballistic missile protection for Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Washington did not provide the requested systems, leaving Ukraine exposed to continued Russian missile strikes while the United States sought to restrict Ukrainian operations against Russia’s oil industry.

Speaking at a press conference in Brussels on Friday, 16 October, Zelenskyy said the proposal had been presented to Washington as a compromise following President Donald Trump’s agreement with Vladimir Putin on Russian diesel supplies and restrictions on attacks against energy facilities.

The Ukrainian president confirmed that Kyiv had not been consulted before Washington reached its understanding with Moscow. He described the diesel agreement as a surprise and objected to arrangements determining Ukraine’s military actions without its participation. Any agreement concerning Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory, he argued, required consultation with the Ukrainian government.

Nevertheless, Zelenskyy said Ukraine had been willing to accommodate American demands, even under an arrangement that did not require Russia to suspend its own attacks. Instead of insisting on reciprocal restrictions, Kyiv proposed receiving sufficient anti-ballistic missile systems to protect its electricity network for the duration of the requested suspension.

The proposal reflected Ukraine’s immediate security requirements. Russia has repeatedly targeted power stations, substations and other critical infrastructure, while Ukrainian forces have attacked Russian refineries to disrupt fuel production and reduce revenues available to Moscow. Halting the Ukrainian campaign without additional defensive capabilities would have left Kyiv surrendering one means of economic pressure while remaining vulnerable to Russian bombardment.

Zelenskyy said he had asked Washington for a limited number of systems, rather than a substantial new military commitment. The proposed deployment would have lasted only as long as the United States required Ukraine to refrain from attacking Russian refineries. However, according to the president, no such assistance was provided.

US diesel agreement deepens dispute

The disagreement follows the diesel arrangement announced by Trump on 9 October, under which Russia agreed to resume substantial petroleum product exports to American and international markets. Washington also authorised certain transactions involving Russian diesel, easing restrictions previously intended to reduce Moscow’s energy revenues.

The agreement created a direct conflict between American energy policy and Ukraine’s strategy of targeting Russian refining capacity. Washington wants additional diesel supplies to ease pressure on fuel markets, while Kyiv regards attacks on oil infrastructure as a means of weakening Russia’s ability to sustain its invasion.

That disagreement intensified after Ukraine resumed attacks on Russian refineries, including a strike against a facility in the Ryazan region. Trump criticised the operations, accusing Kyiv of contributing to higher global oil prices. Zelenskyy, meanwhile, argued that increased Russian diesel revenues would provide Moscow with additional resources to finance its military campaign.

The Ukrainian president’s proposal also exposed the limitations of the temporary energy ceasefire promoted by Washington. Russia continued attacks against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, including electricity facilities, despite the American initiative. Kyiv’s proposed compromise would have addressed the resulting imbalance by providing defensive protection rather than relying on Russian restraint.

Russian strikes underline Ukraine’s defensive requirements

The urgency of Ukraine’s request was illustrated by renewed Russian attacks during Zelenskyy’s visit to Brussels. According to the Ukrainian presidency, strikes on 15 October damaged energy infrastructure in several regions, leaving almost 15,000 people without electricity in Volyn and disrupting supplies in parts of Kyiv and the surrounding region.

Ukraine continues to face shortages of the interceptors required to defend against ballistic missiles. Zelenskyy has identified anti-ballistic capabilities as an immediate priority, particularly as Russia intensifies attacks ahead of winter. During talks with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, he stressed the need for additional missile interceptors and other air defence equipment.

The president also raised these requirements during Friday’s meeting with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa. Discussions covered air defence, protection of energy infrastructure and financial assistance needed to sustain Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression.

European leaders support Kyiv’s position

Zelenskyy said European leaders had supported Ukraine’s position in the dispute with Washington. His remarks came as the EU reaffirmed its intention to maintain economic pressure on Moscow despite the Trump administration’s decision to facilitate Russian diesel exports.

As EU Today reported earlier on Friday, von der Leyen and Costa rejected any relaxation of European sanctions while Russia continues its war. The Commission is preparing a further sanctions package, maintaining a policy intended to restrict Moscow’s ability to finance its military operations.

The contrasting American and European positions have become increasingly significant for Kyiv. Washington is seeking to stabilise fuel markets through arrangements with Moscow, while European governments remain committed to reducing Russian energy revenues and strengthening Ukraine’s military and economic resilience.

For Zelenskyy, the unresolved question is whether Ukraine can be expected to limit attacks on Russian oil infrastructure while receiving neither reciprocal guarantees from Moscow nor additional protection against Russian ballistic missiles. His account of the unsuccessful American negotiations indicates that Kyiv was prepared to compromise, but only if its immediate defensive needs were addressed.

Belgian investigators have searched properties associated with relatives and associates of Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi in an inquiry into alleged laundering of mining revenues, bringing renewed scrutiny to financial links between the two countries.

Belgian police have conducted searches at several properties in Brussels and its surrounding areas as part of an investigation into allegations that money diverted from the Democratic Republic of Congo’s mining sector was laundered through Belgium.

The searches, carried out on 15th October, reportedly involved homes associated with relatives and individuals close to Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi. Belgian prosecutors confirmed that searches had taken place but did not publicly identify those concerned, while the Congolese presidency declined to comment.

The investigation follows a complaint lodged in Belgium in 2025 by civil society organisations from Katanga, the mineral-rich region of south-eastern Congo. Their lawyers, Bernard Maingain and Hervé Diakese, allege that mining revenues which should have benefited Congolese communities were instead diverted and channelled through financial arrangements involving individuals with connections to Belgium.

The allegations have not been established in court. The searches form part of an investigation, and their execution does not establish criminal responsibility on the part of the individuals or organisations whose premises were examined.

Mining revenues under scrutiny

Congo is one of the world’s most important suppliers of copper and cobalt, minerals essential to electric vehicles, batteries, electronics and other advanced industrial products. Its mineral resources also occupy an increasingly important position in the European Union’s effort to diversify strategic supply chains.

Yet the financial arrangements surrounding mineral extraction have repeatedly generated controversy over public accountability, the distribution of revenues and the relationship between political authorities and commercial interests.

The Belgian inquiry concerns an especially sensitive question: whether funds originating from Congo’s mining economy were transferred into the European financial system under circumstances that could constitute money laundering.

According to the details of the investigation published on Thursday, the original complainants maintain that money linked to mining operations was diverted from its intended beneficiaries and used to benefit people connected to the Congolese leadership.

The proceedings are particularly significant because Belgian courts can investigate alleged laundering through Belgian financial structures even when the suspected underlying misconduct occurred abroad, subject to the applicable jurisdictional requirements.

Investigators will need to establish the origin of the funds, the route they allegedly followed and whether those involved knew or should have known that the money represented proceeds of criminal activity.

Belgium’s relationship with Congo

The investigation also has a diplomatic dimension. Belgium ruled Congo until independence in 1960, and the countries retain extensive commercial, political and personal connections.

Brussels remains an important centre for Congolese political and business networks, making Belgium a potentially relevant jurisdiction when investigators examine suspected financial movements connected to the country.

At European level, the inquiry comes as the EU attempts to strengthen relationships with mineral-producing countries while reducing its dependence on concentrated supply chains.

The European Commission’s cooperation programme with the Democratic Republic of Congo specifically identifies responsible sourcing, transparency, due diligence and action against illegal trafficking in raw materials as areas for cooperation.

These commitments have practical consequences for European businesses seeking greater access to copper and cobalt. Investment and supply arrangements depend not only on access to mineral deposits but also on the reliability of commercial records, ownership structures and the institutions responsible for supervising mining revenues.

A money-laundering investigation involving politically connected individuals therefore raises questions extending beyond Congo’s internal affairs.

Implications for European financial supervision

Belgium has recently joined other EU member states in adopting additional measures intended to recover criminal assets and strengthen cross-border cooperation against illicit financial activity.

As EU Today reported on 14th October, European governments have endorsed new international arrangements designed to improve their ability to trace and recover assets associated with serious crime.

The Congo investigation concerns an existing criminal inquiry rather than the application of those newly agreed arrangements. Nevertheless, both developments illustrate the importance of financial intelligence, access to ownership records and cooperation between prosecutors when suspected proceeds move across jurisdictions.

For investigators, the central task will be tracing the alleged flow of money and determining whether financial transactions in Belgium conceal proceeds unlawfully obtained elsewhere.

For Congo, the proceedings arrive during a period of serious domestic instability, including renewed armed confrontation in the east of the country and growing political uncertainty surrounding its leadership.

Former president Joseph Kabila’s involvement in a new opposition alliance has intensified that confrontation, complicating Tshisekedi’s political position as his administration faces continuing security and economic pressures.

The Belgian authorities have not announced any findings establishing that President Tshisekedi personally participated in wrongdoing. The next important developments will be whether investigators identify specific transactions, bring charges or expand the inquiry to additional individuals or corporate structures.

Main Image: Kremlin, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=84821955

A former Ukrainian special forces officer has gone on trial in Hamburg over the 2022 Nord Stream explosions, with his lawyers arguing that Russian energy infrastructure used to finance aggression cannot automatically enjoy protection as a civilian installation.

The first criminal trial arising from the destruction of the Nord Stream gas pipelines has opened in Hamburg, confronting German judges with allegations against a former Ukrainian military officer and a dispute over whether Russian energy infrastructure constituted a legitimate wartime target.

Serhii Kuznietsov, 50, is accused of organising an operation that destroyed three of the four Nord Stream pipeline strands in the Baltic Sea in September 2022. German prosecutors have charged him with offences involving explosives, damage to infrastructure and participation in a war crime.

At the opening hearing on 14 October, Kuznietsov’s lawyers sought to have the proceedings dismissed, challenging both the evidence against their client and the prosecution’s classification of the pipelines as protected civilian infrastructure.

According to the account of the opening proceedings, the defence argued that the installations served Russia’s strategic interests and had been used to exert economic and political pressure on European countries.

Kuznietsov denies involvement in the explosions. His lawyers maintain that the prosecution has not established that he participated in, let alone directed, the operation.

German prosecutors allege Ukrainian involvement

The explosions occurred on 26 September 2022, approximately seven months after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Underwater detonations near the Danish island of Bornholm ruptured sections of Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2, releasing large quantities of natural gas into the Baltic Sea.

German investigators allege that a group of Ukrainians used a rented sailing yacht, the Andromeda, to transport divers, explosives and equipment to the pipelines.

According to the prosecution, the operation involved military-grade explosive devices and was organised with the knowledge or direction of Ukrainian state authorities.

These allegations remain to be tested in court. Ukrainian officials have denied state involvement, and no German judicial finding has established responsibility on the part of Kyiv’s political or military leadership.

The defendant was arrested in Italy in August 2025 and subsequently extradited to Germany following lengthy legal proceedings.

As EU Today reported following the Italian Supreme Court’s ruling, Kuznietsov’s defence had challenged the legality of his transfer and questioned the evidence underpinning the German investigation.

His appearance in Hamburg now moves the case from extradition disputes to direct examination of the prosecution’s allegations.

Can a gas pipeline be a military target?

The central legal controversy concerns whether the Nord Stream infrastructure was entitled to protection as a civilian installation during an international armed conflict.

Under international humanitarian law, civilian objects are generally protected against attack unless their nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and their destruction offers a definite military advantage.

Kuznietsov’s defence argues that Nord Stream had served Russian strategic interests by generating energy revenue and providing Moscow with leverage over European governments.

Defence lawyer Nicola Canestrini has described the pipelines as an instrument of Russian economic coercion rather than infrastructure serving an exclusively civilian purpose.

German prosecutors reject the proposition that those circumstances automatically justified their destruction. They maintain that the operation involved attacks against civilian infrastructure and therefore constituted a war crime.

The legal assessment is more complicated than determining who owned the pipelines.

Financial benefits to a belligerent state do not necessarily make every commercial installation a military objective. Equally, civilian ownership or use does not automatically exclude infrastructure from becoming a military target if the conditions established under the laws of armed conflict are satisfied.

The operational circumstances in September 2022 could become important. Nord Stream 1 had already ceased delivering gas, while Nord Stream 2 had never received German certification to begin commercial operations.

The court will therefore have to consider both the pipelines’ strategic significance and their actual contribution to Russia’s military operations at the time of the explosions.

Defence raises questions about state secrecy

Kuznietsov’s lawyers have also argued that his military status restricts his ability to discuss information that could be covered by Ukrainian state secrecy obligations.

According to the opening-day court reporting, the defence contends that these restrictions undermine his ability to challenge the prosecution’s case.

The proceedings also raise questions concerning the legality of his extradition from Italy and the precise offences for which his transfer was authorised.

These are separate from the underlying question of responsibility for the explosions. A procedural objection could affect the conduct of the trial without resolving the factual allegations.

Berlin faces an uncomfortable political dispute

The case has implications for relations between Germany and Ukraine, although criminal responsibility must be determined independently of diplomatic considerations.

Germany remains a major supplier of military and financial assistance to Kyiv. At the same time, German prosecutors are pursuing allegations that Ukrainian personnel damaged infrastructure in which German companies had invested heavily.

The pipelines themselves remain politically contentious. As EU Today previously examined, the owner of Nord Stream 2 has separately challenged the EU’s plans to eliminate Russian gas imports, demonstrating that the commercial and legal consequences of Europe’s former energy relationship with Moscow remain unresolved.

The Hamburg trial will not determine the legality of Russia’s invasion, nor will it establish Ukrainian government responsibility merely because a former officer stands accused.

It will examine the evidence against Kuznietsov and the circumstances in which the destruction of infrastructure connected to an aggressor state can constitute a criminal offence.

Further hearings are scheduled, with the evidentiary proceedings expected to begin on 27 October. The outcome will depend on whether prosecutors can establish the defendant’s alleged role and overcome the legal challenges raised by his defence.

Venezuela categorically rejected Uruguay’s Foreign Ministry position not to resume bilateral diplomatic relations, Venezuela’s Foreign Minister, Félix Plasencia González, wrote via social media.

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Plasencia González wrote that “The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela rejects the antiquated and arrogant views that disrespect the sovereignty and self-determination of peoples and that have nothing to do with the transformation process Venezuela is carrying out through political dialogue for democratic coexistence.”

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The response followed remarks by Uruguayan Foreign Minister Mario Lubetkin to Brazilian outlet Folha de S.Paulo, in which he justified the refusal to normalize diplomatic ties by saying that “nothing has changed” in the country after electoral processes his government questions.

Lubetkin conditioned the restoration of relations on the holding of new elections and their evaluation by independent courts, he said. He added that “fifteen minutes after” ratifying a democratic winner, his country would resume bilateral relations.

Ante las declaraciones del canciller de la República Oriental del Uruguay, la República Bolivariana de Venezuela rechaza las visiones vetustas y arrogantes que irrespetan la soberanía y la autodeterminación de los pueblos y que nada tienen que ver con el proceso de transformación…

— Félix Plasencia González (@plasenciafelixr) October 12, 2026

Plasencia González said such declarations and positions constituted inadmissible interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs. Venezuela’s future, he made clear, will be defined by its people, in strict adherence to its Constitution and legal order.

The European Union has adopted an unprecedented package of sanctions against Russia’s military-industrial complex, blacklisting 1,569 companies and individuals involved in supplying weapons for Moscow’s war against Ukraine.

The Council measures announced on 12 October target 826 companies and 743 executives. Unlike earlier sanctions targeting political figures, the latest listings reach deeper into the industrial supply chains needed to manufacture missiles, drones, aircraft and ammunition.

Ballistic missile supply chains

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said more than half the new listings concerned ballistic missile production. The Council identified electronics manufacturers, semiconductor suppliers, radar specialists, navigation equipment firms and producers of explosives.

These businesses occupy positions in production networks that enable Russia to sustain the manufacture of weapons despite restrictions on its access to Western technologies. The Council announcement estimates their combined annual turnover at at least €20 billion and employment at more than 250,000.

The move follows intensive Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian cities and energy installations. European governments increasingly seek to undermine Moscow’s operational capacity by identifying businesses that procure or manufacture components for its armed forces.

Enforcement beyond EU borders

Listed firms face asset freezes, while EU businesses and citizens cannot make funds or economic resources available to them. The named executives also face travel restrictions. Suppliers and financial institutions will need to check commercial transactions for links to sanctioned entities.

The actual impact on Russian output remains uncertain. Businesses with few assets in Europe may experience limited immediate disruption. Moscow has developed alternative procurement channels through third countries, some involving intermediaries that acquire electronics or equipment originally manufactured elsewhere.

Sanctions effectiveness therefore depends on customs intelligence, financial due diligence, international cooperation and the willingness of commercial partners to stop dealing with listed companies. Targeting managers individually is also intended to raise the personal costs of directing Russia’s military production.

A test for Europe’s economic pressure

Precision navigation systems, sophisticated electronics and specialised manufacturing technology remain difficult to substitute rapidly. Nevertheless, listing a supplier cannot by itself prevent components from moving through indirect trading routes.

The sanctions coincide with renewed discussion of a possible halt to attacks on energy infrastructure. Brussels is signalling that negotiations about the war’s conduct need not entail relief from restrictions on Russia’s defence economy.

Whether the measures reduce missile production will depend on changes in procurement and output over the coming months. Their immediate significance is the EU’s decision to extend restrictions beyond the most visible weapons producers into the broader industrial networks sustaining Russia’s war.

The imposition of emergency rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, an opposition-controlled province, raises disturbing questions about the relationship between Pakistan’s civilian government and its powerful military establishment. Is this a legitimate response to terrorism, or another calculated assault on democracy?

There is an old saying in Pakistan that most countries have an army, but in Pakistan the army has a country. It is a cynical observation, certainly, but one that has survived successive governments, constitutional crises and military interventions with remarkable durability.

The latest developments in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the northwestern province governed by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party of imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan, suggest that the observation may be as relevant today as ever.

President Asif Ali Zardari’s decision to impose emergency rule in the province, ostensibly in response to deteriorating security conditions, has prompted an obvious and deeply uncomfortable question: is Pakistan witnessing another military coup, albeit one conducted without tanks surrounding parliament or generals appearing on television to announce the suspension of democracy?

The answer depends largely upon how one defines a coup.

A constitutional manoeuvre with political consequences

Under Pakistan’s constitutional framework, federal authorities possess emergency powers that can, under specified circumstances, override provincial administrations.

Such powers are not inherently illegitimate. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has experienced serious violence involving the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the federal government has a responsibility to protect citizens against terrorist attacks.

Nevertheless, the timing of the intervention demands scrutiny.

The province represents one of the most significant remaining political strongholds of Imran Khan, whose imprisonment and continuing confrontation with Pakistan’s political establishment have generated considerable unrest.

Suspending an elected provincial administration in these circumstances inevitably raises suspicions that national security has become a convenient instrument for achieving political objectives.

The crucial distinction is between responding to a genuine emergency and exploiting that emergency to neutralise an inconvenient opposition.

Pakistan’s authorities must demonstrate not merely that a security threat exists, but that the removal of elected provincial leadership is necessary and proportionate.

The army that never really left politics

Pakistan’s military has exercised an extraordinary degree of influence over the country’s political development since independence in 1947.

General Ayub Khan seized power in 1958. General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government in 1977. General Pervez Musharraf removed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999.

These were unmistakable military coups, involving direct intervention against civilian authority.

Yet Pakistan’s experience also demonstrates that generals need not formally assume the presidency to dominate political affairs. The military establishment has long maintained substantial influence over national security, relations with India, Afghanistan policy and, at various moments, the composition and survival of civilian governments.

Under Field Marshal Asim Munir, the relationship between the armed forces and civilian political authority has again attracted intense scrutiny. The central question is therefore not simply whether Pakistan’s generals have seized power. It is whether elected politicians retain sufficient independence to exercise it.

Imran Khan and the price of political defiance

Imran Khan’s political trajectory illustrates the extraordinary volatility of Pakistan’s relationship between civilian leadership and military power.

Once widely regarded as enjoying the establishment’s favour, Khan subsequently became one of its most prominent critics. His removal through a parliamentary no-confidence vote in April 2022 marked the beginning of an increasingly bitter confrontation.

His subsequent imprisonment, the prosecution of PTI figures and restrictions affecting the party’s political activities have fuelled allegations that Pakistan’s democratic institutions are being manipulated to exclude a popular opposition movement.

The authorities reject accusations of politically motivated persecution, while Khan’s supporters insist that his treatment demonstrates the extent to which democratic competition has been compromised.

Against this background, emergency intervention in a PTI-governed province cannot reasonably be viewed in isolation. It forms part of a wider struggle over who ultimately controls Pakistan’s political future.

A coup without the traditional trappings?

The latest emergency is particularly significant because Pakistan’s civilian government and military leadership appear aligned in their criticism of PTI.

According to Reuters reporting on 11 October, the province will be administered by a governor for an initial six months, with troops deployed to support security operations.

Hundreds of activists and three of Khan’s sisters have reportedly been detained ahead of opposition demonstrations.

PTI spokesperson Zulfikar Bukhari has characterised the emergency as a disguised coup. Even Maulana Fazlur Rehman, whose party has been involved in mediation efforts, condemned the intervention as an attack on democracy.

Yet evidence that the military directly ordered the takeover remains absent from the public record. Accusations of military involvement should be investigated rather than treated as established fact.

Nevertheless, a coup need not always involve soldiers removing a prime minister. Democratic institutions can also be progressively hollowed out through ostensibly lawful decisions that concentrate authority and deprive opposition parties of meaningful power.

A dangerous precedent for Pakistan

For Pakistan’s international partners, including the European Union, the implications extend beyond an internal constitutional dispute.

Pakistan benefits from preferential access to European markets under the EU’s GSP+ trading arrangement, which is linked to commitments concerning human rights, democratic governance and international conventions. Brussels should therefore be watching developments closely.

If emergency powers become a mechanism for suppressing political opposition rather than protecting public security, the European Commission will face legitimate questions about Pakistan’s adherence to its international obligations.

The immediate crisis may not constitute a conventional military coup. But the more troubling possibility is that Pakistan’s political system is evolving towards a form of government in which elections continue, civilian politicians remain in office, and the military’s influence is sufficiently powerful to determine the boundaries of democracy.

For Imran Khan‘s supporters, that distinction may offer little consolation.

Pakistan’s generals have seized power openly before. The question now is whether they need to do so again.

Geneva side event sharpens focus on Pakistan’s GSP+ status and rights record

 

The Sudanese army is once again facing mounting international pressure over allegations that it used chlorine-based chemical weapons in its war against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

The United States, Germany, Australia, Finland and Belgium pressed Sudan over the allegations at the 113th session of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), held in The Hague from 6 to 9 October 2026.

The United Kingdom and the European Union also raised Sudan at the session. The EU said the Council had been seized of the matter under Article IX, paragraph 4 of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which allows member states to ask the Council to obtain clarification from another member. 

The statements came a month after The New York Times and The Washington Post published separate investigations on 5 September reporting that the Sudanese army ran a secret programme to develop, test and store chlorine-based munitions. 

The material included around 150 documents, photographs, video clips and voice messages, as well as several thousand text messages taken from the phones of senior Sudanese officers, according to The New York Times. The newspaper reported that voice and text messages involving army chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan suggest he had direct knowledge of the programme.

A Sudanese military spokesperson rejected the findings as “baseless and without material foundation” and threatened to sue The New York Times in a US court, according to Semafor. Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in July that Washington had presented no evidence for its allegations and that Sudan had repeatedly offered to host US experts for on-site verification.

Belgium Voices Concern

Belgium told the Council that Sudan’s answers so far did not match the seriousness of the allegations. Ambassador Wouter Detavernier, speaking in French on 7 October, said Belgium was concerned by allegations that the army had used chlorine bombs during the civil war, and he asked Sudan’s authorities for more information, according to the Belgian statement.

US Warning

The United States has gone further than the other four countries and imposed two rounds of sanctions on Sudan.

The State Department determined on 24 April 2025 that Sudan’s government had used chemical weapons in 2024, and it announced the finding on 22 May 2025. Washington imposed the first sanctions, restricting US exports and Sudan’s access to US government credit, on 27 June 2025. A second round, which took effect on 20 July 2026, added US opposition to multilateral development bank loans to Sudan, further export restrictions and the suspension of air carrier authority linked to Sudan, according to the Federal Register.

At the Council’s 112th session in July, US Ambassador Nicole Shampaine said Sudan should give the OPCW Technical Secretariat “unhindered, transparent access” and that its national investigative committee could not replace independent verification, according to the Arms Control Association.

This week Shampaine told the Council it must confront Sudan’s continued non-compliance tied to its 2024 use of chemical weapons. She asked regional groups and States Parties to “reject as candidates for this Council those States Parties that remain in noncompliance,” according to the US statement.

Sudan currently holds a seat on the 41-member Council, according to The Standard. In March, the United States warned it would revisit its approach to Sudan’s seat if the matter was not resolved swiftly. Council members are elected by the Conference of the States Parties, which next meets from 23 to 27 November 2026, according to the OPCW calendar.

Germany Points to an Undeclared Programme

Germany’s ambassador, Gudrun Lingner, said new media reporting suggested the 2024 use might have been more than a single incident. “Indications pointing at an undeclared chemical weapons programme have been published,” Lingner said, according to the German statement.

Germany called on Sudan’s government to finish a thorough national investigation, publish it swiftly and cooperate fully and transparently with the OPCW.

Australia Focuses on Storage and Use

Australian Ambassador Gregory French said Australia had noted with alarm media reports that the Sudanese Armed Forces had stockpiled and used chemical weapons. He said Sudan had shared an interim report from its national investigation, and he called on Sudan to give “a genuine and transparent account of any non-compliance with the Convention,” according to the Australian statement.

Finland Seeks Prompt Answers

Finland repeated its serious concern about the allegations and said Sudan’s authorities must address them “in a prompt, objective, and transparent manner,” according to its statement. Finland welcomed the Technical Secretariat’s confirmation that it will monitor the situation.

President Donald Trump announced an agreement with Vladimir Putin on Friday, 9th October, under which Russia will resume substantial diesel exports to American and international markets, despite Washington’s existing sanctions against Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine.

According to Trump’s announcement following the telephone conversation, Russia will immediately release more than 300,000 tonnes of diesel, followed by 500,000 tonnes in November and another million tonnes shortly afterwards. A further three million tonnes could become available once Russian refining capacity permits.

The announcement was accompanied by a temporary authorisation from the US Treasury allowing transactions involving Russian diesel until 7 April 2027. It represents a substantial departure from the administration’s recent sanctions policy, which had sought to restrict Russian energy revenues and strengthen Washington’s negotiating position over Ukraine.

The timing is politically significant. Trump faces congressional midterm elections on 3 November, while diesel prices have become a growing economic concern for American businesses and consumers. The agreement gives the White House an opportunity to present itself as addressing fuel costs, although its practical effect on prices remains uncertain.

Russian diesel cannot resolve the global supply shortage

Trump has linked the proposed Russian deliveries to his administration’s efforts to restore energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that the combined measures will produce a rapid reduction in diesel prices.

The disruption of maritime energy supplies following the confrontation with Iran has, however, created a problem considerably larger than the quantities Russia has initially promised.

The first two deliveries amount to approximately 800,000 tonnes. Even including the subsequent million tonnes, the announced volumes are modest relative to global consumption. Their arrival may provide temporary relief in individual markets, but there is little evidence that they could independently reverse the wider shortage.

Russia’s capacity to maintain larger exports is also uncertain.

Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries have disrupted production and contributed to restrictions on petroleum exports. Moscow has periodically imposed limits to protect domestic supplies, while damaged facilities require repairs before returning to normal operations.

The condition of those refineries is explicitly acknowledged in Trump’s announcement, which makes the proposed additional three million tonnes dependent on their recovery.

This introduces a further contradiction. Washington is seeking Russian diesel at precisely the moment Ukraine is attempting to reduce Moscow’s capacity to refine and export petroleum products.

The economic benefits of the agreement may consequently depend partly on developments in a military campaign that the United States has previously supported through intelligence cooperation with Kyiv.

Zelenskyy rejects sanctions relief without Russian concessions

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded critically to the agreement, describing the relaxation of economic pressure as a concession to Putin that had not been accompanied by any meaningful Russian commitment to de-escalation.

In his response to the American decision, Zelenskyy argued that Moscow would exploit renewed export revenues to prolong its war rather than make concessions towards a settlement.

Ukraine has indicated that it remains prepared to consider reciprocal measures concerning attacks on energy infrastructure. Such arrangements would require Russia to stop striking Ukrainian facilities in exchange for restrictions on Ukrainian operations against Russian energy targets.

No comparable undertaking was announced as part of Friday’s diesel agreement.

This distinction is central to Kyiv’s objections. Sanctions relief has traditionally been regarded as leverage to obtain changes in Russian behaviour. In the present arrangement, Moscow stands to receive additional commercial opportunities without publicly agreeing to alter its military campaign.

Lukoil negotiations raise further questions

The agreement also comes amid separate discussions concerning the international assets of Lukoil, Russia’s second-largest oil producer.

A recent account of negotiations involving American investors and Russian officials described proposals involving Lukoil’s overseas oilfields, refineries and distribution businesses.

The discussions have reportedly involved figures connected to Trump’s diplomatic efforts, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, alongside Russian representatives.

On Friday, another development complicated the proposed transaction when Carlyle withdrew from the competition to acquire Lukoil’s international assets, previously valued at approximately $22 billion.

The negotiations illustrate the extent to which potential commercial cooperation has entered the broader American-Russian relationship.

There is no verified evidence, however, that the diesel agreement was concluded to facilitate a particular acquisition or benefit individuals connected to Trump’s administration. The commercial negotiations and Friday’s sanctions decision remain separate developments unless further evidence establishes a direct connection.

Washington and Europe move in different directions

The American decision creates an additional complication for European sanctions policy.

On 7th October, EU ambassadors agreed to expand sanctions against Russia’s military-industrial network, approving 1,646 additional designations, many directed at the production of ballistic missiles used against Ukraine.

Britain has also introduced further restrictions on Russian oil-related businesses, tankers and financial intermediaries, reinforcing its stated objective of limiting Moscow’s ability to finance the war.

The contrast with Washington’s diesel authorisation is substantial. While European governments are attempting to restrict Russian petroleum revenues, the United States is providing a temporary legal route for renewed sales.

The development also recalls the difficulties already examined by EU Today in its reporting on sanctions enforcement against Russia’s shadow fleet, where differences in national restrictions and their application have complicated efforts to control petroleum exports.

For Moscow, the significance of Friday’s agreement extends beyond the immediate revenue generated by diesel sales. It establishes that the United States is prepared to relax particular economic restrictions before securing a settlement over Ukraine.

Whether the arrangement ultimately lowers American fuel prices will depend on production, shipping and international market conditions. The diplomatic consequence is already apparent: Russia has obtained an opportunity to restore part of its international energy trade without accepting publicly announced conditions concerning its war against Ukraine.

For Kyiv and European governments, the question is whether this remains a narrowly defined response to an energy shortage or marks the beginning of a broader American policy of separating commercial relations with Moscow from negotiations over Ukraine.

 

For years, the European Union has struggled with a peculiar contradiction in its dealings with China. The EU is one of the largest and wealthiest trading blocs on earth, capable of determining access to a market of some 450 million relatively affluent consumers, yet it frequently conducts foreign policy as though it were the supplicant.

Hilde Vautmans, the Belgian Renew Europe MEP and European Parliament rapporteur on EU-China political relations, is right to challenge this timidity.

Her report, debated this week in Strasbourg, does not advocate severing relations with Beijing. Nor should it. China is too economically important and too influential on questions ranging from climate change to international security for Europe simply to close the door.

But dialogue must not become an alternative to action.

“Europe has economic power. It’s time to use it,” Vautmans told Parliament ahead of the vote. That sentence ought to be pinned above every desk in the European Commission dealing with China.

The figures make the case brutally clear. In 2025 the EU imported €559.4 billion of goods from China while exporting just €199.6 billion in the opposite direction. The resulting deficit was €359.8 billion — almost €1 billion every day.

As EU Today reported recently, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has herself warned of a potential “second China shock”, with subsidised Chinese industrial production threatening European manufacturers.

Fine words. But Beijing has heard fine words before.

The Commission’s preferred formulation remains “de-risking, not decoupling”. There is sense in that distinction. Nobody seriously proposes shutting down trade with the world’s second-largest economy. But de-risking becomes meaningless if every risk identified is followed by another dialogue, another working group and another opportunity to postpone difficult decisions.

Indeed, the Commission acknowledges that European companies operating in China face regulatory obstacles, inadequate intellectual-property protection, restrictions on data flows and pressures associated with technology transfer.

Europe possesses formidable weapons with which to respond: anti-dumping duties, anti-subsidy measures, foreign-investment screening, the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, the Anti-Coercion Instrument, procurement restrictions and controls on strategically sensitive technologies.

These instruments should not be deployed indiscriminately. But neither should they sit polished in the armoury while Beijing exploits European openness.

Vautmans is particularly right to connect economics with security and values. China cannot reasonably expect privileged access to European markets while helping sustain the Russian war machine. The European Parliament’s own research service describes Beijing as a “decisive enabler and dual-use provider”, including through goods entering Russian weapons and drone supply chains.

If Chinese companies materially assist Russia’s ability to wage war against Ukraine, Europe should be prepared to impose a direct economic price. The same principle should apply to human rights.

EU Today has warned repeatedly that Brussels’ ritualised engagement with Beijing risks becoming precisely that: ritual.

We reported earlier that the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue risks losing credibility, pointing to the continuing imprisonment of Swedish citizen Gui Minhai and Uyghur academic and Sakharov Prize laureate Ilham Tohti. After round upon round of discussions, Beijing has learnt that European expressions of “deep concern” are inexpensive things to endure.

The problem is hardly new. Years ago, EU Today highlighted calls for concrete EU action over goods associated with forced labour in China, including demands for tougher restrictions on entities implicated in abuses against Uyghurs.

Yet repression continues. In March this year China adopted its new Law on the Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress. The European Parliament subsequently condemned what it described as intensified repression and assimilation affecting Tibetans, Uyghurs and other minorities, by the overwhelming margin of 439 votes to 52.

Europe therefore faces a straightforward question. What is the purpose of economic power if it is never translated into political influence?

The EU should not attempt to bully China. Nor should it abandon diplomacy. Vautmans is correct that channels of communication must remain open. But reciprocity must become something more than a word appearing in communiqués.

Where China closes markets to European companies, Europe should be prepared to restrict equivalent access. Where state subsidies distort competition, Brussels should respond rapidly with trade-defence measures. Where strategic dependencies expose Europe to political coercion, alternative supply chains must be built. Where Chinese entities support Russia’s military-industrial complex, sanctions should follow. And where companies benefit from forced labour or serious human-rights abuses, access to the European marketplace should carry consequences.

That is not protectionism. It is leverage.

Totalitarian states understand leverage perfectly well. China routinely uses access to its enormous market as an instrument of statecraft. Europe, by contrast, too often behaves as though exploiting its own commercial strength would somehow represent a failure of diplomacy. It represents precisely the opposite.

The European Commission has spent years discovering that China is simultaneously a partner, competitor and “systemic rival”. It is time to move beyond discovering the obvious.

Vautmans has identified the essential point. Europe already possesses economic power on a scale few countries can ignore. What it appears to lack is the political confidence to use it.

Main Image: by Valentine ZELER, © European Union 2026 – Source : EP

 

It was poor old Greece who drew the short straw. It chairs the UN Security Council this month and it’s fallen to them to chair the Council’s extra-sticky deliberations this coming Thursday on whether—as the United States is proposing—to extend the arms embargo on Sudan to the whole of the country. 

If the current embargo, currently covering Darfur, is of any practical effect, that would be in favour the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF); their supply lines are easier. That would change under a countrywide embargo, and the regime led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan naturally argue that the proposed extension would deny a ‘sovereign government’ a right to defend its people, its borders, and its own existence. 

But the issue isn’t whether Sudan has a right to exist or to protect civilians. It is whether the combatants who have made Sudan ungovernable should continue to receive external military support without meaningful restraints. The answer, say the United States, the United Kingdom and France, must be no. However, fortunately for Burhan, it’s a da from Russia and a semi-da and a raised eyebrow from China, neither of whom are especially squeamish about aggressive population control measures. 

So if the pro-extensionists are to make any headway on a countrywide UN arms embargo, they are going to have to make, and carry the day on, some fine distinctions. 

To begin with, a countrywide embargo would not settle the question of who represents Sudan at the United Nations. But it would recognise that neither the SAF nor the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) should enjoy an unlimited licence to import the means to continue a ruinous civil war.

There is an important distinction between a state’s standing in the UN and the rights claimed by those who temporarily wield power within that state. Sudan remains a member state. It has a seat in the General Assembly. Burhan and his minions continue turning up and claiming to speak in Sudan’s name. 

None of that would necessarily change in the face of an arms embargo extending across the whole of Sudan. The Security Council would not be making a determination regarding Burhan’s or the SAF’s legitimacy. Recognition, credentials, representation—these are all distinct matters decided elsewhere and by other means. 

The Council’s job is something else. It’s not dealing with constitutional niceties; it’s dealing with the life and death issues of international peace and security. If weapons are feeding a conflict and threatening civilians in a territory or state, it can restrict the transfer of arms to that state or territory without stripping it of its international legal personality. Sanctions are not derecognition. What they do recognise is that in some circumstances, stopping the bloodshed take precedence over any right to buy arms. 

A nationwide embargo would establish at least this much: that the SAF and the RSF are both belligerents. The SAF may be commanded by General Burhan and presently in control of the state’s formal institutions; the RSF may be a paramilitary force with its own commercial interests, territorial ambitions and record of atrocities. But neither distinction entitles either side to decide Sudan’s future at gunpoint. According to the UN Charter we are not supposed to be living in a world where political legitimacy is determined by the military power at your disposal.

The SAF’s claim to sovereignty cannot mean an unconstrained right to acquire weapons while the country is being torn apart. The RSF’s local control, meanwhile, cannot be converted into international entitlement by force, atrocity or the occupation of territory. Both forces are armed parties to a conflict. Both draw sustenance from external supplies. Both have strong incentives to believe that, if they can secure the next shipment, the next drone or the next patron, a military decision remains possible.

It’s this kind of calculation that the Security Council has to disrupt.

All that said, an embargo alone can’t bring peace. Sudan needs a ceasefire now, with humanitarian access protected, credible monitoring of violations and a civilian-led political process that gives Sudanese people — not rival generals — the authority to determine their country’s future.

But if both sides believe more arms may tilt the balance then a ceasefire becomes harder to achieve. An embargo changes that calculation. It increases the cost and risk of resupply, makes foreign sponsors more visible, and tells commanders that time is no longer automatically on the side of whichever force can secure a fresh consignment.

That is why this measure matters. It’s nowhere near a magic bullet but it would at least narrow the military options of the SAF and RSF alike, improve the prospects for a ceasefire, and more create political space for civilians to reclaim their state. 

Moscow has again told foreign diplomats to leave Kyiv before further Russian strikes. The embassies have stayed. The episode exposes a broader Russian objective: turning military pressure on Ukraine’s capital into political and diplomatic retreat by its Western partners.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry renewed its warning to foreign diplomats and other foreign nationals on 3 October, urging them to leave Kyiv and saying Russian forces would continue large-scale strikes against targets in the Ukrainian capital and elsewhere. The warning said those who remained were exposing themselves to “mortal danger”, while Moscow sought to place responsibility for any consequences on the individuals and governments choosing to remain.

The military threat behind that warning is not theoretical. Russian missile and drone attacks on Kyiv have intensified, striking transport infrastructure, energy facilities and residential districts. EU Today has documented a succession of such attacks, including a September missile and drone barrage that killed three people and damaged residential and public buildings and a later jet-powered drone strike on the National Academy of Sciences in central Kyiv. Air alerts and attacks on the capital are now a routine part of the security environment in which foreign missions operate.

The significance of Moscow’s latest statement, however, goes beyond the question of physical safety. By telling foreign governments that their diplomats should leave and suggesting that those who stay must accept the consequences, Russia is attempting to change the political calculation surrounding Kyiv. If Western states began moving their embassies to Lviv or across the border into Poland, Moscow would have achieved something that continued military pressure has so far failed to deliver: a visible reduction in the international diplomatic presence in the Ukrainian capital.

That has not happened. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry says it has received no request or notification from a foreign diplomatic mission indicating that it intends to relocate. Reports that some Western governments have considered contingency arrangements appear to concern emergency planning rather than decisions to withdraw, which is hardly surprising for embassies operating in a capital subjected to repeated missile and drone attacks. The distinction is important because preparing evacuation options is standard risk management; implementing them would be a political signal.

The European Union has gone further than simply denying evacuation plans. EU Ambassador Katarína Mathernová said that the EU Delegation, the EU Advisory Mission and all 25 EU member states maintaining embassies in Kyiv would remain in the capital. Her response was deliberately public, making clear that the Russian warning would not alter the diplomatic footprint of the EU or its member states in Ukraine.

Moscow has tried this before. In May, Russia issued a similar warning to diplomats and foreign nationals, prompting Brussels to summon the Russian chargé d’affaires. EU Today reported at the time that European officials viewed the warning as a threat against the foreign diplomatic community in Kyiv. Mathernová subsequently said that the EU would remain in Kyiv despite Russia’s renewed warnings, describing the pressure as an attempt to generate fear and isolate Ukraine.

The October warning has produced much the same result. One day later, Chancellor Friedrich Merz travelled to Kyiv, accompanied by Economy Minister Katherina Reiche and a German business delegation. His arrival was particularly difficult to reconcile with suggestions that European governments were preparing to abandon the capital. EU Today reported that the visit brought more than €1.3 billion in new German defence and energy commitments, while the German government presented the trip as a demonstration of continuing support for Ukraine.

Washington has taken a similar position. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the United States would make its own assessment of whether it was safe for American diplomats to remain in Kyiv and noted that Russia had been issuing such warnings for months. The US embassy has continued operating, while the State Department has maintained its highest-level travel warning for American citizens because of the continuing war. That distinction — between advising private citizens not to travel and maintaining an official diplomatic presence — reflects the different responsibilities involved.

There is also a legal dimension to Moscow’s attempt to shift responsibility. Russian statements create the impression that once diplomats have been warned, the consequences of any subsequent attack fall on those who chose to stay. International law does not support such an interpretation. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations establishes the inviolability of diplomatic premises and personnel, although the immediate obligation to protect foreign missions rests principally with Ukraine as the receiving state.

Russia’s conduct of military operations is governed primarily by international humanitarian law. Diplomats remain civilians, while diplomatic buildings remain civilian objects unless they are being used in circumstances that would make them military objectives. Warnings can form part of an attacker’s obligation to take precautions, but they do not transfer legal responsibility to civilians who remain in place. The International Committee of the Red Cross makes clear that civilians who stay after an advance warning continue to enjoy protection, and an attacking force must still comply with the rules of distinction, proportionality and precautions.

That legal point is relevant because the wording used by Moscow appears designed to establish a different political narrative. Russia can warn foreign governments that further strikes are coming, but such warnings cannot provide advance immunity for the way those attacks are conducted. Nor do they relieve Russia of responsibility if attacks unlawfully damage civilian or diplomatic property.

The continued presence of embassies in Kyiv also has practical significance for Ukraine. Foreign missions give governments direct access to Ukrainian institutions and their own assessment of political, military and economic conditions on the ground. Their diplomats meet ministers, military officials, civil society representatives and businesses, reducing governments’ dependence on second-hand reporting and allowing them to judge developments for themselves.

Relocating those missions would therefore have consequences beyond symbolism. Diplomatic relations could continue from Lviv, Warsaw or elsewhere, but Moscow would inevitably portray any large-scale withdrawal from Kyiv as evidence that foreign governments no longer regarded the Ukrainian capital as sustainable as a diplomatic centre. That helps explain why European governments have answered the latest warning so publicly and why maintaining a visible presence has itself become part of the political response.

Russia has increasingly sought to combine physical attacks with wider political effects. Its missile and drone campaign places pressure on Ukraine’s electricity system, transport network, air defences and civilian population. The warnings to foreign missions extend the same logic to Ukraine’s international relationships: increase the perceived cost of remaining in Kyiv and encourage foreign governments to reduce their presence.

So far, that strategy has not produced the intended result. The EU says all of its embassies are staying, Germany’s Chancellor travelled to Kyiv immediately after the warning and Washington has made clear that it will take its own decisions about the security of its mission. Russia can make the Ukrainian capital more dangerous, but it has not persuaded Ukraine’s principal partners to treat Kyiv as a city they must leave.