In this harrowing, incredibly reported story co-published by Science and Retraction Watch, Brendan Borrell uncovers how “Mei,” a 6-year-old girl in China, died a week after an experimental gene-editing trial went wrong—and how her medical team, led by neuroscientist Zilong Qiu, downplayed the risks to her parents, did not publicly disclose her death, and has faced no real accountability.
On 23 March 2025, the day before the procedure, the family settled into a shared room inside a crowded pediatric ward. When the other girl in the room broke into tears, Mei handed her one of her favorite stuffed animals: a blue bird. “She liked to give things to other kids,” Jason said.
The next day Mei put on a brave face as she was taken to the procedure room. Yu’s handpicked doctor inserted a needle between two vertebrae on her lower back and withdrew just over a teaspoon of spinal fluid to create space for the drug. Then, he swapped syringes and gently pressed down on the plunger, filling her spinal canal with viruses.
The map of absolute destruction: 42% of the forests in Attica burned in the last 10 years. From 2017 until yesterday, August 3, 2026, a total of 15 major fires have burned more than 800,000 stremma* or 80,000 hectares and approximately 197,684.3 acres acres. The data resulting from the updated analysis of the burned areas […]
Artificial intelligence (AI) has permeated our workplaces, where many employers have sought to boost productivity, cut labor costs, and eliminate jobs via the technology. A 2025 Pew Research Center poll found that 1 in 5 workers now use AI in their jobs.
Organized labor’s response to the AI has been fraught. Where some see an inevitable shift that simply needs to be regulated and could potentially even create jobs, others see a dangerous trend that will result in further job losses along with a variety of other problems.
The tension is succinctly summarized by a recent Politico headline: “Voters fear AI. Unions want the jobs.”
The ongoing debate over data centers encapsulates this tension. Across the country, community members have spearheaded efforts to block their construction over concerns about water depletion, higher utility bills, noise, and air pollution.
In March, Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vermont) and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-New York) introduced the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Data Center Moratorium Act, which would institute a pause on data center construction until federal safeguards can be established. “We need serious public debate and democratic oversight over this enormously consequential issue,” said Sanders in a statement on the bill. “The time for action is now.”
The legislative effort is backed by multiple unions including National Nurses United (NNU), the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), and the Association of Flight Attendants. “The unchecked explosion of AI data centers is a public health crisis, an environmental crisis, and a workers’ rights crisis,” declared NNU co-president Jamie Brown at a press conference announcing the bill.
However, there are also many unions that oppose any moratorium on data centers, particularly building trade unions that believe such construction can stimulate economic growth for struggling communities and provide members with work.
“We need the guardrails on AI, we just don’t think that a moratorium is the way to get there,” AFL-CIO President Liz Shuler toldPunchbowl News in June.
The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) is even calling on members to contact their congressional representatives and make social media posts connected to the issue. “I’m a proud IBEW member and I oppose any bans on data center construction since these bans would eliminate good-paying union jobs,” reads suggested text for a social media post.
In June, Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer appeared at the groundbreaking ceremony for Oracle and OpenAI’s planned 1.4-gigawatt data center in the state’s Saline Township. Alongside OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, Whitmer told the assembled crowd that the state was setting an example for “the rest of the world” by ensuring the “responsible adoption” of AI.
The project was opposed by many residents and local lawmakers. Rep. Rashida Tlaib (D-Michigan) called it “disgusting” and said she was “disappointed” with Whitmer, while Democratic State Rep. Dylan Wegela of Garden City said it was a “complete betrayal of the working class” and that the governor had sold out “Michigan to big tech billionaires.”
However, the data center was backed by North America’s Building Trades Unions (NABTU), and its president, Sean McGarvey, was present at the groundbreaking. “America’s ability to lead in the next era of innovation depends, in part, on America’s ability to build, and our members are proud to be helping make that future possible,” he told the crowd.
Speaking to Politico in June, Senator Sanders’s chief political adviser, Faiz Shakir, said that the data center jobs heralded by certain unions won’t necessarily establish lasting occupations.
“It’s fine to say that [data centers will] be built with good-paying union jobs now — and I hope that that’s the case — but what we’re also looking for on behalf of the working class of America is long-term sustainability of jobs,” he said. “It doesn’t help a lot in our view if you have a short-term infusion of good, union paying jobs at the cost of the decimation of many, many long-term jobs.”
Support for AI within organized labor is receiving a boost from AI companies themselves. Last year, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) announced that it would create an AI training hub in New York City via $23 million from Microsoft, OpenAI, and Anthropic.
“The industry funding is part of a drive by U.S. tech companies to reshape education with generative A.I. chatbots,” notedTheNew York Times. “These tools, like OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Microsoft’s Copilot, can produce humanlike essays, research summaries and class quizzes.”
AFT President Randi Weingarten said the academy was inspired by the work of other unions, like the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, and that the idea for the National Academy for AI Instruction sprang from a partnership established between Microsoft and the AFL-CIO in 2023.
“AI holds tremendous promise but huge challenges — and it’s our job as educators to make sure AI serves our students and society, not the other way around,” declared Weingarten. “The direct connection between a teacher and their kids can never be replaced by new technologies, but if we learn how to harness it, set commonsense guardrails and put teachers in the driver’s seat, teaching and learning can be enhanced.”
The way Weingarten is selling the hub is seemingly at odds with that of Roy Bahat, who first proposed the idea. In a LinkedIn post made shortly after the announcement, Bahat, who heads the venture capital firm Bloomberg Beta, essentially admits that the center can serve as a test case for applying AI more broadly — or, as Nolan Higdon put it in Truthdig: “Teachers are guinea pigs in Big Tech’s broader project to reengineer labor, one profession at a time.”
“If we can figure out how teachers should teach with and about AI, we can affect the lives of millions of educators, and millions and millions of young people,” explains Bahat in the post. “And if we can figure out how to train teachers on using AI, maybe we can figure it out for other occupations.”
The training hub, and union leadership’s wider connections to AI, have sparked criticism from labor activists and rank-and-file members.
“Using AI compliments, intensifies, and accelerates privatization of the public sector, and that’s in addition to any harm that it’s doing to work.”
“Using AI compliments, intensifies, and accelerates privatization of the public sector, and that’s in addition to any harm that it’s doing to work,” author and teacher union activist Lois Weiner told Truthout. “The labor movement should be contesting the idea that the imposition of AI is inevitable. That’s the labor movement’s responsibility.”
“What makes this so disturbing is that it raises fully the problem of union democracy,” she added. “These decisions were made without informed debate with union members. They have a moral responsibility to community and the kids we serve to have a voice.”
Trevor Griffey, a labor historian, lecturer at UCLA and UC Irvine, and vice president of legislation for AFT Local 1474, told Truthout that, since the collaboration was established, the AFT national has focused too much on trying to help teachers adapt to AI, and too little on organizing worker power in school districts. He believes unions should go on the offensive and push for deeper reforms, as AI is already having a dramatic impact. He points out that groups like the California Federation of Labor Unions are trying to bring together statewide unions in California to lobby on a range of bills targeting the dangers of Big Tech.
“The question is less where unions stand on AI or other forms of technology, and more how they organize to resist the unsafe and unethical use of automation at work,” he told Truthout. “Unions need to invest in strategic research and organizing to support workers most likely to be negatively impacted by employers’ adoption of AI-powered technology — both at work, and in building political power sufficient to prevent the unethical and unsafe use of new technology. Beyond just regulating AI, unions should push for full employment and/or universal income policies to mitigate the disruptions to people’s lives that AI-related layoffs are already having.”
These sentiments were echoed by Vishal Reddy, a union negotiator for nursing home workers and the executive director of WorkFour.
“Unions at the local, international, and federation levels need to put real money and organizing capacity into figuring out which affirmative AI-related demands — four-day workweek, UBI [universal basic income], AI dividends, and so on — actually resonate with a wide swath of workers,” he told Truthout. “Just like in bargaining, we want to know which affirmative policy would be most deeply and widely felt, so we can prioritize it in the fights ahead, including May Day 2028.”
“That means cross-union convenings, issue campaigns, commissioned polling and research, and real resourcing behind the bargaining fights where these policies are already surfacing,” Reddy added. “For example, if a fight over a 32-hour workweek is on the table somewhere, that’s exactly where the labor movement should be throwing its weight.”
Il governo prepara per settembre una variazione di bilancio di dimensioni paragonabili a una legge di bilancio. La quota maggiore va alla spesa militare, coperta con nuovo debito: SAFE o titoli di Stato. Il resto è una partita di giro sulle accise che non produce un euro di risorse nuove. Nel frattempo il risiko bancario consegna a un gruppo con azionariato dominato dai grandi fondi il secondo polo bancario europeo, e la politica estera fabbrica un avversario simbolico a costo zero: la Spagna. Tre movimenti, una sola logica. Ne discutiamo a Levante, martedì 4 agosto, con Alessandro Volpi e Francesco Dall’Aglio. Conduce Margherita Furlan. IN QUESTA PUNTATA Le due guerre aperte e la crisi di Ceuta: oltre cinquantamila ingressi nell’esclave, la sospensione di Schengen decisa dall’Italia verso un altro Paese fondatore, il Consiglio Affari Interni straordinario. Chi guadagna dallo scontro fra Roma e Madrid, e qual è la posta reale sullo Stretto di Gibilterra. Lo scostamento di settembre: 0,9 per cento del prodotto alla difesa, finanziato interamente a debito; 0,6 per cento di partita di giro sulle accise mobili. Che cosa significa coprire spesa militare con emissioni nuove, e perché il riarmo è oggi l’unica spesa pubblica che l’Europa considera legittimo finanziare a debito. Il credito passa di mano: dopo il ritiro di Banco Bpm resta sul tavolo l’Opas di Intesa Sanpaolo su Mps da 30,6 miliardi. Il premio vero non è la rete del Monte: è Mediobanca e la sua quota in Generali. La stessa geometria azionaria già vista in Unicredit e nell’Opas Poste-Tim. La favola della spesa pubblica: chi invoca la motosega alla Milei dimentica che l’istruzione è scesa dal 4,5 al 3,9 per cento del prodotto e la sanità dal 7 al 6,3. E che il servizio sanitario nazionale è finanziato in larga parte da imposte indirette, cioè senza alcuna progressività. Il perimetro del dicibile: la politica statunitense dei visti, le revoche a chi scrive articoli di opinione, i dinieghi motivati con la sicurezza nazionale. Quando la critica a uno Stato terzo diventa criterio di ammissione a un Paese. I LIBRI DEGLI OSPITI ALESSANDRO VOLPI La guerra della finanza. Trump e la fine del capitalismo globale, Laterza, 2025 I padroni del mondo. Come i fondi finanziari stanno distruggendo il mercato e la democrazia, Laterza, 2024 Nelle mani dei fondi, Altreconomia, 2024 L’America secondo Trump. Prospettive economiche e scenari globali, Edizioni La Vela, 2024 FRANCESCO DALL’AGLIO Oppenheimer, Putin e altre storie sulla bomba, ad est dell’equatore, 2023 (curato con Carlo Ziviello) SOSTIENI CASA DEL SOLE TV Casa del Sole TV è un progetto di giornalismo indipendente autofinanziato, senza editori, senza partiti, senza padrini politici. Per donazioni: IBAN: IT63P0326822300052392596590 Intestato a: La Casa del Sole Edizioni Causale: Donazione Casa del Sole TV Membership YouTube: / @casadelsoletvchannel — Analista Multipolare €5/mese — Inviato della Verità €15/mese — Architetto del Futuro €25/mese I LIBRI DI MARGHERITA FURLAN BRICS Scacco Matto (disponibile in italiano, inglese, russo), La Casa del Sole Edizioni SEGUI CASA DEL SOLE TV YouTube: @CasadelSoleTVChannel #guerra#finanza#ceuta#news#geopolitics
Four turtles rescued from a fire-stricken area in northern Greece were found to have been abused by human thugs who painted their shells with orange oil paint.The discovery prompted the intervention of the Prosecutor’s Office in Thessaloniki on Tuesday. The unprecedented incident was revealed when members of the Wild Animal Rescue & Reintegration Team arrived […]
Um aparatoso despiste de um miniautocarro dos Transportes Urbanos de Tomar (TUT) provocou este início de tarde um morto e três feridos, no parque de estacionamento do Hospital de Tomar.
Segundo a Tomar na rede, o alerta para o acidente, ocorrido junto à entrada para as consultas externas da unidade hospitalar, foi dado às 14h38 desta terça-feira, dia 4.
O veículo de passageiros despistou-se, embateu contra uma carrinha e só imobilizou a sua marcha após colidir com a fachada do próprio hospital. Os passageiros do autocarro ficaram encarcerados no interior da viatura, enquanto o motorista conseguiu sair pelo seu próprio pé.
Do acidente resultaram quatro vítimas: uma mulher de 64 anos acabou por falecer no local, registando-se ainda dois feridos graves e um ligeiro, segundo informação do comando operacional.
Para o local do acidente foram mobilizados 16 operacionais de socorro, apoiados por sete viaturas.
Por: Dino Frazão Data: 4 de Agosto de 2026
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Hanoi (dpa) – Vietnam and the European Union on Thursday upgraded ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership, Vietnam’s highest diplomatic tier, amid a tumultuous period for global trade.
In a joint statement, Vietnam and EU stressed “the importance of a partnership based on common interests and shared values of peace, security, and prosperity in a rules-based international order, based on international law.”
Though US tariffs were not explicitly mentioned, at a press briefing held after meeting Vietnamese President Luong Cuong, European Council President António Costa said: “At a moment when the international rules-based order is under threat from multiple sides, we need to stand side-by-side as reliable and predictable partners.”
“Vietnam considers the EU one of its most important partners in the world and wishes to continue promoting and deepening its relationship with the EU,” Cuong said.
Cuong labelled the move a “historic milestone,” coming 35 years after Vietnam and the EU established diplomatic relations. The EU-Vietnam free trade agreement, signed in 2020, has helped drive a 40 percent increase in bilateral trade.
Vietnam is one of the EU’s largest trading partners in South-East Asia, while the EU is Vietnam’s fourth-largest trading partner. In the first 10 months of 2025, two-way trade reached nearly 61 billion Dollar (51 billion Euro), up 8.4 percent year on year.
Vietnam and the EU on Thursday also underscored the need to strengthen cooperation on peace, defence and security, and voiced support for multilateralism and respect for international law, including the UN Charter. (29 January)
Berlin (dpa) – Germany’s Greens are backing the European Union’s landmark trade deal with India, days after the party’s lawmakers in the European Parliament played a key role in challenging the bloc’s agreement with the South American Mercosur countries.
Andreas Audretsch, the party’s deputy group leader in the German parliament, said the deal with India, which was announced earlier on Tuesday, was good for businesses and workers in Germany.
In view of the “destructive rage” of US President Donald Trump, Europe must build new alliances for trade and cooperation, Audretsch argued.
The deal was finalised during an EU-India summit in New Delhi, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi proclaiming the agreement on Tuesday.
“The EU and India make history today, deepening the partnership between the world’s biggest democracies,” von der Leyen said.
The latest agreement will not be as comprehensive as the one recently concluded between the EU and Mercosur countries Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.
Last week, several Green lawmakers in Brussels voted in favour of referring the bloc’s deal with Mercosur to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which could result in a substantial delay to ratification. Their votes were decisive in passing the motion, prompting severe criticism for the party in Germany, whose export-led economy stands to benefit from the boost to trade.
In a paper, the Green leadership has said that Germany needs “new economic partnerships” to diversify foreign trade. “That is why it is important to provisionally apply the agreement with the Mercosur countries and then ratify it,” the paper continued. (January 27)
The European Union is bringing out the big guns in the face of widespread outrage over the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) violating people’s privacy and dignity.
Brussels is considering the possibility of classifying the creation of sexual deepfakes as a prohibited practice under the Artificial Intelligence Act following the scandal involving sexualised images created by Grok AI, the chatbot integrated into Elon Musk’s X platform.
Grok outrage
Musk’s company xAI – after prolonged international criticism – has introduced new restrictions in mid-January on sexually suggestive AI-generated images in Grok. The move follows criticism that Grok allowed users to digitally replace women’s clothing with bikinis and, in some cases, create sexualised depictions of minors.
The first images of people being stripped naked without consent (“nudification”) began circulating in the days following the release of the feature, but their spread increased particularly around New Year’s Eve. According to CNN, between January 5 and 6 alone, Grok was used to generate at least 6,700 sexual images. These often involved women or minors.
“Grok is now offering a ‘spicy mode’ showing explicit sexual content with some output generated with childlike images. This is not spicy. This is illegal. This is appalling,” EU digital affairs spokesman Thomas Regnier told reporters back then.
The European Commission, which acts as the bloc’s digital watchdog, said it would take note of new measures taken by X and would review them. Officials warned that if the steps prove insufficient, the EU will consider using the full scope of its Digital Services Act (DSA).
European Commission Vice-President Henna Virkkunen has stated that the Commission is considering explicitly banning these types of AI-generated sexual images under the AI Act, classifying them as unacceptable risks.
The prohibition of harmful practices in the field of AI could be relevant to addressing the issue of non-consensual sexual deepfakes and child pornography, said Virkkunen, who is also the responsible commissioner for Tech Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, at this week’s plenary session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg. She also said the DSA mitigated the risk of online sexual material being disseminated without consent.
She also recalled that the Commission had sent a request for information to X regarding Grok as part of its investigation into the platform under the DSA.
The platform was asked to preserve all internal documents and data relating to it until the end of the year. “We are now examining the extent to which X may in any case be in breach of the DSA and will not hesitate to take further action if the evidence suggests it,” she said.
The Commission had previously stepped up pressure on X, which was fined 120 million Euro in early December over transparency violations. The EU has insisted it will enforce its rules despite causing backlash from the US administration.
“The DSA is very clear in Europe. All platforms have to get their own house in order, because what they’re generating here is unacceptable, and compliance with EU law is not an option. It’s an obligation,” Regnier said at the height of the scandal in early January.
Last week, a group of about 50 MEPs had called on the Commission to ban artificial intelligence apps used to create nude images from the EU market.
Illustration: 12 July 2025: In this photo illustration, the xAI Grok logo is seen displayed on a smartphone screen. Grok is a generative artificial intelligence chatbot developed by xAI. Photo: Algi Febri Sugita/ZUMA Press Wire/dpa
Can’t live without X
Despite criticism of X, nearly all senior EU officials continue to post there rather than on European alternatives, according to research by dpa.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and other top officials still do not have official accounts on Mastodon, a Germany-based alternative. Virkkunen opened an official Mastodon account in January. High-ranking EU politicians are also active on Bluesky, another US-based platform currently gaining traction.
The Commission justifies continued use of X due to its reach: Mastodon has roughly 750,000 monthly users, compared with 100 million on X, according to the companies.
The long legal path towards better safety online
The path towards protection of minors in the EU is long-winded as concerns of privacy, business and protection clash. Several regulations intersect:
Chat Control
The Commission in 2022 proposed a regulation to require platforms to detect and report images and videos of abuse (child sexual abuse material or CSAM), as well as attempts by predators to contact minors.
The final legislation is expected to be negotiated in early 2026, aiming to bridge the gap between Parliament’s privacy-focused approach and the EU Council’s desire for broad voluntary scanning powers.
While extending temporary voluntary scanning measures until April 2026 to avoid a legal vacuum, MEPs have expressed urgency for a permanent solution.
October 9, 2025, Berlin: Members of the alliance “Stop Chat Control!” demonstrate in front of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Civil society organizations demonstrate in front of the Federal Ministry of the Interior in Berlin against the planned EU-wide chat control and hand over more than 300,000 signatures. Photo: Fabian Sommer/dpa
DSA
The European Union uses the Digital Services Act to sanction online platforms by imposing massive fines, requiring immediate operational changes, and – as a last resort – temporarily suspending their services. It can apply fines if platforms violate DSA obligations, fail to comply with interim measures or breach commitments.
It is an EU regulation for a safer online world, requiring platforms to tackle illegal content, protect users, and increase transparency.
AI Act
The AI Act was adopted in 2024 and is the world’s first and only comprehensive legal framework in the artificial intelligence context. It establishes a risk-based system to regulate AI technologies within the EU, aiming to ensure they are safe, trustworthy, and respect fundamental rights while fostering innovation.
It bans certain unacceptable AI practices, such as social scoring, and sets rules for areas of high risk for AI use – like in critical infrastructure or employment. It also sets out restrictions on manipulative AI uses such as deepfakes targeting children, among others.
Social media bans
France, which is considering banning social media for children under 15, has been testing an age verification app developed by the European Commission since this summer. This tool is one of several methods used to verify the age of internet users, which is a headache for tech giants and authorities alike.
Individual efforts
The Spanish Minister of Youth and Children, Sira Rego, in early January asked the attorney general’s office to investigate whether Grok may be committing crimes related to the dissemination of child sexual abuse material.
Currently, Spain is developing its own law for the protection of minors in digital environments. The law strengthens the framework for protecting personal integrity and privacy against new forms of violation linked to the use of technologies such as artificial intelligence, reaffirming that the best interests of the child must always prevail over any digital business model.
Bulgaria has stepped up efforts to combat online child sexual abuse through international law enforcement cooperation, national prevention campaigns and policy discussions aligned with EU legislation. In 2025, Bulgarian authorities took part in a major international operation that shut down Kidflix, one of the world’s largest platforms for child sexual exploitation, used between 2022 and 2025 by nearly 2 million users.
Romania has legislative mechanisms in place to combat child sexual abuse material through its criminal code, and the authorities are seeking to expand and modernise these rules.
Since 2025 an important bill on the protection of children online (called the Online Age of Majority Law) has been under parliamentary debate, and Romania is also gradually participating in and implementing EU rules on the prevention and combating of online sexual abuse. The Online Age of Majority Law introduces mandatory age verification and parental consent for minors (under 16) to access online services such as social media, gaming and streaming platforms.
EU candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina still has no specific law regulating this area. In BiH, criminal liability for the production, distribution and possession of such material is based on criminal laws that cover the sexual exploitation of children, but do not contain explicit provisions on AI-generated or simulated content.
The EU has put into place a set of complementary tools and measures to protect its citizens – young and old – from harmful practices online, but weak points include challenges in enforcement, algorithmic amplification of harm, inconsistent national implementation, and debates over balancing security with privacy.
This article is an ENR Key Story. The content is based on information published by ENR participating agencies.
Davos, Switzerland (dpa) – German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has blasted the European Parliament for referring the contested EU free trade deal with four countries from the South American Mercosur bloc to court.
“I deeply regret that the European Parliament has put another obstacle in our way,” Merz told political and business leaders at the World Economic Forum in Davos on Thursday. “But rest assured, we will not be stopped. The Mercosur deal is fair and balanced. There is no alternative to it if we want to have higher growth in Europe.”
Merz said he expects the trade deal to be implemented “provisionally” despite the Parliament’s challenge.
The European Parliament voted on Wednesday to have the Mercosur trade deal, which was signed last week following decades of painstaking negotiations, reviewed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
Waiting for the court’s opinion could significantly delay the ratification process for the agreement with Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. It is unclear how long it will take for the judges at the ECJ in Luxembourg to submit their assessment, but previous assessments took between 16 and 26 months.
The agreement, which aims to remove trade barriers and customs duties and boost the exchange of goods and services, would create one of the largest free trade zones in the world. (22 January)
European Union countries are rushing to find a joint response to threats by US President Donald Trump to impose an additional 10-percent tariff on goods from several European allies from February 1.
EU leaders are set to meet in Brussels on Thursday after Trump threatened that eight European countries would face higher tariffs until the United States secures what he described as the “complete and total purchase” of Greenland.
The US repeatedly said it wants the mineral-rich autonomous Danish territory of Greenland for “national security”, despite it already having a base on the island and long established security agreements with fellow NATO ally Denmark, which has controlled the Arctic island for about 300 years.
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom recently sent a small number of soldiers on a reconnaissance mission to Greenland as a sign of solidarity with Denmark, which is pushing back against Trump’s takeover ambitions.
“We won’t be blackmailed, and we stand together in solidarity in Europe,” said German Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil, arriving in Brussels on Monday for two days of previously planned talks with his EU counterparts. “We don’t want an escalation. We are not looking for an escalation, but we are ready if it comes,” Klingbeil said.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni – considered one of Trump’s few allies in the EU – has called the new tariff threat a “mistake”.
In a different threat scenario, Trump also ramped up his rhetoric against France on Tuesday, warning he would impose 200 percent tariffs on French wine and champagne over its intentions to decline his invitation to join his “Board of Peace” set up to oversee the rebuilding of Gaza.
French President Emmanuel Macron said at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos (Switzerland) on Tuesday: “What doesn’t make sense is to have tariffs between allies. We have to fix the war in Ukraine, we have to help the Ukrainians resist, and find a sustainable peace.”
Macron called the possibility of potentially activating the Anti-Coercion Instrument against the US “crazy” and added: “I do regret that. But this is a consequence of just unpredictability and useless aggressivity.”
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has warned Trump not to plunge transatlantic relations into a dangerous downward spiral over Greenland. “This is why the proposed additional tariffs are a mistake, especially between long-standing allies,” she said in Davos.
Arctic security can only be achieved together.
This is why the proposed additional tariffs are a mistake, especially between long-standing allies.
The EU and US have agreed to a trade deal last July.
Washington mayhem tests transatlantic alliance and post-WWII order
The leader of global rights group Amnesty International, Agnes Callamard,urged European countries Monday to stop “appeasing” Trump and to resist him and other “bullies” who she said were intent on destroying the rules-based order in place since World War II.
Since Trump’s return to the White House a year ago, he has taken “a range of decisions that have led to the demise of many rules around the world”, while Russia was destroying the system “through its aggression in Ukraine”, the human rights organisation’s secretary general told AFP in an interview in Davos.
The post-WWII order “is also being destroyed by Israel that has completely ignored international law in its genocide of Palestinians in Gaza”, she added.
Furthermore, European powers have been treading a thin line over Ukraine in recent months, relying on Washington to try to help settle the conflict but resisting terms too favourable to Moscow.
Trump meanwhile has put the transatlantic alliance to the test with threats to take over Greenland “one way or the other”, as European countries close ranks against Washington’s designs on the vast Danish autonomous territory.
In a message to Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store, Trump said “I no longer feel an obligation to think purely of Peace”, citing his failure to win last year’s Nobel Peace Prize despite openly coveting it. He said although peace would still be “predominant”, he could “now think about what is good and proper for the United States of America”.
Store said in a statement: “I have clearly explained, including to President Trump, what is well known – the prize is awarded by an independent Nobel Committee”, not the Norwegian government.
Danish soldiers disembark at the port of Nuuk. Photo: Mads Claus Rasmussen/Ritzau Scanpix Photo/AP/dpa
NATO ramps up Greenland presence amid search for unity
Amid the global tensions, Denmark is proposing that NATO start surveillance operations in Greenland, with the support of the Arctic island, Defence Minister Troels Lund Poulsen said Monday after meeting NATO’s chief Mark Rutte. The precise details of the proposal and the response from Rutteremain unknown.
While a number of NATO allies have sent troops to Greenland or have announced plans to do so despite the risk of additional US tariffs being imposed on them, others remain reluctant and divided over the move.
Belgium is sending a liaison officer to Greenland. Despite this decision, the country was not included on Trump’s list of sanctioned countries on Saturday. “But there is no guarantee that this will not be the case in the future and we must show solidarity with our colleagues”, Foreign minister Maxime Prévot said. He called the American measures “incomprehensible and unnecessarily hostile”.
Likewise, Slovenia on Saturday announced it would deploy two Armed Forces officers to Greenland to take part in the planning and implementation of the Danish-led international military exercise Arctic Endurance.
Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk – whose country is a staunch NATO ally with the highest defence expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) in the EU – already said last week the country was “not planning to send Polish soldiers to Greenland”.
Contrary to false claims on social media that Germany had sent warships to Greenland, the country did send 15 soldiers to the island for a reconnaissance mission. The troops however left Greenland on Sunday after the mission was completed on schedule, according to the Ministry of Defence.
Spain has not announced plans to participate in the mission in Greenland. Defence Minister Margarita Robles however said recently that the country could join the group in the future.
At the same time, some NATO allies are still navigating how the Greenland dispute plays out in their domestic political debates.
Asked on Monday whether the government of the Czech Republic supports Greenland, Prime Minister Andrej Babiš said he could not give a clear answer. He added that the United States is the leader of NATO and that conflicts are counterproductive. “We definitely prefer that an agreement be reached within the alliance. It would be very unfortunate if there were to be any conflicts,” Babiš said.
In Bulgaria, political reactions are mixed. The outgoing government has not issued a position on the recent developments around Greenland, but reactions from parliament have begun to emerge.
On the one hand, the leader of Continue the Change – a party affiliated at European level with Renew Europe – Assen Vassilev, said that every country should have the right to determine its own future, rather than having its choices dictated by external powers.
On the other hand, Revival (Vazrazhdane) – whose MEPs sit with the Europe of Sovereign Nations Group in the European Parliament – backs the US claims over Greenland. Party leader Kostadin Kostadinov reiterated the party’s call for Bulgaria to withdraw from NATO and argued that tensions between Washington and Copenhagen expose deeper structural problems within both NATO and the European Union.
Slovakia’s Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár said “Slovakia considers Greenland to be part of Denmark”. He rejected tariff battles between states: “We prefer diplomacy and peace, not tension or fighting,” he said.
EU “trade bazooka” on standby
EU leaders will meet in Brussels on Thursday to discuss a coordinated response to the prospect of US tariffs – with its most powerful trade tool on the table.
The Anti-Coercion Instrument, a mechanism adopted in 2023, that can be used in cases of economic coercion when a non-EU country attempts to pressure the bloc or one of its 27 members into making a decision through trade restrictions.
Such practices “unduly interfere with the legitimate sovereign choices of the European Union and its member states”, the European Commission says on its website.
France had signalled its intention to request the activation of the instrument after Trump announced on Saturday that he would impose additional tariffs on the eight NATO allies.
To apply the instrument, the European Commission first has to examine whether economic coercion is present in the case. EU countries must then back the Commission’s conclusion, before the EU’s executive arm ideally enters into talks with the country. If these are unsuccessful, the EU can impose countermeasures.
Retaliatory measures under the ACI however are only a last resort and must be proportionate. Using it against the United States would be ”the very first time” the EU has ever applied the tool, Macron recalled in Davos on Tuesday.
Should the ACI be applied over Trump’s latest trade threats, retaliatory tariffs on imports of US goods are likely. The EU-US tariff agreement concluded in July could also be put on hold.
Under discussion is also the possibility of imposing additional tariffs on a list of goods with a total trade volume of 93 billion Euro (108 billion Dollar), including industrial and agricultural goods such as motorcycles, beef, whiskey and citrus fruits.
This article is an ENR Key Story. The content is based on information published by ENR participating agencies.
Growing popularity of electric vehicles (EVs) from China is causing headaches for European carmakers – and for Brussels, with national governments clamouring for protection for their national champions.
The European Commission, which is in charge of trade policies for the bloc, has to square the circle between avoiding a trade war and injecting some life into the idling economy.
In one recent step the EU is attempting to introduce minimum prices for Chinese made EVs to offset subsidies instead of slapping on more tariffs.
The EU in 2024 had introduced tariffs of up to 35.3 percent on EVs imported from China after an anti-subsidy probe concluded that the country’s support undercut European automakers. Manufacturers in China benefit from unfair subsidies that give them a significant advantage in the European market. Since then, the two sides have been engaged in talks to find other solutions.
How cheap is too cheap?
Under new guidelines published by the Commission last week, companies can commit to setting minimum prices for vehicles exported to the European Union in order to avoid the price surcharges. In addition, in the case of a corresponding offer, commitments to invest in the EU or to limit exports would be positively taken into account.
Such offers would be assessed objectively and fairly by the Commission, according to the new guidelines. A prerequisite for acceptance is that the measures eliminate the damaging effects of subsidies and have an effect equivalent to the tariffs.
The published document was “intended to provide guidance to Chinese exporters who may be considering submitting price undertaking offers for exports of battery electric vehicles to the EU, which are currently subject to countervailing duties,” Commission spokesman Olof Gill said.
He said that at present, the Commission has received one price undertaking offer, without specifying which company or for which model. He added that the Commission is ready to consider other proposals, provided that they “adequately address the unfair competitive advantage” and demonstrate that they are “feasible in practice”.
Leading German automotive expert Ferdinand Dudenhöffer, head of the private institute Center Automotive Research (CAR), was sceptical of the effects of the minimum prices could have on competition.
According to EU calculations, manufacturers in China benefit from unfair subsidies that give them a price advantage of around 20 percent on the European market. For this reason, tariffs ranging from 7.8 to 35.3 percent were imposed from 2024, depending on the manufacturer. German and US companies that manufacture in China are also affected. In retaliation, China imposed special tariffs on EU goods such as spirits, pork, and dairy products.
According to CAR, Chinese manufacturers sell their models in the EU at an average markup of 118 percent on top of the domestic price. “Given the current price level in Europe, there should still be significant scope for Chinese manufacturers to reduce prices,” said Dudenhöffer.
Pressure from all sides
According to the latest report by the EU research agency Eurofound, the automotive industry in the EU directly employs around 6 million workers and another 6 million in related sectors.
Since 2019, the pace of job losses in the sector has clearly accelerated. In 2024 alone and at the beginning of 2025, layoffs announced by European companies affected around 100,000 jobs.
The largest employment losses have been recorded in countries with a strong presence of Europe’s biggest car manufacturers. In France, a structural decline is feared, while since 2019 job cuts have also affected Germany, Italy, and, to a lesser extent, Spain. Central and Eastern European countries – Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia – are facing the relocation of production outside the EU to countries with lower labor costs.
This is happening because sales of cars originating from China, including electric vehicles (EVs), are increasing in the EU. In practice, some of these cars on EU markets are not only models of Chinese brands but also vehicles produced in China for Western brands.
ARCHIVE – November 20, 2025, Saxony, Leipzig: A Volkswagen electric vehicle is charging at a charging station using a yellow cable. Photo: Jan Woitas/dpa
German auto angst
Germany, for many years a global carmaking powerhouse, is facing a dilemma. Demand for EVs is rising, but it is not just the battery powered Volkswagens or BMWs customers are flocking to – and the long-term outlook is dire.
Electric vehicle sales rebounded strongly in Germany in 2025, according to official data from early January this year, with Chinese manufacturers making inroads from a low base in the EU’s largest economy despite tariffs.
EV sales rose 43.2 percent last year to 545,142 in total, the KBA federal transport authority said, representing 19.1 percent of all new cars sold.
Chinese EV giant BYD – which last year overtook Elon Musk’s Tesla to become the worlds largest electric carmaker – saw its German sales rise over 700 percent to more than 23,000 cars, giving it 0.8 percent of the overall auto market.
“International vehicle manufacturers with affordable battery electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids have contributed disproportionately to growth in these segments,” said Imelda Labbé, head of the VDIK foreign carmakers’ lobby in Germany.
The rise in EV sales last year comes after a fall of almost 30 percent in 2024 following the withdrawal of government subsidies, and Germany’s electric car market is still smaller than optimists had hoped for. After the decline in the market in 2024, the government said in December it would introduce subsidies again.
Some motorists will be able to benefit from 5,000 Euro for the purchase of new EVs or hybrids so long as their components are largely made in Germany. But industry figures say that better charging infrastructure and cheaper power would be needed to really boost EVs and warned that the planned subsidy would have limited impact.
On the other hand, German carmakers have been reporting strong declines in vehicle sales in China. Volkswagen said in January its sales dropped by 8 percent in 2025 year-on-year, as it was facing intense competition on the Chinese market from local producers. Mercedes-Benz reported a 19 percent decline in sales for the year, while BMW sold 12,5 percent fewer cars in China.
German manufacturers like Mercedes or VW sell about 30 percent of their cars on the Chinese market.
The tug-of-war affects not just major players, but the automotive sector across the continent.
Bulgaria for example is not a major car producer, but it is increasingly important as a supplier of automotive components to European manufacturers. The sector has grown into one of the country’s strongest industrial branches, generating close to 11 billion Euro in annual turnover, according to business media and industry analyses.
This means that it is indirectly exposed to the EU-China trade dispute over electric vehicles: weaker competitiveness of European carmakers could reduce orders for Bulgarian suppliers, while a recovery in EV sales in core markets such as Germany would have the opposite effect.
At the same time, Chinese manufacturers are not only exporting cars to Europe but are also expanding production and partnerships within the EU, with Bulgaria being increasingly part of China’s automotive strategy in Southeast Europe according to analysts.
For Bulgaria, this creates a mixed impact: EU trade measures may protect European carmakers, but Chinese localization in Europe could also open new opportunities for Bulgarian suppliers.
Dudenhöffer expects the sector to shrink in the next years in Germany and Europe, as manufacturers shift their production to the US or Asia, he said in his market forecast for 2026.
“Growth is taking place in Asia, and Asian car manufacturers (Japan, Korea, China) are increasingly dominating the car business.”
Ferdinand Dudenhöffer, German Automotive Expert
Fading from Green to Petrol
And then there are of course the EU’s green policies: The EU in December rolled back a 2035 ban on new petrol and diesel cars seen as a milestone in the fight against climate change, as the bloc pivots to bolstering its crisis-hit auto sector.
Under proposals slammed by green groups as an act of “self-sabotage”, carmakers will have to cut exhaust emissions from new vehicles by 90 percent from 2021 levels – down from an envisaged 100 percent.
This means that in practice automakers will still be able to sell a limited number of polluting vehicles – from plug-in hybrids to diesel cars – beyond 2035, provided the resulting emissions are “compensated” in various ways.
The EU’s Industry Commissioner, Stéphane Séjourné, insisted the bloc’s green ambitions stood intact as he put forward a plan billed as a “lifeline” for Europe’s auto industry.
The combustion-engine ban was hailed as a major win in the climate fight and a key tool to drive investments in electrification when adopted in 2023.
The compromise plan was slammed by both environmentalists and industry groups.
While the EU had recognised that remaining open to different technologies was important, its proposal was “fraught with so many obstacles it threatens to remain ineffective in practice”, the president of the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA), Hildegard Müller, said. “In times of increasing international competition, in times when European economic power is crucial, this overall package from Brussels is disastrous.”
The future of German car manufacturers – and by extension automakers in other EU member states – is closely linked to the Chinese market.
According to Dudenhöffer, they must develop and build electric cars “in China for China”. In this context, he criticised the softening of the combustion engine phase-out. He said it was not possible to disconnect from developments, but that it is necessary to face competition in the tough Chinese market. “If you’re not in China, you’re not in the car business.”
This article is an ENR Key Story. The content is based on information published by ENR participating agencies.
Brussels (dpa) – European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen unveiled on Wednesday details on how the European Union is to support Ukraine with 90 billion Euro over the next two years, including 60 billion Euro to bolster the military.
“We all want peace for Ukraine and for that Ukraine must be in a position of strength,” von der Leyen said in Brussels, weeks before the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The loan package is to provide “stable and predictable funding” and “reaffirms Europe’s unwavering commitment to the security, the defence and the future prosperity of Ukraine,” von der Leyen said.
Two-thirds of the funds are earmarked for military support.
Ukraine is required to spend the money on Ukrainian and European-built equipment but can acquire weaponry from abroad if the needed equipment is not available in Europe, von der Leyen said.
“With the military assistance, Ukraine can stand strong against Russia and, at the same time, it can integrate more closely into Europe’s defence industrial base,” she said.
The remaining 30 billion Euro is meant to support Kyiv’s budgetary needs but are tied to further reforms in the areas of democracy, rule of law and anti-corruption measures.
The conditions are “to make sure that Ukraine moves forward on its path of accession to the European Union” and are “non-negotiable for any financial support,” the Commission president said.
Von der Leyen said she hopes the first disbursement to Kyiv can be done as early as April, once the European Parliament and capitals have scrutinised the proposal. (14 January)
Die Ukraine ist finanziell ein Fass ohne Boden, oder, wie es in Washington formuliert wurde, ein „Schwarzes Loch“. Daher ist es interessant, sich anzuschauen, wie viel die Bürger der verschiedenen europäischen Länder in den letzten Jahren pro Kopf für die Unterstützung der Ukraine bezahlt haben und bis heute bezahlen, denn auch die Dynamik der Zahlungen […]
Britain’s far-right, anti-immigration party, Reform UK, has announced that it would stop immigrants from France with the biggest military operation in the English Channel since the Second World War.
Unveiling the proposal, dubbed “Operation Fortress”, Reform leader Nigel Farage said at a press conference that asylum seekers arriving in small boats from France will be detained and sent back.
“Under a Reform government, within a fortnight, there would be no more boats,” Farage declared, claiming the plan would render Britain’s borders “impenetrable.”
Farage, whose party has recently lost its lead in national opinion polls for the first time in more than a year amid controversies over donations and gifts to senior figures, pointed to the recent migrant surge into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta.
Roughly 60,000 people crossed from Morocco over a few days in late July, with at least 72 deaths from drownings and crushes at the breakwater barriers. “What happened in Ceuta over the weekend shows you just how serious this situation is,” he told reporters.
The Reform UK party has reportedly proposed a joint military command drawing units from the British Army, Royal Navy, Royal Marines, and RAF, supported by a specialized surveillance command to track vessels. The military would stop unauthorized boats, hold those on board, and return them on navy ships. The party said it would introduce emergency legislation “as necessary” to give the command any extra powers required.
“When you think about it, what is the Royal Navy for? If the Royal Navy is not there to protect this country from invasion, then, frankly, I can’t see what its purpose is,” Farage said at the press conference.
Reform UK has said it wants to launch “the largest military operation in the English Channel since World War Two” to stop small boat arrivals.
A Nigel Farage-led government would send the Royal Navy to intercept migrant boats there and return them to France or Belgium.
The French Interior Ministry condemned the plan, telling AFP it “would be a violation of French sovereignty as well as a violation of maritime law and international law.”
While the ruling Labor Party vociferously opposed the Reform proposal, Prime Minister Andy Burnham pledged to make “relentless” efforts to halt asylum seekers after new data revealed that over 2,000 people had entered Britain since he took office two weeks ago.
Several former service personnel, particularly ex-Royal Navy officers, have strongly criticized and dismissed Reform UK’s “Operation Fortress” proposal.
The Royal Navy is there to protect this country from invasion and that is what I intend to use it for. pic.twitter.com/jbvTUTEzZR
For example, Retired Royal Navy Commander Tom Sharpe questioned the “substance” of the concept, adding that the navy lacks ships to conduct the operation. “A billion-pound warship that’s configured for anti-air warfare or anti-submarine warfare, which are both threats to the UK, is not best used ferrying people around. You’re better off using an actual ferry,” Sharpe told BBC Radio 4’s Today program.
The concept “sounds magnificent, provided you know nothing about ships, sailors, France, or the law,” said Andrew Fox, a former paratrooper and senior associate fellow at the Henry Jackson Society think tank. He noted that London won’t be able to move warships into French territorial waters, seize boats, or disembark passengers without French permission.
Ben Obese-Jecty, a Conservative MP and former British army officer, dismissed the proposal as “ridiculous”, adding that Reform had announced this ridiculous idea before. Additionally, he pointed out in a post on X that Reform UK’s “Operation Fortress” poster uses the image of HMS Ocean, which was sold to Brazil in 2018.
Via Reform UK. Edited by Grok
Meanwhile, Former Royal Navy officer John Foreman CBE dismissed the plan bluntly as “a crock of shit,” in a post on X.
Undeterred by the criticism, Farage justified his proposal, saying, ”humanitarian missions do not violate maritime or international law,” and the party defiantly vowed to “stand up for British interests,” whether French President Emmanuel Macron “likes it or not.”
While experts from both the military and legal domains believe that the proposal is unfeasible, Farage’s call for “the largest military operation” after World War II has created quite a stir and brought back memories of the actual biggest military operations in the channel that changed the face of the WW2 and reversed Germany’s fortunes.
The Largest Operation In The English Channel
The English Channel saw intense, sustained naval warfare throughout the Second World War. However, two operations in particular stand out for sheer scale and are the clear historical benchmarks that Farage invoked.
One of these operations came to be known as Operation Dynamo, or Dunkirk Evacuation, which took place between May 26, 1940, and June 4, 1940.
In May 1940, German forces invaded the Low Countries and France using Blitzkrieg tactics. They rapidly advanced, cutting off the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and large numbers of French and Belgian troops. Thus, the Allies were driven back towards the English Channel and found themselves trapped in a shrinking pocket around the port of Dunkirk, with their backs to the sea and the prospect of annihilation or capture.
This necessitated an evacuation. Vice Admiral Bertram Ramsay directed the rescue operation from the tunnels beneath Dover Castle.
Allied evacuation of Dunkirk-Wikipedia
The Dunkirk harbor was heavily damaged by Luftwaffe bombing, rendering its inner docks unusable. This meant that larger warships could not approach the shallow beaches stretching roughly ten miles east. So, a plan was hatched: two-thirds of the rescued troops boarded destroyers, minesweepers, and other ships from the East Mole, a 1,400-yard breakwater that extended into deeper water. Meanwhile, the remaining one-third were lifted from the open beaches at Malo-les-Bains, Bray-Dunes, and La Panne by small ships.
Nearly a thousand vessels, including Royal Navy destroyers, minesweepers, and merchant ships, formed the backbone of the effort, while hundreds of civilian “little ships” such as yachts, fishing boats, pleasure craft, and lifeboats, ferried men from the shallow beaches to the larger ships waiting offshore or carried them all the way to England.
The Luftwaffe subjected the harbor, beaches, and shipping to intense bombing, while the RAF fought to provide air cover at considerable cost.
Planners initially expected to save only about 45,000 men over a couple of days. However, as the operation progressed, roughly 338,000 troops, including around 224,000 British and some 120,000 French and other Allied soldiers, were brought safely across the Channel.
And, by the time the operation ended on 4 June, the bulk of the British Expeditionary Force had been saved.
The second major operation in the Channel was Operation Neptune, the codename for the naval and amphibious assault phase of the Allied invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944. This operation apparently formed the seaborne component of the larger Operation Overlord, the plan to liberate north-west Europe from German occupation, and remains the largest seaborne invasion in history.
Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay of the Royal Navy commanded the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force. The fleet was organized into two task forces: the Western Task Force for the American beaches and the Eastern Task Force for the British and Canadian beaches.
Allied forces assembled in ports along the southern coast of England, then crossed the English Channel overnight on 5–6 June 1944 to land on the beaches of Normandy in German-occupied France. The distance varied by route and beach but was typically between about 60 and 100 miles.
The naval armada of nearly 7,000 vessels transported troops, vehicles, and supplies through these waters under the protection of warships and air cover.
The successful execution of Neptune opened the long-awaited second front in Western Europe and marked the beginning of the final campaign against Nazi Germany.
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
Marine Le Pen’s candidacy for president means Europeans should brace for the possibility of a France wholly different to the one they know.
A Rassemblement National government would be hostile to the EU and a disruptive partner on numerous issues facing Europe; including on Russia, enlargement, climate and migration.
The party is divided over whether and how to work with other right-wing parties in France; and how to position the country within Europe and the Western alliance.
Le Pen is likely to work in a “duo” with party leader, Jordan Bardella, but there are notable differences between their outlooks. Europeans should pay attention to these.
European political leaders would struggle to influence a Le Pen-led government, but nor should they expect a unified European far-right to emerge. They would be wise to begin their preparations now.
Note: This policy brief is a second edition of an earlier paper published on June 9th 2026. It updates the prior analysis in light of Marine Le Pen’s confirmation that she will run for the French presidency.
The restoration of a matriarch
In the early hours of November 2nd 1976, a bomb exploded outside the Paris home of the far-right leader Jean-Marie Le Pen and his family. The perpetrators were never found. His youngest daughter, Marine, 8 years old at the time of the attack, later seethed that the family was not shown “the slightest sign of solidarity or compassion” by the French authorities. Today, as Marine Le Pen launches into her fourth—and most competitive—bid for France’s presidency, that quote reveals something of the woman who might soon occupy the Elysée Palace. If she wins, European policymakers will need to understand this self-defined outsider and how her family’s and party’s long years in the political wilderness shape her domestic and international agenda.
That insurgent self-perception may seem odd now. After all, the National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN) is far ahead in polling for the first round of the election, is accepted by an increasing share of French polite society, and is close to some of the country’s most powerful economic elites. But it still explains why the rest of Europe should brace for the possibility of a French president who sees herself as a rebel against the country’s and the EU’s established norms and institutions. As this paper will argue, a Le Pen presidency of France would be a significantly more formidable challenge to European orthodoxies than Giorgia Meloni is in Italy or Viktor Orban was in Hungary.
*
Only one thing is certain about the result of France’s presidential election next year: President Emmanuel Macron’s decade in power will come to an end. Who replaces him is an open question, with any number of conceivable outcomes. The exact field of candidates is not yet clear, not even in Macron’s centrist camp, where two former prime ministers—Édouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal—are vying for primacy. French presidential election campaigns are often volatile; both those in 2017 and 2022 saw major shifts over the half-year before polling day. But current polling suggests that the RN party candidate is on track to win the first round, on April 18th 2027, and to enjoy good prospects in the second, due on May 2nd.
The RN went through months of speculation over who would represent it at the presidential election. In March 2025, Marine Le Pen was convicted of embezzling European parliamentary funds and received a five-year ban on standing for election. Over recent months, Jordan Bardella, the RN’s untested young leader and Le Pen’s protégé, was talked about as the party’s best hope.
On July 7th 2026, however, the Court of Appeal reduced Le Pen’s ineligibility penalty, which enabled her to run. It also required her to serve a year of house arrest with an electronic ankle tag. That evening, Le Pen announced that she would seek the presidency and would appeal to the Court of Cassation. The penalty is suspended until France’s highest court rules on the case, which could take place as late as April 2027.
Her candidacy has significant implications for the rest of Europe. Le Pen is an experienced campaigner and an established (though also divisive) figure in France. Her bid for the presidency is perhaps more likely to survive the heat of the campaign than a Bardella run would have. The fact that she is the candidate probably increases the chances of the French far-right coming to power for the first time since Marshal Pétain, the puppet leader of Vichy France.
Le Pen is marked by the RN’s long years in the wilderness. She believes in radical solutions. As president, she would likely be a confrontational and abrasive force in Europe.
To reiterate, the outcome of the election remains wide open. But the scale of the potential rupture of a Le Pen win means policymakers elsewhere in Europe must both understand the RN and prepare for that eventuality. To that end, the authors of this paper have extensively researched the party’s Europe and foreign policies. The following study is based on in-depth interviews with an array of senior RN figures and external experts as well as analysis of the party’s speeches, legislative proposals, voting records and electoral programmes. The result is a series of five theses about what a Le Pen win next year would mean for Europe.
Understanding an RN presidency
Point 1: Marine Le Pen’s candidacy reaffirms her primacy inside the RN, although her duo with Bardella will endure
Marine Le Pen’s decision to run for president despite her upheld conviction—and in contradiction of her own prior statements—is a reminder of her centrality to the RN. She is still the party’s dominant leader. The decision also dispelled the illusion that Bardella constitutes a real alternative to her leadership. It showed that today’s RN is still Marine Le Pen’s inheritance and achievement.
The party was founded as the National Front (FN) in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen, along with French former members of the Waffen-SS and other nostalgists for colonial French Algeria. It drew together different threads of the far-right. For decades most French citizens considered it beyond the pale. When Jean-Marie Le Pen narrowly made it into the second round of the 2002 presidential election, it shocked both France and Europe. He was roundly defeated by 82% to 18% by then-president Jacques Chirac.
Taking the reins of the party from her father in 2011, however, Marine Le Pen pursued a strategy of “dédiabolisation” (“detoxification”). This saw her expel Jean-Marie from the party in 2015 over his racist and anti-Semitic comments. After her resounding defeat to Macron in 2017 she intensified the process, renaming the party and dropping its commitment to “Frexit” (leaving the EU).
In 2019, she appointed a fresh-faced young activist from a deprived Paris suburb to lead the RN’s campaign for the European Parliament election. Jordan Bardella delivered the party’s first ever first-placed result in a national election and was rewarded with the RN presidency in 2021. He would play a central role in the party’s 2022 presidential campaign—a much closer contest—and in its triumphant win in the 2024 European vote. Le Pen further empowered Bardella when she announced he would be her choice for prime minister. When it looked like she might be banned from running, Bardella became her natural replacement as a presidential hopeful.
Nevertheless, despite Bardella’s rapid rise and growing public profile, the RN remains firmly in Le Pen’s hands. For nearly half a century, the promotion of family members, such as Marine Le Pen’s niece Marion Maréchal, and significant turnover among the lower levels of the party has kept power within the Le Pen clan. Many of the party’s cadres remain more loyal to her than to Bardella, and were determined that she should run rather than him.
Now that the party is back behind its leader, Le Pen will continue to highlight the duo she forms with Bardella—as she did on prime-time television when she launched her campaign. She once again promised to make him prime minister if she becomes president. Running a “ticket” for the French presidency is unprecedented and anathema to the function. But it has a distinct advantage: broadening her voter coalition while keeping the party together.
Le Pen’s own political base has two main parts. First, an anti-elite and disaffected working- and middle-class electorate in the northern post-industrial Pas-de-Calais region that she has represented since 1998 (as a councillor, MEP and in the National Assembly), And, second, a chain of strongholds along the Mediterranean coast, which adhere to long-term RN positions hostile to immigration and taxes.
By contrast, Bardella appears more economically liberal and temperamentally closer to other parts of the French right, including the conservative flank of the Republicans (LR, the rump centre-right force) and culturally reactionary forces like Éric Zemmour’s far-right Reconquest. He is also more engaged with the wider European right, especially Meloni in Italy. Within the RN itself this aligns him more with a more bourgeois and younger new electorate.
Over the last year, Bardella had even started to sand down some of the party’s most abrasive ideas. Where Le Pen cleaves to some of the party’s old Putin-friendly instincts on Russia, he has spoken in defence of Ukraine’s sovereignty. He also broke from Le Pen on pensions reform, suggesting dropping the fixed retirement age and moving to a more contributory system. Where Le Pen went to Budapest to help out an embattled Orban, he struck a friendly tone towards Germany and even met with the country’s ambassador in Paris. All this created expectations in Brussels and other EU capitals that a President Bardella might be closer to the bloc’s economic orthodoxies and more open, at least, to compromises.
Le Pen’s candidacy firmly relegates him to a subordinate position within the party. Gone, too, is the spectre of a somewhat more conciliatory RN presence in the Elysée Palace if the party wins power next year. “Bardellism cannot exist, as it is ultimately Marinism”, Jean-Philippe Tanguy, a senior RN figure, has said. The reassertion of Le Pen’s primacy within the RN thus makes the party both more likely to take power and more likely to disrupt the rest of the EU and its foreign policies if it does.
Point 2: An RN presidency would be a rupture in French and European politics
France is a highly centralised state, and its president wields executive power more akin to an American president than to counterparts in its European neighbours. The country also remains a pivotal power in Europe as one of its two nuclear-armed countries and half of the Franco-German motor that long drove the European project.
News of an RN win would therefore send shockwaves around the continent, stunning the mainstream. It would also lift the spirits of much of Europe’s radical right after a difficult 2026 in which its pre-eminent governing leader, Orban, lost power and its links with Trump turned out to be liabilities. After all, the RN has been unapologetic in its support for fellow “patriots” across Europe. Le Pen campaigned for Orban, and Bardella has engaged closely with Meloni and her government in Italy and Nigel Farage’s Reform in the UK.
Farther afield, the RN has been increasingly welcomed by fellow nationalists like Israel’s Likud government, which hosted Bardella and other far-right leaders in 2025. The Trump administration has professed its own commitment to supporting “patriotic parties” and would react favourably to an RN win. This is despite Bardella’s and Le Pen’s efforts to cool their party’s earlier enthusiasm for the US president.
The RN would revel in the sense of rupture. In private, party leaders compare their potential accession to power to left-winger François Mitterrand’s historic victory in 1981—which they see as the only true political change France has undergone in the last 50 years.
*
Thus empowered, the RN would want to enact its programme. Although foreign and defence policy may not be its top policy priority, “fixing” France’s relationship with the EU is bound to be one.
In its 2019 and 2024 European election campaign manifesto, the RN suggested transforming the European Commission into a mere secretariat of the EU, leaving legislative initiative only to the European Council. The party decries attempts to expand qualified majority voting, refuses any new transfers of competencies on foreign and defence policy to the commission—and seeks European allies in that endeavour.
The RN is vehemently against EU common taxation and borrowing. Both Le Pen and Bardella have proposed slashing the French contribution to the EU budget (by “between €2bn and 3bn”, as Bardella suggested, equivalent to 9-14% of the French payment in 2024). RN MPs have already put forward severalamendments to the budgetary laws to that effect. In July, Bardella has even advocated reducing the contribution by half. In place of European joint spending, the party wants the creation of a sovereign wealth fund to back “sovereign industries” in defence, technology and energy.
The party’s antipathy towards NATO means it plans to prioritise national-level defence instead. The RN has committed to maintaining current defence spending, but argues this should support France’s own military-industrial infrastructure first and foremost. Even if it has paused an earlier plan to leave NATO’s integrated command, at least for “as long as the war [in Ukraine] goes on”, Le Pen revived the idea as recently as May 2026.
The strictly national principle applies to energy too. The RN has promised to lower French energy costs, notably by breaking from EU-wide electricity pricing (which often depends on gas prices less relevant to France’s nuclear-heavy energy system) and thus allegedly reducing the French retail price. And, despite claiming to be concerned about the consequences of climate change, the RN is relentless in its opposition to the European Green Deal and its insistence that French nuclear energy should exempt the country from EU climate strictures.
Overall, if Le Pen were to become president, the RN’s highly disruptive European agenda would inevitably put France on a path to confrontation with European partners and institutions. As the fight against the EU is both a symbolic and a policy priority for the RN, other European leaders may have to find a way to negotiate on some of the demands—that for a budget rebate, for example—in order to prevent French vetoes.
Point 3: The RN’s inexperience and lack of interest in foreign policy would make France an erratic partner, especially in a crisis
Europe’s best hope, in the event of a Le Pen presidency, may reside in the fact that foreign policy would not be the top priority for the RN in power.
First, the RN’s foreign policies often remain vague or only partially formed. Despite its long-standing presence in the French political landscape, the party has no national governing experience and only in 2022 won a significant share of seats in the National Assembly. With little network among the French diplomatic establishment, RN leaders have rarely engaged closely with foreign policy debates. The party prefers to hide behind references to General de Gaulle’s pro-independence foreign policy to justify criticisms of the EU or NATO without being too specific.
According to RN insiders, the party’s foreign policy decisions emanate from private discussions between Le Pen and Bardella, with the occasional counsel of the advisory group Les Horaces. If she attains power in 2027, Le Pen may seek to attract more experienced figures from the traditional right (from LR or UDR) or from the military to lead on top foreign policy positions.
Second, the RN is clearly prepared to change its tone on international topics when political expediency dictates. RN figures privately insist that foreign policy cannot win it elections, but can lose it ones. They blame Le Pen’s defeat in April 2022 on her failure convincingly to pivot away from Russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine two months earlier.
The party abandoned Frexit after the UK’s Brexit turned out to be a disaster. It curbed its old openness to strongmen such as Putin (repaying a contentious loan to a Russian bank in 2023) and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. In recent years, it attempted to erase its anti-Semitic past by adopting a strongly pro-Israel line. Since February 2022, the party has walked a tightrope: paying lip service to Ukraine’s right to self-defence while criticising sanctions against Russia as costly to French consumers and opposing some military aid to Kyiv as escalatory. Having greeted Trump’s re-election in 2024, the party has become a nimble critic as his erratic foreign policies have made alignment with him a political liability.
It is safe to assume, then, that, even with Le Pen as candidate, the party will tend towards orthodox language on most foreign policy ahead of the election. It has a vested interest in a campaign that focuses on topics such as immigration, crime and purchasing power (where the party is most confident), rather than one that debates France’s role in Europe or global geopolitics (where it is more uncertain and, in some cases, divided).
And even if the party wins power, the domestic agenda will likely come first. This can be summarised as: countering cultural and industrial decline by pursuing “national preference”. In policy terms it would include harsher law-and-order measures (especially on migration and crime), trade protectionism and efforts to reverse green policies in the hope of revitalising industry, and prioritising French nationals over foreigners in accessing welfare or public services. European partners should reckon on an RN presidency being most intransigent on EU matters related to those domestic priorities—and possibly being more open to negotiation in other areas.
In sum, however, they should expect a Le Pen foreign policy that is unclear, evolving or even contradictory. Under her leadership, France would take few initiatives and rather behave as a blocker. For example, it is hard to imagine an RN president responding decisively to a security crisis on Europe’s eastern flank. If under pressure from EU member states to be tougher on Russia, she would likely seek concessions and negotiations rather than further action.
If it does anything proactively, such a presidency would concentrate on disentangling France from EU policies that contradict its domestic goals. At best, the RN’s lack of interest and inexperience may be an opportunity for other European governments to shape some of the outcomes, as long as they keep their expectations low.
Point 4: How broad and how European? The strategic debates running through the RN
Today’s RN is infused by two strategic debates that would shape Le Pen’s tenure as president.
Movement or coalition?
The first has to do with the RN’s political identity: the party is struggling to determine whether it seeks to forge an union des droites (union of the right) or whether its outsider populist status remains its core identity.
In the long years the FN and the RN spent on the political margins, the Le Pens’ “neither left, nor right” approach appealed to disillusioned voters who rejected all forms of politics. It acknowledged the cordon sanitaire between the mainstream right and their parties. Even back in the FN days, Jean-Marie Le Pen crushed several internal attempts to unite the right. Marine Le Pen remains firmly opposed to any such efforts today.
If she is elected, it is unclear how Le Pen will position herself towards other right-of-centre French parties. Her instinct seems to be that working with them would dilute the RN and prevent it from conducting truly disruptive policies. Given her aversion to compromise and her long years of ostracism by the mainstream political class, Le Pen would struggle to extend a hand to others to form a majority in the National Assembly.
She may, however, continue using Bardella as a useful bridge to other parties of the right, at both national and European levels. In an interview with Le Figaro after Le Pen’s official launch of her presidential bid, he insisted that, as prime minister, he would seek to gather the right-wing electorate back to his party in order to build a “solid majority”.
It is reasonable to expect that, if Le Pen allows Bardella to forge these links at home, she will let him do so abroad too. If so, Bardella would continue building alliances with the European right spanning conservatives and various families of the radical right, likely with immigration as a focal point. The RN has already demonstrated its ability to build coalitions with other far-right parties and the European People’s Party to advance tougher migration legislation in the European Parliament. It would likely continue to do so if elected. Bardella has indicated that he wouldshare this agenda with leaders such as Meloni and German chancellor Friedrich Merz and seek to work with them.
Rival futures
The second faultline within the RN today is between rival conceptions of national sovereignty, a point that came across especially strongly in the authors’ interviews with senior party figures. Le Pen and the “old guard” around her have long held the view that France must resist Anglo-American hegemony and EU technocracy alike. They treat Washington and Brussels as equal threats to French autonomy.
Yet a new generation around Bardella—having come of age against the backdrop of the 2015 terror attacks in Paris and the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine—has adopted an identity-based sense of Europeanness. It acknowledges the need for European cooperation against common threats, as long as this cooperation is “chosen”. It is inclined to invoke a shared Western and European cultural affinity.
For example, on Russia and Ukraine, Le Pen and the old guard have continued to blame NATO’s enlargement for “provoking” Russia. This fits their antipathy to Washington and Brussels. Their old ideological affinities with Moscow as a counterweight to American hegemony allow them to imagine a future in which Russia might even be a partner in a multipolar order once the war ends. But Bardella has admitted the “naivety” of Europeans in the face of the Russian challenge. Despite a less-than-keenly pro-Ukrainian voting record in the European Parliament, he has also spoken in favour of Ukrainian national sovereignty and against Russian imperialism.
These debates will continue within the RN—especially because Le Pen has been unwilling to sweep aside Bardella’s “union of the right” and rhetorically “pro-Ukraine” positions. For as long as she wants the electoral breadth he brings, the tension will persist.
Point 5: The likeliest outcome of an RN presidency would be a more isolated France in a weaker EU
The disruptive nature of RN policies towards Europe means France’s relationship with European partners would deteriorate over time.
At first, the RN would likely seek to reassure the financial markets and its international partners. Victory for the party may be accompanied by protests and strikes, and the new government would face economic limitations like France’s high levels of debt. In this context, Le Pen may want to project stability. Nevertheless, the RN has promised to engage on a number of priorities that will put it at odds with other European governments—including those led by the right—as well as EU institutions.
Opting out of the EU-wide electricity pricing could push up prices for other member states; quitting the migration pact would put greater pressure on others; curbing the French contribution to the EU budget would force others to pay more and possibly trigger an infringement procedure. More generally, Paris governing in a spirit of French exceptionalism would roil Europe’s collective efforts on common challenges.
Enlargement could prove an especially inflammatory topic. Plenty of European governments have concerns about bringing Western Balkans countries, Moldova and especially Ukraine into the EU. But if the RN wins the French presidency, it will be the most outspokenly opposed government among major European states. It has warned that enlargement would ruin French agriculture and suppress French wages; intensify the EU budgetary demands on France; and further centralise power within the EU at the cost of individual states. The accession of Ukraine, with its vast agricultural industry, particularly alarms the RN.
The long-term result of these trends would likely be some degree of French isolation. The party’s policies and instincts would set Le Pen up for conflict with the European Commission—but also with other national governments, including right-wing counterparts. Although others in the EU might conceivably come around to RN doubts about enlargement, the insistence on French national priority will alienate even ideologically sympathetic forces elsewhere.
Tensions could emerge with other far-right leaders, such as Meloni, over issues like migration. Despite broad ideological alignment on reducing migration, the RN prioritises national sovereignty over the management of borders and migration flows. By contrast, Brothers of Italy has advocatedgreater EU coordination and burden-sharing. As a result, a cohesive far-right alliance at the EU level should not be taken for granted. If these conflicts escalate, an “empty chair” moment, where France simply withdraws from EU meetings as it did under de Gaulle in 1965, is not unthinkable.
At a time when nationalist parties are rising in other major EU states, including Germany, an RN presidency could encourage unilateralism there too. The result could be doubly paradoxical: a lonelier right-wing France in a more right-wing Europe, and a more nationalist France more exposed to the interference of external powers like China, Russia and the US.
How the rest of Europe can move into “brace position”
As the rest of Europe faces up to the possibility of President Le Pen, the risk is that leaders and other policymakers bunch around one of two poles: complacency (the over-confident belief that she could simply be “handled” like any other challenging leader); and panic (the fatalistic assumption that an RN-led France would automatically mean the beginning of the end of the European project). Of the two courses, the first—the assumption of business as usual—currently looks like the greater risk. But neither is advisable.
This paper has shown that an RN win is a real possibility and would herald great disruption for the EU and its place in the world. It has argued that a Le Pen presidency would see itself ultimately as a radical insurgency against the French and European establishment. But it has also explored some of the complexities and shed some light on how the rest of Europe should think about them. In particular, leaders elsewhere on the continent should:
Abandon all precedents when thinking about an RN-led France
As president, Le Pen would be as fundamentally rooted in French traditions and peculiarities as equivalent leaders are in those of their countries. Trump’s America is simply too different to be closely relevant to France, despite the executive power both presidents wield. Orban’s Hungary does not fit either, with its distinctive tale of state capture and subordination to kleptocratic interests. Meloni’s Italy, meanwhile, is a complex story of creeping authoritarianism at home but emollience internationally. A Le Pen presidency would bear passing resemblances to each, but be sui generis.
Seek to understand the party and its instincts
Le Pen is a familiar figure, but her party has never held national power before and has evolved over time. Knowing how it ticks will be essential. This should lead decision-makers to engage with the party now, including by pursuing carefully calibrated efforts to meet with its senior figures to assess their true intentions. The decision of the German government to make contact with Bardella, for example, was the right one—though Europeans should be wary about reading Le Pen’s positions and instincts via Bardella and his circle.
Brace for a wider, but not necessarily more unified, European right
An RN win would be significant for Europe’s far-right. But ECFR’s research points firmly away from the idea of a coherent and durable European “union of the far-right” of any sort. The radical right has an emphatic sense of momentum, but that is not the same thing as a common project. Indeed, dismantling European integration is likely to generate conflicts over budgets and policies on issues like borders, energy, industry and defence—even between governments of similarly nationalist ideological hues.
Manage expectations when seeking to work with an RN-led France
Even in today’s more plural Europe, France is too big and too important to be circumvented entirely in a world of predators. Perhaps there would even be some limited common ground (most likely to be around defence, geoeconomics and building strategic autonomy). There could even be the possibility to mould a party that is still uncertain about its exact foreign policy agenda. But, especially under Le Pen rather than Bardella, this would still be a significantly less predictable, less collegiate and less European France than the one partners have known under Macron.
Prepare to deploy all the arts of European and international politics
An RN-led presidency would be complicated and disruptive. It would call for real diplomatic skill and political leadership in the EU and the rest of Europe, especially in powerful states like Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and, outside the bloc, Britain. In some cases, the task at hand might be to moderate France and bind it into groups of other states on matters of common and agreed interest. In others, it would be to build coalitions of the willing where France was reluctant to join. This would be a good time to deepen relationships between Brussels, Berlin, Rome, Warsaw, Madrid and London, as well as other capitals.
The other futures
Europeans prepare for the possibility of Le Pen as president of France, they should keep in mind that an array of outcomes is still possible. There is also a significant chance of a moderate candidate making it to the second round and rallying the republican front once again against the RN. And in today’s volatile and fragmented French politics, there is even the possibility of a far-right against far-left runoff. But polls are polls, and probabilities are probabilities. This paper is a response to one major possibility among several—and an urgent call to France’s European partners to be ready.
About the authors
Célia Belin is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and head of its Paris office.
Jeremy Cliffe is editorial director and senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He co-heads the New Politics Project within the European Power programme.
Camille Lons is a policy fellow and deputy head of the Paris office at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
Constance Victor is the Paris office coordinator at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
Acknowledgments
We would like to start by thanking ECFR colleagues, including Piotr Buras, Teresa Coratella, Agathe Demarais, Janka Oertel, Nicu Popescu, Jana Puglierin, Marta Prochwicz Jazowska, Herman Quarles, Jeremy Shapiro, Vessela Tcherneva and Pawel Zerka who gave thoughtful comments on various drafts. We would also like to thank Zineb Bouziane for her thorough research support in the earlier stages of this project.
We are grateful to experts such as Catherine Fieschi, Jacob Ross and Victor Mallet for engaging with us and offering constructive feedback. We also would like to acknowledge the politicians, journalists and thinkers we interviewed over the course of this research; while we respect their anonymity, we thank each of them for their time and insights.
The task of editing the two editions of this paper fell to Kim Butson and Adam Harrison and we are grateful for their time and dedication in bringing it to completion. Thanks also go to Chris Eichberger for offering beautiful visuals to complement our work.
In 1935, two chemists at Tokyo’s Imperial University synthesized a new molecule and unwittingly launched one of the strangest narratives of the psychedelic age. Toshio Hoshino and Kenya Shimodaira were working on a family of compounds known as the tryptamines, which occur widely in nature and have a range of intriguing biological properties. The neurotransmitter serotonin, which among other things regulates mood, cognition, and social behavior, is a tryptamine. So are many psychoactive drugs, although this would only be discovered later on. The Japanese scientists had recently completed the world’s first laboratory synthesis of a molecule called bufotenine, which is produced by toads and certain species of mushrooms. Now, via a sequence of reactions, they engineered a close chemical relative. Diagrams of the two tryptamines looked nearly identical, each represented by two angular rings and a tail, resembling microscopic organisms; the only difference lay in the shape of the head. Such tiny changes in chemical structure “can lead to radically different consequences, like a railroad’s switch points,” as the writer and organic chemist Primo Levi once wrote. The new molecule’s name, following scientific convention, would be 5-MeO-DMT.
Hoshino and Shimodaira published their findings in the Bulletin of the Chemical Society of Japan, leaving no explanation as to why they had conducted these experiments. The early 20th century was a time of wide-ranging exploration in organic chemistry, with researchers synthesizing new compounds to assess their pharmacological potential or better understand the reactions by which one substance could be transformed into another. Many of these compounds had no evident utility, such as 5-MeO-DMT, which for decades was thought only to be a product of the laboratory.
This changed in 1959, when the molecule was isolated from a shrub native to Brazil. Not long afterward, 5-MeO-DMT was detected in Anadenanthera peregrina, a leguminous tree from the Caribbean and South America. For thousands of years, Indigenous communities had been harvesting its slender bean pods to prepare snuffs called cohoba or yopo, which were typically inhaled using hollow bones or bamboo shoots—the earliest known use of psychedelics in the New World. “With this powder they lose consciousness and become like drunken men,” Christopher Columbus observed in the 15th century. The Spaniards regarded such practices as demonic and sought to eradicate them as they colonized the region. After witnessing a yopo ceremony in the Andes, where the snuff was dispensed from a snail shell with a spoon carved from the bone of a puma, one missionary reported, “They summoned the devil.”
The rich biodiversity of the Amazon also yielded other hallucinogenic snuffs containing 5-MeO-DMT. These were prepared from trees in the nutmeg family and were known, in some local communities, as “semen of the sun.” In the early 1950s, a distinguished Harvard scholar named Richard Evans Schultes had documented the snuffs being used for “witchcraft, divination and the diagnosis of illness” by the medicine men of more than half a dozen tribes, describing the effects as “virulently potent.” Schultes expressed incredulity that such a widely used substance had gone unstudied for so long. “It makes one wonder how many more narcotic plants, up to now obscured by better-known ones, still wait to be discovered,” he wrote. These snuffs were only later found to contain 5-MeO-DMT.
A tall, bespectacled man who wore a pith helmet in the jungle, Schultes was considered the father of modern ethnobotany, a field that studies the traditional uses of plants. He was also one of the world’s foremost experts on psychedelic rituals in an era before they had captured mainstream attention. In the 1930s, he had uncovered the ceremonial use of psilocybin mushrooms in southern Mexico and identified the source of an ancient Aztec sacrament as the seeds of a native morning glory vine, which contained a chemical cousin of LSD. He went on to live in the Amazon for a decade, documenting thousands of medicinal plant traditions while researching alternative rubber sources for the US military. The only provisions he carried were instant coffee and tins of Boston baked beans.
Even then, Schultes recognized that incursions from the wider world threatened the survival of Indigenous knowledge. “Time is running out,” he once warned. “The Indians’ botanical knowledge is disappearing even faster than the plants themselves.” Yet capturing this knowledge, as an outsider, was a formidable endeavor. In addition to navigating remote and inhospitable regions, ethnobotanists had to draw on scattered records from disparate disciplines—botany, anthropology, archaeology, plant chemistry, pharmacology, history, geography and sundry other tangential fields of the sciences and arts,” as Schultes put it. There was always the risk that in selecting and piecing together this information one might draw false conclusions.
A misleading narrative about psychedelic toads took hold, involving not only the wrong molecule but the wrong species entirely.
In the 1960s, while Schultes was continuing his ethnobotanical research, 5-MeO-DMT was detected in numerous other plants around the world, including a type of grass that could cause grazing sheep to convulse uncontrollably, a phenomenon known as “staggers.” Then, in 1964, the molecule showed up in an animal for the first time, detected in the skins of Sonoran Desert toads, a species that had formerly been of interest only to the occasional herpetologist. This breakthrough was thanks to an Italian chemist named Vittorio Erspamer. Earlier in his career, Erspamer had discovered the neurotransmitter serotonin—a pivotal moment in the field of neuroscience, laying the groundwork for understanding chemical signaling in the brain. His lifelong interest was pharmacognosy, or the study of drugs from natural sources; by the end of his career, he would identify and name more than 60 new compounds, including from octopuses, shellfish, and sea anemones, and twice be nominated for the Nobel Prize. “Land and sea are populated by a miraculous variety of creatures, representing the outcome of the tremendous biosynthetic work carried out by Nature over hundreds of millions of years,” he once wrote.
No animals captured his attention like amphibians, which he described as “an inexhaustible mine of active compounds.” In his laboratory, which was decorated with pictures of frogs and toads, Erspamer and his assistants minced the skins of different species with scissors and exposed them to a variety of tests: gas and paper chromatography, X-ray fluorescence analysis. Colleagues from around the world sent him samples by airmail, and in the early 1960s he received 21 Sonoran Desert toad specimens that had been skinned and dried in Arizona. (At the time, the species was classified as Bufa alvarius, a name that remains in widespread use despite being formally changed in 2006.) The findings were striking. All toads produce bufotenine, but this was the only species among some of the most chemically diverse animals in the world that contained 5-MeO-DMT.
Erspamer’s study was published in a technical journal in 1965, just as the psychedelic revolution was getting started. At around this time, a small cohort of psychonauts began using synthetic 5-MeO-DMT, alerted by its discovery in South American snuffs, but it would be decades before anyone in this milieu realized that the same molecule could be obtained from a North American toad. Knowledge of psychedelic toads was fractured across niche academic disciplines, and even Erspamer appears not to have been aware that 5-MeO-DMT had hallucinogenic properties. But over the next two decades, something remarkable happened: A misleading narrative about psychedelic toads took hold, involving not only the wrong molecule but the wrong species entirely. Although 5-MeO-DMT can produce experiences of overwhelming intensity, often interpreted as encounters with ultimate truth, the history of toad smoking is riddled with false leads and misinformation.
In 1956, a psychiatrist named Howard Fabing co-authored a study in Science, the prestigious academic journal, about the effects of a purported hallucinogen. Like many others in his field, he had become fascinated by drugs that appeared to evoke states of psychosis, inspired by the discovery, the previous decade, of LSD. People had reported overpowering hallucinations after consuming tiny doses of acid, as the substance would become known in psychedelic culture. “My field of vision fluctuated and swam like an image in a distorted mirror,” its creator, a Swiss chemist named Albert Hofmann, recalled of his first trip (during which he somehow wobbled home from work on his bicycle). Accounts like these, Fabing wrote, had “precipitated the whole field of biochemistry into a new look at the brain.” Psychoanalysis had long been the dominant paradigm for treating mental illness, but now another possibility was arising. If certain compounds could seemingly induce the symptoms of insanity, then perhaps insanity was a result of faulty brain chemistry—and could thus be treated with psychiatric drugs.
Fabing’s interest lay in using psychedelics not as therapeutic agents but as tools for understanding how a healthy mind could malfunction. This was seen as especially urgent in the 1950s, when around half the hospital beds in the developed world were occupied by patients with schizophrenia and other mental disorders. “The stakes are high,” Fabing wrote. Scientists had begun revisiting anthropological accounts of hallucinogenic rituals—iboga ceremonies in Central Africa, peyote cults in the American Southwest. The term “psychedelics” was not yet in use; instead, such substances were known as psychotomimetics, reflecting an underlying belief that they induced not illumination but madness. Intriguingly, many of them shared a chemical structure with serotonin.
This line of inquiry had led Fabing to bufotenine, the tryptamine relative of 5-MeO-DMT that Hoshino and Shimodaira had originally synthesized. Besides occurring in most toad species, bufotenine was known to occur in fly agaric mushrooms, the iconic red toadstools of fairy tales, and thought to be the origin of the Norse berserker legend, involving warriors who reputedly consumed the mushrooms and entered such frenzied states that they were invincible in battle—the root of the phrase “going berserk.” Separate accounts from Siberia described nomadic herders using fly agaric in shamanic ceremonies, taking pains to prolong its psychoactive effects. “The urine of persons intoxicated with fly agaric is not wasted,” an anthropologist noted in 1901. “The drunkard himself drinks it to prolong his hallucinations, or he offers it to others as a treat.”
Fabing hypothesized that schizophrenia might arise from the abnormal production of bufotenine in the brain, possibly instead of serotonin. To explore the compound’s effects in more controlled settings, he and a colleague injected subjects with escalating doses and monitored their reactions. One man experienced a bodily numbness that he described as “a pleasant Martini feeling.” Another became light-headed and reported visual hallucinations. “I see white straight lines with a black background. I can’t trace a pattern,” he exclaimed. “Nowthere are red, green, and yellow dots, very bright, like they were made out of fluorescent cloth, moving like blood cells through capillaries, weaving in and out of the white lines.” Based on the results of this experiment, the scientists concluded that bufotenine had hallucinogenic properties similar to LSD.
This finding, published in a reputed journal, would later cross disciplinary lines and be picked up in the rush to solve a major anthropological mystery. Across Mesoamerica, archaeologists had unearthed a preponderance of toad artifacts, including detailed depictions of the parotid glands (located at the top of the neck) in which toads produce their defense toxins. Each of the great civilizations—the Olmecs, the Mayans, the Aztecs—had left behind extensive toad artworks: sculptures, altars, friezes, ceramics. There were middens of toad bones in what appeared to be ritual contexts, sometimes comprising thousands of skeletons. What significance had these ancient societies ascribed to toads?
Women in ancient Rome used toad secretions to murder their husbands; 16th-century Italian chemists laced salts with toad toxins for poisoning the food of enemies.
In the 1970s, amid surging popular interest in psychedelics, a compelling academic theory arose: that toads had been used as ritual intoxicants, much like psilocybin mushrooms or ayahuasca. It was well established that Indigenous cultures across the region had performed healing or shamanic rituals with psychedelics. Of the psychoactive plants identified worldwide, close to 90 percent were native to the Americas, with more than a dozen psychedelic traditions documented in Mexico alone. Fabing’s research had suggested that bufotenine, which occurs inmany species of toads, was hallucinogenic. The pieces of the puzzle all seemed to connect.
There was also an obvious candidate species: Bufa marinus, more commonly known as the cane toad, a lumbering, fleshy creature that can grow up to ten inches in length and weigh as much as six pounds, a little less than a typical newborn baby. Cane toads were native to Central America, dwelling in marshlands and swamps. They corresponded to many of the archaeological depictions of toads, with bulging parotid glands, and their bones were frequently excavated during archaeological digs. It wasn’t long before researchers were confidently asserting that there had been a psychedelic cane toad tradition in Mesoamerica. “The Olmecs had a predisposition for consuming toads,” one scholar wrote in a book about the region’s archaeology. “Consumption of these toads produces hallucinations.”
* The dark art of toad poisoning seemingly made a return in May 2022, when a Russian oligarch whose firm had called for an end to the invasion of Ukraine died after visiting a shaman who served him a “hangover cure” prepared using toads. Three other senior executives at the company have since died in mysterious circumstances, presumptively at the behest of the Russian government, including a former chairman who fell out of a hospital window.
Yet the theory had a glaring weakness. In addition to bufotenine, the cane toad produces an array of other chemicals, several of them acutely toxic. Its glands secrete two classes of compounds, bufogenin and bufotoxin, that can be lethal to humans even in tiny doses. Similar molecules are found in the skins of many toad species around the world and have long been used for preparing poisons. Women in ancient Rome used toad secretions to murder their husbands; 16th-century Italian chemists laced salts with toad toxins for poisoning the food of enemies. At English country fairs in the 17th and 18th centuries, charlatan doctors hawked medicines by feeding live toads to hired assistants, who fainted or became delirious in front of onlookers, only to revive upon swallowing whichever concoction was being advertised. The assistants survived by lining their mouths and stomachs with oil or by consuming large meals in advance. They became known as “toadies,” a word that has drifted from being associated with charlatanism to its modern definition: a sycophant or obsequious helper.*
The driving question for proponents of the psychedelic cane toad hypothesis thus became how precolonial Mesoamerican cultures might have isolated bufotenine from these deadlier defense toxins. In the early 1970s, an American graduate student named Timothy Knab went searching the Mexican countryside for a healer, or curandero, who could provide an answer. Knab eventually came across an elderly man in the mountains of Veracruz who claimed to remember a potion that had not been used in decades. The man ground the glands of 10 cane toads into a paste, added lime water and ash, then boiled the mixture overnight. This was stirred into corn beer, filtered, mixed with cornmeal, and left for several days to ferment before being heated to drive off the remaining moisture. The result was a hardened doughlike substance. The curandero refused to consume it and only reluctantly consented to dose Knab, who recorded the experience in dissociative terms. “Profuse sweating is noted along with a sudden increase in heartbeat,” he wrote. “The heartbeat becomes continuously harder and stronger. A pronounced chill sets in with twitching of the facial and eye muscles. A pounding headache and delirium shortly follow the onset of twitching.” For several hours, he lay in front of a fire, sweating and unable to move.
In a seeming blow to the theory, Knab reported no hallucinations from this experiment. But his account, which he presented at an anthropology conference in Mexico City, stirred the imagination of another young scholar. Alison Kennedy was the heiress of a wealthy Palo Alto family who would later adopt the alter ego Queen Mu and launch an influential cyberculture magazine called Mondo 2000, a futuristic mash-up of technology, psychedelics, and arts writing. Before all of this, Kennedy was an anthropology graduate student with an interest in Mesoamerican iconography; this had led her, almost inevitably, to the question of toads. She turned her eye to the artifacts of the Olmecs, who died out around twenty-five hundred years ago and are considered the first major civilization in Mesoamerica. Jaguars featured prominently among their artworks, which many researchers had interpreted as a sign of mythological significance. But Kennedy concluded that this had been a case of mistaken identity. Many of the artworks weren’t jaguars, she argued. They were toads.
In support, she presented dozens of illustrations, focusing on what she described as “the attributes of toadiness”: downturned mouths, inward-facing forelimbs, glandular swellings. She became drawn, like so many others in her field, to the idea that toads had been used in psychedelic ceremonies.
To account for the toxicity of the toads, Kennedy proposed a solution that reads like science fiction from the magazine she later founded. In addition to toads, the Olmecs had left behind depictions of many other animals, including ducks, which have highly efficient livers. Perhaps ducks had been used as bio-processors, feeding on toads and metabolizing their poisonous compounds so that humans could safely consume them. Kennedy drew attention to Olmec figurines of people wearing what appeared to be duck-billed masks. These masks would have provided protection from “venom spatters” as putative toad shamans “stood at their toad altars lancing the parotid glands,” she posited. This relied on the assumption that ducks could eat toads without being poisoned themselves. To investigate further, Kennedy visited a zoo in Texas, where she and the head aviculturist flung some cane toads into a duck pond. The ducks had been reared in captivity and were “toad-naive,” as Kennedy wrote, yet they pursued the toads with avidity, juggling their soft bodies before gulping them down. Kennedy described this behavior as “singular and apparently wholly instinctive.” Duck bills have neither nerve endings for sensing toad toxins nor blood vessels for absorbing them; the juggling movements were conceivably an adaptation for rinsing poisons into the water. Two of the duck species in the pond happened to be native to Mexico, home of both the Olmec culture and Bufa marinus. Here, at least, was proof that ducks had an appetite for the toads.
Now Kennedy took her suppositions even further, reexamining the literature on a famous Olmec site where thousands of toad skeletons had been excavated. The ruins featured an elaborate system of water channels hewn from some three hundred tons of rock, running between a sculpture of a jaguar (or possibly a toad) and an enormous stone receptacle in the shape of a duck. The main channel drained into a series of smaller pools too shallow for human bathing; confounded researchers had guessed that they were for unspecified “ritual use.” With a flourish, Kennedy now presented her final claim: That this complex hydraulic system had been designed as an integrated bufo-culture station, including both spawning grounds for toads and a captive population of bio-processing ducks. These bold ideas won her a prize at an anthropology conference in 1979, but there was one problem: No one had taken the obvious next step and tested whether the duck livers were in fact hallucinogenic. For all the scholarly attention it had garnered, the mystery of the psychedelic toad remained unresolved.
In the early 1980s, after reading about Fabing’s bufotenine study, a British artist named Adrian Morgan began a series of personal experiments with toads. These included “licking poison glands, rubbing animals against my forehead, and in one instance collecting venom with blotting paper . . . and then eating the paper,” he reported. Disappointingly, Morgan experienced no hallucinations from these tests, which seemed only to aggravate his research subjects. “One specimen of green toad showed its disgust by leaping from an open window into the celery patch below me,” he wrote. “It was never seen again.”
One spring, Morgan visited a forest outside London and came upon two dead female toads in a pond. He took them home, where he pounded their skins and poison glands in a mortar. Then he snuffed the residue and took notes in an increasingly jagged hand:
3:41 p.m. First quantity ingested into right nostril. Within one minute, nostril strongly anesthetized.
3:49 Sneezing violently, profuse sweating of forehead.
4:03 Fleeting pain at temples.
4:05 Salivating strongly.
4:15 Thick saliva at back of throat causing tendency to gag.
4:32 Feeling very tired.
Midway through, colors briefly appeared richer and moving objects left trails in his vision, like speed blurs. Morgan described these sensations as “only slightly psychedelic” and concluded, “The experience was not pleasant.”
Yet the notion of hallucinogenic toads persisted, cropping up in stranger contexts still. While Morgan was pursuing his investigations, stories of psychedelic cane toad use began surfacing in Australia, of all places, where the animals had been introduced in the 1930s to control pests on plantations. The toads had gone rogue, consuming native frogs, birds, insects, small marsupials, even Ping-Pong balls and cigarette butts flicked toward them at pubs—almost everything except the swarms of sugarcane beetles they had been imported to feed on. Australia’s plague of beetles had been compounded by a plague of toads.
This was possible in large part because toads are opportunistic and superbly adaptable creatures. They are residents of the gutter, the verge, the ditch. They can hunker down when times are bad and burst to life when conditions favor them. They are capable of producing millions of eggs. In their present form, toads have existed for at least 30 million years, enduring all kinds of planetary upheaval, from ice ages to the rise of humans. Released onto a new continent, the cane toads marauded unstoppably.
For all the scholarly attention it had garnered, the mystery of the psychedelic toad remained unresolved.
In the 1980s, 50 years into the invasion, an Australian filmmaker named Mark Lewis began working on a satirical documentary, Cane Toads: An Unnatural History, which Werner Herzog later declared to be his favorite film of all time. Hundreds of millions of the animals had taken up residence across Australia’s east coast, expanding their occupied range at a rate of more than 15 miles annually. Researchers dubbed the toads “an amphibian weed.” Streets were slicked with flattened toad carcasses, which emitted a fishy aroma. Bands of vigilantes went after the animals with cricket bats or swerved deliberately to run them over, but the toads continued their relentless spread.
During his research for the film, Lewis picked up on a rumor that people were getting high on the toads. He ended up speaking by phone with a man who claimed to have been in prison, where the inmates “would race to grab a toad if it found its way inside the compound,” Lewis told me. His source was unwilling to appear on camera, so Lewis hired an actor to deliver the lines. “You use a little quantity at first, then larger,” the man mumbles in the film, which identifies him as a “cane toad drug abuser” from the town of Mullumbimby. He makes a reference to Carlos Castaneda’s writings, saying how users of peyote would “see the world through the consciousness of the cactus. “With a weak laugh, the man adds, “The toad’s the same.”
The documentary also features a detective from Queensland who attests that people in “hippie communes” have been tripping on cane toads since at least the 1970s. “When heroin and other drugs weren’t freely available, the next best alternative was to go out and get a cane toad, “the detective explains. These toads would be boiled down in billycans to produce a sludgy brew, which the hippies purportedly drank. “From what I’ve been told, they had fantastic color hallucinations, “the detective says. “It warped their sense of time.”
Australians have a certain reputation for toughness, but even the hardiest among them would likely have been poisoned by the bufotoxins in this recipe. Yet Lewis also heard about a more plausible mode of ingestion. A local narcotics squad was said to possess a jar of confiscated dried cane toad skins that could be “shredded and put into a hookah or a pipe and smoked,” apparently causing intense hallucinatory effects. At one point during his research (“to see what all the fuss was about”) Lewis rolled a small quantity with tobacco into a joint. “I smoked it, and the only result was that I got a bad headache,” he told me. “I would not recommend that kids try this at home.”
Dubiously sourced accounts followed of Australians who died after drinking toad tea and a man supposedly being imprisoned in South America on toad-licking charges.
But in 1988, the year Lewis’s film came out, a moral panic began that swept the concept of psychedelic toads into popular culture. “I feel partly responsible,” Lewis told me decades later, sounding mystified. This strange sequence began with media reports in the United States of Australian hippies “forsaking traditional drugs for cane toads, which they boil for a slimy, potentially lethal cocktail.” Later that year, a doctor at the Haight Ashbury Free Clinic, a San Francisco drug treatment facility established during the Summer of Love, jokingly mentioned the “rare 1960s practice of toad licking” during a lecture. Afterward, the clinic was inundated with calls from reporters around the world, wanting to know about “crazed hippies licking toads in the mountains,” as the clinic’s director later recalled. Staff assured the journalists that there was no evidence of toads being licked in the United States, but the idea, like some invasive animal, took on a life of its own. At a conference on crack cocaine the following year, the Berkeley police chief announced that toad licking was a “problem that comes up from time to time.” An official from the Drug Enforcement Administration was quoted saying that cane toad secretions were “in the same (legal) category as heroin or LSD.” Bufotenine had indeed been listed as a Schedule I substance in 1967—even though, at the time, there had been virtually no reports of anybody using it. Citing the DEA, news articles now declared toad licking “the latest way to hallucinate.” (One headline: ”A Desperation High: Crack? Coke? Croak!”) The DEA official later clarified that he had said nothing about toad licking, but the phrase continued spawning fresh rounds of coverage until, as Scientific American later put it, “reality imitated fiction.”
In 1989, two teenagers were hospitalized in New Mexico after licking toads, which they had read about in the papers. The following year, two men were admitted to an emergency ward in Canada, bewildered and vomiting, after reportedly scraping the back of a pet cane toad and eating its secretions on crackers; the tabloids later claimed that one of the men had committed suicide after being discharged. Dubiously sourced accounts followed of Australians who died after drinking toad tea and a man supposedly being imprisoned in South America on toad-licking charges. Hungry for copy, journalists pressed experts for comment. “It gives them a kick like alcohol,” an Australian herpetologist professed, of the toad users. In a foretelling of toad mythmaking to come, it had become difficult to tell fact, conjecture, and fabrication apart. “This is a case of media feeding on media,” a reporter who covered the story would later reflect. Psychedelic toads, as a 1993 journal article titled “Misuse and Legend in the ‘Toad Licking’ Phenomenon” described it, had become an “informational epidemic.”
Meanwhile, the television drama L.A. Law ran an episode involving a retiree accused of toad licking, and Beavis and Butt-Head licked toads on MTV. (“Tastes like chicken,” Beavis remarked.) Psychedelic toads also captured the attention of lawmakers: A state representative in Georgia cautioned his colleagues about “the extreme dangers of toad licking,” while a representative in South Carolina proposed sentencing offenders to community service at zoos. The men appear to have been speaking in jest, but Canadian police were serious when, in 1991, they urged officials to ban imports of cane toads and outlaw them as pets, citing “the deaths of several Australian drug users.” Before long, Australia also passed laws against psychoactive toad use, listing bufotenine as a controlled substance. Toad licking had become so ingrained in popular consciousness that three decades later, while I was working on this book, people continuously brought it up as a point of reference. Yet the hype about cane toads obscured a crucial detail. As the anthropologist Wade Davis, who became drawn into solving the mystery, would later write, “An animal venom that contained no hallucinogenic agent but that did contain lethal poisons was not likely to inspire a new drug craze.” A satirical film had broadcast rumors that snowballed into full-blown hysteria about cane toads, but there was still no evidence that they were psychoactive at all.
Kimon de Greef is a journalist from South Africa and the author ofThe Ego Trip, an investigative nonfiction book about psychedelic toads. His work has appeared in The New Yorker, New York, The New York Times, The Guardian, Guernica, National Geographic, and other publications. He has coauthored a book about abalone poaching and holds a conservation biology master’s from the University of Cape Town.
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