Al Mayadeen | September 26, 2026
Ireland’s preparations for Sunday’s Nations League match against “Israel” have been thrown into uncertainty after goalkeeper Gavin Bazunu reportedly told teammates that he did not want to participate in the fixture, prompting further discussions within the squad.
The players missed their scheduled training session and press conference in Debrecen, Hungary, as they held lengthy meetings over whether individual players should proceed with the match.
The Ireland squad was due to train at the Nagyerdei Stadium in Debrecen and hold a press conference ahead of Sunday’s Nations League encounter.
Instead, the players remained at their hotel for discussions with head coach Heimir Hallgrímsson and his coaching staff. They had earlier met with Football Association of Ireland (FAI) CEO David Courell.
The scheduled press conference was postponed with only 19 minutes’ notice. Irish and Israeli media had already assembled at the stadium when Irish journalists were informed that the event could be delayed by up to two hours.
The UEFA match delegate was also informed of the delay but was reportedly not given a reason. The team ultimately did not arrive for the scheduled training session.
The disruption followed an initial squad meeting on Friday intended to establish the players’ position on the “Israel” fixture and discuss whether they would stage a protest.
According to reports, a collective boycott was not initially the purpose of the meeting. During the discussions, however, Bazunu indicated that he did not want to participate in the match, with other players subsequently considering whether to join him.
The extent of opposition within the squad remains unclear, and no final collective decision had been announced at the time of reporting.
The developments mark a significant escalation in the controversy surrounding Ireland’s Nations League meetings with “Israel”.
Earlier this week, Ireland captain Dara O’Shea said the squad intended to fulfill the two fixtures, while any decision over a separate protest was to be discussed following Ireland’s opening Nations League match against Kosovo.
The position has since become less certain following the latest internal discussions.
Hallgrímsson had previously acknowledged that Ireland’s players did not share identical views or the same intensity of feeling regarding the “Israel” fixtures. He also said that he would respect a player’s decision if an individual did not want to take part.
Ireland’s match against “Israel” is scheduled for Sunday, September 27, at the Nagyerdei Stadium in Debrecen.
FAI faces pressure over ‘Israel’ games
The latest dispute follows months of controversy over the FAI’s decision to proceed with the fixtures.
In July, an FAI motion endorsing the fulfillment of the Nations League matches against “Israel” passed by 68% to 32%. The association had argued that failing to fulfill the fixtures could expose Irish football to sporting and financial consequences.
The FAI has also acknowledged the strength of public opposition to the fixtures. In September, CEO David Courell said the organization was in a “really difficult position,” arguing that UEFA’s failure to take action over “Israel’s” participation had left the FAI with limited options.
The controversy has extended beyond the football establishment. More than 160 Irish athletes have signed an open letter urging the national team to refuse to participate in the “Israel” fixtures, while protests have been held outside the team’s hotel.
The U.S. Marine Corps is buying Anduril Pulsar-L electronic warfare jammers to meet an urgent operational need to better protect its 8×8 wheeled Amphibious Combat Vehicles (ACV) from drones. This is part of broader efforts the service is pursuing to boost the ACV’s defenses against uncrewed aerial attackers, as well as incoming anti-tank guided missiles and other threats. Drone threats are real now and have notably sidelined even the most advanced heavy armor in Ukraine.
Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) announced it had awarded a sole-source deal to Anduril, valued at $15,711,445.50, for an unspecified number of Pulsar-Ls, yesterday. This follows a statement of intent the Command put out last month. Anduril first unveiled Pulsar-L, a lightweight addition to its larger Pulsar family of electronic warfare systems, in April 2025.
The Marine Corps had 150 baseline personnel carrier variants of the ACV (or ACV-Ps), as well as 21 command-and-control ACV-C versions, in inventory as of April 2026. The default armament for ACV-P currently is just a single .50 caliber M2 machine gun in a remote weapon station on top of the hull. The service’s goal is to eventually acquire 389 ACV-Ps and 33 ACV-Cs, as well as 152 ACV-30s with new 30mm cannon-armed turrets and 34 ACV-R armored recovery vehicle variants. The ACV family has already supplanted the Marine Corps’ previous fleet of tracked Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAV).
“The Anduril Pulsar-L system is a platform-integrated omni-directional SK C-UAS [soft-kill counter-uncrewed aerial systems] with a combined sensor/jammer package that detects, tracks, identifies, and defeats radio frequency-dependent Group 1 and Group 2 Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs),” MARCORSYSCOM wrote in a justification for the sole-source contract, which was also released yesterday. “Additionally, the system provides counter positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities.”
The U.S. military definition of a Group 1 drone is any design weighing up to 20 pounds, that is able to fly up to an altitude of 1,200 feet, and that can reach speeds of up to 100 knots. Group 2 is the next tier up, encompassing types with gross weights between 21 and 55 pounds, that can get up to an altitude of 3,500 feet, and hit top speeds of up to 250 knots. Kamikaze drones and other small weaponized types that fall into Groups 1 and 2 are used on a daily basis in Ukraine to attack armored vehicles, as well as unarmored vehicles and personnel. These are threats that have been steadily expanding to other hotspots globally, and that we will come back to later on.
Furthermore, “the Pulsar-L is the only solution capable of being mounted on the ACV to provide a mobile and organic means to effectively and simultaneously execute the entire kill-chain against hostile UASs in the deployed land and maritime/littoral environment while not exceeding the limited ACV space, weight, and power claim allotted to the SK C-UAS solution,” according to MARCORSYSCOM. “This will provide the ACV with an essential defensive capability, directly contributing to increased survivability and force protection while not sacrificing the mobility and operational tempo of the ACV.”
Pulsar-L is already “in use by the Special Operations Command due to the system’s low weight, proven performance in engaging multiple UASs, and simultaneous execution of the full kill-chain while static or on the move,” the justification document adds. “Additionally, it is the only known commercially available system that meets the minimum requirement to rapidly identify and respond to emerging UAS technologies and tactics without frequent updates to predefined threat data libraries. The Pulsar-L is the only solution that uses machine based learning to continually adapt to these ever-changing threats without requiring vendor updates, allowing the warfighters to continually be effective in the fight.”
The latter point here is a particularly important consideration for electronic warfare systems, in general, which need to be able to accurately detect, categorize, and respond to different waveforms to be most effective. The emergence of new waveforms, as well as changes to how existing ones are emitted, together with new tactics, techniques, and procedures, can all negatively impact a system’s performance. Historically, the process of responding to those developments with updates to built-in threat libraries has been lengthy and complex. The conflict in Ukraine has shown that the cycle of new developments in the electromagnetic spectrum and then the need for new countermeasures can be regularly measured in weeks.
The U.S. military has been heavily investing in so-called cognitive electronic warfare capabilities to help automate and otherwise accelerate various aspects of this process. The ability of a particular electronic warfare suite to adapt autonomously in real-time, even in the middle of operations, has been viewed as the absolute ‘holy grail’ of this concept, which you can read more about here. How exactly Pulsar-L leverages machine-learning and artificial intelligence to this end, and the speed with which it can adapt to changing threats, is still not entirely clear.
Regardless, “there is an unusual and compelling need for the rapid deployment of SK C-UASs to forward-deployed ground units as Marines currently lack the ability to conduct self-defense against emerging UAS threats,” the justification document stresses. “Failure to deliver this capability places Marines at unnecessary risk, potentially leading to mission failure and loss of life, and hampers the Government’s ability to keep them safe during forward deployments.”
MARCORSYSCOM’s justification for the sole-source deal to Anduril does not otherwise elaborate on the urgent requirements that drove the deal, which it says were only formalized on April 7. That is notably roughly a week after the United States and Israel first launched major combat operations against Iran, which is a prolific developer and user of various tiers of weaponized drones. There is no explicit confirmation of any link, but Iranian drones, as well as missiles and other capabilities, have been a real threat to U.S. forces in the region. We have also just gained more insights recently into how forward-deployed Marine Corps elements contributed to those operations. Counter-drone capabilities would also be especially critical in any future amphibious landing operation, wherever it might occur.
All that being said, threats posed by armed Group 1 and 2 drones are not at all limited to Iran and the Middle East, nor are they new. They are only likely to become a more ubiquitous feature in the hands of nation-state armed forces and non-state actors in conflict zones globally as time goes on. The nature of these threats is also expanding significantly in scale and scope, especially when it comes to more automated targeting capabilities, thanks heavily to the increasing democratization of AI-driven technologies, something TWZ has explored in depth in the past.
A number of other significant developments in this arena have emerged from the conflict in Ukraine, where electronic warfare systems are heavily employed against drones. This includes the introduction of physical fiber-optic control links that cannot be jammed, as well as the use of mesh-like and often ad-hoc networks to increase resiliency.
The fighting in Ukraine has also underscored the threat that even small kamikaze drones pose to armored vehicles, including types that are far more heavily protected to start with than the Marine Corps’ ACVs. As mentioned, Ukrainian forces have been sidelining their M1 Abrams and other main battle tanks in the face of constant drone attacks.
MARCORSYSCOM’s justification for the Pulsar-L order makes clear that this is just one part of a larger plan to boost the ACV’s defenses.
“Marine Corps program of record for SK C-UAS is planned to initiate in FY27,” the document mentions toward the very end. “The components of this future program will be procured through full and open competition as it is expected that advanced non-kinetic and SK defeat technologies should be mature by this time.”
Marine Corps officials have also talked in the past about integrating active protection systems (APS), which could be blended together with C-UAS capabilities, and other defensive features to the service’s ACV fleet.
“We’re constantly looking at what the next generation of APS is and how we can get that onto the [ACV] platform in a lightweight form factor,” Chris Melkonian, the Marine Corps’ Program Manager for Advanced Amphibious Assault (PM AAA), told TWZ and other attendees at the annual Modern Day Marine exposition in April.
Improved “situational awareness, that’s kind of a gateway to counter-UAS, in terms of the ability to sense your environment,” Melkonian also highlighted at that time. “Take all that video on board and then be able to feed that into [a] counter-UAS system.”
Additional “overhead protection right now is a critical thing that we’re working on right now for this platform,” he added. The practice of adding on anti-drone armor screens on armored vehicles (and now other platforms), especially to protect against top-down attacks, first emerged in Russia in the lead-up to the all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, the installation of this kind of so-called ‘cope cage’ type armor has now become a global trend, including in the U.S. military.
The U.S. Marine Corps is also pressing ahead with a larger vision to field several tiers of counter-drone capabilities at all levels of its forces, to better protect everything from static installations at home and abroad right down to individual squads.
When it comes to the Marine Corps ACV fleet, the rush order for Pulsar-Ls is an important new step in boosting those vehicles’ defenses against threats that exist now. At the same time, drones are increasingly calling the role of armored vehicles in future conflicts into question.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
The post Marines Rushing To Equip Amphibious Combat Vehicles With New Anti-Drone Jammers appeared first on TWZ.
Read in English here
La campaña de Donald Trump para poner a Groenlandia bajo el control de los Estados Unidos a menudo se ha descartado como pura fanfarronería. Eso es un error. Detrás del lenguaje de un acuerdo inmobiliario se esconde un intento serio de revivir un antiguo principio imperial: que Washington pueda decidir el futuro político y económico de todo el hemisferio occidental. Groenlandia, estratégicamente ubicada entre América del Norte y Europa, se ha convertido en una prueba de esa afirmación – y de si la soberanía de una pequeña nación indígena cuenta cuando entra en conflicto con las ambiciones de una gran potencia.
Trump planteó la idea de comprar Groenlandia durante su primer mandato presidencial en 2019. Tras su reelección, la propuesta se volvió más agresiva. En diciembre de 2024 declaró que la “propiedad y el control” de Groenlandia por parte de los Estados Unidos eran una “necesidad absoluta”. El 7 de enero de 2025, se negó a descartar la coacción militar o económica contra Groenlandia y el Canal de Panamá, afirmando: “Necesitamos Groenlandia por motivos de seguridad nacional”. Posteriormente, insistió en que los Estados Unidos se haría con la isla “de una forma u otra”. Esta afirmación combinaba varios argumentos: Groenlandia es vital para la defensa antimisiles; Rusia y China amenazan el Ártico; los yacimientos de tierras raras de Groenlandia tienen un valor estratégico; y, supuestamente, los groenlandeses acogerían con agrado el dominio estadounidense.
Esta última afirmación resultó ser demostrablemente falsa. Una encuesta de enero de 2025, realizada tanto en groenlandés como en danés, reveló que el 85% de la población de Groenlandia se oponía a abandonar el reino danés para unirse a los Estados Unidos, mientras que solo el 6% lo apoyaba. Sin embargo, la misma encuesta mostró que una mayoría estaba a favor de una eventual independencia. Esa distinción es fundamental. El deseo de los groenlandeses de poner fin a la tutela colonial danesa no puede interpretarse como un consentimiento a la anexión estadounidense.
El argumento de seguridad a favor de la propiedad estadounidense es engañoso, ya que Washington ya goza de amplios derechos militares en Groenlandia. La relación comenzó durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Con Dinamarca ocupada por la Alemania nazi, su embajador en Washington firmó un acuerdo de 1941 que permitía a los Estados Unidos defender Groenlandia y construir instalaciones allí. Dinamarca solicitó la retirada estadounidense después de la guerra, pero prevaleció la estrategia de la Guerra Fría.
El Acuerdo de Defensa de Groenlandia de 1951, celebrado en el marco del Tratado del Atlántico Norte, autorizó a los Estados Unidos a establecer y operar “zonas de defensa”. Esto permitió la rápida construcción de la Base Aérea de Thule – rebautizada como Base Espacial de Pituffik en 2023 – en un lugar ideal para las rutas aéreas y de misiles más cortas entre la Unión Soviética y América del Norte. En el apogeo de la Guerra Fría, los Estados Unidos operaba numerosas instalaciones en toda Groenlandia. Hoy en día, Pituffik, la base militar más septentrional de Washington, desempeña funciones de alerta de misiles, defensa antimisiles y vigilancia espacial.
El acuerdo ofrece a Washington una amplia libertad operativa. Una enmienda de 2004 – el Acuerdo de Igaliku – reconoció al Gobierno autónomo de Groenlandia, estableció a Pituffik como la única zona de defensa existente y exigió la consulta previa antes de realizar cambios significativos o crear nuevas zonas de defensa. También estableció la cooperación en temas económicos, técnicos y ambientales. En otras palabras, si los Estados Unidos considera que se necesitan más radares, puertos, aeródromos o personal, ya existe un mecanismo legal para negociarlo con Dinamarca y Groenlandia. La soberanía, por lo tanto, no es un requisito militar.
La historia de las bases también explica por qué “seguridad” no es un término neutral en Groenlandia. En 1953, las autoridades danesas ordenaron a 116 inughuit – 27 familias – que abandonaran la recién fundada Qaanaaq, mientras que el resto se reubicó en asentamientos en otras partes del distrito. Camp Century se construyó bajo el hielo entre 1959 y 1960 y estaba vinculado a la propuesta secreta del Proyecto Iceworm, que contemplaba una extensa red de bases de lanzamiento de misiles nucleares.
En 1968, un B-52 estadounidense que transportaba cuatro bombas de hidrógeno se estrelló sobre el hielo marino en la Base Aérea de Thule, lo que provocó contaminación por plutonio y otras sustancias. El accidente puso de manifiesto la inconsistencia entre la política declarada públicamente por Dinamarca en contra de las armas nucleares en territorio danés en tiempos de paz y los permisos secretos otorgados por el Gobierno danés a los Estados Unidos para almacenar armas nucleares en Groenlandia. Las instalaciones abandonadas dejaron combustible, desechos y otros contaminantes. Los reportajes de Groenlandia continúan cuestionando quién pagará por las futuras limpiezas. La relación militar protegió los intereses estratégicos de los Estados Unidos, mientras que los costos humanos y ambientales recayeron de manera desproporcionada sobre los groenlandeses.
Groenlandia dejó de ser formalmente una colonia en 1953, obtuvo autonomía en 1979 y amplió su autogobierno en 2009. La Ley de Autogobierno reconoce a los groenlandeses como un pueblo con derecho a la autodeterminación y establece un camino hacia la independencia. Washington reabrió su consulado en Nuuk en 2020, y la cooperación se intensificó en materia de comercio, educación, minería e investigación. Los gobiernos de Groenlandia (desde Kuupik Kleist hasta Jens-Frederik Nielsen) han acogido con beneplácito los vínculos económicos con Washington, pero rechazan la tendencia de este último a exigir cada vez más a la isla para satisfacer sus necesidades militares.
La exigencia de Trump respecto a Groenlandia forma parte de una política hemisférica más amplia. La Doctrina Monroe de 1823 advertía a las potencias europeas contra nuevas intervenciones coloniales en las Américas. Presentada como anticolonial, se transformó en una reivindicación de la supremacía estadounidense. El corolario de Theodore Roosevelt de 1904 afirmaba el derecho de intervención en América Latina, proporcionando una justificación ideológica para ocupaciones, cambios de régimen y el control de activos estratégicos.
Los partidarios de Trump rebautizaron su última versión como la “Doctrina Donroe”. Esta denominación vincula la presión sobre Groenlandia con las exigencias relativas al Canal de Panamá, las amenazas contra Cuba y Colombia, las reivindicaciones sobre Canadá y la intervención de los Estados Unidos en Venezuela. A finales de 2025, la Casa Blanca proclamó formalmente un Corolario Trump a la Doctrina de Monroe, en el que se afirmaba el liderazgo de los Estados Unidos en todo “nuestro hemisferio”. Groenlandia queda arrastrada a esta esfera porque geográficamente forma parte de América del Norte, aunque esté vinculada políticamente a Dinamarca y su pueblo inuit posea su propio derecho a la autodeterminación. Esta doctrina contiene una contradicción reveladora. Trump denuncia el control europeo sobre Groenlandia como un anacronismo, al tiempo que exige que la isla sea transferida a los Estados Unidos. El colonialismo no se ha abolido; simplemente cambia el colonizador propuesto. Las referencias de Trump a los minerales, las rutas marítimas y la geografía militar reducen a Groenlandia a un activo y a sus 56.000 habitantes a un obstáculo en una transacción entre potencias.
Las amenazas de Trump provocaron una ruptura extraordinaria entre los Estados Unidos y Europa. Dinamarca no es un adversario, sino un aliado de la OTAN cuyas tropas lucharon junto a los soldados estadounidenses en Afganistán. La amenaza de arrebatar territorio a un aliado por la fuerza ataca la premisa misma de la alianza. La primera ministra danesa, Mette Frederiksen advirtió que un ataque de los Estados Unidos contra otro país de la OTAN pondría fin al orden de seguridad de la posguerra. Los gobiernos europeos se unieron en torno al principio de que las fronteras no pueden modificarse mediante la coacción, un principio que invocan contra Rusia en Ucrania.
La crisis puso de manifiesto la dependencia de Europa. La OTAN no cuenta con un procedimiento claro para defender a un miembro frente a su miembro más poderoso. Los Estados europeos dependen en gran medida del poderío militar de los Estados Unidos, al tiempo que se les pide que resistan la coacción estadounidense. Copenhague respondió con una diplomacia cautelosa, un mayor gasto militar en el Ártico y la insistencia en que las decisiones corresponden a Groenlandia y a Dinamarca. Francia, Alemania, los países nórdicos y la Unión Europea expresaron su solidaridad, pero el episodio intensificó los llamado a la autonomía estratégica europea. También dañó la pretensión de Washington de liderar una alianza de democracias contra el revisionismo autoritario.
El 18 de septiembre de 2026, Trump anunció un nuevo acuerdo trilateral de seguridad tras meses de negociaciones, reivindicando el “control permanente” sobre la seguridad de Groenlandia. Los líderes daneses y groenlandeses lo describieron en términos más limitados: una ampliación de la cooperación militar con los Estados Unidos que preserva la soberanía y la autodeterminación de Groenlandia. El texto completo aún debe firmarse y aprobarse. Si su versión es correcta, el resultado confirma lo que era evidente desde el principio: los Estados Unidos podría obtener acuerdos de seguridad adicionales sin llegar a ser dueño de Groenlandia. Sin embargo, la presión que precedió al acuerdo sigue siendo una advertencia sobre las negociaciones llevadas a cabo bajo amenazas.
La respuesta de Groenlandia ha combinado rechazo, unidad y complejidad política. Kalaallit Nunaat – el nombre groenlandés del país – se convirtió en el centro de las declaraciones de que Groenlandia pertenece a su pueblo y no está en venta. En marzo de 2025, grandes manifestaciones en Nuuk, Sisimiut y Qaanaaq marcharon bajo la bandera roja y blanca de Erfalasorput. Los manifestantes le pidieron a Trump que respetara a los inuit, a su país y a su nacionalidad. Los partidos políticos de Groenlandia, a pesar de profundos desacuerdos sobre el ritmo y las condiciones económicas de la independencia, condenaron conjuntamente la presión externa. El Parlamento prohibió las donaciones políticas extranjeras y anónimas, defendiendo explícitamente la integridad de la democracia groenlandesa en medio del interés de las grandes potencias.
El colonialismo danés dejó profundas heridas: asimilación forzada, ingeniería social, desarrollo desigual y decisiones tomadas en Copenhague sobre la tierra y el pueblo groenlandeses (toda la cuarta temporada de la popular serie de televisión Borgen, en 2022, se centró en un conflicto entre Copenhague y Nuuk por el descubrimiento de un nuevo yacimiento de petróleo con implicaciones de China y Rusia). Muchos groenlandeses desean la independencia, y algunos ven el creciente interés de los Estados Unidos como una ventaja para atraer inversiones y lograr una relación más equitativa con Dinamarca.
Groenlandia revela el verdadero contenido de la Doctrina Donroe: una afirmación del siglo XXI de que la geografía otorga a Washington derechos superiores sobre los pueblos vecinos. La respuesta de Groenlandia es igualmente moderna y universal. La ubicación estratégica no anula la soberanía popular, los minerales no borran la identidad nacional, y ninguna gran potencia adquiere un país simplemente por declarar que lo necesita.
Vijay Prashad es un historiador y periodista indio. Es autor de cuarenta libros, entre los que se incluyen Balas de Washington, Una estrella roja sobre el Tercer Mundo, Las naciones oscuras: una historia del Tercer Mundo; Las naciones pobres: una posible historia del Sur Global y How the International Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, escrito con Grieve Chelwa. Es el director ejecutivo de Tricontinental: Instituto de Investigación Social, corresponsal jefe de Globetrotter, y el editor jefe de LeftWord Books (Nueva Delhi). También ha hecho apariciones en las películas Shadow World (2016) y Two Meetings (2017).
Este artículo fue elaborado por Globetrotter.
In just one year, the number of foreigners staying illegally in Poland has risen by about 40 percent. From January to the end of August 2026 alone, the Polish Border Guard identified 8,300 such people.
Many foreigners work illegally and rent apartments outside the official system; some make a living from crime. They live without documents or residence permits. It often takes the services years to identify them and establish where they are. Polish news outlet Rzeczpospolita describes a “gray zone” in which foreigners staying illegally operate. The Border Guard and other services identify people who have overstayed the permitted period of residence, work without the required permits, or use invalid documents. Inspections also turn up people who have previously been banned from entering Poland or other Schengen countries.
“From January 1 to the end of August this year, the Border Guard identified almost 8,300 foreigners who had breached Polish law on the conditions of entry and stay in the Republic of Poland. By comparison, in the same period of 2025 the figure was nearly 6,000, and for the whole of 2025 it was more than 9,300,” Major Anna Sobieska-Tekień of the Border Guard, spokesperson for Border Guard Headquarters, told the newspaper.
Of those illegal migrants arrested, Ukrainians (2,200) and Colombians (1,400) dominate the figures. Also detained were 748 Georgians, 400 Belarusians and 354 Moldovans. Those who were detained did not have documents entitling them to stay in Poland.
“Everything indicates that Poland is entering a full-scale crisis in managing foreigners already present on its territory. If a state can control the border but loses the ability to determine effectively who remains after the right of residence expires, a security gap is created,” said Tomasz Safjański, a professor at WSB University in Dąbrowa Górnicza and deputy director of the Center for Research on Cross-Border Security.
Rzeczpospolita points to an extensive support network that makes it possible to operate outside the legal system. It includes illegal employment, informal apartment rentals, and the forging of visas, work permits and other documents. The paper also recalls cases in which fictitious companies were set up and used to obtain work visas for foreigners.
Growth of the shadow economy is leading to more illegal employment, which allows employers to avoid taxes and social-security contributions. Experts also point to the risk of a rise in ordinary and organized crime, including human trafficking and document forgery.
People who remain outside the official registration system may also be harder to monitor and, according to those interviewed, may be used by foreign intelligence services for sabotage or other hostile activity.
The post Poland is losing control over foreigners: Border agency warns of sharp increase in illegal migrants appeared first on Remix News.
Taiwan has provided the first public look at its new 105mm 8×8 mobile gun system in action, with the domestically developed vehicle engaging moving and stationary targets during a live-fire demonstration in southern Taiwan. The vehicle is being developed as Taiwan continues to modernize its ground forces in response to the growing capabilities and increasingly frequent military activity of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) around the island.
During the demonstration, held by the Republic of China Army (ROCA) at a training area in Tainan today, the vehicle reportedly engaged a moving target at approximately 0.75 miles and a stationary target at around 0.6 miles. It also fired against targets positioned 90 degrees to the side of the vehicle while operating on a gentle slope, demonstrating the gun system’s ability to engage targets while the vehicle is positioned on uneven terrain.
— 青年日報 Youth Daily News, ROC(Taiwan)
Eight wheels. Six-wheel steering. One 105mm gun.
— 國防部 Ministry of National Defense, ROC(Taiwan)
Definitely not your average ride.#ROCArmedForces #MobileGunSystem#MadeInTaiwan pic.twitter.com/oaHsyMNtev
The vehicle subsequently fired its 7.62mm coaxial machine gun simultaneously with its main gun as part of a scenario intended to demonstrate engagement of multiple targets, including simulated amphibious assault vehicles.
台灣105公厘獵豹輪型戰車實彈射擊https://t.co/cHaXthUCfA pic.twitter.com/aKBBzoVsKz
— 新‧二七部隊 軍事雜談 (New 27 Brigade)
An apparent weapon malfunction was also recorded during the demonstration. One of the 105mm rounds initially failed to fire, according to reports. The crew waited approximately two minutes in accordance with safety procedures before reloading the weapon, after which the vehicle fired normally. Maj. Gen. Chen Chien-chung, head of Taiwan’s Arsenal 202, the Production and Manufacturing Center of the Armament Bureau, said an investigation would be conducted into the misfire.
The 155 mm infantry fighting vehicle showcased to media before entering production phase. pic.twitter.com/DBhs66aw5Q
— Taepodong (@stoa1984) September 23, 2026
Despite the incident, the demonstration provided an important look at a vehicle that Taiwan is developing specifically around the country’s geography and battlefield requirements, including a potential amphibious invasion by the Chinese PLA.
A new direct fire support variant of the Clouded Leopard 8×8 infantry fighting vehicle was first publicly displayed at the Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition in 2023. It passed initial combat readiness testing with the ROCA in October 2023, and it was authorized for mass production in April 2024.
The production configuration has undergone significant changes since then.
Its height has been reduced by approximately 12 inches, bringing the overall vehicle height to below 9 feet 10 inches. Its turning radius has also been reduced from 36 feet to 26 feet. The reduction in turning radius was achieved by providing steering to three pairs of wheels, rather than two pairs on the earlier configuration.
Those changes are especially relevant to Taiwan, where large sections of the island feature restrictive terrain, dense urban development, narrow roads, drainage channels, and other obstacles that can limit the movement of heavy armored vehicles.
Taiwanese officials specifically highlighted the system’s suitability for culverts and urban areas, as well as the challenging terrain of Hualien and Taitung on the island’s mountainous east coast.
The vehicle’s principal weapon is a 105mm gun. The weapon can fire the general-purpose ammunition already developed for tank guns, in addition to ammunition developed specifically for the new system. The ROCA displayed armor-piercing, anti-personnel, and training ammunition during the demonstration. The gun also offers useful ammunition commonality with Taiwan’s older, but still active M60A3 and CM11 tanks.
That compatibility potentially gives the vehicle access to an existing ammunition ecosystem while allowing Taiwan to develop specialized rounds for its particular requirements.
Against a PLA assault, the 105mm system would provide mobile direct firepower against amphibious vehicles, armored personnel carriers, fortifications, and other ground targets, complementing Taiwan’s heavier tanks and other anti-armor weapons. Its wheeled configuration also allows the vehicle to rapidly reposition along Taiwan’s road network, giving commanders a mobile source of direct firepower that could respond to amphibious landings and reinforce threatened sectors.
The system falls into the same broad category as other modern 8×8 mobile gun systems, including Italy’s Centauro family and Japan’s Type 16 Mobile Combat Vehicle.
Less successful was a mobile gun system version of the U.S. Army Stryker, also with a 105mm gun, but the service divested that in 2021 because of problems with its dated cannon and autoloader. The U.S. Army then received the M10 Booker Combat Vehicle. Armed with a 105mm main gun, the Booker is a tracked vehicle with a much higher degree of armor protection and off-road mobility, but this, too, was canceled in 2025, amid cost and weight increases.
A wheeled 105mm gun system can provide substantial direct-fire capability while offering advantages in road mobility and potentially lower logistical demands. It also lacks the combination of protection, cross-country mobility, and heavy armament associated with a tracked main battle tank.
For Taiwan, this kind of vehicle provides a comparatively compact armored platform able to move rapidly between positions and bring heavy direct firepower to areas where larger vehicles could face mobility constraints.
If fighting reaches Taiwan’s cities, the ROCA regularly trains for the challenges of urban warfare. The service has also demonstrated unusual measures to conceal and protect its armored vehicles, including disguising tanks and other vehicles as scrap piles or civilian construction equipment to complicate PLA targeting.
The vehicle’s development is also being influenced by the threat of battlefield drones. Taiwanese military officials say the system is expected to receive additional counter-drone capabilities before entering mass production. One planned modification is an anti-drone cage around the vehicle.
More ambitious changes could involve the installation of a larger-caliber automatic weapon. Reportedly, the vehicle could eventually receive another machine gun or larger-caliber automatic cannon, with the 30mm M230 chain gun identified as one possible option. The proposed weapon could use canister-type ammunition designed to disperse numerous fragments against small drones.
Adding dedicated counter-drone equipment to the mobile gun system would therefore give the vehicle another role beyond direct engagement of conventional ground targets.
The prominence of counter-drone measures in the planning of the vehicle also reflects the increasingly contested environment in which Taiwan’s armored forces would have to operate. In a conflict with China, armored units have to operate under the threat of persistent surveillance and attacks from a wide range of uncrewed systems, making concealment, mobility, dispersion, and organic counter-drone capabilities very important to any change of survival. Questioning just how long any armor would last in a full-on invasion scenario is absolutely relevant. As we have seen in Ukraine, the drone threat alone has sidelined even the most capable armor. At the same time, Taiwan is working toward its own drone-heavy battlefield doctrine, part of a broader plan to turn the island into a “hellscape” for any invading force.
Overall, the September 23 demonstration offered a useful glimpse into the thinking behind Taiwan’s indigenous armored vehicle program.
As part of a wider modernization of ROCA armor, the service has also received 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks, broadly equivalent to the M1A2 SEPv3 version — or System Enhancement Package version 3 — which you can read more about here.
With production of 178 series examples of the new vehicle scheduled to begin in 2027, Taiwan’s new 105mm mobile gun system is moving toward becoming a significant component of the island’s domestically produced armored fleet.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post This Is Taiwan’s New 105mm 8×8 Mobile Gun System appeared first on TWZ.
It’s stunning to comprehend how much has changed since Russia began its invasion of Ukraine. The conflict quickly turned into one dominated by artillery, with both sides scrambling to source shells wherever possible. Drones have since replaced tubed artillery as the ‘king of battle’ along the front, but cannons still have an important place on the battlefield. The commander of a new combined drone-artillery brigade offered some fresh insights into how his guns are now being deployed to achieve effects that drones still can’t provide.
As we have frequently documented, the ubiquity of drones has changed the nature of combat, especially when it comes to artillery. Not only can drones hold artillery positions at risk, many are cheaper than shells and easier to produce at scale. Most types are also precision guided munitions capable of hitting moving targets with pinpoint accuracy and can also provide battlefield surveillance. However, they are not a panacea, especially amid the cat-and-mouse game of electronic warfare countermeasures and improving kinetic and passive defenses.
In a recent interview with the Ukrainian Oboronka news outlet, Lt. Col. Vitalii Korniienko, commander of the 7th Artillery Brigade, talked about the changing nature of artillery warfare. Korniienko, whose unit is part of the Ukrainian National Guard, explained what is being done to keep his array of domestically produced Bogdana 155mm systems, donated weapons like M777 howitzers, remaining Soviet-era 2S7 Pion 203mm self-propelled howitzers and other guns, relevant. Here are some takeaways from that discussion.
“Guns used to be massed at positions to create an ‘artillery wall’ and a barrage of fire,” the lieutenant colonel said. “That practice is gone now. So, how effective is artillery today? We can create an artillery barrage, but what is the point of mindlessly churning up the earth? I’d rather send 20 FPV drones to destroy the target. The cost of that mission is $20,000.”
“Alternatively, I could fire 200 shells, but the cost would be astronomical,” he pointed out. “Plus, if we fired 100 shells from a gun in a single day, it likely wouldn’t survive until evening. The sky is full of drones; every shot gives away the position, leading to detection and an attempt to dismantle it using every available means. Nowadays, a typical mission involves a series of up to 10 shots. First, 3–5 shells for ranging, followed by fire on the target. That’s a minimum of five shells, with each costing at least $2,000.”
“It is a concept of ours that was approved: combining artillery and drones within a single brigade,” Korniienko said. “Drones take out enemy artillery and logistics, while our guns provide cover for the infantry, destroy targets, and pin the enemy down in their dugouts. This way, we mitigate the limitations of both systems and boost overall effectiveness.”
“Our primary operations are focused within the corps’ area of responsibility—targeting positions 10 kilometers deep or farther behind enemy lines. Of course, we will also engage closer targets if requested by the brigade holding the defense. In addition, we are shifting logistics tasks from pickup trucks to ground-based robotic systems. They are already transporting ammunition to drone and artillery positions, as well as food and fuel for generators.”
“Let’s be honest: 95% of strikes right now are carried out by drones,” Korniienko explained. “Yet, we cannot simply abandon artillery. The focus of our operations has shifted from merely striking the enemy to destroying, suppressing, and halting the actions of assault groups and armored columns—and the need for that remains as critical as ever. There are tasks that only artillery can handle.”
The high art of war, as practiced by the warriors of the National Guard's Artillery Brigade.
— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) September 23, 2026
So high, it lands beyond the horizon.
“For instance, we currently have several enemy targets in the Kupyansk sector that drones cannot reach due to electronic warfare (EW) interference, while slow fiber-optic drones are simply shot down,” the officer noted. “What do we do? We call in artillery. Nothing affects its shells. Fog, strong winds, snow, or headwinds—it makes no difference to artillery; it will operate regardless.”
“At the beginning, both we and the Russians might have had two or three guns at a single position,” Korniienko proffered. “The enemy was doing this as late as 2023. Then it tapered off, because if you deployed six guns, an hour later they’d be gone. No one drives out into an open field anymore. Today, a gun wouldn’t even make it to the position without being spotted.”
As a result, the artillery crew’s deployment “is prepared in advance,” the officer stated. “First, anti-aircraft drone teams ‘clear’ the sky above the site of enemy reconnaissance assets. The position itself is a fully underground-dugout caponier with well-camouflaged access routes. We put a lot of effort into ensuring the artillery doesn’t get destroyed. Losing a gun is a huge blow to us.”
“There is currently an ongoing debate about phasing out ‘short’ shells and switching entirely to long-range variants,” the officer stated. “This is intended to protect artillery from drone strikes.”
“What exactly is a ‘short’ shell, and should we stop using it?” he asked rhetorically. “The M107 155mm round is what is known as a ‘short’ shell. It is inexpensive and mass-produced; all our allies—and even our own country—manufacture it. We have sufficient stocks of them for combat operations. While accurate, its range is limited to 14–18 km, depending on the propellant used.”
Long-range options “include the M795 and its foreign equivalents,” Korniienko explained. “These are longer, heavier, and significantly more expensive. With high-quality propellant, they can reach 30 km, or even further if equipped with a base-bleed unit. However, both these shells and the necessary propellants are in short supply.”
“I do not believe abandoning the M107 is the right move,” the officer suggested. “Long-range shells cause faster barrel wear and compromise position concealment; firing a long-range charge produces a massive burst of flame from the muzzle—visible for kilometers at dusk or dawn.” “Besides,” he added, “18 km is a respectable range. If the gun is positioned 15 km back, it still has a 3-km margin to spare. That is sufficient for engaging frontline infantry. In my view, the ideal mix for most brigades would be 60% long-range shells and 40% standard M107 rounds.”
“I operated 105mm guns in the Serebryanka area, on the Kharkiv axis,” Korniienko noted. “Based on intercepted communications, the enemy thought it was a mortar and searched for it within a five-to-six-kilometer range. But the howitzer was positioned eight or nine kilometers away and fired out to 10–12 kilometers.”
“There is almost no muzzle flash, just a bit of dust,” he added. “The shell arrives, and the enemy doesn’t even hear the sound of the shot. It’s compact and lightweight—you can transport it on a pickup truck. So yes, it would be useful.”
“I’d also like to see the development of 203mm artillery; why move away from that caliber?” the officer wondered aloud. “Our ‘Pion’ systems fire a massive 100-kilogram shell capable of punching through at least two floors of a building or a bunker. And it’s reasonably accurate, too. You wouldn’t want to be on the receiving end when guns like that are firing at you. Overall, I believe we need competition. Right now, the ‘Bogdana’ is evolving under wartime conditions, which is good. But in a few years, momentum could stall. They might just keep producing the same system without significant upgrades because there’s no incentive to innovate. Yet, the nature of war doesn’t stand still.”
“We have a wide range of shells from different countries, and the ones coming from the West are fine,” Korniienko said. “However, their counterparts produced in certain Asian countries… the quality is frankly poor.”
“What is wrong with them?” queried Korniienko, who did not name the country in question. “On paper, the shell weight is listed as 46 kilograms, but when we weigh them, we find 46.9 or 45.4 kg. And that half-kilogram difference—give or take—has a huge impact on where the shell lands.”
As a result, “we no longer trust the standard firing tables provided with the shells; instead, we compile our own for each manufacturer. We weigh every batch and sort them by weight so that the difference between the ‘piles’ is minimal, ensuring a reasonably tight grouping. I can’t afford to make a mistake that causes a shell to land 2 kilometers off-target—right where our infantry guys are positioned. I should add that our artillerymen are actually wary of shells from one specific country. There have been instances where they tore off the muzzle brake or even caused the barrel to burst. A barrel burst is a disaster.”
Korniienko said his unit was one of the first to test the Bogdana system, adding that he prefers it to other guns.
“We tested them and provided feedback to the manufacturer, which was then used to refine the design,” he explained. “It is a solid gun now, and it is my preferred choice. It might not be the absolute best, but I am very satisfied with the support and service.”
“If there’s a breakdown, the gun is back in position within a day or two,” he pointed out. “For instance, a gun broke down today, and we needed a repair team from the manufacturer. I know I’ll have it fixed by the day after tomorrow. They arrive in the morning, and by midday, the gun is ready. Then it takes another day or two to get it back to the position. That is very fast.”
That’s a very different experience than what he sees with donated weapons like the U.S.-made M777.
“As for the Western partners helping us—we are deeply grateful,” the officer avowed. “However, by the time you actually receive a part—say, a sensor—the gun might have been sitting idle for six months. And you can’t try to fix it yourself, because that would void the warranty.”
While artillery may no longer be the reigning weapon of war, as far as Ukraine is concerned, it has not been relegated to the dustbin of history yet either.
Contact the author: howard@twz.com
The post The Evolving Role Of Ukraine’s Artillery In The Age Of Drones appeared first on TWZ.
Just a few years ago, Jos Leijdekkers was a gangster in Antwerp, working for a major drug lord. Today he’s the most powerful man in Sierra Leone, which he’s single-handedly turned into a crucial port in the transatlantic cocaine trade. European authorities haven’t been able to track him down. Can a journalist? Alexander Clapp details Leijdekkers’s remarkable, violent rise to power, while looking for the man himself:
“These kinds of people, we are always seeing them in Africa. They come, they disappear. But the moment we learned who he was, it freaked me out,” a local car-dealer who was one of the first people to sell a motor to Leijdekkers, told me. “I left Sierra Leone after finding out. I became really scared. Not small scared.” Sophie van Leeuwen, a Dutch correspondent for RTL News, told me she “had the strong feeling I was being followed by the secret police” during the first days of a reporting trip she took to Sierra Leone in February 2025. She was arrested outside a villa where Leijdekkers was believed to reside, informed that she had intruded upon a “special security situation”, and questioned for 15 hours. Her camera and computer were searched and scrubbed. The Flemish owner of her hotel was interrogated over her alleged role in seeding a European spy network in Sierra Leone.
One evening in the hills above Freetown I attended a cocktail party where Western diplomats mingled with aid-workers. “Careful with that,” a European mission head told me when I mentioned why I had come to Africa, swivelling her blue eyes round the room. A Norwegian mining investor assured me that there would only be one way of knowing whether I was making progress in my investigation: “The government will arrange a car crash for you.”
In July 1952, reports of a railway disaster in Poland began circulating in the Western media. According to these reports, a Soviet military train derailed near the Polish town of Rzepin on 9 July 1952, killing around 160 Red Army soldiers who were returning to the Soviet Union. The train reportedly left the tracks between Rzepin and Boczów and plunged into a lake. What makes this alleged accident interesting is the uncertainty surrounding whether it actually happened.
The accident as reported by various western newspapers. Credit. Newspaper.com
Donald Trump’s campaign to bring Greenland under United States control has often been dismissed as bluster. That is a mistake. Behind the language of a property deal lies a serious attempt to revive an old imperial principle: that Washington may decide the political and economic future of the entire Western Hemisphere. Greenland, strategically placed between North America and Europe, has become a test of that claim – and of whether the sovereignty of a small Indigenous nation counts when it conflicts with the ambitions of a great power.
Trump floated buying Greenland during his first presidency in 2019. After his re-election, the proposal became more aggressive. In December 2024 he declared US “ownership and control” of Greenland as an “absolute necessity.” On January 7, 2025, he refused to rule out military or economic coercion against Greenland and the Panama Canal, saying, “We need Greenland for national security purposes.” He subsequently insisted that the United States would obtain the island “one way or the other.” The claim mixed several arguments: Greenland is vital to missile defense, Russia and China threaten the Arctic, Greenland’s rare-earth deposits are strategically valuable, and Greenlanders would supposedly welcome US rule.
The last claim was demonstrably false. A January 2025 survey conducted in both Greenlandic and Danish found that 85% of Greenland’s population opposed leaving the Danish realm to join the United States, while only 6% supported it. Yet the same poll showed a majority favoring eventual independence. That distinction is central. Greenlanders’ desire to end Danish colonial tutelage cannot be converted into consent to US annexation.
The security case for US ownership is misleading because Washington already enjoys extensive military rights in Greenland. The relationship began during the Second World War. With Denmark occupied by Nazi Germany, its ambassador in Washington signed a 1941 agreement permitting the United States to defend Greenland and construct facilities there. Denmark sought a US withdrawal after the war, but Cold War strategy prevailed.
The 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement, concluded under the North Atlantic Treaty, authorized the United States to establish and operate “defense areas.” It enabled the rapid construction of Thule Air Base – renamed Pituffik Space Base in 2023 – at a location ideal for the shortest air and missile routes between the Soviet Union and North America. At its Cold War height, the US operated numerous installations across Greenland. Today Pituffik, Washington’s northernmost military base, performs missile-warning, missile-defense and space-surveillance functions.
The agreement offers Washington wide operational freedom. A 2004 amendment – the Igaliku Agreement – recognized Greenland’s Home Rule government, made Pituffik the sole existing defense area, and required consultation before significant changes or the creation of new defense areas. It also established cooperation on economic, technical, and environmental issues. In other words, if the United States believes more radar, ports, airfields or personnel are necessary, a legal mechanism already exists to negotiate them with Denmark and Greenland. Sovereignty is, therefore, not a military requirement.
The history of the bases also explains why “security” is not a neutral word in Greenland. In 1953, Danish authorities ordered 116 Inughuit – 27 families – to leave the newly established Qaanaaq, while the others relocated to settlements elsewhere in the district. Camp Century was constructed beneath the ice in 1959-60 and was connected with the secret Project Iceworm proposal for an extensive network of nuclear-missile launch sites.
In 1968, a US B-52 carrying four hydrogen bombs crashed on the sea ice at Thule Air Base, causing plutonium and other contamination. The accident exposed the inconsistency between Denmark’s publicly declared policy against nuclear weapons on Danish territory in peacetime and the Danish government’s secret permissions for the US to store nuclear weapons in Greenland. Abandoned installations left fuel, waste and other pollution. Greenlandic reporting continues to question who will pay for future clean-ups. The military relationship protected US strategic interests while its human and environmental costs were disproportionately borne by Greenlanders.
Greenland ceased formally to be a colony in 1953, gained Home Rule in 1979 and expanded self-government in 2009. The Self-Government Act recognizes Greenlanders as a people entitled to self-determination and provides a path to independence. Washington reopened its Nuuk consulate in 2020, and cooperation grew in trade, education, mining, and research. Greenland’s governments (from Kuupik Kleist to Jens-Frederik Nielsen) have welcomed economic ties with Washington, but reject the tendency of Washington to want more and more from the island for its military needs.
Trump’s Greenland demand belongs to a wider hemispheric policy. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 warned European powers against new colonial intervention in the Americas. Presented as anti-colonial, it evolved into a claim of US supremacy. Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 corollary asserted a right of intervention in Latin America, furnishing ideological cover for occupations, regime changes, and control over strategic assets.
Trump’s supporters rechristened its latest version the “Donroe Doctrine.” The label links pressure on Greenland with demands concerning the Panama Canal, threats against Cuba and Colombia, claims over Canada, and US intervention in Venezuela. In late 2025, the White House formally proclaimed a Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, asserting US leadership throughout “our hemisphere.” Greenland is swept into this sphere because it is geographically part of North America, even though it is politically tied to Denmark and its Inuit people possess their own right of self-determination. This doctrine contains a revealing contradiction. Trump denounces European control of Greenland as an anachronism while demanding that the island be transferred to the United States. Colonialism is not abolished; the proposed colonizer merely changes. Trump’s references to minerals, sea routes, and military geography reduce Greenland to an asset and its 56,000 people to an obstacle in a transaction between powers.
Trump’s threats produced an extraordinary rupture between the United States and Europe. Denmark is not an adversary, but a NATO ally whose troops fought alongside US soldiers in Afghanistan. A threat to seize territory from one ally by force attacks the premise of the alliance itself. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen warned that a US attack on another NATO country would bring the post-war security order to an end. European governments rallied behind the principle that borders cannot be changed by coercion, a principle they invoke against Russia in Ukraine.
The crisis exposed Europe’s dependency. NATO has no comfortable procedure for defending one member against its strongest member. European states rely heavily on US military power while being asked to resist US coercion. Copenhagen responded with careful diplomacy, greater Arctic military spending, and insistence that decisions belong to Greenland and Denmark. France, Germany, the Nordic states, and the European Union expressed solidarity, but the episode sharpened calls for European strategic autonomy. It also damaged Washington’s claim to lead an alliance of democracies against authoritarian revisionism.
On September 18, 2026, Trump announced an emerging trilateral security agreement after months of negotiation, claiming “permanent control” over Greenland’s security. Danish and Greenlandic leaders described it more narrowly: an expansion of US military cooperation that preserves sovereignty and Greenlandic self-determination. The full text remains to be signed and approved. If their account holds, the outcome confirms what was apparent from the beginning: the United States could obtain additional security arrangements without owning Greenland. Yet the pressure that preceded the deal remains a warning about negotiations conducted under threats.
Greenland’s response has combined rejection, unity, and political complexity. Kalaallit Nunaat – the Greenlandic name for the country – became the center of declarations that Greenland belongs to its people and is not for sale. In March 2025, large demonstrations in Nuuk, Sisimiut, and Qaanaaq marched under the red-and-white Erfalasorput flag. Protesters told Trump to respect Inuit, their country, and their nationality. Greenland’s political parties, despite deep disagreements over the speed and economic terms of independence, jointly condemned external pressure. Parliament prohibited foreign and anonymous political donations, explicitly defending the integrity of Greenlandic democracy amid great-power interest.
Danish colonialism left profound injuries: forced assimilation, social engineering, unequal development, and decisions taken in Copenhagen about Greenlandic land and people (the entire fourth season of the popular television drama, Borgen, in 2022 centered on a conflict between Copenhagen and Nuuk about the discovery of a new oil field with a China and Russia angle). Many Greenlanders want independence, and some see heightened US interest as leverage for investment and a more equal relationship with Denmark.
Greenland reveals the real content of the Donroe Doctrine: a twenty-first-century claim that geography gives Washington superior rights over neighboring peoples. The answer from Greenland is equally modern and universal. Strategic location does not cancel popular sovereignty, minerals do not erase nationhood, and no great power acquires a country merely by declaring that it needs one.
Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian and journalist. He is the author of forty books, including Washington Bullets, Red Star Over the Third World, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South, and How the International Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, written with Grieve Chelwa. He is the executive director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, the chief correspondent for Globetrotter, and the chief editor of LeftWord Books (New Delhi). He also appeared in the films Shadow World (2016) and Two Meetings (2017).
This article was produced by Globetrotter.
A French Navy Mistral class amphibious assault ship has been photographed carrying Naval Group’s new Rampart modular launcher, a system designed to allow a single weapon station to employ different types of rockets, missiles, and other effectors against a wide range of threats.
The imagery, captured off Toulon during training on September 21, reveals the launcher installed on the ship’s forward starboard sponson. While the specific identity of the vessel is unclear, this represents the first publicly observed evidence that Rampart has moved into shipboard testing.
— PEtienne
— G.GYSSELSSHIPCOLLECTION (@GGYSSELSSHIPS) September 22, 2026
Naval Group announced in June that the first at-sea firing campaign for Rampart was planned for October aboard a Mistral class ship during the French Navy’s Wildfire counter-drone exercise.
What makes Rampart unusual is its modular architecture. Rather than being built around one missile or rocket, the system uses interchangeable launch modules that can accommodate different weapons. This allows a ship to carry large numbers of relatively inexpensive guided rockets for counter-drone work while retaining the option of using larger and more capable short-range missiles against more challenging targets.
Because the launch modules are interchangeable, the mix can theoretically be changed as the mission or threat environment changes.
The approach is aimed squarely at a problem that has become increasingly important for naval forces: defending expensive ships against potentially large numbers of inexpensive uncrewed systems and missiles without relying exclusively on high-cost interceptors.
Rampart was previously known as the Multi-purpose and Modular Launching System (MPLS). Naval Group unveiled the concept in 2023 as a self-funded development effort and formally presented the Rampart earlier this year.
The launcher uses four interchangeable ammunition modules. Depending on the configuration, Naval Group says that the system can accommodate up to 80 Thales 68mm laser-guided rockets or 48 NATO-standard 70mm laser-guided rockets. Other configurations can carry smaller numbers of short-range missiles (four to six per module, depending on type) or other effectors, including decoys.
The system has already been demonstrated with guided rockets. A January 2026 test involved a Thales 68mm guided rocket, followed by a series of firings at the Canjuers range in southern France in May. Those trials, seen in the video below, included engagements against targets at roughly two miles and a five-rocket salvo.
The relatively small guided rockets are particularly relevant to counter-drone operations. They offer a way of engaging aerial targets with a weapon substantially smaller than a conventional surface-to-air missile, while still providing precision guidance.
As well as rockets, Naval Group has been working with Thales on the Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM). Also known as Martlet, the LMM is intended to tackle a range of challenging airborne and surface targets, as you can read about here.
The company has also explored integration of loitering munitions and other missiles, while a separate agreement with the UAE-based EDGE Group covers trials of the SkyKnight surface-to-air missile.
The company has also pursued integration of Poland’s Piorun short-range air-defense missile. This may well be with a view to a potential Polish purchase of Rampart to arm its forthcoming frigates, which you can read about here.
This means the launcher is effectively being developed as an open weapons-integration platform, rather than as a dedicated launcher for one or a small set of particular munitions.
That openness could make Rampart attractive to a wide range of navies. Instead of requiring customers to adopt a completely new missile family, the launcher can potentially be configured around weapons already in their inventories or sourced from their domestic defense industries. A country could therefore buy the common Rampart launcher while retaining control over the effectors it wants to integrate, whether those are guided rockets, short-range missiles, loitering munitions or other systems. At the same time, when it comes to air threats, this is very much a point defense system for close-in engagements, and a last line of defense to complement longer-range and more capable systems.
Naval Group has described the system as capable of operating either autonomously or as part of a ship’s combat system, with a stabilized turret and integrated fire-control equipment.
That integration will be particularly important during the upcoming sea trials. A launcher that works against stationary or land-based targets still has to contend with ship motion, vibration, sea spray, sensor integration, and the compressed timelines involved in defending a moving vessel.
France operates three Mistral class amphibious assault ships, which serve as major aviation, command, and amphibious warfare platforms. Their size and mission make them high-value assets that could face a broad range of aerial threats during operations. Another two vessels were built to the same design for Russia, before being placed under embargo, and then sold to the Egyptian Navy.
Naval Group’s choice of a Mistral for the initial at-sea campaign provides an opportunity to test Rampart under realistic operational conditions while integrating it with an existing French naval combat system.
In its basic form, each Mistral is armed with a pair of Simbad launchers, each of which is fitted with two Mistral short-range surface-to-air missiles. In terms of guns, each of the vessels is armed with two 30mm and two 20mm cannons, two 7.62mm M134 Miniguns, and four 12.7mm machine guns. Adding even a single Rampart launcher provides considerably more options against aerial targets across a wide range of threats — depending on the effectors that are included.
Recent U.S. and allied operations in the Middle East have highlighted the problem of large-scale missile and drone attacks causing forces to expend substantial numbers of interceptors, raising concerns about both magazine depth and the cost of using high-end missiles against lower-cost threats. Directed-energy weapons could eventually provide a way out of that cost-exchange problem, but shipboard laser systems remain in the early stages of operational development. Navies cannot simply wait for them to mature, creating an immediate requirement for lower-cost, high-capacity kinetic options. Rampart’s large guided-rocket capacity and ability to mix different effectors are aimed at exactly that gap.
If Rampart can reliably engage drones with inexpensive guided rockets while retaining the ability to employ more capable missiles from the same launcher, it could offer navies an additional defensive layer between conventional guns and high-end surface-to-air missile systems.
Critically, new effectors could potentially also be integrated as they become available, allowing the system to evolve without replacing the entire turret.
Reflecting the urgency of the requirement, Naval Group’s development path for Rampart has been relatively rapid.
Naval Group has also demonstrated a ground-based Rampart, mounted on a high-mobility truck chassis. This configuration is intended for mobile air defense missions as well as protection of fixed sites, giving the system a role beyond ship self-defense. The truck-mounted version could provide a rapidly relocatable launcher for counter-drone and short-range air-defense missions, while retaining the same basic modular architecture and ability to employ different effectors.
Sur le stand John Cockerill, un châssis Zetros équipé du Rampart (ex lanceur modulaire polyvalent, ou LMP) de Naval Group. Avantage : un seul système de lancement pour des armements divers (roquettes, missiles, grenades, leurres, drones…) pic.twitter.com/6v4R93HGsj
— Vincent Lamigeon (@VincentLamigeon) June 16, 2026
The photographs from Toulon indicate that the Rampart concept is now moving from the range to the French fleet, albeit on an experimental basis. The forthcoming sea campaign will be an important milestone and should provide a better idea of how this system works at sea.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post France’s Modular Rampart Point Defense Launcher Has Gone To Sea appeared first on TWZ.
North Korea has released imagery of what appears to be a flight test of an updated version of its Hwasong-11Ma hypersonic missile, nearly a year after the weapon first appeared publicly at a military technology exhibition in Pyongyang.
The September 20 test involved a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) booster fitted with a hypersonic glide vehicle, according to photographs released by North Korean state media. A display screen visible in the imagery identifies the weapon as the Hwasongpho-11Ma-1, or Hwasong-11E-1 in the equivalent English-language designation.
The test was conducted from the east coast near Anbyon County, south of Wonsan, an area North Korea has repeatedly used for missile testing. The launch site allows missiles to be fired eastward over the Sea of Japan, providing a relatively controlled area for testing short- and medium-range systems.
South Korean and Japanese authorities say they detected two launches on September 20, with the first occurring at approximately 3:00 p.m. local time and the second several hours later.
North Korean photographs show the missile being launched from a coastal location, with Kim Jong Un and senior missile officials observing the test. Kim’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae, also appears in the imagery.
North Korea displayed a mock-up of what it called the Hwasong-11Ma at its Defense Development-2025 exhibition in October 2025. The design uses the basic architecture of the Hwasong-11 family, known in the West as the KN-23 family, but substitutes a distinctive glide wedge-shaped vehicle for the conventional warhead arrangement.
North Korea claimed another hypersonic missile test that same month, but did not release launch imagery clearly connecting that test to the Hwasong-11Ma. The missile was subsequently shown again during a military parade in Pyongyang.
The latest “-1” designation suggests an iterative evolution of the Hwasong-11Ma, although Pyongyang has not explained what modifications it represents.
Based on the imagery, the new configuration also includes a modified launcher, with the missile carried on a six-axle transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). When the Hwasong-11Ma was first shown, it was mounted on a five-axle TEL. The latest vehicle also appears to incorporate modified retractable covers around the missile.
It remains unclear whether the new TEL represents a standardized operational vehicle or a test configuration.
Preliminary illustration of the new launch vehicle for North Korea's hypersonic missiles. pic.twitter.com/dZ31LA1cbn
— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 22, 2026
As with previous North Korean weapons announcements, the country’s state media claims need to be treated very cautiously. Pyongyang has a long record of publicizing weapons systems and test results that cannot be independently verified, while some of its purported hypersonic tests have left outside analysts unable to determine whether the advertised maneuvering performance was actually demonstrated.
Perhaps the most revealing test-related imagery comes from a display screen photographed at the launch site.
Kim Jong Un and his daughter can be seen watching the screen, which shows the apparent flight trajectory of the Hwasong-11Ma-1. The displayed path initially follows a ballistic trajectory before descending and then performing a pull-up maneuver, regaining altitude before continuing toward the target area.
That type of trajectory is consistent with the basic concept behind a hypersonic glide vehicle. The booster provides the initial velocity and altitude, after which the unpowered glide body follows a relatively shallow, atmospheric flight path at hypersonic speeds, while maneuvering rather than following a simple ballistic path.
The graphic is useful for understanding what Pyongyang says the weapon is designed to do, but it does not independently demonstrate that the missile actually followed the depicted trajectory.
The flight data visible on the display provides some unusually specific figures.
Enhancing the original image released by North Korea allows for an excellent view of the HS-11Ma hypersonic glide missile trajectory, providing altitude and speed data. Note: Slight inaccuracies in the numbers may occur due to the use of AI tools. pic.twitter.com/M4LkfF5VYu
— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 22, 2026
According to the North Korean imagery, the missile traveled 908.2 kilometers (564.3 miles), reached an altitude of 35.8 kilometers (22.2 miles), and remained in flight for approximately 445 seconds, or 7.4 minutes.
The display gives a velocity of 2,146 meters per second, equivalent to roughly 4,800 mph. That is hypersonic velocity in the aerodynamic sense, but speed alone is not what makes a hypersonic glide weapon particularly challenging to defend against. More consequential parameters include sustained controlled flight, maneuverability, guidance, and accuracy.
Other portions of the display appear to show additional points along the flight, including different times, altitudes, and speeds. None of these figures have been independently verified.
The claimed range is particularly noteworthy because it does not match the publicly reported tracking data from South Korea and Japan.
South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said North Korea launched two SRBMs from the Wonsan area on September 20. The missiles were assessed to have traveled approximately 450 and 600 kilometers, respectively.
Japan similarly reported two launches, assessing the first at approximately 440 kilometers and the second at approximately 590 kilometers, with maximum altitudes of roughly 60 and 70 kilometers.
Those figures are substantially different from the 908.2-kilometer distance shown on North Korea’s display.
The discrepancy does not necessarily establish that either side’s data are incorrect. The North Korean figure could represent a different measurement of the flight path, or could correspond to a portion of the test that was not reflected in the public South Korean and Japanese assessments. It is also possible, if not highly probable, that Pyongyang selectively presented or altered the data.
South Korean analysts have already raised questions about the unusually long distance displayed by North Korea. Yonhap reported that experts suggested Pyongyang may have altered the figure to portray the test as more successful.
Regardless of the range actually achieved in this test, the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 is significant because it represents an attempt to combine a relatively compact SRBM with a maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicle.
The underlying Hwasong-11 family is a well-established North Korean missile design. In its KN-23 configuration, members of the family have also been used by Russia against Ukraine. By placing a glide vehicle on this type of booster, Pyongyang could potentially give a regional strike weapon a flight profile substantially different from that of a conventional ballistic missile. The Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 also uses a solid-fuel booster, allowing for faster launches than earlier liquid-fuel designs.
In principle, the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 could give North Korea an additional hypersonic strike option against more heavily defended targets in South Korea. Having road-mobile TELs would also provide greater operational flexibility despite their relatively limited range, while making it more difficult for adversaries to locate and track the launchers.
A genuine boost-glide weapon creates significant challenges for defending forces since the sheer speed of the weapon bypasses most air defenses. Its trajectory can also become less predictable after the boost phase. Maneuvering at lower altitudes could also reduce the time available to detect, track, and engage the weapon.
However, the available imagery does not establish the extent of the vehicle’s maneuverability, its ability to maintain controlled flight, its accuracy, or the reliability of the complete missile system.
North Korea has made similar claims about its hypersonic weapons in the past.
Pyongyang says it has flight-tested multiple hypersonic boost-glide vehicle designs since at least 2021, but there continue to be questions about what degree of actual capability the country has achieved in this regard. Viable wedge-shaped boost-glide vehicles have historically been extremely difficult to design and then bring to an operational state.
The challenge is not simply reaching hypersonic speed. A weapon has to sustain controlled flight and maneuverability under extreme thermal loads, while also overcoming demanding materials-science, guidance, and navigation requirements. The terminal phase is harder still. Accurately finding and striking a moving target, particularly a ship, requires a highly capable seeker and guidance system. Integrating a nuclear warhead introduces another layer of engineering and weapons-design challenges.
Those demands have made hypersonic weapons a major technological challenge for the United States and other major powers. China is currently widely regarded as the leading country in deploying and developing operational hypersonic systems, although important questions remain about the capabilities and maturity of individual weapons.
Pyongyang said it first flight-tested a wedge-shaped hypersonic glide vehicle in 2021 aboard the liquid-fuel Hwasong-8, before pairing a similar-looking vehicle with the solid-fueled Hwasong-16B intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in 2024.
VIDEO: Korean Central Television (KCTV) broadcasted footage of North Korea successfully testing the new "Hwasong-16B" hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) on Tuesday. pic.twitter.com/VNdhLAeyyK
— NK NEWS (@nknewsorg) April 3, 2024
In its coverage of the latest test, North Korean state media initially avoided identifying the weapon, describing the event as a successful trial of a “new-type weapon” that it said was significant for the rapid development of weapons technology.
Kim said the development would give adversaries an “incurable headache” and deliver what he described as a “cruel and unavoidable blow.”
Tal Inbar, the head of the Space and UAV Research Center at Israel’s Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies identifies the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 as a “very significant weapon, bringing hypersonics to the operational/tactical arena and [posing] a challenge to … air and missile defense systems.”
Whatever the exact achievements of the test, the imagery points to continued development of a weapon North Korea first publicly displayed nearly a year ago. The appearance of a new, six-axle TEL, a potentially modified missile, combined with the apparent flight test, suggests that the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 program has progressed since its initial public unveiling.
What remains uncertain is how much of that progress represents a genuine improvement in operational capability.
The latest test therefore provides another indication of the resources and attention Pyongyang is devoting to hypersonic weapons, but the available evidence is still insufficient to determine how closely the Hwasong-11Ma-1’s actual performance matches the capabilities depicted by North Korean state media.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post North Korea Tests New Hwasong-11Ma Hypersonic Missile appeared first on TWZ.
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