Militants and supporters of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva participated, this Sunday, September 27, in demonstrations as part of the national mobilization “Let’s go, Lula,” held a week before the first round of elections. In Rio de Janeiro, “CarnaLula 2026” spanned the length of Copacabana beach.
With a microphone, PT Senate candidate Benedita da Silva spoke about the importance of Carnival as an expression of popular culture and called on those present to also vote for a progressive bloc in the Rio de Janeiro Legislative Assembly and the Federal Chamber of Deputies. She reinforced the discourse that, in this election, not only democracy is at stake, but also national sovereignty. “We will not be anyone’s backyard,” she repeated Lula’s phrase.
In São Paulo, the event began with Carnival parades, circus performances, and bike rides on Paulista Avenue, where candidates gave speeches in defense of democracy. “Denialism will not prevail,” said Senate candidate Simone Tebet. Federal deputy Erika Hilton echoed Tebet, speaking about the importance of electing candidates who will steer Brazil away from fascism and who are in favor of the working class, as well as defending the end of the 6×1 work schedule. Also present at the event, actor Humberto Carrão told Brasil de Fato that he urged voters to decide the presidential election in the first round.
The capital of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, was one of the cities with the largest number of activities in support of Lula’s re-election. Among them was a flag-waving demonstration in the city center, where hundreds of activists unfurled a banner that read “Lula of Brazil.” In a review of the event, Pedro Martins, a member of the Alvorada collective, one of the organizers of the action, spoke of the need to occupy the streets. “It was a spectacular event, with all the social movements gathered. This week was an important week, showing that we need to go to the streets, and only in this way can we turn the vote around and achieve victory,” he told Brasil de Fato.
In Florianópolis and Curitiba, supporters held a bike ride carrying flags in defense of Lula’s candidacy. In Brasília, the gathering was on the Eixão, a fast road that connects the Plano Piloto from north to south.
Lula’s campaign reported that the day’s events were organized in a decentralized manner, with more than 500 activities planned across the 27 state capitals and hundreds of municipalities. The program included walks, motorcades, leaflet distribution, and cultural performances.
First published by Brasil de Fato in Portuguese.
This story originally appeared in Panamerican Dispatch on Sep. 23, 2026, and is shared here with permission.
On September 22, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva gave the opening speech of the 2026 U.N. General Assembly in New York City. He discussed the concerning state of the world, demanded diplomacy to resolve conflicts and said, “this is the most critical moment of the United Nations.”
He also denounced attempts to influence upcoming Brazilian elections.
“Brazil does not fit into anyone’s backyard,” he said. “We need partners with a positive agenda that promotes development.”
My compliments to the President of the General Assembly, Ambassador Khalilur Rahman from Bangladesh.
I greet each of the Heads of State and Government and the delegates present. I address in particular the Secretary-General of the United Nations. During his two terms, António Guterres was a direct witness to the growing mismanagement of the superpower.
Mr. President, this is the tenth occasion in which I open the General Debate of this Assembly. Since I stood at this podium for the first time in 2003, this is the most critical moment of the United Nations. The feeling that moves me today is that of indignation.
The United Nations is failing in one of its highest missions, to free humanity from the fray of war. Its credibility has never been so low. Its ability to protect the most vulnerable, those who have no army or arsenals, has never been so small.
We are all victims of the immobility of a Security Council that does not fulfill its role. In 1946, already in the first session of this assembly, Brazil warned of the high price that the international community would pay for the right to veto. This vice, which gave rise to the U.N. Charter, conferred the great powers the privilege of insensitivity.
This original sin is now added to a profound crisis of leadership. The year 2025 recorded the highest number of armed conflicts since World War II. Trillions of dollars financed a new arms race.
Geopolitical tensions threaten to turn regional disputes into a conflict of global proportions. Those who hold the reins of crucial decisions must act responsibly and in a sense of urgency. The leaders of the countries that make up the Security Council must come together.
I know the realities of power, but the concessions to the law of the strongest have already crossed the limits. This is not idealism, it is pure realism. War is not the continuation of politics by other means, it is the total failure of politics.
In an interdependent world, to lead is to reconcile the interests of the homeland with that of humanity. This is the statement of someone who represents a nation that loves peace and freedom. Someone who fought against a military dictatorship and defended his country against a coup d’état. It is the conviction of a factory worker, who was elected president three times and who won the fight against hunger in Brazil.
This assembly has recently corrected historical distortions. It has recognized the trafficking of enslaved Africans as the most serious crime against humanity. It has approved the most precise representation of the world map. Now we must debate about determining themes for the future of humanity. We are called to choose between multilateralism and unilateralism, democracy or extremism, sovereignty or subordination.
These choices demand courage, political will and clarity of objectives. This is what is expected of a statesman. Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin were statesmen.
They challenged the past to design a future of peace. They were defeated by hatred. Generations of Palestinians will carry the pain and trauma left by the genocide practiced by the Netanyahu government against women and children in Gaza.
Israeli civilians paid the price of radicalism and intolerance of the terrorist acts of Hamas. Pursuing the International Criminal Court and its members is an incentive for these crimes to be punished. The U.N. Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese cannot be silenced for telling the truth.
Illegal settlements in the West Bank are becoming less and less viable. The two-state solution is essential so that Israelis and Palestinians can live in peace. Threatening the extinction of a civilization will not bring stability to the Middle East.
The Strait of Hormuz became a trench of war when it should remain a vital passage for international trade. Families all over the world pay for the increase in the price of fuel, fertilizers and food.
The war between Russia and Ukraine has dragged on for five years in a humanitarian drama that continues to save lives.
We all know that there will be no winners on the battlefield. Diplomacy is the only option. Initiatives such as the Group of Friends of Peace, created by Brazil and China, reveal the strength of the international community willing to work for dialogue.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the geographical proximity to the world’s largest military power is inescapable, especially in the context of the worsening of hegemonic temptations. Brazil does not fit into anyone’s backyard. We need partners with a positive agenda that promotes development.
Ideological differences should not be an obstacle to greater integration between neighbors. Countries in the region have recognized the horrors of regimes of exception. We have come a long way to restore popular will.
Democracy is once again in check. We are once again witnessing foreign interference in electoral processes. The division of the world into areas of influence and neocolonial attacks for strategic resources constitute anachronistic gestures.
The Venezuelan people deserve to define their own destiny. Nicaragua will not solve its problems by preventing the opposition from running for office. The crisis in Haiti continues to test the limits of the indifference of the international community. In Cuba, the world is suffering. The collective punishment imposed on 10 million people by an illegal economic embargo and energy blockade.
Mr. President, Brazil does not underestimate the challenge posed by organized crime. We are prepared to face criminal organizations that terrorize our communities. Workers are robbed, mothers lose their children, police officers do not return home. People are tired of violence.
But we will not outsource the responsibility of defending our borders and guaranteeing the population the right to live without fear. We do not need aircraft carriers guarding our waters. We need cooperation to stop the flow of weapons and money that supplies organized crime.
This is the spirit of the proposal that I personally delivered to the president of the United States. We want to fight the money laundering carried out by Brazilian criminals abroad.
For a long time, Brazilian states have acted in their own way. Criminals took advantage of the lack of coordination. But this is changing. In Manaus we created the International Police Cooperation Center of the Amazon, bringing together the public security officials of the nine Amazon countries.
In 2025, we carried out the largest organized crime operation in the history of Brazil. We broke records in the seizure of drugs, goods and illicit resources. We are confronting all levels of organized crime, including crime magnates.
The Anti-Faction Law, which we have just passed, imposes more severe penalties on organized crime than those stipulated for terrorism. Organized crime and corruption go hand in hand. The fight against corruption will continue to be relentless, no matter who may be hurt. No one is above the law.
Ladies and gentlemen, the pillars of multilateralism are being corroded. The World Trade Organization is on life support. When governments capitulate in the face of those who use tariffs as a weapon of coercion and blackmail, the consequences are disastrous. In the age of disinformation, those who fight progress and knowledge resistthe evidence of science. We will never forget the millions of lives lost by negligence in the fight against COVID-19. Campaigns against vaccines are bringing back diseases that we considered eradicated. Weakening the World Health Organization makes everyone more vulnerable.
Until recently, the response to climate change was consolidated in the center of the international agenda. This year, the issue disappeared from the G7 debate and the G20 debate, forums that bring together the largest carbon emitters in the world. It is time to resume the offensive and impose a defeat to negationism. Nature reminds us every day that we have but one planet.
The Himalayan glaciers are melting. A super El Niño can cause torrential rains, droughts and forest fires in different parts of the globe. Its effects will impact, above all, the most vulnerable.
Brazil has been demonstrating that it is possible to combine economic growth with emission reduction. We have achieved our self-sufficiency in oil and we will continue to research the potential of new reserves such as the Equatorial Margin.
We will not renounce the environmental agenda. We will carry forward the roadmap for the decarbonization of the Brazilian economy. The Forever Tropical Forest Fund, launched at COP30 in Belém, shows that it is possible to change old paradigms. The forest is worth more standing than destroyed.
We will continue to reduce deforestation, which fell by half in the Amazon and reached the lowest level of deforestation in 11 years. We have the moral authority to reject protectionist measures disguised as embracing the environmental cause.
Brazil is a global leader in green energy. We have the critical minerals and rare earth minerals that the world needs to carry out the energy transition. Our natural wealth belongs to the Brazilian people and it is for their benefit that they will be exploited. Access to our minerals will be a mandatory counterpart to the generation of value in our territory, the transfer of technology and the supply of national strategic sectors.
Mr. President, we live in an unprecedented technological revolution, with great risks and opportunities. It would be an unforgivable historical omission not to face the challenge of regulating big tech and artificial intelligence. A handful of oligarchic technicians want to revive a version of digital neoliberalism without rules or transparency.
They are promoting a race without ethical restraints, beyond the backs of the U.N. and the Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence. As Pope Leo XIV warns, decisions on technology should never be separated from conscience and responsibility. Companies that know the risks of their products transfer to families the impossible task of facing algorithms.
The millionaire industry of betting apps turns addiction into profit. Its dizzying dissemination is indebting and destroying millions of homes. Brazil will not tolerate this business model. We approved one of the most advanced laws in the world to protect children, teenagers and women in the digital environment. We will ensure the joint remuneration of artists, musicians and audiovisual content creators. We will not give in to the pressure of multinationals who want to privatize our Pix, a public and free payment infrastructure that has made financial inclusion a reality for millions of Brazilians.
Ladies and gentlemen, sustainable development goals are the target of attacks from reactionary forces that want to naturalize injustice. Inequality and underdevelopment result from political choices. It is possible to put the poor in the budget and make the rich pay their share.
It is necessary to roll back privileges and invest in free, quality education and healthcare.
There is a legitimate desire for change in the world. But changing is not going backwards. Changing is not taking away rights. It is not rehashing theories of racial supremacy or of female submission. It is not recolonizing the Global South.
Changing is advancing to a future of more participation and more achievements. It is creating and sharing effective public solutions for the challenges of development through a democratic, strong, efficient and capable state. It is betting on the spirit of solidarity and cooperation with Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.
Initiatives such as the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty and the International Panel on Inequality are born from this political will. Brazil is in a hurry to become a developed and socially just nation. We have adopted an economic model that focuses on income distribution, creating jobs and wage increases.
We are betting on improving productivity, on increasing credit and on building a robust social protection network. Brazil has grown again in a sustainable way. We are the third largest destination for foreign foreign direct investment.
Despite the U.S. tariffs against our economy, this year we will hit a new record of exports. There is still a lot to be done. The labor market is transforming.
Older people want to remain active. Young people want to start a business. Workers need time to rest, to improve their skills and be with their families.
In Brazil, achieving this goal means ending the so-called 6×1 scale to guarantee workers two days off a week. This change is essential to alleviate the domestic overload that still falls on women.
We are building a Brazil where women don’t have to ask for permission to occupy positions of power or enter the labor market.
A country free of femicide where no woman, in or outside the home, lives under the threat of violence. This is a cause that the world needs to embrace.
Mr. President, upon receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, Mr. King said, “I believe that what self-centered men have torn down, other-centered men can build up.”
The UN was born under the symbol of hope. Over eight decades, it has contributed to decolonization, promoted human rights and supported sustainable development. It protected immigrants and refugees. It condemned racism, anti-Semitism and religious intolerance.
These were the achievements of leaders who stood at this podium, moved by indignation in the face of the injustices of their time. Men and women who refused to accept war as their destiny, colonialism as their right, apartheid as their legitimate system. This ability to say “no” to the inequalities gave birth to some of the greatest transformations that we have lived.
Faced with the paralysis of the United Nations, we need to rediscover the political will so that it can, again, be a temple of peace.
I want to conclude with a message about my country to all who listen to us.
On October 4, millions of Brazilians go to the polls to decide their destiny. They will not just elect the President of the Republic, state governors and representatives of the legislative power. They will decide between democracy and negationism. If Brazil is going to move toward a future of more opportunities or return to a past of exclusion.
We will have a transparent and competitive election where candidates enjoy the broadest freedom of expression. We know that some abuses of this freedom seem to be associated with the interests of foreigners, contrary to those of our country.
We do not underestimate the challenge of the disinformation network that intends to disrupt the public debate during the campaign.
But we have a modern and robust electoral system. Under the watchful eye of a plural citizenry and a free press, we will not allow the enemies of democracy, both internal and external, to attack the popular will.
Brazilian democracy belongs to Brazilians.
Brazil will continue to be a sovereign country.
No one, no one will take us away from this path.
May God bless us all. Thank you.
This speech was translated into English by Michael Fox at Panamerican Dispatch. You can read the original in Portuguese, here. You can watch his speech, below.
Longreads has published hundreds of original stories—personal essays, reported features, reading lists, and more—and more than 14,000 editor’s picks. And they’re all funded by readers like you. Become a member today.
Earl Swift was a reporter for The Virginia Pilot and has contributed to Outside. He’s been nominated for a Pulitzer eight times. Among other books, he wrote Chesapeake Requiem, a New York Times bestseller that chronicles a year in the life of Tangier Island, located 12 miles out in the middle of Virginia’s Chesapeake Bay. There, a dozen miles from shore, residents live a life with “one foot in the twenty-first century and another in times long passed,” he writes.
Swift spoke with Brendan O’Meara, host of The Creative Nonfiction Podcast, about reporting and writing his new book, Up on Cove Mountain: Adventure, Tragedy, and a Quest for Meaning on the Appalachian Trail. Swift hiked the 2,000-mile trail twice, 30 years apart, in order to write the book. He talks with O’Meara about story structure, getting close to the truth, and why it’s important to remove the speedbumps that might cause a reader to abandon your story before the end.
This conversation has been edited for pacing and flow.
—Krista Stevens
Brendan: Much has been written about the Appalachian Trail, and you’ve brought a different kind of sensibility to it. How do you make your book fresh and immediate and yet able to sit alongside all the other titles about the trail?
Earl: I’m lucky, in the sense that probably the two best books about trail hikes were written by people who didn’t finish them. Bill Bryson was one and Cheryl Strayed was the other. Most trail accounts are self-published and unedited, written by folks with relatively little writing experience. Not to sound highfalutin, but it shows. I also knew I had a story to tell with Molly and Jeff and what had happened there. [Ed: to say more about Molly and Jeff here would spoil the plot of Swift’s book.] I felt I was pretty well-suited to tell that story. The opportunity was to be that one rare book about a trail journey that stands apart, and I figured it was worth the risk to try to write that book.
Brendan: As you hiked south, getting into Georgia, you started to experience congestion, more people. You noticed a generational divide at Low Gap and other campsites. Younger hikers seem predisposed to tenting, no matter what. Even in the middle of a downpour, they’ll choose their individual shelter over the communal. You also noticed isolation and phones, something you wouldn’t see 30 years ago.
Earl: You didn’t see it 30 years ago because there were no phones. We forget that the smartphone didn’t come along until 2007, a full 17 years after I did that first hike. It was a very different environment back then. This was eight years before Bill Bryson wrote A Walk in the Woods. The trail did not occupy a spot in the collective consciousness. It was not part of American culture the way it has become since, and so you were dealing with people who were drawn from a much narrower band of society. There were people who were already outdoorsy, and that’s not necessarily the case now. All walks [of life] attempt a thru hike these days, but back then it tended to be people who were already part of the fraternity. If you wanted to make a call, you hitchhiked to the nearest town and went to a payphone. There was no other option. If you wanted a pizza, you had to hitch into town. Now you have people who will get on their phones when they’re two miles from the nearest road crossing, and they’ll arrange for a pizza joint to deliver a pie at the road crossing when they arrive, which would have been science fiction.
Brendan: There’s a balance in what to include, so that it doesn’t feel repetitive. You need to pick high intensity moments, be it the physical experience of a gnarly section of trail, or the three siblings from Kentucky who are assholes with no etiquette. You pick these moments so it’s not front-loaded or middle-loaded or back-loaded. There is a delicacy in how you deploy various elements throughout.
Earl: For any storyteller, proportionality is the key ingredient. You must figure out how much of each piece you share with the reader. If there’s one fatal flaw in most trail chronicles, it’s that writers don’t make enough of a distinction between telling moments and untelling moments. They just throw everything at you, and it gets boring.
There are relatively few classic books about the Appalachian Trail, but one of them came in the late ’70s. It’s this two-volume, 1,000-page book called Hiking the Appalachian Trail. It gives you first-person accounts of the first 50 or so thru hikes. By 100 pages into the first volume, you’ve gone numb because every story is exactly the same. Part of the problem is that the whole tenor of the story is This happened, and then this happened. There’s never a moment’s pause to reflect on what it means and why I should care as a reader. Everything’s treated as equally important, and therefore nothing is important.
Job one, for anybody writing a book—for anybody writing a story of any kind, of any length—is to get the reader to that last word. If you don’t do that, it doesn’t matter which pretty words you drop in the middle of the story.
Brendan: You’re the tour guide and you’re going to point to what matters. That degree of authorial authority is integral to any narrative, especially something like this, because otherwise it would just be so rote and boring. You have to imbue it with a pulse.
Earl: Job one, for anybody writing a book—for anybody writing a story of any kind, of any length—is to get the reader to that last word. If you don’t do that, it doesn’t matter which pretty words you drop in the middle of the story. It doesn’t matter how brilliantly conceived it is. The story has failed because you have failed to get the reader to the end, to the finish line.
The whole process of structuring a story, and strategizing about a story comes down to, How do I remove all the speed bumps that will encourage the reader to set this aside? If you can do that effectively, then you win, you get the reader to finish the story. The reader can badmouth the story after the fact. If the reader’s reached the end, you as the writer have achieved what you set out to do. All you can ask is for them to finish the story. You can’t ask them to like it. That’s up to them. But you can get them to finish it if you do it right.
We make decisions about what we include and what we leave out. We decide where we start a story, which is not always at the beginning. We decide where we’re going to end it, which is not always at the ending. You hope that in making those decisions, you get the reader to the truth, or pretty damn close to it, as close as you can, given the facts that you’re working with. But it is a construct, and it is your responsibility. Structure your story in such a way that the story will achieve what it sets out to do. That it will succeed in terms of incorporating enough propulsion to get the reader to the end.
I probably spent three months doing nothing but cutting. Most of the writing of this book was cutting. I wrote a journal while I was hiking, and then I did nothing but cut when it came to writing the book.
Brendan: In what ways did the hike change you?
Earl: In 1990, the big takeaway for me was that I could do anything. It boosted my confidence to the point where I’m sure I was pretty obnoxious in the months immediately after. God knows I must have been difficult to deal with. I could do anything! It made me Superman. Part of that was seeing something demonstrated daily that my dad had been saying to me for years. He was always big on saying, “How do you eat the elephant? One bite at a time.” It had just been “dad talk” to me until this hike, when I realized part of being able to do anything is knowing how to bust it up into its components, and then bust those components up into their individual ingredients. How to take each little bite-sized fragment in sequence, and pretty soon you’ve accomplished the whole thing.
That dictated my approach to big assignments at the paper and in magazines, and certainly it has informed every book effort. It’s a stupid amount of work to write a book. I wouldn’t recommend this line of work to anybody. It’s a ridiculous way to try to make a living. So uncertain, so filled with terror, and so potentially without reward of any kind. But breaking the 2,200 miles into daily doses of 14 to 17 miles describes perfectly how I go about writing a book now. You don’t sit down to write 105,000 words. You sit down to write 1,200 words a day. That’s my daily quota. Do that over enough days, and pretty soon you have the 105,000 words.
Brendan: How did you settle on 1,200?
Earl: Early on, with my first couple of books, it was 2,000, and I just whacked it down. My first hike, I had no trouble banging out 17 to 20 miles a day. Now, 14 miles feels like a pretty tough day at the office, a long day.
It’s the same with writing. Twelve hundred words takes as much out of me now as 2,000 used to. I’ll probably drop it down to 1,100, maybe even 1,000 with the next book. I’d like to think that the words are better than they used to be. I still find that I spend the first hour or two every morning, in the middle of a book project, going back through what I thought were perfect words laid down the day before. Invariably, when I wake up, I find that they weren’t so perfect after all. In fact, they need a lot of fixing and so I do repair for the first couple of hours, and then try to make something out of the rest of the day with new stuff.
Listen to the full conversation below.
This story originally appeared in Panamerican Dispatch on Sep. 21, 2026, and is shared with permission.
The Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) has raised the risk of external influence and interference by the United States in Brazil’s 2026 elections to a “critical level.” The confidential report was sent to the Presidency, the Supreme Electoral Court, and the Ministry of Justice. In it, the agency points to escalating pressure from the administration of Donald Trump on Brazil. It ties Washington’s actions to a broader strategy to politically reorient Latin America.
The document is titled, “Threats to the 2026 electoral process.” It was forwarded to authorities in late August, and its contents were revealed this Saturday, Sept. 19, by journalist Mônica Bergamo’s column in the Folha de S.Paulo newspaper.
According to the report, there is a “trend of escalating pressure on Brazil” and a “selective intensification and reconfiguration of the pressure exerted by the United States,” albeit within a historic pattern of U.S. influence over the region.
The report’s assessment does not mention ballot tampering or altering the election results. The intelligence agency’s warning addresses the possibility that political, economic and diplomatic pressures could interfere with the institutional environment and with public debate during the electoral process.
The agency places these actions within the strategy adopted by the second Trump administration to reaffirm U.S. hegemony in Latin America.
According to the analysis, strategic documents released by the U.S. government between November 2025 and May of this year point to its objectives as reducing the influence of powers considered rivals and preventing their access to the region’s “strategic assets, natural resources and infrastructure.”
ABIN identifies China as one of the primary targets of this policy. In the agency’s assessment, Washington seeks to expand its direct or indirect control over these resources, whether through the U.S. government or the country’s private investment.
The report pays special attention to the actions of U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio. According to ABIN, his policy toward Latin America has an ideological bent and he seeks to “influence and reorient the foreign policy of countries in the region.”
According to the document, this strategy involves steering Latin American countries away from China and promoting a domestic political shift “by supporting the rise of conservative governments.”
The agency cites a U.S. Senate hearing held in June, during which Rubio linked the restoration of U.S. hegemony in Latin America to the presence of governments aligned with Washington.
At the time, Rubio stated that the region had come to rely on several governments “friendly” to the United States during Trump’s second term. He singled out Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as exceptions.
The document also noted statements in which Rubio held Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva responsible for U.S. tariffs on Brazilian products, alleging that Brazil had not negotiated “in good faith.”
In ABIN’s view, this approach personalizes the pressure exerted on the country and has the potential to impact public debate in Brazil during the electoral period.
The intelligence agency assessed that Brazil holds a unique position in U.S. strategy, because it has a government with “greater political will and the means to defend its strategic autonomy” in the face of Washington’s pressure for concessions and geopolitical realignment.
The report states that, despite periods of easing tensions between Lula and Trump, actions taken by the United States since May indicate a trend of increasing pressure.
Among the actions cited is the U.S. designation of Brazilian criminal organizations as terrorist groups and sanctions announced in July against two Brazilians and companies based in Brazil and Portugal. The U.S. government accused them of ties to money-laundering networks linked to the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) drug gang. For ABIN, these sanctions represented a “transition” because they caused U.S. pressure to have concrete effects on Brazilian individuals and companies.
“As a result, U.S. external interference now directly impacts financial relationships, corporate reputation, access to the dollar, international operations, and the exposure of third parties to the risk of secondary sanctions,” states an excerpt from the report released by Folha de S. Paulo.
According to the analysis, the U.S. strategy is happening in a “gradual, combined and adaptive” manner, linking Brazilian organizations to threats against U.S. national security. This is then followed by measures capable of affecting the country’s companies, banks and other institutions.
The Brazilian Intelligence Agency warns that these types of sanctions could prompt Brazilian and foreign economic actors to alter their decisions out of fear of losing access to the U.S. financial system or being impacted by secondary sanctions.
The report has also emerged amid tensions between Brasília and Washington directly related to the 2026 elections.
During negotiations held in 2025, the Trump administration presented Brazil with a draft joint statement that outlined a Brazilian commitment to not “arbitrarily” detain, arrest or limit the participation of “political dissidents” in the electoral process. The proposal stated that Brazil should commit to holding “free and fair” elections and ensure the participation of such individuals in the vote.
On Thursday. Sept. 17, Lula stated in an interview with Rádio Itatiaia that the proposal had become a “dead issue” for the Brazilian government. The president also rejected the possibility of granting the United States preferential access to the country’s mineral resources.
The confidential agency report delves deeper into the concerns previously raised in public analyses by the Brazilian Intelligence Agency. In a document released this year regarding intelligence challenges for 2026, the agency identified foreign interference as a threat to sovereignty. It warned that a combination of technological dependence, disinformation, espionage, and coercion could enable foreign actors to influence public debate and decision-making processes in Brazil.
Edited by Geisa Marques. This article was originally published by Brasil de Fato. It can be read in its original form, in Portuguese, here.
On October 4, nearly 160 million Brazilians will go to the polls to elect their next president, vice president, members of Congress, governors, and state legislators from the country’s various states. If no presidential candidate receives more than 50% of the valid votes, a runoff election will be held on October 25.
At this time, 13 presidential candidates are vying for the presidency in Brasília, although polls clearly point to two candidates vying for the presidency of Latin America’s most economically powerful country.
On one side is Brazil’s current president, the former union leader and progressive Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. Lula served as president from 2003 to 2011 with very high approval ratings, although following corruption allegations, he was imprisoned and sentenced to nine years.
However, after over 500 days in detention, a judge ordered his release, ruling that the proceedings were flawed. The Supreme Court of Justice called the incident a “historic error.” Following that, Lula faced off against then-far-right President Jair Bolsonaro and defeated him in the 2022 election. Now Lula hopes to be re-elected once again.
At the forefront is none other than Jair Bolsonaro’s son, Flávio Bolsonaro, who has leveraged his father’s reputation to boost his own. This is because Jair Bolsonaro was found guilty of several crimes that, according to the Brazilian justice system, were intended to prevent Lula’s inauguration and promote a coup d’état. Jair Bolsonaro is currently in house arrest for those crimes.
Consequently, a significant portion of Brazilian society, as well as international politicians such as Donald Trump, consider Bolsonaro’s imprisonment to be unjust. This explains how his son Flávio – a lawyer and businessman who currently serves as a senator – has managed to garner significant support in his bid to win the presidency on October 4.
Thus, two clearly distinct political and economic models are pitted against one another. Lula belongs to a political tradition that seeks to strengthen the state, reduce extreme poverty, invest in social programs, and diversify trade partners (such as China and India), all in line with a clearly pro-sovereignty discourse.
For his part, Flávio Bolsonaro promises to continue on his father’s path: economic neoliberalism, reducing the size of the state, building closer ties with the private sector, and – perhaps most importantly – placing Brazil once again under the influence of the Trump administration, which supports the far-right candidate.
Clearly, a victory for the far right – which is close to Washington – would represent a sharp shift in the region’s current economic and political course. Brazil accounts for nearly 50% of the region’s total GDP, so a victory for a Trump ally would drastically alter not only the political landscape but also the economic one. On the other hand, a victory for Lula would signal a “halt” (probably the most significant of all possible outcomes) to the wave of victories by the Latin American right and far right – allies and supporters of US hemispheric and military policy – that have swept the electoral landscape in recent years.
Since the start of the presidential race, Lula has maintained a lead over his political opponent. However, that lead has been narrowing as the weeks have gone by, raising the possibility that the runoff election, scheduled for October 25, will be a very close race. This is because, it appears, neither candidate will manage to secure more than 50% of the vote to win in a single round.
According to a poll by the MDA Pesquisa Institute, Lula holds a solid lead over Bolsonaro: 40.06% to 30.4%. Augusto Cury comes in third with 6% of the vote, while the remaining candidates trail behind this mark. According to this poll, in the event of a runoff, Lula would win with 47.3% against Bolsonaro’s likely 40%.
However, other polls paint a different picture, in which Lula remains in the lead but by a very narrow margin. This is according to an AtlasIntel poll, which shows Lula with 46% of the vote, while Bolsonaro would receive 44% in the first round. In the runoff, the gap would disappear, and both candidates would receive nearly 47% of the vote (a technical tie).
However, everything could change in the wake of a scandal that has rocked Brazilian politics. In late 2025, the former owner of Banco Máster SA, Daniel Vorcaro, allegedly committed a serious case of bank fraud. Since his arrest in March 2026, his conversations, friendships, and connections have all been under close investigation.
One of the people who has come under scrutiny is Flávio Bolsonaro, who confirmed that he had asked the banker for money to make a film about his father called “Dark Horse”. The Federal Police are investigating this case to determine whether Bolsonaro participated in any illegal activity.
Meanwhile, Lula’s inner circle has also been affected. The judge who ordered Jair Bolsonaro’s arrest, Alexandre de Moraes, is alleged to have exchanged messages with Vorcaro. Moraes has been portrayed as a judge close to Lula and thus Bolsonaro and his supporters have seized on the revelation of the messages to call for Moraes’s removal and indirectly accuse the government of suspicious activities.
The debate has led to a serious crisis within the Brazilian judiciary because a decision to investigate Moraes was postponed, prompting accusations of political bias among the judges.
Tatiana Fernandes Um incêndio de grandes proporções e muito violento está a lavrar no distrito de Coimbra.
As chamas resultam da junção de três fogos distintos que deflagraram quase em simultâneo em concelhos diferentes, dois dos quais no lugar de Sabouga, freguesia de Lavegadas (Vila Nova de Poiares), pelas 13h40, e outro em Murganheira, freguesia de Pombeiro da Beira (Arganil), pelas 13h35
Segundo o comandante do Comando Sub-regional da Região de Coimbra da Proteção Civil, Carlos Tavares, o fogo está a “progredir livremente” com uma frente em direção a Góis, mantendo três povoações na linha de fogo: Chapinheira, Arroças e Vila Nova de Ceira.
O comandante classificou como “muito estranho” o facto de três incêndios nascerem em simultâneo a pouca distância e acabarem por se fundir num só, aumentando drasticamente a libertação de energia e a gravidade da situação.
A área afetada é maioritariamente composta por eucalipto, pinheiro e mato denso, numa zona sem ordenamento florestal e onde já não ardia há vários anos.
Segundo o presidente da Câmara Municipal de Arganil, Luís Paulo Costa, a proximidade do aparecimento dos focos de incêndio em concelhos limítrofes gera fortes dúvidas.
Segundo a Autoridade Nacional de Emergência e Proteção Civil (ANEPC), pelas 20h00 estavam mobilizados 711 operacionais e 223 veículos no combate às chamas.
Os meios aéreos já foram retirados devido à falta de visibilidade noturna, concentrando-se agora o combate no terreno para tentar dominar o incêndio durante a noite.
Por: Dino Frazão
19 de Setembro de 2026
————————————————–
© 2026 Os Monhacas. Todos os direitos reservados.
Este é um projeto independente de criação de conteúdos.
Se gostou do que leu e ainda não é seguidor, siga a nossa página para ver mais conteúdos!
————————————————–
O conteúdo Três incêndios juntam-se e provocam fogo violento com três aldeias na linha de fogo no distrito de Coimbra aparece primeiro em OS MONHACAS.
This is a particularly important episode, coming just two weeks ahead of the 1st round of high stakes presidential elections in Brazil.
Host Michael Fox speaks with Artur Romeu. He’s a Brazilian journalist and the Latin American Director for Latin America of the international NGO Reporters Without Borders.
They spoke ahead of Episode 6 of The Battle for Free Speech, about Brazil’s fight against disinformation. He has an important analysis, which helps to deconstruct how Trump, Silicon Valley and the far-right in the United States, and around the world is “instrumentalizing the idea of free speech for their own political purpose and abandoning key dimension of freedom of expression, which is this more social and collective dimension to receive plural, reliable, diverse, and free information from others.”
This is the third bonus episode of The Battle for Free Speech. The Battle for Free Speech Podcast is a production of The Real News Network hosted by Michael Fox and Marc Steiner.
Guests:
Resources:
Many thanks to everyone who has supported this show.
Follow The Battle for Free Speech on Spotify or Apple Podcasts. Support Michael Fox’s reporting at patreon.com/mfox. Never miss an episode — sign up for The Real News newsletter at therealnews.com.
The following is a rushed transcript and may contain errors. It will be updated.
Michael Fox:
Hi folks. I’m your co-host, Michael Fox. This is the Battle for Free Speech, and this is the third bonus episode in this series. So this one is particularly important and timely as Brazil is heading into high stakes presidential elections this October. The race is between current leftist president Luis Ignacio Lula de Silva and Flavio Bolsonaro, the son of former far-right president Jair Bolsonaro. If you have listened to episode six of this podcast series or my podcast series Brazil on Fire or the entire season two of my podcast Under the Shadow, then you know a little bit about where things are and where they’re headed. And this is another deep dive. Today, I’m bringing you my full conversation with Arturo Romeo. He’s a Brazilian journalist and the director for Latin America of the International NGO Reporters Without Borders. I spoke with him specifically for my episode about Brazil of the battle for free speech, but there was so much more from our conversation that I couldn’t fit into that episode.
In this conversation, Artur mentions a couple of things and I want to give you some context. First, Alexandre Morais is the Brazilian Supreme Court justice who led the investigations into fake news and Bolsonaro’s hate cabinet. He also oversaw the electoral court in the 2022 elections, and he was the guy who had the showdown with billionaire Elon Musk over Twitter back in 2024. In fact, Morais blocked the social media platform in Brazil for roughly two months after Musk refused to suspend a series of Brazilian accounts who were disseminating fake news. Then Musk pulled Twitter’s legal representation from the country. Musk later acquiesced and Twitter went back online. But that escapade has been used by the far right and even President Donald Trump to claim that Morais and the Lula government have been censoring free speech in the country. And in fact, that was one of the top reasons for the 50% tariff on Brazilian goods that Trump imposed last year on the country.
And it has been at the heart of Trump’s campaign against Brazil and Lula in an effort to influence the outcome of Brazil’s presidential elections this year. Okay, I think you are up to speed. Here is my full conversation with Artur Romeo in its entirety. We spoke last year, 2025, but it is more relevant than ever today. I hope you like it. Arturo, thank you so much for being with me today. Thank you so much for your availability. I really, really appreciate. Super excited to talk with you about all these things.
Artur Romeu:
Thank you, Michael. I’m also excited to talk about those issues with you. I
Michael Fox:
Say the same question to everybody. For you, what does free speech mean?
Artur Romeu:
It seems like a simple question, especially for an NGO working with press freedom for 40 years at the institution that I work for, the NGO, that I work for Reporters Without Borders, we have been working defending press freedom, not exactly free speech, but they kind of free speech and press freedom drink on the same fountain or same roots of freedom of expression more broadly. So free speech is the ability to essentially being able to impart ideas, opinions, views on the world around us without being harassed, persecuted, prosecuted, attacked by governments or other groups, can be religious groups, but also economic interests. So the ability to be able to, as an individual or a collective, to express yourself and your ideas and contribute to the public debate without fear for reprisal essentially.
Michael Fox:
And Artur, what is your analysis of the state of free speech today in the world in Brazil and the United States and elsewhere? Where are we?
Artur Romeu:
I think that there is a lot of confusion. Maybe I never saw as much confusion around those issues as we are seeing today. Basically, one of the things that scares me is the fact that free speech is being weaponized against press freedom, for example. Another issue is that we are focusing too much on the individualistic aspect of free speech, and we have to have this understanding that at least coming from a freedom of expression perspective, there are an individual dimension, but also a social and collective dimension of freedom of expression. It’s not just our ability to being able to express ourselves and to impart information and ideas, but also to receive those information and ideas from others. So the way we are talking about, or at least the way that some political groups and specifically the far right nowadays everywhere in the world, not specifically in the US, has been instrumentalizing the idea of free speech for their own political purpose and abandoning a key aspect, a key dimension of freedom of expression, which is this more social and collected dimension to receive plural, reliable, diverse and free information from others.
And a third issue, and I think that’s behind most of this confusion as well, is the role that big tech social media platforms are having on this discussion because we have the idea that regulating this economic activity sector would be the same as censorship, but actually better regulation, good regulation, democratic supervision, improve the condition for free speech and press freedom and the integrity of information in general. So this opposition between the ability to be able to impart your ideas and the need that governments have to find a way to regulate the digital sphere arena online is they are not opposed to each other, but it’s a complex discussion because emerging technology always poses new problems. And even if we are not saying that social media platforms are necessarily new to our political landscape, AI is becoming something more popularized and we don’t know the impact that AI will have in this cacophony, this, I don’t know, some people are calling it epidemics or this crisis of reliable information.
And the key problem here is all those things together are fragmenting public conversation, public debate, and public debate is at the core of our democracies. So there is a clear link between this fragmentation of public debate due to all this and the erosion of democracies everywhere.
Michael Fox:
Arturo, you’ve just mentioned everything you said, I was like, we need to talk more about that because this is at the root of all this is why it’s so important. Before we dive into more specifics of all those things that you just mentioned, I have this idea, this hypothesis, are we in a moment where the far right folks like Trump and Bolsonaro are trying to redefine free speech in their favor instead of what you mentioned, “Oh, we need actually some regulation so that we can have a field where we’re actually getting not just random information and fake lies and everything else for everybody else, but we’re actually getting information that is what we should be receiving.” Are we in a moment right now where certain groups are trying to redefine what free speech means so that they can use it to push their agenda?
Artur Romeu:
Of course, it’s very clear. It’s been happening for a while and it’s crazy how effective it is because I think people are very concerned with society in general every day on our daily lives, every citizen is concerned with their ability to basic freedom. And I think that for a very long time, at least in other democracies, this is something that was kind of taken for granted. And even if there were some complex discussions from time to time, there was at least this frame, this common ground, this common denominator where there were international standards in terms of human rights related to free speech, very clearly defined. But sometimes there is this complex issues where you have limits to free speech, right? It’s not an absolute right as a series of human rights. They are not absolute in themselves. There is a balance between rights. And for a long time, I think it generated some stress and tension, but it was kind of relevant discussions, philosophical discussions.
People may disagree, but still we had a common ground. And what we’ve been seeing lately for the past, I don’t know, 10 years at least, is that the way those limits are defined and their political appropriation is stressing this debate. And we are seeing a relevant debate for democracies and to ensure rights and public participation in general being distorted, inverted in a sense that a specific political group is using this to play the victims and saying that they are being oppressed by those ideas. And they made a political flag out of this, and it’s being very effective in terms of how this idea has permeated society and gaining capularity. And I think our field of organizations that are defending freedom of expression is having a lot of difficulty to fight back or reframe the debate. So we are talking about those issues from a rights-based approach and not from a political biased approach.
Just to give an example, specific example, in Brazil, there was a very important milestone march protest during the Independence Day of 2021 with Bolsonaro, thousands of people in the streets supporting Bolsonaro, supporters of Bolsonaro going to flooding the streets in every major capital. And researchers were the streets trying to survey why people were, in their views, going to protest. And one question was about what was their main motivation? And the first motivation was freedom of expression. So in theory, something good. But when they asked them, “And what are you fighting against?” And the first was the Supreme Court in Brazil, which is, I won’t go into the political context in Brazil, but a key issue here in terms of how the constitutional court and Supreme Court has been limiting transgressions and abuses of the executive branch. And the second was the press. So they were fighting against the press.
So they were defending press freedom by attacking the press. And so I think it’s a kind of a paradox where you see a very individualistic perspective. People want to be able to say whatever they want and less and less are accepting that the fact that we are living in a society, there are symmetries of powers, this speech has to be balanced with other rights. So this imbalance and the way it has been appropriated by and kind of really weaponized by the far right is having a major effect in creating this imbalance and making people forget why it’s important to balance a free speech, which is kind of incoherent, at least when you see what happened with Charlie Kirk and people were expressing their views on the fact that criticizing him some very harsh level and the same group that is defending that people should be able to speak wherever they want are doing their own witch hunt.
So you see how politically biased and how this weaponization appropriation of the idea of free speech or freedom of expression is a power struggle more than a philosophical and conceptual one.
Michael Fox:
Do you think that part of how we got to this point goes back to what you were mentioning before, the splintering of society. Now with social media, I get all of my news from here, you get all of your news from there, and so we’re allowed to attack the other because they’re the other rather than having this open debate. Is that part of what led us to this moment?
Artur Romeu:
Yeah. Social media had a major impact in the information ecosystem as a whole for better or for worse, kind of changed everything, how people are receiving, how we are less dependent of a few broadcasters. And now we feel that we are in this environment where we can speak freely. But actually what happened was the privatization of a public space, and you have this impression that you are in Agora, this public arena where there is this idealized perspective of the free flow of information, the free market of ideas, the better ideas will win. And actually this is happening in a specific space controlled by specific groups, interest groups, a very profit oriented perspective. No transparency at all on how those information are being moderated and gaining more or less reach. So yeah, definitely. I think the major shifts that those technologies had on our information space are partly not necessarily too blamed by their own, because I think also when we talk about censorship, it’s easier for us to think of a more classic censorship approach in the same way that when we think about a dictatorship or a coup d’etat, we have references from our past and we kind of compare what is happening now and our collective memory of what those words mean.
And freedom of expression was kind of invented to protect citizen rights, individual citizen rights to oppose all powerful state in a very different political landscape from centuries ago. And now censorship is not only having a propaganda ministry and having censors within newsrooms and journalists being detained and killed because of what they’re saying. Of course, it still happens a lot in several parts of the words, but censorship or at least freedom of expression and free speech is also eroded when not only the state. Because the idea behind this is that the state should restrain itself from any interference in the free flow of information. So any kind of interference equals bad, equals censorship. People should be able to speak freely without government or state interference, but that’s not enough. You also need positive obligation. And positive obligation means that the governments and states have to develop, establish public policies that will help the information space, the information ecosystem to balance assymetries.
For example, pluralism, diversity, reliability of information are key aspects of this, of a healthier information space. So for this to work, you need governments to create those policies, to establish these laws, policies, how antitrust policies, for example, to fight excessive media ownership concentration in the hands of few groups to help balance market asymmetries and to ensure that the rights of their citizens is assured also in terms of access to pluralistic and reliable information. With the social media and big text, what they are saying is that any regulation is bad, they are self-regulating by themselves, and they are at the end protecting their commercial interests and creating those regulatory backups where they can operate without accountability or any kind of accountability. And if we don’t do anything about it, we will keep seeing a disintegration of this information space.
Michael Fox:
Following from that point, can you talk a little bit about what we saw over the last year? For instance, this whole battle between Brazil, Aleshande Morais, Twitter, X, Musk, because I feel like that’s a perfect example of exactly what you’re talking about. And also these two visions where Brazil has this vision of saying, no, we’re going to regulate more because you can’t have just a get out of jail free card completely. And whereas the United States is much more laissez-fraire backed by Donald Trump and particularly now, but this was even before he came to office.
Artur Romeu:
First of all, you have different traditions, different countries, you have different traditions in terms of how you interpret law. Brazil’s approach to freedom of expression is closer to the European approach where there is a focus on this balance between rights than the US one where there is a broader, I don’t know, more elasticity when you are talking about freedom of expression. You have to have in mind that our legal tradition is closer to the European one in terms of philosophical, conceptual jurisprudence expiration. Within this context, have a very specific example. When former President Bolsonaro started saying that people should not trust on electoral results because digital ballot box are not reliable when he did not and still has not any kind of proof of this. And much on the contrary, by the way, the electoral system in Brazil is widely recognized and as a very strong electoral system.
When he started doing that, for example, calling a meeting with ambassadors from a bunch of different countries to give a press conference saying that before the election, one year before the elections, that people should not trust electoral results if we kept the system as it was. It’s very, very, very serious because he has a lot of supporters and echo chambers on social media, and this kind of information erodes trusts of society, on their political institutions and their electoral institutions. So basically you cannot argue that that’s within his absolute right of print of expression because it has very serious impact for democracy and it’s not because you are the president that you can say whatever you want without any kind of accountability. But from there, what happened is that this idea was widely spread by his supporters and political groups, and the social media had a huge impact on this.
So this is clearly organized, this information, casebook. It’s pretty straightforward. And this information in the sense that it has a set of cogs in the machines, and it’s not just one person saying something false, it’s how this information is being spread and the structure of this information, the different levels, actors, stakeholders involved in this, financed with public money, public funds, and social media companies within their codes of conduct, you cannot just let this level of disinformation spread, including the reach they’re having without, again, any accountabilities, they could have acted to limit the reach, not necessarily censoring the presidential Twitter account or something, but at least putting contextual information, whatever those links, I don’t know. But there are several possible strategies for those social media to limit those kinds of harmful disinformation. But since we did not have a regulatory framework for this, the Supreme Court took the responsibility to act and to investigate this fake news industry or disinformation industry, how it was being structured and its impact.
And by doing that, said explicitly that, I don’t know, judges could not be threatened, basic stuff. And starting, for example, Alishanj Morais, which is at the epicenter of all this, even if he’s, and I think this is a parenthesis here, Morais was very important within all this, but he himself, I mean as an individual judge, but we have to take into account always that his decision were being systematically validated by the other judges of the Supreme Court. So even if he was the one being more visible on all this, and even though that there were tensions between and discussions between the judges, the vast majority of all those decisions went through the plenary, all the judges. So we talk a lot about him, but it’s more like the Supreme Court itself. I think he’s the image of these fights in a way, but he wasn’t alone doing that.
It’s not all powerful judge that is doing that as a rogue mode and acting on his own. We had strong institutions and it worked in the sense that we had the highest body in the judiciary power acting on this and investigating those issues, how they were spreading and taking harsh measures to prevent the impact of what everything was happening be even higher. For example, closing, requesting for the suppression of individual accounts on social media, and that’s something that led to the blockage of acts here in Brazil because what happened is that Elon Musk decided that he would not accept sovereign decision from the Brazilian highest court. He just moved his policy team away from Brazil. There was no legal representation as a way clearly to escape Brazilian jurisdiction in a clearly politically motivated move. And what the court said is that you cannot do that if you are operating You have to operate within our laws.
So if you don’t have a legal representation here in Brazil, and if you do not accept court orders related to several specific measures to mitigate the impact of this information of what was happening, you could not operate. And he was not blaffing. I think for, I don’t know, 50 days, it took a while. And there was a lot of support because you could imagine that this kind of decision, it’s very unpopular. You have tons, millions of social media users, including a lot of journalists using those tools for their daily work. But the way it was done showed that there was at least an understanding from Brazilian society that it was a fair fight, that it was something legitimate. And you can go even backwards with the pandemic. I won’t go all the way there, but the way that Bolsonaro governed during the pandemic was a big disasters for several reasons, but also in terms of access to reliable information on health issues and the way that false information was spreading for, again, politically biased moves.
And I think he had a bet in the sense that he thought that by going this way, he would show a different path than other global leaders, but it was a big disaster, no surprise. And there was a lot of discussion around this time about disinformation as well. So it’s a discussion that has been going on in Brazil on how public and democratic institutions have to respond to widespread disinformation strategy, especially those coming from the highest ranking officials. It’s gained a lot of track and legitimacy. And I would dare even to say that we have now more than other countries an awareness about those issues where, for example, there was a, I don’t know if it’s very recent survey, I have to double check the numbers, but what I know for sure is that most of Brazilian society, a survey showed is in favor of regulating social media.
So you have this support, even of course, if it’s not, if you have clearly political groups which are very strong and a lot of debate on how you do it. I think the major question is how you do it because it’s not that the fact that you have to act, I think that’s pretty clear here and from every perspective. What is more difficult is how you do it to avoid a very obvious trap where by doing this, you are creating a censorship mechanism and more control over those tools, those technologies. So this should be actually the discussion, how you do it and not if you have to do it or not, why it’s important. I think we are well over the time where those discussions should have passed and now, I don’t know. I really don’t know. I feel that we are living parallel universes sometimes.
When you see, for example, Trump’s speech on the UN and Lula’s speech in the UN, we feel that we are living in parallel universes. So different periods of time. I think it’s clear for, there is a consensus among digital rights activists, organizations, even a part of mainstream progressive groups, NGOs working with freedom of expression that you have to create mechanisms to improve democratic supervisions of how those emerging technologies, especially social media, are creating those rifts in our democratic systems.
Michael Fox:
Artu, thank you so much. I just have two more really quick questions. And this is so important, this last point that you touched on, because particularly in the United States, even amongst folks on the left, because historically, obviously censorship has been used against usually marginalized communities, minority communities. And so the discourse is always, well, once you start to say, well, you can’t say this and these people can’t say that, well then that’s going to be used against always, eventually it’s going to be used against and particularly against minority communities and marginalized communities. The people with the least amount of voice are the ones that are going to have their voice taken away completely. And yet this question no one meant, I feel like this huge elephant in the room is always this question of fake news. I can believe what I want to believe, you can believe what you want to believe.
More or less we can talk, but you still can’t be spreading just complete disinformation and lies and yet that’s what we’re seeing. And unless you actually take that on and say, okay, well this is here and how do we try and roll this back? But I feel like so many people or organizations or individuals, it’s just kind of give it, well, no, we don’t want to do that because then that’s stopping people. But no, there are lies. There are people trying to manipulate this. And so it’s a huge, it’s a complicated debate to ask that question of even how do we do this? But I think that is the question of saying, no, we absolutely have to. We can’t even be discussing if we are going to or not. We need to be talking about how we do it in the most democratic way possible or else we’re just going to see more and more of our rights willed away and more and more of our ability to communicate as a people whittled away.
So it’s crazy.
Artur Romeu:
Yeah. Talking about more on journalism and how specifically on journalism, the way things are told nowadays, I mean in terms of how all this has been appropriated by this fear of censorship or by saying that any kind of regulation is censorship is creating this environment of a crisis of trust and polluting democratic public debate, but also it’s creating something that science and journalism are put in the same level as any other opinion. So this is my opinion. So I can say it because it’s my opinion. And if you have 30 pages special dossier done by one of the journalists working that biggest newsroom in the country and you take this and you say, “Well, they can say wherever they want, that’s my opinion and I’m against this.” Same thing with, I don’t know, climate denialism just to keep one specific issue related to science. So when you put everything, conspiracy theories, opinions, ideas at the same level of other kinds of expressions, they should not be able to say to disagree, of course, or to question, this is healthy for democratic debate, but you cannot dismiss investigative journalistic piece on a very key issue and that had multiple sources done in journalistic processes.
You have a process to doing journalism. It’s not ChatGPT, it’s those investigations in the same way that science has its processes of verification, experimentation, peer review, et cetera. Journalism has its own. And if this is not recognized as a positive incentive, a society to receive this information and to criticize or to discuss what is being said in a different way than just someone saying what they think, journalism have foundations in terms of what is being said. And ideas can have more or less, opinions can have more or less depending from if it’s coming from someone that has studied all his life, all her life about the specific issue and then is expressing of course an idea, a different idea or a position on this topic. But if we put everything at the same level, we won’t have a real conversation. We will be just everyone saying what they want.
And for democracies to work, we have to find commonplaces and those commonplaces have to be based on some kind of logic or some kind of method or some kind of common ground. And so this is a problem right now with journalism because it’s being treated as just another opinion.
And on our newsfeed on social media, it’s being treated as just another opinion. Even sometimes even dismissed or the reach of news articles and links are having a worse reach than other kinds of videos posted by influencers. But there’s no due prominence of journalistic content or scientific content. So the conversation
Is becoming more and more based on the rule of the stronger. If you appear to be stronger than others, your position can overlap all the others because you say so. That’s extremely dangerous for the kind of democracy we have been building. So this is a specific issue with journalism. And the other issue is media sustainability and news deserts and how those new technologies have shifted completely the business model of the media industry in just a few years. And it’s creating more fusions, less pluralism. You have this illusion of pluralism because you feel that there’s more people speaking than before where you have the gatekeepers and all this, but it’s noise. So there’s a lot of noise happening and noise is not necessarily pluralism because pluralism needs some kind of framework to be effective for a democratic debate. If it’s just a bunch of people in a room saying what they think about the problem, not necessarily the best idea or the idea that has the stronger chance to work will win.
So also this idea of a free market of ideas, we don’t live in a political vacuum. So a free market of ideas is completely dependent on the correlations of force between the different stakeholders in the ecosystem, the political landscape. You have a lot of social and economic inequalities. So talking about a free market of ideas with no kinds of balancing this just don’t work because ideas will step on others anyway. When we talk about AI regulation or digital service acts to regulate the social media and the whole industry behind it, you need to have some kind of how you can create mechanisms to create financial compensation for media. And there are a lot of taxating profits from big tech revenue, advertisement revenue of big tax, for example, and creating a fund and this fund being. I don’t know. There are several ideas going on, bargaining codes.
But the point is if we do nothing, what we are seeing is that the economic pressure on journalism, on public interest journalism is becoming asphyxiating. And what we will see soon is an environment, a media landscape with a lot of concentration of power and local news markets disappearing and being replaced by, we don’t really know, but what we’ve been seeing is that when a local news media disappear, there’s no empty space. This space is immediately occupied by propaganda, by this information, by other interests. So preserving journalism, especially local journalism, is a democratic imperative. And we have to understand how we can do this when discussing democratic regulations for social media and AI.
Michael Fox:
Artur, so great. My last really quick question is you mentioned toward the beginning something I thought was really important, you want to forget it, free speech being weaponized against press freedoms. Can you talk a little bit more about that? Where are we seeing that? What does that look like?
Artur Romeu:
We are seeing that in a daily basis in the US for sure. And I have very specific example. When Trump wrote a letter to President Lula to justify the tariffs, the letter mentioned Bolsonaro, the prosecution of Bolsonaro in Brazil, mentioned big tax and the fact that the rights of American citizens was being violated and companies was being violated by the judiciary in Brazil. And just after the letter itself, there was some kind of, I don’t know the name of it, but an order where there were more explanations of the reasons. It was like a one and a half page document and the expression like freedom of speech or free speech or freedom of expression or censorship was repeated at least 10 times in a letter basically saying that the US was imposing tariffs on Brazil because Brazil was promoting censorship. So when I say that free speech is being weaponized against freedom of expression, in parts it connects to this example where you make yourself look like as a free press paladin, but actually what your distorted vision of free speech is doing is fragmenting the idea, the different ideas behind what freedom of expression really is, and mostly the social and collective dimension of freedom of expression.
You are only saying that people should say whatever they want without any kind of interference. If that’s the case, you are basically ignoring completely the fact that people live in a society and part of the freedom of expression right is related to receive pluralistic, diverse, reliable information. When we see these kinds of marches that I’ve talked about in Brazil as well where you say you are there to defend freedom of expression, but actually your enemy is press freedom, you are again weaponizing this idea because what you are really interested in is being able to express your ideas without any kind of repercussions, any kind of accountability, because it’s a very empowering feeling. So I think what those leaders, Bolsonaro, Trump, Edogan, Obam, and others, Milei have been doing the media bashing and fueling general hostility towards journalism and not just journalists, but journalism, like the ideal of journalism, again, not just against the press, but the idea really of journalism is at the core of their political strategy.
It’s not isolated. It’s not something that’s part of their personality. It’s really something that has the ability to keep their electoral basis very mobilized. It’s a very effective way to polarize public debate. And those leaders, they are dependent on polarizations. They cannot leave, have a political career without these kinds of systematic polarization and attacking the press systematically. The press, the media institutions, journalism in general is very effective for your strategy and that’s why they keep doing. In Argentina, for example, recently Mile said, “The problem is we don’t hate journalists enough.” So these kind of ideas, Bukele in El Salvador, it’s really at the core of the political strategy. So again, instrumentalizing, weaponizing free speech to erode press freedom, to have more control over the public debate and less scrutiny in society. It’s much easier to kill the messenger than have to deal with whatever the report or the news article is discussing.
Michael Fox:
Artur, incredible. Thank you so, so much. I really appreciate your time. I know we went over a little bit, but I really appreciate it.
Artur Romeu:
Thank you, Michael.
Michael Fox:
Hi folks. I hope you enjoyed our conversation. As I mentioned before, this is the third bonus episode of this series. There are more on the way. Please watch out for those in your feed. This is the battle for free speech. This podcast is co-hosted by myself and Mark Steiner. This show is produced by The Real News. You can find out more about my work and this show on my Patreon. That’s www.patreon.com/mfox. As always, please make sure to sign up for the Real News Network’s newsletter so you never miss an episode. You can find that at therealnews.com. Thanks so much again for listening to this podcast. See you next time.
Fernando Cerimedo. A name that unless you follow Latin America closely, you likely have never heard.
He’s been called “MAGA’s man” in Latin America. And he is at the heart of a shocking scandal that includes “attempted femicide,” election rigging, fake news, disinformation and powerful political ties to far-right presidents across Latin America, and even the White House, under Donald Trump.
It’s big news in Latin America, even though it’s been largely under the radar in the United States, until now.
The scandal has dire implications for the legitimacy of elections up and down the Americas, including elections where U.S. president Donald Trump has been throwing his weight around over the last year. Elections where right-wingers have won close, but shocking victories. And big elections are coming up in Brazil and elsewhere.
This is Episode 14 of Under the Shadow, Season 2.
Under the Shadow is an investigative narrative podcast series that walks back in time, telling the story of the past by visiting momentous places in the present. Season 2 responds in real time to the Trump administration’s onslaught on Latin America.
Follow Under the Shadow on Spotify and Apple Podcasts.
Hosted by Latin America-based journalist Michael Fox.
This podcast is produced in partnership between The Real News Network and NACLA.
It is supported, in part, by Global Exchange.
Theme music by Michael Fox’s band, Monte Perdido. Monte Perdido’s 2024 album Ofrenda is available on Spotify, Deezer, Apple Music, YouTube or wherever you listen to music.
Other music from Blue Dot Sessions and Epidemic Sound.
Script editing by Heather Gies. Hosted, written, produced, mixed, and edited by Michael Fox.
Guests:
Resources:
Support Under the Shadow
Please consider supporting this podcast and Michael Fox’s reporting on his Patreon account: patreon.com/mfox. There you can also see exclusive pictures, video, and interviews.
You can subscribe to Michael Fox’s new free speech podcast, The Battle for Free Speech on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts.
The following is a rushed transcript and may contain errors. It will be updated.
Michael Fox:
Fernando Cerimedo, a name that unless you follow Latin America closely, you likely have never heard. He’s been called MAGA’s man in Latin America, and he’s at the heart of a shocking scandal that includes election rigging, fake news, disinformation, and powerful political ties to far right presidents across Latin America, and even the White House under Donald Trump. It’s big news in Latin America, even though it’s been largely under the radar in the United States until now. The scandal has dire implications for the legitimacy of elections up and down the Americas, including elections where US President Donald Trump has been throwing his weight around over the last year. Elections where right-wingers have won close but shocking victories. Like Lawyer Abelardo de la Estrella’s right-wing defeat of the leftist candidate Ivan Cepeda in Columbia in June, he won by less than 1% of the vote.
Donald Trump:
He called me at 8:30 in the evening just to thank me very much. And I said, “You ran a great campaign?” He’s LT Gray, right?
Journalist:
And what do you anticipate for the relation with Colombia? Good,
Donald Trump:
Much better. It’ll be better. He’s going to be a great president.
Michael Fox:
And big elections are coming up in Brazil and elsewhere. We begin here. That’s him, Fernando Cerimedo, walking down a hallway lined with people ahead of Chile’s new far right president, Antonio Cast. Cerimedo puts a hand on his back and ushers him into a side room to meet with a group of men in suits. Cerimedo is a 45-year-old strategist and publicist from Argentina. He’s a co-founder of the right-wing Argentine outlet, La Dereche Diario. And in recent years, he’s become perhaps the most prominent political consultant for the far right in Latin America. But as we will see in this episode, he’s much more than a consultant. I think you could call him an election fixer and not in a democratic way.
Jake Johnston:
So you’ve had this sort of network of far right leaders who’ve shown a lot of affinity for one another, traveling to each other’s countries, supporting each other, this sort of broad network. And behind that, there’s been this sort of digital infrastructure that is built out to support this sort of new wave of far right leaders in Latin America.
Michael Fox:
I asked Jake Johnston from the Center for Economic and Policy Research to set the scene here.
Jake Johnston:
I mean, if you’ve spent any time on social media, you have seen the bots, you’ve potentially been attacked by the bots. You see this happening every day and you’ve seen it in all of these elections, many of which it should be noted were extraordinarily close elections. I mean, less than one percentage point separating the winner from the loser. And throughout this last year, year and a half, there has been one very prominent person sort of parading around the hemisphere and claiming credit for a lot of these electoral wins. And it’s just this guy, an Argentine political consultant that apparently used to drive a taxi in Argentina and has sort of risen to the top of the food chain in Latin American politics is Fernando Serimedo.
Michael Fox:
Here is the reason why we’re all talking about him right now.
Last month on August 18th, 2026, Cerimedo was arrested at Bolivia’s Viru Vero Airport after attempting to board a flight to Buenos Aires, Argentina. He was accused of ordering a hit on his pregnant girlfriend. Her name is Nadia Bayer. She’s a Bolivian lawyer and a political analyst. She’s a former supporter of leftist president Eva Morales, turned staunch critic. She was shot three times by two armed gunmen the day before outside of a hotel in the Bolivian lowland capital city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. That’s the heart of Bolivia’s agricultural heartland and one of the most conservative regions in the country. She survived. From her hospital room, she asked to speak to press.
This is the video. You can find it online. She’s laying in a hospital bed, the back slightly raised, so she’s kind of sitting up. She wears a white and gray striped hospital gown. She has several bandages and she’s attached to some machines. She sounds exhausted. “I’ve requested the presence of DTV to make a live statement because they tried to silence me,” she says. “And I’m absolutely sure that if I don’t speak out to the Bolivian people, they’re going to finish what they tried to do today. They’re going to end my life.” She speaks for 15 minutes about her relationship with Fernando Cerimedo, about his physical abuse, his cheating on her and others, and then she reveals dirt on Cerimedo and his underhanded political dealings across the region, including in high, high places.
She discusses Cerimedo’s ties to Trump’s former campaign manager, Brad Pascali, referring to Parscale as a member of the CIA. She describes her personal knowledge of corruption committed by Cerimedo and Bolivia’s new right-wing president, Rodrigo Pas and his family. Pas is the eldest son of the former Bolivian president, Jaime Pasamora. He was born in Spain, went to college in the United States, and Fernando Cerimedo helped to lift him into the presidency last year. “The government is the main one interested in silencing me,” she says. Rodrigo Pas, his wife, his family, they make the biggest deals with the brokers, with all of the insurance companies of all the state companies. They are the ones who negotiate the broker’s commission. “Do you have proof of all that?” Asked the man interviewing her behind the camera. “I have proof of many extremes,” she says. She also details Cerimedo’s power in Bolivia and abroad.
“Rodrigo Pas does not govern here,” she says. Fernando Cerimedo governs and they will absolutely cover it. He manages a group of the police that supposedly operates around the hotel where he made me go. That was the hotel where she was shot. All of this is just the tip of the iceberg about Cerimedo, the disinformation campaign he concocted, and the right-wing election wins he had a large hand in securing across the region.
Jake Johnston:
This is a door that is opening to a world that has largely been closed. I think that’s the interesting part about this. It’s what does this tell us about the broader infrastructure that exists in the region and likely elsewhere across the globe that is using digital sort of shock troops, bots, disinformation, media polarization to try and skew electoral outcomes, even at the margins where it might have a tremendously large impact, even if the operation itself seems sort of small.
Michael Fox:
All of that in a minute. This is Under the Shadow, an investigative narrative podcast series that looks at the role of the United States abroad in the past and the very present. This podcast is a co-production in partnership with The Real News and NACLA. I’m your host, Michael Fox, longtime radio reporter, editor, journalist, the producer and host of the podcast, Brazil on Fire: Stories of Resistance, and my new series, The Battle for Free Speech. I’ve spent the better part of the last 20 years in Latin America. I’ve seen firsthand the role of the US government abroad, and most often sadly, it is not for the better. Invasions, coups, sanctions, support for authoritarian regimes. Politically and economically, the United States has cast a long shadow over Latin America for the past 200 years. It still does. This is season two of Under the Shadow: Trump’s attack, episode 14, Fernando Cerimedo.
It’s February 10th this year. A passionate man is speaking in Spanish on a stage in Mar-a-Lago, Florida. This is Trump’s Hispanic prosperity gala. The back wall of the stage is plastered with a logo of a bull’s head and the words Latino Wall Street, Spanish language financial website. The name of the man on stage is Eduardo Bolsonaro, the son of Brazil’s former president, Jair Bolsonaro, and brother of the current far right presidential candidate, Flavio Bolsonaro. Eduardo resigned as a member of Congress in 2025 and moved to the United States after he came under investigation for trying to pressure the Supreme Court in defense of his father, who is now on house arrest for couplotting. The Bolsonaro family are close allies of President Trump, and Eduardo Bolsonaro has close ties with Trump’s former campaign manager, Steve Bannon. On stage, Eduardo Bolsonaro is praising Fernando Cerimedo. They’ve reportedly known each other for years, since 2010 when they met in the United States.
Eduardo invites Cerimedo to the podium. So I have the great pleasure, a great honor, he says, to call here on the stage Fernando Cerimedo, a brave Argentine who had the courage to denounce the bad things that happen in the world.
Eduardo Bolsonaro presents Fernando Cerimedo with the award for Best Hispanic Political Consultant of the Year. Cerimedo is wearing a black suit, white shirt, black tie. He has a bald head. Fernando and Eduardo embrace, and then they pose for the cameras with a tiny statue. Then Cerimedo walks to the podium. 2025 was a very good year for us. Together with our team, we won two elections, he says, Bolivia and Honduras. Serimedo also gives a shout out to the Bolivian First Lady and her daughter who he says are in the audience. Serimedo then turns and thanks his connection with the Trump administration.
Fernando Cerimedo:
I want to say something in English. Thank you to Brad Parscale for believing me all the time and give me your technology and Tim Dunn for do the fighting in Latin America against socialism. Thank you, Brad.
Michael Fox:
Tim Dunn is a Trump allied businessman from Texas. He’s in oil and gas, and he’s a big financial supporter of conservative causes. As for Brad Parscale, if you remember, Serimedo’s girlfriend mentioned him in her hospital interview. She said he was tied to US intelligence. He is a digital consultant with deep ties to the White House and Mar-a-Lago. He ran digital media for both Trump’s 2016 and 2020 campaigns. Since 2025, he’s been the chief strategy officer at the right-wing Christian Conservative Media Corporation, Salem Media Group. In May, The Intercept reported that he had been hired by the Israeli government to push pro-Israeli views over conservative media. Serimedo closes his acceptance speech.
“The message I want to give you is that it’s not about winning elections,” he told the audience. “That can even seem easy. If we don’t help our candidates govern so that the left never returns to those governments, our work will never be finished. So let’s keep fighting the cultural battle. That’s not just winning elections and taking positions. It’s battling every day to be able to regain freedom in Latin America. Thank you all very much and goodnight, “he said. Fernando Cerimedo. This guy is no ordinary political consultant. The things he has done that helped him win that award presented by Trump allies and Mar-a-Lago have included using underhanded, dirty, and other illegal means to help his candidates win elections, candidates who are all right-wing or far-right Trump allies. And look, he allegedly even tried to kill his own girlfriend to silence her. Cerimedo is just one man, but he’s part of a much broader network.
And for them, pushing their agenda is not politics as usual within democratic systems. As Cerimedo mentioned at that award ceremony, this is a culture war and they are fighting to win by any means necessary. It all calls into question many of these victories that the right has been winning across Latin America in recent years. Jake Johnston.
Jake Johnston:
But of course he’s not operating alone and his business partner in his company, Neumann Advisors, which was actually first registered in Florida, is Brad Parscale, who is Trump’s former campaign manager. And the way that it has been described, and Saramedo has given some interviews on this in the past, is that Parscale provides a sort of digital infrastructure that was implemented in the United States during Trump’s election and is sort of exporting that to the region. And the connection to all of these far right Latin American leaders in these networks between Parscale and them is Fernando Ceramedo.
Michael Fox:
Jake says that a key mouthpiece of this right-wing network has been La Derecho Diario, a right-wing news and opinion site founded by Serimedo and two of his colleagues around the year 2020. La Derecho Diario is now partially owned by Javier Negre, a Spanish right-wing media entrepreneur and disinformation broker.
Jake Johnston:
Now, in parallel to this, you’ve had this sort of digital media outlet, Ladarecho Diario, that has sort of risen to prominence as big promoters of the new far right in Latin America, sort of classic disinformation campaigns and things like this, but always sort of in support of these candidates and have been extremely active in a number of these electoral races and have sort of begun to expand both in Mexico and certainly are looking at Brazil, and Sarameto was also a partial owner of that operation. And of course, this is nothing new, right? I mean, this network of right-wing political operatives has been extremely active in Spain and Europe, but also in Latin America for any number of years, going back decades and following a lot of these folks’ work. What’s changed is that they now have an administration in Washington that is directly supporting the same agenda.
Donald Trump:
Found out in Chile, the person I endorsed who was not leading ended up winning quite easily, so I look forward to paying my respects to him. I hear he’s a very good person.
Jake Johnston:
And so that has sort of elevated it to a different level and certainly sort of just put a lot of money in the pockets of a lot of people who have an interest in promoting this new far right in Latin America.
Michael Fox:
The other thing is that we don’t actually know the true extent of everything. We have clues. Many are really concerning, but not all the dots connect. Just remember that as we continue. It’s been reported that Serimedo has had a role in the political victories of the right and far right in at least seven countries over the last four years, including Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Polivia, and Peru. That is not a bad record. The first place I want to visit though, came before all of those in Brazil in late 2022. It’s election night, October 30th, 2022. Former Brazilian President Luis Ignacio Lula de Silva wins the vote by a slim margin, defeating Trump ally and incumbent far-right President Jair Bolsonaro in a huge victory for the left. But the next morning. Bolsonaro supporters hit the streets in protest, claiming the election was stolen. A claim Bolsonaro himself had spread ahead of the vote.
They shut down highways. They set up vigils in front of military barracks demanding the country’s armed forces rise up to overturn the results.
Amid this chaos, Jair Bolsonaro’s son, Eduardo Bolsonaro, who we heard from earlier, is interviewed by a right-wing Argentine media outlet where he spreads lies about Brazil’s electoral system. The interview was aired just three days before the vote. According to news reports at the time, the video had a live audience of more than 400,000 viewers. I remember this. It was a big deal because what Eduardo Bolsonaro did was actually illegal in Brazil. You can’t disparage the country’s electoral system, particularly just days before the vote. That’s why Eduardo Bolsonaro did the live in Argentina. Anyway, what most of us only realized recently is that the guy who interviewed Eduardo Bolsonaro during that live was Fernando Cerimero, and that outlet was Cerimedo’s La Derechediario. You can think of it as something akin to the bright part of Argentina. That live, I’ve been looking for it to play a clip here, but it was taken down shortly afterwards in Brazil.
It still had a wide reach though. It was shared across WhatsApp groups and far right media spheres. It reportedly played a significant role in undermining the election result and intensifying the widespread protests by Bolsonaro supporters in the wake of the 2022 elections.
All of this stoking of Bolsonaro’s base would of course culminate in the January 8th, 2023 invasion of Brazil’s capital by Bolsonaro supporters. They wreaked havoc, causing millions of dollars of property damage in Congress and the Supreme Court in a copycat performance of the January 6th US Capitol invasion in 2021. There was pushback against Laderecha Diario in Brazil.
Maria Martha Bruno:
And because of that live broadcasting and because of Cerimero’s intervention after Lula has won, actually the Brazilian electoral justice decided to suspend Laderecha Diario’s account in social media because it identified that it was a source of falsehoods and rumors that had been extensively dismissed by the Brazilian authorities.
Michael Fox:
Maria Marta Bruno is a journalist at Ajin Shepublica, the largest nonprofit investigative newsroom in Brazil. That outlet did an in-depth investigation in 2023 into the so-called digital militias and the use of internet, bots, disinformation, fake news, and media manipulation to sway opinions and elections across Latin America.
Maria Martha Bruno:
And the investigation is named the digital mercenaries. And Fernando Serimero is a core figure in this ecosystem because he orbited between Brazil, Argentina, and more recently we knew that he was also participating in the electoral process in Honduras in 2025.
Michael Fox:
Maria Marta actually spoke with Serimero for their report.
Maria Martha Bruno:
But Fernando Serimedo, when he talked to and to our partners at the Central Latin American he actually admitted in some of the interviews that he twisted and that he put many informations out of context just to make the case that he want to make the case. He admitted that that was sort of his strategy.
Michael Fox:
It’s a strategy that has been deployed across the region. Last month, Brazil’s Folio de Sao Paulo newspaper interviewed Nalia Bayer about Fernando Serimedo’s work fixing elections around Latin America. Remember, Bayer is Serimero’s ex-girlfriend who he allegedly tried to kill. This video was published eight days after the attempt on her life. She’s laying in bed and looking up at a cell phone through which she’s doing the interview. She spoke about the cases that she remembers where Serimedo used bots to sway public opinion online ahead of the election.
“I knew that in Honduras,” she says. “I knew that in Chile, in the constitutional assembly vote. I knew that in Brazil, in Bolivia, obviously in Argentina, in Columbia, they were going to do it, but I think they didn’t get to do it. I don’t know why. I think maybe it was because of economic agreements that weren’t closed or unless they had told me later that they had done it. But there were some negotiations with Spain as well, she says. I don’t know if you caught that, but she just said that he was even supporting Jair Bolsonaro’s digital campaign in Brazil in 2022. Maria Marta Bruno.
Maria Martha Bruno:
Fernando Serimedo, it’s a very key example of a core figure that get all those notes together, all those wires together across Latin America and help to boost this very successful digital communication ecosystem that has been helping the right and the far right in the past eight or so years.
Michael Fox:
The Brazilian outlet released the Fordham has reported that during an investigation into Serimedo’s properties, investigators discovered a mini bot farm worth more than $40,000 with a digital infrastructure to coordinate campaigns over social media. Jake Johnston.
Jake Johnston:
There’ve been a lot of allegations around. I mean, he’s even bragged around his control of hundreds of thousands of bots and things like this. And I think we do have to take a second to think like, okay, putting aside any legality or anything like this, or whether this is electoral interference or electoral fraud or anything, just put it aside. I mean, could this have had an effect on these elections? And I think you start to look at that, you say, “Well, these elections where there’s less than 1% difference between a winner and a loser, yeah, these sorts of interventions may have had a really profound effect in shaping this narrative that we have today of this rightward shift in Latin America, and how much of that narrative is really the product of a sort of digital army of folks all associated in one way or another with Serameto and with connections right back to the Trump.
Donald Trump:
When people like me, I like them. It’s very simple. It’s a very simple formula, and I like him. He said really nice things about me and the job we’ve done in the United States, and very, very powerful.
Michael Fox:
Here’s the thing, and Jake mentioned this earlier, this Cerimeto scandal has opened a window into the underhanded or dirty maneuvers one man has taken, in part on behalf of the Trump administration, to win elections for the far right in Brazil, but we don’t really know the full extent of what was done behind the scenes to sway the vote.
Jake Johnston:
It is important to note, we really don’t know much of what these people were doing, right? I mean, that is, I think, hopefully what we can learn through these investigations that are happening in Bolivia, through what I think should be far greater attention from the US media about the role of Brad Parscale and Trump connected officials with him and what they’re actually doing. What is the gangway? How have they helped these campaigns or interacted with these campaigns?
Michael Fox:
We do have a glimpse into actions that Serimeto took to allegedly help the right return to power in Honduras last year, and it is extremely concerning. Honduras. It’s just after the country’s election on November 30th, 2025. The race was so close the winner won’t be announced for weeks.
The conservative candidate Nazri Asfurda has faced off against leftist Rixi Muncada and Centris Salvador Nasraya. The leftist Libre Party has run the country for the previous four years. Before then, the US back right-wing national party held onto the presidency through violence, repression, and fraudulent elections. They took power after the 2009 coup. The president who ruled the country for much of that time with an iron fist was named Juan Orlando Hernandez. At that point last year, he was in a West Virginia prison serving a 45-year sentence for drug trafficking. We looked at a bunch of this in episode 12 about Honduras Gate. If you miss that, you can go back and listen. But here’s the thing. There’s a new audio clip about Honduras that was only released last month. It’s a one-minute, 30-second voice message from political consultant Fernando Serimedo to a member of the electoral campaign of Nasri Asfura.
He’s the right-wing candidate, Trump ally, and the man who would be declared president in late December after a protracted recount. I just have to tell you, this voice message gives me the chills. In it, Serimedo says not to worry that they’ve rigged the election, stuffed ballot boxes where necessary, and removed votes elsewhere, all with the support of members of the armed forces who are stationed at polling stations. Serimedo is confident about their victory.
“Yes, from all of this, the only thing we can learn is that the area where the votes are coming in right now is where Tito wins, “says Serimedo. Tito is the nickname of Nasri Asfura, the national party candidate who is now president. “In the second place, the locations where more national party votes are going to come in, if there were votes from somebody else, those were taken out. Those are being fixed,” he says. “We already have the numbers. According to what I’m seeing, we already have people aligned in the armed forces. It seems that everything is going well, “he says. “If we have the votes and we know where we lost the election, that’s where we place more votes, and they talk to everyone at each polling station. “That’s all that matters. We don’t have to worry,” he says.
This audio was released publicly last month by Marlon Ochoa. He’s a former member of the country’s electoral court who had to flee Honduras over death threats against him. He said he handed over the audio evidence in December 2025 before the election results were finalized, but investigations didn’t move forward and election authorities rubber stamped Asfura’s win. Ochoa did not reveal how he obtained the damning audio. I’m left with so many questions. Did Seri Medo really rig the elections for Nasre Asfura? If so, did the United States know? Did Israel? Both of them are staunch allies of former right-wing president Juan Orlando Hernandez, who was sentenced to decades in a US prison for drug trafficking and who Trump pardoned just after last year’s vote. Most importantly, if Seri Maedo rigged the elections in Honduras, did he also do it elsewhere? In Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru?
Even if he didn’t stuff ballots everywhere, it’s clear he was willing to use whatever means necessary to get his candidate elected, including spreading disinformation or fake news during the campaigns and even about the country’s electoral system. And this is “MAGA’s man in Latin America. Democracy itself is at risk.” Serimado is now in custody. He’s being investigated for attempted femicide. Many of his former staunch allies are trying to distance themselves. Jake Johnston.
Jake Johnston:
And so this has been a huge scandal and the investigation in Bolivia has expanded to move from femicide to illicit enrichment to the protection of drug traffickers. And so there’s at least three now investigations taking place in Bolivia. And one of the most shocking things is just the way in which all of the politicians who just a few months ago were working quite closely with Sarameta. Now totally wash their hands. I don’t know who this guy is. Rodrigo Paz, the new president in Bolivia says, “Oh, he was involved a little bit in the campaign, but I don’t know who he is.” There are photos of him meeting with Marco Rubio and the Bolivian president from just a couple months ago. So this is a total sort of hand wash. You saw the same thing in Argentina where Sarameto was very involved in the campaign of Javier Millet.
Now Miley said, “Oh no, he has nothing to do with us. Of course, it just came out that he visited the Casa Rosada 14 times last year.” So you see this all over the hemisphere. He was obviously very involved in Honduras and very publicly involved in Honduras and that electoral process. Again, another razor thin electoral margin there. I mean, obviously this fits into a much broader conversation around social media disinformation and what its effect is on democracy, on political processes more broadly. It’s certainly a conversation that has been quite prevalent in the United States for a long time now that is extremely relevant for the upcoming election in Brazil.
Michael Fox:
Jake says it’s not just about what Serimedo has or hasn’t done in these other elections. It’s about what underhanded tactics may still be used in future elections with or without Serimedo, and not just in Latin America, but in Spain and elsewhere where right-wing parties are gaining ground.
Jake Johnston:
There is a lot of people who are looking to make money off the political changes that are happening in Latin America, and they can sell their access to the Trump administration, their access to this legislator, this lobbyist, this business, and they play up those connections to get a contract, to get a consulting gig. And this is sort of the brave new world of the Don Roe doctrine in Latin America where it’s not just Sara Mato, it’s not just Brad Parscali and Javier Negre and Londoreche Diario. I mean, this is happening all over the place. You can see these lobbying filings that are coming in every day with different people hiring Trump connected folks. And so they’re all sort of competing for this space and to influence pedal and make money doing so in the region and take advantage of the sort of political interventionism and rightborn shift that we’re seeing.
And so this is just one piece of it.
Michael Fox:
In other words, this doesn’t begin or end with Serimado, but as Jake Johnston said in the beginning, this is a door that is opening to a world that has largely been closed. And there is so much more we need to understand and consider about how US President Donald Trump is using his power to influence elections around the region. This is where we’re headed next time. In the lead up to high stakes elections in Brazil in October where Trump is vying to help the son of the former far-right president Jair Bolsonaro win the election. Trump has levied tariffs and revoked the visa of the Brazilian ambassador to the United States and state department officials are allegedly courting journalists in order to spread the US narrative around the country’s elections. That is next time on Under the Shadow.
Folks, first off, I have big news. I’ve just launched a new website called Pan-American Dispatch. It’s a project of The Real News. We are translating daily articles from Portuguese and Spanish into English for a US audience. Over the next two months, we’re exclusively focused on the Brazilian election and Trump’s attempts to influence it. Please check it out. You can find us at panamericandispatch.org. As always, you can find me at patreon.com/mfox. There you can also support my work, become a monthly sustainer or sign up to stay abreast of all the latest on this podcast and my other reporting across Latin America. You can find a ton of content there exclusively for my supporters. Many, many thanks to SIEPR’s Jake Johnston and Ajin Shepublica’s Maria Marta Bruno. It was a pleasure to speak with you. I’ll add links to some of the reporting from their outlets in the show notes.
As always, if you’re looking for more information, news and reporting on Trump’s onslaught, both on communities within the United States and abroad, please check out The Real News and NACLA. Both of them are publishing daily indispensable reporting. The theme music is by my band, Monte Perdido. You can find us on Spotify or wherever you stream music. This closing music playing right now is off our 2024 album, Ofrenda. I hope you check it out. Under the Shadow is a co-production of The Real News and NACLA, it’s produced in partnership with Global Exchange. This episode was written, researched, reported, and produced by me, Michael Fox. The script was edited by Heather Geis. Thanks for listening. See you next time.
Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and MEP Dirk Gotink (EPP, Netherlands) Photographer: Mathieu Cugnot © European Union
The European Parliament has approved a major overhaul of the EU’s customs system, tightening requirements on e-commerce platforms, introducing a new handling fee for goods ordered from outside the bloc and creating a central EU customs authority.
“This is the biggest reform of European customs since 1968, supporting trade and the enforcement of EU rules,” said MEP Dirk Gotink, (EPP, Netherlands) who steered the legislation through Parliament. Gotink said European customs authorities had been overwhelmed by a “tsunami of Chinese parcels” and that the reform would give customs officers stronger tools to enforce EU standards.
Under the new rules, e-commerce platforms and sellers shipping goods directly from non-EU countries to European consumers will be treated as importers. That will make them responsible for providing customs data, handling applicable charges and ensuring products comply with EU law.
The reform also introduces an EU-wide handling fee on goods ordered directly from non-EU countries, with member states required to begin collecting it no later than 1 November, 2026. The European Commission will determine the amount and review it every two years.
Companies that repeatedly breach EU customs rules could face fines ranging from at least 1% to as much as 6% of the value of goods they imported into the EU during the previous 12 months.
The overhaul will also establish an EU Customs Data Hub, designed to replace at least 111 existing customs IT systems. A new EU Customs Authority, based in Lille, France, will manage the hub and coordinate customs cooperation and risk management across the EU.
The Council has already given the reform its final formal approval, making Parliament’s vote the final step in the legislative procedure.
Emma Bonino understood early on that Europe could not afford to turn inwards. For her, Europe was meant to be much more than a common market. She believed that Europe’s role in the world was inseparable from its defence of freedom, democracy and human rights, and that its foreign policy was ultimately about the people behind the decisions made by states. She also helped make European politics a wider space for women, opening paths and challenging expectations along the way. Her legacy is not only in the causes she championed, but in the courage with which she pursued them. The voices of women like Emma, who always fought for our rights, mattered enormously in shaping the Europe we know today. At a time when that Europe is being tested once again, and when civil liberties can no longer be taken for granted, her example matters more than ever.
Despite her diminutive stature, Emma Bonino was a giant of European foreign policy. She made a critical difference on a bewildering range of causes. She was a master at operating in a diverse array of settings: protesting on the streets, mobilising NGOs, shaping the agenda of the European Commission, creating unlikely coalitions in the European Parliament and chairing the Italian Senate. She managed to make such a difference in all these places because, wherever she found herself, she was always an activist fighting for civil rights, for justice, for equality.
Emma was also a rebel. She used her charm, humour and honesty to puncture pomposity and force people into a real conversation. She embraced controversy, both in her advocacy for challenging causes like women’s rights, abortion access and drug legalisation, and in her methods such as protests and hunger strikes.
She knew how to translate lofty goals into concrete steps which had some hope of being implemented, whether it was setting up the European Commission’s humanitarian office, campaigning for the establishment of the International Criminal Court, advocating to ban female genital mutilation, or working to change Italian electoral law. She had a sense of history and understood how to use crises to shift the agenda—as she did when she moved to Cairo after 9/11, deciding to learn Arabic and to push for a better understanding between Europeans and the Muslim world. And she was willing to assemble and work with unlikely coalitions to advance her causes, from joint projects with the Egyptian former president’s wife Mrs Mubarak to campaigns with the Pope.
Emma was a founding member of ECFR and helped turn it into the organisation it has become. We assumed when she became Italian foreign minister in 2013 that she would step down as a member, but instead she wanted to stay involved and constantly drew on ECFR’s ideas, expertise and pan-European networks to shape the Italian and European agenda. When she stepped down as foreign minister she became a co-chair of the organisation, and we felt her sense of urgency, ambition and pro-Europeanism in every board meeting.
Emma helped shape the DNA of ECFR. She encouraged us to be courageous, not to be afraid of controversy and to challenge conventional wisdom. She pushed us to be as pragmatic about how to make a difference as we were principled about our goals. Always inspiring others, Emma was a friend and a role model to so many of us—but she didn’t do small talk or make time for idle fun. When the substantive discussions were finished, she would say “va bene” and move on to the next fight (or go out to smoke a cigarette). Her death leaves Europe a greyer and less vital place. We need more Emmas.
We are deeply saddened to share the news of Emma Bonino’s passing
Messages in memory of Emma Bonino from ECFR’s council members
On September 30th, the European Commission is expected to unveil a comprehensive document on EU enlargement, which will be used as a basis for discussion by the European Council in October. The paper is likely to confirm that Montenegro and Albania could finish negotiations soon. But it should also propose ideas on how other countries in the region without this perspective can move forward in their own EU accession journeys.
Any Western Balkan country that joins the EU after waiting over 20 years deserves to be celebrated; the two frontrunners should be commended for making best use of this opportunity and supported to make it over the finish line. But by focusing on these two countries, the EU has prioritised quick wins. Montenegro and Albania have demonstrated commitment to reform, but also have no major bilateral issues to resolve or difficult neighbours to reconcile with.
Montenegro in particular, given its small size and its lack of significant outstanding issues with neighbours, seems ideal for making the case for enlargement as a low-cost and problem-free geopolitical gain. Indeed, commission officials recently compared the annual cost of Montenegro’s entry to the EU per EU citizen to that of a cup of coffee.
However, going for low-hanging fruit must not serve as cover for the EU not achieving its core responsibility in the Western Balkans. It should use its leverage to promote reform and the resolution of bilateral issues, thereby strengthening stability in a region still struggling to overcome its difficult past. The recent funeral of convicted Bosnian Serb war criminal Ratko Mladic demonstrates how important this task remains: the presence of senior Serbian state representatives at his commemoration has caused shock and dismay across the region and within the EU, as well as among many Serbian citizens.
At the end of the wars of the 1990s, the EU adopted a regional framework towards the Western Balkans. The idea was simple and appealing: improving relations between the Western Balkan countries would go hand in hand with closer ties to the EU. Two decades on, this had led to many challenges and some successes, but only Croatia has become a fully fledged EU member state. While the stagnation in the enlargement process is partly due to a lack of commitment from regional governments, it is also a result of internal EU blockages and a lack of urgency while it dealt with a series of pressing crises.
After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, enlargement suddenly became a priority again. The EU understood that it needed to prevent a grey area emerging between itself and Russia. Ukraine and Moldova obtaining candidate status in 2022 revived member-state interest in the dormant case of the Western Balkans enlargement process; Montenegro and Albania recognised the geopolitical opportunity, accelerated their reform efforts and have arrived at a point where EU accession is a realistic possibility.
But the main impetus for this new momentum towards enlargement is dramatically different from what originally drove Western Balkans integration. While the eventual integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the EU aims to strengthen European defences in the face of a common threat, Western Balkan enlargement was meant to foster regional stability and reconciliation among countries that had been at war with each other.
The successful accession of a Western Balkan country may signal to the rest of the region that EU membership is possible and that enlargement is truly a merit-based process, which rewards those advancing reform and making the right geopolitical choices. However, neither the EU nor the Western Balkans can ignore the fact that Kosovo is stuck due to unresolved status issues, Bosnia and Herzegovina carries the burden of a dysfunctional constitution imposed by the international community and North Macedonia is held back by bilateral issues with its EU neighbours.
Focusing on the countries facing fewest obstacles to accession might suit the geopolitical needs of the moment, but it risks losing sight of the original regional dimension of Western Balkans enlargement
Focusing on the countries facing fewest obstacles to accession might suit the geopolitical needs of the moment, but it risks losing sight of the original regional dimension of Western Balkans enlargement.
The European Commission is aware that it needs to provide incentives for countries without an early accession perspective. It is planning to present new proposals on gradual integration in its forthcoming communication on September 30th. A more ambitious and flexible framework for gradual integration, aiming to include countries in parts of the internal market, would encourage reforms and allow the EU to develop a more intelligent and honest approach to conditionality. This is especially necessary for advancing the rule of law and democratic standards, which are all too often neglected in favour of the broader geopolitical picture. This has contributed to the diminished transformative power of the accession process and negatively impacted regional stability.
In addition to exploring options for gradual integration, the EU should revive the diplomatic processes at the heart of what its regional approach was originally meant to achieve. This requires redoubling efforts on the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, progressing state reform of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and engaging with member states to clear the blockages holding North Macedonia back. This would contribute to regional stability and advance Europe’s geopolitical agenda by reducing opportunities for Russia, China and other actors to exert influence in the region.
The generations that lived through the good and the bad of the regional past are getting older. They might not live to see the European future promised to them at the turn of the century. Many would, however, still remember a line from an old Italian comic book Alan Ford, much loved in former Yugoslavia: “It is much better to be rich and beautiful than to be poor and ugly”. If the EU does not redouble its efforts to close remaining unresolved issues, its membership criteria would effectively follow the same logic. This would be a sad case of the EU abandoning its own ambition and responsibility.
The EU welcomes Cambodia’s decision to join the Multi-party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) for WTO members, contributing to efforts to uphold a rules-based multilateral trading system.
With Cambodia’s participation, the MPIA now covers 62 World Trade Organization (WTO) members and 60.4% of world trade.
The MPIA brings together participants from all continents and at different levels of development, united by a shared commitment to upholding the rules-based trading system.
The MPIA preserves the right to appeal in trade disputes among participating WTO members, at a time when the WTO’s Appellate Body remains non-functioning. It helps ensure that disputes can continue to be resolved in an orderly and binding manner, avoiding appeals 'into the void'.
“I welcome Cambodia to the MPIA. The arrangement plays an important role in upholding the rules-based trading system. Each new participant helps reinforce the predictability, stability and credibility of global trade rules. I encourage other WTO members to join the MPIA,” said EU Trade and Economic Security Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič.
The MPIA was established in 2020 and has proven its effectiveness in many WTO disputes.
Under the MPIA, appeals are heard by arbitrators randomly selected from a pool of 10 standing appeal arbitrators set up by the participating WTO members. These arbitrators are persons of recognised authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and WTO agreements.
The MPIA is open to all WTO members as a practical tool for appeal arbitration, pending the restoration of a reformed and fully functioning WTO dispute settlement system.
As of 1 June 2025, the MPIA has an updated pool of appeal arbitrators to ensure that appeals continue to be heard by independent arbitrators of the highest calibre.
At the WTO Ministerial Conference that took place earlier this year, MPIA ministers stressed the importance of the MPIA for the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system.
The current MPIA participants are Australia, Barbados, Benin, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, the European Union (and its Member States), Guatemala, Hong Kong (China), Iceland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Macao (China), Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Uruguay and Vietnam.
MC14: Supporting the rules-based multilateral trading system: the role of the MPIA
O Polo “Casimiro de Brito” da Biblioteca Municipal de Loulé, em Almancil, celebra os 70 anos de “Grande Sertão: Veredas”, romance icónico do autor João Guimarães Rosa.
A atividade, realizada em parceria com a UALG, Município de Montemor-o-Novo e Fundação José Saramago, tem lugar no dia 11 de setembro, pelas 18h.
Em 2026, comemoram-se os 70 anos da publicação de “Grande Sertão: Veredas” (1956), obra maior de João Guimarães Rosa (1908–1967) e um dos marcos da Literatura de língua portuguesa. O evento proposto assinala esta efeméride em Loulé, trazendo o universo rosiano ao Algarve através de três dimensões complementares: a narração oral, a criação artística e a reflexão sobre literatura, território e turismo cultural.
A iniciativa articula-se com a vinda a Portugal de Dôra Guimarães e Thiago Goulart, a convite da Fundação José Saramago e da Câmara Municipal de Montemor-o-Novo, e com a estância de investigação na UAlg de Diomira Faria, diretora do Espaço do Conhecimento UFMG – Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais e cocuradora da exposição “Sertão Mundo”, dedicada à obra rosiana e às suas reverberações pelo mundo.
O encontro pretende demonstrar que a exposição “Sertão Mundo” e o trabalho de narração oral do Grupo Miguilim podem constituir modelos replicáveis nos territórios do Algarve e adaptáveis a outros autores, portugueses e lusófonos, constituindo instrumentos concretos de mediação literária, de reforço identitário e de desenvolvimento local.
Para além de uma sessão de narração oral, o momento contará com a mesa-redonda “O sertão está em toda a parte: turismo literário e desenvolvimento dos territórios, de Cordisburgo ao Algarve”.
A atividade é de entrada livre.
Europe is rearming. Defence budgets are rising, factories are expanding, and new EU instruments are pouring money into ammunition production and joint procurement. But money is only part of Europe’s defence problems. The main constraint is that its systems remain slow, fragmented and poorly suited to an age when military technology can change in months rather than decades.
Three transformations are hitting the continent at once. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought back large-scale war to European soil. Washington’s growing focus on the Indo-Pacific, its renewed interest in Greenland and its push to move NATO from “burden sharing” towards what might be called “burden shifting” mean that Europe will have to provide not only more money for the alliance but also a larger share of its combat power. At the same time, technology is changing warfare faster than traditional procurement systems can keep up.
At present, procurement systems work as follows: a military identifies a requirement; officials draw up specifications; companies compete for a contract and, years later, a system enters service. The problem is that, by then, the technologies shaping the battlefield may have changed dramatically. Promising technologies can become obsolete or fall by the wayside before they ever reach soldiers.
Ukraine has demonstrated a different model. Operational problems generate ideas; engineers turn them into prototypes; soldiers test them; manufacturers improve and scale them; battlefield experience feeds into the next iteration. Technology can also work in the other direction: new capabilities, such as cheap drones, can create tactics that planners had not previously considered.
The real measure of defence-industrial success should not be how many platforms roll off the line, but how fast capability can be imagined, built, tested, industrialised, fielded and adapted again
Europe needs to make this cycle permanent. I propose a model called Adaptive Defence Industrial Ecosystem Management, or ADIEM. The principle is for governments to move from being regulators and buyers to orchestrators of a defence ecosystem that links governments, armed forces, defence and tech companies, start-ups, universities and investors in a continuous loop. The real measure of defence-industrial success should not be how many platforms roll off the line, but how fast capability can be imagined, built, tested, industrialised, fielded and adapted again.
Industrial resilience and human capital are central to this model. Ukraine has shown that sustained operations depend on raw materials, reliable energy, resilient logistics and skilled labour quite as much as on the platforms themselves. And because digital capability now depends as much on software and data engineering as on heavy manufacturing, Europe’s defence sector competes directly with the commercial tech industry for the same scarce talent. This makes the appeal of a defence career a strategic question.
Reform defence governance. Create permanent structures that bring together military planning, industrial policy, innovation and procurement around shared capability goals. Give them room to depart from standard rules where those rules are the obstacle.
Start with battlefield problems. Build capabilities around what armed forces need to achieve. It works in reverse too: a new system needs a concept of operations written for it before it is bought at scale. Treat these as living documents that evolve with experimentation and real-world lessons.
Make procurement faster and more flexible. Use a hybrid procurement method. While central procurement agencies buy major systems, individual units are allowed to meet certain urgent combat needs. Alongside that, break large procurements into smaller contracts with incremental delivery, allow continuous software updates, use open architecture and speed up certification.
Build a genuine innovation ecosystem. Give start-ups, universities and public labs clear routes to deployment. Reward experimentation and operational relevance over novelty for its own sake.
Achieve affordable mass. Create dedicated programmes for weapon systems that are effective enough, cheap enough to buy in large numbers and simple enough to replace quickly. These include drones, autonomous vehicles, loitering munitions, low-cost intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and electronic warfare.
Invest in human capital. Build a long-term pipeline of software engineers, AI specialists, systems engineers and skilled production workers, and change how the sector is perceived—presenting it as a high-technology field, not just a traditional military one.
Institutionalise experimentation. Set up permanent centres where soldiers, engineers, researchers and industry jointly evaluate new operational concepts and technologies. Test continuously rather than only in the run-up to a procurement decision.
Develop digital defence infrastructure. Invest in a sovereign defence cloud, secure data architecture, digital twins and common digital standards.
Governments also need to reform the institutions through which capability is developed, not just the funding lines that feed them. And while Europe has much of what it needs—sophisticated armed forces, world-class manufacturers, strong universities and a growing defence-tech sector—it still lacks a system capable of connecting them quickly enough. That is the purpose of ADIEM: to connect these actors in a continuously adapting ecosystem, with governments acting as orchestrators rather than simply regulators and buyers.
It took Europe’s far-right leaders no time at all to work out what Icelanders meant on August 29th, when they voted 52.8% to 47.2% against resuming negotiations to join the EU: a prosperous democracy had looked hard at Brussels and said no. Britain’s Nigel Farage congratulated them on “voting to keep their independence”. France’s Marine Le Pen went further, calling the result a reminder that “another Europe is possible”.
But Iceland did not vote against Europe—it voted to keep the Europe it already has.The country sits inside the single market through the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, is part of the Schengen area, and adopts swathes of EU legislation to stay compliant with standards set in Brussels. Short of membership, there is no closer relationship with the EU on offer.
Opposition to tight integration with Europe remains at the fringes of Icelandic politics and does not appear in any party’s manifesto. The foreign ministry’s latest annual survey showed that only 6% of Icelanders believe that international co-operation diminishes our sovereignty, against 69% who think it strengthens it. On the EEA agreement, 58% take a positive view and only 19% a negative one.
The Icelandic electorate has never shown much enthusiasm for politics built on distrust of institutions, conspiracy theories or the dissolution of the post-1945 international system. A country whose biggest annual festival is the Pride parade, and where women hold the offices of president, prime minister, foreign minister, bishop of the national church, mayor of the capital, chief of police and deans of both main universities is not a promising beacon for movements in the West that are uncomfortable with the inclusive nature of liberal democracy.
That being said, there is no denying that there was more than a whiff of culture wars in the no campaign. The masculine energy was palpable, and much effort went into far-fetched notions of an EU plot to expropriate Icelandic wealth. Young people were, by all accounts, targeted on social media and inundated with phone calls; one of the most potent messages was that EU accession could see them drafted into a European army. The yes side also played loose with the facts, not least in assertions that lower euro interest rates would automatically ease young people’s access to the housing market. Highly nationalistic messaging left some voters in a charged emotional state—and those voices were the loudest online, both during the campaign and in celebrating the outcome.
Still, the result was not a victory for the reactionary fringe. The fringe just happened to be on the winning side. The reasons Icelanders voted no are deep, domestic and largely unglamorous: fish, the currency, a comfortable arrangement with the world and a belief that the international order will remain relatively unchanged, despite temporary turbulence.
Through the EEA and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Icelanders and Icelandic businesses already enjoy the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. Every knowledgeable Icelander understands that without the market access, Iceland would not have prospered as it has. No serious politician dares to entertain abandoning the EEA. In fact, the no side ran on defending the agreement as the better alternative to full membership.
On defence and security, Iceland is a founding member of NATO and has a bilateral defence agreement with the US. For a country of 400,000 people that has never in its history had a military, these two pillars seem more than adequate, untested as they may be.
Full membership in the EU would require amending the constitution, which currently does not permit the transfer of sovereign powers that accession involves. This is sensitive in any debate about independence and sovereignty. As things stand, obligations arising from the EEA agreement only reach Icelandic law when the Icelandic parliament, the Althingi, legislates for them.
Iceland owes its rise from poverty to prosperity in the 20th century to controlling the rich maritime resources that surround it. For centuries, foreign fleets exploited those grounds while Icelanders were kept out of large-scale fishing by both restrictions imposed by Denmark (which ruled Iceland from 1380 to 1918) and a lack of financial infrastructure.
At the start of the last century, new technology and financing opportunities unleashed an explosion of entrepreneurial activity in the sector. Iceland then pushed its fisheries zone outwards until it reached its present limit in 1975, over fierce British opposition in stand-offs known as the “cod wars”. It was the closest the country has ever come to a military confrontation. Legal victory in that dispute is a tremendous source of national pride and a standing reminder of the importance of natural resources to our economy. Furthermore, Iceland’s track record in managing this resource compares very favourably with efforts elsewhere.
Accepting the EU’s common fisheries policy is, on the face of it, a requirement for full membership. For most Icelanders, this is where the conversation stops.
It follows that a crucial question is whether Iceland could join the EU and keep control of its fisheries. Accepting the EU’s common fisheries policy is, on the face of it, a requirement for full membership. For most Icelanders, this is where the conversation stops. It is out of the question. Therefore, much of the historical debate about EU membership has revolved around whether a permanent carve-out is possible, and much energy has gone into reading cryptic remarks on the matter from EU representatives. The application launched in 2009 produced no answer. Talks were shelved before this vital question was seriously engaged.
For the yes camp, applying again was the only way to find out the real answer. The no side held that a satisfactory answer was simply not on the table—a belief that makes a no vote logical even for people who do not object to membership in principle. Why board a train if you do not believe it will reach its destination?
Since its adoption in 1918, the króna has been one of the most consistent sources of frustration in Icelandic public life. It started out at par with the Danish krone and, by that benchmark, has since lost 99.9% of its value. Long protected by import, export and currency controls, and propped up by punishing interest rates, it has now been largely abandoned by the big Icelandic businesses that operate internationally. They have mostly chosen the euro as their operating currency.
Despite its drawbacks, the flexibility that a national currency provides a small economy reliant on natural resources is not to be discounted. Some economists claim that the currency is a valuable tool to smooth out external shocks and protect Icelanders from economic setbacks turning into societal hardships such as mass unemployment. For many, the costs of maintaining a tiny currency that is attuned to our specific economic conditions are well worth the benefits of keeping unemployment at a minimum. For others, these benefits are overstated, and the costs in perennially high interest rates and market risk do not make economic sense.
Iceland’s business and finance community is very focused on topline economic figures that show European growth lagging behind America’s. The prevailing narrative is that Europe buries its entrepreneurial talent under the weight of regulation while the US offers a superior environment for economic activity and technical innovation. Iceland’s business and financial community sees the country’s relative economic success as too valuable to risk with full EU membership.
Counter-narratives that build on broader measures of well-being do not seem to gain traction. Even extensive first-hand experience of European quality of life stands little chance when pitted against economic metrics.
Icelanders often cite Mario Draghi’s bleak assessment of the EU’s competitiveness as evidence that even consummate EU insiders have lost faith. The claim of the EU’s supposed economic feebleness does more than feed the economic debate; it has also become a thinly veiled contribution to the culture-war caricature of a weak Europe in contrast to a muscular America.
The biggest disconnect between international affairs experts and the general Icelandic population lies in how each reads the way geopolitics is evolving. Contrary to much international reporting, the volatile state of the world barely featured in the campaign, which was mostly fought on domestic issues. Even threats from the American president, Donald Trump, against our Greenlandic neighbours have not moved the needle. Perhaps most Icelanders viewed the episode as too outlandish to be taken seriously, or too uncomfortable to contemplate.
Icelanders are very supportive of Ukraine and disdainful of Russia’s aggression, but they seem to judge the war far enough away not to affect them. Many are perplexed by America’s current foreign policy yet treat it as a deviation from a norm that will eventually re-establish itself. Bogi Ágústsson, a respected Icelandic journalist, recently told The Economist that Icelanders are in denial about how serious some recent international developments are. I believe most close observers of US politics would tend to agree with him.
During the campaign, warnings about an impending rupture in the world order that underwrites Iceland’s peaceful existence found few takers. The government had brought the referendum forward from a planned 2027 precisely because of these international developments, but worries about Europe’s security and NATO—that now dominate international policy discussions—were simply not top of mind.
In this context, it bears mention that Iceland has never suffered a violent invasion or a hostile occupation, which leaves matters of security and defence largely a theoretical exercise.
While the referendum’s result does not represent what some far-right European leaders wish it did, some elements of the campaign should give cause for concern. The intensity of the rhetoric was excessive considering the low stakes of the vote. Any accession treaty would itself have gone to a second referendum.
The international reaction to the result also suggested that some elements within Icelandic politics are embedded within the international anti-globalist movement. Micro-targeting, emotional pressure and unsupported claims proved effective. A sense of crisis or impending disaster was invoked, inviting a mindset that loosens the scruples that normally keep political discourse civil and constructive. The success of this approach could provide a campaign blueprint that all parties might find hard to resist in future elections, to the detriment of Iceland’s hitherto relatively civil political culture.
As any fisherman knows, illegal bait might get you an easier catch a few times, but eventually will ruin the fishing for all. Trust in elections is a common stock too, and it does not tend to replenish on demand.
While the country queues for petrol, import licences are being given to the network behind Mongolia’s largest corporate fraud. Mongolia spent August rationing petrol, as the country faces an ‘unprecedented’ fuel crisis. In response, the Government has made importing fuel more profitable, and has sped up the process for issuing new licences.[1]
By opening the gates, the government has allowed existing networks to exploit the crisis, including the one connected to Jononbayar Erdenesuren, the disgraced Mongolian businessman reportedly as being allegedly responsible for the $1.1 bn fraud scheme operated through Lex Oil, the fuel importer that was run by his aunt.[2]
Mongolia is heavily reliant on foreign oil, primarily from Russia. To import it, businesses need an ‘all-types fuel import licence’, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources, which decides through paperwork checks.[3] Foreign businesses cannot import directly — they must sell through a Mongolian-licensed entity.[4]
Some 164 companies hold an import licence. Of these, 34 have been granted since 2025.[5] The number of companies licensed to import fuel has more than doubled in under five years.[6]
They have also become considerably more valuable. Duty and excise on fuel have been zeroed, importers offered preferential loans and subsidised storage for reserves, and the customs service has been told to expedite clearance of petrol consignments.[7]
A number of companies granted all-types fuel import licences in 2025 and 2026 are connected to Jononbayar Erdenesuren and the Lex Oil network behind his $1.1bn scheme. That scheme was executed through the very exploitation of import licences.
None of these importers are required to disclose the amount of oil they import. Only 11 of the 164 licence holders imported fuel in the first days of August. When asked which 11, and how much each imported, the Customs General Administration refused to answer, citing customs law.
Lex Oil’s network is growing
Since 2025, two former Lex Oil CEOs have taken positions in dormant companies that then received fuel licences. In one case, the licence was obtained the same day the shareholding was registered.
Following five years of inactivity,[8] Standard Oil Gas appointed a new Director, Erdenebat Indra, in December 2025. Indra ran Lex Oil from January 2019 until February 2024 – nearly the whole period in which the losses accrued.[9] Six weeks later, Standard Oil was granted an import licence. Indra became a shareholder that same day.[10]
The pattern was replicated by Indra’s successor at Lex Oil, Banzragch Batdavaa.[11] Batdavaa bought into Best Dragon, a company with no prior fuel operations, in July 2025. It was granted import permits just two months later.[12] Batdavaa remains in business with both Mongolian and offshore entities linked to the scheme,[13] amongst them two Dubai entities – Peak Solutions (co-managed with Jononbayar’s mother)[14], and his own APEXPP commodities.[15]
Two other companies, granted licences in the spring of 2025, were already owned by individuals in the network. Tod Oil received its first licence in April 2025, although the company was incorporated six years earlier by entities closely tied to Jononbayar.[16] Its founder, Tod Petroleum, was co-founded by Lex Oil and former VS Oil CEO Bataa Anarchuluu.[17] Bataa continues to operate within the network, serving as the Executive Director of the helicopter business linked to both the scheme and the son of former Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene.[18]
Another, Apex Petroleum, was incorporated in October 2024 – the month the $1.1bn provision was made public.[19] Three of the five founding shareholders had previously founded businesses with Jononbayar himself.[20] These three include Mönkhjargal Javkhlan (son of a licensed importer linked to the Government)[21] and Jononbayar’s rumoured mistress, Yalaltbayar Khongorzul.[22]
Three further entities — ABR Eco Trans, Petro Spark and Standard Energy and Oil — have links to Jononbayar’s network. ABR was incorporated in October 2024 and licensed to import fuel in April 2025.[23] It has since taken on the founder of BID Energy, Bold Luvsandagva, as its shareholder and executive director.[24] In February 2026, ABR moved into the same unit BID Energy had occupied until that December.[25] BID Energy is Indra's other licensed importer. It was granted import licences in 2024, 11 weeks after Indra left Lex Oil.[26] Indra bought into the company and is now its ultimate beneficial owner.[27]
Another, Petro Spark, was licensed on the same day as Apex Petroleum.[28] Its owner, Yadamsüren Dorjchanga, holds a network of businesses with Yondon Uuganbayar.[29] Uuganbayar bought shares in Jononbayar’s family’s meat business, Erdenet Makh Market, two weeks after the Lex Oil scheme was disclosed in October 2024.[30]
The seventh company, Standard Energy and Oil, was licensed in 2025.[31] In May 2026, it was taken over by N. Monsor.[32] Monsor is a reported close contact of Jononbayar.[33] He was director of a Mongolian company, Sky Professional Logistics,[34] when it received over $7.5 million from an offshore entity called Class Trading Limited,[35] and distributed it the same day among nine recipients. These included Jocondy, a company owned by Jononbayar’s aunt, the founder of Lex Oil.[36] Jocondy was reportedly directed by Jononbayar at the time.[37] It is reported that Jononbayar had previously made transfers into Class Trading.[38]
These are not the network's first import licences. Nine companies linked to Jononbayar, the first being Lex Oil itself in 2019, were granted import licences before 2025,[39] meaning at least 16 of the 164 importers are connected to his network.
New Licences, Existing Networks
Even outside that seven, what distinguishes a successful candidate is often the individual owner, as opposed to the company profile. One grantee, TES Petroleum Trade,[40] is owned by the reported son of Baagaa Battömör,[41] a sitting MP who had previously run both Mongolia’s tax and customs administrations.[42] Two licences went to companies owned separately by partners in an existing fuel business.[43] Four more went to Chinese-controlled businesses, two of them on the same day. None was set up as a fuel business, and three were still unregistered for fuel activity when they were licensed.[44]
Of the 34 companies granted import licences by the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources in 2025 and 2026, 14 had been incorporated less than two years before the award.[45] Eight more of the organisations granted licences changed hands shortly before they were licensed.[46]
The Government’s Response
On 17 August, the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources warned that importers who failed to keep filling stations supplied could lose their licences. The Minister admitted that some importers were holding stock and not selling it.
Revoking a licence removes a registration but has no bearing on the individuals behind the businesses. With fewer regulatory checks, and more demand than ever, the doors are being left open to actors who previously exploited Mongolia’s fuel import regulations.
Mongolia scored 31 out of 100 on Transparency International's 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, ranking 124th of 182 countries, its worst score on record. In September 2025 the US State Department reported that businesses in Mongolia face "substantial and unpredictable regulatory burdens at every level", with officials across ministries and agencies routinely contravening existing law and regulation. Unless the country creates laws transparently and implements them predictably, it warned, "investors may find Mongolia too risky and opt for more competitive countries."[47]
The victim of Jononbayar’s fraud scheme, Trafigura, used to be one of the most important importers of oil into Mongolia.[48] The fraud orchestrated by the playboy,[49] which personally enriched both himself and his family,[50] put that to an end. Now, the individuals involved are being allowed back in to exploit the crisis at the expense of ordinary Mongolians.
The crisis was a chance to show that direction had changed. Instead, the Government zeroed duty, offered importers preferential loans and subsidised storage, and issued 34 new licences — leaving at least 16 of the 164 with one network. Now agents known to have exploited the same system previously, are being allowed in again.
Photo by Zbynek Burival on Unsplash
[1] Government’s announcement that fuel import licence applications should be processed quickly and the licences granted, reported: https://ikon.mn/n/3pep and https://sonin.mn/newsDetail/18284
[2] Lex-Oil LLC granted fuel import licence in 2019: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979. Owned through his aunt, Dorjgochoo Erdenetul.
[3] In order to gain these, an applicant must produce its registration documents, prove membership of the relevant professional association, and file its contract with the fuel supplier in original: https://legalinfo.mn/mn/detail?lawId=208190
[4] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-11-02/trafigura-mongolia-oil-fraud-how-trader-faces-1-billion-loss
[5] Data as of 20 August, taken from https://license.mn/ (official electronic licence system)
[6] 80 companies Eighty companies held a licence to import fuel into Mongolia on 1 January 2022, recorded in the Ministry of Mining and Heavy Industry's register of petroleum products special licences, 22 March 2022: https://mmhi.gov.mn/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/ГТБ-тусгай-зөвшөөрлийн-жагсаалт-2022.03.22.pdf. 164 currently hold licences, per license.mn, the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources official register, as of September 2026: https://license.mn/.
[7] Tax and lending measures: https://mmhi.gov.mn/2026/08/06/. Expedited customs clearance: E. Oyun-Erdene, GoGo.mn, 17 August 2026, https://cmsm.mongolcontent.mn/r/6k9g8
[8] Standard Oil Gas LLC’s fuel import licence expired in 2020, and it recorded no other activity in the intervening period: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6120954
[9] CEO of Lex Oil 2019-224: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979
[10] 6 February 2026: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6120954
[11] Batdavaa sat as Executive Director of Lex Oil from Feb-April 2014: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979
[12] Best Dragon, incorporated 2020, dormant until 2025 when ownership was transferred to Batdavaa. Fuel import licence granted 26 September 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6574246
[13] B.Batdavaa is currently a shareholder of Diamond Oil and Energy alongside Oyunbileg Sainbileg https://opendatalab.mn/search/6552544. Sainbeleg is known to a key actor alongside Jononbayer, and remains director of one of the family’s companies, Zuunnaim Oil: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5272378
[14] Cedar Rose UAE corporate data accessed via Sayari, 21 August 2026: PEAK SOLUTION DMCC, commercial register DMCC194234, licence DMCC-855346, incorporated 5 August 2022;
[15] Offshore link reported in https://www.eureporter.co/world/mongolia/2026/08/13/the-helicopter-that-helped-topple-mongolias-prime-minister-linked-to-lex-oil-scheme/, Batdaava’s Linkedin states him as CEO of APEXPP Commodities: www.linkedin.com/in/batdavaa-banzragch-46120115a
[16] Tod Oil, incorporated 2019 by Tod Petroleum, granted licence 23 April 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6415636
[17] Tod Petroleum, founded Lex Oil and Bataa Anarchuluu https://opendatalab.mn/search/6104894. Bataa served as VS Oil CEO https://www.opendatalab.mn/search/6225578.
[18] Listed as UBO of Alpha Aurora Aviation: https://www.opendatalab.mn/search/8376344
[19] Apex Petroleum was incorporated 17 October 2024 (https://opendatalab.mn/search/7078633). Trafigura’s statement on losses 30 October 2024: https://www.trafigura.com/news-and-insights/press-releases/2024/statement-re-trafiguras-petroleum-products-business-in-mongolia/
[20] Three founders: Bayardalai Erdenezaya (founded Kem Tek with Jononbayar in 2016, and Commodity Trans with his mother in 2019); Mönkhjargal Javkhlan (registered at the same two businesses, alongside Diamond Oil and Energy), Yalaltbayar Khongorzul (co-founded Khongorfinance with Jononbayar in 2015),
[21] Reported to be the brother in-law and former campaign manager for the Minister of Economic Development: https://ergelt.mn/news/22/singile/40012
[22] Archived article: https://web.archive.org/web/20241113103634/https://www.reelnews.mn/a/1225 and X: https://x.com/miigaasbntv/status/1852208500715459004
[23] ABR Eco Trans LLC, incorporated 15 October 2024; wholesale permit 0016 from 20 March 2025 and all-types fuel import licence 0015 from 25 April 2025; https://opendatalab.mn/search/7077609
[24] Luvsandagva registered as ABR shareholder and joint beneficial owner on 24 November 2025 and as executive director on 29 January 2026; he founded BID Energy on 13 December 2023 with Baterdene Lkhagvadulam and was its first executive director: https://opendatalab.mn/search/7077609 and https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485
[25] BID Energy moved from Bayanzürkh, 3rd khoroo, 12th microdistrict, Tsendgüni 30b, unit 53 on 1 December 2025; ABR moved into that unit on 2 February 2026, from Tokio 24a, unit 134 in the same microdistrict: https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485 and https://opendatalab.mn/search/7077609
[26] BID Energy LLC, import licence 0015 granted 24 April 2024; https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485. Indra was executive director of Lex Oil from January 2019 to February 2024: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979.
[27] Indra registered as BID Energy shareholder and executive director on 16 August 2024 and as sole ultimate beneficial owner on 1 December 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485
[28] Petro Spark LLC, incorporated 8 May 2024, sole shareholder and beneficial owner Yadamsüren Dorjchanga; import licence 19 May 2025, the same date as Apex Petroleum: https://opendatalab.mn/search/7025169
[29] Joint holdings with Yondon Uuganbayar: Mongolian Truck Union Group LLC, https://opendatalab.mn/search/6840175; Novel Development Union LLC: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6894402; and the Gobi Genetics, https://opendatalab.mn/search/3646203
[30] Uuganbayar owns Mon Beef Cattle: https://opendatalab.mn/search/8324328 . Mon Beef Cattle acquired Erdenet Makh Market LLC, from Dorjgochoo Erdenetuyaa 24 October 2024, days before the scheme was disclosed.
[31] Standard Energy and Oil, received wholesale permit in June, the import licence that September: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6754244
[32] Monsor became the director of Standard Energy and Oil on 5 May 2026. It was acquired the same day by an investment fund, then owned by Dorj Enkhtuya (renamed KK Real Estate private fund two days later): https://opendatalab.mn/search/6607829. Mansor was the previous manager of that fund, and founded it himself through another vehicle he still owns and manages, Ulaanbaatar Asset Management: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5493498 . He became the CEO of Standard Energy and Oil on the day it was taken over by KK Real Estate.
[33] Reported in https://www.livetv.mn/p/11193/ and in https://www.polit.mn/a/69636
[34] Monsor is reported to have run Sky Professional Logistics: https://www.livetv.mn/p/11193. Court records state the executive director of Sky Professional Logistics concluded a wagon-transport agreement with the head of Ulaanbaatar Railway on 28 July 2017, naming him as Н.Монсов: https://shuukh.mn/single_case/19024
[35] Reporting states that US$7,545,900 was transferred from Class Trading Limited to Sky Professional Logistics on 8 August 2017 https://gogo.mn/r/5292y. Class Trading Limited was incorporated in the Turks and Caicos Islands and registered a Hong Kong place of business on 13 May 2015: Hong Kong Companies Registry, Company Particulars, BRN 64752427.
[36] Jocondy was founded by Dorjgochoo Erdenetuul, https://opendatalab.mn/search/5247632. She is Jononbayar's maternal aunt and the owner of Lex Oil LLC: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979 and https://zuv.mn/n/16a3.
[37] Reporting records US$612,400 paid to Jocondy and describes Jononbayar as its director at the time: https://gogo.mn/r/5292y and https://dardas.mn/news/view/2970
[38] Reported that Jononbayar sent $500,000 to Class Trading in 2014: https://dardas.mn/news/view/2970
[39] 2019: Lex Oil, 2019 https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979,Tod Petroleum, https://opendatalab.mn/search/6104894. 2020: ICIC, https://opendatalab.mn/search/5288193 VS Oil, https://opendatalab.mn/search/6225578, Zuunnaim Oil https://opendatalab.mn/search/5272378. 2022: Argal Oil https://opendatalab.mn/search/6309011. 2023: Alpha Aviation Fuel https://opendatalab.mn/search/8403473. 2024: BID Energy https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485 · Interasia Energy Mongolia, 2024 https://opendatalab.mn/search/6902987. Register of all 164 holders: https://opendatalab.mn/licences/15
[40] Tes Petroleum Trade, licenced 21 February 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6373135
[41] Paternity reported in: https://ergelt.mn/news/22/single/40012
[42] Battömör has sat in the State great Khural since 2016, he was deputy head, then head of the State Customs General Administration from 2008-11 and Head of the Tax General Administration from 2011-13: https://www.24tsag.mn/a/227052
[43] Greenjob, owned by Batsukh Baigalmaa, granted licence in October 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5645867; and Gobi Petroleum GPT, owned by Onurbat Ragchaa, granted a licence September 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/7121913. Together they are exclusive owners and directors of Green Oil Trade since incorporation in 2020: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6528716
[44] Tana Khiimori Oil - received import licence 11 August 2025, First registered for fuel-related activities 15 August 2025
: https://opendatalab.mn/search/7080033; Talnutgiin Ayalal - received import licence 11 August 2025, First registered for fuel-related activities 15 August 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5887488;
Achit Güür MS - received import licence 14 Jan 2026, Remains unregistered for any kind of fuel-related activity (registration codes are for freight, agriculture, tourism and motor vehicle sales): https://opendatalab.mn/search/6891802; Söüd Mont Forest - received import licence 11 December 2025, Registered for fuel wholesaling 6 December 2025, (previous registration codes are for motor vehicles, freight, automotive sales and machinery), https://opendatalab.mn/search/7058649.
[45] Data as of 20 August, taken from https://licence.mn/ (official electronic licence system)
[46] Data as of https://licence.mn/ checked against https://opendatalab.mn/search/[registration number]. “Changed hands” to mean change of shareholder, director or beneficial owner within twelve months on either side of grant.
[47] https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/638719_2025-Mongolia-Investment-Climate-Statement.pdf
[48] Trafigura supplied around a third of the region’s oil products, particularly diesel: https://eulerpool.com/news/markets/trafigura-in-crisis-mongolian-oil-credit-causes-million-loss; deals undertaken through the scheme said to account for around 80% of Mongolia's imported oil products: https://eguur.mn/556936/
[49] Jononbayar known for “parties he threw for friends and contacts” per Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-11-02/trafigura-mongolia-oil-fraud-how-trader-faces-1-billion-loss; reported to have thrown some of the “most expensive parties in Mongolia” https://eguur.mn/556936/
[50] https://zuv.mn/n/16a3; https://itoim.mn/a/2024/07/22/news-break/ugg
Login