In this tense, riveting first-person excerpt from his new book This Cursed Beautiful Land: A Russian Story, Evan Gershkovich recounts the harrowing months he spent as a prisoner in Russia, leading up to his eventual release in a complex, multi-country prisoner exchange. Even in the darkness, Gershkovich offers rays of light: care packages from friends, letters by the hundred, and a cautiously blossoming love with a friend in Berlin. We may know the ending, but the details of these days reveal what it takes to get there.
A few hours after my arrival, I heard a cart rolling down the hallway. A guard opened a kormushka — a feeder window in the door about the size of a human head. A man in a chef’s uniform filled my bowl with porridge, placed a piece of rancid-smelling boiled fish on my plate and gave me some weak tea. The reality of my new surroundings slammed into me.
Thoughts ricocheted inside my head. Earlier in the day I’d had a comforting one: they’ve taken me for a swap, I told myself. That’s all this is.
Now, curled up on the bed in my 12ft by 8ft cell, knees pulled to my chest, I thought, what if the FSB really does think I’m a spy and wants to make an example out of me? Maybe they don’t want to swap me at all. Maybe I really will spend 20 years here.
RT | September 30, 2026
Increased NATO military exercises near Russia’s Kaliningrad Region and aggressive rhetoric from members of the US-led bloc are raising the risk of a direct armed conflict, Moscow has warned.
Russia has sent NATO a warning stressing its determination to protect the Russian exclave in the Baltic region “with its entire available arsenal,” according to a statement published on Monday by the Russian Embassy in Belgium, which hosts the bloc’s headquarters.
The message alluded to remarks made earlier this month by Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, who said there are “hardly any troops” in Kaliningrad Region and urged NATO to increase its military posture near Russia’s borders so that Moscow would be “uncertain of what we will do.”
NATO spokesperson Allison Hart confirmed receiving the Russian message and accused Moscow of irresponsible rhetoric.
”We strongly denounce the threat of force, including any irresponsible nuclear rhetoric,” she said.
Western officials have frequently described Russian statements invoking its nuclear deterrent as “blackmail,” while presenting NATO’s own nuclear-sharing arrangements as a pillar of collective defense.
France has offered to discuss the possible deployment of its nuclear weapons in other European NATO countries, arguing that this could reduce the bloc’s dependence on the US. Under NATO’s existing nuclear-sharing arrangements, American nuclear bombs are stored in several European countries, while personnel from non-nuclear member states train for missions involving their potential use.
Russia has repeatedly rejected Western claims that it intends to attack NATO before the end of the decade, describing such warnings as warmongering aimed at persuading voters to support sharply higher military spending.
Moscow, in turn, views NATO’s military preparations as potentially paving the way for an attack on Russia. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has repeatedly warned that any such conflict would be extremely brief, implying that Moscow could resort to nuclear weapons.
The Russian Embassy in Ireland used more direct language, saying on Tuesday that Moscow is prepared to use nuclear weapons in response to an attempted NATO blockade of Kaliningrad Region and may consider pre-emptive military action in such a crisis.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Wednesday it was “natural for our diplomats to try and remind hotheads in Europe about our doctrinal documents,” in response to the rhetoric coming from Poland and other nations.
Last week, Russia recorded its highest estimated revenues from seaborne oil exports since the start of the war with Ukraine.
The main driver of this demand is the armed conflict and the resulting blockade of the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East. Due to supply problems, buyers are looking for additional sources of crude oil. This also applies to China which, although it has already secured reserves of the commodity, is also starting to increase purchases from the Russian Federation.
Last week, Russia achieved record weekly revenues from seaborne oil exports since the beginning of the war. Oil companies there shipped about 3.99 million barrels of oil a day to foreign markets. Given the high prices, this significantly increased the value of Russian exports.
Bloomberg estimates that the total value of oil shipped from Russian ports last week was about $2.75 billion. That is about $180 million more than the previous week and the highest weekly figure since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war.
Russian oil is now much more expensive than in previous months. As noted earlier, this is influenced by the situation in the global oil market, and in particular, the war in the Middle East. The price of Brent crude remained above $100 a barrel in September.
At the end of September, the price of this benchmark exceeded $103 per barrel. Earlier, prices rose further amid concerns about disruptions in oil supplies from the Middle East.
The Kremlin has decided to limit fuel exports to support the domestic market. The ban on diesel exports by Russian producers has been extended until Sept. 30, and restrictions on the export of gasoline and some diesel fuels by other exporters remain in place for an extended period.
The UA News portal points out that an exceptional situation has arisen as a result, stating: “Russia cannot export as many petroleum products as before, but it has a surplus of crude oil that it cannot fully process domestically. Consequently, the oil surplus is diverted to the foreign market.”
This situation increases the volume of maritime exports. Russia’s current revenues have significantly exceeded the previous week’s value. To avoid drawing conclusions based on just one week, the agency also calculated average revenue over four weeks. This indicator is less susceptible to sharp short-term fluctuations in prices and volumes.
Over the past four weeks, the estimated average value of Russian oil exported by sea has been around $2.39 billion per week. That is about $290 million more than in the previous four-week period and the most since the second half of May.
Russia may continue to earn significant revenue from crude oil sales. As long as the price of Brent crude remains above $100 a barrel and Russian crude enjoys demand among buyers in Asia, Moscow can generate additional revenue, even despite operational problems at its own refineries.
This situation may change as supplies from the Middle East gradually resume. Reuters reported that exports from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates increased in September, and reconstruction of some infrastructure began after the attacks. This could ease pressure on the global market and affect the price of Russian oil, even if oil prices are expected to remain elevated throughout 2026 and 2027.
The post Russia earns record seaborne oil revenues despite Ukraine attacks appeared first on Remix News.
Press TV – September 30, 2026
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s prediction that Iran’s economy would soon collapse underscores the depth of delusion within the current American leadership.
“Iran is absolutely not sanctionable,” Deputy Economy Minister Mortaza Zamanian said this week as Tehran worked to keep trade flowing despite Washington’s latest sanctions campaign.
Zamanian cited Iran’s extensive borders, established commercial routes and longstanding trading relationships, saying that they make it impossible for external pressure simply to switch off the country’s economy.
His remarks came as Washington intensified its economic terrorism against Iranian oil, shipping, aviation, finance, technology and foreign companies supporting those sectors.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that Iran would probably make its final oil deliveries to China within two weeks, after which, he asserted, “they will have nothing.”
That prediction deserves comparison with history, because American administrations have imposed increasingly severe sanctions since 1979 while repeatedly expecting economic pressure eventually to produce decisive Iranian economic collapse.
The economy did not disappear under those campaigns; instead, Iran developed domestic industries, expanded regional commerce, strengthened Asian trade and accumulated extensive experience operating outside Western financial systems.
The proposition that an economy which has absorbed American sanctions for almost half a century will suddenly become economically empty within two weeks therefore indicates the depth of delusion among the current US leadership.
Iran enters the current confrontation with a large domestic market, substantial productive capacity, enormous energy resources and deeply established commercial relationships extending across neighboring countries and wider Eurasian markets.
The World Bank describes Iran as relatively diversified for an oil-exporting economy, with substantial manufacturing, agricultural and service activity supported by a large population and significant domestic consumption.
That domestic market sustains production across food, pharmaceuticals, construction materials, steel, petrochemicals, machinery and consumer goods, meaning Iranian production does not depend entirely upon continuous access to Western consumers.
Iran has also developed major industrial capabilities suited to its own resources and infrastructure, including steel, refining, petrochemicals, cement, power generation, construction, food processing and pharmaceutical manufacturing.
These capabilities have continued developing despite restrictions on Western investment and technology, demonstrating that Iranian industrial activity does not depend upon permanent participation by Western companies.
Iran’s prolonged exposure to sanctions has produced accumulated technical and commercial knowledge, giving Iranian companies decades of experience managing restricted supply chains and unreliable access to foreign suppliers.
When foreign manufacturers withdraw, Iranian companies have learned to redesign equipment, substitute components, develop domestic suppliers and cooperate with businesses from countries willing to maintain commercial relationships.
Academic research has documented this process, showing that sanctions can simultaneously restrict foreign technology while encouraging domestic technological development and adaptation within affected Iranian industrial sectors.
The resulting knowledge extends beyond individual companies, because engineers, technicians, procurement specialists and managers have accumulated practical experience managing shortages, substitution and alternative sourcing.
Iranian manufacturers therefore do not design procurement systems around the assumption that every international supplier will remain available indefinitely, making adaptation part of ordinary commercial planning.
Iran’s geography provides another economic advantage, because the country borders Turkey, Iraq, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan while possessing coastlines reaching the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman.
Those borders connect Iranian commerce with the Caucasus, Central Asia, South Asia, the Persian Gulf, Turkey and Iraq, while transportation corridors also connect Iran with Russia and wider Eurasian markets.
Financial sanctions can make transactions more difficult, but they cannot physically relocate Iran or eliminate its access to neighboring markets, suppliers, transportation routes and established regional trading relationships.
Iran has consequently developed commercial links involving Iraq, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Caucasus, Central Asia and China through years of sustained economic interaction.
The World Bank has documented Iran’s increasing trade orientation toward neighboring countries and China as sanctions restricted conventional international relationships, making this regional pivot an established economic feature.
China adds another dimension because it combines enormous industrial capacity with sustained demand for Iranian energy while supplying machinery, manufactured products and industrial inputs required throughout Iran’s domestic economy.
The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission identifies China as Iran’s largest trading partner and estimates that China imported approximately 1.4 million barrels of Iranian crude daily during 2025.
Chinese independent refiners have continued purchasing Iranian crude through commercial arrangements designed to reduce their exposure to American financial restrictions and sanctions enforcement.
That relationship demonstrates why Iran does not require unrestricted access to every Western market when Chinese demand and extensive regional commerce provide alternative markets for Iranian commodities.
Iran’s energy resources provide enormous economic depth, with the World Bank ranking the country second globally in proven natural-gas reserves and fourth globally in proven crude-oil reserves.
Those resources provide export potential while also supplying abundant domestic energy and petrochemical feedstocks supporting manufacturing, electricity generation, transportation and numerous energy-intensive industrial activities.
Iran has consequently developed a substantial downstream economy converting hydrocarbons into refined products, petrochemicals and industrial inputs rather than depending exclusively upon crude-oil exports.
The World Bank has noted that sanctions encouraged additional processing of hydrocarbons into petrochemicals, illustrating how restrictions contributed to changes within Iran’s export structure.
Iran has also developed financial mechanisms outside conventional Western banking, including bilateral currency arrangements, exchange houses, barter, intermediary companies and indirect settlement channels supporting international commercial activity.
The World Bank has documented growing use of bilateral currency exchange, barter and indirect payment mechanisms as Iranian trade shifted increasingly toward neighboring countries and China.
These arrangements provide alternative methods for exchanging value when conventional dollar-based transactions become unavailable or prohibitively difficult.
Their existence helps explain why Washington increasingly targets third-country banks, intermediaries and commercial facilitators, because Iranian commerce extends through extensive international networks beyond domestic financial institutions.
Against this background, Bessent’s prediction assumes that eliminating a major source of oil revenue would effectively remove the broader economic foundations supporting Iran’s productive system and commercial institutions.
Iran’s economic structure is considerably broader, because oil exports represent one component of national activity alongside manufacturing, agriculture, services, domestic consumption and regional commerce.
The World Bank estimates that Iran’s economy contracted during the Iranian year ending March 2026, while simultaneously describing adaptation through changing trade patterns and alternative payment mechanisms.
Economic contraction, however, is fundamentally different from the disappearance of productive capacity, infrastructure, commercial institutions and domestic relationships sustaining millions of Iranian consumers and businesses.
American sanctions have repeatedly targeted Iranian banking, oil exports, investment, technology, shipping and foreign companies, yet Iran has retained its industrial base and redirected substantial trade toward neighboring countries.
Washington possesses powerful financial tools, but financial restrictions cannot physically eliminate Iran’s factories, oilfields, farms, engineers, consumers, ports, borders or commercial relationships accumulated over decades.
The central question is therefore whether American pressure can erase the productive, geographical, resource and commercial foundations Iran has accumulated across nearly half a century of economic adaptation.
Nothing in Iran’s economic history demonstrates that those foundations can disappear within two weeks, particularly while the country retains domestic production, regional markets, energy resources and established commercial relationships.
Iran therefore enters the present confrontation with domestic capabilities, energy resources, industrial capacity, geographic advantages and international relationships capable of keeping its economy operating despite intensified American terrorism.
They’ve been shown to raise electricity bills, pollute drinking water, do little to boost local employment while threatening millions of jobs in a variety of industries, and top executives have warned that the technology they support could wipe out all of humanity by the end of the decade. But rather than take widespread public opposition to artificial intelligence data centers at face value, House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) announced he had […]
The post US House speaker sees AI data center worries as ‘Chinese psyop’ appeared first on Asia Times.
Over the summer, Russia intensified its use of jet-powered one-way attack drones. Flying faster and higher than the propeller-driven Shahed-136s (or Geran-2s as Russia calls their copies) that have been terrorizing Ukraine for years, these weapons are far harder to intercept. We predicted this would happen over three years ago when Iran first introduced its jet-powered Shahed-238, which itself was an adaptation of the Shahed-136. Initial variants of Russia’s copy of that drone, called the Geran-3, first appeared over the skies of Ukraine in early 2024. By mid-2025 they were becoming a real problem. Since then, the latest higher-performance variant of this weapon, the Geran-4, has added great strain to Ukraine’s dwindling air defense resources and is the source of increasing levels of destruction across the country.
The Geran-4 appeared last May, according to the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR). Unlike the Geran-3, which largely used a modified Shahed-136 airframe, the new drone has one purpose-built for higher-speed flight because “the structural strength [of the older model] was insufficient for high-speed flights, and even less so for maneuvering under high G-loads,” GUR noted.
The Geran-4’s new airframe features a blended air intake and overall “improved aerodynamic efficiency, a reinforced structure, and a turbojet engine with increased thrust,” GUR stated. “The wings are now permanently integrated into the center wing section. To reduce air resistance, the number of technological hatches on the fuselage has been minimized.”
In an overnight attack across Ukraine that lasted until Monday, “Russia launched 165 drones overnight, 79 of them jet-powered, the Air Force reported. Air defenses downed or suppressed 112, and hits were recorded at 14 locations.” You can see the aftermath of one of those attacks in the following video.
We’re under constant attack
— Antoninaodesa NAFO (@antoninaodesssa) September 28, 2026
Burn in hell, ruzzians
Recently, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) got its hands on one of these weapons. Its report offers the best view yet of what makes these drones so dangerous.
The Geran-4 is “a new, faster version of the attack drone that is proving harder for Ukrainian air defenses to intercept,” the report states. “We were given a rare opportunity to literally take this surviving drone apart and find out what makes it so much faster, more maneuverable, and more accurate.”
“The first part we uncover is the turbojet engine. It is one of the Geran-4’s most significant upgrades, allowing the drone to fly at altitudes of up to eight kilometers,” the report explained. “That’s twice as high as the older propeller-powered drones. According to specialists, drones equipped with this type of engine have already flown from Russia-occupied Crimea to Lutsk in northwestern Ukraine, a distance of more than 700 kilometers.”
RFE/RL takes apart a Russian Geran-4 drone to uncover what makes the jet-powered unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) faster, harder to intercept, and capable of operating deep inside Ukraine — from its turbojet engine and advanced camera to foreign-made communications and navigation… pic.twitter.com/WGNdlpS9w1
— Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (@RFERL) September 25, 2026
“This engine allows it to fly at speeds of up to 450 to 500 kilometers per hour over Ukrainian territory. Sometimes even faster,” RFE/RL proffered. “It flies fast and high, which is why it is still difficult to intercept.”
As the camera pans down over the engine, the reporters noted that while it is made in China, “we have investigated cases where these engines were assembled in Russia using Chinese components.”
The next component examined was the drone’s camera.
“It has several modes: daylight, night vision, and infrared,” the report stated. “The camera offers 10-times optical zoom and up to 32-times digital zoom, allowing the drone operator to view terrain from an altitude of eight kilometers.”
“If there is a relay station and it is connected to the network, an operator sitting in an automated workstation somewhere in Bryansk, Oryol, or Crimea can control the drone and guide it to its target,” RFE/RL stated.
“Once the drone is inside Ukraine, regular cellular SIM cards can help keep it connected,” the report continued. “We also found two GSM modems inside this drone. Using SIM cards, they can transmit the Geran-4’s location over mobile networks, allowing the operator to track it in real time.”
Back in 2024, we explained how Shaheds fitted with 4G modems and SIM cards from Ukrainian telecom firms, combined with a camera installed on the drone and the ability to use wireless networks, could be one of a number of avenues that would transform the Shahed into a relatively long-range reconnaissance and strike asset capable of beyond-line-of-sight real-time operations. This could help plug what at the time was a glaring gap in the Russian arsenal, although the stability of its connectivity is still unknown and providing man-in-the-loop guidances in real-time for strikes may be beyond the capabilities of this configuration, at least consistently.
Regardless, most of these drones do not have cameras or modems, they fly to a specific set of coordinates and dive on a target before detonating.
The following images offered a glimpse into that system.
— MAKS 26
Drone specialists who have investigated the remains of these weapons told the outlet that they had found SIM cards “from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and even some European Union countries. And the deeper we go inside the drone, the more foreign-made components we find.”
The RFE/RL team also found a Chinese mesh modem the Russians use to help guide the drone.
“It’s responsible, among other things, for radio and video communications. Essentially, this device allows the drone operator to see the video feed from the Geran-4 almost in real time,” RFE/RL stated. “The modem has a range of up to 300 kilometers and can also act as a signal relay. That means several drones flying near each other can relay and strengthen the signal, making it possible to control them over much greater distances.”
The discovery of the Chinese mesh modem illustrates something we reported earlier this year: “For some time now, Russia has been working on a man-in-the-loop (MITL) control capability for the Shahed/Geran, a feature that was confirmed when they started to appear with cameras and cellular modems, something TWZ explored in detail at the time. These developments allow the drone to be connected to an operator. Standard Shaheds fly autonomous routes to pre-planned targets on autopilot with no man-in-the-loop control. They are ‘fire and forget’ weapons.“
“Meanwhile, the range at which MITL can be achieved has been steadily increased. At first, the drones were adapted to exploit patchy cellular networks to provide additional connectivity when available. More recently, Shaheds have been flying with antennas allowing for direct line-of-sight control close to the front lines. This allows them to hit targets dynamically like an FPV drone, while packing a much heavier punch and being able to loiter for long periods of time. You can read all about this development here. Now, the datalink range is being extended using airborne signal relays, possibly creating a mesh network with multiple line-of-sight links.”
درون”Geran-4“ توقف محرك الـMicro-turbojet قبل الانقضاض على الهدف،
— TACTIX
وتتَّخذ وضعية الانزلاق البطيء، ربّما لتوفير الوقود او لدقة افضل اثناء البحث بالعدسة البصرية.
ايضاً يظهر بوضوح هوائيات الارسال Mesh Antennas
اثنان مثبَّتان على الذَّيل، أحدهما موجّه الى الاعلى والاخر الى الاسفل. pic.twitter.com/cQIyHhvbmm
Finally, the Ukrainian journalists found something else we have long reported on. Like many other Russian weapons, the Geran-4 even contains components made in America.
“Despite international sanctions, a significant portion of its components are still coming from abroad, highlighting gaps in global export control enforcement,” RFE/RL showcased. “We just opened up the drone’s onboard computer, and these circuit boards contain components made by a U.S. company. The markings on this component are partly worn off, but you can still see the manufacturer, Texas Instruments.”
“According to the specialists, what is actually Russian-made here is mainly the drone’s body and its assembly. This particular drone was manufactured and assembled at Alabuga, a major Russian drone production site. According to Ukraine’s military intelligence, Russia is now producing around 3,000 Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones a month at Alabuga and other facilities across Russia.”
Satellite images of the site first emerged in 2023, which you can see below.
Satellite images of the factory producing Iranian kamikaze drones Shahed-136 in Yelabuga, Tatarstan.#russia #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/07HBMwcGCs
— Dr. Khaled Alfaiomi (@Alfaiomi) November 15, 2023
As if the Geran-4 drones were not challenging enough for Ukraine, Russian Geran-5 jet-powered drones are equipped with “a DSMAC (Digital Sensor Module for Autonomous Navigation) module for navigation using reference images of the Earth’s surface, similar to the X-101 missile,” the Ukrainian technology monitoring channel Polkovnyk GSh reported on Telegram. DSMAC allows for a weapon to navigate without any external help from global positioning satellites. The Tomahawk also uses this system. You can read all about it and how AI embedded in Shahed models will be the next leap in true autonomy far beyond the front lines, even for hunting and killing targets of opportunity, in our special feature linked here.
In addition, Russia has installed mesh repeaters on these weapons for radio signals so that video of the attacks can be “recorded (and immediately transmitted),” presidential adviser on defense technology Serhii Beskrestnov, known as Flash, said on Telegram.
The Russian military is now capable of acquiring real-time, high-quality BDA of its strikes with Geran-type OWA-UAVs/cruise missiles in downtown Kyiv.
— Status-6 (@Archer83Able) September 27, 2026
In the footage below, we can see the moment of a Russian strike with Geran-5 cruise missile on the "Inkom" business center… pic.twitter.com/mPx4Kf9tmH
Though these jet-powered drones are causing major problems for Ukraine, the country is finding a way to combat them.
One way is by using Ukrainian Air Force F-16 Vipers to shoot them down, which you can see in the following video.
The moment a Russian jet-powered "Shahed" drone is shot down by an F-16 fighter jet using its M61 Vulcan cannon. pic.twitter.com/gU72HJTXUa
— WarTranslated (@wartranslated) September 23, 2026
The Russian jet-powered drones were largely outrunning the drone interceptors Ukraine began using with great success against the piston-driven Shaheds. Those interceptors were not only saving lives, but they were also saving money because they cost a tiny fraction of far more expensive, higher-end munitions like the PAC-3 MSE fired by the Patriot system or the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile variants fired from the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) air defense launchers.
Seeking a more efficient and effective defense, Ukraine adapted by fielding higher-performing interceptor drones that are purpose-built to take on the jet-powered Russian munitions. Still, the engagement window for hitting the Russian drones is small, and these are more expensive to build. However, they will remain far less costly and faster to acquire than surface-to-air missiles.
In his speech earlier this week at the U.N. General Assembly, President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that “our soldiers have already successfully tested four new jet-powered interceptor drones against Russian jet-powered Shaheds. So we are scaling up production.”
It is unclear exactly which interceptors the Ukrainian president was talking about; however, other types designed to take on Russian jet-powered Gerans have become public. One of them is the Sting S, a variant of the bullet-shaped Sting interceptor drone made by the Ukrainian Wild Hornets drone company.
On Sept. 19, the company posted a video on X claiming that “a crew from the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment took down a Russian Geran-5 using the new STING S. This drone is faster and carries a larger explosive payload than other Geran variants.”
TWZ cannot independently verify these claims.
STING S takes down a Geran-5 jet-powered drone-missile
— Wild Hornets (@wilendhornets) September 19, 2026
The crew from the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment took down a Russian Geran-5 using the new STING S. This drone is faster and carries a larger explosive payload than other Geran variants.
Big thanks to the… pic.twitter.com/Eg0rQgd1tL
When we asked for more details, Wild Hornets told us “that the tests are going well. About a dozen enemy ‘Geran-4′ jet-powered strike UAVs have already been shot down, as well as several ‘Geran-5’ models, just in the last few days. We should note that at this stage we are talking about only the first results of combat testing within a few select units.”
The Sting S “is a high-speed quadcopter-type interceptor,” the Wild Hornets spokesperson added. “When choosing this model, we took into account that the solution should be inexpensive, easy to use, and quickly scalable.”
“Furthermore, most of the targets during combat testing have been destroyed using ‘Hornet Vision Ctrl’ remote control technology,” the spokesman stated. Wild Hornets claims the system provides low-latency image transmission, long-range communication, and resistance to electronic warfare.
100 remote interceptions in 100 seconds: Hornet Vision CTRL in action
— Wild Hornets (@wilendhornets) September 3, 2026
Since deployment, Ukraine’s Defense Forces have remotely destroyed 1,000+ enemy targets using the system.
All thanks to the skill of crews taking down enemy drones with STING interceptors every day
“We expect this will allow us to rapidly scale up the deployment of the new interceptor once mass production begins,” the spokesperson noted.
As we have frequently noted, Russia and Ukraine continuously create new weapons and ways to defeat them. The jet-powered Russian drones, and Ukraine’s newest interceptors designed to destroy them, are the latest examples of a seemingly endless weapons evolution cycle in this war.
Contact the author: howard@twz.com
The post Russia’s Jet-Powered Shahed Drones Are Quickly Evolving As Ukraine Scrambles To Blunt Their Damage appeared first on TWZ.
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