Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Who asked, and who decided

There are phrases which, on their own, say more about a state than a Defence White Paper. One such phrase appeared in the Corriere della Sera on 4 October, in an interview with the Chief of the Army General Staff, Lieutenant General Carmine Masiello: “On the eastern flank, we were asked to deploy units capable of providing a real deterrent: we are leading the multinational battlegroup in Bulgaria and are present in Latvia and Hungary. War does not ask for permission, and the contingent must be ready to respond.”

A few lines earlier, the same general had opened the interview as follows: “We are at war. A hybrid war, but war nonetheless.” The attentive reader will pause to consider three words. We have been asked. By whom? Real deterrence. Compared to what deterrence, until now, has been unreal? We are at war. Who has declared it? These are questions that the Italian public debate should ask itself seriously, without indulging either in the caricature of the warmongering military or in the conditioned reflex that treats every doubt as enemy propaganda. The argument put forward in these pages is simple: the idea of direct involvement by Italy and European countries in an armed conflict with Russia is strategic folly, and the bellicose rhetoric that is making it seem conceivable protects no one. It makes the situation worse.

It is best to start with the facts, because the controversy surrounding the interview has misrepresented some of them. The contingents mentioned by Masiello are not a development from the past week. Italy has been participating in NATO’s forward presence in Latvia since 2017 and, since 2022, has been leading the multinational battlegroup in Bulgaria – established following Russia’s conflict with Ukraine alongside those from Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. The Madrid Summit in June 2022 then committed the allies to strengthening these groups to brigade level ‘where and when required’. The general’s statement that ‘we were asked’ therefore has a clear source: the Alliance’s planning, approved by the North Atlantic Council, to which the Italian government has given its consent.

Parliament, too, has formally expressed its view. Law 145 of 2016 stipulates that the government must approve international missions annually and that Parliament must authorise them. For 2026, the Council of Ministers’ resolution is dated 14 May; the Chamber of Deputies approved the authorisation resolution on 28 July, for missions valid from 1 January to 31 December. On closer inspection, this situation is more serious than the mere omission denounced by many commentators. Parliament was not bypassed: it was called upon at the end of July to ratify what had been in progress for seven months, as part of a single package bringing together dozens of different missions, from Lebanon to the Horn of Africa. Voting against the eastern flank means, in this context, voting against the whole package. It is a procedure that produces consensus without generating debate.

The problem, then, is not strictly legal. It is political, and concerns the quality of the decision. It is one thing to maintain a contingent in an allied country for reassurance purposes. It is quite another to publicly declare that that contingent must provide ‘real deterrence’ and be ‘ready to respond’ to a war that ‘does not ask for permission’. This shift in function – from a symbolic presence to combat readiness – has not been the subject of any specific parliamentary debate. Italians learnt of it from an interview published at the weekend, in a tone one might use to describe the modernisation of barracks.

A war that no one has authorised

Article 78 of the Constitution is so clear that it sounds almost embarrassing today: ‘The Chambers shall declare a state of war and confer upon the Government the necessary powers.’ Article 11 adds that Italy repudiates war as an instrument of aggression and as a means of resolving international disputes. In this context, the phrase ‘we are at war’, uttered by the head of the Armed Forces, is not merely a lexical detail. Neither House has declared a state of war. No government has been granted extraordinary powers. If words have any meaning, that phrase describes a condition that is not recognised by the legal system.

The contrast with Masiello’s own words from two and a half years ago is striking. In May 2024, in another interview, the general had been unequivocal in the opposite sense: ‘Let’s be clear: we are not at war,’ he had said, referring to a ‘sub-threshold’ conflict. The material reality described then and now is essentially the same: cyber-attacks, sabotage, disinformation, airspace violations. What has changed is the verbal framework. And in international politics, the framework is never neutral. Those who repeat every day that we are already at war accustom public opinion to the idea that actual war is merely the next step on a path that has already begun. This is precisely the process that the literature on threat construction describes as securitisation: a problem is shifted from the ordinary political sphere to that of emergency, where the usual rules – including debate – appear to be a luxury.

It is no coincidence that, in that very interview, the priority highlighted is the distribution to military personnel of a ‘cognitive self-defence manual’ against disinformation. The stated aim is to protect personnel. The side effect is to delimit the scope of what is conceivable: if every voice that questions the necessity of conflict can be interpreted as an emotional lever wielded by the enemy, dissent becomes a security issue. A democracy that fears manipulation should respond with more debate, not less.

Deterrence that produces what it fears

The strategic crux of the matter is the very concept of deterrence. Deterrence works when the adversary perceives our stance as both defensive and credible. It ceases to work – and indeed becomes counterproductive – when the measures a state adopts to feel secure are interpreted by the other as offensive preparations. This is the security dilemma: in a system without a higher authority, many of the means by which a state increases its own security reduce that of others, triggering a spiral that neither actor had intended.

The eastern flank is where this spiral is most visible. From Moscow’s perspective, allied brigades permanently deployed a few hundred kilometres from St Petersburg and the Belarusian border, exercises in the Baltic and attempts to stop Russian ships in transit are signs of encirclement. Putin stated this explicitly at the Valdai Forum in early October, describing the Western manoeuvres in the Baltic as an escalation. One might regard that interpretation as self-serving, and in part it is. But deterrence is not measured by our intentions: it is measured by the perceptions of those who are to be deterred. Ignoring them does not make them go away.

There is also one factor that should be of the greatest concern, and it is Masiello himself who articulates it. In hybrid warfare, the general explains, the risk is ‘not only to suffer, but to slip, by mistake, into an open confrontation’. This is a valuable admission. It means that the Italian military leadership considers the possibility of an unintended war – arising from an accident, a misinterpretation or a chain of automatic responses – to be very real. Thomas Schelling referred to this mechanism as ‘the threat that leaves something to chance’: the more forces are in contact and ready to react, the more control over the crisis slips from the hands of political decision-makers. If the main risk is error, the rational response is to reduce friction and increase the number of communication channels. Yet whilst the readiness of troops near the border is being stepped up, the tone of rhetoric is moving in the opposite direction.

In Moscow, Putin spoke clearly

At the Valdai Forum, Putin reiterated that Russia has no intention of attacking anyone ‘neither in 2029, nor in 2030, nor in 2050’, adding that in the event of an attack, Moscow would respond with all means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons. A few days earlier, in St Petersburg, he had said that Russia is in no way preparing to go to war with Europe. The usual response in the Italian press is that these reassurances are worthless: Formiche pointed out, for example, that even the 1994 Budapest Memorandum contained written commitments that were subsequently breached.

This argument deserves a serious response, not a slogan. No one is obliged to take the statements of a head of state – be they Russian or American – at face value. But mistrust of others’ words does not justify abandoning diplomacy: it makes it all the more necessary. Public statements serve precisely this purpose: to establish commitments that can be verified, negotiated, translated into measures of mutual trust, limits on troop deployments, notifications of military exercises, and direct military lines of communication. This is precisely what Europe did during the decades of the Cold War, with the Helsinki Final Act and the subsequent Vienna documents, when mistrust of Moscow was at least as great as it is today. Responding to every overture by increasing military readiness amounts to choosing not to verify. And those who fail to verify their adversary’s intentions end up planning for the worst-case scenario, which, by dint of being planned for, becomes the most likely outcome.

The reverse is also true. If it is genuinely believed that Russia is preparing an act of aggression against an EU member state, then the matter is of such gravity as to demand a public and parliamentary debate commensurate with its importance, based on the available evidence, intelligence assessments and the alternatives under consideration. Not an interview. The two things are mutually exclusive: either the threat is existential, in which case the nation must be mobilised; or it is not, in which case the language of imminence is a mistake.

To die for whom and for what?

The question currently circulating on social media – whether Italians are prepared to die for the Baltic states or for Zelensky – is phrased brutally, but it hits upon a real issue. European public opinion, and Italian public opinion in particular, has never given an explicit mandate for direct military confrontation with Russia. Surveys in recent years have consistently ranked Italy amongst the European countries most opposed to sending troops and most in favour of a negotiated solution. A democratic system that prepares for war against the prevailing will of its citizens, without even consulting them, accumulates a debt of legitimacy that would be called in at the worst possible moment: precisely when national cohesion is most needed.

Nor is there any need to demonise the Baltic states to recognise the problem. Their perception of the threat has historical roots that a Western European struggles to fully comprehend. The point is another: in a thirty-two-member alliance, the most hardline positions tend to set the tone for the whole, because no government wants to appear the least supportive. Italy has different geopolitical interests, focused on the Mediterranean, Africa, the Balkans and its energy ties with the East. A country in that position has everything to lose from a conflict in the Baltic and nothing to gain. Its historical role, from Andreotti to Prodi, has been that of a mediator, not an outpost. To abandon this role in order to align with the hardline stance is a choice that someone should openly advocate, rather than letting it seep out through an interview.

Finally, there is the practical reality, which the general himself does not hide. Masiello speaks of the return of the ‘importance of mass’: forces are quickly worn down, and without the capacity to replenish them, a prolonged conflict cannot be sustained. In short: a conventional war with Russia would be a war of attrition, fought with ammunition stocks that Europe does not possess and with an industrial base that would take years to reconvert. Against a nuclear power that has just reiterated that it regards nuclear weapons as part of its defence. There is no rational interpretation of Italy’s national interest in which this scenario is acceptable.

Alternatives do exist and do not require naivety. The first is institutional: to separate missions on the eastern flank from the annual budget and subject them to a specific vote, preceded by a public hearing of military and government leaders on the nature of the mandate. If Italian soldiers are asked to be ‘ready to respond’, Parliament has the right and the duty to know to what, under what rules of engagement, and within what limits.

The second concerns language. The military leadership has a responsibility to prepare the forces, not to influence public opinion on the underlying political judgement – namely, whether or not Italy is at war. That assessment is the remit of the constitutional bodies. A return to verbal restraint is not a concession: it is the condition for deterrence to remain defensive even in the eyes of those observing it from Moscow.

The third is diplomatic. Any Russian declaration of non-aggression should be taken at face value in the technical sense of the term: put to the test with concrete proposals for risk reduction, starting with the Baltic, where the density of ships, aircraft and units in close proximity makes an incident more likely than elsewhere. Rome has the credibility and the history to champion such an initiative at European level. The fact that it is not doing so, and that the issue emerges only from the words of a general, is the real cause for alarm in this affair.

The enemy to be feared is not a country a thousand kilometres from our borders. It is the habit – which is taking root here – of deciding on the most serious matters without discussing them, and of presenting them as if they were inevitable; a psychopathology that is dramatically eroding the last remnants of common sense.

NATO Edge 26 in Izmir merges civilian tech with war-fighting. AI, cloud, cybersecurity now serve the military-industrial complex.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The summit NATO held in Ankara in July continues to make its impact felt in our country — a summit marked by the lockdown of the city, red carpets rolled out for imperialist leaders, Janissary marches, the narrative of a “great Turkey” constructed around hosting the event, and arrests that continue to keep people behind bars.

As has often been pointed out, the July summit marked the beginning of a “new era” both internationally and for our country.

It looks like we will be discussing this important turning point for a long time to come. Meanwhile, NATO’s “work” in our country is not yet finished. Another critical NATO event is approaching, one that has received little attention in the mainstream media — and when it does, it will once again be framed through the narrative of “Turkey’s importance”: NATO Edge 26…

NATO Edge 26, which will be held in Izmir in November 2026, is being promoted using concepts such as “innovation,” “readiness,” and “the security of the future.” Or, to put it in plain language: the marketing and integration of military technologies, the defense industry, and war-fighting capacity…

The official promotional text of the event, organized by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), lays out its purpose quite clearly:

“NATO Edge 26 will focus on strengthening NATO’s readiness and war-fighting capacity through faster, smarter, and more scalable collaboration with industry.

…NCIA is excited to carry this legacy forward in Türkiye in 2026 and take the event a step further with a renewed format focused on delivering effective solutions and prioritizing industry partnerships.

Industry participation will be at the heart of the 2026 edition, providing more opportunities for direct engagement, focused information sessions, a more comprehensive understanding of NATO’s upcoming procurement requirements and priorities, as well as greater opportunities to showcase industry solutions to NATO decision-makers, end users, and potential partners.”

A military ecosystem operating according to market logic, with partnerships and participation at its core. Defense companies, states and military commands are expanding their cooperation in order to strengthen “war readiness”…

What exactly is NATO Edge?

NATO Edge is the flagship technology event of NATO’s technology and cybersecurity center, the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency).

“Edge” can be translated into Turkish as “edge,” “frontier,” “advantage,” “superiority,” or, depending on the context, “cutting-edge” or “advanced.”

It was first held in 2022 in Mons, Belgium. The event was created by merging two previously separate events: the NATO Information Assurance Symposium (NIAS) and an industry conference known as NITEC.

According to NATO’s official documents, NIAS focused on cybersecurity, while NITEC carried the technology-and-industry dimension. In other words, NATO Edge explicitly targets both the technology and industry/commercial spheres.

At the first event, held in Mons, Belgium, on October 25–27, 2022, more than 2,100 registered participants and over 100 companies took part in the exhibition area. The program included topics such as the use of artificial intelligence in military applications, cybersecurity, and digital transformation.

At the second event, held in Tampa, Florida, in the United States, on December 3–5, 2024, cloud technologies, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and the strategic use of resources were discussed. According to NCIA’s 2024 annual report, approximately 60 percent of participants came from industry, while 31 percent represented NATO, governments, and armed forces.

This picture is a clear indication that artificial intelligence technology — whose development in the United States has accelerated since the early 2000s and exploded in recent years — is being systematically taken up by the military-industrial complex.

Moreover, this system has been developed directly under NATO’s military leadership, in cooperation with civilian industry, using resources so vast that civilian initiatives seeking to use technology — particularly artificial intelligence — “for the benefit of humanity” cannot compete with them.

In the United States, for example, many companies unable to find investment have begun receiving funding from military institutions such as the CIA and NATO and developing technologies under their direction. The fact that the CIA has been the “first investor” in numerous technology startups is a striking example of this system.

In short, the path of technological development has largely been left at the mercy of military leadership and the American technology giants.

A similar picture will emerge at NATO Edge 26. Many small startups participating in the event will seek agreements with major players and attempt to secure financing from them. Naturally, this will come at the price of working for NATO’s military interests.

For the “domestic, national, and highly nationalist” technology companies whose numbers have grown tremendously in our country in recent years, the “justification” is equally clear: Turkey is now a country on the verge of a major breakthrough, hosting major international events, supposedly becoming not their subordinate but their master, and possessing qualities that make it indispensable to everyone… So why not devote all our strength and labor to the strategy drawn up by NATO? We will make money, and we will take yet another step forward in a world order in which we are already supposedly such an important player…

This is more or less the logic behind the seemingly contradictory and irrational rhetoric of the Turkish defense industry about “challenging the world” and its actions that ultimately amount to working for imperialist powers.

Put simply, NATO Edge is precisely the embodiment of this logic through events, sessions, and corporate exhibition stands.

Why is it being held in Izmir?

NCIA has not given a specific reason for choosing Izmir as the venue for NATO Edge 26. However, it is possible to understand why Izmir was chosen by looking at the institution’s own documents.

First, a NATO Industry Forum was held during the Ankara Summit on July 7–8, where new procurement decisions worth tens of billions of dollars were announced. The decisions taken by NATO in July are intended to translate the political and financial commitments made in Ankara into operational capacity, while in Izmir, NATO and industry are to work together to accelerate that capacity.

Second, the Ankara Summit adopted a new Strategy for Industry-NATO Cooperation (SYNC). This document moves the NATO-industry relationship to an earlier stage. Through this mechanism, companies will not merely submit bids for tenders that have already been announced; they will be brought into the process from the point at which future capacity requirements are identified.

Third, the Turkish Ministry of National Defense presented NATO Edge 26 as an event aimed at “the international promotion and increased visibility of the Turkish defense industry’s ‘high-tech’ capabilities.” NCIA also signed, during the Turkish Industry Day it organized in Türkiye, one of the first contracts of its history concerning the modernization of very-low-frequency air-surveillance equipment for Allied Maritime Command with ASELSAN.

In other words, Izmir should be viewed not merely as an “event venue,” but as a point of contact for tying Turkey more tightly into imperialism’s defense-technology supply chain.

This is also where NATO Edge 26 differs most significantly from previous meetings. NCIA is openly telling companies: “You can learn about NATO’s requirements before they become official tender specifications,” while offering more than €1 billion in upcoming “NATO procurement opportunities.”

NATO Edge 26 is creating an early-stage matching mechanism between NATO’s military requirements and the private sector’s product-development and investment decisions.

Who is taking part?

The official NATO Edge participant list is still being updated, and in its publicly visible format, not all of the more than 270 companies known to be participating appear simultaneously. Nevertheless, a number of notable companies can be confirmed either through the official list or through the companies’ own NATO Edge announcements. Names appearing on the official list include Airbus, AWS, Anduril, ASELSAN, ASFAT, BAE Systems Digital Intelligence, BlackBerry, Booz Allen Hamilton, Cisco, Cloudflare, Broadcom, Armis Federal/ServiceNow, Atos, and Barikat Cyber Security.

Among the industry speakers on the program are Helsing co-founder and CEO Gundbert Scherf, Planet Labs CEO Will Marshall, UiPath founder Daniel Dines, AWS Global Defense executive Christian Hoff, Leonardo technology executive Alessandro Massa, Thales cortAIx Factory executive Mickael Brossard, and BlackBerry Chief Security Advisor Christine Gadsby.

The danger of ‘dual-use’

One of the concepts that stands out particularly in NATO’s 2026 event materials is “dual-use” technology.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Jean-Charles Ellermann-Kingombe said that NATO Edge 26 would be particularly attractive to “companies that have a credible military application alongside their primary commercial business.” In other words, NATO is no longer targeting only traditional defense companies; it is also targeting technologies that can be transferred from the commercial market into the military sphere.

What this means is that a technology company no longer needs to be a “weapons company” from the outset. A company can operate in data analytics, satellite imagery, cloud systems, communications, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, automation, or computing, while simultaneously entering the NATO system and working for NATO.

This significantly broadens the scope of what has long been described as the “militarization of technology.”

The NATO Edge 26 participant profile makes this clear. On one side are defense giants such as Airbus, Anduril, ASELSAN, Leonardo, and Thales; on the other are civilian technology companies such as AWS, Cisco, Cloudflare, Broadcom, BlackBerry, UiPath, and Planet Labs.

In other words, military technology no longer means merely “producing military products for armies”; it increasingly means placing the products you create at the service of military interests.

How are the market and militarization being merged?

In this new system, in which the private sector is also being drawn into the defense industry, the formula is clear:

Public funding, NATO demand, corporate investment, technology development, military integration, public procurement, larger-scale production, new investment…

At this point, we need to make a brief detour. Combining private enterprise with military requirements, when military needs are given priority, means the emergence of new economic crises in capitalist societies. Because this entire chain of needs will ultimately be paid for at the expense of workers and their social needs, which are placed at the bottom of the priority list.

The competitive strength of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has made its own breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, technology, and military technology, stems not only from those advances but also from the leadership of the Communist Party, which directs the public and private sectors from a single center. What provides China’s “speed,” as well as the threat it represents to the Atlantic alliance, is the Party’s control over and direction of the private sector.

This “threat” posed by China is pushing capitalism to take faster and harsher steps in new areas of civilian-military cooperation similar to Edge.

The ‘domestic and national industry’ is being tied to the NATO market

The enthusiasm of the “domestic and national industry” mentioned above is also being directly tied, under this new system, to the NATO market and its military requirements.

It is repeatedly argued that Turkey is expanding its own defense industry. But what kind of expansion is this?

The defense industry is being internationalized through NATO standards, NATO procurement mechanisms, NATO operational requirements, and access to the NATO market.

For this reason, “domestic production” and “NATO integration” do not necessarily have to be opposites. On the contrary, under today’s model, the two can take place simultaneously. The “domestic” character being referred to is, for a country whose entire military strategy has already been built for years in accordance with NATO interests, a very particular kind of domesticity.

Interestingly, a June 2026 announcement by the Aegean Region Chamber of Industry reveals that the quota initially allocated for 100 booths for Turkish defense-industry organizations at the event was reduced to 40 after fewer applications than expected were received from domestic companies.

This data is important in two respects.

First, the assumption that the Turkish defense industry is automatically and intensively turning toward the NATO market does not apply equally to every company. It is possible to guess which types of companies can afford to apply.

Second, it shows that presenting NATO Edge 26 simply as a “giant exhibition opening all of Turkey’s defense companies to the world” does not reflect reality.

What does the Ukraine connection show?

NATO Edge 26 also contains important signals regarding the war in Ukraine. Although our country has repeatedly sought to position itself as a mediator at every major turning point in the Russia-Ukraine war, it is quite clear that no one — NATO above all — has taken this intention seriously.

Among the Edge participants are Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense Innovation and Defense Technology Development Center and Brave1. Established in 2023, Brave1 is an official platform through which the Ukrainian government brings together defense-technology developers, the military, investors, and technology companies. Their participation also means that NATO will directly transfer the technological experience of the war in Ukraine into its own innovation ecosystem.

This, too, is no coincidence. Under the UNITE–Brave NATO program, NATO and Ukraine have already established a joint contract pool worth a total of €10 million, with plans to expand the program to as much as €50 million in subsequent stages.

Whose interests is technology serving?

Treating NATO Edge 26 in Izmir simply as an event where next-generation weapons, artificial intelligence applications, or digital defense systems are put on display would be a serious oversimplification. The “bigger picture” shows civilian and military capacities being merged into the same pool, with companies, states, military institutions, and technology developers jointly participating in the construction of a new war-fighting capacity under the name of “partnership.”

Thus, the scope of war ceases to be limited to weapons systems used on the battlefield; data, artificial intelligence, cloud systems, communications, satellite technologies, software, and logistics are all becoming components of war preparation and military planning.

From the perspective of our country, it is possible to say that Ankara’s “domestic and national” rhetoric points toward NATO’s requirements, standards, procurement mechanisms, and international defense-industry networks. The limits of the narrative that Turkey is an independent power capable of challenging the world through its own defense industry are ultimately being determined by the decisions taken at NATO events.

At the same time, events of this kind once again expose another reality that Marxists have repeatedly pointed out — and repeatedly demonstrated in practice: how conditional capitalism’s rhetoric of the “free market” really is.

When the issue is war and military requirements, the traditional claim that the market should be left to its own devices can suddenly be pushed into the background. Production capacity can be directed according to strategic priorities, and private capital can be encouraged to work for “security” needs.

In short, the “real question” posed by NATO Edge 26 is not which new technology is being developed, but according to whose needs, according to which political and economic priorities, and ultimately in whose service this technological capacity is being developed.

People involved in organized struggle used to be told: “Forget all this, get yourself a job first.” Now the phrase has changed: “Forget politics, we are living in the age of artificial intelligence — learn technology.”

And yet, although technological development and changing times transform the tools and needs at our disposal, they do not change the fact that the ruling classes use every instrument of “progress” to preserve their power.

From this perspective, the political purpose underlying the monopolization of artificial intelligence by military and economic giants is the same as the purpose underlying the control of machinery by the owners of capital in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution.

In our country, where changing times, tools, and needs are pregnant with major crises, these “devilish deals” to be made in Izmir will open the door to yet another new era.

Ultimately, NATO Edge 26 is a contemporary example not only of technological development itself, but of the organization of technology for “pre-war” purposes and the socialization of its costs — that is, the shifting of those costs onto the backs of working people.

Our political predecessors, who once observed what the giant machines in factories were actually being used for alongside production, also passed down to us what needed to be done in response.

What needs to be built today is the stick that will be thrust into the digital gears of our age.

By Jonathan COOK

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

When the establishment media deals with issues in which the West’s war industries are most heavily invested, it happily jettisons even the semblance of critical distance from the state

It’s easy to forget that the western media – the so-called “free press” – likes to distinguish itself from media in authoritarian regimes on the basis that, unlike them, it asks critical questions of the powerful, reports facts objectively, and formulates its analyses dispassionately.

They do propaganda, we do news – or so the western media argues.

The feverish coverage since five men were arrested in the early hours of Sunday morning close to RAF Fairford in the UK is blowing a very big hole in that claim.

Here are the known facts so far.

Three white vans, bearing the logo of a genuine fuel transit company, were spotted by a local farmer on the road outside her property as she returned from a party. Police arrived promptly and arrested the men, who were all British nationals in their twenties.

On Tuesday, it emerged that one of the arrested men actually called the police earlier – seemingly the reason officers were on the scene so quickly.

Although the men were initially arrested on explosives charges, no “viable” explosives were found. Although they were arrested on terrorism charges, which allow for 14 days of detention, they were released on bail under normal criminal laws in less than two days.

It has also emerged that the men had several empty “barrels” in their vans, plus one that contained what police described disturbingly as an “accelerant”.

Actually, that was simply a reference to petrol. The stuff that goes into vehicles to make them accelerate.

British prime minister Andy Burnham held a rare national emergency Cobra meeting over the incident.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration got involved because RAF Fairford, despite its name, is in reality a US air base from which American planes are waging an illegal war of aggression against Iran, with the UK’s blessing.

US Secretary of state Marco Rubio has said the incident “clearly involves the hands of a foreign actor”. When asked whether Iran was that actor, Trump replied: “It might be.” He added: “I know the answer… I can be very specific, but I’d rather not say.”

According to a report in the New York Times, “American and British intelligence services worked with Israel and Western countries to discover the threats against US bases, including ones in Germany.” [my emphasis]

Despite these sparse facts, the British media have uniformly rushed to a single conclusion: that this was almost certainly part of an Iranian terror plot to target the US airbase and its planes. The only room for debate allowed is whether the five men were witting or unwitting actors in that plot.

As the Guardian reported in its Wednesday edition, referring to this as a “complex investigation”: “An Iranian link to the bizarre events in the Gloucestershire countryside over the weekend is seen as increasingly likely.”

As context, let us note the following: that British and US officials have every interest in trying to hype this incident as an Iranian “terror plot”, whatever the actual evidence suggests.

Why? Because the US is waging an illegal war on Iran, and the UK is allowing it to do so from British soil. Under the rules of war, Iran has every right to attack RAF Fairford.

If the British state and billionaire-owned media were actually serving as a truly “free press”, they would be offering the context that RAF Fairford is a legitimate military target and that any attack on it by Iran would not constitute terrorism.

Of course, none have done so.

Instead, they have loyally regurgitated the British and US security services spin of a “terror plot” – based on no tangible evidence at all – that paints Britain and the US as the victims of a sinister and unwarranted act of Iranian aggression.

But context aside, an objective, sceptical media – a “free press” – would be reserving judgment on what had happened. It would be asking difficult questions. It would be offering plausible counter-narratives.

Again, none of this is happening. In the British media, there has been a lemming-like rush towards accepting uncritically the very conclusions that best serve British and US state interests.

The constant highlighting of a terrorism connection to the arrested men – for which there is no apparent evidence – is precisely the kind of coverage you would expect from state media in an authoritarian regime. This is about whipping up a public mood of fear, not about transparent fact-finding.

Notably, unlike the British media, the New York Times report does allow for another possibility, even if it instantly ignores it and then joins the British media in treating what evidence there is as proof of an Iranian terror plot.

The Times opens with a question: “The potential ambiguities – were the men Iranian operatives, petty gas thieves, or both? – added to the confusion surrounding the arrests that the authorities have yet to fully explain.”

“Petty gas thieves”! Men in vans with empty barrels close to a farm in the middle of the night. Is it possible they could simply be criminals?!

In fact, this conjecture has been all over social media since the first reports of the men being arrested surfaced. As new details have emerged, those suspicions have only grown.

And yet Britain’s “free press” has uniformly ignored this counter-theory in favour of the US and British security services’ narrative.

Doubtless, British journalists covering this incident would call the idea that this was simply a criminal group caught in the act unhelpful “speculation”.

But how is their no-more-plausible, and possibly less plausible, theory that this was an Iranian terror plot not equally speculation – if in their case, speculation that happens to be extremely helpful to the British and US security establishments?

There are other theories we could posit too, given the known facts. Israel, which originally pushed for the illegal and disastrous war on Iran, has been looking for a way to persuade the Trump administration to return to a full-scale bombing campaign.

Powerus, a US defense company with ties to President Donald Trump’s sons, drew scrutiny after signing a memorandum of understanding this month with the Pakistani Army and offering Islamabad access to Ukrainian drone technology, sparking debate over the deal’s potential impact on India and wider regional security. Powerus was founded in October 2025 by veterans […]

The post Trump family-tied drone maker woos Pakistan at India’s expense appeared first on Asia Times.

Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-New York) issued a stark warning this week about a congressional measure that would merge the U.S. and Israel’s military technology industrial complexes, saying that it represents an “existential threat” to U.S. democracy.

The provision — called the “U.S.-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative,” or Section 219 — is included in the 2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which passed the House in a 216 to 212 vote on Wednesday. Six Democrats broke from the party to vote “yes,” and seven Republicans voted “no.” The bill is still stalled in the Senate, however, after Democrats voted against its advancement last week.

The NDAA “includes a provision to merge parts of our military with the [Israeli military],” Ocasio-Cortez said in a post on social media on Tuesday. “This [provision] is an existential threat to American sovereignty and democracy. Every member of Congress must vote NO.”

The provision, if included in the final bill, would entrench Israel’s enmeshment with the U.S. military, mandating cooperation with regard to technology and intelligence with Israeli forces even when the U.S. gets little in return. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has advocated for the measure as public scrutiny over the U.S.’s monetary military aid to Israel has increased amid Israel’s genocide in Gaza.

Some lawmakers in Congress have waged a bipartisan effort for Section 219 to be stripped from the NDAA. Representatives Ro Khanna (D-California) and Thomas Massie (R-Kentucky) have introduced an amendment to the bill to remove Section 219.

However, these efforts have been quashed by pro-Israel lawmakers, who make up the vast majority of Congress. When it published its list of proposed amendments to the bill this week, the House Rules Committee didn’t even include the Khanna/Massie proposal — barring it from being considered by the full chamber.

In a video posted to social media on Tuesday, Khanna pledged to continue to advocate for the proposal. He said that the lawmakers will now seek to fight against Section 219’s inclusion in the bill during the conference between the House and Senate, during which the two chambers reconcile differences in their versions of the legislation.

“It’s shocking that this even has to be explained. It’s about American sovereignty,” Khanna said. “We do not even have the chance to vote in the House to stop Israel and the United States from co-producing weapons.”

Last week, the House voted overwhelmingly to kill another Massie amendment to strip a State Department funding bill of $3.3 billion in military assistance to Israel. However, the measure did garner 103 votes from Democrats, marking a shift within the caucus.

Ahead of the House vote on Wednesday, progressive lawmakers vowed to vote against the NDAA due to its inclusion of Section 219.

Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-Minnesota) said the provision is an “outrageous threat to our country’s security and autonomy.”

“Americans want no part in Netanyahu’s genocidal regime. Congress cannot continue to bankroll Israel’s campaign of terror,” she went on.

“Despite Americans demanding an end to genocide, this bill deeply merges the U.S. and Israeli militaries, fuels Trump’s immoral war on Iran, and enriches billionaire arms dealers,” wrote Rep. Rashida Tlaib (D-Michigan). “Hell no.”