Multiple reports now say that U.S. Air Force B-1 Lancers left the United Kingdom over the weekend due to the threat of an Iranian-directed near-field drone attack broadly akin to Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb that decimated Russian bombers. Though many specific details are still unconfirmed, this is an entirely plausible mode of attack that TWZ has been warning about for many years now.
Short- and long-range drone threats against parked aircraft have now morphed fully from theory to reality, as also demonstrated by losses in the course of the conflict with Iran, and even non-state actors are increasingly brandishing these capabilities. Despite the increasing dangers posed to planes out on open flightlines, the Pentagon continues to drag its feet on building hardened aircraft shelters and other fortified air base infrastructure.
Before the hasty and unexpected departure of the bombers on Sunday, B-1s had been deployed to RAF Fairford continuously since March, initially in support of Operation Epic Fury against Iran. A contingent of B-52s had also conducted strikes on Iran from Fairford, but left back in July. The base is a major operational hub for the U.S. military in the United Kingdom, and regularly hosts strategic aircraft, including bombers and U-2 spy planes.
Dan Rivers, U.S. correspondent for ITV News in the United Kingdom, was among the first to report on Monday that the B-1’s quick departure had been prompted by concerns about a potential Spiderweb-like drone attack ordered by Iran, citing an unnamed source. Other outlets have subsequently reported similar details, all sourced to anonymous U.S. and British officials.
Ukraine’s unprecedented Operation Spiderweb last year involved simultaneous covert near-field attacks using explosive-laden quadcopter-type drones on airbases across Russia. At least 10 Russian bombers, as well as a variety of other aircraft, all parked on open flightlines, were destroyed.
“They didn’t fly out by accident,” U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters during a gaggle at the White House on Monday when asked about why the B-1s had left Fairford. “There were some threats.”
“I can’t tell you that, but if they did, they’ll suffer greatly,” Trump added in response to a separate question about whether Iran might have managed to get weaponized drones into the United Kingdom.
“What you saw there was the Secretary of War [Pete Hegseth], out of an abundance of caution, trying to protect our guys,” U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance said during a separate press engagement on Monday. “We do feel, with some confidence, that the Iranians are – they’re trying to do what the Iranian state has done for 49 years, which is engage in acts of terrorism against the United States, and a lot of other people, as well. So, we are being extremely cautious.”
It’s also worth noting here that British authorities had arrested five men on suspicion of driving bomb-laden vans toward the base back on September 27. Those individuals were released on bail after no explosives were found in the vehicles. U.S. and British officials have also raised the possibility of an Iranian link to that incident.
“We’ve documented what happened [near Fairford] last week. I wouldn’t just directly tie that to the move that was made,” U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio also told members of the press on Monday. “The only reason why you guys are focused on how many planes are at Fairford is because of the threat that happened last week.”
“We have confidence in the security of all of our bases, because all of our bases are [sic] theoretically could be threatened at any moment,” he added.
Rubio’s comments notwithstanding, the remarks from Trump and Vance make clear that there was some recent threat intelligence that contributed to the decision to pull the bombers from Fairford. There are still many questions about the exact nature of the potential attacks, and how imminent, or not, the danger may have been.
Regardless, as mentioned, the prospect of a near-field drone attack on a base like Fairford carried out by actors in close proximity is extremely plausible, and the barrier to entry to such an operation is relatively low. Spiderweb may have thrust this reality into the public consciousness in dramatic fashion, but the danger well predates that operation, and even the start of Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
TWZ has been highlighting exactly these kinds of threats in the course of a decade or so now of regular reporting on drone incursions over U.S. and foreign military facilities and critical infrastructure, as well as American naval vessels operating offshore. Langley Air Force Base in Virginia and Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, some of America’s most strategic airbases domestically, are among the facilities that have had to grapple with this in the past. After the Langley incident, in particular, it had become clear to the larger public what we had been reporting for many years, that the United States does not control the airspace over even its most critical military installations.
This all extends overseas, as well. In November 2024, there was a rash of drone sightings over and around several airbases in the United Kingdom, including RAF Fairford. This has been an issue more broadly in Europe in recent years, as well. This was only further underscored by an attempted drone attack on a Ukrainian An-124 at an airport in Germany in August, which authorities in that country have blamed on Russia.
New footage of yet another act of Russian terrorism on EU soil, showing the drone loaded with explosives on the tarmac at Leipzig/Halle Airport, just meters from a Ukrainian Antonov An-124 cargo aircraft.
— SPRAVDI — Stratcom Centre (@StratcomCentre) August 5, 2026
According to German authorities, the drone was carrying an improvised… https://t.co/eCZaLfz9yx pic.twitter.com/DbRz87wgIv
A drone attack on Fairford would also not necessarily have had to come from somewhere very close by. Longer-range one-way attack drones are steadily proliferating, and can be launched using a variety of methods from positions on the ground, as well as vessels at sea. TWZ explored the very real threat of sea-based drone attacks, including ones conducted covertly, and Iran’s specific ability to carry them out globally, following the leak of an FBI alert back in March.
The proliferation of lower-end one-way-attack drones has ‘democratized’ precision-guided attacks, even for non-state actors. The fielding of automated targeting capabilities, driven by developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning, is also becoming more and more widespread. That technology will soon enable these weapons to find and strike even moving targets on their own. Even without anyone at the controls and without the drone putting out any detectable radio emissions, very effective precision attacks can still be launched at static targets, like known parking areas for aircraft at airbases, just by using basic map coordinates or Google Earth. It’s also worth pointing out here that the definition of a stand-off attack is becoming increasingly blurry, with even quadcopter-type drones capable of flying miles away to conduct a kamikaze attack on a target based on a set of GPS coordinates.
Ukrainian Saker UAV with AI capabilities. The video shows the process of target recognition. It has reportedly already been put to use several times against Russian targets. pic.twitter.com/NVNJyxUjGP
— NOELREPORTS
Overall, it is an indisputable fact that aircraft sitting exposed on a flightline are particularly vulnerable to drone attacks, as well as other threats. This is something U.S. military officials have acknowledged themselves. Fairford, where B-1s and other bombers have no option but to park out in the open in well-established areas that are plainly visible from outside the base’s immediate perimeter, is indicative of how American military aircraft are generally positioned on the ground abroad and at home.
As we wrote all the way back in 2017:
“Similar swarming strikes could be unleashed behind the front lines as well, with hugely expensive and low density/high demand combat aircraft being especially vulnerable to this sort of tactic—something General James Holmes alluded to inadvertently while speaking to the Air Force Association, stating:
‘Imagine a world where somebody flies a couple hundred of those and flies one down the intake of my F-22s with just a small weapon on it.’
Actually, it would be even easier to just strike the jets as they sit idle and vulnerable on the flight line. One swarm could see a whole squadron of tightly packed fighters destroyed without even having a chance to fight back.”
With all this in mind, a heated debate has emerged in the past few years in and around the U.S. military about the value of investing in new hardened aircraft shelters, as well as other fortified infrastructure.
To date, the U.S. Air Force, in particular, has put virtually all emphasis on surface-to-air missiles and other active defenses, as well as the dispersal of aircraft, over physical hardening. The conflict with Iran, in which a number of American military aircraft have been damaged or destroyed on the ground by drone and missile attacks, has underscored the limits of these strategies.
Second angle. pic.twitter.com/NUupdRkdm9
— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) March 29, 2026
“I’m not a big fan of hardening infrastructure,” Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach said at a roundtable at the Air and Space Forces Association’s main annual symposium in 2023, offering a prime example of this viewpoint. “The reason is because of the advent of precision-guided weapons … you saw what we did to the Iraqi Air Force and their hardened aircraft shelters. They’re not so hard when you put a 2,000-pound bomb right through the roof.”
Wilsbach was commander of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) at the time. He subsequently became head of ACC and is now Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the service’s top officer.
“I think that I don’t want to spend a lot of money on hardening shelters. Unless you’re going to send something 100 feet or more underground, we can blow it up, and so can they,” Wilsbach said in an interview with Breaking Defense in July of this year when asked explicitly if his position changed. “So, the economics of building a shelter that is impervious to a strike doesn’t work.”
“I think the economics favor defending your airspace, defending your ground space with systems that can defeat the incoming rounds, versus building a shelter,” he added. “Some people would argue, well, you should do both. Well, that’s even more expensive. And the other thing is, the shelter doesn’t go anywhere.”
It is fair to point out that typical above-ground hardened aircraft shelters are not invulnerable, especially to attacks involving ballistic, cruise, and certain air-launched threats. There are also substantial cost and other factors to consider when it comes to any major military construction effort.
That being said, having more hardened infrastructure also imposes costs and complexities on opponents, who have to dedicate more advanced and costly munitions and other resources to ensure targets are neutralized. Shelters have the knock-on benefit of complicating the targeting process for an enemy by obscuring where aircraft are or are not positioned, to begin with. An opponent has to treat shelters like they are full even if they are empty.
When thinking about hardened aircraft shelters, stereotypical Cold War-era reinforced concrete structures typically come to mind. However, they do not all have to be built to a one-size-fits-all standard with the same degree of hardening across the board to be useful. Shorter-range drone attacks are typically carried out by platforms carrying small explosive charges or that are designed to drop small bomblets. Even longer-range one-way-attack drones generally have smaller warheads than traditional missiles, they also hit with less kinetic energy.
A structure that shields against smaller blasts and shrapnel, also including from cluster munitions that can be readily scattered across wide areas, is one that then has to be addressed by more capable weapons. This could even include mobile or otherwise temporary shelters that offer sufficient concealment and protection.
Eliminating, or at least substantially mitigating, the lowest rung of threats creates a dilemma for opponents, who then have to decide whether it is even worthwhile to attempt certain types of attacks. There is clear value in narrowing the available options for the enemy and pushing them toward having to expend higher-end, more expensive munitions, that are available in smaller quantities, and that traditional active defenses may be better optimized to handle. As an example, it may be more viable to shoot down a small barrage of incoming cruise missiles than a swarm of dozens of drones.
Active defenses, especially surface-to-air missile batteries and interceptors to go with them, have historically been very expensive. Lower-end counter-drone-focused interceptors and directed energy weapons are helping to bring these costs down in some regards. Even so, those capabilities come at a significant cost.
There are magazine and stockpile depth issues at play here, too. This is something that has also been brought front and center by the conflict with Iran, which has fueled already long-standing concerns about the sufficiency of stockpiles of air defense interceptors, other critical munitions, and the capacity to replenish them quickly. This is something the British government, among others, is also grappling with, as you can read more about in our separate reporting here.
Furthermore, losses of aircraft on the ground are not without their own costs, which are even more lopsided if an opponent can simply use lower-cost weaponized drones. U.S. bombers are particularly expensive and prized assets that are in short supply compared to the level of demand, as seen during the height of combat operations earlier this year against Iran. When it comes to B-1s, specifically, there are only 45 of them left in service today. A dozen of them being knocked out in one go would have major repercussions strategically. Losing even one would also be a propaganda coup for whoever might be responsible.
How many shelters can we build for the upgrade cost of one Zumwalt class DDG that will probably be parted out in 10 years anyway?
— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) October 5, 2026
On top of all this, the U.S. military simply will not always have the luxury of being able to rapidly relocate aircraft in response to threats. Moving a dozen bombers on short notice takes massive resources. It is not just aircraft that have to be repositioned, but supporting personnel and assets, as well as weapons and fuel. Having to shift to alternate locations could easily have negative impacts on tempo and other aspects of operations, especially in the midst of actual conflict. RAF Fairford is one of only a few bases globally that can support bomber operations for a prolonged period.
More recently, there have been signs of changing mindsets on the matter of hardening across the U.S. military. In January, Joint Inter-Agency Task Force 401 (JIATF-401), a focal point for counter-drone efforts the Pentagon established last year, issued explicit guidance regarding the use of netting, cables, and other kinds of passive physical defenses around bases and other critical infrastructure. A contracting notice in March also called attention to plans for new hardened underground facilities at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.
“There is value in some light protection against small, unmanned threats,” Gen. Wilsbach also told Breaking Defense in July. “Some of them — just nets that are up that keep a small, few-$100 drone from getting next to a $2 billion aircraft. That actually works, [and is] really cheap.”
“It’s not either or,” Wilsbach said in a separate interview with Air & Space Forces Magazine in July. “The net keeps the small UAS [uncrewed aerial system] from getting close to an aircraft that you’re trying to protect… That’s a very inexpensive way to give you some modicum of protection without killing your checkbook on really exquisite defensive systems.”
In spite of these institutional developments, action to implement such recommendations on a broad basis has continued to lag. There still does not appear to be any major department-wide push to build new hardened aircraft shelters or other fortified structures at facilities globally. The U.S. Air Force does have a certain number of hardened aircraft shelters at bases now, especially in the Pacific and Europe.
This is all despite a very visible trend in the construction of new aircraft shelters and other hardened infrastructure elsewhere around the globe, including in China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Even before Operation Spiderweb, Russia had already initiated a large-scale effort to build new hardened shelters at various bases, especially on the occupied Crimean Peninsula, in the face of expanding Ukrainian drone and missile attacks. This effort has now extended to building the huge hardened shelters for the country’s bomber force, something the country has never done before.
“It is inappropriate to discuss matters of intelligence, and we will not discuss specific force protection measures,” a U.S. Air Force spokesperson told TWZ yesterday when asked about the reports that Iranian drone threats prompted the recent removal of the B-1s from Fairford. “The Department will continue to assess the threat environment surrounding our installations and take appropriate actions to protect our people, our platforms and the bases where our forces operate from.”
We still do not know exactly how serious or imminent any recent threat to the B-1s at Fairford was that contributed to their hasty departure. Regardless, the reports of concerns about potential drone attacks remain very plausible. The reality here is that a dozen bombers were yanked from a forward operating location in Europe without an adversary ever having to fire a shot. This is a problem set that is only growing, especially as lessons and expertise on low-end weaponized drones from the war in Ukraine are spreading around the globe.
Erecting new aircraft shelters and other hardened infrastructure would not be a full solution to those threats by themselves. At the same time, they would be a valuable added layer of defense, and a passive one that would have a huge logistical footprint to operate once the initial investment is made. The lack of movement to better fortify American airbases globally is only becoming more and more glaring, and it remains to be seen if real action will not occur until lessons are learned in a most unfortunate way.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
The post Glaring Lack Of Investment In Aircraft Shelters Highlighted By B-1B’s Sudden Retreat From U.K. Airbase appeared first on TWZ.
Hilde Vautmans, the Belgian Renew Europe MEP and European Parliament rapporteur on EU-China political relations, is right to challenge this timidity.
Her report, debated this week in Strasbourg, does not advocate severing relations with Beijing. Nor should it. China is too economically important and too influential on questions ranging from climate change to international security for Europe simply to close the door.
But dialogue must not become an alternative to action.
“Europe has economic power. It’s time to use it,” Vautmans told Parliament ahead of the vote. That sentence ought to be pinned above every desk in the European Commission dealing with China.
The figures make the case brutally clear. In 2025 the EU imported €559.4 billion of goods from China while exporting just €199.6 billion in the opposite direction. The resulting deficit was €359.8 billion — almost €1 billion every day.
As EU Today reported recently, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has herself warned of a potential “second China shock”, with subsidised Chinese industrial production threatening European manufacturers.
Fine words. But Beijing has heard fine words before.
The Commission’s preferred formulation remains “de-risking, not decoupling”. There is sense in that distinction. Nobody seriously proposes shutting down trade with the world’s second-largest economy. But de-risking becomes meaningless if every risk identified is followed by another dialogue, another working group and another opportunity to postpone difficult decisions.
Indeed, the Commission acknowledges that European companies operating in China face regulatory obstacles, inadequate intellectual-property protection, restrictions on data flows and pressures associated with technology transfer.
Europe possesses formidable weapons with which to respond: anti-dumping duties, anti-subsidy measures, foreign-investment screening, the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, the Anti-Coercion Instrument, procurement restrictions and controls on strategically sensitive technologies.
These instruments should not be deployed indiscriminately. But neither should they sit polished in the armoury while Beijing exploits European openness.
Vautmans is particularly right to connect economics with security and values. China cannot reasonably expect privileged access to European markets while helping sustain the Russian war machine. The European Parliament’s own research service describes Beijing as a “decisive enabler and dual-use provider”, including through goods entering Russian weapons and drone supply chains.
If Chinese companies materially assist Russia’s ability to wage war against Ukraine, Europe should be prepared to impose a direct economic price. The same principle should apply to human rights.
EU Today has warned repeatedly that Brussels’ ritualised engagement with Beijing risks becoming precisely that: ritual.
We reported earlier that the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue risks losing credibility, pointing to the continuing imprisonment of Swedish citizen Gui Minhai and Uyghur academic and Sakharov Prize laureate Ilham Tohti. After round upon round of discussions, Beijing has learnt that European expressions of “deep concern” are inexpensive things to endure.
The problem is hardly new. Years ago, EU Today highlighted calls for concrete EU action over goods associated with forced labour in China, including demands for tougher restrictions on entities implicated in abuses against Uyghurs.
Yet repression continues. In March this year China adopted its new Law on the Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress. The European Parliament subsequently condemned what it described as intensified repression and assimilation affecting Tibetans, Uyghurs and other minorities, by the overwhelming margin of 439 votes to 52.
Europe therefore faces a straightforward question. What is the purpose of economic power if it is never translated into political influence?
The EU should not attempt to bully China. Nor should it abandon diplomacy. Vautmans is correct that channels of communication must remain open. But reciprocity must become something more than a word appearing in communiqués.
Where China closes markets to European companies, Europe should be prepared to restrict equivalent access. Where state subsidies distort competition, Brussels should respond rapidly with trade-defence measures. Where strategic dependencies expose Europe to political coercion, alternative supply chains must be built. Where Chinese entities support Russia’s military-industrial complex, sanctions should follow. And where companies benefit from forced labour or serious human-rights abuses, access to the European marketplace should carry consequences.
That is not protectionism. It is leverage.
Totalitarian states understand leverage perfectly well. China routinely uses access to its enormous market as an instrument of statecraft. Europe, by contrast, too often behaves as though exploiting its own commercial strength would somehow represent a failure of diplomacy. It represents precisely the opposite.
The European Commission has spent years discovering that China is simultaneously a partner, competitor and “systemic rival”. It is time to move beyond discovering the obvious.
Vautmans has identified the essential point. Europe already possesses economic power on a scale few countries can ignore. What it appears to lack is the political confidence to use it.
Europe’s energy crisis isn’t over.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
Europe’s energy crisis isn’t over. Gas prices remain stubbornly high across the continent as Europeans confront a long winter.
In response to an energy crisis stemming from Europe’s continued reliance on imported liquefied natural gas against the backdrop of ongoing global geopolitical volatility, Europe’s leaders are pushing to diversify the bloc’s energy mix. While this means that Europe is rapidly expanding its renewable energy capacity, it also marks a significant return to the world’s dirtiest fossil fuel – coal.
Earlier this year, when the United States and Israel began an offensive in Iran and thereby instigated the disruption of one-fifth of the world’s oil and gas trades, Europe awakened to realize that it had sleepwalked into yet another energy crisis – its third in just four years. “We swore we’d learn. We promised things would change, but here we are,” a ‘highly frustrated European diplomat’ was recently (anonymously) quoted by the BBC.
“Instead of concentrating on much-needed long-term plans – about how to make Europe more competitive in this increasingly volatile world, [European] prime ministers and presidents are now in a panic over [energy] prices, worried about angry voters and scrambling for short-term solutions,” the source continued. “Just like the crisis after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Different conflict. Same European divisions; same dilemmas over energy. We can’t keep going round in these circles. Something’s got to give.”
Now, half a year after the outbreak of the war in Iran and the initial closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Europe is still grappling with the fallout as gas prices remain brutally high. Just this month, gas prices hit their highest mark in three years, soaring above €80 ($90.98) per megawatt hour.
Prices are so high, in fact, that coal-fired power has become cheaper than gas-fired power in Europe for the first time in years. This has pushed many European nations, and especially the European Union’s largest economy, Germany, back to coal. And, worryingly, experts contend that that trend will continue for years to come.
“Coal is expected to remain cheaper than gas for power generation through next year and potentially until March 2028,” Reuters reported earlier this week, based on a conversation with Marta Wroniszewska, an analyst at Veyt. “Longer-dated gas prices indicate traders expect supply constraints to persist.”
However, there are notable limits to coal’s growth potential in Europe. Years of policy aimed at phasing down and phasing out coal have left the continent with dramatically fewer coal-fired power plants than it had previously. In 1990, the European Union derived more than a third of its electricity production from coal. By 2025, that share had fallen to just 9.2 percent, according to data from Eurostat. So while Europe’s remaining coal plants will receive a windfall from the current gas prices, there is a ceiling to coal’s potential rebound in the region.
Outside of Europe, however, it’s a different story. Globally, coal is still the single-biggest source of power production. And while Europe is shutting down its coal-fired capacity, many emerging economies are continuing to build theirs up, with particularly strong growth from the Philippines, Indonesia, and other rapidly developing countries across Asia. Not coincidentally, this was also the region hit hardest by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
While coal is cheap, abundant, and seen as a critical tool for enabling economic development in poor countries, the continuously extending timeline of coal’s reign presents trade-offs that far outweigh the benefits. Coal is the single largest driver of global warming, responsible for about 40 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions. However, it’s not all bad news – coal’s comeback is happening in tandem with a major global increase in clean energy resources. Increasingly, renewable energies are being adopted for their role in a more energy-secure future, and are seen as a critical buffer against the next global energy crisis.
Unlike natural gas, oil, and coal, “Wind and solar cannot be embargoed, blockaded, or shut off by a foreign power,” David Frykman, General Partner at Stockholm-based venture capital group Norrsken, wrote in an op-ed for Fortune earlier this year. “Every terawatt-hour of domestic renewable generation is a terawatt-hour that no adversary can weaponize.”
Lula has failed to meet the demands of the people and is now facing the consequences.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
The first round of Brazil’s presidential election ended with candidate Flávio Bolsonaro (PL) ahead of Lula da Silva (PT), 47% to 45%. In the parliamentary elections, the PT and the left suffered overwhelming defeats across the country, indicating growing rejection of the left among ordinary Brazilians. Now, with only a few weeks remaining before the final decision on who will govern the country from next year onward, the question remains open: what factors will voters take into consideration when choosing the president?
The Lula government has taken several measures considered “desperate” attempts to reverse its popularity crisis and regain support in the final stretch of the election. Expanding social programs is one such measure, but its political effectiveness is becoming increasingly questionable. After decades of income redistribution under PT governments, without this producing any real transformation in the situation of working people, public perceptions of these policies have become increasingly negative.
Lula’s central problem is that a significant portion of the electorate appears less interested in new palliative measures and more concerned with problems that remain present in their daily lives. Public security, employment, income, inflation, and the quality of public services have a much more direct impact on the population than the major debates promoted by the government.
Security is perhaps the clearest example. The expansion of criminal organizations, the territorial growth of organized crime, and the perception of impunity have made violence one of the country’s main concerns. For millions of Brazilians, this is no longer an abstract discussion about security policy. It is a daily reality that determines where people can live, work, travel, and even open a business – particularly in major urban centers such as Rio de Janeiro, where organized crime is estimated to control between 60% and 70% of the city’s total territory.
In this context, proposals associated with the progressive cultural agenda may also carry significant electoral costs for the left. Brazilian debates over gender, identity, education, and minority rights have increasingly reproduced political conflicts originating in the United States and Europe. A considerable portion of the population, however, does not identify with this agenda and believes that the state should concentrate its efforts on more urgent material problems.
This helps explain why the runoff will likely be determined much more by domestic issues than by foreign policy – which is the aspect of the Lula government most frequently praised by the international expert community. BRICS, Palestine, or Brazil’s position toward the United States may mobilize politically engaged sectors of society, but they are unlikely to constitute the main concerns of the average voter when deciding how to vote.
Foreign policy has strategic importance for the Brazilian state. Ordinary citizens, however, tend to evaluate it through its concrete effects on their own lives. A foreign policy regarded as successful will not, by itself, compensate for perceptions of insecurity, unemployment, or deterioration in public services. As the Lula government avoids directly confronting the problem of organized crime, support may naturally grow for a right-wing camp that welcomes the United States’ designation of Brazilian criminal factions as terrorist organizations.
The same applies to the aforementioned income-transfer programs. Such mechanisms may have an important social function in a country marked by profound inequalities, but their use as the principal instrument of social policy has serious limitations. Transferring income can alleviate poverty, but it does not automatically create skilled employment, increase productivity, or rebuild national industry. Instead, it can contribute to the emergence of a large precarious population dependent on government assistance. When welfare becomes a permanent substitute for development policies, the structural problem remains.
This is precisely where the electoral dispute enters a decisive phase. Voters will have to choose between different proposals for addressing problems that have not disappeared in recent years. The ability to present convincing answers on security, employment, income, and social order may carry greater weight than speeches about major geopolitical projects.
The first-round result also demonstrates that Brazil’s right was able to transform domestic discontent into electoral strength. Flávio Bolsonaro’s lead and the composition of the new Congress indicate significant demand for change. This does not mean that all these voters share the same views on the economy, foreign policy, or cultural issues. It means, above all, that dissatisfaction has become sufficiently broad to alter the country’s political balance.
In the remaining weeks of the campaign, therefore, the fundamental question will be whether the government can convince voters that its policies offer lasting solutions, or whether the perception will prevail that it has adopted temporary measures to manage problems that remain unresolved.
Talking about gender, human rights, or Palestine will definitely not help Lula secure reelection.
The economic model that transformed Central and Eastern Europe after EU accession is losing momentum, according to the International Monetary Fund, which is warning governments that structural reforms are needed if the region is to continue narrowing the income gap with Western Europe.
Carlos Mulas-Granados, the IMF’s regional representative, said on Tuesday that medium-term growth potential across Central and Eastern Europe had declined to around 2.5 per cent, compared with roughly 5 per cent before countries in the region joined the European Union.
The slowdown does not mean that every economy is stagnating. Poland continues to grow faster than much of Western Europe, while the Czech economy has recovered from recent shocks. The concern is instead about the underlying rate at which these economies can expand once temporary fiscal stimulus, EU funding and post-crisis recoveries are stripped out.
Several of the forces behind the region’s earlier success are becoming weaker.
EU accession opened access to the single market, attracted foreign investment and integrated Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary deeply into European industrial supply chains. German manufacturers in particular moved production eastwards, taking advantage of lower labour costs, skilled workforces and geographic proximity.
That process generated rapid gains in productivity and incomes. It cannot simply be repeated.
Demographics are one of the most immediate constraints. Working-age populations are shrinking across much of the region while ageing increases spending requirements for pensions, health care and social support.
The IMF’s country assessments illustrate the problem. Its assessment of Poland says demographic pressures are mounting even as labour productivity remains comparatively strong, and calls for higher labour participation, better skills and deeper capital markets.
In Slovakia, the Fund expects growth of only 0.9 per cent this year and says adverse demographics and weaker productivity are weighing on the medium-term outlook. The economy remains particularly exposed to manufacturing and the automotive industry.
The Czech Republic faces a similar structural constraint. The IMF estimates its medium-term potential growth at around 1.8 per cent, with population ageing and modest productivity gains limiting further convergence.
External conditions have also changed.
Germany, the region’s principal industrial partner, has experienced prolonged weakness in manufacturing. Central European producers therefore face softer demand from the market around which many of their supply chains were originally built.
At the same time, China has moved from being primarily a source of imports and components to a direct competitor in sectors where Central Europe has substantial industrial exposure, including cars, batteries, machinery and electrical equipment.
That combination is particularly difficult for economies built around export-oriented manufacturing.
The problem overlaps with the wider European competitiveness debate. EU Today reported in July that only 15.7 per cent of the reforms recommended in Mario Draghi’s competitiveness report had been fully implemented at that stage, with important work still outstanding on capital markets, energy and investment.
For Central Europe, progress on those issues has a direct bearing on growth. Smaller national capital markets make it harder for companies to finance expansion. Fragmented energy systems add to industrial costs, while limited access to venture capital can restrict the development of businesses outside established manufacturing sectors.
There are significant differences between countries. Poland’s larger domestic market gives it more insulation from industrial weakness elsewhere and the IMF expects relatively strong growth. Hungary has faced a different combination of weak investment and fiscal constraints, while Slovakia’s dependence on car production leaves it particularly exposed to changes in the European automotive sector.
EU funding remains an important source of investment across the region, particularly for infrastructure and modernisation. But EU transfers cannot by themselves replace improvements in productivity.
The IMF’s argument is therefore less about an immediate recession than about the end of an unusually favourable period of convergence.
Central Europe entered the EU with lower wages, substantial scope to import Western technology and a powerful incentive for Western European manufacturers to move production eastwards. As those gaps narrow, future growth depends more heavily on innovation, skills, investment and domestic productivity.
The region is still converging with Western Europe. The question raised by the latest IMF warning is how quickly that process can continue once the economic advantages that powered its first two decades of EU membership become less powerful.
The United Kingdom could be heading toward its most significant expansion of ground-based air defense in generations, under a plan announced by the Conservative Party. For now, however, with the Conservatives in opposition, the proposed £10 billion (about $13.3 billion) “Britannia Shield” exists only as a policy commitment rather than an approved government program. At the same time, it highlights the seriousness of U.K. military deficiencies in this area, as the threat from the air continues to grow.
The world is becoming more dangerous.
— Conservatives (@Conservatives) October 6, 2026
We will always do what is necessary to keep our country safe. pic.twitter.com/Z4EblxrGn7
Today the @Conservatives are announcing ‘Britannia Shield’ – our £10bn plan to protect the UK from drone & missile attack. This is only possible because @KemiBadenoch is willing to take tough decisions to fund 3% on Defence. pic.twitter.com/tLrF2KSOHw
— James Cartlidge MP
The proposal will move into the U.K. Ministry of Defense acquisition system if the party returns to government following the next general election and then follows through on the funding and procurement decisions required to turn the pledge into an operational capability. The party has proposed spreading the investment over a decade, with an initial capability intended to emerge during the first term of a future Conservative government and the wider network established after that.
Britannia Shield comes with the character of the air threat facing Europe having changed dramatically over the last decade. Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated the scale at which relatively inexpensive drones can be employed alongside cruise and ballistic missiles, while recent fighting in the Middle East has clearly shown the costs involved in maintaining a sophisticated, layered air defense system under sustained attack. At the same time, the threat is no longer confined to weapons fielded by major state militaries. Small, widely available drone technologies can be weaponized with relative ease by non-state actors, providing a cheap and potentially highly scalable means of attack.
For Britain, which has traditionally relied heavily on fighter aircraft, naval air defense, and the protection provided by geography and NATO, it is increasingly doubtful whether those capabilities provide enough coverage for the infrastructure that would be most important to keep functioning during a major conflict.
While a party press release refers to it directly, Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch has made efforts to distinguish Britannia Shield from a British version of Israel’s Iron Dome.
Iron Dome has become one of the best-known elements of Israel’s layered air defense network, having been developed primarily to deal with short-range rockets, artillery, and mortar rounds threatening populated areas. The system has evolved, however, and newer configurations can also engage threats including cruise missiles and drones. Importantly, Israel’s Iron Dome systems protect a country a twelfth of the size of United Kingdom and deal with only a portion of the potential threats in critical areas.
Mention should also be made of the U.S. Golden Dome missile defense initiative, which envisions integrating sensors, interceptors, and other defensive capabilities as part of an enormous architecture with a greater emphasis on protecting the U.S. against a range of aerial and missile threats, up to and including intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Talking to the BBC, Badenoch argued that Britain does not face the same kind of persistent rocket and missile threat as Israel and therefore does not require an equivalent level of coverage. Instead, the Conservative proposal is intended to combine improved radar, command and control, interceptor missiles, and counter-drone capabilities into an integrated network designed around the threats Britain is considered most likely to face.
Britain already has some of the components that such a system could leverage. Royal Navy Type 45 destroyers — when they are available — provide a highly capable long-range air-defense layer through Sea Viper missiles, while the Army’s Sky Sabre system uses CAMM missiles for shorter-range engagements. The RAF provides combat aircraft and airborne surveillance capabilities, and Britain is integrated into NATO’s wider air and missile defense architecture. The problem is that these capabilities were not designed to provide a dense, permanent defensive umbrella over critical infrastructure, and the ground-based component in particular remains relatively limited when compared with the scale of the potential target set. There is also the reality that these assets are required to defend locales far from the British Isles themselves.
The government’s own 2025 Strategic Defense Review acknowledged that changing threat environment, allocating up to £1 billion in new funding for homeland air and missile defense and calling for improvements to the United Kingdom’s wider integrated air and missile defense architecture. Britannia Shield would therefore be a much larger political commitment to expanding and integrating capabilities that already exist, while adding new layers intended to deal with the growing drone and missile threat.
The £10 billion figure provides little idea of the scope of capabilities. The scale of the proposed system will determine whether that additional money represents a major expansion or simply the beginning of a much larger requirement.
Gen. Sir Richard Barrons has previously estimated that an entry-level system of the kind outlined could cost around £80 billion over a decade, illustrating how quickly the cost can rise once the requirement expands from protecting selected sites to providing something approaching comprehensive national coverage.
2/ Estimates suggest north of £80bn for the full cost of a perfect system, so we almost certainly need to think differently than a “dome” solution. A layered air defence will include a number of elements, including the ability to deter and strike back at an adversary.
— Greg Bagwell (@gregbagwell) October 6, 2026
Badenoch’s description of the threat instead points toward a system in which Britain would identify the infrastructure and military facilities most important to national resilience and then build increasingly dense layers of protection around them. That would include major airbases, ports, energy infrastructure, communications facilities, and other critical nodes, rather than attempting to create a continuous defensive bubble over the entire country.
Such a system would also have to account for the fact that the location of the launch platform can be as critical as the weapon itself. Badenoch described a scenario in which an adversary could operate in the English Channel to launch drones or missiles against targets in Britain. The resulting reduction in warning time would place greater demands on sensors and command systems, but it would also mean that the defensive problem could begin well before an incoming weapon reached British airspace. Maritime surveillance, intelligence collection, fighter aircraft, and naval forces could all potentially contribute to detecting or disrupting a launch platform before it had the opportunity to fire.
That broader approach is particularly important because the economics of countering drones are fundamentally different from those associated with conventional air defense targets. A system that responds to inexpensive drones by firing a sophisticated interceptor costing hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars would rapidly become unsustainable during a large attack. Any serious British architecture would therefore need several layers, with electronic warfare, guns, low-cost interceptors, and other counter-drone systems, potentially including directed-energy weapons, dealing with the lower end of the threat wherever possible. Meanwhile, more expensive surface-to-air missiles would be preserved for cruise missiles, aircraft and other targets that cannot be economically engaged by cheaper means.
The recent situation at RAF Fairford adds another dimension to that problem. The United States recently withdrew a dozen B-1 bombers from the Gloucestershire base amid reported concerns about a possible Iran-backed attack, after U.S. officials said commanders had received new information about a potential plot. British authorities maintained that the base was safe, while British sources reportedly questioned whether Iran could reproduce the kind of complex operation carried out by Ukraine against Russian airfields in 2025. The episode nevertheless demonstrated the degree to which even a major military installation can become a concern when an adversary is believed to be looking for unconventional ways to reach it.
That brings Operation Spiderweb into the discussion, although there is no public evidence that Iran is preparing a comparable operation against Britain. Ukraine’s June 2025 attack was prepared over roughly 18 months and involved small drones being moved deep into Russia inside containers carried by trucks before being launched remotely against military airfields. The operation illustrated that once relatively cheap drones have been positioned close to their targets, the defender may have little opportunity to intercept them through traditional long-range air defense means. This is exactly a scenario we have been warning of for many years.
Today, Ukrainian intelligence reportedly launched 117 attack drones from trucks that had been placed near Russian air bases. I tasked several collects this morning via @umbraspace and my first images have already started processing. What a remarkable success in a well-executed… pic.twitter.com/LzXulw8jnK
— Chris Biggers (@CSBiggers) June 2, 2025
For Britannia Shield, that means protecting an airbase such as RAF Fairford cannot simply be a matter of installing missile batteries. Physical security, counter-intelligence, surveillance of access routes, low-level drone detection, electronic warfare and the ability to identify suspicious activity before an attack begins would all become part of the same defensive problem. Hardened infrastructure would also be essential, helping to protect aircraft, fuel, munitions, command facilities and other critical assets from attacks that penetrate the outer layers of the defense. The distinction is increasingly important as military aircraft themselves become more valuable and as relatively inexpensive unmanned systems demonstrate their ability to threaten aircraft on the ground without ever having to penetrate the surrounding air defense network.
The new British proposal also becomes more complicated because its intended coverage extends beyond the British mainland. Badenoch has specifically referred to defending installations in Cyprus and the Falkland Islands, which introduces a very different set of operational and logistical requirements. A network supporting critical infrastructure in Britain can draw on dense communications infrastructure, nearby industrial support and the wider NATO system, whereas a defensive capability at RAF Akrotiri or in the Falklands requires its own radar coverage, launchers, personnel, ammunition stocks, and sustainment arrangements. Extending the same architecture across those locations would therefore consume considerably more resources.
A similar problem exists with ammunition stocks. Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated that sophisticated air defenses can come under sustained pressure during large missile and drone attacks, while Western countries have struggled to replenish some categories of precision-guided weapons at anything approaching wartime consumption rates. A British system that looks impressive on paper but has only a small stockpile of interceptors would provide much less meaningful protection during a prolonged campaign, particularly if an adversary deliberately attempted to exhaust the defenses through repeated attacks using inexpensive drones.
Ukraine also offers lessons for how Britain could organize such a network. Mobile air defense teams, distributed sensors, acoustic detection systems, and digital applications that connect air defense operators with military units and civilian spotters have all become increasingly important in Ukraine, where defenders have had to detect and respond to large numbers of drones and missiles across a wide area. There are echoes here of the distributed air defense networks developed during World War II, when observers, radar operators, fighter controllers, and anti-aircraft units were linked together to provide early warning and direct defensive responses. As in 1940, Britain would need an air defense network that is distributed, mobile, and adaptable to new threats.
The most revealing details of Britannia Shield are yet to be provided. The number of defended sites, the types and numbers of radars, the number of launchers, the size of interceptor stocks, and the proportion of the budget devoted to counter-drone capabilities all remain unclear for now. The same applies to the money required for training, maintenance, software, communications, and replenishment across the life of the system.
There is also a straightforward political limitation to the proposal. The Conservatives have pledged to invest in Britannia Shield as part of a broader plan to increase defense spending, but that money is not currently sitting in a government procurement account waiting to be spent and defense budgets are increasingly stretched by other big-ticket programs. The Conservatives would first have to return to government, establish the program as a formal requirement, and then make the associated spending and procurement decisions. Even if those steps were taken quickly, the most capable elements of the system would take years to design, procure, integrate, and deploy.
Whether £10 billion would ultimately be sufficient depends on the mission the future government assigns to the system. If Britannia Shield were expected to provide nationwide protection against sustained attacks involving ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and large numbers of drones, the budget would fall far short, particularly once interceptor stocks and long-term sustainment are included. If it is designed as a layered network protecting a defined group of critical infrastructure sites and military bases, integrated with the RAF, Royal Navy, Army, and NATO systems already in place, the proposal becomes more realistic, but it wouldn’t address higher-end threats, like longer-range ballistic missiles.
That limitation is particularly significant when considering Russia, which remains the most serious military threat to the United Kingdom and its European allies. From what we know so far, Britannia Shield is heavily focused on drones and shorter-range missile threats, but Russia possesses a much broader strike arsenal that includes ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonic weapons. A British air defense program that concentrates primarily on the lower and middle tiers of the threat therefore leaves a significant gap at the upper end of the spectrum.
The United Kingdom is also not considering this problem in isolation. Across Europe, governments are increasingly pursuing multinational efforts to strengthen air and missile defenses, as the return of large-scale state-on-state warfare and the experience of the war in Ukraine have made the vulnerability of European infrastructure and military forces much more tangible. Nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, ballistic and cruise missile defense has once again become a central European security requirement. Britannia Shield would therefore need to be considered not only as a national counter-drone and air-defense program, but as part of a much broader European effort to rebuild layered air and missile defenses against the full range of modern threats.
The experience of Ukraine and the Middle East suggests that Britain is unlikely to solve this problem simply by buying more surface-to-air missiles. Increasingly, air warfare relies on complex networks that find the attacker, identify the weapon, choose the appropriate response, and undertake this all at a cost that can be sustained throughout a conflict. That network also has to extend beyond the airspace itself, because the threat may involve a launch platform approaching the coast, a drone operator operating near a military installation, or small drones already hidden inside the defender’s security perimeter.
With their proposed reorientation of Britain’s air defense priorities, the Conservatives have put a financial value and a recognizable name around a capability gap that has become increasingly difficult to ignore. If they return to government, there will be many tougher questions to address, including which sites should receive protection, how many layers are required, how much ammunition must be held in reserve, and how the system can be sustained on a wartime footing.
The recent concerns surrounding RAF Fairford, together with the lessons of Operation Spiderweb, underline why that question is becoming more complicated. The next serious attack on a British military installation may not arrive as a large formation of aircraft or a visible wave of missiles crossing the Channel. It could involve a mixture of long-range weapons, cheap drones, electronic warfare, and hybrid warfare activity taking place much closer to the target. A future Britannia Shield would have to be designed around that reality, and would come with a price tag to match.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post Glaring Holes In UK Air Defense Take Center Stage In New “Britannia Shield” Proposal appeared first on TWZ.
Massive school protests are ongoing in France, where students have been mobilizing for their right to education – and against the austerity measures undermining it. Roughly 1,800 high schools were forced to shut down on Tuesday, October 6, as students – supported by trade unions, families, and progressive politicians – took to the streets. According to trade unions, over 450,000 people participated in protests across the country.
Students at 90% of French universities organized actions on the same day, adding even more weight to the historic mobilization.
The students’ main demands include urgent measures to address the critical situation in French schools: a shortage of teaching and support staff, oversized classes, and dilapidated buildings – particularly in working-class areas. Protesters are also calling for more manageable timetables, affordable and quality food and student housing, and an equitable education system.
The situation in schools is strongly linked to years of neoliberal policies pushed by President Emmanuel Macron and several administrations. The mobilizations are taking place amid widespread discontent over the planned continuation – and harshening – of the same policies.
The country’s public deficit reached 5.1% of GDP in 2025, and debt interest rates represent a growing driver of this deficit. In 2025, the interest burden amounted to around €66 billion across all public administrations; it is expected to reach €91 billion in 2027 and approximately €120 billion in 2030, warned Francesco Tirro for Progetto Me-Ti.
Mainstream economists suggest the only way to address that deficit is through cuts – an approach the current administration is only too eager to try, including through attacks on the pension and education systems.
In response to the protests, French authorities have unleashed a rarely seen wave of police violence against students. The Ministry of Interior recorded approximately 5,000 arrests between September 21 and October 2, with 85% of those detained underage. Police used rubber bullets and dispersal grenades on children, leading to serious injuries – including protesters losing limbs and vision.
“Footage and testimonies widely reported over the last week raise alarming concerns about the dangerous use of tear gas, batons and restraint techniques by police,” said Anne Savinel-Barras from Amnesty International France. The organization emphasized that authorities must ensure the response to demonstrations is “necessary and proportionate,” and that “children and young people peacefully demanding their right to education are protected rather than being beaten, tear-gassed, or arbitrarily detained.”
While human rights organizations appealed for an end to state-sanctioned violence against students, things were much quieter among the European political establishment. Where reactions were formulated, they were mild at best.
Different progressive movements have sharpened their support for the student demonstrations over the past week, resulting in thousands of trade union members and dozens of elected officials forming cordons between police and students to shield the youth. “All over the country, union members have turned out in large numbers to provide protection and support for high school students,” one of the main student associations, Union Syndicale Lycéenne, stated on Tuesday.
“Today’s high school and university students are tomorrow’s workers, and they shouldn’t have to pay the price for austerity policies,” the General Confederation of Labor (Confédération Générale du Travail, CGT) emphasized. “When there is a shortage of teachers, when classrooms are overcrowded, when buildings are falling apart, and when young people see their future prospects shrinking, the answer cannot be repression.”
Progressive politicians, notably from La France Insoumise (LFI), also joined the protests, providing physical protection for students. As the mobilization began to roll out from Créteil, home of LFI’s Clémence Guetté and several other members, the left party was among the first to offer support – and remained by their side as repression grew. One of the most notable examples was Saint-Denis mayor Bally Bagayoko, filmed as he protected students from more violence.
“The coming together of labor unions, the youth movement, and the parliamentary left-wing opposition forms a kind of ‘tortoise formation’ of mutual protection, making a broader collective momentum possible,” emphasized left presidential candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon.
Solidarity statements came from youth organizations in other European countries, including Greece. “Young people are reacting massively to the cuts in education spending, given that the French government, as in the rest of the EU, is spending billions on military equipment at the expense of wages, healthcare and education,” the Communist Youth of Greece (KNE) wrote in a statement, foreshadowing more student struggles to follow.
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