By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – October 7, 2026

On October 5, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan activated the Makkah Pact, taking their new alliance to war for the first time, and potentially revealing the future of American power in the Middle East: Washington provides the security umbrella while regional partners increasingly do the fighting.

From treaty to military alliance

Only two months after Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, the new alliance has been activated. As representatives of the three countries met in Riyadh and Houthi missiles and drones targeted Saudi territory, Saudi-backed Yemeni forces launched a major counteroffensive around the strategically important Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Despite hundreds of strikes, the Saudi offensive has not been enough to push the Houthis back to their original position. In this context, the alliance’s Strategic-Political and Defense Committee agreed to move “immediately” toward implementing its collective-defence commitments and to provide agreed military forces and capabilities for rapid deployment in Saudi Arabia. The meeting also appointed retired Pakistani Lieutenant General Nauman Mahmood as the alliance’s first secretary-general.

The significance goes beyond additional military assistance for Riyadh. The Yemen war is transforming – and that, too, very rapidly – a remarkably young agreement into an operational military alliance. Signed on August 7, the Makkah Pact contains a collective-defence commitment under which an armed attack against one member is regarded as an attack against all three. Pakistan describes the agreement as defensive and grounded in the right to collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

That inevitably invites comparisons with NATO. The analogy should not be exaggerated. NATO possesses 32 members, an integrated command structure and more than seven decades of institutional development. The Makkah Pact possesses none of that depth.

But its institutional development has been unusually rapid. On August 31, the three governments established mechanisms for political and military coordination, agreed to create a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia and committed themselves to joint activities, defence-industrial cooperation and joint technology development and production. Now comes the most important stage in the evolution of any military alliance: responding to an actual threat.

Pakistan and Türkiye were already assisting Saudi Arabia before formal activation. Reports show that Pakistan had supplied air-defence systems, drones, anti-drone equipment and light artillery, while Pakistani advisers were working with Saudi counterparts supporting Yemeni forces. Türkiye had supplied drones. The October 5 decision potentially integrates such capabilities into something larger: collective military action undertaken because one alliance member has come under attack.

The distinction between defensive and offensive action consequently becomes blurred. Defending Saudi airspace against Houthi missiles is clearly defensive. Destroying the launchers firing those missiles from Yemen would involve offensive operations undertaken for a defensive purpose. Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has deliberately avoided ruling out that possibility, saying Pakistan would make “whatever means are available” at its disposal available to defend Saudi Arabia.

America stays, but its role changes

It would be tempting to interpret this development as evidence that Saudi Arabia is preparing for a post-American Middle East. That conclusion would be premature. The more interesting possibility is almost the opposite: the Makkah Pact may fit remarkably well into the kind of Middle Eastern security order the Trump administration itself wants to create. Trump welcomed the agreement shortly after it was signed. He called it’s a “big, bold and important first step” and argued that it demonstrated how regional countries could “defend themselves in a more meaningful way.” That language closely matches the administration’s formal defence strategy.

The 2026 National Defense Strategy says Washington wants regional allies and partners to assume “primary responsibility” for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies, while the United States supports them and deepens cooperation with Gulf partners. The administration’s arms-transfer strategy similarly argues that allies should assume more responsibility for regional security while Washington equips them with advanced American military capabilities. Yemen now offers an unusually clear illustration of what this division of labour can look like.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sought direct American military intervention against the Houthis in September. Trump declined to order US strikes. But Washington did not withdraw from the conflict. Instead, it offered intelligence and targeting assistance, while CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper travelled to Saudi Arabia for consultations. As the Saudi-backed offensive subsequently began, the same pattern continued. Saudi aircraft provided extensive air support to Yemeni government forces, while the United States supplied intelligence and targeting support. America therefore remains deeply involved. What has declined, at least for now, is direct participation in the fighting. This distinction matters.

The choice facing Washington is not simply between dominating Middle Eastern security and abandoning it. There is a third possibility: remaining the indispensable strategic enabler while shifting more of the immediate military burden onto regional states. That is precisely where the Makkah Pact becomes useful.

Saudi Arabia brings financial resources, geography and enormous investments in advanced weaponry. Türkiye contributes a large, NATO-trained military and a rapidly expanding defence industry. Pakistan brings substantial conventional forces, longstanding military relations with Saudi Arabia and extensive operational experience. Together, they can potentially perform missions that previously might have generated demands for more direct American intervention. The United States can remain above this architecture rather than outside it: supplying intelligence, weapons, logistical assistance, strategic deterrence and diplomatic backing while allies provide more of the personnel and firepower required to confront regional threats. Seen this way, the pact is not necessarily a rebellion against American primacy. It could become one mechanism through which that primacy is made less militarily expensive for the US.

A different kind of American order

This model also helps explain why describing the emerging Middle East as “post-American” can be misleading. American power has traditionally been measured partly through deployments, bases and direct military intervention. But primacy does not require Washington to fight every regional war itself. The Makkah Pact could push this transformation considerably further.

Its future significance will depend less on what its three members call the alliance than on what they build after Yemen, and whether their first experiment in collective defence proves sufficiently successful to encourage deeper cooperation. Regular military planning, interoperable forces, integrated air and missile defence, intelligence-sharing arrangements and joint weapons production would gradually give the agreement institutional substance.

Yet therein lies a paradox for Washington. The same burden-sharing that reduces America’s military responsibilities could eventually reduce its leverage. More capable allies are not necessarily more dependent allies. As regional powers acquire the institutions, experience and capabilities to conduct military operations with diminishing direct American involvement, they may also acquire greater freedom to pursue threats and strategic objectives that do not fully correspond with Washington’s preferences. An arrangement that initially reinforces the US security architecture could therefore gradually produce greater regional strategic autonomy.

The consequences could extend to military technology. Saudi Arabia’s armed forces remain heavily equipped with American weapons, but neither Pakistan nor Türkiye operates exclusively within a US defence ecosystem. Pakistan, for example, operates the JF-17 fighter aircraft jointly developed with China. In fact, Islamabad has deployed this jet in Saudi Arabia as part of the pact. While Türkiye has built an increasingly indigenous defence industry. A more deeply integrated Makkah alliance could therefore eventually combine American, Turkish, Pakistani and Chinese-origin military technologies rather than reproduce an exclusively US-centred weapons architecture.

That may prove more consequential for American primacy than the pact itself. If the Makkah alliance fades once the immediate Houthi threat recedes, it will remain another temporary regional alignment. But if Yemen produces permanent military integration, Washington could confront an unexpected consequence of its own burden-sharing strategy: the more successfully regional allies learn to defend the American-led order themselves, the less dependent that order may eventually become on America.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs

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The Pakistan government’s decision on Monday, October 5, to deploy its armed forces to Saudi Arabia and provide other military assistance in its fight against Yemen is facing widespread criticism from the left and other progressive sections within the country.

Critics have questioned the rationale behind the decision, expressing concerns that it will further erode the credibility of Pakistan among the people in the region and unnecessarily drag it into endless wars.

According to the joint statement, the constituents decided “to move immediately to the practical implementation of the collective defense commitments” under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement and provide military force and other capabilities to Saudi Arabia to protect its security and territorial integrity.

The statement was issued after a meeting of the Strategic-Political and Defence Committee of the Mecca Alliance countries in Riyadh on Monday. 

The Mecca Alliance is a three party group (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye) created earlier this year as a regional collective security alliance. 

Though Pakistan has one of the largest armed forces in the world along with being the sole Muslim majority country with a nuclear weapon, the decision has invited strong criticism from the scholars and activists in the country.  

Critics have pointed out how its armed forces have already been engaged in numerous domestic conflicts, such as prolonged operations against the terrorist groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and other separatist forces in Balochistan 

These groups have been allegedly involved in carrying out large-scale violent attacks against civilian and military targets.

Terrorism and the failure of the country’s armed forces to curb it has emerged as one of the central issues in the ongoing long march to the capital, Islamabad, by thousands of supporters of former Prime Minister Imran Khan and the country’s main opposition party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI).  

Pakistan, which is also facing a grave financial and economic crisis is also involved in cross border fights with the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan for months now and has an active decades-long conflict on its eastern borders with India.

Given the multifrontal engagement of the Pakistan army at the moment it would be dangerous to get involved in yet another conflict in West Asia, experts have pointed out.

Pakistan is being drawn into an endless quagmire 

Saudi Arabia has been involved in an over-a-decade-long war against Yemen since 2015. It has imposed a complete air, sea, and land blockade on the country, which has caused an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the Arab world’s poorest nation.

Though the joint statement issued after the meeting on Monday did not name Ansar Allah or Yemen explicitly, it condemned the alleged attacks on Mecca and Medina, two of the holiest places of Islam, last month.

Ansar Allah has denied Saudi Arabia’s accusations about its involvement in those attacks.  

“Pakistan is getting sucked into the Saudi-Yemen war. We can all thank Trump for igniting a new war in the Middle East. But shouldn’t we also have more sense to stay out of such a quagmire?” asked Taimur Rahman, leader of the left-wing Mazdoor Kisan Party (MKP), in a post on X on Tuesday.

Ammar Ali Jan, leader of another major left formation in the country, the Haqooq-e-Khalq Party (HKP) claimed that the “deployment of troops in Saudi Arabia is a dangerous escalation that can push Pakistan into an endless quagmire.”

He questioned the government for moving against “the people of Yemen” who “have shown exemplary solidarity to Gaza despite suffering endless aggression and siege,” claiming “attacking them would be a political and moral catastrophe.”

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I have watched Pakistan-Afghanistan relations long enough to distrust easy headlines, and last week’s news produced a few of them. At the Center-2026 (Tsentr-2026) war games in Russia’s Chelyabinsk region, Taliban officers stood among the foreign observers. Reports say it was the first time Moscow had invited a Taliban military delegation since the movement returned […]

The post Russia courts the Taliban without dropping Pakistan appeared first on Asia Times.

A 2,500-seat stadium in suburban Nagoya has become the unlikely setting for one of sport’s most combustible rivalries — and a glimpse of cricket’s growing reach beyond its traditional heartlands.

There are few sporting rivalries capable of transporting an entire stadium thousands of miles away from home. On Saturday, India and Pakistan managed precisely that — turning a modest Japanese baseball facility into an arena charged with all the anticipation, colour and emotion normally associated with the great cricket grounds of South Asia.

The setting could hardly have been more incongruous. The Asian Games final was being staged at Korogi Athletic Park in Nisshin, near Nagoya, a purpose-built cricket venue with capacity for only about 2,500 spectators. Beyond the boundary stood the unmistakable features of a Japanese baseball ground, including a pitcher’s mound.

Yet for those inside, this was no novelty fixture.

Hours before the first ball, Indian and Pakistani supporters were queuing to enter. Flags were draped over shoulders, shirts provided the national colours and tickets had become sufficiently scarce to generate reports of inflated resale prices. For many members of the South Asian communities living in Japan, the occasion represented a rare chance to see the two countries meet in person.

That matters because India-Pakistan cricket is not simply another international sporting contest. Political tensions mean that the teams generally encounter each other only in major tournaments, making every meeting an event in its own right. Their February T20 World Cup encounter in Sri Lanka was played before a sell-out crowd of 35,000; television audiences in the two countries routinely run into the hundreds of millions.

Japan therefore found itself hosting one of cricket’s most valuable commodities: scarcity.

For Japanese spectators, meanwhile, the spectacle offered an introduction to a sport that remains distinctly niche in the country. Some had attended earlier matches simply out of curiosity. Teachers from nearby Gifu admitted that they knew virtually nothing about cricket, but found themselves enjoying the experience after reading explanatory material and watching the action.

The comparison with baseball is inevitable. Japan possesses one of the world’s great baseball cultures, while cricket remains a relative outsider. But the recent arrival of India has provided an intriguing bridge between the two.

Last week, Japan played India in its first-ever T20 international against a full-member cricket nation. The hosts came within two runs of a remarkable victory in a rain-shortened five-over contest, giving Japanese cricket precisely the sort of exposure its administrators could scarcely have manufactured themselves.

The significance extends beyond the scoreboard.

India’s appearance in Japan was linked to the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the countries, while the Asian Games have provided an unusually prominent platform for cricket. The sport is already established among expatriate communities, but encounters involving India’s global stars can introduce it to an entirely new audience.

That is perhaps the most interesting aspect of Saturday’s extraordinary scene. Cricket did not need to conquer Japan overnight. It merely needed to persuade a few thousand people to come and watch.

And India versus Pakistan is perhaps the ultimate sales pitch.

The match was always going to generate passion. What nobody could have guaranteed was that the passion would survive the journey from the packed stadiums of Colombo and Mumbai to a small baseball field outside Nagoya.

It did.

The geography changed. The rivalry did not.

Main Image: By 運動会プロテインパワー – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=112511600

RT | October 2, 2026

Yemen’s Houthis have denied targeting a power station in the city of Medina. A Saudi-led coalition earlier accused the militant group of targeting the facility supplying power to the Prophet’s Mosque – one of the holiest sites in the Muslim world.

A senior Houthi official branded the accusation a “lie” aimed at tarnishing the group’s image and reinforcing similar claims made by the coalition in the past.

On Thursday, the Saudi coalition’s spokesman, Major General Turki al-Maliki, accused the Yemeni militants of striking the Taibah electricity distribution station in Medina earlier this week in what he called a “cowardly terrorist act” and a part of an alleged broader campaign by the Houthis to “target the Two Holy Mosques.”

In mid-September, Saudi Arabia accused the Houthis of launching a drone towards the holy city of Mecca. The unmanned aerial vehicle was intercepted and destroyed, it added. The Yemeni movement’s leader, Abdel-Malik al-Houthi, dismissed that claim as a “heinous lie” in a televised address at the time, claiming Riyadh was “weaponizing lies” to advance its own agenda.

The developments have sparked concerns in Türkiye and Pakistan, which signed a joint defense agreement with Saudi Arabia in August. Speaking to the United Nations General Assembly last week, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called any “threat to the sanctity” of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina a “red line that must never be crossed.”

Ankara denounced this week’s alleged Medina attack. “Any attack targeting the sanctity, peace, and security of the Two Holy Mosques is an unacceptable affront directed at the shared sensitivities of the entire Islamic world,” the Turkish government spokesman, Burhanettin Duran, said on X on Friday. He vowed that Türkiye “will continue to stand by Saudi Arabia.”

The developments come amid the continued escalation between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. Riyadh has backed Yemen’s internationally recognized government against the Houthis since intervening in the country’s civil war in 2015.

Large-scale fighting largely subsided after a UN-brokered truce in 2022, but the conflict erupted again this summer after an airport in the Houthi-controlled Yemeni capital of Sanaa was bombed to prevent a returning Houthi delegation that had flown to Iran from landing.

A side event held during the 63rd session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva has brought together parliamentarians, journalists and civil-society representatives to discuss terrorism, religious freedom and the European Union’s relationship with Pakistan.

The event, “Remembrance and Tribute to the Victims of Terrorism”, took place at the Palais des Nations on 1st October. Speakers included Greek MP Georgios Manous, EU Today Publisher and Editor Gary Cartwright, Stéphane Michot of Ideal International, with a contribution from Prof K. Warikoo.

Two interventions focused particularly on Pakistan and the implications for European policy.

Victims of terrorism at centre of debate

Gary Cartwright began with the victims rather than trade or institutional policy.

“Terrorism is not an abstract concept,” he told the meeting, describing a bomb exploding in a market, a child killed outside a school and families waiting for someone who will never return.

He acknowledged that Pakistan itself has suffered heavily from terrorist violence. The 2026 Global Terrorism Index ranked Pakistan as the country most affected by terrorism in 2025, recording 1,139 deaths and 1,045 incidents.

At the same time, Gary raised the record of militant organisations operating from Pakistani territory. The UN Security Council describes Lashkar-e-Tayyiba as a Pakistan-based organisation involved in terrorist activity and records its involvement in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, in which approximately 164 people were killed and hundreds injured. The same UN entry also records links to the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament.

Questions over EU education funding

Gary also questioned the safeguards surrounding European education funding in Pakistan.

In December 2024, Dutch MEP Bert-Jan Ruissen asked the European Commission whether EU money intended for education could reach Islamic religious seminaries and what controls were in place over the use of those funds.

In its February 2025 response, the Commission said EU assistance in Sindh and Balochistan was primarily directed through provincial education authorities. It also confirmed that, in selected areas of Balochistan, EU support facilitated formal education for pupils enrolled in religious seminaries through a government-recognised certification programme intended to ease their transition into state education. The Commission said projects were subject to field visits, reporting, monitoring and evaluation.

Gary stressed that he was not arguing that religious education itself constituted extremism. His argument was that European taxpayers should be able to establish where money was going, who administered programmes and what safeguards existed against extremist recruitment.

His intervention then turned to Pakistan’s GSP+ trade status.

Pakistan has benefited from GSP+ since 2014 and is currently the scheme’s largest beneficiary. According to the European Commission’s figures on EU-Pakistan trade, more than 85 per cent of Pakistan’s exports enter the EU duty and quota free. Continued participation requires Pakistan to ratify and effectively implement 27 international conventions covering human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance.

Gary called for Pakistan’s GSP+ preferences to be suspended pending an assessment of the country’s compliance with its international commitments, counter-terrorism obligations and safeguards surrounding EU-funded programmes.

The issue has been examined previously by EU Today. Its 2025 white paper on Pakistan’s GSP+ compliance argued that the evidential threshold for beginning temporary withdrawal proceedings had been reached, while a Geneva side event in March 2026 considered Pakistan’s human-rights record and the conditionality attached to GSP+ preferences.

Pahalgam attack raised by Greek MP

Greek MP Georgios Manous approached the subject through terrorism, religious freedom and European security.

He referred to the terrorist attack at Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir on 22 April 2025, in which 25 tourists and one local civilian were killed. EU Today previously examined the attack and its victims in its coverage of the Pahalgam massacre.

In December 2025, India’s National Investigation Agency filed a 1,597-page charge sheet naming Lashkar-e-Tayyiba/The Resistance Front and six other accused. The NIA said its investigation alleged that the attack had been planned, facilitated and executed with direction from Pakistan.

Pakistan rejects Indian allegations of responsibility. Islamabad has said India acted without verifiable evidence and maintains that Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif offered a transparent and independent investigation into the Pahalgam attack.

Manous also addressed Pakistan’s blasphemy legislation and the position of Christians, Hindus and Ahmadis, linking those questions to the broader problem of religious extremism. Concerns over minority rights and blasphemy laws have also featured in EU Today’s continuing coverage of the debate over Pakistan’s GSP+ eligibility.

The Greek MP then turned to Europe, arguing that extremist ideologies and networks should not be viewed solely as a South Asian security problem.

Pakistan, meanwhile, continues to present itself as both a major victim of terrorism and an international counter-terrorism partner. At the fourth US-Pakistan Counterterrorism Dialogue in Washington in August, the two governments reaffirmed cooperation against ISIS-K, al-Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Balochistan Liberation Army, while discussing border security and the disruption of terrorist facilitation networks.

The Geneva discussion therefore centred on two linked questions for European policymakers: how Pakistan’s counter-terrorism record should be assessed, and how that assessment should interact with the conditions attached to EU trade preferences and European-funded programmes.

For years, Pakistan’s claim that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan operates from sanctuaries inside Afghanistan produced a familiar exchange: Islamabad accused, Kabul denied, and each new militant attack triggered another round of recrimination. That pattern is becoming harder to sustain. The sanctuary dispute can now be tested against a growing body of evidence rather than competing claims […]

The post Afghanistan’s TTP sanctuary is becoming harder to deny appeared first on Asia Times.

When Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan agreed to a mutual defense pact in August, it was principally seen as a political commitment. The “Mecca alliance,” as it was dubbed, stipulated that an armed attack on one would be treated as an attack on all three, accompanied by deeper military cooperation. That pact is no longer […]

The post Baptism of Houthi fire for Mecca mutual defense pact appeared first on Asia Times.

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), the country’s main opposition party, announced a long march to the capital, Islamabad, on Sunday, October 4, as part of its ongoing nationwide movement to demand the release of its leader and former Prime Minister Imran Khan.

The march, which was originally scheduled to be held on Sunday, September 27, starting from Peshawar, was postponed on Friday after the party’s top leadership decided it needed more time to mobilize to face the state’s preparations to block it.

Thousands of people have been taking to the streets in different parts of the country demanding the immediate release of Khan, his wife Bushra Bibi, and other party leaders.

Khan’s party and supporters have also accused the Shehbaz Sharif-led coalition government in the country of deliberately ignoring Khan’s bad health condition and trying to “slowly kill him in prison” by keeping him in solitary confinement.

They have also alleged that Khan has been denied access to his family members and party colleagues in Rawalpindi’s Adiala Jail for almost six months now and demanded that he be transferred out of the jail to a private hospital.

State repression

Meanwhile, the security forces have fortified the capital, blocking all the ways leading to the capital with shipping containers and large deployments after the government called the protests illegal and threatened consequences for the PTI leadership.

Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi had earlier called the march a failure and “a drama” and warned that if the PTI does not abandon its plan to go to Islamabad the state will find a “permanent solution” to stop them.

The security forces had arrested a large number of PTI leaders and workers in order to derail the protests. The PTI last week said that even its elected members of the National Assembly were arrested.

Three of Khan’s sisters Aleema, Uzma, and Noreen Khan were also arrested by the Pakistani authorities last week and jailed for 30 days on charges of being an alleged “threat to public order.”

The PTI released a statement on Monday, September 28, claiming Khan’s sisters have not been allowed to meet their family members or lawyers at Kot Lakhpat Jail in Lahore. Calling the situation of their incarceration “alarming” and a violation of their fundamental rights.

The previous mobilization to Islamabad in November 2024 had also witnessed large-scale state repression leading to clashes between the security forces and the PTI workers. Over a dozen people, including four security officials, were killed in those clashes.

Three years of incarceration 

Khan, largely considered the most popular political leader in Pakistan’s politics today, was first arrested almost a year after he was ousted from his Prime Minister’s post in May 2023. He led the Pakistan government from August 2018 to April 2022.

The interim government that assumed power after his removal filed over a hundred cases against Khan, accusing him of the misuse of power, corruption, and violence against the security forces during the May 9, 2023 protests.

However, he was released after a court ruled his arrest was illegal only to be arrested again on August 5, this time after a district court sentenced him to three years in prison in the Toshakhana case, related to the state department that stores valuable gifts given to Pakistani officials by foreign dignitaries. Later his wife Bushra Bibi was also arrested.

Though a higher court later overturned his conviction, he and his wife have remained in Adiala Jail facing charges and even convictions in several other cases. 

Many leaders in Khan’s party, PTI, were either arrested or forced to denounce the party and politics in public altogether. 

Despite the fact that the PTI was blocked from contesting national elections in February 2024, it emerged as the largest opposition group in the country’s National Assembly after it decided to field its candidates as independents. 

PTI and Khan’s supporters maintain that the cases against Khan and his wife were politically motivated and fake.  

Ammar Ali Jan, leader of the Left wing Haqooq-e-Khalq Party (HKP) and a member of the Tehreek-i-Tahaffuz Ayeen-i-Pakistan (Movement to Save Pakistan’s Constitution or TTAP) formed as a broader alliance to fight for Khan’s release has condemned the continued incarceration of Khan and the repression of movements for his release. 

He also questioned the state’s narrative about the failure of the movement, pointing out how it has made every effort to oppress it, including the arrests and fortification of the capital.

Al Mayadeen | September 26, 2026

International flights from Iran to several destinations remain operational despite the expansion of US sanctions targeting the country’s aviation sector, according to Tehran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport.

The airport said Saturday that flights to Turkey, Malaysia, China, Pakistan, Vietnam, and Afghanistan were continuing according to their previously announced schedules.

The announcement comes as Washington escalates economic pressure on Iran and seeks to restrict the ability of Iranian airlines to maintain international operations.

Iranian flights continue despite sanctions

Imam Khomeini International Airport said that, aside from flights already canceled, no additional cancellations had been announced.

The canceled services include flights involving the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Oman, and Georgia.

The airport also said it was working to restore suspended air connections as soon as possible.

The continued operation of several international routes comes despite growing restrictions on Iranian aviation following a new round of US sanctions announced on September 8.

The measures have affected Iranian airlines as well as companies and intermediaries involved in providing services to the country’s aviation sector.

Recent reporting indicates that Iranian carriers have continued operating some international services despite the sanctions, including flights to China, Turkey, Thailand, and Afghanistan.

US measures target Iran’s aviation sector

The US Treasury Department announced sanctions on September 8 against 36 targets linked to Iran’s aviation sector, including 27 Iranian airlines. Washington described the measures as an effort to target what it considers Iran’s remaining unsanctioned carriers and the networks supporting them.

The sanctions form part of a broader US campaign to restrict Iran’s access to international financial and commercial networks.

The measures have also placed pressure on foreign companies providing Iranian carriers with fuel, ground handling, aircraft-related services, and other forms of support.

The consequences, however, have varied by country. While some governments and companies have restricted Iranian aviation connections, other countries have continued to facilitate flights.

Iraq restrictions trigger backlash

In Iraq, the suspension of Iranian flights, particularly through Najaf International Airport, has triggered criticism from official, political, factional, and religious quarters.

Several Iraqi parties and figures have called for the decision to be reversed and rejected what they described as US pressure on Baghdad.

The Iraqi government is also moving toward dialogue with Washington in an effort to secure an exemption that would allow air links with Iran to resume.

Ali Akbar Velayati, international affairs advisor to Iran’s Leader, said the restrictions on Iranian flights were part of an effort by Iran’s enemies to compensate for their battlefield defeat by attempting to dismantle the “unity of the fronts” from within.

The Iranian Ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al-Sadegh, further told Iran’s ISNA news agency that a new decision surrounding Iranian flights to Iraq is likely to be announced soon.

He added that Iran is in contact with Iraqi officials and proposals on the matter have been submitted.

Al-e Sadegh noted that roughly 12,000 to 13,000 people travel between Iraq and Iran via Iranian airlines.

China maintains air links with Iran

China has maintained its opposition to unilateral US sanctions and continued to receive Iranian flights.

Flight-tracking data cited in recent reports showed Iranian services continuing to operate to Chinese destinations after the latest US measures took effect.

The continued connections with China also reflect the broader geopolitical divide over Washington’s unilateral sanctions policy, with Beijing maintaining economic and diplomatic ties with Tehran despite US pressure.

Al Mayadeen | September 25, 2026

Turkey’s Parliament is expected to consider the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan next month, Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmus told reporters on Friday, as the three countries move to establish mechanisms for implementing the pact.

Kurtulmus said the agreement has not yet been submitted to Parliament for ratification and is expected to be formally presented once lawmakers return from recess next month. He added that international agreements require parliamentary approval to enter into force in Turkey, while meetings currently being held under the agreement remain preparatory.

Turkey prepares to ratify Mecca defense agreement

Kurtulmus made the remarks to reporters in Ankara, confirming that the agreement has yet to reach Parliament despite ongoing coordination among Ankara, Riyadh, and Islamabad.

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement was signed on August 7 by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in Mecca.

The agreement states that an armed attack against any one of the three countries would be regarded as an attack against all three, while providing for expanded defense cooperation and collective deterrence.

The pact is therefore moving from its initial political agreement toward institutional and legal implementation, with parliamentary approval constituting a key step for Turkey.

When asked about the claim that the Mecca agreement was against Iran, Kurtulmus denied the allegation and stated that the main source of the region’s problems was “Israel” and its aggressive policies.

He reminded parliamentarians that “Israel” launched multiple attacks on numerous nations without question as part of its hostile policies, and explained that the balance of power has completely changed following the US-Israeli war on Iran.

“We propose that the countries in the region increase their cooperation to establish and secure their own security,” he said. “We absolutely do not, and should never, view the Mecca Agreement as an agreement against Iran. The Mecca Agreement, and perhaps even its expansion to include Iran and other regional countries, should become an agreement that ensures the security of the regional countries and, more broadly, the Islamic world.”

Kurtulmus added that the agreement was not formed as a threat to any country as it’s an agreement for the promotion of unity, solidarity, and security of the region.

“It is still in its initial stages and is not yet fully formed,” he said. “We hope that with the participation of other regional countries, it will become a much stronger agreement.”

Saudi Arabia calls for military coordination

The development comes as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan prepare for an urgent meeting of their military chiefs, amid Saudi Arabia’s aggression on Yemen.

Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Ministry announced Friday that the chiefs of staff of the three countries would meet to discuss ways to support the Kingdom under the terms of the Mecca agreement.

The announcement followed a meeting in New York between Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. The Saudi statement did not specify when the military chiefs would meet or what form potential support could take.

Pact moves toward institutionalization

The three countries have already begun establishing mechanisms to implement the agreement.

At a Strategic Political and Defense Committee meeting in Istanbul on August 31, the three sides agreed to establish a secretariat in Saudi Arabia, initially headed by a Pakistani secretary-general for three years.

They also agreed to strengthen military capabilities through joint activities, defense-industry cooperation, technology development, and production.

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