As part of the largest U.K. Commando Force exercise in 15 years, British special operators conducted a submarine insertion off Scotland, making use of a German Navy Type 212A — a boat you can read about in detail here. The maneuvers are the first time since the war in Afghanistan that all of the Commando Force’s specialist elements have operated together. The submarine insertion, conducted at Cape Wrath on September 29, is part of Exercise Strike Warrior, a major NATO drill intended to rehearse allied crisis-response and warfighting operations across the North Atlantic and High North.

The U.K. Royal Navy-led Commando Force specializes in amphibious, littoral, and expeditionary operations. It brings together Royal Marines commandos with specialist elements including reconnaissance, intelligence, targeting, artillery, logistics, and medical capabilities. The force is increasingly focused on smaller, dispersed teams operating across contested littoral environments.

Including elements of the Commando Force, more than 2,000 personnel from the United Kingdom, United States, Germany, Netherlands, Canada, and Norway are currently participating in Strike Warrior, with eight warships and 19 aircraft involved in activity spanning Scotland, the Western Isles, the North-West Approaches, Galloway, the Borders and the North Sea.

The submarine insertion underscores the type of maritime special operations the British Commando Force is now increasingly training to conduct. Personnel from 148 (Meiktila) Commando Forward Observation Battery, Royal Artillery, boarded the unnamed German attack submarine off Scotland before being infiltrated toward the coast. The sub provided intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support as the force approached the target area, after which the commandos conducted a discreet small-boat insertion using inflatable raiding craft.

Once ashore, the commandos moved onto the cliffs and established an extemporized observation post. From there, they confirmed the simulated target and coordinated live naval surface fires against a simulated enemy position. Here, firepower was provided by the Portuguese Karel Doorman class frigate Dom Francisco de Almeida, presumably using its Oto Melara 76mm deck gun. Following the engagement, the team was extracted. The complete sequence incorporated submarine infiltration, small-boat insertion, covert reconnaissance and targeting, live naval gunfire, and withdrawal into a single mission profile.

The German submarine involved is particularly well suited to this kind of mission. Conventional diesel-electric attack submarines (SSK) lack the nuclear-powered endurance and sustained high speed of an SSN, but those characteristics are not necessarily what a short-range clandestine insertion mission requires. Modern SSKs such as Germany’s Type 212A are designed around extremely low acoustic signatures and can remain submerged for extended periods using air-independent propulsion, making them difficult to detect while operating in relatively shallow and constrained waters.

That combination is hugely valuable for special operations. An SSK can approach a coastline covertly, conduct ISR, release a small team and its boats, and withdraw without exposing a large surface vessel or maintaining the high-speed transit capability associated with a nuclear submarine. Its comparatively small size can also be advantageous when operating closer to shore, where depth, seabed conditions and the presence of coastal sensors can constrain larger submarines. Conventionally powered boats are also far cheaper to procure and operate and have smaller crews.

An SSN offers major advantages for longer-range deployments: far greater endurance, sustained speed, and the ability to carry and support larger payloads over intercontinental distances. These payloads can include dry deck shelters and swimmer delivery vehicles, allowing divers easy exit and entrance while the boat is submerged and at a standoff distance from the coast.

But for a mission whose essential requirement is to quietly loiter near a coast, put a small team ashore and leave, an SSK remains a highly relevant platform. Conventional submarines are particularly valuable to the kind of distributed littoral operations NATO is rehearsing in northern European waters.

The U.K. Royal Navy’s four Upholder class were its last diesel-electric submarines. They were withdrawn in 1994–95 and subsequently transferred to Canada. The Royal Navy today operates an all-nuclear submarine fleet.

The Upholders were also particularly suited to inshore operations, reconnaissance, and other missions demanding extreme quietness and maneuverability.

With this in mind, TWZ has, in the past, examined whether the U.S. Navy should complement its all-nuclear submarine fleet with advanced conventional boats. Sweden’s Gotland demonstrated the value of these kinds of boats when it was leased to the U.S. Navy for adversary training and proved exceptionally difficult for American ASW forces to detect.

Returning to the Cape Wrath drill, the 148 Battery operations officer involved explained that “This level of complexity and coordination of live assets has not been achieved by 148 for nearly 30 years.”

“We wanted to demonstrate to our partners across the United Kingdom Commando Force, wider U.K. Defense and NATO SOF community the type of missions we are prepared to execute against future threats,” the officer added.

Multinational integration is central to the exercise. Strike Warrior is testing the ability of the British Commando Force to plug into a much larger allied force in which submarines, surface combatants, aircraft, drones, and small specialist teams can contribute to different parts of the same operation.

Earlier in Strike Warrior, 148 Battery also directed fires from the Dutch Karel Doorman class frigate HNLMS Van Amstel and Royal Canadian Navy Halifax class frigate HMCS St. John’s after establishing observation posts. Those ships were operating as part of Standing NATO Maritime Group One.

The exercise also provides a snapshot of how Britain’s commandos have evolved since their intensive employment in Afghanistan. The Royal Marines’ Future Commando Force concept emphasizes smaller, more dispersed formations capable of operating in contested littoral environments, with greater reliance on maritime mobility, uncrewed systems, long-range fires, and allied capabilities.

Strike Warrior combines those elements, with the exercise including amphibious landings, boarding operations, intelligence and surveillance missions, maritime security, and anti-submarine warfare, alongside drone missions involving strikes and combat resupply. Other elements have practiced establishing protected medical facilities.

The geography of Strike Warrior is equally significant. The exercise extends across Scotland and its surrounding waters, including the Western Isles and out into the North Sea, placing the Commando Force in the maritime environment connecting the highly strategic North Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, and northern European approaches.

That region has become increasingly important to NATO planning because of the difficulty of monitoring and controlling such a large maritime battlespace. Submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, surface combatants, drones, and long-range weapons all have roles to play, while the geography provides numerous opportunities for small forces to operate from the coast and islands.

The United Kingdom has been repeatedly using the region and the wider High North as a training ground for this type of activity. Earlier this year, British commandos conducted a submarine insertion during Exercise Cold Response in Norway using the German Navy’s Type 212A submarine U-35. That also involved submarine infiltration, small-boat deployment, establishment of an observation post, and the direction of allied naval fires.

Strike Warrior expands that concept considerably and across a much larger battlespace, providing an opportunity to test not simply individual capabilities but the ability to combine them during a sustained NATO exercise.

The exercise began September 28 and concludes October 9.

For the British Commando Force, the significance extends beyond the dramatic imagery of troops emerging from a German submarine at Cape Wrath. After years in which British commandos were heavily committed to land-based counterinsurgency operations, the exercise is intended to put them firmly back in a maritime and high-end warfighting context.

This is the kind of operation that the U.K. Commando Force is now preparing to conduct alongside NATO partners in the increasingly contested waters of the North Atlantic and High North.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post British Commandos Emerge From German Submarine During Major NATO Exercise appeared first on TWZ.

Multiple reports now say that U.S. Air Force B-1 Lancers left the United Kingdom over the weekend due to the threat of an Iranian-directed near-field drone attack broadly akin to Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb that decimated Russian bombers. Though many specific details are still unconfirmed, this is an entirely plausible mode of attack that TWZ has been warning about for many years now.

Short- and long-range drone threats against parked aircraft have now morphed fully from theory to reality, as also demonstrated by losses in the course of the conflict with Iran, and even non-state actors are increasingly brandishing these capabilities. Despite the increasing dangers posed to planes out on open flightlines, the Pentagon continues to drag its feet on building hardened aircraft shelters and other fortified air base infrastructure.

Before the hasty and unexpected departure of the bombers on Sunday, B-1s had been deployed to RAF Fairford continuously since March, initially in support of Operation Epic Fury against Iran. A contingent of B-52s had also conducted strikes on Iran from Fairford, but left back in July. The base is a major operational hub for the U.S. military in the United Kingdom, and regularly hosts strategic aircraft, including bombers and U-2 spy planes.

Dan Rivers, U.S. correspondent for ITV News in the United Kingdom, was among the first to report on Monday that the B-1’s quick departure had been prompted by concerns about a potential Spiderweb-like drone attack ordered by Iran, citing an unnamed source. Other outlets have subsequently reported similar details, all sourced to anonymous U.S. and British officials.

Ukraine’s unprecedented Operation Spiderweb last year involved simultaneous covert near-field attacks using explosive-laden quadcopter-type drones on airbases across Russia. At least 10 Russian bombers, as well as a variety of other aircraft, all parked on open flightlines, were destroyed.

“They didn’t fly out by accident,” U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters during a gaggle at the White House on Monday when asked about why the B-1s had left Fairford. “There were some threats.”

“I can’t tell you that, but if they did, they’ll suffer greatly,” Trump added in response to a separate question about whether Iran might have managed to get weaponized drones into the United Kingdom.

“What you saw there was the Secretary of War [Pete Hegseth], out of an abundance of caution, trying to protect our guys,” U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance said during a separate press engagement on Monday. “We do feel, with some confidence, that the Iranians are – they’re trying to do what the Iranian state has done for 49 years, which is engage in acts of terrorism against the United States, and a lot of other people, as well. So, we are being extremely cautious.”

It’s also worth noting here that British authorities had arrested five men on suspicion of driving bomb-laden vans toward the base back on September 27. Those individuals were released on bail after no explosives were found in the vehicles. U.S. and British officials have also raised the possibility of an Iranian link to that incident.

“We’ve documented what happened [near Fairford] last week. I wouldn’t just directly tie that to the move that was made,” U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio also told members of the press on Monday. “The only reason why you guys are focused on how many planes are at Fairford is because of the threat that happened last week.”

“We have confidence in the security of all of our bases, because all of our bases are [sic] theoretically could be threatened at any moment,” he added.

Rubio’s comments notwithstanding, the remarks from Trump and Vance make clear that there was some recent threat intelligence that contributed to the decision to pull the bombers from Fairford. There are still many questions about the exact nature of the potential attacks, and how imminent, or not, the danger may have been.

Regardless, as mentioned, the prospect of a near-field drone attack on a base like Fairford carried out by actors in close proximity is extremely plausible, and the barrier to entry to such an operation is relatively low. Spiderweb may have thrust this reality into the public consciousness in dramatic fashion, but the danger well predates that operation, and even the start of Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

TWZ has been highlighting exactly these kinds of threats in the course of a decade or so now of regular reporting on drone incursions over U.S. and foreign military facilities and critical infrastructure, as well as American naval vessels operating offshore. Langley Air Force Base in Virginia and Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, some of America’s most strategic airbases domestically, are among the facilities that have had to grapple with this in the past. After the Langley incident, in particular, it had become clear to the larger public what we had been reporting for many years, that the United States does not control the airspace over even its most critical military installations.

This all extends overseas, as well. In November 2024, there was a rash of drone sightings over and around several airbases in the United Kingdom, including RAF Fairford. This has been an issue more broadly in Europe in recent years, as well. This was only further underscored by an attempted drone attack on a Ukrainian An-124 at an airport in Germany in August, which authorities in that country have blamed on Russia.

New footage of yet another act of Russian terrorism on EU soil, showing the drone loaded with explosives on the tarmac at Leipzig/Halle Airport, just meters from a Ukrainian Antonov An-124 cargo aircraft.

According to German authorities, the drone was carrying an improvised… https://t.co/eCZaLfz9yx pic.twitter.com/DbRz87wgIv

— SPRAVDI — Stratcom Centre (@StratcomCentre) August 5, 2026

A drone attack on Fairford would also not necessarily have had to come from somewhere very close by. Longer-range one-way attack drones are steadily proliferating, and can be launched using a variety of methods from positions on the ground, as well as vessels at sea. TWZ explored the very real threat of sea-based drone attacks, including ones conducted covertly, and Iran’s specific ability to carry them out globally, following the leak of an FBI alert back in March.

The proliferation of lower-end one-way-attack drones has ‘democratized’ precision-guided attacks, even for non-state actors. The fielding of automated targeting capabilities, driven by developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning, is also becoming more and more widespread. That technology will soon enable these weapons to find and strike even moving targets on their own. Even without anyone at the controls and without the drone putting out any detectable radio emissions, very effective precision attacks can still be launched at static targets, like known parking areas for aircraft at airbases, just by using basic map coordinates or Google Earth. It’s also worth pointing out here that the definition of a stand-off attack is becoming increasingly blurry, with even quadcopter-type drones capable of flying miles away to conduct a kamikaze attack on a target based on a set of GPS coordinates.

Ukrainian Saker UAV with AI capabilities. The video shows the process of target recognition. It has reportedly already been put to use several times against Russian targets. pic.twitter.com/NVNJyxUjGP

— NOELREPORTS (@NOELreports) January 25, 2024

Overall, it is an indisputable fact that aircraft sitting exposed on a flightline are particularly vulnerable to drone attacks, as well as other threats. This is something U.S. military officials have acknowledged themselves. Fairford, where B-1s and other bombers have no option but to park out in the open in well-established areas that are plainly visible from outside the base’s immediate perimeter, is indicative of how American military aircraft are generally positioned on the ground abroad and at home.

As we wrote all the way back in 2017:

“Similar swarming strikes could be unleashed behind the front lines as well, with hugely expensive and low density/high demand combat aircraft being especially vulnerable to this sort of tactic—something General James Holmes alluded to inadvertently while speaking to the Air Force Association, stating:

‘Imagine a world where somebody flies a couple hundred of those and flies one down the intake of my F-22s with just a small weapon on it.’

Actually, it would be even easier to just strike the jets as they sit idle and vulnerable on the flight line. One swarm could see a whole squadron of tightly packed fighters destroyed without even having a chance to fight back.”

With all this in mind, a heated debate has emerged in the past few years in and around the U.S. military about the value of investing in new hardened aircraft shelters, as well as other fortified infrastructure.

To date, the U.S. Air Force, in particular, has put virtually all emphasis on surface-to-air missiles and other active defenses, as well as the dispersal of aircraft, over physical hardening. The conflict with Iran, in which a number of American military aircraft have been damaged or destroyed on the ground by drone and missile attacks, has underscored the limits of these strategies.

Second angle. pic.twitter.com/NUupdRkdm9

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) March 29, 2026

“I’m not a big fan of hardening infrastructure,” Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach said at a roundtable at the Air and Space Forces Association’s main annual symposium in 2023, offering a prime example of this viewpoint. “The reason is because of the advent of precision-guided weapons … you saw what we did to the Iraqi Air Force and their hardened aircraft shelters. They’re not so hard when you put a 2,000-pound bomb right through the roof.”

Wilsbach was commander of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) at the time. He subsequently became head of ACC and is now Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the service’s top officer.

“I think that I don’t want to spend a lot of money on hardening shelters. Unless you’re going to send something 100 feet or more underground, we can blow it up, and so can they,” Wilsbach said in an interview with Breaking Defense in July of this year when asked explicitly if his position changed. “So, the economics of building a shelter that is impervious to a strike doesn’t work.”

“I think the economics favor defending your airspace, defending your ground space with systems that can defeat the incoming rounds, versus building a shelter,” he added. “Some people would argue, well, you should do both. Well, that’s even more expensive. And the other thing is, the shelter doesn’t go anywhere.”

It is fair to point out that typical above-ground hardened aircraft shelters are not invulnerable, especially to attacks involving ballistic, cruise, and certain air-launched threats. There are also substantial cost and other factors to consider when it comes to any major military construction effort.

That being said, having more hardened infrastructure also imposes costs and complexities on opponents, who have to dedicate more advanced and costly munitions and other resources to ensure targets are neutralized. Shelters have the knock-on benefit of complicating the targeting process for an enemy by obscuring where aircraft are or are not positioned, to begin with. An opponent has to treat shelters like they are full even if they are empty.

When thinking about hardened aircraft shelters, stereotypical Cold War-era reinforced concrete structures typically come to mind. However, they do not all have to be built to a one-size-fits-all standard with the same degree of hardening across the board to be useful. Shorter-range drone attacks are typically carried out by platforms carrying small explosive charges or that are designed to drop small bomblets. Even longer-range one-way-attack drones generally have smaller warheads than traditional missiles, they also hit with less kinetic energy.

A structure that shields against smaller blasts and shrapnel, also including from cluster munitions that can be readily scattered across wide areas, is one that then has to be addressed by more capable weapons. This could even include mobile or otherwise temporary shelters that offer sufficient concealment and protection.

Eliminating, or at least substantially mitigating, the lowest rung of threats creates a dilemma for opponents, who then have to decide whether it is even worthwhile to attempt certain types of attacks. There is clear value in narrowing the available options for the enemy and pushing them toward having to expend higher-end, more expensive munitions, that are available in smaller quantities, and that traditional active defenses may be better optimized to handle. As an example, it may be more viable to shoot down a small barrage of incoming cruise missiles than a swarm of dozens of drones.

Active defenses, especially surface-to-air missile batteries and interceptors to go with them, have historically been very expensive. Lower-end counter-drone-focused interceptors and directed energy weapons are helping to bring these costs down in some regards. Even so, those capabilities come at a significant cost.

There are magazine and stockpile depth issues at play here, too. This is something that has also been brought front and center by the conflict with Iran, which has fueled already long-standing concerns about the sufficiency of stockpiles of air defense interceptors, other critical munitions, and the capacity to replenish them quickly. This is something the British government, among others, is also grappling with, as you can read more about in our separate reporting here.

Furthermore, losses of aircraft on the ground are not without their own costs, which are even more lopsided if an opponent can simply use lower-cost weaponized drones. U.S. bombers are particularly expensive and prized assets that are in short supply compared to the level of demand, as seen during the height of combat operations earlier this year against Iran. When it comes to B-1s, specifically, there are only 45 of them left in service today. A dozen of them being knocked out in one go would have major repercussions strategically. Losing even one would also be a propaganda coup for whoever might be responsible.

How many shelters can we build for the upgrade cost of one Zumwalt class DDG that will probably be parted out in 10 years anyway?

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) October 5, 2026

On top of all this, the U.S. military simply will not always have the luxury of being able to rapidly relocate aircraft in response to threats. Moving a dozen bombers on short notice takes massive resources. It is not just aircraft that have to be repositioned, but supporting personnel and assets, as well as weapons and fuel. Having to shift to alternate locations could easily have negative impacts on tempo and other aspects of operations, especially in the midst of actual conflict. RAF Fairford is one of only a few bases globally that can support bomber operations for a prolonged period.

More recently, there have been signs of changing mindsets on the matter of hardening across the U.S. military. In January, Joint Inter-Agency Task Force 401 (JIATF-401), a focal point for counter-drone efforts the Pentagon established last year, issued explicit guidance regarding the use of netting, cables, and other kinds of passive physical defenses around bases and other critical infrastructure. A contracting notice in March also called attention to plans for new hardened underground facilities at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

“There is value in some light protection against small, unmanned threats,” Gen. Wilsbach also told Breaking Defense in July. “Some of them — just nets that are up that keep a small, few-$100 drone from getting next to a $2 billion aircraft. That actually works, [and is] really cheap.”

“It’s not either or,” Wilsbach said in a separate interview with Air & Space Forces Magazine in July. “The net keeps the small UAS [uncrewed aerial system] from getting close to an aircraft that you’re trying to protect… That’s a very inexpensive way to give you some modicum of protection without killing your checkbook on really exquisite defensive systems.”

In spite of these institutional developments, action to implement such recommendations on a broad basis has continued to lag. There still does not appear to be any major department-wide push to build new hardened aircraft shelters or other fortified structures at facilities globally. The U.S. Air Force does have a certain number of hardened aircraft shelters at bases now, especially in the Pacific and Europe.

This is all despite a very visible trend in the construction of new aircraft shelters and other hardened infrastructure elsewhere around the globe, including in China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Even before Operation Spiderweb, Russia had already initiated a large-scale effort to build new hardened shelters at various bases, especially on the occupied Crimean Peninsula, in the face of expanding Ukrainian drone and missile attacks. This effort has now extended to building the huge hardened shelters for the country’s bomber force, something the country has never done before.

“It is inappropriate to discuss matters of intelligence, and we will not discuss specific force protection measures,” a U.S. Air Force spokesperson told TWZ yesterday when asked about the reports that Iranian drone threats prompted the recent removal of the B-1s from Fairford. “The Department will continue to assess the threat environment surrounding our installations and take appropriate actions to protect our people, our platforms and the bases where our forces operate from.”

We still do not know exactly how serious or imminent any recent threat to the B-1s at Fairford was that contributed to their hasty departure. Regardless, the reports of concerns about potential drone attacks remain very plausible. The reality here is that a dozen bombers were yanked from a forward operating location in Europe without an adversary ever having to fire a shot. This is a problem set that is only growing, especially as lessons and expertise on low-end weaponized drones from the war in Ukraine are spreading around the globe.

Erecting new aircraft shelters and other hardened infrastructure would not be a full solution to those threats by themselves. At the same time, they would be a valuable added layer of defense, and a passive one that would have a huge logistical footprint to operate once the initial investment is made. The lack of movement to better fortify American airbases globally is only becoming more and more glaring, and it remains to be seen if real action will not occur until lessons are learned in a most unfortunate way.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Glaring Lack Of Investment In Aircraft Shelters Highlighted By B-1B’s Sudden Retreat From U.K. Airbase appeared first on TWZ.

The United Kingdom could be heading toward its most significant expansion of ground-based air defense in generations, under a plan announced by the Conservative Party. For now, however, with the Conservatives in opposition, the proposed £10 billion (about $13.3 billion) “Britannia Shield” exists only as a policy commitment rather than an approved government program. At the same time, it highlights the seriousness of U.K. military deficiencies in this area, as the threat from the air continues to grow.

The world is becoming more dangerous.

We will always do what is necessary to keep our country safe. pic.twitter.com/Z4EblxrGn7

— Conservatives (@Conservatives) October 6, 2026

Today the @Conservatives are announcing ‘Britannia Shield’ – our £10bn plan to protect the UK from drone & missile attack. This is only possible because @KemiBadenoch is willing to take tough decisions to fund 3% on Defence. pic.twitter.com/tLrF2KSOHw

— James Cartlidge MP (@jcartlidgemp) October 6, 2026

The proposal will move into the U.K. Ministry of Defense acquisition system if the party returns to government following the next general election and then follows through on the funding and procurement decisions required to turn the pledge into an operational capability. The party has proposed spreading the investment over a decade, with an initial capability intended to emerge during the first term of a future Conservative government and the wider network established after that.

Britannia Shield comes with the character of the air threat facing Europe having changed dramatically over the last decade. Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated the scale at which relatively inexpensive drones can be employed alongside cruise and ballistic missiles, while recent fighting in the Middle East has clearly shown the costs involved in maintaining a sophisticated, layered air defense system under sustained attack. At the same time, the threat is no longer confined to weapons fielded by major state militaries. Small, widely available drone technologies can be weaponized with relative ease by non-state actors, providing a cheap and potentially highly scalable means of attack.

For Britain, which has traditionally relied heavily on fighter aircraft, naval air defense, and the protection provided by geography and NATO, it is increasingly doubtful whether those capabilities provide enough coverage for the infrastructure that would be most important to keep functioning during a major conflict.

While a party press release refers to it directly, Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch has made efforts to distinguish Britannia Shield from a British version of Israel’s Iron Dome.

Iron Dome has become one of the best-known elements of Israel’s layered air defense network, having been developed primarily to deal with short-range rockets, artillery, and mortar rounds threatening populated areas. The system has evolved, however, and newer configurations can also engage threats including cruise missiles and drones. Importantly, Israel’s Iron Dome systems protect a country a twelfth of the size of United Kingdom and deal with only a portion of the potential threats in critical areas.

Mention should also be made of the U.S. Golden Dome missile defense initiative, which envisions integrating sensors, interceptors, and other defensive capabilities as part of an enormous architecture with a greater emphasis on protecting the U.S. against a range of aerial and missile threats, up to and including intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Talking to the BBC, Badenoch argued that Britain does not face the same kind of persistent rocket and missile threat as Israel and therefore does not require an equivalent level of coverage. Instead, the Conservative proposal is intended to combine improved radar, command and control, interceptor missiles, and counter-drone capabilities into an integrated network designed around the threats Britain is considered most likely to face.

Britain already has some of the components that such a system could leverage. Royal Navy Type 45 destroyers — when they are available — provide a highly capable long-range air-defense layer through Sea Viper missiles, while the Army’s Sky Sabre system uses CAMM missiles for shorter-range engagements. The RAF provides combat aircraft and airborne surveillance capabilities, and Britain is integrated into NATO’s wider air and missile defense architecture. The problem is that these capabilities were not designed to provide a dense, permanent defensive umbrella over critical infrastructure, and the ground-based component in particular remains relatively limited when compared with the scale of the potential target set. There is also the reality that these assets are required to defend locales far from the British Isles themselves.

The government’s own 2025 Strategic Defense Review acknowledged that changing threat environment, allocating up to £1 billion in new funding for homeland air and missile defense and calling for improvements to the United Kingdom’s wider integrated air and missile defense architecture. Britannia Shield would therefore be a much larger political commitment to expanding and integrating capabilities that already exist, while adding new layers intended to deal with the growing drone and missile threat.

The £10 billion figure provides little idea of the scope of capabilities. The scale of the proposed system will determine whether that additional money represents a major expansion or simply the beginning of a much larger requirement.

Gen. Sir Richard Barrons has previously estimated that an entry-level system of the kind outlined could cost around £80 billion over a decade, illustrating how quickly the cost can rise once the requirement expands from protecting selected sites to providing something approaching comprehensive national coverage.

2/ Estimates suggest north of £80bn for the full cost of a perfect system, so we almost certainly need to think differently than a “dome” solution. A layered air defence will include a number of elements, including the ability to deter and strike back at an adversary.

— Greg Bagwell (@gregbagwell) October 6, 2026

Badenoch’s description of the threat instead points toward a system in which Britain would identify the infrastructure and military facilities most important to national resilience and then build increasingly dense layers of protection around them. That would include major airbases, ports, energy infrastructure, communications facilities, and other critical nodes, rather than attempting to create a continuous defensive bubble over the entire country.

Such a system would also have to account for the fact that the location of the launch platform can be as critical as the weapon itself. Badenoch described a scenario in which an adversary could operate in the English Channel to launch drones or missiles against targets in Britain. The resulting reduction in warning time would place greater demands on sensors and command systems, but it would also mean that the defensive problem could begin well before an incoming weapon reached British airspace. Maritime surveillance, intelligence collection, fighter aircraft, and naval forces could all potentially contribute to detecting or disrupting a launch platform before it had the opportunity to fire.

That broader approach is particularly important because the economics of countering drones are fundamentally different from those associated with conventional air defense targets. A system that responds to inexpensive drones by firing a sophisticated interceptor costing hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars would rapidly become unsustainable during a large attack. Any serious British architecture would therefore need several layers, with electronic warfare, guns, low-cost interceptors, and other counter-drone systems, potentially including directed-energy weapons, dealing with the lower end of the threat wherever possible. Meanwhile, more expensive surface-to-air missiles would be preserved for cruise missiles, aircraft and other targets that cannot be economically engaged by cheaper means.

The recent situation at RAF Fairford adds another dimension to that problem. The United States recently withdrew a dozen B-1 bombers from the Gloucestershire base amid reported concerns about a possible Iran-backed attack, after U.S. officials said commanders had received new information about a potential plot. British authorities maintained that the base was safe, while British sources reportedly questioned whether Iran could reproduce the kind of complex operation carried out by Ukraine against Russian airfields in 2025. The episode nevertheless demonstrated the degree to which even a major military installation can become a concern when an adversary is believed to be looking for unconventional ways to reach it.

That brings Operation Spiderweb into the discussion, although there is no public evidence that Iran is preparing a comparable operation against Britain. Ukraine’s June 2025 attack was prepared over roughly 18 months and involved small drones being moved deep into Russia inside containers carried by trucks before being launched remotely against military airfields. The operation illustrated that once relatively cheap drones have been positioned close to their targets, the defender may have little opportunity to intercept them through traditional long-range air defense means. This is exactly a scenario we have been warning of for many years.

Today, Ukrainian intelligence reportedly launched 117 attack drones from trucks that had been placed near Russian air bases. I tasked several collects this morning via @umbraspace and my first images have already started processing. What a remarkable success in a well-executed… pic.twitter.com/LzXulw8jnK

— Chris Biggers (@CSBiggers) June 2, 2025

For Britannia Shield, that means protecting an airbase such as RAF Fairford cannot simply be a matter of installing missile batteries. Physical security, counter-intelligence, surveillance of access routes, low-level drone detection, electronic warfare and the ability to identify suspicious activity before an attack begins would all become part of the same defensive problem. Hardened infrastructure would also be essential, helping to protect aircraft, fuel, munitions, command facilities and other critical assets from attacks that penetrate the outer layers of the defense. The distinction is increasingly important as military aircraft themselves become more valuable and as relatively inexpensive unmanned systems demonstrate their ability to threaten aircraft on the ground without ever having to penetrate the surrounding air defense network.

The new British proposal also becomes more complicated because its intended coverage extends beyond the British mainland. Badenoch has specifically referred to defending installations in Cyprus and the Falkland Islands, which introduces a very different set of operational and logistical requirements. A network supporting critical infrastructure in Britain can draw on dense communications infrastructure, nearby industrial support and the wider NATO system, whereas a defensive capability at RAF Akrotiri or in the Falklands requires its own radar coverage, launchers, personnel, ammunition stocks, and sustainment arrangements. Extending the same architecture across those locations would therefore consume considerably more resources.

A similar problem exists with ammunition stocks. Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated that sophisticated air defenses can come under sustained pressure during large missile and drone attacks, while Western countries have struggled to replenish some categories of precision-guided weapons at anything approaching wartime consumption rates. A British system that looks impressive on paper but has only a small stockpile of interceptors would provide much less meaningful protection during a prolonged campaign, particularly if an adversary deliberately attempted to exhaust the defenses through repeated attacks using inexpensive drones.

Ukraine also offers lessons for how Britain could organize such a network. Mobile air defense teams, distributed sensors, acoustic detection systems, and digital applications that connect air defense operators with military units and civilian spotters have all become increasingly important in Ukraine, where defenders have had to detect and respond to large numbers of drones and missiles across a wide area. There are echoes here of the distributed air defense networks developed during World War II, when observers, radar operators, fighter controllers, and anti-aircraft units were linked together to provide early warning and direct defensive responses. As in 1940, Britain would need an air defense network that is distributed, mobile, and adaptable to new threats.

The most revealing details of Britannia Shield are yet to be provided. The number of defended sites, the types and numbers of radars, the number of launchers, the size of interceptor stocks, and the proportion of the budget devoted to counter-drone capabilities all remain unclear for now. The same applies to the money required for training, maintenance, software, communications, and replenishment across the life of the system.

There is also a straightforward political limitation to the proposal. The Conservatives have pledged to invest in Britannia Shield as part of a broader plan to increase defense spending, but that money is not currently sitting in a government procurement account waiting to be spent and defense budgets are increasingly stretched by other big-ticket programs. The Conservatives would first have to return to government, establish the program as a formal requirement, and then make the associated spending and procurement decisions. Even if those steps were taken quickly, the most capable elements of the system would take years to design, procure, integrate, and deploy.

Whether £10 billion would ultimately be sufficient depends on the mission the future government assigns to the system. If Britannia Shield were expected to provide nationwide protection against sustained attacks involving ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and large numbers of drones, the budget would fall far short, particularly once interceptor stocks and long-term sustainment are included. If it is designed as a layered network protecting a defined group of critical infrastructure sites and military bases, integrated with the RAF, Royal Navy, Army, and NATO systems already in place, the proposal becomes more realistic, but it wouldn’t address higher-end threats, like longer-range ballistic missiles.

That limitation is particularly significant when considering Russia, which remains the most serious military threat to the United Kingdom and its European allies. From what we know so far, Britannia Shield is heavily focused on drones and shorter-range missile threats, but Russia possesses a much broader strike arsenal that includes ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonic weapons. A British air defense program that concentrates primarily on the lower and middle tiers of the threat therefore leaves a significant gap at the upper end of the spectrum.

The United Kingdom is also not considering this problem in isolation. Across Europe, governments are increasingly pursuing multinational efforts to strengthen air and missile defenses, as the return of large-scale state-on-state warfare and the experience of the war in Ukraine have made the vulnerability of European infrastructure and military forces much more tangible. Nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, ballistic and cruise missile defense has once again become a central European security requirement. Britannia Shield would therefore need to be considered not only as a national counter-drone and air-defense program, but as part of a much broader European effort to rebuild layered air and missile defenses against the full range of modern threats.

The experience of Ukraine and the Middle East suggests that Britain is unlikely to solve this problem simply by buying more surface-to-air missiles. Increasingly, air warfare relies on complex networks that find the attacker, identify the weapon, choose the appropriate response, and undertake this all at a cost that can be sustained throughout a conflict. That network also has to extend beyond the airspace itself, because the threat may involve a launch platform approaching the coast, a drone operator operating near a military installation, or small drones already hidden inside the defender’s security perimeter.

With their proposed reorientation of Britain’s air defense priorities, the Conservatives have put a financial value and a recognizable name around a capability gap that has become increasingly difficult to ignore. If they return to government, there will be many tougher questions to address, including which sites should receive protection, how many layers are required, how much ammunition must be held in reserve, and how the system can be sustained on a wartime footing.

The recent concerns surrounding RAF Fairford, together with the lessons of Operation Spiderweb, underline why that question is becoming more complicated. The next serious attack on a British military installation may not arrive as a large formation of aircraft or a visible wave of missiles crossing the Channel. It could involve a mixture of long-range weapons, cheap drones, electronic warfare, and hybrid warfare activity taking place much closer to the target. A future Britannia Shield would have to be designed around that reality, and would come with a price tag to match.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Glaring Holes In UK Air Defense Take Center Stage In New “Britannia Shield” Proposal appeared first on TWZ.

The first-ever F-16 Block 72 has taken to the air, marking a major milestone for the program and for Morocco’s long-running effort to field what Lockheed Martin describes as the most advanced version of the Viper.

The first of the jets for the Royal Moroccan Air Force (RMAF), a two-seat F-16D, completed its maiden flight at Lockheed Martin’s facility in Greenville, South Carolina, the company announced today. The aircraft will now proceed through flight testing ahead of its delivery to Morocco.

Morocco’s first @LockheedMartin F-16 Block 72 aircraft has taken flight in Greenville, South Carolina. The milestone marks another step toward delivering the most advanced F-16 configuration to the Royal Moroccan Air Force.

— Lockheed Martin News (@LMNews) October 6, 2026

Interestingly, one of the photos of the jet published by Lockheed Martin shows the pilot in the front cockpit wearing a Digital Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (D-JHMCS). This advanced helmet is not often seen worn by F-16 pilots and it is not clear if it has been ordered by Morocco.

Regardless, Morocco was the first customer to select the Block 72 configuration when the U.S. government approved its purchase in March 2019.

At that time, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency said Morocco was seeking 25 F-16C/D Block 72 aircraft in a package estimated at $3.787 billion. The proposed aircraft were to be equipped with the AN/APG-83 Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR), an active electronically scanned array type, new mission computers, Link 16 Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems, modernized navigation systems, helmet-mounted cueing systems, and a range of air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons.

The distinction between the Block 70 and Block 72 is the engine. The Block 70 uses General Electric’s F110-GE-129, while the Block 72 uses Pratt & Whitney’s F100-PW-229, providing fractionally more power. The two configurations otherwise share the same major avionics and systems modernization package.

The F-16 began life as a Pratt & Whitney-powered fighter, with the F100 selected to power the original F-16A/B. But reliability and maintainability problems with early F100s prompted the U.S. Air Force to launch its Alternate Fighter Engine competition in the 1980s, leading General Electric to develop the F110 as an alternative. The resulting “Great Engine War” established two competing F-16 engine families, with Pratt & Whitney’s F100 and GE’s F110 ultimately becoming the principal powerplants for later F-16C/Ds. Although U.S. procurement eventually became heavily concentrated on the GE-powered F-16, Pratt & Whitney continued to supply F100-powered aircraft to international customers.

For Morocco, the choice of the Block 72 is based on ensuring as much fleet commonality as possible. The RMAF already operates F-16C/D Block 52+ aircraft powered by F100 engines, making the new aircraft a natural fit within its existing support infrastructure.

Morocco is also upgrading its existing F-16 fleet to the F-16V configuration, which is broadly similar to the new-build Block 70/72 standard.

That will eventually provide the RMAF with a larger fleet centered around a common, substantially modernized F-16 standard.

A separate notification in March 2019 covered the upgrade of Morocco’s existing 23 F-16C/D Block 52+ aircraft to the F-16V standard.

Morocco’s new and upgraded F-16s could also provide a significant boost to combined operations with its other international partners. In recent years, Moroccan F-16s participated in the campaign against ISIS, while the country has also deployed the aircraft on missions against Houthi rebels as part of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in Yemen. In 2015, a Moroccan F-16 crashed in Yemen. Although the Houthis claimed they had shot down the aircraft, Moroccan authorities attributed the loss to a technical malfunction.

Reported wreckage of #Morocco Air Force F-16 lost during #Yemen operations http://t.co/bZUOnFm0vp pic.twitter.com/x5H7CQ0puD

— Joseph Dempsey (@JosephHDempsey) May 11, 2015

Outside of combat operations, the RMAF also frequently takes part in exercises with its allies, including the African Lion series, the largest annual, multinational joint military exercise led by U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and partner nations.

Meanwhile, the new-build Moroccan aircraft also arrives at an interesting point in the F-16 program.

The Block 70/72 has attracted customers across Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere, with Bahrain, Bulgaria, Jordan, Peru, the Philippines, Slovakia, Taiwan, and Turkey also having selected the latest-generation Viper configuration. So far, only Block 70s have been ordered, although tbe Block 72 has been offered to some customers and potential customers. There is also apparent U.S. Air Force interest in a version of the Block 70 tailored for its specific needs and referred to by the manufacturer as the F-16G.

Morocco’s position as the Block 72 launch customer means the aircraft now flying is effectively the prototype-standard production aircraft for an export configuration that other countries can now buy.

The Moroccan F-16 program is also increasingly tied to a broader effort to develop the country’s military-industrial and sustainment infrastructure.

Lockheed Martin says it is working with Moroccan industry, including Maintenance Aero Maroc, on an upcoming MRO facility at Benslimane. The more than 86,000-square-foot facility is intended initially to support heavy maintenance and modernization of C-130 Hercules aircraft, with plans to expand into additional platforms, including the F-16.

That could eventually give Morocco a greater role in sustaining its own expanding fleet and potentially supporting other aircraft in the region.

The F-16 program itself is part of a much broader U.S.-Moroccan defense relationship that dates back more than five decades. The Royal Moroccan Armed Forces now operate a range of U.S.-supplied systems, while Morocco is also set to receive HIMARS and has expanded its rotary-wing capabilities with AH-64E Apache attack helicopters.

For the RMAF, however, the F-16 remains central to its combat-aircraft modernization and, once it arrives, it will be the spearhead of the country’s fighter fleet.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post First F-16 Block 72 Has Flown appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. Air Force’s scramjet-powered Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) has finally reached the flight test phase, with at least one “release” having been carried out so far over a range in Australia. HACM has suffered significant delays, and the Air Force has taken the risky step of scaling back overall testing plans to try to keep the program on schedule. The stated goal is to be able to make a decision to start rapidly acquiring HACMs in 2027.

The Air Force has been working on HACM in cooperation with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). The program has been conducted, in part, under the broader umbrella of the U.S.-Australian Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE). The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) project also fed into HACM. Raytheon (now formally RTX), in cooperation with Northrop Grumman, was chosen to develop the missile in 2022. The weapon has reportedly been designated AHM-4A in a new branch of the U.S. military’s joint service nomenclature system for aircraft and missiles.

“The U.S. Air Force, in partnership with Australia, has conducted a flight test of the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) as part of our continuous work to advance long-range strike capabilities,” an Air Force spokesperson confirmed to TWZ today. “This effort is part of the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE), a collaborative agreement built on more than 15 years of partnership between our two nations.”

“Leveraging this enduring alliance, the Royal Australian Air Force executed the release of a HACM flight test unit over a designated Australian test range, gathering crucial data to advance the program’s objectives,” the spokesperson added. “The flight was the culmination of an extensive series of tests designed to measure the missile’s performance under realistic flight conditions.”

The spokesperson did not name the test range where the “release” was conducted or say when that occurred. Whether the missile flew under its own power for any amount of time after release is unknown. What aircraft was used to carry the missile aloft is also not known. TWZ has reached out for more information.

The Air Force did say previously that it planned to conduct HACM launches in Australia. The expectation has long been that this would be done at the country’s sprawling Woomera Test Range, which provides an ideal location for extended-range flight testing activities in general. The U.S. and Australia have partnered on other hypersonic testing at Woomera in the past, as seen in the video below. The remote inland location of the range complex makes it well suited for conducting more sensitive tests away from prying eyes, as well.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO), a Congressional watchdog, has also reported in the past that RAAF F/A-18F Super Hornets would be used to conduct at least some of the HACM test launches. This would fit with today’s statement from the U.S. Air Force saying that it was the RAAF that “executed the release.” The Air Force’s initial launch platform is the F-15E Strike Eagle, though others are expected to follow.

To date, neither the Air Force nor Raytheon has released a confirmed picture or rendering of HACM. In 2023, the Air Force did release a picture, seen below, showing an air-breathing hypersonic cruise missile test article related to either HACM or the preceding HAWC effort.

“The missile consists of two stages, a rocket booster and a scramjet cruiser, which separates from the booster and eventually dives toward its target,” according to GAO. Scramjets do not function effectively at lower speeds, and designs powered by them require some form of initial boost to a high Mach velocity. Hypersonic speed is generally defined as anything above Mach 5, but what HACM’s peak speed might be is unknown.

Two-stage air-breathing missile-like hypersonic vehicle designs have been tested on several occasions in the past. This includes Boeing’s scramjet-powered X-51 Waverider and HyFly 2 hypersonic test vehicles, among others. The X-51 (as its name indicates) and HyFly 2 also notably had so-called ‘waverider’ configurations designed to ‘skip’ on the shockwaves generated during high-speed flight to help provide additional lift. Whether HACM might also use this principle is not known.

It’s also worth noting here that Castelion’s Blackbeard hypersonic missile also has a two-stage configuration. It remains unconfirmed whether or not the second stage of that weapon is powered, but it does not appear to be an air-breathing design either way. Castelion is currently developing an air-launched version of Blackbeard for the U.S. Navy, which is also in flight testing now, as well as a ground-launched type for the U.S. Army. You can read more about that missile here.

Coming soon to a theater near you…BLACKBEARD!@USPACOM @CENTCOM @PAEAviation pic.twitter.com/KgBtIqdf8I

— NAVAIR (@NAVAIRNews) September 25, 2026

Scramjet-powered air vehicle designs, including aircraft and missiles, have historically proven challenging. As noted, HACM has suffered delays over the years. The original goal had been to begin flight testing in 2024, which slipped first to 2025 and then 2026.

“The HACM program is on track to conduct its first flight test in the second quarter of fiscal year 2026, but officials said there is effectively zero margin left in the schedule for the rapid prototyping effort. The program has already descoped the rapid prototyping effort from seven to five planned flight tests,” GAO said bluntly in a report published in July. “The Air Force plans to produce 13 missiles during the rapid prototyping effort, including test assets, test spares, and operational rounds.”

“If a significant flight test failure occurs, it is likely that the program will not be able to complete all five tests within the 5-year rapid prototyping timeframe,” the report continued. “According to the program, completing at least the first three flight tests is critical for informing the Air Force’s decision to initiate a rapid fielding effort and procure HACM in fiscal year 2027.”

GAO’s July report, which had a January cutoff date, noted later on that the Air Force’s target date for initiating the rapid fielding effort, more specifically, was the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2027. This fiscal period began last Thursday and runs through the end of the year. Whether the service is still aiming to keep to that part of the schedule is unclear, but it would seem extremely difficult to do so.

“The HACM program has taken on risk to maintain its current schedule. According to program officials, maintaining the schedule has required aggressively resequencing activities to focus almost exclusively on those necessary to support the first flight test date,” GAO’s report added. “In some cases, officials said this has involved risky strategies, such as concurrently performing parts validation testing while completing the system’s design, which could require the redesign of key parts if they fail validation testing.”

In terms of U.S. hypersonic missile developments, challenges have also not been limited to scramjet-powered types like HACM. Air Force, Navy, and Army efforts to develop a variety of air- and surface-launched hypersonic missiles in various sizes and configurations have all suffered setbacks in the past decade or so. The Navy notably cancelled its own air-launched hypersonic cruise missile program, called Hypersonic Air-Launched Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare, or HALO, last year. The service subsequently shifted focus to the aforementioned Blackbeard under a program called the Multi-mission Affordable Capacity Effector (MACE). This has all prompted particular concerns about a growing and increasingly worrisome gap in this regard between the United States and its chief global competitors, especially China.

There is also a cost question. HACM traces to a time when hypersonic missiles were generally viewed, at least publicly, as highly capable, but also higher-cost and lower-density, assets. Blackbeard, for example, reflects a more recent push to develop and field more economical munition designs across the board that can also be more readily produced at scale. This demand signal has become even more pronounced in light of the dwindling American stockpiles of critical munitions due to the conflict with Iran, as well as other crises globally in recent years. More exquisite munitions, including hypersonic types, will still be part of the larger U.S. arsenal going forward.

Regardless, the U.S. military, as well as its Australian counterparts, have made it clear in the past that they view hypersonic weapons as critical for success in future conflicts, especially high-end fights, such as one in the Pacific against China. In general, air-breathing hypersonic cruise missiles offer a valuable and highly flexible way to strike targets, especially time-sensitive ones, quickly and over extended ranges. The weapon’s high speed and maneuverability drastically increase its ability to penetrate through enemy air defenses and reduce the total time an opponent has to react.

Whether or not the Air Force will be able to avoid any more major delays with HACM remains to be seen. The service’s goal to start at least limited production of HACM before the end of 2027, if not sooner, is even more ambitious now after years of schedule slips. As mentioned, officials have already acknowledged there was no more margin for error at the start of the year. There are many questions still about what form any initial fielding will take, and how that might be further impacted by the truncated testing plan.

The HACM program has at least now hit the important milestone of beginning flight testing.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post First Release Of USAF’s New HACM Hypersonic Cruise Missile Has Happened Over Australian Range appeared first on TWZ.

The Saudi-backed Yemeni forces battling the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels claim they have regained a large swath of territory in a new counteroffensive launched on Monday. This includes the recapture of the Red Sea port city of Mokha and other key positions near the highly-strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait (BAM). As we reported last month, the Houthis had taken these areas during an offensive of their own.

“On Monday, the Nation Shield Forces, the Giants Brigades, and the Tihama Resistance—supported by the Popular Resistance—seized control of the city of Al-Mokha in western Taiz Governorate following fierce battles against the terrorist Houthi militias backed by the Iranian regime,” the official Yemeni Saba news outlet reported. “The forces, aided by air support, succeeded in capturing Al-Mokha after clashes with the terrorist Houthi militias, which had controlled the city since early last September. The battles, which took place at various locations surrounding Al-Mokha, involved the use of diverse weaponry and resulted in casualties among the terrorist Houthi militias, the capture of several of their members, and the flight of others.”

Dubbed Operation Yemen Dawn, the counteroffensive aims to “restore state institutions, liberate the capital Sana’a, and end the Houthi terrorist militia coup,” Rashad al-Alimi, president of the internationally recognized government of Yemen, stated Monday on X.

“With God’s aid, the will of our people, the valor of our armed forces and all military formations, and the support of our brothers and friends, Yemen will march toward a new dawn of freedom, peace, and stability,” al-Alimi added.

على بركة الله، انطلقت عملية "فجر اليمن" لاستعادة مؤسسات الدولة، وتحرير العاصمة صنعاء، وإنهاء انقلاب الميليشيات الحوثية الإرهابية.
بعون الله، وإرادة شعبنا وبسالة قواتنا المسلحة وكافة التشكيلات العسكرية، ودعم أشقائنا وأصدقائنا، سيمضي اليمن نحو فجر جديد من الحرية والسلام والاستقرار. pic.twitter.com/bP1h9EVdu2

— د/ رشاد محمد العليمي (@PresidentRashad) October 5, 2026

The claims about the recapture of Mokha follow statements made earlier on Monday that the National Shield Forces and Giants Brigades, “liberated Dhubab [also spelled Dhobab] District and strategic positions around the Bab al-Mandab Strait in western Taiz Governorate on Monday following clashes with Iran-backed Houthi militias,” Saba claimed. “The clashes left a number of Houthi fighters dead or wounded, while others fled under pressure from the military operation. Several military vehicles and pieces of equipment were also destroyed or disabled. The forces are continuing clearance and security operations in the liberated areas and cutting Houthi supply routes.”

In addition, the Kingdom’s Maj. Gen. Turki al-Maliki, spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition, stated that “100 fighter jets were providing support to the forces of Yemen’s internationally recognized government fighting against the Houthis,” according to The Associated Press. “He said the coalition has secured ‘air protection’ of the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait and destroyed hundreds of Houthi targets as part of the ongoing campaign.”

After Yemeni officials announced the new counteroffensive on Sunday, al-Maliki vowed “full operational support” to the Yemeni government forces, until the Houthis are “eliminated,” the AP added.

On Monday, the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC), an organization closely aligned with the Houthis, confirmed increased Saudi airstrikes and threatened a response. HOCC warned “all airlines operating in Saudi airspace that it is unsafe, with the exception of the airspace over ‘Mecca and Medina,'” the official Houthi Telegram channel reported.

HOCC did not elaborate on that warning.

While TWZ cannot verify these claims, independent Yemen analyst Mohammed al-Basha said it appears that the anti-Houthi forces have gained ground on the Red Sea coast.

The founder of the widely quoted Basha Report stated on X that he had “high confidence” that Yemeni government forces recaptured Dhobab Airport, “cutting off the Houthi supply route between Mocha and Bab al-Mandab.” He added that “Southern Giants Forces are now heading towards the city of Dhobab, Al-Omari Camp, and Bab al-Mandab.”

بثقة عالية
الساعة العاشرة صباح الاثنين ٥ أكتوبر
استعادة مطار ذوباب وقطع طريق إمداد الحوثي بين المخا وباب المندب
قوات العمالقة الجنوبية الان تتجه نحو مدينة ذوباب ومعسكر العمري وباب المندب https://t.co/6eHYJ3cnza

— Basha باشا (@BashaReport) October 5, 2026

Videos have emerged showing what appears to be Saudi-backed forces running over Houthi fighters. The Houthis have called this a war crime.

Several videos emerging of Saudi-backed government forces driving over and shooting fleeing Houthi fighters caught off guard by their offensive in southwestern Yemen.

Pretty mad. pic.twitter.com/HGo1kGboPW

— Status-6 (@Archer83Able) October 5, 2026

Amid the spike in fighting, the State Department issued a new warning to Americans in Saudi Arabia.

“Due to the ongoing security situation in Saudi Arabia and the potential for aerial drone or missile attacks on Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Mission strongly encourages all U.S. citizens to remain vigilant and follow the guidance of national alerts released by Saudi Arabia’s Civil Defense,” the department stated on X.

Saudi Arabia: Due to the ongoing security situation in Saudi Arabia and the potential for aerial drone or missile attacks on Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Mission strongly encourages all U.S. citizens to remain vigilant and follow the guidance of national alerts released by Saudi… pic.twitter.com/QzVaER1WZ8

— TravelGov (@TravelGov) October 5, 2026

Yemen Dawn was launched in the wake of large-scale Houthi advances. As we noted earlier in this story, the rebel group captured the port of Mokha and two key islands in the Red Sea, increasing its control over the Bab al-Mandab Strait (BAM). That moved the front lines to the key city of Taiz, which sits astride a major roadway linking it to the port city of Aden. The Houthis recently captured strategic hilltops near Taiz, advancing on the last road between the city and Aden, which serves as the interim capital of the Yemeni government.

The conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis grew out of a civil war in Yemen that erupted in 2014. It expanded a year later when a Saudi-led coalition joined forces with the government ousted by the Houthis and raged on until the parties reached a tenuous ceasefire in 2022. The Saudis held off on getting involved in the recent Red Sea conflict which saw the U.S. and coalition warships duking it out with the Houthis, and eventually led to a U.S.-led air campaign over Yemen. Tensions, however, reignited after that conflict ended when the Houthis joined the U.S.-Iran conflict on the side of their major supporter.

Earlier this year, the Houthis imposed a blockade on the BAM and began striking Saudi ships in the southern part of the Red Sea as well as targeting critical energy terminals on that body of water and Saudi refineries. Iranian proxies have also struck the vital East-West pipeline that carries oil to the Red Sea to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran has vastly curtailed shipping after the launch of Operation Epic Fury. That line has reportedly since reopened after being shut down following a long-range drone attack.

On Monday, Turkey and Pakistan said they will undertake a “rapid deployment” of troops to Saudi Arabia under the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, a pact designed to assist the Kingdom’s fight against the Houthis, the Middle East Eye reported. 

“The announcement on Monday came after representatives of the three countries held an emergency meeting in Riyadh where they condemned recent attacks on Saudi Arabia, in particular those targeting the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, without mentioning the Houthis by name,” the publication added.

Concern about maintaining the flow of energy resources from the region has spurred France and the U.K. to send additional forces to help the Saudis.

As we reported two weeks ago, French President Emmanuel Macron said he was sending “soldiers, radar systems and defense ⁠systems, to protect” the Kingdom’s Yanbu oil facilities. Two days before Macron’s announcement, U.K.’s  Royal Air Force (RAF) said it would deploy one of its Voyager aerial refueling jets to help Saudi Arabia defend against Houthi attacks. As with the French move, it is a response to concerns about the flow of oil.

You can see Macron’s announcement in the following video.

Nous agissons pour protéger nos compatriotes des conséquences de la crise au Moyen-Orient. Objectifs : sécuriser les approvisionnements et faire baisser les prix à la pompe. pic.twitter.com/kvrgHcV4E4

— Emmanuel Macron (@EmmanuelMacron) September 24, 2026

The U.S. also appears to be increasing its assistance to Saudi Arabia. Though President Donald Trump turned down the Kingdom’s request to directly attack the Houthis, the U.S. is “providing aerial refueling for Saudi warplanes conducting defensive air patrols,” The New York Times reported on Sunday. That’s in addition to the previously known assistance to Riyadh provided by “more than 200 U.S. intelligence and military analysts working in Saudi command centers helping to analyze and select targets in support of its Yemeni allies,” the newspaper added.

The stark reality, especially facing European leaders like Macron, is that if Saudi oil infrastructure and transport nodes near the Red Sea are destroyed or the pipeline that feeds them is shut down for months, the last major oil lifeline from the region — and especially to Europe — will be closed off, sparking a deeper energy crisis.

Iran has already severely curtailed the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz since the U.S. and Israel attacked it on Feb. 28. The movement of oil has been further impeded by a U.S. blockade on Iranian ports. However, transits have been increasing as of late, thanks in large measure to U.S. military escorts that U.S. Central Command claims have allowed more than a billion barrels of crude to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. 

Still, the price of Brent crude continues to hover over $100 per barrel due to a combination of factors that still make this a very dangerous region. This includes the ongoing threats from the Houthis in the BAM and the aforementioned spike in fighting between the Houthis and Saudi-backed forces. In addition, there are continuing Iranian attacks on shipping, including one today and three over the weekend, the skyrocketing cost of insuring vessels and the possibility Gulf countries may be paying Iran to allow their oil through. Such payments, essentially a toll, are “potentially handing Tehran a significant portion of the value of the cargo,” Al Jazeera noted.

Asked about the Saudi-backed counteroffensive, Trump said “It will all work out very well.”

Question: What's your view on the Saudi and Yemeni counter attack against the Houthis?

TRUMP: It will all work out very well. It's gonna work out very well. pic.twitter.com/L1lCG3GqJV

— Open Source Intel (@Osint613) October 5, 2026

Meanwhile, talks between the U.S. and Iran to end hostilities between the countries remain at an impasse, though the two sides have not directly attacked each other in weeks. The U.S. rejected Iran’s conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and Tehran says it is preparing a reply to the U.S. counterproposal, CBS News reported Monday morning.

For his part, Trump continues to waver, suggesting the U.S. could “leave tomorrow” or resume striking Iran.

Trump on his war in Iran:

We could leave tomorrow. I said 2 or 3 weeks, and the fake news kills me. pic.twitter.com/eEYaGbIgUv

— Headquarters (@HQNewsNow) October 3, 2026

It is far too early to tell whether the new Saudi-backed counteroffensive in Yemen will have any lasting effect on the battlefield. The coalition arrayed against the Houthis isn’t known to be highly robust and the quality of its forces have been in question. Still, it has been clear that the Saudis and their allies had to act strongly, and this would be exactly that.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Houthis Lose Ground Along Strategic Bab Al Mandeb Strait In Saudi-Backed Counteroffensive appeared first on TWZ.

Spain is moving ahead with plans to rebuild its airborne signals intelligence (SIGINT) capability, with the Airbus A321 — part of the highly successful A320 twin-engine airliner family — selected as the basis for three new SIGINT aircraft.

The choice is disclosed in the latest issue of Spain’s Revista de Aeronáutica y Astronáutica, the Ministry of Defense’s official publication. Airbus and Indra are currently working on the program’s conceptual design under the Santiago II initiative, which aims to deliver a crewed platform capable of collecting and processing intelligence across the electromagnetic spectrum.

The program is intended to restore a capability Spain lost when its last Boeing 707 SIGINT aircraft was retired in 2014. Equipped with Israeli SIGINT equipment, this 707 was designated TM.17-4 in Spanish service, and nicknamed Reina del Espectro (Queen of the Spectrum).

También del #47Grupo el #Boeing 707-351C (TM.17-4 / 47-04) "BRUJO". #BASanJavier @EjercitoAire @SpottersMurcia pic.twitter.com/RB3Dcpn7Qp

— Salvador Marín (@05derecha) April 17, 2020

It served in the 47th Mixed Air Force Group, alongside four Dassault Falcon 20s (designated TM.11 in Spain), that were used for navigation aid calibration, remote sensing, and electronic warfare training.

The new aircraft will have to undergo extensive modification, including the installation of antennas, receivers, signal-processing equipment, operator consoles, communications systems and associated electrical and cooling infrastructure.

Indra is expected to provide much of the mission-system architecture. The company’s AirSign concept, unveiled in 2023, incorporated COMINT and ELINT sensors alongside data fusion, real-time signal analysis, communications, and command-and-control functions.

While COMINT is concerned primarily with collecting intelligence from communications, ELINT focuses on non-communications electromagnetic emissions, including radar signals. Together, these capabilities provide a much fuller intelligence picture of not only what the enemy is doing in terms of their electronic emissions, but what they are planning, and their processes of operation.

Bizjets have become the platform of choice for many new intelligence aircraft, particularly where operators want a relatively low-cost, long-endurance platform with a smaller logistical footprint. Aircraft such as the Bombardier Global 6000/6500, Gulfstream G550, and Dassault Falcon 8X have been adapted for electronic intelligence and special-mission roles.

Spain’s decision to use the substantially larger A321 points instead toward the other end of the spectrum, providing significantly more room for antennas, processing hardware and crew, and allowing the aircraft to carry a much larger and more power-hungry mission system than the typical bizjet-based SIGINT platform.

At one time, the A321 was envisaged as the platform for NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, which provides the alliance with reconnaissance capabilities, including synthetic aperture radar. However, this capability was eventually fielded on NATO’s fleet of five RQ-4D Phoenix uncrewed aerial vehicles, specialized versions of the Global Hawk.

Elsewhere in Europe, Airbus launched a risk-assessment study for France’s future maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), also to be based on an A321 platform. Billed as a “flying frigate” by the company, the new MPA is intended to replace the French Navy’s Dassault Atlantique 2 fleet and emerges at a time when NATO nations are increasingly adopting the in-production Boeing P-8 Poseidon for their maritime patrol requirements.

Airbus does, however, have relevant experience in the conversion of airliners for military roles. The company’s A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aircraft are modified at Airbus’s Getafe facility, providing an existing industrial base for converting commercial-derived aircraft into specialized military platforms.

The Santiago II program is currently in its definition phase. Spain awarded Airbus and Indra a €16-million ($17.9-million), 18-month contract to study the platform and define the overall system. A subsequent phase will cover modification and integration of the three aircraft. The Spanish Ministry of Defense estimates the complete program at approximately €436 million ($489 million).

The program also has an industrial objective. Spanish authorities want domestic industry to acquire expertise and control over the integration of the SIGINT system, rather than simply purchasing a finished foreign intelligence aircraft.

The A321-based Santiago II fleet is intended to address the shortfall left by the retirement of the specially modified Boeing 707, providing a substantially more modern platform, and with more airframes for improved availability.

The three new aircraft will also complement Spain’s emerging uncrewed SIGINT capability. The Spanish Air and Space Force is introducing the L3Harris Scalable Open Architecture Reconnaissance (SOAR) system on its Predator B drones, giving the fleet ELINT and COMINT collection capabilities. The two systems are likely to fill different niches: the Predator B offers a relatively persistent, lower-cost uncrewed collection option, while the much larger A321 will provide substantially greater payload capacity, onboard processing, and crewed mission-management capabilities. Together, they will give Spain a layered airborne SIGINT architecture.

Spain’s decision also reflects a broader drive to invest in long-range SIGINT platforms capable of collecting, processing, and fusing vast amounts of electromagnetic data, as competition over the electromagnetic spectrum becomes increasingly central to modern warfare.

If the program remains on schedule, three heavily modified A321s will eventually provide Spain with a persistent airborne capability to detect, classify, locate, and analyze electromagnetic emitters in support of a host of operations. Especially when paired with the Predator B, the capability will likely be of considerable interest to other NATO partners in Europe, too.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Spain Picks Airbus A321 For New Electronic Intelligence Aircraft appeared first on TWZ.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has retired the last of its P-3 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. The AEW version is instantly recognizable from the saucer-like radar dome on top, as seen on other AEW types like the E-2 Hawkeye and the E-3 Sentry. CBP was the only operator of this variant of the P-3 Orion and is said to have been the only law enforcement agency to fly any kind of dedicated AEW plane. The retirement of these aircraft comes at a time when American AEW assets, in general, are under heavy strain by demands globally.

CBP officially retired its final P-3 AEW on September 30, 2026, after a final flight from National Air Security Operations Center Jacksonville (NASOC Jacksonville), in Jacksonville, Florida. CBP has also flown Long Range Tracker (LRT) variants of the P-3, configured for more traditional maritime surveillance missions. The current plans for the LRT aircraft, and whether their sunset may also be on the horizon, are not immediately clear, and TWZ has reached out for more information. Orions of all types have been steadily disappearing from service with the U.S. military and elsewhere across the U.S. government as the aging aircraft become more difficult to operate and maintain.

End of the Road: AMO’s Iconic P-3 Dome Takes Its Final Flight!

On September 30, 2026, the distinct silhouette of a four-engine turboprop carrying its massive rotating radar dome touched down for the final time at the National Air Security Operations Center in Jacksonville.

Our… pic.twitter.com/doT9TZYJzD

— CBP AMO (@CBPAMO) October 1, 2026

“Our Jacksonville-based P-3 AEW fleet has served as a cornerstone of America’s outer-layer border security,” according to a brief announcement from CBP about the retirement on social media. “Its crews flew far beyond our borders, providing wide-area surveillance across the Caribbean, Gulf of America [Gulf of Mexico], and the transit zones of Central and South America, helping detect and track threats before they could reach the United States.”

By all indications, including official CBP sources, the P-3 AEW fleet consisted of eight aircraft at its peak. There is a confusingly worded 2014 CBP press release that mentions an “11th and final Lockheed Martin P-3 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft overhaul,” but that figure looks to also include three of the six LRT versions. The same release says that CBP only had 14 P-3s of all types at that time.

What was then known as the U.S. Customs Service (USCS) first began operating the P-3 AEW version in the late 1980s. The aircraft were converted from second-hand maritime patrol variants of the Orion. The first example had started life as a P-3B for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). Ex-U.S. Navy P-3s were also converted.

The initial three P-3 AEWs were equipped with the AN/APS-138 radar. The same radar was used on early E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning and control aircraft operated by the U.S. Navy, as well as several other armed forces internationally.

“The Customs Service had previously borrowed U.S. Navy E-2Cs to meet its antinarcotics surveillance requirements, but required an aircraft with longer range and on-station time,” according to a 2006 report from Forecast International. “In June 1989, the U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report on the drug interdiction P-3B AEW aircraft. The findings indicated that the radar performance was as specified, but the P-3B (when compared to the E-2C) was less costly to operate per square mile of area covered because of the higher cruising speed and longer endurance. The P-3B had at least twice the in-flight endurance of the E-2C.”

Starting in the 1990s, USCS began the process of acquiring additional P-3 AEWs with newer AN/APS-145 radars, as also used on later model E-2Cs. The original AEW Orions were eventually refitted with APS-145s, as well. It’s worth noting here that the U.S. Coast Guard separately moved to acquire an AEW version of the C-130H, designated the EC-130V, in the 1990s, which used the AN/APS-125 radar, also used on older E-2s. Budget cuts led to the end of that program. The EC-130V that had been built was redesignated as an NC-130H and subsequently used for test purposes.

The P-3 AEWs were also equipped with a sensor turret containing electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) video cameras, allowing the aircraft to more closely investigate targets spotted on radar. CBP regularly conducted P-3 operations that paired AEWs with LRT variants to provide an even broader array of sensor capabilities on missions. The LRTs have EO/IR sensor turrets, as well as AN/APG-66 and SeaVue radars. The pulse-doppler AN/APG-66 is primarily designed for spotting and tracking aerial targets, and was originally used on early variants of the F-16 fighter. SeaVue is a multi-function type with surface search and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery modes. Images produced via SAR are highly detailed maps of the surface below, and can be captured day or night, and regardless of any cloud cover, smoke, or dust. 

Beyond radars and other sensors, the P-3 AEWs also had a robust communications suite consisting of VHF and UHF radios, as well as satellite communications links by the end of their career. CBP’s entire P-3 fleet, including the AEWs and LRTs, has received various updates over the years, including new ‘glass cockpits’ starting in the early 2000s.

Though primarily employed in support of counter-narcotics interdiction operations, the airborne radar and command and control capabilities were also applied to other missions, including disaster relief and humanitarian assistance efforts at home and abroad. As an example, CBP’s P-3 AEWs helped with air traffic coordination, as well as provided other support, during relief efforts in Texas in the wake of Hurricane Harvey in 2017.

At the same time, CBP’s entire P-3 fleet, including both the AEW and LRT versions, has only been getting increasingly older and difficult to sustain. The P-3B variant first entered U.S. Navy service in the 1960s. CBP did put its P-3s through a Service Life Extension Program overhaul in the 2010s, which included “new wings and tail for each aircraft and completely strips down the aircraft to its bare metal for an inspection,” according to a 2014 press release.

As mentioned, the P-3 family has been in steadily dwindling service in the United States, overall, in recent years. The U.S. Navy has completely retired the Orion as a maritime patrol platform, and the service has also fully divested its more specialized EP-3 intelligence-gathering variants. The Navy had retained a small number of P-3s for research and development and test and evaluation activities, but growing sustainment challenges have been prompting the retirement of those planes, as well. The last NP-3C assigned to the Navy’s Scientific Development Squadron One (VXS-1), the “Warlocks,” was also retired last month. VXS-1 previously operated a ‘domed’ NP-3D, similar to, but distinct from, CBP’s P-3 AEWs, as well. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is also in the process of replacing its pair of P-3s, configured as civilian hurricane hunter aircraft, with new C-130J Hercules-based platforms. The shrinking U.S. Orion operator base can only have a knock-on impact on CBP P-3 operations.

A key question now is how CBP will fill any gaps left by the retirement of the final AEW version. The agency does continue to operate a mix of other crewed fixed-wing aircraft with mixtures of radars and other sensors, as well as MQ-9 drones, but none of these platforms are equipped with a sensor like the AN/APS-145. CBP also has a network of tethered aerostats with radars at fixed sites around the Caribbean. As an aside, General Atomics, together with Saab, is now working on an AEW configuration for the MQ-9B drone, but there are no known U.S. orders for that capability at the time of writing. That platform will not offer the same level of flexibility and look-down capability as modern crewed AEW aircraft, either. Look-down AEW capability is only growing in importance today amid expanding and evolving drone threats, including to the U.S. homeland.

High demand for AEW support, in general, means that the U.S. military regularly steps in to provide additional coverage with U.S. Navy E-2s and U.S. Air Force E-3s to aid in U.S. counter-drug operations around Latin America. Newer E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes notably have far more powerful radars than the E-2C or the P-3 AEW, with added surface search and track capability, too. At the same time, as mentioned at the start, those assets are in heavy demand, especially in light of the conflict with Iran. On top of that, the Air Force’s E-3 fleet is facing serious sustainment challenges itself, with replacement E-7 Wedgetail aircraft still years away from being delivered.

The Air Force, in particular, is also aiming to eventually push most, if not all, air moving-target indicator (AMTI) tasks currently performed by aircraft like the E-3 and E-7 into space. The service is heavily investing to accelerate the fielding of those capabilities, which could eventually offer revolutionary constant, persistent coverage globally. The first of those satellites are still not expected to reach an early operational state until 2028. It is possible that CBP could get access to a tailored data feed from this system when it does become operational. It still does not obviate the need to have crewed or uncrewed aircraft capable of more closely investigating tracks of interest using EO/IR cameras and other sensors.

Whatever the future might now hold, CBP’s unique time as the operator of the P-3 AEW aircraft has come to an end.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post The P-3 Orion Airborne Early Warning Aircraft Has Flown Its Last Mission appeared first on TWZ.

U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancer bombers that had been deployed to RAF Fairford in the U.K. since operation Epic Fury have returned to their home stations, a U.S. defense official confirmed to TWZ. The hasty movement was reportedly sparked by new Iranian threats against the base, although the Pentagon doesn’t confirm that assertion.

The sudden withdrawal came a week after a major incident was declared near Fairford following the arrest of five men on suspicion of driving bomb-laden vans toward it. They were later released on bail after no explosives were found. However, Counter-Terrorism police are continuing the investigation and said they were considering ​whether a foreign ​state had ⁠been involved. On Wednesday, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham said the incident might have had an Iranian ​link.

The Wall Street Journal was the first to report the departure.

Bomber strikes launched from Fairford, which included ones executed by both B-1s and B-52s, were a central aspect of major U.S. combat operations against Iran earlier this year. In addition, the installation is a major hub for U.S. military aircraft in the United Kingdom. It is a regular host of strategic assets, including bombers and U-2 spy planes. It also acts as a pit stop for other aircraft, including fighters, that are being ferried to and from the United States.

The U.S. withdrew all 12 B-1s “after commanders received new threats about an Iran-backed plot against the installation,” The New York Times reported, citing two U.S. officials.

“The withdrawal was highly unusual: Such moves are rarely made so quickly from an allied air base in a peacetime country thousands of miles from a combat zone,” the publication added. “The need to move the bombers out of the base, R.A.F. Fairford, was deemed so urgent that some of the planes and their flight crews left while aerial refueling aircraft were still being scrambled to support their flights to the United States. At least three of the planes had landed at their home base in South Dakota by Sunday.”

U.S. officials declined to tell the Times the specific nature of the new information that prompted the Lancer withdrawal, some of which had just arrived in the past week as part of a normal rotation of forces to maintain the B-1 forward presence in Europe.

“One U.S. official said the new information was part of the same threat warnings that surfaced three weeks ago, but specific details and a sense of urgency spiked in the past 24 hours, alarming commanders,” the publication noted.

As we previously reported, Tehran directly threatened RAF Fairford in July over its use as a base to launch attacks against Iran.

“The American aggressor army, which used to launch cruise missiles from its vessels in the Indian Ocean in its aggression after the official resumption of the war, with the end of the missile reserves of the aforementioned vessels, yesterday switched to using B1 planes flying from Fairford Air Base, England,” Tasnim News Agency, a quasi-state outlet in Iran with ties to the country’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), claimed on Telegram on July 23. “As the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also stated, any base that is used to invade Iran’s territory is our legitimate goal.”

the enemy must pay the price for its breach of promises, and this time we will not allow America to use deceptive ceasefires to replenish its oil and ammunition stockpiles and then resume attacks once again.

— Press TV (@PressTV) July 23, 2026

Local aircraft spotters and aviation photographers began to notice the aircraft departing in large numbers earlier on Sunday.

The aircraft left in several waves, according to the DefenceGeek X account, run by the senior editor of the U.K. Defence Journal.

IN FULL: US Bomber Force Withdrawal from RAF Fairford #IranWar‌

OK so now we know the full scale of this withdrawal, here's the details – 10 of the 12 B-1B "Lancer" bombers remaining at the base (including the aircraft that only arrived 6 days ago on a rotation) are heading… pic.twitter.com/LSBHuomAcz

— DefenceGeek (@DefenceGeek) October 4, 2026

B-1 MAYAN42 departing for home just now it was with MAYAN41 86-0111 which only recently arrived at RAF Fairford suggesting not a rotation. That's 10 today now. pic.twitter.com/sfvDjmgdgK

— Saint1 (@Saint1Mil) October 4, 2026

The defense official who confirmed the withdrawal said the aircraft movements won’t affect overall readiness.

“The Airmen that operate America’s bomber force, including B-1s, B-2s, and B-52s, remain ready to deliver precision global strike capabilities – including through operations that launch and recover from the continental United States – anywhere, anytime,” the official added.

When we asked the Pentagon about the retrograde movement of bombers from the U.K., they did not confirm the security issue that prompted it, stating:

“U.S. Air Force bombers routinely operate around the world to support global force readiness and operational requirements. While operational security precluded us from confirming the movement of our assets and forces in real-time, we can acknowledge now that all U.S. bombers that were deployed to RAF Fairford have re-deployed to their home stations in the United States. The Airmen that operate America’s bomber force, including B-1s, B-2s, and B-52s, remain ready to deliver precision global strike capabilities – including through operations that launch and recover from the continental United States – anywhere, anytime.”

Regardless, this is the first time in months that RAF Fairford has not hosted U.S. bombers.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post B-1B Bombers Make Hasty Departure From England appeared first on TWZ.

Welcome to Bunker Talk. This is a weekend open discussion post for the best commenting crew on the net, in which we can chat about all the stuff that went on this week that we didn’t cover. We can also talk about the stuff we did or whatever else grabs your interest. In other words, it’s an off-topic thread.

This week’s caption reads:

NANTWICH, ENGLAND – MAY 24: The BBC broadcasting studio inside the former RAF Hack Green secret nuclear bunker on May 24, 2023 in Nantwich, England. Hack Green played a central role in the defence of Britain for almost sixty years. It was chosen during WW2 to protect the land between Birmingham and Liverpool from hostile attack and as a location for the new RADAR equipment. The bunker went on to be used for shelter and protection during the Cold War. As relations between East and West thawed many of the UK’s nuclear bunkers were sold off. The Secret Bunker is now privately owned by the Siebert family and is run as a museum trust. (Photo by Christopher Furlong/Getty Images)

PRIME DIRECTIVES:

• If you want to talk politics, do so respectfully and know that there’s always somebody that isn’t going to agree with you. 
• If you have political differences, hash it out respectfully, stick to the facts, and no childish name-calling or personal attacks of any kind. If you can’t handle yourself in that manner, then please, discuss virtually anything else.
• No drive-by garbage political memes. No conspiracy theory rants. Links to crackpot sites will be axed, too. Trolling and shitposting will not be tolerated. No obsessive behavior about other users. Just don’t interact with folks you don’t like. 
• Do not be a sucker and feed trolls! That’s as much on you as on them. Use the mute button if you don’t like what you see.  
• So unless you have something of quality to say, know how to treat people with respect, understand that everyone isn’t going to subscribe to your exact same worldview, and have come to terms with the reality that there is no perfect solution when it comes to moderation of a community like this, it’s probably best to just move on. 
• Finally, as always, report offenders, please. This doesn’t mean reporting people who don’t share your political views, but we really need your help in this regard.

The post Bunker Talk: Let’s Talk About All The Things We Did And Didn’t Cover This Week appeared first on TWZ.

The volume of munitions expended in the course of U.S. operations against Iran this year has been and continues to be a hot topic of discussion, and there has been relatively little official data provided on this front. However, now we know that the F/A-18F Super Hornets of the U.S. Navy’s Strike Fighter Squadron 41 (VFA-41), the “Black Aces,” launched 421 missiles and bombs during their time supporting Operation Epic Fury.

This new insight into VFA-41’s role in the conflict with Iran comes from a photo of a large board listing the squadron’s weapons expenditures during Epic Fury, via Jeff Rojas, who goes by the handle @jro_photography on Instagram. Rojas also shared pictures recently taken of VFA-41’s Super Hornets. The Black Aces were one of the squadrons assigned to the Nimitz class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, which has been on a marathon deployment since last year. The carrier only left the Middle East region last month and is now set to formally return home to San Diego, California, within days. Per the Pentagon’s official timeline, Operation Epic Fury began on February 28 and concluded on May 5, though U.S. forces have continued to conduct strikes on Iran, on and off, since then.

The complete tally of munitions employed as shown on the board, broken down by type, from greatest to fewest, is as follows:

• 173 GBU-38/B 500-pound-class Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) GPS-assisted precision-guided bombs
• 52 GBU-31(V)4/B 2,000-pound-class JDAMs
• 48 GBU-54/B 500-pound-class dual-mode Laser JDAMs (LJDAM)
• 41 AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) precision-guided glide bombs
• 33 AIM-9X Sidewinder air-to-air missiles
• 30 GBU-31(V)2/B 2,000-pound-class JDAMs
• 27 GBU-32/B 1,000-pound-class JDAMs
• 10 AGM-84K Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) land attack cruise missiles
• 6 AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM)
• 1 GBU-12/B 500-pound-class Paveway II laser-guided precision-guided bomb

The total cost of all of these munitions, using available data from U.S. military budget documents, is very roughly $43,646,000, at least. Unit costs fluctuate regularly due to a variety of factors. Furthermore, the exact price tag for different JDAMs can be somewhat difficult to calculate given how the individual components are budgeted.

The JDAM is really a family of kits that turn standard unguided ‘iron bombs,’ which can vary significantly in the kinds of effects they are designed to produce, into warheads for precision-guided munitions. This is exemplified by the (V)2 and (V)4 subvariants of the GBU-31/B mentioned here, which are built using standard high-explosive and bunker-buster bombs, respectively. No specific subvariants of the GBU-32, GBU-38, or GBU-54 were mentioned in the information provided. Standard JDAMs can also only be employed against static target coordinates. The LJDAM kits add a laser guidance component (akin to what is found on Paveway-series bombs) that enables strikes against moving targets.

No specific version of AGM-154 is mentioned, either, but the C and C-1 types, which have multi-stage bunker-busting warheads, are the only ones understood to be in service today. Remaining A variants, which were loaded with 145 small bomblets, were removed from U.S. service in 2008 as a result of new guidelines on cluster munitions issued under President George W. Bush. A planned AGM-154B, which would have contained six “smart” Sensor Fuzed Munition bomblets, was never produced. You can read more about the full JSOW family here.

2/2 https://t.co/DRQuyMTwNa

— Guy Plopsky (@GuyPlopsky) March 8, 2026

We do not know exactly what targets any of these munitions were employed against. However, a picture that Jeff Rojas grabbed of one of VFA-41’s Super Hornets, seen toward the top of this story and in part below, shows a very interesting broken submarine kill marking, with the added text “Sub Buster.” The jet also has a number of more typical bomb-shaped kill marks.

Iranian naval vessels, including the country’s Russian-made Kilo class and other submarines, were top priority targets during Epic Fury. The U.S. military has previously confirmed that air-launched AGM-114 Hellfire laser-guided missiles (likely fired from MQ-9 Reaper drones) and ground-launched Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short-range ballistic missiles were employed against submarines, specifically.

The video montage in the social media post below includes a clip, starting at 0:13 in the runtime, of a Hellfire missile hitting what looks to be a Ghadir class diesel-electric midget submarine in port.

U.S. forces are degrading the Iranian regime's ability to project power at sea and harass international shipping. For years, Iranian forces have threatened freedom of navigation in waters essential to American, regional and global security and prosperity. pic.twitter.com/gIBN02mowh

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) March 10, 2026

Bunker-busting JDAMs are also known to have been key munitions employed during strikes on targets in Iran during Epic Fury. TWZ previously called explicit attention to the employment of JSOW in the opening phases of the operation, as well. Navy strike fighter squadrons made significant use of SLAM-ERs in strikes against Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen last year, too.

Honest Abe is burning through the JSOWs like crazy. https://t.co/rQMZPBnwAz

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) March 1, 2026

1/ Aside from the launch of F/A-18E/Fs armed with JSOW C/C-1s, the video also shows F/A-18Es armed with SLAM-ER ATAs parked on the fligh deck. https://t.co/3TC4kKIn17 pic.twitter.com/OqQBbRrYGY

— Guy Plopsky (@GuyPlopsky) March 16, 2025

It is extremely likely that the AIM-9Xs and AIM-120s were fired at Iranian drones, though they could have been launched at incoming cruise missiles, as well. At the time of writing, there are no known or reported instances of U.S. military jets engaging crewed Iranian aircraft in the course of the conflict to date. In 2024, the Navy carried out a crash program that increased the total number of AIM-9Xs that F/A-18E/Fs could carry per sortie, specifically in response to Houthi drone threats. Super Hornets loaded with nine air-to-air missiles are now referred to as “Murder Hornets.”

Notably absent in VFA-41’s tally is any mention of 70mm laser-guided Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) rockets. Air-to-air optimized versions of the APKWS II are now part of the arsenal available to U.S. Air Force F-16C Vipers, F-15E Strike Eagles, and A-10 Warthogs, and have become the service’s go-to aerial weapon for engaging drones. In February, the U.S. Marine Corps disclosed that it was working to integrate this capability onto its legacy F/A-18C/D Hornets. Whether the Navy has any such plans for the Super Hornet is unclear.

It is also important to remember that this is a discussion of the munitions expended by just one Navy strike fighter squadron. Lincoln‘s air wing includes four strike squadrons, three with Super Hornets and one with F-35Cs, as well as units flying other types of aircraft and helicopters. The carrier was just one part of a much larger array of air, naval, and ground forces that participated in Operation Epic Fury and subsequent operations against Iran. For additional context, consider that the entire Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group, including its entire air wing and escorting ships, fired off 770 munitions in total, by the official count, during very active combat operations in and around the Red Sea between November 2023 and June 2024.

All of this speaks to the larger matter of how many munitions the U.S. military has expended in the course of operations against Iran this year, which is now fueling concerns about the sufficiency of remaining stockpiles and what it will take to replenish them.

As such, the tally of munitions launched from VFA-41 Super Hornets offers a very interesting view into that squadron’s contributions to Operation Epic Fury, as well as the full scale and scope of the conflict with Iran.

Special thanks again to Jeff Rojas for sharing the details about VFA-41’s participation in Operation Epic Fury and his pictures with us.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post All The Weapons A Single Navy Fighter Squadron Launched During Operation Epic Fury appeared first on TWZ.

Germany is moving ahead with plans to give its unusually large F125 frigates a medium-range air-defense capability, helping address one of the most conspicuous weaknesses of a four-ship class that has long attracted attention for having relatively little combat power for its size.

Diehl Defense and Germany’s Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) have signed a contract to adapt and develop the IRIS-T SLM surface-to-air missile system for operational use aboard the German Navy’s F125 frigates. Under the agreement, Diehl will build prototypes and conduct comprehensive test firings intended to validate the system’s integration and performance within the existing F125 architecture. Each frigate will be fitted with two new launchers, each capable of holding 16 missiles, for a total of 32.

“The aim is to make the system mission-capable on the German Navy’s F125 frigates,” Diehl said in today’s announcement. The company described the prototype construction and test-firing phase as necessary to ensure “the seamless integration and maximum performance” of IRIS-T SLM within the frigate’s existing architecture.

The program has moved notably quickly, reflecting the urgency of the requirement.

Germany began examining the feasibility of integrating IRIS-T SLM with the F125 in 2024, with BAAINBw and Diehl studying the technical risks and requirements of adapting the normally land-based system for shipboard use. That effort led to the development of a navalized demonstrator in 2025. In October of that year, the F125 frigate Baden-Württemberg took part in a German Navy Maritime Firing Exercise off Andøya, Norway, carrying an experimental anti-air warfare module based on IRIS-T SLM. Diehl says the module went from concept to firing in less than 10 months and met all established test and evaluation objectives.

The Bundeswehr subsequently reported that Baden-Württemberg fired three live IRIS-T SLM missiles during the exercise. The ship’s radar supplied target data to the missile system, demonstrating the basic integration between the F125’s sensors and the navalized air defense architecture.

The exercise established that the concept could work at sea; the contract signed now is intended to turn that demonstration into a qualified fleet capability.

The German parliament’s Budget Committee approved the adaptation effort on September 23, with the German Defense Ministry describing it as a means of expanding the F125’s self-defense capabilities in response to the current air threat. The ministry also pointed to IRIS-T SLM’s combat experience in Ukraine.

The effort needs to be seen in the context of why the F125 has been such a controversial warship in the first place.

As TWZ examined in 2017, the F125 is a roughly 7,200-ton, 490-foot warship with an unusually small core crew and a concept of operations centered on long-duration deployments, stabilization missions, crisis management, conflict prevention, and international intervention rather than high-end fleet combat. The class was designed to spend long periods away from Germany and operate with relatively modest manpower requirements.

But its armament does not remotely match the size and sophistication of the hull. As completed, the ships were equipped with eight RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, a 127mm gun, remotely operated guns and, for close-quarters air defense, two RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile launchers. The F125 has no medium- or long-range surface-to-air missile capability and no organic sonar or dedicated anti-submarine warfare weapon system.

At the same time, the TRS-4D/NR radar and other sensors can see far beyond the engagement envelope of the close-in air-defense weapons, but there is little the ship itself can do with that information against an aircraft or incoming missile at medium range.

Nearly a decade later, IRIS-T SLM is emerging as an answer to at least part of that problem.

Even with IRIS-T SLM, the F125 is well short of being an air warfare destroyer. It also still lacks an organic anti-submarine warfare capability or the kind of large vertical-launch missile battery found on Germany’s F124 frigates.

However, it does fill a gap between the F125’s original short-range defenses and the capabilities of other ships or aircraft operating around it.

IRIS-T SLM is designed as a medium-range surface-to-air system, with an engagement range of around 25 miles and an altitude envelope of approximately 65,000 feet. As shown in the 2025 demonstration, the F125’s radar can feed information directly into the missile system, exploiting the ship’s existing sensor capabilities.

Rather than rely heavily on escorts for protection against airborne threats outside the short range of RAM, an IRIS-T-equipped F125 could at least contribute to its own medium-range air defense. Recent operations in the Middle East have underscored the importance of this in contested maritime environments.

It also gives the ships a more useful role in a task group. The threat environment has changed substantially since the F125’s original concept was drafted. Cruise missiles, drones, loitering munitions, and increasingly sophisticated aircraft mean that even ships operating away from a major naval war can face threats well beyond the range of their existing close-in defenses.

In November 2024, Germany confirmed that the F125 frigate Baden-Württemberg, returning from an Indo-Pacific deployment, would avoid the Red Sea and sail around Africa because of the Houthi missile and drone threat. The German Defense Ministry explicitly cited the ship’s limited air defense capability and its inability to provide an effective air-defense umbrella for itself or its accompanying replenishment ship.

Ironically, the F125’s large hull, extensive electrical power, sophisticated radar, substantial aviation facilities, long endurance and relatively spacious mission areas were always supposed to provide room for a flexible approach to future missions. Yet the class’s original weight and integration constraints made adding major weapons difficult, a concern TWZ also highlighted in 2017.

IRIS-T SLM offers Germany a way to add a meaningful capability without undertaking the much more invasive redesign associated with installing a conventional vertical-launch system. The 2025 demonstration used an AAW module mounted on the ship’s deck rather than a conventional VLS installation, and today’s program is focused on adapting the system to the F125 architecture.

Once IRIS-T SLM is installed, the F125 will still be an unusual frigate. It is enormous by the standards of its mission, optimized for endurance, and lacks some of the weapons traditionally associated with a high-end surface combatant. But it will bring more to a contested fight.

The program should give the class a credible medium-range air-defense role, and provide Germany with a way to get considerably more utility out of four ships whose original design philosophy was always somewhat controversial.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Germany Is Finally Giving Its F125 Frigates Some More Teeth With IRIS-T SLM Surface-To-Air Missiles appeared first on TWZ.

Seven companies are said to now be in the running to develop a lower-cost and highly modular drone to succeed the MQ-9A Reaper. Though the field has some well-established entrants and some far lesser known names, the inclusion of Otto Aerospace in this group is particularly unexpected and interesting to examine. Otto has made bold, but still unrealized pronouncements about disrupting the aviation industry with potentially revolutionary high-efficiency designs that could have civilian and military applications. TWZ has been steadily tracking the company’s developments since we first reported on the existence of the Celera 500L aircraft back in 2017.

Air & Space Forces Magazine first reported on Wednesday that Otto Aerospace (previously Otto Aviation), as well as Anduril, Chaos Industries, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Grid Aero, Shield AI, and Swarm Aero, had “made the cut” for the Massed Modular Aircraft (MMA) program, citing anonymous sources. The MMA effort formally kicked off in July, and the Air Force is now aiming to have a fleet of at least 500 of these drones by 2032.

An industry source has also told us that these seven companies are moving ahead in the MMA program. The Air Force has not yet offered an official confirmation.

“The Air Force’s partnership with the Defense Innovation Unit is accelerating requirements development and rapid prototyping by leveraging commercial innovation and reducing timelines,” a spokesperson for the service said when we asked for more information. “We continue working with industry to inform requirements and assess potential solutions as we shape the future MMA capability.”

TWZ has also reached out to all of the companies on the list for more details.

As mentioned, it is unexpected and especially interesting to see Otto named here in the context of MMA. The company’s core design philosophy centers around what is called laminar flow. Broadly speaking, this refers to liquid or gaseous “fluids,” including air, flowing in smooth, regular layers across a surface with little to no mixing between them. In aviation, optimization for laminar flow translates to reduced drag and improved aerodynamic efficiency. This, in turn, can offer a host of benefits, including when it comes to fuel economy, extended range, and overall performance, as well as reductions in operating costs.

With this in mind, all of the designs that Otto has shown to date, starting with the Celera 500L, have been based around teardrop-shaped fuselages to maximize laminar flow benefits. Many of them also feature long, slender glider-like wings. The sudden and unannounced appearance of the very exotic and futuristic-looking Celera 500L at the Southern California Logistics Airport in 2017, at which time nothing was known about the aircraft or its manufacturer, caused a stir in the broader aviation community. TWZ was the first to report on the plane and then unmasked its identity.

On top of the laminar flow-optimized shaping, the Celera 500L was a pusher-propeller design powered by a single high-efficiency, turbocharged, multi-fuel V12 piston engine. A relevant patent held by Otto also describes a novel exhaust system with a heat exchanger that provides an additional boost in thrust.

Otto conducted an extensive test campaign with the Celera 500L, taking the aircraft up to an altitude of 15,000 feet and to a speed of 250 miles per hour. The company posited that this would translate to a cruising speed of around 460 miles per hour at the design’s intended operating ceiling of 50,000 feet.

Development focus at the company has since shifted to the jet-powered Phantom 3500, which has a much revised design compared to the Celera 500L. Otto has said previously that it expects this aircraft to burn just 115 gallons of fuel per hour, further underscoring the benefits of its laminar-flow-centric approach. Comparably sized business jets like the Bombardier Challenger 350, Cessna Citation Latitude, and Embraer Praetor 500 consume around 300 gallons per hour, according to the company, citing data from Jet Support Services, Inc. (JSSI).

It is also worth noting here that Otto has already developed a drone with a “highly laminar-flow efficient airframe” for the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The company announced the successful completion of a flight test campaign in May. The pusher-propeller design has a teardrop-shaped main body, a glider-type main wing, and a T-tail at the end of a boom that extends to the rear of the aircraft. DARPA plans to use that drone to demonstrate laser-based power beaming technology that could be used to relay electricity to forward operating locations. The technology could also dramatically extend the endurance of an electrically-powered drone, potentially allowing it to stay in the air indefinitely.

The drone for DARPA is far too small to meet the Air Force’s MMA requirements. However, “the program leveraged Otto’s aerodynamic expertise to design and flight-test an unmanned vehicle that could inform design parameters for future energy-relay systems or more extremely fuel-efficient, long-endurance platforms,” per a press release Otto put out in May.

TWZ has highlighted in the past how the general range, fuel economy, and other advantages inherent to Otto’s designs could be even more pronounced in a configuration that does not need to support a human crew. Furthermore, Otto has previously shown militarized concepts, crewed and uncrewed. As we’ve written in our earlier coverage of the Celera 500L:

“Though primarily aimed at civilian and commercial operators, Otto’s new website also highlights the potential for the Celera 500L to use its long-range and high fuel economy to support military missions, including transporting personnel and cargo, as well as conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. A version of the aircraft, possibly unmanned, equipped with any number of sensor suites could be an impressive persistent surveillance and communications relay platform able to orbit over particular areas for very long periods of time and cover a wide swath of the battlefield from its high perch. It could also be able to reposition itself quickly and transit to its tasking area at jet-like speeds.”

While we have yet to see an explicit MMA proposal from Otto, a laminar flow-optimized drone could be a very attractive offering, given the program’s focus on reducing costs while having an unrefueled combat radius of at least 2,300 nautical miles, among other capabilities. A more efficient design could further translate to a drone that needs less fuel to meet range and other requirements, which, in turn, could allow for a smaller and/or cheaper design overall. Weight and physical space savings afforded by reduced fuel demand could be used to increase ordnance and other payload capacity, too. You can read more about what is known about the MMA requirements here.

There are more companies beyond Otto in the running. With the Air Force aiming to buy hundreds of MMA drones in the coming years, there will be stiff competition.

General Atomics, which developed and produced the MQ-9A, has publicly put forward its own proposal for a successor, called Wildfire. The new drone draws heavily on experience with the Reaper, as well as other drones in the company’s portfolio, and you can read more about what is known about that design here. General Atomics declined to offer additional comment in response to questions regarding the current state of the MMA program. As an aside, General Atomics is also now on contract to build higher-end FQ-42 Vengeance drones for the Air Force, one of two designs intended for higher-end air combat the service is acquiring under its Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program.

The other company building CCA drones for the Air Force is Anduril, with its FQ-44 Fury, and it has now also been named in relation to the MMA effort. Anduril has unveiled two other very different tactical drones since 2025, the twin-engine hybrid-electric tail-sitting Omen, designed primarily for surveillance and reconnaissance, and Thunder, an armed tiltrotor pitched as an uncrewed companion for crewed rotorcraft. Neither of those uncrewed aircraft would seem to directly align with the stated MMA requirements, but might serve as a starting place. Anduril also has a history now of developing new uncrewed platforms and other systems discreetly, and sharing them with the public only when they have become relatively mature.

What design Shield AI might be offering is unknown. The MMA requirements would seem to sit between the company’s V-BAT drone, which is in service with several armed forces today, including in the United States and Ukraine, and the much higher-end X-BAT that is now in development. Shield AI has been working to expand on the V-BAT design, including plans to integrate air-launched munitions. Both V-BAT and X-BAT are also vertical-takeoff and landing designs. Beyond drones, Shield AI remains a major developer of artificial intelligence-driven autonomy packages for the U.S. military and others.

Earlier this month, newcomer Swarm Aero unveiled a new drone with performance and capabilities that align with the stated MMA requirements earlier this month. Called Gamera, the design has a single propeller at the front of a small central fuselage, together with sponsons holding large fuel cells on either side and a twin-boom tail configuration broadly reminiscent of the OV-10 Bronco light attack aircraft, as TWZ previously reported on in more detail.

Grid Aero is publicly developing a twin-engine cargo drone called the Lifter Lite, in part with funding from AFWERX, the Air Force’s internal technology incubator. Whether the company might work to adapt the Lifter Lite, which has been undergoing testing at least on the ground, to meet the MMA requirements or has proposed something entirely different is not known.

The last firm on the list, Chaos Industries, does not appear to show any drone designs on its website at the time of writing. It is primarily known as a developer of radar systems, especially for use in counter-drone systems. The company declined to comment in response to TWZ queries regarding the MMA program.

To reiterate, the Air Force still has not confirmed the full list of MMA program contenders. Otto’s participation would be a standout, but the field as it is understood now features a number of very established drone makers, as well as emerging start-ups, all vying for a very lucrative opportunity. On top of the potential just to supply hundreds of drones upfront, those uncrewed aircraft look set to be a key part of the Air Force’s force structure for years to come, and will need to be supported throughout their lifecycles. The MMA requirements put heavy emphasis on modularity and open-architecture systems to allow for the rapid integration of new and improved capabilities and functionality down the line.

The Air Force has also previously raised the possibility of selecting multiple vendors to produce designs under the MMA program, or to pursue follow-on rounds of competition to help meet its operations requirements. This is exactly how the service has been running the CCA program, and has already led to the aforementioned production contracts with General Atomics and Anduril. In addition, the Air Force is targeting a base $10 million unit cost for each MMA drone, a price point that would help make losses more tolerable, and could open the door to acquiring a fleet of far more than 500 examples.

It is also important to remember that the Air Force has tried and failed on several occasions to develop and field an MQ-9A replacement. As TWZ has previously explored in great detail, the service’s view of what that drone should be has also evolved over time, with the current MMA program squarely focused on a more affordable option that does not put a heavy premium on survivability. The Air Force has acknowledged potential budget and other hurdles to its new effort. At the same time, heavy continued operational demand for Reapers, coupled with dozens of losses in the course of the war with Iran, as well as other operations in and around the Middle East in recent years, have put major new emphasis on finally finding a successor.

Overall, beyond what is already known about potential MMA offerings, it will be very interesting to see what Otto and the other contenders put forward to finally succeed the iconic Reaper.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Hunt For MQ-9 Reaper Successor Surprisingly Includes Exotic Aircraft Manufacturer Otto Aerospace appeared first on TWZ.

After nearly seven years of waiting, Taiwan has received the first two aircraft from its long-delayed purchase of 66 new-build F-16C/D Block 70 fighters from the United States.

The two single-seat F-16Cs, serials 6727 and 6728, touched down at Chihhang Air Base near Taitung on October 2. They are the first factory-new fighter aircraft delivered to Taiwan in 25 years and mark the beginning of the aircraft acceptance and integration phase of the Republic of China Air Force’s (ROCAF) so-called Peace Phoenix Soaring project.

The two jets have also had an unusually eventful trip to Taiwan.

They began their journey to the island on August 17, flying from Lockheed Martin’s production facility in Greenville, South Carolina, to Hawaii. The aircraft were subsequently forced to remain there for more than a month after an unexpected issue prevented them from continuing across the Pacific as planned. The reasons for the delay have been the subject of considerable speculation, including weather and tanker availability.

The two jets finally departed Hawaii again on October 1, stopping in Guam before making the final leg to Taitung today.

Taiwanese Defense Minister Wellington Koo said today that more of the aircraft will arrive before the end of the year, although he did not provide a specific number.

Taiwan receives first 2 F-16V Block 70 fighter jets

Taiwan took delivery Friday of the first two of 66 F-16V Block 70 fighter jets purchased from the United States, with the aircraft landing at Chihhang Air Base in the eastern county of Taitung at around noon. pic.twitter.com/hbqdV6io26

— Focus Taiwan (CNA English News) (@Focus_Taiwan) October 2, 2026

The 66-aircraft purchase is worth approximately $8 billion. Taiwan originally expected deliveries to begin much sooner, but production-line adjustments, supply-chain problems, and software issues contributed to delays. COVID, too, had an impact on the production line.

The program’s delivery schedule has slipped repeatedly. Defense Minister Koo said in March, May, and again through his deputy in June that the first aircraft were expected to arrive by the end of September. That deadline passed without an F-16 reaching Taiwan.

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense acknowledged in late September that development and production of the aircraft’s new electronic warfare self-protection system had also been a factor.

The Block 70s are being equipped with L3Harris’ AN/ALQ-254(V)1 Viper Shield electronic warfare suite, and the system was not yet fully through its development and production process when the first aircraft were otherwise ready for delivery. L3Harris announced on September 3 that it had completed production of the first 35 Viper Shield systems, underscoring that the electronic warfare equipment was itself still moving into production as Taiwan’s fighters were approaching delivery.

Taiwan chose to acquire the AN/ALQ-254 rather than the AN/ALQ-257 electronic warfare system used on U.S. Air Force F-16s.

Lawmakers have questioned whether the system meets requirements associated with earlier work to modernize earlier F-16A/B Block 20 fighters to the F-16V standard. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Koo argued that those requirements applied to the earlier Block 20 upgrade rather than the new Block 70 purchase. Other international F-16 Block 70 operators are also using Viper Shield.

Taiwanese officials have defended the decision, citing the specific requirements of Taiwan’s F-16 fleet and associated procurement considerations. The system is intended to provide the new fighters with a modern electronic warfare and self-protection capability against increasingly sophisticated radar and missile threats.

There are also still questions about when the Viper Shield system itself will be fully ready.

Weapons deliveries have also not kept pace with the aircraft themselves.

Taiwan is receiving AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles as part of the F-16 package, with 200 ordered. The C-8 version incorporates upgrades from the U.S. Air Force’s Form, Fit, Function Refresh (F3R) effort, including new electronics and improved electronic-counter-countermeasures intended to make the missile more capable in a heavily contested electromagnetic environment. For Taiwan, the missile will provide the new F-16s with a modern beyond-visual-range air-to-air weapon that can be cued by the aircraft’s AN/APG-83 Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR), as well as other sources of targeting information through the F-16’s networked systems.

The AIM-120C-8 is particularly relevant as Taiwan fields more F-16s against China’s increasingly capable fighter fleet, which includes aircraft equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles such as the PL-15.

Taiwan’s F-16 Block 70s will also be armed with the AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), intended for attacks against enemy air defense systems. According to Roy Choo, a defense journalist and TWZ contributor, the first of the new AGM-88F (remanufactured from U.S. Air Force AGM-88B) missiles arrived in Taiwan back in 2022, for the F-16V fleet.

The major gap is the AGM-154C Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW). The precision glide weapon is intended to give Taiwan a longer-range strike capability against ground targets without requiring the launching aircraft to fly directly over heavily defended areas. According to the latest reporting from Taiwan, deliveries of the AGM-154C have been held up by delays on the U.S. production line and may not begin until 2027 or 2028 at the earliest. Existing stocks of these weapons were also heavily used in Operation Epic Fury.

The two aircraft now sitting at Chihhang are significant for another reason. Unlike Taiwan’s existing F-16V fleet, they are new-production aircraft rather than older fighters that have been upgraded.

Taiwan received 141 F-16A/B Block 20s that were upgraded to the F-16V configuration under a separate modernization program completed in 2023. The new Block 70s incorporate many of the same technologies — including the APG-83 — but are built from the ground up as new aircraft.

The Block 70s will also bring a significant new passive-sensing capability to Taiwan’s F-16 fleet. Under a $328.5-million U.S. Foreign Military Sales contract awarded to Lockheed Martin in February, Taiwan is receiving the company’s IRST21 Legion-ES infrared search and track system. Designed specifically for the F-16, the long-wave infrared sensor can passively detect and track airborne targets without emitting radar energy. That gives the aircraft another way to search for and track threats while reducing its own electromagnetic signature. The IRST21 also gives the F-16s a passive way to detect and track low-observable targets, potentially providing another means of finding Chinese stealth aircraft without relying solely on radar.

In 2019, Lockheed Martin displayed a model of a Block 70 F-16 with what appeared to be a podded IRST system on one of its chin stations at the biennial Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition in Taiwan:

The mysterious IRST pod at TADTE – https://t.co/avpx5djZMM pic.twitter.com/86lqxu6fN6

— Alert 5 (@alert5) August 16, 2019

The new fighters will therefore complement Taiwan’s upgraded F-16A/Bs while expanding the overall number of modern F-16s available to the ROCAF.

The timing matters.

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft operate around Taiwan on an increasingly routine basis, forcing the ROCAF to maintain a persistent air-defense posture. The additional F-16s will provide more aircraft for missions ranging from air defense and counter-air operations to maritime strike.

The F-16V fleet is also being tested for a more specialized intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance role. The ROCAF has recently been conducting flight and systems integration testing of the MS-110 advanced reconnaissance pod, part of its Phoenix Scout project. The service plans to acquire six pods to replace older reconnaissance equipment. Based on the DB-110 digital sensor architecture, the system combines visible-light and infrared imaging with long-range, day-and-night reconnaissance, and real-time image transmission, allowing imagery to be passed more rapidly to ground command and intelligence elements. Integrating the pod with the F-16 and associated ground systems will give Taiwan another means of monitoring activity around the island and its surrounding waters.

But Taiwan remains heavily outnumbered across the Taiwan Strait.

China is fielding an increasingly sophisticated combat aircraft fleet that includes the J-20 and J-35 stealth fighter, large numbers of advanced fourth-generation fighters, airborne early warning and other force-multiplier aircraft, and a growing variety of uncrewed systems.

And the F-16s will face the same fundamental problem as Taiwan’s other combat aircraft in a major conflict: staying operational.

China possesses extensive missile and air capabilities that could threaten Taiwan’s airbases, aircraft shelters, fuel supplies, command-and-control infrastructure, and other elements needed to keep fighters flying. You can read more about how the ROCAF would likely go to war with China in this previous in-depth feature.

Basing the new F-16s at Chihhang Air Base, operated by the 7th Tactical Fighter Wing, is significant, Choo told us.

“The basing of the aircraft at Chihhang allows the ROCAF to readily project air power south and eastwards, especially over the Bashi Channel, which is one avenue PLA can gain access to the Philippine Sea and beyond,” he explained. “Previously, ROCAF fighters from other bases maintain QRA detachments there”

The F-16 delivery today is only the beginning of a much larger effort to get all 66 aircraft into Taiwanese service.

According to the latest information from the ROCAF, 63 F-16C/D Block 70s remain in various stages of production and delivery in the United States, with some already moving through the handover process. The remaining aircraft will be delivered according to production, flight-test, and acceptance milestones before being ferried to Taiwan.

Once the full order is delivered, Taiwan will operate more than 200 F-16s when the new Block 70s are combined with its existing fleet.

That will give the ROCAF a considerably larger force of modern F-16s, with substantial commonality between the upgraded F-16V fleet and the new-production Block 70s.

The aircraft will still need to go through Taiwan’s acceptance procedures, while pilots and maintenance personnel complete the necessary conversion and training work. The new jets will then be progressively incorporated into the ROCAF’s operational units.

Remarkably, the arrival of the first Block 70 fighters today marks the first delivery of new fighters to Taiwan since 2001, when the last of the 150 F-16A/B Block 20s were delivered.

“The ROCAF’s surviving fleet of 139 F-16s, 53 Mirage 2000s, and 129 F-CK-1s was largely inducted in the 1990s, when Taiwan held the upper hand in the cross-Strait air-power balance,” Choo explained. “Even then, there remained a requirement for additional fighters, prompting the island’s first formal request to purchase 66 F-16C/Ds during the 2006 Monterey Talks.”

“By the late 2000s, these fighters were approaching the limits of their combat effectiveness as the PLA air fleet expanded in both size and capability. Fortunately, substantial upgrades began to be rolled out to the F-CK-1s and F-16s from the 2010s.”

In the wake of the 2019 acquisition of the F-16C/D Block 70s, questions arose over the aircraft’s asymmetric value as the Taiwan military increasingly focused on developing a plan for asymmetric capabilities in response to the PLA’s growing combat power.

“However, developments in recent years have underscored the continued importance of a capable fighter fleet not least for policing Taiwan’s airspace amid the PLA’s sustained gray-zone air operations around the island,” Choo added.

The timing of today’s arrival is also notable.

The aircraft reached Taiwan just days after U.S. President Donald Trump met Chinese President Xi Jinping in Washington. The delivery comes amid questions in Taipei about the future pace of U.S. arms transfers, after Trump said in May that a proposed $14-billion Taiwan arms package was being held in abeyance. He had approved an $11-billion package in December 2025.

Washington continues to say that its policy toward Taiwan has not changed.

Beijing, for its part, continues to oppose U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and regards the island as part of Chinese territory.

It has taken nearly seven years to get the first two F-16C/D Block 70s, to Taiwan. But their arrival marks the first step in a major modernization of the ROCAF’s F-16 fleet, adding new-production fighters with improved radar, electronic warfare, sensors, and weapons to a force that is already operating upgraded F-16Vs.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Taiwan’s First F-16 Block 70s Have Finally Arrived appeared first on TWZ.

Ukraine says it has used its domestically developed FP-7 tactical ballistic missile in combat for the first time, in what would mark another significant milestone in the country’s rapidly expanding indigenous long-range strike program.

President Volodymyr Zelensky announced today that Ukraine had conducted the first combat use of the FP-7, a ground-launched ballistic missile developed by Ukrainian defense company Fire Point. He also said production of the weapon would follow.

Ukrainian tactical ballistic missile. FP-7. First combat use. Thank you for the result. Next up: production. Glory to Ukraine! pic.twitter.com/IxdjVg51c1

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) October 1, 2026

The claim has not been independently verified, and Ukrainian authorities have not disclosed the target, location, number of missiles involved, or other details surrounding the reported strike. A video has been published showing what’s said to be a nighttime launch of the missile.

The FP-7 is one of several increasingly ambitious weapons being developed by Fire Point, a Ukrainian defense company that has expanded rapidly since Russia’s full-scale invasion. The company began with drones and has subsequently moved into long-range strike missiles and ballistic missile technology.

Fire Point CEO Iryna Terekh previously described the company’s development and manufacturing model in an interview with TWZ, detailing an effort to rapidly scale production while maintaining a dispersed industrial base inside Ukraine. The company’s better-known systems include the FP-1 and FP-2 long-range strike drones and the FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile.

According to Ukrainian and company-released information, the FP-7 has a range of approximately 250 kilometers (155 miles) and a warhead weighing around 150 kilograms (331 pounds). Other published figures have put its velocity at approximately 1,500 meters per second (around 3,350 miles per hour). Rather than striking targets deep in the Russian rear areas, the missile is optimized for use against objectives such as logistics hubs, air defense sites, and drone bases. This makes it more of a shorter-range complement to the U.S.-supplied Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) ballistic missile, rather than a direct replacement, although it comes without any restrictions on the kinds of targets that it can be used against.

Details from missile debris shown by Russia confirm Ukraine launched ATACMS at Voronezh region on November 18, marking the first use of U.S.-made missiles on Russian territory during Trump’s presidency. According to the Russian MoD, S-400 and Pantsir-S1 systems helped repel the… pic.twitter.com/8SeQCo9OEO

— NOELREPORTS (@NOELreports) November 19, 2025

At the same time, those specifications should likewise be treated as reported figures rather than independently verified performance data. Actual range, payload and accuracy can vary according to missile configuration and mission profile.

The FP-7’s development is particularly notable because Fire Point is also using the basic missile architecture as the foundation for a very different weapon.

Fire Point has developed the FP-7.X, an anti-ballistic missile interceptor derived from the surface-to-surface FP-7.

A video showing a test launch of an FP-7.X surface-to-air missile:

Держави програють війни на полі бою значно рідше, ніж вони програють їх у інститутах, лабораторіях та на виробництві за десять років до їх початку.

Коли країна роками недофінансовує інженерну освіту, скорочує дослідження, втрачає виробничі компетенції або звикає покладатися на… pic.twitter.com/Ti1Ayn4INf

— terekh (@iraterekh) June 3, 2026

Fire Point’s expectation is that commonality between the two systems can shorten development and provide manufacturing efficiencies by allowing the company to draw upon work already conducted on the FP-7’s propulsion, airframe, guidance, and production processes.

The FP-7.X forms part of Project Freyja, a European effort to develop a comparatively inexpensive and potentially more numerous ballistic-missile-defense interceptor. Fire Point has also discussed an eventual production rate of thousands of interceptors annually, although such targets represent company ambitions rather than demonstrated production capacity.

Fire Point has said it is working with European and Ukrainian partners on the system, including work on the interceptor’s seeker. The company has described an initial interceptor using a blast-fragmentation approach, with more sophisticated hit-to-kill capability envisioned for later versions.

Earlier this year, Diehl Defense confirmed that it plans to launch production of the Flamingo cruise missile in Germany. Previously, Diehl had signed a technology agreement with Fire Point but had not disclosed any details. Potentially, that could open a path to Fire Point’s ballistic and cruise missiles helping to meet the growing demand for long-range fires capabilities among NATO’s European members.

A video of the Flamingo cruise missile in action:

As it stands, the baseline FP-7 is only one element of Fire Point’s ballistic missile ambitions.

The company is also developing the larger FP-9, which Fire Point has described as having a planned range of approximately 850 kilometers (528 miles). The larger missile requires substantially more solid propellant and has driven the company to establish new industrial capabilities for manufacturing large solid-rocket motors.

As with the FP-7, the available FP-9 performance figures are based primarily on statements from Fire Point and Ukrainian sources and should not be treated as independently established specifications.

The development of these weapons reflects Ukraine’s broader effort to expand domestic production of long-range strike systems. Kyiv has relied heavily on Western-supplied weapons during the war while simultaneously attempting to establish an indigenous capacity for drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.

For Fire Point, that effort has produced an unusually broad portfolio in a relatively short period: long-range attack drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and, potentially, interceptors designed to defeat ballistic missiles.

The claimed combat debut would give Ukraine a fast, hard-to-intercept strike option for targets within the FP-7’s reported range, with its combination of kinetic energy and relatively heavy warhead making it particularly useful against hardened targets. If targeting and launch procedures can keep pace, its short flight time can also enable rapid-response strikes against more time-sensitive targets. More broadly, the FP-7 represents the culmination of years of Ukrainian efforts to close a major ballistic-missile gap with Russia and establish an indigenous capability.

The reported combat debut of the FP-7 also comes as the long-range strike campaign between Russia and Ukraine continues to intensify, with both sides increasingly seeking to hold targets deep behind the other’s front lines at risk. That dynamic will become particularly important as the two countries head into another winter, when strikes against energy, industrial, and military infrastructure ramp up significantly. At the same time, the FP-7’s reported range gives it a considerably more limited target set than Ukraine’s longer-range cruise missiles and drones, constraining where it can be employed and distinguishing it from systems designed for deep strikes hundreds of miles beyond the front.

Вітаємо FP7) pic.twitter.com/FxgCHVHMET

— Denys Shtilierman (@DenShtilierman) February 27, 2026

The significance of Zelensky’s announcement will ultimately depend heavily on whether the FP-7 can move from a claimed combat debut into sustained production and operational service.

Ukraine has not publicly disclosed the number of FP-7 missiles produced, current production rates, or when significant quantities could become available.

Using the FP-7 in combat for the first time would mark an important transition for Fire Point’s ballistic missile program, from development and testing toward operational employment. The company’s ability to manufacture the weapon at scale will become the next critical question.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Ukraine Claims First Combat Use Of FP-7 Ballistic Missile appeared first on TWZ.

Taking a break from fighting Russians in the Kostiantynivka sector of the eastern Donetsk region, the commander of a Ukrainian uncrewed ground vehicle (UGV) unit spoke with us about innovations in the use of these systems. One was the first deployment of a UGV specifically designed for amphibious operations to deliver supplies to frontline troops in areas impeded by water obstacles. Large areas of the front line are bisected by rivers and wetlands, and the country has many other small waterways and marsh areas. As we have frequently reported, the use of UGVs by both Ukraine and Russia has exploded as the ubiquity of aerial attack drones makes it far too dangerous for human battlefield movements.

In an exclusive interview with TWZ, the commander of the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade’s “Alter Ego” UGV unit, who goes by the call sign “Electric,” offered us unique insights into the challenges of developing amphibious UGVs and how they were deployed.

In the first of two parts, Electric talks about why Alter Ego developed amphibious UGVs – including modifying a Triton variant for this – and how the unit made them work. The second part features his insights into using heavy ‘bomber drones’ to drop UGVs behind enemy lines for kamikaze raids. In addition, a representative of Brave1, Ukraine’s weapons technology accelerator, spoke about developing these systems at scale.

Some of the questions and answers have been slightly edited for clarity.

Q: How did the need for amphibious UGVs for logistics operations first come up?

A: We had this idea for a long time, but recently one of the units of the Armed Forces asked for our help to solve this problem, so that the UGV could overcome water obstacles.

There was a crucial need for this kind of means at certain parts of the front, but the units that are located there didn’t have the capacity by themselves to solve this task. So our battalion was asked to solve this problem because we are one of the most experienced units in terms of UGVs.

A first-ever logistics mission on an amphibious UGV: the robot covered 40 kilometers across land and water.

Operators of the "Alter Ego" unit (93rd Brigade) deployed the robotic system across mixed terrain. Facing water obstacles, the UGV seamlessly switched to swimming mode to… pic.twitter.com/rH8waq04a4

— BRAVE1 (@BRAVE1ua) September 29, 2026

Q: How long did it take to design and test the amphibious UGV, and what went into that process?

A: The whole process from development to battle deployment took less than three months.

Q: What did you have to do to make this work?

A: First of all, we looked at amphibious solutions that were on the market, not only in Ukraine, but in the world, and we took two separate approaches. One was taking one of the main UGVs that our unit is using on the ground, and we made it amphibious. And the other approach was that we took one of the solutions that was on the market that already had amphibious capabilities, and we solved several disadvantages that it had. And at the moment, we are using both.

Q: What did you have to do to make the UGV amphibious, and then what were some of the obstacles that had to be overcome to get this operational?

A: First of all, we have to explain that there are different solutions on the market that kind of work on the testing ground — like they can swim, they can drive on the ground, and in the vision of the manufacturer, they are working. But the fact is that these solutions are not ready for the reality on the front line, which is often very different from what is on the testing ground.

And the second point is that the unit has its own workshops where people work near the front line, and the experts, the engineers that work there, they have a very high level of competence to evaluate different solutions and select the one that has potential. And that’s what’s completely different between this unit and everyone else, like manufacturers and others who are working on these solutions, because they don’t understand what’s needed on the battlefield.

Q: So what did you have to change to make it work?

A: Regarding the amphibious one, basically the unit changed almost everything that that UGV had, starting from electronics, the software, the waterproofing, the communications – we basically changed everything. Regarding the one that we already used on the ground, we basically tried to retain what was allowing it to be an effective UGV on the ground, and we added waterproofing and specific mechanics, so that it can work in the water environment.

Q: You mentioned communications. What kind of communications did you add?

A: The communication means that was installed on the UGV by the manufacturer was not sufficient at all. Basically, it didn’t have enough quality for the battlefield situation. It was not working. But we already have our own communications that we were working on, and we have a lot of experience because we have been working for a long time in this UGV area. So we basically helped to install a sufficient level of communications on this UGV.

Q: So how does the amphibious UGV communicate with the controller? Does it use Starlink or some other satellite communications system for navigation?

A: This is satellite navigation, but not only. Satellite navigation is a part of this communication system.

Q: What are the other parts?

A: It’s better not to talk in detail about the other part of the communication system.

Q: There were probably a lot of different missions that could have been used for this first amphibious UGV logistics delivery. Why was this particular mission chosen?

A: The Alter Ego unit has so much experience in terms of UGVs, and not just experience of using UGVs, but the experience of being the first in the world. We had one of the first evacuation missions, we had one of the first strike missions using UGVs, the paratrooper UGV, and now the amphibious UGV. So basically, we have the systems to make it work for the first time when nobody knows how to conduct this mission.

Q: No, I mean why did this particular mission get chosen to be the first one?

A: There are certain places on the front line where we have water obstacles that prevent logistics from being done by UGV. At the moment, UGVs are carrying hundreds of tons of logistics, probably the most compared to any other means on the front line, but before this, these water obstacles would prevent UGVs from providing logistics for those parts of the front, and that need can’t be fully satisfied by UAVs or other means. That’s why we did this mission with the amphibious UGV, and now our task here is to scale this technology and provide this logistics system for other similar parts of the front where there are water obstacles.

Q: Tell me about where and when this mission took place and what it was like to watch it unfold.

A: So unfortunately, we can’t provide information about when and where this operation took place. But regarding how it went and what we felt, this was another big challenge, because this is something that wasn’t done before, and nobody thought this is real. So this was quite difficult, and to tell the truth, the mission didn’t succeed on the first try, actually, and it required a lot of effort in terms of planning, preparing, engineering, and basically it required 100% effort from everyone involved in that mission.

Q: How many times did it fail before, and what went wrong?

A: We had one failed attempt. The reason for failure was a certain technical problem. After that, we analyzed what went wrong, and we worked on solving those issues. Basically, it’s something that nobody had tried to do, it’s kind of hard to know what can go wrong before you actually try it. So the best way to find a solution like that is to try and then iterate on that attempt and make it better and better and better.

Also, I would like to add that although this was the first successful mission regarding an amphibious UGV, it’s not that there was no work on that before that. We were actively talking to and collecting the experience of everyone who was working on these kinds of missions before, and that was also a reason why this mission succeeded.

Q: How far did the amphibious UGV go for this mission?

A: So the UGV went 40 kilometers one way, and then it returned. So probably around 70 kilometers in total, and it carried food and other supplies.

Q: Did this UGV come under Russian fire on this mission?

A: Yes, and it survived.

Q: How does the UGV switch from water to land operations?

A: So the UGV has two separate control systems, one for water and one for land, and basically it switches to the one that is required at the moment. That’s how it can operate in both environments.

Q: Is that autonomous, or is that something that the controller at the base has to do as they watch the UGV on its mission?

A: At the moment, the operator fully controls the UGV manually. And basically, before, the operators of UGVs only knew how to move them on land, but now they also had to learn how to move them in the water. So not only was the technology itself developed, but we also had to prepare the operator and come up with tactics for this UGV.

Q: Did you use AI on this mission in any way, and if so, how?

A: We didn’t use AI.

Q: Have there been other missions using amphibious UGVs?

A: Yes.

Q: Can you say how many and what was delivered?

A: No.

Q: Is this designed only for logistics missions, or will it be used in the future for strike missions, either as a one-way attack system or as a platform for machine guns or other weapons?

A: We can use it in different ways in the future.

Q: Mud season is fast approaching, when much maneuvering becomes impossible or severely degraded because of how difficult it is to move in the thick, oozing slop. Will your amphibious UGVs work in the mud?

A: I think it can operate in the mud in the same way it operates in the water.

In the next segment of our interview, Electric talks about using bomber drones to deliver UGVs behind the lines, and a Brave1 representative talks about how the organization is working to develop these systems at scale for wider use.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Inside Ukraine’s First Combat Deployment Of Robotic Amphibious Vehicles appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. government set off conventional explosives inside a tunnel deep in the Nevada desert this week in a test designed to replicate a so-called “decoupled” nuclear detonation. Data collected is now being used to help improve methods for detecting this kind of nuclear testing. Just earlier this year, American authorities accused China of using decoupling to conceal new nuclear tests despite the country’s stated moratorium on such activities.

The test, which involved the use of chemical high-explosives and radiotracers, was conducted yesterday inside P Tunnel in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSA), according to a press release from the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The NNSS, which is situated within the boundaries of the U.S. Air Force’s Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), is used for a wide variety of testing purposes today. An agency under the Department of Energy, NNSA’s main jobs are to oversee the development and production of nuclear weapons, as well as manage America’s nuclear deterrent stockpile.

“This experiment is especially focused on further enhancing the U.S. capabilities to detect a ‘decoupled’ explosion,” per NNSA’s release. “Data collected from the experiment will be used to validate scientific models and refine algorithms that are critical to U.S. nuclear explosion detection efforts.”

“Just as a stealth aircraft looks smaller on radar, decoupling can greatly muffle the signals detected by nuclear detection sensors, making a large explosion appear smaller,” the release explains. “In a conventional, or ‘coupled,’ underground nuclear test, a device is placed deep in a hole in close contact with the rock, allowing much of the explosion’s shockwave to reach sensors. In a decoupled test, by contrast, the device is detonated inside a large underground chamber, substantially reducing the explosion’s seismic signature.”

“In this experiment, researchers gathered measurements using a broad suite of advanced sensors, including accelerometers, seismometers, infrasound sensors, electromagnetic sensors, chemical and radiotracer samplers, and meteorological sensors,” it adds. ”Together, these measurements will improve scientists’ understanding of the signatures produced by underground explosions and strengthen the United States’ ability to detect and characterize nuclear explosive events.”

The U.S. already maintains a U.S. Atomic Energy Detection Systems (USAEDS) network, which is overseen by the U.S. Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC). USAEDS is made up of more than 3,600 sensors positioned around the world. USAEDS is also tied in with the International Monitoring System (IMS), which is managed by the organization responsible for overseeing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). AFTAC also supports the mission to monitor for potential nuclear testing globally using a fleet of specially configured WC-135R Constant Phoenix aircraft. In addition, those planes are used to help keep watch for unusual spikes in atmospheric radiation that could point to nuclear or radiological accidents or other incidents leading to the spread of potentially dangerous radioactive material.

With regard to the USAEDS network specifically, “once a disturbance is detected underground, underwater, in the atmosphere or in space, the event is analyzed for nuclear identification, and the findings are reported to command authorities,” according to AFTAC’s website.

As mentioned, the U.S. government has accused its Chinese counterparts of using decoupling to conceal new nuclear testing, and NNSA’s press release draws explicit attention to these allegations. At the annual Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland, in February, Thomas DiNanno, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, said that China had conducted at least one such test at Lop Nur on June 22, 2020. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) subsequently said the IMS had not detected an event matching that description at that location on that date. For its part, the Chinese government has denied the accusation.

The social media posts below include satellite imagery showing activity at Lop Nur that could point to new nuclear testing activities in recent years.

参考
Satellite Imagery Analysis of China’s Alleged 2020 Nuclear Test at Lop Nurhttps://t.co/aafvU5Szh7
CSIS 20260213
ROLES SAT ANALYSIS No.7　中国に核実験実施の動き ー Lop Nur核実験場の画像分析 ーhttps://t.co/n66yYk0hLg
ROLES 20250522

— KAROTASU (@type36512) May 24, 2026

While China is a signatory to the CTBT, the country has never ratified it. The Chinese government last acknowledged a critical-level nuclear test in 1996, after which a self-imposed moratorium was put in place, at least publicly. As an aside, the United States has also signed, but never ratified, the CTBT, and has a similar self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing since 1992. It is worth noting that the treaty does not ban so-called sub-critical testing, which involves fissile material, but does not result in a full-fledged nuclear reaction.

Last week, The Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump administration has been holding new talks with the Chinese government regarding various aspects of the country’s massively and rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, including the testing allegations. That story immediately preceded a state visit by China’s President Xi Jinping to Washington, D.C., to meet with Trump.

“The discussions between American and Chinese officials have centered on measures to reduce nuclear risks and haven’t been aimed at negotiating a formal arms-control pact, an effort Beijing has sharply rebuffed in the past,” according to that report. “The Trump administration has begun to highlight the possibility of implementing new verification measures.”

“Independent experts say seismic instruments might be placed on or near test sites,” The Journal‘s story also noted. “Another possibility, which was floated during the Biden administration, is to install radiation-detection equipment at test sites.”

NNSA’s announcement about the test at the Nevada National Security Site is certainly an example of the development underway already of new means of verification that could be deployed at sites around the world.

The United States has separately accused Russia of conducting lower-yield nuclear testing in secret in the past. Russia is a signatory to the CTBT and had previously ratified it. In 2023, President Vladimir Putin revoked that ratification in line with the provisions of a law passed by the country’s parliament, or Duma.

President Trump has also floated the idea of the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing in response to Russian and Chinese activities, though other U.S. officials have downplayed the possibility of doing so. The United States is otherwise in the midst of a huge nuclear modernization effort that impacts the air, sea, and land-based legs of the deterrent triad. American authorities are also now pursuing these efforts in an environment fully unbounded by relevant arms control agreements following the sunset of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) earlier this year.

The Russian government has said it is ready to conduct new nuclear tests if the United States pursues this course of action. The last official nuclear test in Russia came in 1990 right before the fall of the Soviet Union.

“It takes nuclear expertise to detect nuclear activities and experiments like these [to] ensure America remains unmatched in detection,” NNSA Administrator Brandon Williams said in a statement yesterday in light of the test in Nevada. “The Trump Administration has made it clear that the United States will lead from a position of strength. You cannot evade American innovation. With this experiment, we are sending a clear message: under this administration, America will never be outmatched.” 

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post U.S. Mimics “Decoupled” Nuclear Detonation By Blowing Up A Tunnel Conventionally appeared first on TWZ.

The Pentagon has announced plans for a new functional combatant command, very broadly akin to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) or U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM), but for operational activities involving autonomous and robotic capabilities. Secretary Pete Hegseth has also announced new initiatives to help further accelerate the fielding of uncrewed systems in the air, at sea, and on land, as well as to explore future warfighting challenges. All of this builds on previous and long-overdue efforts to prioritize the fielding of various tiers of drones, as well as artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies, across domains, but there are questions about how these new efforts will translate into tangible developments.

Secretary Hegseth unveiled plans for what is tentatively dubbed Autonomous Warfare Command (AUTOWARCOM), as well as the aforementioned initiatives, called Project Agincourt and Project Meridian, during a speech to service members today at the U.S. Marine Corps’ base in Quantico, Virginia. Hegseth called this a State of the Force address, and said he planned to make it an annual event.

.@SECWAR “Today, at my direction—we are announcing the creation of Autonomous Warfare Command, or AutoWarCom:

A new 4-star combatant command—with service-like authorities—built to scale autonomous and robotic capabilities across the Joint Force in the fastest peacetime shift in… pic.twitter.com/kYWBxy6Dij

— DOW Rapid Response (@DOWResponse) September 30, 2026

“At my direction, we are announcing the creation of Autonomous Warfare Command, or AUTOWARCOM, a new four-star combatant command with service-like authorities built to scale autonomous and robotic capabilities across the joint force in the fastest peacetime shift in modern military history,” Hegseth declared. “Drone warfare supercharged by SI-enabled targeting is the biggest battlefield revolution in generations. You already know that. Yet when I was sworn in to the Department of Defense, there was scant urgency in this domain.”

“SI” here stands for “super intelligence,” a term the Trump administration is now using in place of AI.

Hegseth called attention to the Drone Dominance initiative he unveiled last year, as well as the establishment of Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF-401), as examples of steps the Department has already taken in this regard. JIATF-401 is notably focused on counter-drone capabilities, as you read more about here.

“It’s a good start, but it’s certainly not enough. The pace of war is changing faster than the process to support it. Cheap compute, super intelligence, and advanced commercial manufacturing have enabled the proliferation of low-cost, high-precision strikes,” Hegseth continued. “For 40 years, the United States relied … primarily on expensive weapons that placed quality over quantity. Now, that approach gave us a lot of enormous advantages, and we need to preserve those capabilities. But today we need both quality and quantity. The term you know is high-low mix. An analogy is a thunderstorm. We need bolts of lightning high, our existing high-end kill chains capable of striking unexpectedly and decisively. We also need steady wind and rain, mass drones and other autonomous attritable systems that flip the cost exchange and impose unrelenting pressure on an adversary on the battlefield.”

Hegseth highlighted lessons learned from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine as underscoring these points.

.@SECWAR "Ukraine’s lesson is not that one type of drone wins wars but rather the need for a purpose-built system that maximizes the ability to adapt.

We will fuse procurement with operations at scale – and allow our warfighters, engineers, and entrepreneurs to learn, adapt, and… pic.twitter.com/x7iNMAbU0t

— DOW Rapid Response (@DOWResponse) September 30, 2026

“So today, with Autonomous War Command, AUTOWARCOM, we institutionalize and we supercharge the era of SI, robotics, and autonomous systems, all in order to win,” he added.

A memo the Pentagon has now released makes clear that the establishment of this command is contingent on Congressional approval, and the current goal is for it to be established by October 1, 2027.

“Autonomous Warfare Command will define joint needs and integrate Service-provided forces in support of geographic combatant commanders,” the memo also notes. “It will test equipment and force designs with realistic opposition in demanding exercises and rugged environments, modify rapidly, and field what works. We must build a wartime arsenal whose main product is adaptation at the edge.”

Many questions remain to be answered about how these activities will work with what’s already being done within the individual services, and how all of that will translate into operational activities. Part of Project Agincourt’s role will be working to help answer the questions above. The name here is a reference to the battle in 1415 in which British forces prevailed over their French opponents, famously in part through the application of a particular military technology, the longbow.

The office of the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems (DRPM-UxS) will lead this initiative. Owen West, head of the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), and U.S. Navy SEAL Senior Chief Max Strasiser are set to serve as the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operating Officer of the DRPM-UxS, respectively.

Project Agincourt will also “prototype a new construct called warfighting acquisition, not just acquisition that happens at the Pentagon,” according to Hegseth. “This model fuses operators with entrepreneurs in rapid adaptation cycles while distributing decisions and dollars closer to frontline units, to combatant commands. Realistic training exercises, and when possible, the crucible of combat, will be used to compress innovation timelines and scale what works.”

“Also today, we are phasing in new MOS [Military Occupational Specialty] frameworks within each military department to support our shift to autonomy,” the Secretary also noted during his speech in the context of Project Agincourt and the plan for AUTOWARCOM. “We need institutional knowledge and career paths for a new generation of autonomous warfighters.”

Project Meridian sits adjacent to these efforts and has a broader mandate to explore ways to ensure the U.S. military maintains its technological edge on future battlefields.

“Project Meridian, the future of warfare, is not about developing new strategies or new policies. We already do that. Rather, its purpose is to creatively look to the future, and identify the domains that we must conquer, and capabilities we must master,” Hegseth said. “We need to be looking forward into the future to achieve technological and military dominance on the battlefield for decades to come. It is futuristic on purpose. Their work will be focused on discovering, developing, and fielding the weapons and systems that our children and our grandchildren will need in their lifetimes, without any creative limitations or restrictions, on any future battlefield, from under the Earth to beyond the Moon.”

.@SECWAR “Today, at my direction—I am announcing Project Meridian, an effort led by America’s best minds to study the future of warfare.

Under the leadership of @USWREMichael, Project Meridian will be co-led by three of our nation’s best minds: @elonmusk, @PalmerLuckey, and… pic.twitter.com/4DyurVpkUZ

— DOW Rapid Response (@DOWResponse) September 30, 2026

“Project Meridian will study the battlefields of the future, identify which weapons and technologies warfighters will need to harness to dominate in these environments, and propose actionable solutions to start developing, testing and fielding these capabilities such that America will have overmatch for the 21st century and beyond,” according to a separate memo the Pentagon put out today. “The Joint Staff and all services should be prepared to connect their future warfare efforts and research to Project Meridian.”

Furthermore, “Project Meridian will leverage critical perspectives from outside the Pentagon, drawing upon a group of top technologists, innovators, business leaders, policy makers, and national security experts,” according to the memo. “Project Meridian’s primary function will be to map the trajectory of future warfare, identify critical capability gaps, and propose actionable solutions in furtherance of the identified goals in the 2026 National Security Science and Technology Strategy.”

This is also very much a near-term initiative, with Hegseth demanding a final report no later than 120 days from now, or January 28, 2027. The Pentagon’s Chief Technology Officer, Emil Michael, has been directed to set up this project. Today, Hegseth also named Elon Musk, Palmer Luckey, and Newt Gingrich as key members.

Elon Musk, founder of SpaceX, which dominates the commercial space launch and services market globally, as well as the host of other companies, has had an on-again-off-again relationship with the Trump Administration. Palmer Luckey is another entrepreneur now best known for founding Anduril, which has increasingly been a major player in the U.S. defense industry. Newt Gingrich, a highly influential member of Trump’s Republican Party and former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, has more recently become an outspoken advocate of advancing AI technology in the United States.

The inclusion of Musk and Luckey does raise ethical questions, as they both lead companies with major U.S. government contracts already, and which could be in line to see more opportunities based on Project Meridian’s findings. What guardrails might be put in place to prevent conflicts of interest is unclear.

To reiterate, it remains to be seen how all of these efforts will progress and how, or if, they will ultimately translate to more tangible developments. The U.S. military has a long history now of launching high-profile initiatives that still struggle to demonstrate real progress, despite widespread support for accelerating the fielding of uncrewed systems, AI, and other advanced technologies. The Pentagon has certainly produced tangible results through other organizational shifts in recent years, including the aforementioned Drone Dominance initiative and JIATF-401, as well as the Replicator initiative under President Joe Biden.

At the same time, there are real potential hurdles to these new plans. The Pentagon has itself already acknowledged that support from Congress will be key to the AUTOWARCOM vision. Annual budgeting, and the uncertainty that often surrounds that will also be a factor. There is also the matter of efforts to expand the U.S. defense industrial base. The limitations of existing U.S. industrial capacity and supply chains have already become a matter of national debate in light of concerns about dwindling stockpiles of critical munitions as a result of the ongoing conflict with Iran, as well as a succession of other global crises in recent years.

During his speech, Hegseth called attention to efforts to broaden the defense industrial base with new, smaller firms, as well as agreements with large established contractors to expand on their existing capacity. He also highlighted the Trump administration’s $1.5 trillion defense spending plan for Fiscal Year 2027 and issued a new call on Congress to pass an additional $350 billion reconciliation package.

With today’s announcements, the Pentagon has certainly reinforced its commitment to expanding the fielding of uncrewed and other high-tech capabilities across all branches of the U.S. military, but there is clearly work still to be done to turn those visions into realities.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Vision For New Autonomous Warfare Command Laid Out By Pentagon appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. Air Force is looking at adding a missile warning system (MWS) to its new F-15EX Eagle II fighters. This will give the aircraft a way to optically detect incoming missile threats, especially passively guided ones like heat-seeking infrared-guided missiles, which they currently lack. The continued absence of an MWS has become more pronounced in light of recent combat experiences over Iran.

The F-15EX is derived from earlier F-15 variants that all have MWSs, and it had seemed logical to expect the Eagle II would feature this capability. So it was puzzling when the first examples rolled out without such a system, and no apparent plans to install one on a jet already costing upwards of $100 million. The omission has been glaring for years now, especially given that the aircraft has all the provisions for such a system, including blanked-over spots for the sensors.

The Air Force has 22 Eagle IIs in inventory now and currently plans to acquire a total fleet of 267 of the jets. The aircraft’s manufacturer, Boeing, is on contract now to build 120 F-15EXs, including a lot of 22 jets through a new $2.38 billion deal also announced yesterday.

Now, the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center’s (AFLCMC) Fighters & Advanced Aircraft Directorate “is seeking sources for the procurement of an operationally qualified threat missile launch and approach warning system for rapid integration into the United States Air Force (USAF) F-15EX Eagle II fighter aircraft,” per a contracting notice put out yesterday. “The MWS must alert the F-15EX aircrew to the presence of missiles that may threaten the aircraft without unreasonably distracting the aircrew with false alarms.”

As mentioned, the F-15EX is already configured to accommodate an MWS, inside and out, something AFLCMC’s notice emphasizes. This is a result of the Eagle II having been directly derived from the F-15QA variant for Qatar, which itself was an outgrowth of the F-15SA for Saudi Arabia. While many of the F-15EX’s advances come from these aircraft, the first F-15 variant to get an MWS was actually Singapore’s F-15SG. The Advanced Eagle line and the F-15SG are part of Boeing’s extended F-15E Strike Eagle family.

“The MWS must use the six (6) pre-existing F-15EX sensor locations, data cables, power cables, and cooling,” the contracting notice says. “It must be easily, safely, rapidly, and organically installable and removable in the field by USAF military aircraft maintenance personnel without requiring any change to aircraft configuration beyond installation of MWS line replaceable units (LRUs) in the six (6) pre-existing locations in the aircraft dedicated for missile warning.”

The most visually prominent of those pre-existing sensor locations are two horn-like sponsons, one on each side of the forward fuselage right below the cockpit canopy. There are two more locations at the ends of the jet’s tail booms. The last two locations are situated so additional sensors can face straight up and down to provide total 360-degree coverage.

The sources sought notice does not mention any specific MWS and invites prospective vendors to submit proposals. It also stresses that the Air Force is still in the “market research” phase of the contracting process and that it “does not constitute [a] solicitation and shall not be construed as a commitment” to buy such a system.

The F-15SA uses the AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS), and this system is understood to also be found on the F-15QA. Beyond F-15 variants, versions of the AN/AAR-57, for which BAE Systems is currently the prime contractor, are fielded today on a wide variety of other fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, including various types in U.S. military service. CMWS variants are notably found across the U.S. Army’s AH-64, UH-60, and CH-47 helicopter fleets.

All versions of the CMWS consist of several electro-optic missile sensors (EOMS), the number of which varies from platform to platform, linked to a central electronic control unit (ECU). The system is also designed to be integrated into larger defensive suites.

While the AN/AAR-57 is a proven system with years of successful integration on the F-15 and other platforms, it is just one option of the open market today. The Air Force could choose to take another route, possibly with a new system that offers added functionality.

The addition of any MWS will give the F-15EX a valuable, if not increasingly critical, boost in defensive capability. The Eagle II does already have an extremely powerful self-protection suite, including the Eagle Passive/Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS). However, it is heavily geared toward defending against radar-based threats that pump out signals that can be detected and jammed. Infrared-homing anti-air missiles zero in on their targets passively.

In general, MWSs also typically make use of passive infrared sensors to spot the heat plumes of missile launches and the thermal signatures of those threats as they continue their approach. BAE Systems says current-generation versions of the AN/AAR-57 are sensitive enough to detect infantry anti-armor rockets being launched, as well as small arms fire from the ground, under the right circumstances. Though an MWS is not an active countermeasure unto itself, the early warning it provides gives critical time to deploy flares or employ other defensive capabilities, or just take evasive action.

TWZ touched on all of this last month after The New York Times reported new details about the shootdown of an F-15E Strike Eagle over Iran in April. A shoulder-fired, heat-seeking surface-to-air missile, also known as a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS), is said to have been responsible, though this remains unconfirmed. The Strike Eagle also lacks an MWS. The Times‘ story said that the F-15E’s defensive suite provided the crew with only half a second of warning. As we noted at the time, it would actually have provided no warning given that the Strike Eagle also lacks an MWS.

Even before the current conflict with Iran broke out, TWZ had questioned the F-15EX’s lack of this capability given the general focus on increased survivability to match expanding threat ecosystems globally. EPAWSS is already a reflection of that reality, and could be made even more capable when tied together with an MWS. In May, we had reached out to the Air Force about any plans to integrate an MWS onto the F-15EX in light of observations from the ongoing conflict with Iran. The service told us then that it had no details to share. Whether the service now has any plans to add MWSs to the Strike Eagle fleet, which would require more significant integration work, is also unknown.

Buying F-15EX and not springing for the missile approach warning system is absolutely the dumbest thing. $100M fighter, but let's save a few bucks on a key defensive advantage. You are not always going to get a radar spike from a threat, even at altitude.

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) April 4, 2026

They also didn't buy conformals for the first EXs. So silly.

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) April 4, 2026

Infrared homing anti-air missiles, as well as air defense systems that use passive infrared sensors for target detection and cueing, are certainly not threats limited to Iran. In Yemen, Iranian-backed Houthi militants have been making good use of these capabilities for years now, something else we have explored in great detail in the past. The Houthis claimed to have downed a Saudi Arabian F-15 just earlier this month and, per a now-long standing modus operandi, subsequently released video captured through a ground-based forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system as evidence. The group also shared images of the wreckage of what looked to be an F-15SA Advanced Eagle, underscoring the dangers posed even to aircraft equipped MWSs.

Onboard footage of a Houthi SAM system shooting down a Saudi F-15 overnight over Yemen’s Marib province. pic.twitter.com/6mh23B2Ovu

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) September 16, 2026

These threats are not limited to the Middle East more broadly, either, and are only increasingly likely to be encountered in future conflicts globally. The emergence of ever-more capable and longer-range anti-air missiles with infrared or dual-mode guidance systems is a significant factor in all this. Expanding use of passive infrared search and track (IRST) systems on aircraft and infrared sensors on ground-based air defense systems are part of this larger equation, as well.

How the Air Force ultimately decided to proceed with the integration of an MWS onto the F-15EX fleet remains to be seen. However, the Eagle II’s lack of this capability is only becoming more striking, especially in light of the conflict with Iran.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post F-15EX May Finally Get Missile Warning System The USAF Originally Skimped On Buying appeared first on TWZ.

The Navy has announced plans to buy 30 new drone boats, 10 from each of three companies, under its Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel (MUSV) program. The deals are an important step forward for the Navy’s latest attempt to field larger USVs after years of setbacks and shakeups, but it remains to be seen when these new capabilities might actually become operational.

Galliano Marine Services, Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), and Saronic Technologies each received so-called Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreements in relation to the MUSV program today. OTA is a contracting mechanism designed to support rapid prototyping and other research and development work without having to use more traditional and often lengthy processes.

The awards “mark a significant step forward in translating the strategic vision into a tangible fleet capability,” Chris Miller, the Navy’s Acting Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Robotic and Autonomous Systems (DRPM RAS), told TWZ and others at a media roundtable earlier today. “Each agreement is for the procurement of 10 MUSV at an average procurement cost of $40 million per vessel.”

Saronic and HII submitted their Marauder and Romulus designs, respectively, to the MUSV Phase I competition. Galliano Marine Services, which does business as Edison Chouest, does not appear to have announced its entrant publicly. At a unit cost of $40 million, the total price tag for 30 MUSVs, regardless of type, would be $1.2 billion.

“Production will begin immediately at shipyards in Loreauville, Houma, and Franklin, Louisiana, with deliveries starting as early as the fourth quarter of [Fiscal Year] 2027,” Miller added.

To take a step back quickly, the Navy has used a variety of definitions for what qualifies as a “medium” USV over the years. It’s also important to note that the Navy already fields several speedboat and jet ski-type USVs operationally that are capable of performing various different missions, including employment as one-way attack munitions.

Threshold MUSV program requirements the service put out in March included a range of at least “2500 nm [nautical miles] at 25 knots while carrying a 25 MT [metric ton] load on the payload deck in NATO STANAG 4194 Sea State 4.” Sea State 4 is characterized by wind speeds of 17 to 21 knots and wave heights between four and eight feet, per that NATO standard. The MUSVs also had to be able to carry forty-foot equivalent units (FEU) containerized payloads and refuel at sea at a rate of “2,000 gallons per minute of fuel through deck connections.” Various other operational and sustainment requirements were laid out at that time, as you can read more about here.

The OTAs announced today were awarded “following successful at sea testing” under Phase I of the MUSV program, according to a press release the Navy put out today. A total of seven companies competed in this initial phase, with the others being Birdon, Leidos, PacMar Technologies, and Sea Machines. That work was conducted under an earlier round of OTAs.

“The testing evaluated, among other things, the vessel’s ability to see and understand the surrounding maritime environment, how well the vessels navigated autonomously according to the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, and the vessel’s ability to conduct a long-duration mission,” the Navy’s Miller said at the roundtable earlier today. “The demonstrations had to prove that the designs were mature enough to meet the Navy’s operational standards and our requirements.”

In terms of the long-duration mission requirements, “the test was that they had to be able to execute [over] roughly 26 hours and over 360 nautical miles with only a single input during that time from a C2 [command and control] station allowed,” Milleter further explained. “So, it basically demonstrated that the vessel could run for an excess of 24 hours at an extended range with very minimal input from the actual operator from a C2 station. This provided basically our input and our ability to assess how truly autonomous the functionality was of the platforms.”

Overall, the OTA awards “were based on the optimal mix of autonomy, performance, design, production schedule, and cost,” he added.

The MUSV Phase II contracting notice outlines additional parameters, including that submitted designs cannot be more than 295 feet (90 meters) long or displace more than 5,000 metric tons. The USVs also have to be able to accommodate “at least 2x Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) [containerized payloads] weighing 24,000 kg each and consuming 25 kW each” and be “capable of executing multi-day unmanned operations of at least 10 days.” The drone boats need to be “operable in NATO STANAG 4194 Sea State 4 and survivable in Sea State 6,” as well. The full lists of threshold requirements and desired attributes are reproduced below.

In addition, “to be considered for this Call for Solutions, the proposed MUSV must be ready for operational demonstration at the time of solution submission,” according to the Phase II contracting notice. “An MUSV requiring substantial modifications for the production platform compared to the as-demonstrated platform will not be considered.”

“The Phase II solicitation allows entrants to compete and existing vendors to submit updated product blocks and modular payload configurations,” Miller, the Acting DRPM RAS, said today. “Testing evaluations will begin as early as November 16th, and proposals will be assessed on a continually rolling basis over the next five years.”

Miller also drew attention to the elimination of the speed and at-sea refueling targets previously outlined in Phase I.

“What we learned from Phase I is that as you increase the speed requirements and some of these other things, it does present certain challenges for industry,” according to Miller. “So I’m trying to actually find the sweet spot in the market where there is healthy competition, and there’s opportunities, and we can have more things that potentially are dual use, both military and civilian.”

So far, the Navy has only offered limited insights into exactly what specific mission sets it wants the MUSVs to perform, even initially.

The “MUSV Phase I requirements were closely tailored to fulfill operational requirements for a specific mission set focused on demonstrated ability to carry containerized payloads while meeting specific vessel performance requirements for speed and range,” Miller said during today’s roundtable. “However, there is an ever-increasing demand signal that we must be ready to meet. To ensure scalability across the broader mission sets and to support our joint force, we issued a formal call for solutions for MUSV Phase II integration and testing.”

He also stressed that the modularity of the designs being acquired now would allow for the continued evolution of their capabilities as time goes on.

With the focus on containerized payloads, “honestly, inside you could have a sensor, you could have repair equipment for ships,” Rebecca Gassler, who was the Navy’s Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Robotic and Autonomous Systems (PAE RAS) until August, also told TWZ and other outlets back in March. “You could have any number of payloads inside those, and you basically are able to just swap them on.”

In announcing the new OTAs today, as well as discussing the Phase II MUSV plans, the Navy also highlighted continued opportunities for the other companies that had been involved in Phase I.

“Leidos, PAC MAR, and Sea Machines were determined to complete the project provided for in their prototype other transaction agreement and will receive a $15 million award as part of the previously established terms of the prototype OTs,” the Navy’s MUSV announcement today adds. “Alongside the OT awardees, will be accepted onto the Drones.mil hosted Maritime Marketplace, where they are now eligible to receive follow-on production agreements from authorized acquisition authorities across the DOW [Department of War].”

Birdon did not complete the required testing. Based on the terms of the Phase I OTAs, Galliano, HII, and Saronic will also receive $15 million awards and be included in the marketplace. The aforementioned Phase II CFS is intended “to expand its acquisition pipeline through a Maritime Marketplace to broaden offerings and satisfy future MUSV mission sets,” as well, per the Navy.

The Navy stressed the importance of this open-ended “marketplace” model as a way to accelerate the acquisition process when it first outlined the MUSV program to the public back in March, as you can read more about here. Just last week, the service also established a new Robotic and Autonomous Systems Warfighting Development Center (RASWDC) to serve as a focal point for “the development, operational integration, and employment of robotic and autonomous systems (RAS) across the maritime domain,” to include the MUSV effort.

The Drones.mil marketplace also extends to all branches of the U.S. military and beyond just USVs. Miller today did highlight the potential for possible cooperation with other services on drone boat efforts through this framework. He also said the Navy might be willing to consider additional acquisition strategies, including leasing uncrewed platforms, in the future.

Larger USVs have long been seen as key to bolstering the U.S. Navy’s overall operational capacity above the waves, and doing so in a cost-effective and rapidly producible manner. They are also viewed as central to enabling new, more distributed concepts of operations designed to help expand operational coverage and reduce the vulnerability of crewed ships, especially in any future high-end fight in the Pacific with China.

“Unmanned technology is redefining operations and providing our combatant commanders with unprecedented scale, persistence, and risk tolerance,” the Navy’s Miller said at the roundtable.

At the same time, as mentioned, the Navy has attempted to acquire operational fleets of larger drone boats in the past without success. Today, the service’s capabilities in this regard remain limited to a pocket force of still largely experimental optionally-crewed designs.

Since the Navy first unveiled it in March, MUSV has already faced certain hurdles. This includes a major leadership shakeup in August that saw PAE RAS Rebecca Gassler, the first person to ever hold that post, removed from her post after just eight months for reasons that are still not immediately clear.

In July, it also emerged that Blue Water Autonomy and Saildrone had filed suit against the Navy over being left out of Phase I of the MUSV competition. The companies alleged that the service did not follow its own selection criteria. That lawsuit is still ongoing. Blue Water Autonomy, among others, had also previously made investments in response to requirements the Navy had laid out for a previous effort called the Modular Surface Attack Craft (MASC) last year. The MUSV program has now fully supplanted MASC.

In speaking at the roundtable today, Miller acknowledged potential budget limitations and other hurdles that could still impact MUSV going forward. “I’m trying to be prepared depending on where that demand goes,” he said.

As said at the start, today’s MUSV announcement is an important new step forward for the Navy’s efforts to acquire fleets of larger USVs, but the service still has to transition these efforts into operational realities.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

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