Five years after seizing Kabul, the Taliban’s strongest argument for international acceptance rests on control. The Taliban governs every provincial capital and faces no conventional army capable of marching on Kabul. It repeatedly cites improved security as proof that Afghanistan’s post-2021 order is settled. But armed resistance is becoming more geographically dispersed, more organizationally diverse […]

The post Bit by bit, the Taliban is losing control of Afghanistan appeared first on Asia Times.

Na Galeria de Arte do Convento do Espírito Santo, em Loulé, vai estar patente a exposição intitulada “Presenças“, da artista belga Véronique Sabban, sob curadoria de João Serrão.

A exposição presente de 10 de outubro a 21 de novembro em Loulé, marca a estreia da artista fora da Bélgica e reúne um arco temporal de três décadas de produção (1996–2026), focado na sua contínua e obsessiva investigação em torno do rosto humano.

Entre a pintura e a escultura, a mostra contrapõe o gesto visceral e fluido da pincelada sobre a tela ao processo físico e tátil de peças tridimensionais. Afastando-se da representação figurativa convencional, a artista toma o rosto como um território infinito, em que a matéria e a mancha dão corpo à interioridade e à vulnerabilidade da condição humana.

A exposição será inaugurada esta sexta-feira, 9 de outubro, às 18:00 hrs, e pode ser visitada das 10:00 às 13:30 hrs e das 14:30 às 18:00 hrs.
A entrada é livre.

Se la porta che, secondo Mosca, è aperta è in realtà chiusa, lo è da questa parte – e non è stata Roma a chiuderla di propria iniziativa.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Un Valdai fuori sede

Quello che racconterò in questo articolo è meno tecnico e più personale del solito. Si tratta delle informazioni raccolte in alcune giornate di dialogo, confronto e, a quanto pare, una domanda “scandalosa” che è diventata lo scoop dei media europei, perché ho chiesto al Presidente della Federazione Russa, Vladimir Vladimirovic Putin, cosa ne sarà dell’Europa.

Potete trovare il video integrale del discorso di Vladimir Putin al Valdai qui.

Il mio intervento e le risposte di Putin le trovate qui.

Quest’anno il Valdai non si è riunito a Soči. Gli inviti spediti in estate indicavano ancora la città sul Mar Nero, poi a fine agosto gli organizzatori hanno comunicato il trasferimento nella regione di Mosca. Secondo il Meduza, a pretendere lo spostamento è stato il Servizio federale di protezione, preoccupato dalla minaccia dei droni ucraini dopo un’estate di attacchi alle raffinerie della costa. Il dettaglio logistico ha un suo peso. La guerra, di cui al Valdai si parla sempre nel linguaggio del sistema internazionale, entra ormai anche nell’organizzazione materiale del forum.

La XXIII Riunione annuale si è svolta dal 28 settembre al 1° ottobre sotto un titolo che a un europeo suona quasi come una domanda personale: «Responsabilità per il futuro: i limiti del possibile o possibilità senza limiti?». L’apertura è stata affidata al rapporto annuale del Club, Keep Calm. Lo Stato e la responsabilità per il futuro, che gli autori presentano con una strizzata d’occhio a Kubrick come un manuale per smettere di preoccuparsi e imparare ad amare il disordine. Seguivano nove sessioni tematiche, una sessione speciale e, l’ultimo giorno, la plenaria con il Presidente.

Sono arrivato da italiano e da europeo, sapendo che in quelle sale le due qualifiche pesano in modo diverso. Nel corso della settimana ho parlato, in maniera particolare, con quattro interlocutori di alto livello: Sergej Karaganov, Maksim Oreškin, Sergej Lavrov e, durante la plenaria, Vladimir Putin. Le prime tre conversazioni si sono svolte a margine delle sessioni e le restituisco dai miei appunti, nella sostanza e non parola per parola. Il quarto scambio è pubblico e documentato dalla trascrizione, dalla quale cito direttamente.

Presi uno per uno, i quattro dialoghi dicono cose che chi segue il dibattito russo conosce. Messi in fila disegnano qualcosa di più preciso: una diagnosi condivisa sull’Europa e quattro modi diversi di trarne le conseguenze. E, soprattutto, un futuro per niente luminoso.

Karaganov: l’Europa come origine del male

Sergej Karaganov è tra i fondatori del Club Valdai, presidente onorario del Consiglio per la politica estera e di difesa e da anni la voce più radicale del realismo russo. Con lui la conversazione è partita subito dal punto più duro. L’Europa, ha detto, è la radice di ogni male. Se venisse distrutta, nessuno ne sarebbe addolorato. Un conflitto nucleare tattico sul suo territorio non coinvolgerebbe altri attori. Gli europei hanno avuto tutto il tempo per trovare una soluzione ai propri problemi; ora che hanno scelto di prepararsi alla guerra contro la Russia, è troppo tardi per offrire loro un’altra possibilità.

Devo essere sincero, non sono mai stato un fan di Karaganov, spesso ho trovato le sue posizioni troppo radicali e all’antica. Ma a partire da un caffè dopo pranzo insieme, per poi proseguire in una settimana di dialoghi, ho scoperto che la pensiamo in maniera molto simile e che le sue posizioni non sono affatto banali. Chi ha letto i suoi interventi recenti riconosce la linea. Nel giugno 2023 Karaganov aveva sostenuto pubblicamente che la Russia dovesse abbassare la soglia d’impiego dell’arma nucleare per restituire credibilità alla propria deterrenza e indurre l’Occidente a ritirarsi dal conflitto ucraino. Una parte di quell’impostazione è poi entrata nei documenti ufficiali: i Fondamenti della politica statale della Federazione Russa nel campo della deterrenza nucleare, aggiornati nel novembre 2024, trattano come attacco congiunto l’aggressione di uno Stato non nucleare condotta con la partecipazione o il sostegno di una potenza nucleare.

Nelle sue parole convivono però tre affermazioni di natura diversa, e conviene tenerle separate. La prima è un giudizio storico-civilizzazionale: l’Europa come matrice delle grandi catastrofi della modernità, dalle guerre mondiali al colonialismo. È una tesi che Karaganov argomenta da tempo e che si può contestare, ma appartiene al terreno dell’interpretazione. La seconda, che nessuno piangerebbe l’Europa, è una previsione sulle reazioni altrui; per quel che ho potuto osservare in quei giorni, trova ascolto in una parte non piccola dei partecipanti asiatici, africani e latinoamericani. La terza è un’ipotesi strategica e regge tutto il resto: un’escalation nucleare in Europa resterebbe confinata all’Europa.

Su questo punto la letteratura sulla deterrenza discute da settant’anni e le prove empiriche, per fortuna, mancano. Il dato che complica l’ipotesi è interno all’Europa stessa. Francia e Regno Unito dispongono di arsenali nazionali, e nel marzo 2025 Parigi ha aperto formalmente il dibattito sulla dimensione europea della propria dissuasione. Un conflitto nucleare «solo europeo» presuppone che due potenze nucleari europee restino a guardare. È l’assunto più fragile dell’intera costruzione, e lo è indipendentemente da come si giudichino gli altri due.

Va poi ricordato che Karaganov non parla a nome del governo. Al Valdai rappresenta il polo del dibattito russo che spinge il Cremlino verso posizioni più nette, e una delle sue funzioni è proprio spostare il confine di ciò che si può dire. Letto così, il suo «troppo tardi» è un’indicazione di tendenza più che di dottrina.

Oreškin: il mercato che non c’è più

Con Maksim Oreškin il registro è cambiato del tutto. Vice capo dell’Amministrazione presidenziale, già ministro dello Sviluppo economico e poi consigliere economico del presidente, Oreškin ragiona per flussi e bilanci. La sua formula è stata secca: l’Europa è finita. Sul mercato energetico non esiste più una competizione che possa reggere, perché Cina e India occupano ormai il primo posto tra i clienti della Russia. E non vi sono ragioni per investire in un salvataggio europeo, dal momento che agli europei, fino a oggi, non è interessato trovare una soluzione pacifica e ragionevole. La domanda che gli avevo posto nell’incontro con i partecipanti del Valdai era stata: “Considerando che non è più disponibile il gasdotto Nord Stream 2, perché è stato sabotato, avete intenzione di trovare un nuovo sistema di trasporto energetico, sempre che l’Europa si riappacifichi e la situazione diplomatica torni positiva?”. La sua risposta netta – e forse brutale – è come un pugnale di verità che viene piantato nella coscienza di ogni abitante dell’Europa.

«Finita» va inteso in senso tecnico. Oreškin non parlava direttamente della civiltà europea ma dell’Europa come controparte: un mercato che ha smesso di essere centrale per la Russia e che quindi non giustifica concessioni politiche per essere riconquistato. Dopo il 2022 il greggio russo ha trovato in Cina e India i suoi principali acquirenti, mentre Bruxelles, con l’accordo tra Consiglio e Parlamento europeo del dicembre 2025, si è impegnata ad azzerare entro il 2027 le importazioni di gas russo, gasdotto e GNL compresi. L’interdipendenza energetica che per mezzo secolo aveva tenuto in contatto Europa e Russia anche nei momenti peggiori della Guerra fredda è stata smontata da entrambe le parti. Il ragionamento di Oreškin ne registra la conseguenza più semplice: chi non è più il cliente principale non ha più leva. Queste sono le leggi del mercato, e né a Londra, né a Berlino, né a Bruxelles ci sono più politici o gruppi di potere che possano dire alla Russia “che cosa fare”.

Il rovescio è noto anche a Mosca. Un mercato dominato da due grandi compratori consente loro di imporre sconti, e la sostituzione dell’Europa con l’Asia ha un costo in termini di prezzo e di accesso alle tecnologie. Ma nella logica che mi è stata esposta la domanda non è più se l’Europa convenga alla Russia. È quanto costerebbe tornare a farla convenire, e la risposta implicita è che quel costo spetta agli europei.

Lavrov: la porta chiusa a «questo» assetto

Con Sergej Lavrov il discorso si è spostato dall’economia alla diplomazia, senza cambiare la conclusione. L’Europa, ha detto, ha avuto molte possibilità di ristabilire un dialogo con la Russia e ha preferito alimentare lo scontro diretto. Ora è tardi per tornare indietro: sono stati superati tutti i limiti e con l’attuale assetto europeo non c’è modo di tornare alle relazioni precedenti.

Vorrei che ci soffermassimo un attimo sul peso di queste parole. Chi conosce Lavrov sa che è un politico capace di pesare ogni parola con una grande intelligenza, anche in contesti più rilassati come il Summit del Valdai. “I limiti sono stati superati”. Sarebbe inutile fare l’elenco di questi limiti, perché sono talmente evidenti a davanti agli occhi del mondo intero, che sarebbe solo una perdita di tempo. Ma lo sguardo con cui Lavrov ha parlato dell’Europa, quello non lo dimenticherò mai. Lo ho incontrato molte altre volte, ma in questa occasione c’era qualcosa di diverso.

Il ministro ha alle spalle un elenco di occasioni che la diplomazia russa richiama con regolarità: gli accordi di Minsk, le bozze di trattato sulle garanzie di sicurezza consegnate a Stati Uniti e NATO il 17 dicembre 2021, i negoziati di Istanbul della primavera 2022. La lettura russa di ciascuno di questi passaggi è controversa, e in Europa la si contesta. A me interessa qui un altro elemento, una qualificazione che riletta dopo la plenaria si è rivelata la chiave dell’intera settimana. Il ritorno è impossibile con questo assetto europeo. Non con l’Europa, con il suo assetto attuale, ovvero la UE e la NATO. La chiusura riguarda una classe dirigente e un’architettura istituzionale, non i Paesi che ne fanno parte.

Quanto è stata abusata la pazienza russa, mi chiedo, per arrivare a dire queste cose? La letteratura classica russa ci regala degli esempi mirabili di come i politici russi siano capaci di prendere tempo, ignorare, pazientare. E non si può negare che ciò sia stato costantemente l’atteggiamento della classe dirigente russa negli ultimi anni di conflitto. Per giungere a dire che il limite è stato superato – cosa che dirà poi anche Putin nella sessione plenaria del summit – vuol dire che non ci sono più forze da sprecare nell’attesa paziente; vuol dire che l’Orso è stato svegliato dal suo letargo nel momento sbagliato; vuol dire che le conseguenze di queste azioni avranno un peso epocale.

Un’altra cosa ha aggiunto Lavrov: “Siamo pronti a colpire l’Europa in maniera esemplare, non come abbiamo fatto in Ucraina”. Segnatevi queste parole, cari amici europei. Rileggetele e meditate sul loro peso. Non serve aggiungere altro.

Un professore italiano fa una domanda a Putin

Veniamo ad uno dei momenti più pericolosi della mia carriera. La plenaria si è svolta, come da tradizione, con il presidente russo e la moderazione di Fëdor Luk’janov. Ho preso la parola e ho posto una domanda in due parti:

«Vengo dall’Italia, Paese che attualmente non ha buoni rapporti con la Russia. In quanto europeo, vorrei chiederle: quali condizioni porrà la Russia per elaborare un nuovo sistema di sicurezza per i Paesi europei? E, se immaginiamo un’Europa post-Unione Europea, lei la considererà come parte di un grande partenariato eurasiatico oppure, a suo avviso, Stati Uniti e Russia saranno sempre in competizione per questi territori?»

Putin ha cominciato dalla seconda parte, e l’ordine non è casuale:

«L’Italia si trova per l’appunto in Europa e io parlo di partenariato eurasiatico: va da sé, quindi, che considereremo e già consideriamo anche l’Italia un partner eurasiatico.»

Subito dopo ha chiarito che il destino dell’Unione Europea, e la permanenza dell’Italia al suo interno, «non è affar nostro». Mosca non intende nemmeno discuterne, perché qualunque parola in merito verrebbe letta come un tentativo di disgregare l’UE, «mentre noi non vogliamo disgregare un bel niente. Noi vogliamo soltanto costruire e cooperare».

Sulle condizioni per un nuovo sistema di sicurezza la risposta è stata netta: «non abbiamo alcuna condizione preliminare». L’ostacolo, nella sua ricostruzione, sta dall’altra parte. Alcuni politici europei ritengono inammissibile che un singolo Paese apra un dialogo con la Russia, e Putin ha definito questa pretesa un diktat più forte di quello dell’epoca sovietica. Il paragone è stato costruito con cura: l’URSS era uno Stato unitario e fortemente centralizzato, le cui Repubbliche facevano parte di un’unica compagine statale; l’Unione Europea in teoria non lo è, ma in pratica si comporta come se lo fosse. «A noi non lo vieta nessuno, siamo pronti.»

A quel punto Luk’janov è intervenuto con una provocazione da moderatore esperto: visto che a Bruxelles lo vietano, non converrebbe contribuire un po’ alla disgregazione dell’UE, così da trattare più facilmente con i singoli Paesi? La risposta è arrivata senza esitazioni: «Ma non serve, si disgregheranno da soli.»

Poi Putin si è rivolto direttamente a me. «Il nostro collega italiano lo sa meglio di noi», ha detto, e ha cominciato a fare i conti: debito pubblico italiano al 140%, deficit intorno al 3%, in altri Paesi europei vicino al 5%. Le cifre erano arrotondate ma non lontane dal vero. Secondo Istat ed Eurostat, a fine 2024 il debito pubblico italiano era pari al 135,3% del PIL e l’indebitamento netto al 3,4%. Il senso del passaggio, comunque, non stava nei decimali. Tutti i problemi cominciano con l’economia: il tenore di vita cala, i disoccupati aumentano, i cittadini delle principali economie europee lo avvertono sulla propria pelle, e questo, ha detto, «mina anche le fondamenta stesse dell’Unione Europea. Ma non è affar nostro, noi non c’intromettiamo».

La chiusura ha riproposto l’offerta in forma simmetrica: dialogo con l’Unione nel suo complesso, se l’Unione lo desidera, oppure con i singoli Paesi, senza condizioni preliminari. «Ma di condizioni preliminari non devono essercene neppure da parte europea.»

Provare a comprendere la grandezza di queste parole, l’equilibrio politico che ne traspare, la forza di uno statista che ha a cuore non solo il bene del proprio Paese, ma anche quello di un intero altro continente, è un vero esercizio di apprendimento di cosa sia la Politica.

Ascoltatevi l’intero intervento di Putin e capirete come, in meno di cinque minuti, sia possibile fotografare la decadenza dell’Europa intera, sotto tutte le sue sfaccettature, e allo stesso tempo ribadire, con malinconia, che la Russia ha fatto di tutto per dare il proprio aiuto. Ma le scelte degli europei sono degli europei, sotto qualsiasi bandiera essi si trovino. La Russia rispetta e rispetterà sempre i principi fondamentali della propria politica estera e della propria tradizione politica. Nessun messianismo miracoloso, nessun salvatore improvvisato.

L’Europa, anzi gli europei di questa Europa, cosa hanno intenzione di fare?

Rileggendo gli appunti di viaggio

Rileggendo gli appunti al ritorno, la prima cosa evidente è la convergenza. Lo stratega, l’economista, il capo della diplomazia e il Presidente hanno espresso, ciascuno nel proprio linguaggio, lo stesso giudizio: l’Europa attuale ha esaurito il proprio credito presso Mosca. La seconda cosa evidente è che da quella diagnosi ognuno ricava una conseguenza diversa.

In Karaganov la conseguenza è coercitiva e ha un tono quasi escatologico: l’Europa ha avuto la sua occasione e ciò che segue non è più affare di diplomazia. In Oreškin è indifferenza contabile: l’Europa non vale l’investimento necessario a recuperarla. In Lavrov è una chiusura diplomatica circoscritta, rivolta all’assetto e non ai popoli. In Putin, infine, la porta torna aperta, ma verso gli Stati e non verso Bruxelles, accompagnata dall’attesa che l’erosione economica faccia il resto.

La contraddizione apparente tra il «troppo tardi» dei primi tre e il «nessuna condizione preliminare» del quarto si scioglie proprio nella qualificazione di Lavrov. Ne risulta una linea coerente, che chiamerei di bilateralizzazione: Mosca non tratta con l’Unione come soggetto politico finché la sua dirigenza resta quella attuale, offre ai singoli Stati membri canali senza precondizioni e lascia che siano le difficoltà interne europee a rendere quei canali attraenti. Il riferimento all’Italia come partner eurasiatico «già oggi» va letto dentro questa cornice: non è una cortesia, è l’indicazione di quale interlocutore Mosca preferisce.

Non posso certo affermare che i quattro interlocutori d’eccezione si fossero messi d’accordo, è ovvio, ma questa convergenza l’ho trovata veramente “profetica”. Il Valdai è da sempre il luogo in cui il dibattito russo mostra la propria ampiezza davanti a un pubblico straniero. Posso dire che sono compatibili e che si rafforzano a vicenda: la durezza di Karaganov fa apparire moderata l’offerta di Putin, i numeri di Oreškin rendono credibile che Mosca non abbia bisogno di fare concessioni, la formula di Lavrov tiene insieme la chiusura e l’apertura.

La crisi dei debiti sovrani del 2010–2012 produsse il Meccanismo europeo di stabilità e l’unione bancaria; la pandemia produsse Next Generation EU e il primo debito comune su larga scala. Nell’Unione le crisi hanno generato almeno tanta centralizzazione quanta frammentazione. «Si disgregheranno da soli» è dunque una scommessa, non un’osservazione, anche se la scommessa costa poco a chi la fa: se l’Unione regge, Mosca ha comunque offerto il dialogo; se cede, ha già pronti i canali bilaterali.

Gli indicatori da seguire nei prossimi dodici-diciotto mesi sono abbastanza chiari. Il primo riguarda le visite bilaterali a Mosca di capi di governo dell’Unione oltre ai precedenti di Viktor Orbán nel luglio 2024 e di Robert Fico nel maggio 2025. Il secondo è la tenuta dell’unanimità nei rinnovi semestrali delle sanzioni, dove basta un veto per aprire una crepa. Il terzo sono le deroghe nazionali al calendario di uscita dal gas russo. Il quarto, il più significativo per noi, è l’eventuale apertura di un canale strutturato da parte di una grande capitale, Roma inclusa.

Cosa mi porto a casa? Da italiano, la frase che porto con me non è quella sulla disgregazione, è l’altra, «già consideriamo anche l’Italia un partner eurasiatico». Contiene un’offerta e un’osservazione rivolta a noi. Se la porta che Mosca dice aperta è chiusa, lo è da questa parte, e a chiuderla non è stata Roma per una decisione propria.

Per quanto tempo un Paese con un debito oltre il 135% del PIL possa permettersi di lasciare ad altri la decisione su chi può parlare con chi, a Mosca nessuno me l’ha chiesto. È una domanda che mi sono portato a casa da solo. E la risposta la conosce ogni italiano di retta coscienza, ogni europeo che abbia ancora un cuore.

Si la porte que Moscou dit ouverte est en réalité fermée, elle est fermée de ce côté-ci – et ce n’est pas Rome qui l’a fermée de son propre chef.

Un sommet de Valdaï hors site

Ce que je vais partager dans cet article est moins technique et plus personnel que d’habitude. Il s’agit des informations recueillies au cours de plusieurs jours de dialogue, de discussion et, apparemment, d’une question « scandaleuse » qui est devenue un phénomène médiatique en Europe – parce que j’ai demandé au président de la Fédération de Russie, Vladimir Vladimirovitch Poutine, ce qu’il adviendra de l’Europe.

Vous pouvez trouver la vidéo complète du discours de Vladimir Poutine au Forum de Valdaï ici.

Vous pouvez trouver mes remarques et les réponses de Poutine ici.

Cette année, le Forum de Valdaï ne s’est pas réuni à Sotchi. Les invitations envoyées au cours de l’été mentionnaient encore la ville de la mer Noire comme lieu de rendez-vous, mais ensuite, fin août, les organisateurs ont annoncé le déménagement vers la région de Moscou. Selon le FT, le Service fédéral de protection a exigé ce déménagement, inquiet de la menace de drones ukrainiens après un été d’attaques contre des raffineries côtières. Ce détail logistique a son propre poids. La guerre – dont on parle toujours à Valdaï dans le langage du système international – influence désormais aussi l’organisation pratique du forum.

La 23e réunion annuelle s’est tenue du 28 septembre au 1er octobre sous un titre qui, pour un Européen, ressemble presque à une question personnelle : « La responsabilité pour l’avenir : les limites du possible ou des possibilités illimitées ? » L’ouverture a été marquée par le rapport annuel du Club, Keep Calm. The State and Responsibility for the Future, que les auteurs présentent – avec un clin d’œil à Kubrick – comme un manuel pour cesser de s’inquiéter et apprendre à aimer le chaos. Ont suivi neuf sessions thématiques, une session spéciale et, le dernier jour, la session plénière avec le président.

Je suis arrivé en tant qu’Italien et Européen, sachant que dans ces salles, les deux identités n’ont pas le même poids. Tout au long de la semaine, j’ai parlé, en particulier, à quatre interlocuteurs de haut niveau : Sergueï Karaganov, Maksim Orechkine, Sergueï Lavrov et, lors de la session plénière, Vladimir Poutine. Les trois premières conversations ont eu lieu en marge des sessions, et je les rapporte à partir de mes notes – en substance, pas mot pour mot. Le quatrième échange est public et documenté par une transcription, que je cite directement.

Pris un par un, les quatre dialogues transmettent des choses que quiconque suit le débat russe connaît déjà. Mais lorsqu’on les considère dans l’ordre, ils dressent un tableau plus clair : une évaluation commune de l’Europe et quatre manières différentes d’en tirer des conclusions. Et, surtout, un avenir qui n’a rien de brillant.

Karaganov : l’Europe comme source du mal

Sergueï Karaganov est l’un des fondateurs du Club de Valdaï, président honoraire du Conseil pour la politique étrangère et de défense, et, depuis des années, la voix la plus radicale du réalisme russe. Avec lui, la conversation a commencé immédiatement par le point le plus controversé. L’Europe, a-t-il dit, est la racine de tout mal. Si elle était détruite, personne ne la pleurerait. Un conflit nucléaire tactique sur son territoire n’impliquerait pas d’autres acteurs. Les Européens ont eu amplement le temps de trouver une solution à leurs propres problèmes ; maintenant qu’ils ont choisi de se préparer à la guerre contre la Russie, il est trop tard pour leur offrir une autre chance.

Je dois être honnête : je n’ai jamais été un admirateur de Karaganov ; j’ai souvent trouvé ses vues trop radicales et dépassées. Mais à partir d’un café pris ensemble après le déjeuner – et tout au long d’une semaine de discussions – j’ai découvert que nous pensons de manière très similaire et que ses vues ne sont en rien triviales. Quiconque a lu ses déclarations récentes reconnaîtra cette ligne de pensée. En juin 2023, Karaganov avait publiquement soutenu que la Russie devait abaisser le seuil d’utilisation des armes nucléaires afin de restaurer la crédibilité de sa dissuasion et d’inciter l’Occident à se retirer du conflit en Ukraine. Une partie de cette approche a ensuite été intégrée dans des documents officiels : les Principes fondamentaux de la politique d’État de la Fédération de Russie dans le domaine de la dissuasion nucléaire, mis à jour en novembre 2024, traitent une attaque d’un État non nucléaire menée avec la participation ou le soutien d’une puissance nucléaire comme une attaque conjointe.

Ses paroles, cependant, contiennent trois affirmations distinctes, et il vaut la peine de les garder séparées. La première est un jugement historique et civilisationnel : l’Europe comme source des grandes catastrophes de la modernité, des guerres mondiales au colonialisme. C’est une thèse que Karaganov défend depuis longtemps et qui peut être contestée, mais elle relève de l’interprétation. La deuxième – que personne ne pleurerait l’Europe – est une prédiction sur les réactions des autres ; d’après ce que j’ai observé durant ces journées, elle résonne auprès d’une partie significative des participants asiatiques, africains et latino-américains. La troisième est une hypothèse stratégique qui sous-tend tout le reste : une escalade nucléaire en Europe resterait confinée à l’Europe.

Sur ce point, la littérature sur la dissuasion débat depuis soixante-dix ans et – heureusement – les preuves empiriques manquent. Le facteur qui complique cette hypothèse se trouve au sein même de l’Europe. La France et le Royaume-Uni possèdent des arsenaux nationaux et, en mars 2025, Paris a formellement ouvert le débat sur la dimension européenne de sa propre dissuasion. Un conflit nucléaire « purement européen » suppose que deux puissances nucléaires européennes resteraient les bras croisés. C’est l’hypothèse la plus faible de tout l’argument, quelle que soit l’évaluation que l’on fasse des deux autres.

Il faut aussi noter que Karaganov ne parle pas au nom du gouvernement. Au Forum de Valdaï, il représente l’aile du débat russe qui pousse le Kremlin vers des positions plus définitives, et l’un de ses rôles est précisément de repousser les limites de ce qui peut être dit. Vu sous cet angle, son « trop tard » est l’indication d’une tendance plutôt qu’une doctrine.

Orechkine : le marché qui n’existe plus

Avec Maksim Orechkine, le ton a complètement changé. Chef adjoint de l’Administration présidentielle, ancien ministre du Développement économique, puis conseiller économique du président, Orechkine raisonne en termes de flux de trésorerie et de bilans. Son évaluation a été sans détour : l’Europe est finie. Il n’y a plus de concurrence viable sur le marché de l’énergie, car la Chine et l’Inde occupent désormais les premières places parmi les clients de la Russie. Et il n’y a aucune raison d’investir dans un sauvetage européen, puisque les Européens, à ce jour, n’ont montré aucun intérêt à trouver une solution pacifique et raisonnable. La question que je lui avais posée lors de la réunion avec les participants de Valdaï était : « Étant donné que le pipeline Nord Stream 2 n’est plus disponible – parce qu’il a été saboté – avez-vous l’intention de trouver un nouveau système de transport d’énergie, en supposant que l’Europe se réconcilie et que la situation diplomatique s’améliore ? » Sa réponse franche – et peut-être brutale – est comme une dague de vérité plongée dans la conscience de chaque Européen.

« Fini » doit être compris au sens technique. Orechkine ne parlait pas directement de la civilisation européenne, mais de l’Europe comme partenaire commercial : un marché qui a cessé d’être central pour la Russie et qui ne justifie donc pas des concessions politiques pour le reconquérir. Après 2022, le brut russe a trouvé ses principaux acheteurs en Chine et en Inde, tandis que Bruxelles, par l’accord entre le Conseil et le Parlement européen en décembre 2025, s’est engagée à éliminer progressivement les importations de gaz russe – y compris le gaz de pipeline et le GNL – d’ici 2027. L’interdépendance énergétique qui avait maintenu l’Europe et la Russie connectées pendant un demi-siècle – même durant les pires moments de la guerre froide – a été démantelée par les deux parties. Le raisonnement d’Orechkine en saisit la conséquence la plus simple : celui qui n’est plus le principal client n’a plus de levier. Ce sont les lois du marché, et ni à Londres, ni à Berlin, ni à Bruxelles il ne reste de politiciens ou de groupes de pouvoir capables de dire à la Russie « quoi faire ».

Le revers de la médaille est bien connu à Moscou aussi. Un marché dominé par deux grands acheteurs permet à ceux-ci d’exiger des réductions, et remplacer l’Europe par l’Asie a un coût en termes de prix et d’accès à la technologie. Mais selon la logique qui m’a été présentée, la question n’est plus de savoir si l’Europe est dans l’intérêt de la Russie. C’est de savoir combien il coûterait de la rendre à nouveau bénéfique, et la réponse implicite est que les Européens doivent en assumer le coût.

Lavrov : la porte fermée sur « cet » ordre

Avec Sergueï Lavrov, la discussion est passée de l’économie à la diplomatie, sans changer la conclusion. L’Europe, a-t-il dit, a eu de nombreuses occasions de rétablir un dialogue avec la Russie et a choisi au contraire d’alimenter une confrontation directe. Maintenant, il est trop tard pour revenir en arrière : toutes les limites ont été franchies, et avec l’ordre européen actuel, il n’y a aucun moyen de revenir aux relations précédentes.

J’aimerais que nous nous arrêtions un moment pour considérer le poids de ces mots. Ceux qui connaissent Lavrov savent qu’il est un politicien capable de peser chaque mot avec une grande intelligence, même dans des contextes plus détendus comme le sommet de Valdaï. « Les limites ont été franchies. » Il serait inutile d’énumérer ces limites, car elles sont si évidentes pour le monde entier que ce serait simplement une perte de temps. Mais le regard de Lavrov lorsqu’il parlait de l’Europe – je ne l’oublierai jamais. Je l’ai rencontré bien d’autres fois, mais à cette occasion, il y avait quelque chose de différent.

Le ministre a un historique d’événements que la diplomatie russe cite régulièrement : les accords de Minsk, les projets de traités sur les garanties de sécurité soumis aux États-Unis et à l’OTAN le 17 décembre 2021, et les négociations d’Istanbul au printemps 2022. L’interprétation russe de chacun de ces développements est controversée, et elle est contestée en Europe. Ce qui m’intéresse ici est un autre élément – une nuance qui, à la relecture après la session plénière, s’est révélée être la clé de toute la semaine. Un retour est impossible dans ce cadre européen. Pas avec l’Europe, dans sa forme actuelle – c’est-à-dire l’UE et l’OTAN. Le rejet concerne une classe dirigeante et une architecture institutionnelle, pas les pays qui en font partie.

Je me demande jusqu’à quel point la patience russe a été abusée pour en arriver à dire de telles choses. La littérature russe classique nous offre des exemples admirables de la manière dont les politiciens russes sont capables de temporiser, d’ignorer et d’être patients. Et il est indéniable que cela a constamment été l’attitude de la classe dirigeante russe durant les récentes années de conflit. Aller jusqu’à dire que la limite a été franchie – ce que Poutine reprendrait plus tard lors de la session plénière du sommet – signifie qu’il n’y a plus de ressources à gaspiller en attente patiente ; cela signifie que l’Ours a été réveillé de son hibernation au mauvais moment ; cela signifie que les conséquences de ces actions auront une signification d’époque.

Lavrov a ajouté une chose de plus : « Nous sommes prêts à frapper l’Europe de manière exemplaire, pas comme nous l’avons fait en Ukraine. » Prenez note de ces mots, chers amis européens. Relisez-les et réfléchissez à leur poids. Il n’y a rien de plus à dire.

Un professeur italien pose une question à Poutine

Nous arrivons maintenant à l’un des moments les plus dangereux de ma carrière. La session plénière a eu lieu, comme le veut la tradition, en présence du président russe et avec Fiodor Loukianov comme modérateur. J’ai pris la parole et posé une question en deux parties :

« Je viens d’Italie, un pays qui n’entretient actuellement pas de bonnes relations avec la Russie. En tant qu’Européen, j’aimerais vous demander : quelles conditions la Russie fixera-t-elle pour développer un nouveau système de sécurité pour les pays européens ? Et, si nous imaginons une Europe post-Union européenne, la considérerez-vous comme faisant partie d’un grand partenariat eurasien ou, selon vous, les États-Unis et la Russie seront-ils toujours en concurrence pour ces territoires ? »

Poutine a commencé par la seconde partie, et l’ordre n’est pas un hasard :

« L’Italie est, en fait, située en Europe, et je parle d’un partenariat eurasien : il va donc de soi que nous considérerons – et considérons déjà – l’Italie comme un partenaire eurasien également. »

Immédiatement après, il a précisé que le sort de l’Union européenne, et l’appartenance continue de l’Italie à celle-ci, « ne nous regarde pas ». Moscou n’a même pas l’intention d’en discuter, car tout commentaire à ce sujet serait interprété comme une tentative de diviser l’UE, « alors que nous ne voulons rien diviser du tout. Nous voulons seulement construire et coopérer ».

Sur les conditions d’un nouveau système de sécurité, la réponse a été claire : « Nous n’avons aucune condition préalable. » L’obstacle, selon lui, se trouve de l’autre côté. Certains politiciens européens considèrent comme inacceptable qu’un seul pays ouvre un dialogue avec la Russie, et Poutine a qualifié cette exigence d’un diktat encore plus dur que celui de l’ère soviétique. La comparaison était soigneusement construite : l’URSS était un État unitaire et hautement centralisé, dont les républiques faisaient partie d’une structure étatique unique ; l’Union européenne, en théorie, ne l’est pas, mais en pratique se comporte comme si elle l’était. « Personne ne nous l’interdit ; nous sommes prêts. »

À ce moment-là, Loukianov est intervenu avec une remarque provocatrice typique d’un modérateur expérimenté : puisque Bruxelles l’interdit, ne vaudrait-il pas mieux contribuer un peu à la désintégration de l’UE, afin de faciliter les relations avec les pays individuels ? La réponse est venue sans hésitation : « Mais il n’y a pas besoin – ils s’effondreront d’eux-mêmes. »

Puis Poutine s’est adressé directement à moi. « Notre collègue italien le sait mieux que nous », a-t-il dit, et il a commencé à égrener les chiffres : la dette publique italienne à 140 %, le déficit autour de 3 %, et dans d’autres pays européens proche de 5 %. Les chiffres étaient arrondis mais pas loin de la vérité. Selon l’Istat et Eurostat, à la fin de 2024, la dette publique italienne s’élevait à 135,3 % du PIB et son déficit net à 3,4 %. Le point de ce passage, cependant, ne portait pas sur les décimales. Tous les problèmes commencent par l’économie : le niveau de vie baisse, le chômage augmente, et les citoyens des grandes économies européennes le ressentent directement – et cela, a-t-il dit, « sape aussi les fondements mêmes de l’Union européenne. Mais ce n’est pas notre affaire ; nous n’intervenons pas ».

Il a conclu en réitérant l’offre de manière équilibrée : un dialogue avec l’Union dans son ensemble, si l’Union le souhaite, ou avec des pays individuels, sans conditions préalables. « Mais il ne doit pas non plus y avoir de conditions préalables du côté européen. »

Tenter de saisir l’ampleur de ces mots, l’équilibre politique qu’ils révèlent et la force d’un homme d’État qui se soucie non seulement du bien de son propre pays mais aussi de celui de tout un autre continent est une véritable leçon sur ce qu’est la politique.

Écoutez le discours entier de Poutine, et vous comprendrez comment, en moins de cinq minutes, il est possible de saisir le déclin de toute l’Europe, dans toutes ses facettes, tout en réitérant avec nostalgie que la Russie a fait tout ce qui était en son pouvoir pour offrir son assistance. Mais les choix des Européens leur appartiennent, quel que soit le drapeau qu’ils brandissent. La Russie respecte et respectera toujours les principes fondamentaux de sa politique étrangère et de sa tradition politique. Pas de messianisme miraculeux, pas de sauveur improvisé.

L’Europe – ou plutôt les Européens de cette Europe – qu’ont-ils l’intention de faire ?

Relire mes notes de voyage

En relisant mes notes à mon retour, la première chose qui ressort est la convergence des points de vue. Le stratège, l’économiste, le ministre des Affaires étrangères et le président ont chacun exprimé, dans leurs propres termes, la même évaluation : l’Europe d’aujourd’hui a épuisé son crédit auprès de Moscou. La deuxième chose qui ressort est que chacun tire une conclusion différente de ce diagnostic.

Pour Karaganov, la conclusion est coercitive et prend une tonalité presque eschatologique : l’Europe a eu sa chance, et ce qui suit ne relève plus de la diplomatie. Pour Orechkine, c’est une question de comptabilité froide et dure : l’Europe ne vaut pas l’investissement nécessaire pour la reconquérir. Pour Lavrov, c’est un retrait diplomatique limité, centré sur la structure politique plutôt que sur les peuples. Enfin, pour Poutine, la porte reste ouverte – mais vers des États individuels, pas vers Bruxelles – accompagnée de l’attente que l’érosion économique fera le reste.

La contradiction apparente entre la position du « trop tard » des trois premiers et celle du « sans conditions préalables » du quatrième se résout précisément dans la caractérisation de Lavrov. Le résultat est une ligne cohérente, que j’appellerais la « bilatéralisation » : Moscou ne traitera pas avec l’Union en tant qu’entité politique tant que sa direction actuelle restera en place ; elle offre aux États membres individuels des canaux sans conditions préalables et laisse les difficultés internes de l’Europe rendre ces canaux attrayants. La référence à l’Italie comme partenaire eurasien « déjà aujourd’hui » doit être comprise dans ce cadre : ce n’est pas une courtoisie ; c’est l’indication de l’interlocuteur que Moscou préfère.

Je ne peux certainement pas affirmer que les quatre interlocuteurs exceptionnels sont parvenus à un accord – cela va sans dire – mais j’ai trouvé cette convergence véritablement « prophétique ». Valdaï a toujours été le lieu où l’ampleur du débat russe est présentée à un public étranger. Je peux dire que ces perspectives sont compatibles et se renforcent mutuellement : la position dure de Karaganov fait paraître l’offre de Poutine modérée ; les chiffres d’Orechkine donnent de la crédibilité à l’idée que Moscou n’a pas besoin de faire de concessions ; et la formule de Lavrov équilibre fermeté et ouverture.

La crise de la dette souveraine de 2010-2012 a donné naissance au Mécanisme européen de stabilité et à l’union bancaire ; la pandémie a conduit à Next Generation EU et à la première dette commune à grande échelle. Au sein de l’Union, les crises ont généré au moins autant de centralisation que de fragmentation. « Ils s’effondreront d’eux-mêmes » est donc un pari, pas une observation – même si le pari coûte peu à ceux qui le font : si l’UE tient bon, Moscou a au moins offert le dialogue ; si elle s’effondre, il a déjà des canaux bilatéraux en place.

Les indicateurs à surveiller au cours des douze à dix-huit prochains mois sont assez clairs. Le premier concerne les visites bilatérales à Moscou de chefs de gouvernement de l’UE, en plus des visites précédentes de Viktor Orbán en juillet 2024 et de Robert Fico en mai 2025. Le deuxième est de savoir si l’unanimité tient lors des renouvellements semestriels des sanctions, où un seul veto suffit à ouvrir une brèche. Le troisième concerne les exemptions nationales du calendrier d’élimination progressive du gaz russe. Le quatrième – et le plus significatif pour nous – est l’ouverture possible d’un canal structuré par une grande capitale, y compris Rome.

Qu’est-ce que j’en retiens ? En tant qu’Italien, la phrase que j’emporte avec moi n’est pas celle sur la désintégration ; c’est l’autre : « Nous considérons déjà l’Italie comme un partenaire eurasien également. » Elle contient à la fois une offre et une observation qui nous est adressée. Si la porte que Moscou dit ouverte est en réalité fermée, elle est fermée de ce côté-ci – et ce n’est pas Rome qui l’a fermée de son propre chef.

Combien de temps un pays dont la dette dépasse 135 % du PIB peut-il se permettre de laisser aux autres le soin de décider qui peut parler à qui ? Personne à Moscou ne me l’a demandé. C’est une question que j’ai ramenée chez moi de moi-même. Et chaque Italien de bonne conscience, chaque Européen qui a encore un cœur, connaît la réponse.

I have watched Pakistan-Afghanistan relations long enough to distrust easy headlines, and last week’s news produced a few of them. At the Center-2026 (Tsentr-2026) war games in Russia’s Chelyabinsk region, Taliban officers stood among the foreign observers. Reports say it was the first time Moscow had invited a Taliban military delegation since the movement returned […]

The post Russia courts the Taliban without dropping Pakistan appeared first on Asia Times.

If the door that Moscow says is open is actually closed, it’s closed on this side – and it wasn’t Rome that closed it of its own accord.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

A Valdai summit off-site

What I’m going to share in this article is less technical and more personal than usual. It concerns the information gathered over several days of dialogue, discussion, and, apparently, a “scandalous” question that became a media sensation in Europe – because I asked the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, what will become of Europe.

You can find the full video of Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Valdai Forum here.

You can find my remarks and Putin’s responses here.

This year, the Valdai Forum did not meet in Sochi. Invitations sent out in the summer still listed the Black Sea city as the venue, but then, in late August, the organizers announced the move to the Moscow region. According to FT, the Federal Protective Service demanded the relocation, concerned about the threat of Ukrainian drones following a summer of attacks on coastal refineries. This logistical detail carries its own weight. The war – which at Valdai is always discussed in the language of the international system – is now also influencing the practical organization of the forum.

The 23rd Annual Meeting took place from September 28 to October 1 under a title that to a European sounds almost like a personal question: “Responsibility for the Future: The Limits of the Possible or Limitless Possibilities?” The opening featured the Club’s annual report, Keep Calm. The State and Responsibility for the Future, which the authors present – with a nod to Kubrick – as a manual for stopping worrying and learning to love chaos. This was followed by nine thematic sessions, a special session, and, on the final day, the plenary session with the President.

I arrived as an Italian and a European, knowing that in those halls, the two identities carry different weight. Over the course of the week, I spoke, in particular, with four high-level interlocutors: Sergey Karaganov, Maksim Oreshkin, Sergey Lavrov, and, during the plenary session, Vladimir Putin. The first three conversations took place on the sidelines of the sessions, and I’m recounting them from my notes – in essence, not word for word. The fourth exchange is public and documented by a transcript, from which I’m quoting directly.

Taken one by one, the four dialogues convey things that anyone following the Russian debate is already familiar with. When viewed in sequence, however, they paint a clearer picture: a shared assessment of Europe and four different ways of drawing conclusions from it. And, above all, a future that is by no means bright.

Karaganov: Europe as the source of evil

Sergei Karaganov is one of the founders of the Valdai Club, honorary chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and for years has been the most radical voice of Russian realism. With him, the conversation began immediately with the most contentious point. Europe, he said, is the root of all evil. If it were destroyed, no one would mourn it. A tactical nuclear conflict on its territory would not involve other actors. Europeans have had plenty of time to find a solution to their own problems; now that they have chosen to prepare for war against Russia, it is too late to offer them another chance.

I must be honest: I’ve never been a fan of Karaganov; I’ve often found his views too radical and old-fashioned. But starting with an after-lunch coffee together – and continuing over the course of a week of discussions – I discovered that we think very similarly and that his views are by no means trivial. Anyone who has read his recent statements will recognize this line of thinking. In June 2023, Karaganov had publicly argued that Russia should lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons to restore credibility to its deterrence and induce the West to withdraw from the conflict in Ukraine. Part of that approach was subsequently incorporated into official documents: the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence, updated in November 2024, treat an attack by a non-nuclear state carried out with the participation or support of a nuclear power as a joint attack.

His words, however, contain three distinct assertions, and it is worth keeping them separate. The first is a historical and civilizational judgment: Europe as the source of modernity’s great catastrophes, from the world wars to colonialism. This is a thesis that Karaganov has long argued and which can be contested, but it belongs to the realm of interpretation. The second – that no one would mourn Europe – is a prediction about others’ reactions; from what I observed during those days, it resonates with a significant portion of the Asian, African, and Latin American participants. The third is a strategic hypothesis that underpins everything else: a nuclear escalation in Europe would remain confined to Europe.

On this point, the literature on deterrence has been debating for seventy years, and – fortunately – empirical evidence is lacking. The factor that complicates this hypothesis lies within Europe itself. France and the United Kingdom possess national arsenals, and in March 2025, Paris formally opened the debate on the European dimension of its own deterrence. A “solely European” nuclear conflict presupposes that two European nuclear powers would stand idly by. This is the weakest assumption in the entire argument, regardless of how one assesses the other two.

It should also be noted that Karaganov does not speak on behalf of the government. At the Valdai Forum, he represents the wing of the Russian debate that pushes the Kremlin toward more definitive positions, and one of his roles is precisely to push the boundaries of what can be said. Viewed in this light, his “too late” is an indication of a trend rather than a doctrine.

Oreshkin: The market that no longer exists

With Maksim Oreshkin, the tone has shifted entirely. Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, former Minister of Economic Development, and later the President’s economic advisor, Oreshkin reasons in terms of cash flows and balance sheets. His assessment was blunt: Europe is finished. There is no longer any viable competition in the energy market, because China and India now occupy the top spots among Russia’s customers. And there is no reason to invest in a European bailout, since the Europeans, to date, have shown no interest in finding a peaceful and reasonable solution. The question I had posed to him during the meeting with the Valdai participants was: “Given that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is no longer available – because it was sabotaged – do you intend to find a new energy transportation system, assuming Europe reconciles and the diplomatic situation improves?” His blunt – and perhaps brutal – response is like a dagger of truth plunged into the conscience of every European.

“Over” should be understood in a technical sense. Oreshkin was not speaking directly about European civilization but about Europe as a trading partner: a market that has ceased to be central to Russia and therefore does not warrant political concessions to win it back. After 2022, Russian crude oil found its main buyers in China and India, while Brussels, through the agreement between the Council and the European Parliament in December 2025, committed to phasing out imports of Russian gas – including pipeline gas and LNG – by 2027. The energy interdependence that had kept Europe and Russia connected for half a century – even during the worst moments of the Cold War – has been dismantled by both sides. Oreshkin’s reasoning captures the simplest consequence of this: whoever is no longer the main customer no longer has leverage. These are the laws of the market, and neither in London, nor in Berlin, nor in Brussels are there any politicians or power groups left who can tell Russia “what to do”.

The flip side is well known in Moscow, too. A market dominated by two major buyers allows them to demand discounts, and replacing Europe with Asia comes at a cost in terms of price and access to technology. But according to the logic presented to me, the question is no longer whether Europe is in Russia’s interest. It is how much it would cost to make it beneficial again, and the implicit answer is that Europeans must bear that cost.

Lavrov: the door closed on “this” order

With Sergey Lavrov, the discussion shifted from the economy to diplomacy, without changing the conclusion. Europe, he said, had many opportunities to reestablish a dialogue with Russia and chose instead to fuel direct confrontation. Now it is too late to turn back: all limits have been crossed, and with the current European order, there is no way to return to previous relations.

I’d like us to pause for a moment to consider the weight of these words. Those who know Lavrov know that he is a politician capable of weighing every word with great intelligence, even in more relaxed settings such as the Valdai Summit. “The limits have been crossed.” It would be pointless to list these limits, because they are so obvious to the whole world that it would simply be a waste of time. But the look in Lavrov’s eyes as he spoke about Europe – I will never forget that. I have met him many other times, but on this occasion, there was something different.

The minister has a track record of events that Russian diplomacy regularly references: the Minsk agreements, the draft treaties on security guarantees submitted to the United States and NATO on December 17, 2021, and the Istanbul negotiations in the spring of 2022. The Russian interpretation of each of these developments is controversial, and it is contested in Europe. What interests me here is another element – a qualification that, upon re-reading after the plenary session, proved to be the key to the entire week. A return is impossible under this European framework. Not with Europe, in its current form – that is, the EU and NATO. The rejection concerns a ruling class and an institutional architecture, not the countries that are part of it.

I wonder just how much Russian patience has been abused to reach the point of saying such things? Classic Russian literature offers us admirable examples of how Russian politicians are capable of stalling, ignoring, and being patient. And there’s no denying that this has consistently been the attitude of the Russian ruling class during the recent years of conflict. To go so far as to say that the limit has been crossed – something Putin would later echo in the summit’s plenary session – means there are no more resources to waste on patient waiting; it means the Bear has been awakened from its hibernation at the wrong moment; it means the consequences of these actions will be of epochal significance.

Lavrov added one more thing: “We are ready to strike Europe in an exemplary manner, not as we did in Ukraine.” Take note of these words, dear European friends. Reread them and reflect on their weight. Nothing more needs to be said.

An Italian professor asks Putin a question

We come now to one of the most dangerous moments of my career. The plenary session took place, as is traditional, with the Russian president in attendance and Fyodor Lukyanov moderating. I took the floor and asked a two-part question:

“I come from Italy, a country that currently does not have good relations with Russia. As a European, I would like to ask you: What conditions will Russia set for developing a new security system for European countries? And, if we imagine a post-European Union Europe, will you consider it part of a great Eurasian partnership, or, in your view, will the United States and Russia always be competing for these territories?”

Putin began with the second part, and the order is no coincidence:

“Italy is, in fact, located in Europe, and I am speaking of a Eurasian partnership: it goes without saying, therefore, that we will consider – and already do consider – Italy a Eurasian partner as well.”

Immediately afterward, he clarified that the fate of the European Union, and Italy’s continued membership in it, “is none of our business.” Moscow does not even intend to discuss it, because any comment on the matter would be interpreted as an attempt to break up the EU, “while we do not want to break up anything at all. We only want to build and cooperate.”

On the conditions for a new security system, the response was clear: “We have no preconditions.” The obstacle, in his view, lies on the other side. Some European politicians consider it unacceptable for a single country to open a dialogue with Russia, and Putin has called this demand a diktat even harsher than that of the Soviet era. The comparison was carefully crafted: the USSR was a unitary and highly centralized state, whose republics were part of a single state structure; the European Union, in theory, is not, but in practice behaves as if it were. “No one is forbidding us; we’re ready.”

At that point, Lukyanov interjected with a provocative remark typical of an experienced moderator: since Brussels forbids it, wouldn’t it be better to contribute a little to the disintegration of the EU, so as to make it easier to deal with individual countries? The answer came without hesitation: “But there’s no need – they’ll fall apart on their own.”

Then Putin addressed me directly. “Our Italian colleague knows this better than we do,” he said, and began running the numbers: Italian public debt at 140%, the deficit around 3%, and in other European countries close to 5%. The figures were rounded but not far from the truth. According to Istat and Eurostat, at the end of 2024, Italy’s public debt stood at 135.3% of GDP and its net borrowing at 3.4%. The point of the passage, however, wasn’t about the decimal points. All problems start with the economy: living standards fall, unemployment rises, and citizens of the major European economies feel it firsthand – and this, he said, “also undermines the very foundations of the European Union. But that’s not our business; we don’t interfere.”

He concluded by reiterating the offer in a balanced manner: dialogue with the Union as a whole, if the Union so desires, or with individual countries, without preconditions. “But there must be no preconditions on the European side either.”

Trying to grasp the magnitude of these words, the political balance they reveal, and the strength of a statesman who cares not only about the good of his own country but also that of an entire other continent is a true lesson in what politics is all about.

Listen to Putin’s entire speech, and you will understand how, in less than five minutes, it is possible to capture the decline of all of Europe, in all its facets, while at the same time wistfully reiterating that Russia has done everything in its power to offer its assistance. But the choices of Europeans are their own, whatever flag they may fly. Russia respects and will always respect the fundamental principles of its foreign policy and its political tradition. No miraculous messianism, no improvised savior.

Europe – or rather, the Europeans of this Europe – what do they intend to do?

Rereading my travel notes

Rereading my notes upon my return, the first thing that stands out is the convergence of views. The strategist, the economist, the foreign minister, and the President have each expressed, in their own words, the same assessment: today’s Europe has exhausted its credit with Moscow. The second thing that stands out is that each draws a different conclusion from that diagnosis.

For Karaganov, the conclusion is coercive and takes on an almost eschatological tone: Europe has had its chance, and what follows is no longer a matter for diplomacy. For Oreshkin, it is a matter of cold, hard accounting: Europe is not worth the investment needed to win it back. For Lavrov, it is a limited diplomatic withdrawal, focused on the political structure rather than the people. Finally, for Putin, the door remains open – but toward individual states, not toward Brussels – accompanied by the expectation that economic erosion will do the rest.

The apparent contradiction between the “too late” stance of the first three and the “no preconditions” stance of the fourth is resolved precisely in Lavrov’s characterization. The result is a coherent line, which I would call “bilateralization”: Moscow will not deal with the Union as a political entity as long as its current leadership remains in place; it offers individual member states channels without preconditions and lets Europe’s internal difficulties make those channels attractive. The reference to Italy as a Eurasian partner “already today” must be understood within this framework: it is not a courtesy; it is an indication of which interlocutor Moscow prefers.

I certainly cannot claim that the four exceptional interlocutors had reached an agreement – that goes without saying – but I found this convergence truly “prophetic.” Valdai has always been the venue where the breadth of Russian debate is showcased to a foreign audience. I can say that these perspectives are compatible and mutually reinforcing: Karaganov’s tough stance makes Putin’s offer appear moderate; Oreshkin’s figures lend credibility to the idea that Moscow does not need to make concessions; and Lavrov’s formula balances firmness with openness.

The 2010–2012 sovereign debt crisis gave rise to the European Stability Mechanism and the banking union; the pandemic led to Next Generation EU and the first large-scale common debt. Within the Union, crises have generated at least as much centralization as fragmentation. “They will fall apart on their own” is therefore a gamble, not an observation – even if the gamble costs little to those making it: if the EU holds together, Moscow has at least offered dialogue; if it collapses, it already has bilateral channels in place.

The indicators to watch over the next twelve to eighteen months are fairly clear. The first concerns bilateral visits to Moscow by EU heads of government, in addition to the previous visits by Viktor Orbán in July 2024 and Robert Fico in May 2025. The second is whether unanimity holds during the semi-annual renewals of sanctions, where a single veto is enough to open a crack. The third concerns national exemptions from the timeline for phasing out Russian gas. The fourth – and most significant for us – is the possible opening of a structured channel by a major capital, including Rome.

What do I take away from this? As an Italian, the phrase I’m taking with me isn’t the one about disintegration; it’s the other one: “We already consider Italy a Eurasian partner as well.” It contains both an offer and an observation directed at us. If the door that Moscow says is open is actually closed, it’s closed on this side – and it wasn’t Rome that closed it of its own accord.

How long can a country with a debt exceeding 135% of GDP afford to leave it up to others to decide who can speak with whom? No one in Moscow asked me that. It’s a question I brought home with me on my own. And every Italian of good conscience, every European who still has a heart, knows the answer.

The European Parliament’s debate on Monday, October 5th, comes at an awkward moment for Brussels. After years of confrontation with Viktor Orbán, the European Commission now believes Hungary has done enough to justify releasing €4.2 billion in cohesion funding and restoring full access to Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe.

The question before MEPs is therefore deceptively simple: have the conditions really been met, or has Brussels simply found a convenient political moment to declare victory?

The answer matters well beyond Hungary. The original dispute was not some abstract quarrel over Brussels etiquette. In 2022, the EU suspended €6.3 billion in Hungarian cohesion funding after identifying deficiencies in public procurement, conflicts of interest, corruption controls and the effectiveness of prosecutorial action. The conditionality mechanism was deliberately designed to make access to EU taxpayers’ money dependent upon safeguards for the rule of law and the protection of the EU budget.

That principle is important. If membership of the EU means anything, it cannot mean that governments receive billions regardless of whether public money is properly administered.

But Hungary has changed politically. Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule ended with Péter Magyar’s decisive election victory in April. Magyar campaigned partly on repairing Hungary’s relationship with Brussels and unlocking the billions frozen during the Orbán years. His government subsequently notified the Commission that it had implemented the required reforms.

The Commission has now accepted that argument — albeit partially. Its September 23rd proposal says Hungary has addressed the rule-of-law breaches affecting the EU budget, citing improvements in public procurement, the anti-corruption framework, prevention of conflicts of interest and prosecutorial effectiveness. If the Council approves the proposal, €4.2 billion in cohesion commitments will be reinstated and Hungarian students and researchers will regain full access to Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe.

That is a substantial political prize for Magyar, and a substantial test for the EU.

The danger for Brussels is obvious. Having spent years insisting that European money must not subsidise corruption or institutional capture, the Commission cannot now appear to have changed the rules simply because a more congenial government has arrived in Budapest.

There is, however, an equally serious danger on the other side. If Hungary has genuinely implemented the reforms demanded by Brussels, continuing to withhold money would make the conditionality mechanism look less like a defence of European values and more like a political punishment system. That would be profoundly damaging. Rules that apply only to governments Brussels likes are not rules at all.

This is why Monday’s debate matters – and the €4.2 billion is only part of the story.

The Commission has made clear that other Hungarian funds remain blocked. Around €3.5 billion is affected by a separate mechanism, including approximately €2.7 billion linked to horizontal conditions concerning the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, including academic freedom, LGBTI rights and asylum.

Meanwhile, Hungary is still seeking access to roughly €10 billion under the Recovery and Resilience Facility. The new Hungarian recovery plan includes measures on anti-corruption, public procurement, transparency, judicial independence and stakeholder participation, with payments tied to the achievement of specific milestones.

So this is not a clean victory for either side.

For Magyar, the release of €4.2 billion demonstrates that his strategy of accommodation with Brussels is delivering tangible results. For the Commission, it provides an opportunity to demonstrate that conditionality can work: reforms are made, the Commission verifies them, and money is released.

But the real test will come afterwards. Brussels must monitor whether the reforms survive political pressure. Anti-corruption bodies must remain genuinely independent. Public procurement must be transparent. Prosecutorial safeguards must work in practice rather than merely on paper. And the judiciary must be capable of challenging the government when necessary.

That is where the European Parliament should concentrate its fire. The temptation will be to turn Monday’s debate into another referendum on Viktor Orbán. That would be yesterday’s argument. Orbán has gone. The more important question is whether Hungary’s new government has actually dismantled the machinery that generated the dispute.

There is a wider lesson here for the European Union.

Conditionality can only work if Brussels is prepared both to withhold money when standards are breached and to release it when standards are met. Anything else undermines the credibility of the entire system.

The Commission says Hungary has crossed that threshold. The Council must now decide whether it agrees.

MEPs should therefore resist both triumphalism and cynicism, if the reforms are real, Hungary should get its money.

If they are cosmetic, Brussels should keep the cheque in the drawer.

Brussels Moves to Release €4.2bn to Hungary as Magyar Unwinds Orbán-Era Dispute

Ferries remain docked at several ports in Greece on Friday, October 2, due to gale-force winds reaching 9 and up to 10 Beaufort locally in the Aegean Sea. A sailing ban was imposed at the ports of Rafina and Lavrio in south-eastern Attica on Friday morning, while sailings from the port of Piraeus were also […]

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For years, Pakistan’s claim that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan operates from sanctuaries inside Afghanistan produced a familiar exchange: Islamabad accused, Kabul denied, and each new militant attack triggered another round of recrimination. That pattern is becoming harder to sustain. The sanctuary dispute can now be tested against a growing body of evidence rather than competing claims […]

The post Afghanistan’s TTP sanctuary is becoming harder to deny appeared first on Asia Times.

Diesel in the US has climbed to more than US$6.50 a gallon, up about 75% from a year ago, and Asia is likely to pay for it in the form of higher interest rates. Expensive diesel keeps American inflation elevated, which gives the Federal Reserve reason to keep raising interest rates. Higher US rates lift […]

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Hungarian prosecutors have detained two former ministers from Viktor Orbán’s government in separate corruption investigations, weeks after Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s administration intensified its drive to investigate alleged abuses committed under its predecessor.

Balázs Hankó, the former culture and innovation minister, was taken into custody and questioned as a suspect after parliament suspended his immunity. Miklós Seszták, who served as national development minister between 2014 and 2018, has also been detained in a separate investigation involving allegations of bribery connected with state contracts.

The cases are among the most prominent criminal investigations involving senior figures from the Orbán era since the change of government following Hungary’s April election.

Hungary’s prosecution service said on Tuesday that Hankó had been detained on suspicion of mismanagement causing particularly significant financial damage. He has challenged both his detention and the allegations.

The investigation concerns the National Cultural Fund, which Hankó chaired while serving as culture and innovation minister.

Prosecutors allege that money controlled through a temporary board for priority cultural programmes was distributed outside the purposes specified by law and, in some cases, used to finance expenditure connected with the 2026 parliamentary election campaign or for applicants’ personal purposes.

According to prosecutors, 1,079 grants issued between September 2025 and March 2026 caused an estimated loss to the central budget of 17.3 billion forints, equivalent to roughly €47 million.

They further allege that formal decision-making by the cultural fund was separated from the actual process by which recipients were selected.

Hankó denies wrongdoing. Before being detained, he described the proceedings as politically motivated.

The second investigation concerns Seszták, a Christian Democratic politician who served as national development minister during Orbán’s government.

According to detailed Hungarian reporting on the prosecution case, prosecutors suspect Seszták of accepting unlawful payments connected with companies that obtained contracts involving the state.

Investigators allege that Seszták and a former head of the Hungarian National Asset Management Company obtained about 11 billion forints in unlawful benefits. Separate allegations concern payments linked to construction projects and state investments.

Seszták has rejected the accusations, saying he committed no crime and was unaware of criminal conduct connected with the transactions under investigation.

Hungary’s parliament voted to suspend the immunity of both men, allowing prosecutors to proceed with questioning and detention. Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s parliamentary immunity was also lifted in an unrelated case dating from before he entered government.

The prosecutions come during a wider institutional restructuring following Orbán’s defeat in the April parliamentary election.

Magyar’s government has made recovering EU money frozen during disputes with Brussels a major policy objective. The European Commission has linked access to some funds to judicial independence, anti-corruption safeguards and public procurement reforms.

EU Today reported in May that Budapest was negotiating with Brussels over frozen European funds, with anti-corruption measures remaining among the outstanding issues.

That process has since advanced. Earlier this month, the Commission moved towards releasing €4.2 billion in suspended cohesion funding following reforms introduced under the Magyar government.

The criminal investigations therefore have an EU dimension beyond the fate of individual former ministers. Brussels spent several years withholding funds from Hungary under rule-of-law and conditionality mechanisms, with concerns about public procurement, conflicts of interest and the independence of institutions among the principal issues raised.

Magyar has said his government intends to investigate corruption regardless of political affiliation. Fidesz, now in opposition, has accused the government of using law enforcement against political opponents.

The prosecution service has rejected political pressure from both government and opposition figures. In a statement issued on Tuesday, the Prosecutor General’s Office said it was an independent constitutional institution and was not subordinate to either Hungary’s legislature or executive.

The investigations remain at the pre-trial stage. Neither Hankó nor Seszták has been convicted, and the allegations against both men will have to be tested through Hungary’s criminal justice system.

Their cases nevertheless mark a significant escalation in the legal scrutiny of decisions taken during Orbán’s 16 years in office, with prosecutors now examining alleged financial misconduct involving former ministers rather than lower-ranking officials or state bodies.

Was in Ungarn derzeit passiert, ist nur schwer zu verstehen. Dort tobt ein Skandal wegen eines banalen Vorfalls aus dem Jahr 2024, bei dem der heutige ungarische Regierungschef Magyar in einem Nachtclub einem Gast, der ihn filmte, das Mobiltelefon entrissen und in die Donau geworfen hat. Das entsprechende Strafverfahren war bereits eingestellt, wurde nun aber […]

The Durban Conference in South Africa in September 2001 was not just an event; it was a turning point. It was the modern-day Wannsee that planned the contemporary destruction of the Jewish people. I was there for the Italian newspaper, La Stampa. The stench of something rotten was already emanating from the preparations for the great gathering “against racism” convened by the United Nations, with the participation of an enormous number of NGOs—some 3,000—all of them with knives between their teeth, determined to demonstrate that, under the banner of human rights, the real enemy was Israel, writes Fiamma Nirenstein.

It was there, even more than with the U.N.'s “Zionism is racism” resolution of 1975, that Stalin’s path was resumed. In 1952-53, he had initiated and theorized a new great hunt against the Jews, inventing the blood libel of the “Jewish doctors’ plot” and staging the Slánský trial. The systematic murder and deportation of Jews were interrupted by the dictator’s death in 1953. But with theorists such as Maxime Rodinson and Francis Crémieux, the premises were laid for declaring Israel the new enemy of humanity.

The positions that ultimately led to Durban maintained that “the Israeli government has long been simply an agent of American imperialism.” The supposed proof lay in the malign role of Jews in the world. The doctors accused in the so-called conspiracy—all innocent, their confessions extracted under torture—became “identical to the Nazi doctors of Dachau,” in the pay of the Americans. The inversion begins This was the beginning of the inversion that, on Oct. 7, 2023, led to Israel and the Jews being accused of genocide instead of the evident intentions of Hamas and its barbaric determination being condemned. At Durban, the death sentence against Israel went hand in hand, for the first time, with the preemptive legitimization of terrorism, now carried out by “freedom fighters” rather than the terrorists of Munich or Fiumicino.

At a demonstration along the battered streets on the outskirts of Durban, just days before Sept. 11, the crowd marched behind portraits of its mastermind, Osama bin Laden. Along the dusty road, young NGO activists called—as their documents did—on “all of civil society,” from the Maya to the Tibetans, everyone oppressed by racism, to embrace the struggle against Israel and transform it into the fundamental human-rights struggle. When I told the editors at my newspaper, La Stampa, they replied that I had an obsession with that poor Saudi shepherd. The conference was organized by a United Nations that had by then been captured by the great Third World and Islamic blocs that had reliably provided the Soviet Union with a majority. “Zionism is racism,” the 1975 resolution, was an addendum to the death sentence against Judaism following Hitler’s attempt to eliminate it from the planet.

Israel was the new target of antisemitism, invariably linked to anti-Americanism and viewed as the spearhead of the colonial and imperialist West. Every truth was erased. Israel’s almost desperate attempts to share the territory and make territorial concessions to the Arab world were rejected time and again. In 2000, after Arafat had been brought back despite his appalling embrace of terrorism, the Second Intifada erupted. By the time Durban took place, we were in the midst of the Intifada—a preliminary 7 October.

Its preparatory documents had been written and discussed in Strasbourg, Santiago and, astonishingly, Tehran, where since 1979 an Islamist regime had ruled whose foundational principle was the destruction of the State of Israel. Israel as absolute evil In Durban, Fidel Castro, Yasser Arafat and Robert Mugabe converged, and the Jewish question was inserted into the heart of demands for billions in reparations for slavery. Israel obviously had nothing to do with this history, but it was portrayed as absolute evil. The Palestinianism of Durban held that Israel was racist, imperialist, colonialist and genocidal—and therefore even a slave-owning power. All these adjectives are meaningless when applied to a country that represents the miraculous return home, disarmed and hungry, of the people indigenous to that land, armed only with hoes and books.

They armed themselves only when, awakening from the dream, they realized that their lives were once again at risk. And even then, Israel continued to surrender large pieces of territory in the search for peace. I was there In Durban, I rented a room inside a compound surrounded by high walls. I shared it with a journalist from the Italian left-leaning daily, La Repubblica, who was thrilled by the opportunity to encounter Castro and the other idols of the era in the corridors—and, with a little luck, perhaps Nelson Mandela as well. There was the official conference, the domain of Mary Robinson, who purported to moderate the international proceedings and restrain them from excessively harsh resolutions that had in fact been planned from the beginning.

Then there were the stadium and other NGO gathering places, where antisemitic hatred was expressed in every possible way: leaflets, speeches, songs and actual physical hunts for Jews. Several times I had to run away and seek refuge in a building belonging to the local Jewish community, where one could also find something to eat. Thousands of NGO members wore T-shirts bearing the image of Mohammed al-Dura alongside the conference logo. The production of leaflets about Palestinian suffering was endless. Jews were depicted with missiles and knives, blood dripping from their mouths and murdered children. The word “genocide” was already commonplace. From the podium, in a crowded, darkened hall, Fidel Castro, while demanding financial reparations for entire continents for slavery and colonialism, spoke of “the terrible genocide being perpetrated today against our Palestinian brothers” by Israel’s then-prime minister, Ariel Sharon, whom he described as a far-right leader acting in alliance with the “hegemonic superpowers.” Arafat celebrated the universal acceptance of his worldview, describing the situation as the “expression of the racist colonial conspiracy” to uproot the Palestinians and conquer their land. In short, the troops of that global war had finally assembled—a war that only days later would find its expression in the attack on the Twin Towers. That was the true meaning of Durban.

And the Palestinian cause, together with the destruction of Israel, was baptized as the indispensable prerequisite for every revolutionary struggle. The astonishment and disbelief in Israel and the United States were enormous. After everything the Jews had endured, and while they were suffering through the Intifada, finding themselves once again facing such a broad and senseless assault on their right to self-determination and self-defense, their right to return home and the very liberal-democratic nature of their country seemed like a nightmare. The two delegations under attack took days to decide to leave. Israel continued to insist, as Diaspora Affairs Minister Michael Melchior said, that racism—the supposed subject of the conference—was so important to Jews that the country wanted to participate in the discussion and the decisions. In the end, the United States and Israel had to walk out. Canada and Europe remained, but the European position sought an impossible compromise. It proposed restoring the Holocaust to the final documents as the worst expression of racism.

The interventions by Italy’s Renato Ruggiero, Germany’s Joschka Fischer and, in the corridors, the excellent Margherita Boniver—the only one who understood fully, to the point of tears—were hesitant and moderate. Fischer had the strength to say that the right of the Jews to their own state was indisputable. But he returned to the Palestinians’ right to a state and once again forgot that Israel had never called that right into question since 1948, despite its countless offers. ‘Did not happen in a vacuum’ By contrast, the denial of the Jews’ right to have their own state like every other people reached its paroxysm on Oct. 7. And once again the United Nations lined up against Israel, as it had at Durban. So it was with the words of U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, who, instead of expressing horror and condemnation, responded with his infamous statement that the 7 October attacks “did not happen in a vacuum”. It is true: They did not happen in a vacuum. Durban is a milestone in the antisemitic catastrophe that once again torments the world today, and the United Nations is its prophet.

Port authorities imposed a sailing ban from the ports of Lavrio and Rafina in south-eastern Attica on Friday, August 14, 2026, while some ferry itineraries from the port of Piraeus were cancelled on Friday morning due to gale-force winds. Mostly affected by the strong winds are the islands in the Aegean Sea and Crete. Modifications […]

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Swimming and all marine activities have been banned in part of the Ardani area on the island of Karpathos on Sunday, August 9, after objects believed to be munitions were discovered. According to information obtained by state-tun news agency amna.gr, the items are believed to be old munitions. The Hellenic Coast Guard has cordoned off […]

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Greek authorities imposed a sailing ban from the ports of Rafina and Lavrio, eastern Attica, as gale-force winds sweeping across the Aegean Sea also on Friday, July 31, 2026, and ferry services have been disrupted. The sailing ban comes into effect after some ferries has problems to anchor at islands ports and as thousands flock […]

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