ICE is funded through 2029, the Pentagon budget is at record highs – and plenty of Democrats voted for both. So what does winning Congress actually change?

With an ad spend set to hit $11.6 billion and record dark money pouring into the 2026 midterms, BreakThrough News editor-in-chief Ben Becker joins Zoe Alexandra and Rania Khalek to break down what’s really at stake on November 3. He lays out how billionaires and untraceable super PACs are buying the election, the threat of Trump deploying ICE at the polls, and why a likely Democratic majority is unlikely to claw back DHS funding or end Trump’s war on Iran – recalling how Democrats failed to pass comprehensive immigration reform or universal childcare the last time they held power.

And with self-proclaimed socialists like Zohran Mamdani saying Gaza’s a genocide while capitulating to pro-Israel pressure, Becker warns of the Democratic Party’s history of co-opting mass movements – while arguing the pattern reveals real radicalization across US society. And he makes the case for what comes next, pointing to mobilizations now in the streets of France and Spain, and January’s general strike in Minneapolis.

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Rough transcript follows:
[Speaker 1:] With record amounts of dark money pouring into the midterms, and ICE sitting on tens of millions of voter records—records that documents show it tried to share with Peter Thiel’s Palantir—Washington is bracing for an ugly fight over who controls Congress. But for the millions of Americans living in fear of ICE raids, struggling to make rent, or trying to afford fruits and vegetables, how much are their daily lives impacted by the outcome of these midterms? Now that I’m back in the States, I see just how much the price of everything has gone up.

Democrats are running on stopping Trump, but this is also a party that helped push the military budget toward record highs. ICE is already funded through 2029, thanks to a $75 billion windfall Congress handed it last year. So what could—or would—a Democratic majority actually change?

To break it all down, we’re joined by our very own Ben Becker, editor-in-chief of Breakthrough News. Ben, it’s great to have you back on the show.

[Speaker 2:] Thanks for having me. Happy to be back.

[Speaker 1:] These midterms, as I mentioned, are set to break election-spending records. It’s actually insane how much money is pouring in. You’ve got super PACs, the tech and finance industries, and dark-money donors funneling so much cash into ads and races to basically control the outcome like never before.

At the same time, as I mentioned, ICE has been combing through tens of millions of voter records in the name of hunting noncitizen voters, as they call them. With all that in mind, what kind of election is this shaping up to be? Do you think the bigger threat is that money is buying the outcome, or that the state apparatus is being set up to police the vote? Perhaps those two things aren’t mutually exclusive. Either way, none of this sounds very democratic.

[Speaker 2:] It’s sort of like asking, “Would you prefer to die by being hit by a bus, or through long-term cancer?” I think there really are two different things there: the long-term erosion of an already fairly restricted democracy. We shouldn’t pretend that the United States had a shining democratic tradition, given the history of Jim Crow and slavery, the disenfranchisement of millions of undocumented workers, and the largest prison population in the world. All these things were already existing.

Then, after Citizens United, came the infusion of billions of dollars in dark money. The crypto industry, the AI industry, AIPAC, or whoever can give money to nonprofits, which then give money to a super PAC with some shady name that was just started. Literally billions of dollars are going into campaign ads, and nobody knows who’s behind the money. The organizations are basically untraceable.

According to some estimates, around $10 billion will be spent just on these midterm elections, with about 20 billionaires—just 20 individuals—making up one-eighth of all that spending. That’s over a billion dollars. Eighteen of the 20 are Republicans, and two are Democrats. They’re pouring enormous sums of money into going after candidates they don’t like. We’ve seen huge amounts of money spent in some of these key races. That’s obviously a huge threat to any kind of equality or democracy. Some have called it “the best democracy money can buy.” We might want to revise that to “the worst democracy money can buy.”

Then you have Trump’s very particular, immediate threats—which would be like being hit by the bus, so to speak: seizing the ballots, potentially taking control of the count, and deploying ICE agents at ballot stations to scare off people from immigrant communities. There are people in his corner calling for him to declare a state of emergency or invoke the Insurrection Act, or who knows what. I think there’s a whole variety of new threats on top of this long-term erosion, or takeover of the whole electoral system by the billionaire class.

[Speaker 1:] Another element of this month leading up to the midterm elections is that a lot of people have spoken about the very real possibility that Democrats might take back either the House and the Senate, or just one of the two. Let’s say Democrats do manage to win one of these two bodies, or win the majority. ICE’s $75 billion budget is locked in through 2029. The House just passed a record defense bill, and Trump is asking for $1.5 trillion for the Pentagon next year. Suffice it to say, plenty of Democrats voted for these budgets.

If Democrats take the House, does any of that change? Are they able to claw back ICE funding, cut the military budget and the war in Iran, or end the genocide in Gaza? Can they stop health care prices from skyrocketing, and address all these issues that everyday voters in the United States are raising? How do you see it playing out, given the way the Democratic Party has behaved in the past when it has taken back power?

[Speaker 2:] Can they do those things? They could do a lot of them, actually, or at least make life very difficult for the Trump administration and its agencies. They could wage a very persistent struggle to defund ICE. They could create a major obstacle to that enormous war budget, the largest in human history. They could do a lot of things.

The better question is: What will they do? I think both questions are important. We shouldn’t rule out the possibility that they can do these things, because that’s part of holding politicians accountable. If you’ve already internalized that they’ll do nothing in support of the people, that kind of lets them off the hook when they do nothing for the people. I think it’s important to point out concretely how they can do certain things, pass certain bills, and use certain authorities.

But will they? I don’t think any of those things are fundamentally going to be stopped or reversed by the Democratic Party. The party is built on a coalition that includes progressive politicians, people who come from the labor movement, and people who are more tied to working-class demands. But it’s also a coalition with huge sections of corporate America. It’s deeply integrated into the same national security state and military-industrial complex. It takes huge amounts of money from those same industries that give to the Trump administration.

This coalition doesn’t have a cohesive program in defense of the working class, the immigrant community, or anyone in particular that it can hold politicians accountable to. Even having a majority doesn’t really mean that much when you think about it.

If we were having this conversation six years ago, right before Joe Biden came into office, remember, he came in with the House, a very narrow majority in the Senate, and the White House. What was the Build Back Better plan? A lot of the reforms Biden promised, if they had actually gone through, would mean we wouldn’t be dealing with many of the issues we’re dealing with today. For instance, there was universal child care, free community college, paid maternity leave, and comprehensive immigration reform—one of the things the Biden administration promised. There was also voting-rights legislation that would have made it harder for Trump to carry out many of the attacks he’s currently making on voting rights by strengthening federal protections for voting rights.

None of those things came to pass. You can say, “Oh, it was the Republicans,” but it was also Joe Manchin, the Democrat from West Virginia, and Kyrsten Sinema, the Democrat from Arizona, along with a whole assortment of other Democrats who realized they had strategic leverage they could use to block the bills. It’s not like the progressive section of the Democratic Party went to war with those more conservative sections. They blocked all the bills, then cashed out. They all got jobs in the private sector and made tens of millions of dollars, including Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema.

They’re gone now, but we have John Fetterman and other Democrats. I think it’s an illusion to think that having a numerical majority is somehow going to deliver a lot of those things.

And if we’re just being honest, a lot of the political climate against immigration and immigrants was contributed to by the Democrats. The Democrats have also taken huge amounts of money from big tech, so I don’t think we can expect them to stand up to the AI and crypto industries. They’re obviously tied into the military, as we’ve said before. In a way, their biggest frustration with Trump’s Xi meeting was that Trump was too friendly to China.

I think people are going to go to the polls because they hate the Trump administration, for good reason, and the Democrats are going to be the main beneficiaries of that mass opposition to Trump, whose poll numbers are so low right now. But that doesn’t necessarily mean anything will fundamentally change with an incoming majority in the House or Senate.

Back when Joe Biden was running for president in 2020, what was it? He said, “Nothing will fundamentally change.” That’s what he was saying to a group of corporate donors.

[Speaker 1:] Promise. He delivered on that promise.

[Speaker 2:] He did. Yes, he did.

[Speaker 1:] There are some major differences this time around. Suddenly, you’ve got winning Democratic candidates calling themselves socialists, talking about affordability and billionaires, and even saying the word “genocide” about Gaza. The issue of Palestine has come to define so many races across the country. These are things that would have gotten you run out of the party a few years ago. It still stands to be seen, because the party is trying to run some of those people out. But the base of the party clearly wants a lot of this, right?

How do you interpret this shift? Do you see it as a very real shift when people in this party use this language, or is the Democratic Party doing what it’s always done—absorbing energy from the left, in this case from the Palestine movement, to get out the vote, with the real risk that they’ll shelve it once they’re in power?

[Speaker 2:] I think both things are true, and you’re right to note the historical precedent. Dr. King was actually the most hated man in America for a lot of his life, career, and activism. You wouldn’t know it because, once he was dead and the civil-rights reforms were passed, the Democrats in particular—but ultimately both parties—would quote him and co-opt him and the civil-rights movement they had totally opposed.

The same was true with the labor movement and with movements throughout U.S. history. One element of successfully shifting mass consciousness is that elements of the elite then co-opt your message, soften it, dilute it, water it down, and try to gut it of its radical content. In a way, it’s definitely a measure of success. Something is really taking place at the level of the base of society.

I also think you’re right to say that the Democrats don’t intend to deliver on that mass sentiment, nor are they structurally able to. Support for Israel is infused at every level of the U.S. ruling class, from the national security state to big tech companies, financial institutions, and higher education institutions. It’s not just a matter of what someone says on the House or Senate floor, or even this or that bill that’s passed. The same is true of the wars abroad. There’s a tendency toward war that grows regardless of what Congress is doing. For many decades, Congress has done nothing to stop the war machine, and the president has seemingly limitless authority to wage undeclared wars.

I think you’re right to say there’s a level of co-optation, but I think there’s a positive spin on it, too. Being pro-Palestine, as you said, made you somehow unelectable 10 years ago. That was the mainstream wisdom. But if you look at the polls now, there’s been a total reversal. Only 10 or 15 years ago, a majority of the country was absolutely in support of the state of Israel. Now, among Democratic voters, support for Israel is under 20%. Two out of every three Democrats say they have a more favorable opinion of the Palestinian cause.

The same goes for socialism. What’s interesting about the polling around socialism is that, I think, 32 million or so young people have a favorable opinion of it. But you’re also starting to see changes among independents and people who are a little bit older. The favorable rating of capitalism is going down dramatically, including among independents, who are considered the swing voters. A lot of this traditional political thinking—that words like “Palestine” and “socialism” made you toxic—is no longer true. People are losing confidence and trust in the U.S. capitalist system, and they’re no longer going to be turned off by these scare words and scare tactics from the past.

I think the danger of co-optation is real, and obviously socialism also can’t be achieved at the ballot box under a system totally dominated by big business, Wall Street, and the big banks. On the other hand, we should emphasize that there’s a growing radicalization, or politicization, of people across society, of all ages, who are starting to think about new ideas. There’s a positive reading of that.

[Speaker 1:] No, definitely. I think that’s reflected in the interview we did earlier with Danielle Wono about what we’re seeing take place across France as well.

Ben, for people who are watching who are angry, broke, or scared, what’s really at stake on November 3 in these primaries? What should they be doing beyond voting, whichever party comes out on top after November 3? As you said, socialism isn’t voted in at the ballot box, and both of these parties receive significant funds from the capitalist ruling class. What really comes next, and what’s at stake on November 3?

[Speaker 2:] To underscore the point, whether or not you have this or that person in Congress, all the main decisions in your life—who sets the rent, the cost of groceries, the job opportunities that are available, who’s going to introduce artificial intelligence—are basically in the hands of a few corporations. That’s what I meant when I said it can’t be introduced at the ballot box: all these fundamental economic decisions are made privately. There are people taking votes on them, but it ain’t you. It’s boards of directors making those decisions. In that sense, if you really want to change the economic reality, you have to change the economic system. You can’t just change it by voting on November 3.

I think what’s happening in France and Spain is extremely important right now. You’re seeing young people who are upset about the erosion of social services and public schools and the rising cost of rent taking to the streets. They’ve inspired people from all walks of life to take to the streets. It’s really become a kind of rebellion against the political status quo.

We’ve seen that here in Minnesota. In January, we had a general strike for the first time in decades. It was that mass movement in the streets that really pushed back against ICE and the Trump administration. It led to the firing of Bovino and Kristi Noem. It didn’t make ICE disappear, but it did lead ICE to change its tactics.

There’s obviously this latent power of the people in the streets that’s starting to become manifest in Western Europe, and that has been seen in the United States. I think the question is whether these elections open the door for more people to exercise their free-speech and assembly rights, organize, and exercise their rights in the workplace, including withholding their labor. How are these elections won? People might say, “Look, Trump has taken a devastating blow because he probably will lose, and the Republicans will lose.” Does this make people feel more emboldened to organize? It wasn’t the Democrats who really did anything these last two years to restrain the Trump administration.

If you’re looking for them to do something they’ve never done before, that’s a form of insanity: expecting the same result from the Democratic Party. But there is a tradition of mass action pushing back against the far right. Ultimately, what happens in the election isn’t the main thing. Even in France, what if the far right wins the elections? That’s a distinct possibility while young people are in the streets.

Both things can be true at once: there’s growing polarization, and we just have to accept that reality and try to learn from it. I don’t think it’s going to stop, regardless of the outcome on November 3.

[Speaker 1:] Ben Becker, editor-in-chief of Breakthrough News, I really appreciate your analysis. Of course, we’ll be coming back to you as we get closer to the midterms, because this will continue to develop. The horse race always—I really appreciate what you’re saying—becomes the central story. The drama and the various personalities distract from the broader systemic problems we have. Thank you so much. I really appreciate your analysis.

[Speaker 2:] Thanks.

Three years after Israel launched its genocidal aggression on the Gaza strip, massacres and mass destruction continue to take place on a daily basis, despite the US-brokered ceasefire deal that was reached in October 2025.

The nominal truce was preceded by two other short ceasefire agreements. The first was reached in November 2023 and lasted for only one week, while the second was sealed in mid-January 2025 and collapsed two months later.

For three entire years, the world has borne witness to one of the most heinous genocides in modern history, which has resulted in the killing of at least 75,000 Palestinians, according to the latest official health reports, with women, children, and the elderly comprising 56.2% of the death toll. Meanwhile, 82% of Gaza’s structures have been destroyed.

Starvation and the total blockade of aid have also been used as weapons of war against the Palestinian population in the war-ravaged territory.

Read more: Being bombed, starved to death, or killed while seeking food: Israel’s options for Palestinians in Gaza

As soon as it was launched, the US-backed fierce Israeli military campaign expanded beyond Gaza to include other parts of West Asia, including the occupied West Bank, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria.

About 9,000 people have been killed in Lebanon, more than 1,136 in the West Bank, dozens in Yemen and scores of others in Syria.

The systematic targeting of journalists

The genocide in Gaza has been characterized by the systematic targeting of journalists and media workers, with the death toll reaching more than 260, according to Naser Abu Baker, President of the Palestinian Journalists’ Syndicate (PJS).

Abu Baker told BreakThrough News that over the same period, 550 journalists were wounded, and over 200 were arrested.

“All of this underscores a systematic policy implemented by the Israeli occupation, which primarily aims to prevent the truth about the crimes committed in the Palestinian territories by the Israeli occupation against the Palestinian people from being documented and transmitted, especially in the Gaza Strip,” he emphasized.

The chief of PJS noted that the targeting of Palestinian journalists by the Israeli forces began over one decade before the October 7 attacks. 

“PJS documented more than 9000 assaults on journalists in the occupied Palestinian territories between 2012 and 2023. More than 56 journalists were killed during that period, including three foreign journalists,” Abu Baker clarified.

Another silent genocide has been committed against Palestinian detainees in Israeli prisons

Simultaneously with the events in Gaza, the Israel Prison Service escalated a brutal crackdown against the Palestinian Prisoners’ Movement, intensifying a campaign that began in early 2023.

Read more: The Palestinian Prisoners’ Movement: the struggle behind bars

While around 5,200 Palestinian political prisoners were held in Israeli detention prior to October 7, 2023, the number jumped to 9,600 after the outbreak of the Israeli genocidal aggression on Gaza. Many of those prisoners have been placed under administrative detention without charge.

These latest figures only represent the prisoners whose whereabouts inside Israeli detention centers were documented by Palestinian prisoners groups. Thousands of additional Palestinians remain unaccounted for and are believed to have faced enforced disappearance amid the ongoing Israeli military operations in Gaza.

During the past three years, Palestinian prisoners have endured miserable detention conditions, including medical neglect, deprivation of adequate food and hygiene supplies, as well as physical and psychological torture.

Read more: “We are here to kill you”: Released Palestinian prisoner exposes torture and medical neglect in Israeli prisons

This horrific situation culminated with the endorsement of an Israeli law mandating the execution of Palestinian prisoners by hanging. 

On the third anniversary of October 7, Raed Abu al-Hummus, head of the Palestinian Commission of Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs, delivered a message to international human rights organizations via BreakThrough News.

“I call on international human rights organizations to practice their stated objectives, to truthfully convey our message, and to form a parallel front to our heroic prisoners’ front inside the prisons, in an attempt to protect them from these violations, from this far-right monster seeking to slowly kill them,” Abu al-Hummus stated, referring to Israel’s Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir.

It’s not about the Israeli far-right; it’s about the entire Zionist movement, says Omar Assaf

While some media outlets and political analysts suggest that Israel’s intensified atrocities in recent years represent the policy of the far-right wing solely, the Palestinian grassroots believe that they constitute the very core of the Zionist movement. 

Palestinian political activist, freedom fighter and former prisoner in Israeli jails Omar Assaf argued that “the genocide does not reflect a policy of an individual or a current within the Israeli government. It rather reflects a general policy, because the Zionist movement as a whole was founded on the exclusion of the Palestinian people, expelling them, and looting their land.”

“Therefore, if this far-right government is practicing genocide, this does not mean that the next government will be a government of peace,” Assaf asserted. 

Despite three years of unspeakable atrocities and over 78 years of military occupation amid the total silence and inaction of the international community, the Palestinian people remain steadfast and resilient in their homeland, refusing to leave or surrender.

Russia's seaborne exports of refined oil products rose to a three-month high in September, but the growth came from cheaper fuel oil and naphtha as diesel shipments fell to their lowest in more than a decade, Bloomberg reported, citing Vortexa data. Russia kept diesel at home after Ukrainian refinery strikes and paid oil companies to supply its pumps, while high crude prices lifted its crude export earnings.

During the ongoing deep-strike campaign, Ukraine's long-range drones have knocked out more than half of Russia's oil refining capacity, Kyiv says, and Russia's budget oil revenues are falling even as it raises war spending. High global crude prices are softening that blow.

Cheaper fuel out

Total seaborne product exports reached about 1.17 million barrels a day in September. Fuel oil shipments rose 6% to about 613,000 barrels a day, the highest since April. Naphtha, a feedstock for petrochemicals, jumped 35% to 363,000 barrels a day. Exports of refinery feedstocks, including vacuum gasoil, rose to about 32,000 barrels a day, according to Bloomberg.

The trade has moved north. Almost 80% of fuel oil cargoes left from Baltic ports, and naphtha loadings there rose almost 50% as Ukrainian attacks disrupted Black Sea infrastructure. In September, Ukraine reported hitting an oil terminal in Novorossiysk, Russia's main Black Sea oil port—one in a string of attacks on Russia's Black Sea ports and oil sites.

Explore further

More than 500 drones by Moscow’s count: Kh-101 fuel plant, second Yandex data center, and a far-north refinery hit

Diesel kept at home

Diesel and gasoil exports fell 28% to 144,000 barrels a day, the lowest monthly volume in Vortexa data going back more than a decade. Russia has restricted diesel exports to protect domestic supply after Ukrainian attacks on its refineries. Drones kept hitting them into October, from a Lukoil refinery in Volgograd to Gazprom's Salavat complex in Bashkortostan.

In September, Russia paid oil companies the biggest subsidy in more than four years to keep road fuel on the domestic market. It also imported about 350,000 tonnes of motor fuel by sea, mostly gasoline from India, Morocco, and Türkiye, Reuters calculations showed. Officials are considering letting some producers resume diesel exports in October to avoid overstocking, according to Interfax.

The diesel squeeze has reached the White House. US President Donald Trump stated on 30 September that diesel was hurt "not by the Middle East, but by what's going on in Russia, because those diesel refineries are being knocked out at a pretty alarming rate."

Crude carries the revenue

Russia's crude exports reached about 3.99 million barrels a day in the week to 27 September, and the estimated value of its seaborne crude shipments neared its highest since the full-scale invasion began, Bloomberg reported. Brent crude traded at about $102.60 a barrel on 9 October, according to Trading Economics data.

Russian prosecutors have asked the Netherlands to surrender Tomoko Akane and eight other International Criminal Court officials convicted in absentia by a Moscow court, extending the Kremlin’s retaliation against those investigating alleged war crimes in Ukraine.

Russia has demanded the extradition of International Criminal Court (ICC) President Tomoko Akane from the Netherlands, seeking to enforce criminal sentences against judges and prosecutors involved in issuing arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and senior Russian military officials.

The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office announced on Thursday, 8 October, that it had submitted requests to several governments for the extradition of nine current and former ICC officials, including Karim Khan, who served as the court’s chief prosecutor when the arrest warrant against Putin was issued in March 2023.

The requests follow a ruling by Moscow City Court on 12 December 2025, when nine ICC officials were convicted in absentia and sentenced to prison terms ranging from three and a half to 15 years. Their alleged offences arose from their participation in investigations and judicial decisions concerning Russian officials suspected of international crimes.

Moscow’s latest move is unlikely to secure Akane’s extradition from the Netherlands, which hosts the ICC and is among its principal supporters. Russian authorities are nevertheless seeking cooperation from several countries, potentially exposing court officials to arrest when travelling to jurisdictions maintaining close relations with Moscow.

Japan Protests Against Russian Demands

Japan has condemned the proceedings against Akane, a Japanese national who became ICC president in March 2024.

Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Masanao Ozaki said Tokyo had repeatedly protested to Moscow over its treatment of ICC personnel and regarded the latest measures as unjustified and unacceptable.

He indicated that Japan would consider further diplomatic action in consultation with the court and other states parties to the Rome Statute.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reaffirmed Japan’s support for the ICC during a parliamentary session on Friday, 9 October, saying Tokyo would continue to defend the institution as part of its commitment to international law.

Akane, who was elected president for a three-year term in March 2024, served on the judicial panel responsible for the arrest warrants against Putin and Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, Maria Lvova-Belova.

Russian investigators opened criminal proceedings against the judges shortly after those warrants were announced, subsequently adding other ICC officials to their wanted lists as investigations concerning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine progressed.

Moscow’s Retaliation Against the Court

The confrontation began on 17 March 2023, when the ICC issued arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied areas to Russia.

The judges found reasonable grounds to believe that both officials bore individual criminal responsibility for the alleged offences. The warrants remain in force, although neither suspect has been brought before the court.

The investigation concerns the removal of children from Ukrainian territory following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Ukrainian authorities have documented cases involving children transferred to Russia, placed with Russian families or subjected to measures intended to integrate them into Russian society.

Russia maintains that the transfers were humanitarian evacuations. The ICC’s investigation concerns whether children were unlawfully deported or transferred from occupied territory, conduct prohibited under international humanitarian law.

The court subsequently issued further warrants against senior Russian commanders. In June 2024, former defence minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov were accused of responsibility for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity connected to attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.

Russian prosecutors responded by expanding their criminal cases against ICC personnel. The charges included knowingly prosecuting innocent individuals and attacking representatives of a foreign state.

The December 2025 convictions provided Moscow with the domestic judgments it is now attempting to enforce through extradition requests.

Extradition Requests Raise Questions Over Travel

The Netherlands has not indicated any intention to surrender Akane. Dutch authorities have consistently supported the ICC’s independence, and the Russian convictions concern actions undertaken by officials in the exercise of their judicial responsibilities.

The position may be less predictable in countries maintaining extradition arrangements with Moscow. Although Russian convictions would not automatically require another state to surrender an ICC official, the existence of arrest warrants could complicate international travel and expose those named to detention pending legal proceedings.

The situation recalls the difficulties surrounding Putin’s own international movements since March 2023. His arrest warrant has restricted travel to ICC member states, which are generally required to cooperate with the court’s requests for arrest and surrender.

Russia’s withdrawal of its signature from the Rome Statute in 2016 did not prevent the ICC from investigating alleged crimes committed on Ukrainian territory. Ukraine had already accepted the court’s jurisdiction and became a full member on 1 January 2025.

The ICC investigation into Ukraine continues, covering alleged offences committed since 21 November 2013 within the scope of Ukraine’s acceptance of jurisdiction.

US Sanctions Add to Difficulties Facing ICC

The Russian extradition demands coincide with a separate dispute between the ICC and the United States, whose government has sanctioned several members of the court.

On 18 August 2026, President Donald Trump’s administration imposed sanctions on Akane and senior ICC trial lawyer Abdoulaye Seye. Washington has objected to investigations involving American personnel and Israeli officials, arguing that the court has exceeded its jurisdiction.

The ICC condemned the additional American sanctions, warning that restrictions targeting judges and prosecutors interfere with its judicial work.

The American measures primarily involve financial restrictions, while Russia has pursued criminal convictions and extradition requests. Both have placed ICC personnel under pressure for their involvement in proceedings opposed by governments outside the Rome Statute system.

The European Union has repeatedly defended the ICC against attempts to interfere with its investigations. The Netherlands, as host country, has particular responsibilities concerning the court’s operations and the security of its personnel.

Moscow’s latest requests are therefore expected to meet resistance from European governments. Their possible consequences elsewhere will depend on the countries approached and whether local authorities are prepared to act on Russian arrest warrants.

The Kremlin has so far failed to halt the ICC’s proceedings against Putin, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Its response has been to pursue the judges and prosecutors responsible, seeking prison sentences against international judicial officials while the allegations against Russia’s own leadership remain before the court.

Beijing has rebuffed a European Union request to voluntarily cap hybrid car exports to the bloc, raising the prospect of new, steep EU tariffs on Chinese hybrids, which have so far escaped the duties on pure electric vehicles. China has refused to set quotas on its exports of hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) and plug-in hybrid […]

The post EU weighs safeguard tariffs as China refuses hybrid car limits appeared first on Asia Times.

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Las elecciones generales de Brasil del 4 de octubre representaron una severa advertencia para la izquierda. Flávio Bolsonaro, el candidato presidencial del Partido Liberal (PL), superó al presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, con aproximadamente un 47% frente a un 45%. Ninguno de los dos obtuvo la mayoría, lo que los llevará a una segunda vuelta el 25 de octubre. Más preocupante que este estrecho margen presidencial fue el avance del bolsonarismo en el Congreso. Las elecciones han fortalecido un movimiento político cuyas ambiciones van más allá de derrotar a Lula para llegar a remodelar las instituciones que obstaculizan su ejercicio del poder.

El encarcelamiento (arresto domiciliario) y la exclusión electoral de Jair Bolsonaro no han disuelto su movimiento. Su hijo Flávio lleva su estandarte presidencial, mientras que otros miembros de la familia han obtenido escaños en el Congreso. Michelle Bolsonaro, esposa de Jair, y Carlos Bolsonaro, su hijo, ingresan al Senado; Jair Renan, otro de sus hijos, y Renato, hermano de Jair, ingresan a la Cámara de Diputados. Nepobolsonarismo es un nombre apropiado para la expansión de esta familia a través del Estado. Sin embargo, la familia es solo la expresión más visible de un proyecto más amplio, arraigado en poderosos intereses económicos y en una política reaccionaria profundamente organizada.

Una contienda presidencial con implicaciones continentales

Lula sigue siendo el principal obstáculo para el regreso de este proyecto a la presidencia. Su derrota afectaría a los trabajadores y campesinos de todo Brasil, pero también a las posibilidades de cooperación regional y de una política exterior latinoamericana independiente. El tamaño de Brasil, su capacidad industrial, sus minerales en bruto (como los minerales críticos), sus recursos agrícolas y su alcance diplomático otorgan a su orientación política una importancia continental. Un gobierno que subordine estos activos a las prioridades de Washington debilitaría el espacio disponible para los países vecinos que buscan sus propios caminos de desarrollo.

La distribución geográfica de la primera vuelta pone de manifiesto tanto la fortaleza de Lula como sus dificultades. Mantuvo una posición dominante en el Noreste, mientras que Flávio lideró en las otras cuatro regiones. El enorme electorado de São Paulo proporcionó una ventaja particularmente importante a la derecha. Estas divisiones no pueden explicarse mediante una oposición entre una población ilustrada y otra ignorante. Requieren un análisis de las diferentes condiciones laborales, la organización de la vida política y la capacidad de los movimientos rivales para interpretar las frustraciones de la gente.

Lula llega a la segunda vuelta con un historial social sustancial. El desempleo cayó al 5,3% en el trimestre que finalizó en agosto, la tasa más baja para ese período en la serie estadística que comienza en 2012. Estas mejoras son de enorme importancia para las familias para quienes un salario regular supone un alivio frente a la incertidumbre cotidiana. Sin embargo, un indicador nacional mejorado no zanja la discusión política. El empleo puede coexistir con desplazamientos agotadores, viviendas costosas, servicios públicos inadecuados y la inseguridad que genera la deuda. La brecha entre la mejora estadística y la experiencia vivida sigue siendo un terreno en el que opera la derecha.

El bolsonarismo, o la extrema derecha brasileña de un tipo especial, traduce estas frustraciones en resentimiento contra la izquierda, todas las instituciones públicas y los sectores vulnerables de la sociedad. Su promesa de orden ofrece un lenguaje inmediato para el miedo, al tiempo que oculta los mecanismos económicos que generan inseguridad.

La izquierda no puede responder a esto simplemente promocionando los logros del gobierno. Debe vincular esos logros a un programa creíble para cambiar la vida cotidiana y explicar qué intereses impiden nuevos avances. Un trabajador que lucha contra las deudas necesita algo más que la seguridad de que la economía va bien. Este ha sido el problema de Lula, cuyo programa para el futuro no parece prometer más de lo que se ha logrado hasta ahora.

El Senado: una lucha por el poder institucional

Las elecciones al Senado son particularmente trascendentales porque se disputaron 54 de sus 81 escaños. Los senadores tienen mandatos de ocho años, por lo que los resultados marcarán la política nacional mucho más allá de la próxima administración presidencial. El PL obtuvo 19 escaños y contará con 28 en el nuevo Senado, lo que lo convierte en el partido más grande. El PT tendrá nueve. Los bolsonaristas han establecido, por lo tanto, una posición formidable, aunque el propio PL sigue sin alcanzar la mayoría y deberá negociar con otros partidos.

Michelle Bolsonaro y Bia Kicis obtuvieron los dos escaños del Distrito Federal, mientras que Carlos Bolsonaro y Carol de Toni ganaron los dos escaños de Santa Catarina. Estas victorias demuestran la capacidad del movimiento para organizar campañas coordinadas y concentrar el apoyo en torno a sus candidatos. Hubo éxitos importantes para la izquierda: Rui Costa y Jaques Wagner ganaron en Bahía, Humberto Costa conservó su representación en Pernambuco y Marília Campos ganó en Minas Gerais. Estos resultados preservan puntos de resistencia dentro de una cámara cada vez más hostil. La importancia del Senado va más allá de la legislación ordinaria. Los bolsonaristas han convertido su enfrentamiento con la Corte Suprema Federal en un objetivo político central, lo que incluye demandas para destituir a sus magistrados. Su representación reforzada aumenta su capacidad para llevar adelante ese enfrentamiento e influir en la elección del presidente del Senado. Las predicciones de una mayoría automática a favor del juicio político deben tomarse con cautela: la afiliación partidaria, las declaraciones de campaña y los votos en un procedimiento específico son cosas distintas. No obstante, el peligro de utilizar el poder legislativo para intimidar al poder judicial ha aumentado claramente.

Esto forma parte de una lucha por las condiciones bajo las cuales la extrema derecha puede gobernar. Los procesos judiciales contra Jair Bolsonaro no han eliminado a las fuerzas sociales que lo respaldan. Esas fuerzas buscan ahora una mayor influencia sobre las instituciones capaces de frenarlas. Para la izquierda, la defensa del espacio democrático debe, por lo tanto, ir de la mano de la lucha por ampliar los derechos sociales. Las organizaciones de trabajadores no pueden permitirse perder las libertades a través de las cuales se organizan, educan y se enfrentan al capital.

Diputados federales: la derecha avanza, la izquierda encuentra oportunidades

Este año se renovaron los 513 escaños de la Cámara de Diputados. El PL obtuvo 121, consolidando su posición como el partido más grande tanto en esta cámara como en el Senado. La federación del Partido de los Trabajadores, el Partido Comunista de Brasil y el Partido Verde ganó 88 escaños, de los cuales el propio PT obtuvo 70. El crecimiento de la federación es significativo, pero deja a los aliados de Lula lejos de alcanzar la mayoría. Los partidos de la derecha cuentan con 303 escaños, mientras que la izquierda parlamentaria en sentido amplio tiene 124.

El resultado fortalece a una extrema derecha de carácter particular dentro de una legislatura ya dominada por intereses conservadores. También debilita a algunos intermediarios tradicionales del poder parlamentario, como el centrão, la coalición de partidos que intercambia apoyo legislativo por influencia en los nombramientos y los recursos públicos, aunque sigue siendo indispensable para la formación de mayorías. Las negociaciones que se lleven a cabo dentro del centrão ahora se desarrollarán junto a un PL más grande y más asertivo. Si Lula gana en la segunda vuelta, se enfrentará a una resistencia sustancial en el Congreso; pero si gana Flávio, ese mismo Congreso podría facilitar un programa reaccionario.

Sin embargo, la elección también llevó a la Cámara a importantes representantes de una izquierda combativa. Jones Manoel, el historiador comunista elegido por el PSOL en Pernambuco, obtuvo 249.077 votos y quedó en primer lugar en Recife. Elias Jabbour, el geógrafo comunista, fue elegido por el PCdoB en Río de Janeiro. Sus victorias sugieren que existe un público receptivo a la educación política y a los argumentos socialistas, incluso en medio del avance de la derecha. Ofrecen recursos para reconstruir la confianza entre las personas que se han impacientado ante las ambiciones cada vez más limitadas de la política parlamentaria.

Jones Manoel ya se ha ofrecido a colaborar en la campaña de la segunda vuelta de Lula, incluida su comunicación digital, al tiempo que propone prestar mayor atención a demandas como el transporte público gratuito. Este es un ejemplo útil de claridad política: la crítica a las limitaciones del gobierno puede coexistir con una movilización activa contra una extrema derecha de un tipo especial. Dicha unidad no requiere que los trabajadores renuncien a sus demandas. Se fortalece cuando esas demandas aportan energía y dirección a la campaña.

La tarea antes del 25 de octubre

La segunda vuelta no se puede ganar únicamente mediante negociaciones entre los líderes de los partidos. Requiere una actividad organizada en los lugares de trabajo, los barrios, las universidades y las comunidades rurales, con un programa que la gente pueda reconocer en sus propias vidas. El transporte, los salarios, la vivienda, la deuda, la salud pública y el tiempo dedicado al trabajo deben convertirse en la esencia de una campaña democrática. La defensa de la soberanía se vuelve tangible cuando se vincula con la capacidad de utilizar la riqueza de Brasil para satisfacer las necesidades de su pueblo.

La marea furiosa ha avanzado, pero no ha arrastrado a los millones de personas que aún buscan otro Brasil. Los nuevos diputados comunistas, las organizaciones de masas que han sobrevivido (especialmente los trabajadores sin tierra del MST) y la enorme base electoral de Lula constituyen los cimientos de la resistencia. La tarea inmediata es derrotar a Flávio Bolsonaro. La tarea a más largo plazo es construir un poder popular lo suficientemente fuerte como para impedir que la oligarquía decida, elección tras elección, qué tan poco cambio se le permitirá a la mayoría.

Lee en español aquí

Brazil’s general election on October 4 delivered a severe warning to the left. Flávio Bolsonaro, the presidential candidate of the Liberal Party (PL), finished ahead of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, with approximately 47% against 45%. Neither secured a majority, sending them into a runoff on October 25. More troubling than this narrow presidential gap was the advance of bolsonarismo through Congress. The election has strengthened a political movement whose ambitions extend beyond defeating Lula to reshaping the institutions that obstruct its exercise of power.

The imprisonment (house arrest) and electoral exclusion of Jair Bolsonaro have not dissolved his movement. His son Flávio carries its presidential banner, while other members of the family have won seats in Congress. Michelle Bolsonaro, Jair’s wife, and Carlos Bolsonaro, his son, enter the Senate; Jair Renan, another son, and Renato, Jair’s brother, enter the Chamber of Deputies. Nepobolsonarismo is an appropriate name for this family’s expansion through the state. Yet the family is only the most visible expression of a broader project, rooted in powerful economic interests and a deeply organized reactionary politics.

A presidential contest with continental stakes

Lula remains the principal obstacle to the return of this project to the presidency. His defeat would affect workers and peasants throughout Brazil, but also the possibilities for regional cooperation and an independent Latin American foreign policy. Brazil’s size, industrial capacity, raw minerals (such as critical minerals), agricultural resources, and diplomatic reach give its political direction continental significance. A government that subordinates these assets to Washington’s priorities would weaken the space available to neighboring countries seeking their own paths of development.

The first-round geography demonstrates both Lula’s strength and his difficulties. He retained a commanding position in the Northeast, while Flávio led across the other four regions. São Paulo’s enormous electorate provided a particularly important advantage to the right. These divisions cannot be explained by an opposition between an enlightened population and an ignorant one. They require an examination of the different conditions of work, the organization of political life, and the capacity of competing movements to interpret people’s frustrations.

Lula approaches the runoff with a substantial social record. Unemployment fell to 5.3% in the quarter ending in August, the lowest rate for that period in the statistical series beginning in 2012. Such improvements matter enormously to families for whom a regular wage brings relief from daily uncertainty. But an improved national indicator does not settle the political argument. Employment can coexist with exhausting journeys, expensive housing, inadequate public services, and the insecurity of debt. The distance between statistical improvement and lived experience remains terrain on which the right operates.

Bolsonarismo, or Brazil’s far right of a special type, translates these frustrations into resentment against the left, all public institutions, and vulnerable sections of society. Its promise of order offers an immediate language for fear, while concealing the economic arrangements that produce insecurity. The left cannot answer this merely by advertising government achievements. It must connect those achievements to a credible program for changing everyday life, and explain which interests prevent further advances. A worker struggling with debt needs more than reassurance that the economy is performing well. This has been the problem for Lula, whose program for the future does not seem to promise more than what has been delivered till now.

The senate: a struggle over institutional power

The Senate election is particularly consequential because 54 of its 81 seats were contested. Senators serve eight-year terms, so the results will shape national politics well beyond the next presidential administration. The PL won 19 seats and will hold 28 in the new Senate, making it the largest party. The PT will have nine. The bolsonaristas have therefore established a formidable position, although the PL itself remains short of a majority and must bargain with other parties.

Michelle Bolsonaro and Bia Kicis took both seats in the Federal District, while Carlos Bolsonaro and Carol de Toni won the two seats in Santa Catarina. These victories show the movement’s ability to organize coordinated campaigns and concentrate support behind its candidates. There were important successes for the left: Rui Costa and Jaques Wagner won in Bahia, Humberto Costa retained representation in Pernambuco, and Marília Campos won in Minas Gerais. These results preserve points of resistance within an increasingly hostile chamber. The Senate’s significance extends beyond ordinary legislation. The bolsonaristas have made their confrontation with the Supreme Federal Court a central political objective, including demands to impeach its ministers. Their strengthened representation increases their capacity to pursue that confrontation and to influence the election of the Senate president. Predictions of an automatic majority for impeachment should be treated cautiously: party affiliation, campaign declarations, and votes in a specific proceeding are different things. Nevertheless, the danger of using legislative power to intimidate the judiciary has plainly grown.

This is part of a struggle over the conditions under which the far right can govern. The judicial proceedings against Jair Bolsonaro did not remove the social forces supporting him. Those forces now seek greater leverage over institutions capable of restraining them. For the left, defending democratic space must therefore accompany the struggle to expand social rights. Workers’ organizations cannot afford to lose the freedoms through which they organize, educate, and confront capital.

Federal deputies: the right advances, the left finds openings

All 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies were up for election this year. The PL secured 121, consolidating its position as the largest party in this chamber as well as in the Senate. The federation of the Workers’ Party, Communist Party of Brazil, and Green Party won 88 seats, with the PT itself taking 70. The federation’s growth is significant, but it leaves Lula’s allies far from a majority. Parties of the right hold 303 seats, while the broader parliamentary left holds 124.

The outcome strengthens the far right of a special type within a legislature already dominated by conservative interests. It also weakens some established brokers of parliamentary power, such as the centrão, the collection of parties that trades legislative support for influence over appointments and public resources, although it remains indispensable for majority building. What bargaining will take place within the centrão will now take place alongside a larger and more assertive PL. If Lula wins in the second round, he will confront substantial congressional resistance, but if Flávio wins, the same Congress could facilitate a reactionary program.

Yet the election also brought important representatives of a fighting Left into the Chamber. Jones Manoel, the communist historian elected through PSOL in Pernambuco, received 249,077 votes and finished first in Recife. Elias Jabbour, the communist geographer, was elected for the PCdoB in Rio de Janeiro. Their victories suggest an audience for political education and socialist arguments, even amid the right’s advance. They offer resources for rebuilding confidence among people who have grown impatient with the narrowing ambitions of parliamentary politics. Jones Manoel has already offered to assist Lula’s runoff campaign, including its digital communication, while proposing stronger attention to demands such as free public transport. This is a useful example of political clarity: criticism of the government’s limitations can coexist with active mobilization against the far right of a special type. Such unity does not require workers to abandon their demands. It becomes stronger when those demands supply the campaign’s energy and direction.

The task before October 25

The runoff cannot be won through negotiations among party leaders alone. It requires organized activity in workplaces, neighborhoods, universities, and rural communities, with a program people can recognize in their own lives. Transport, wages, housing, debt, public healthcare, and the time consumed by work must become the substance of a democratic campaign. Defense of sovereignty becomes tangible when it is connected to the ability to use Brazil’s wealth for the needs of its people.

The angry tide has advanced, but it has not carried away the millions who still seek another Brazil. The new communist deputies, the surviving mass organizations (especially the landless workers of the MST), and Lula’s enormous electoral base provide foundations for resistance. The immediate task is to defeat Flávio Bolsonaro. The longer task is to build a popular power strong enough to prevent the oligarchy from deciding, election after election, how little change the majority will be allowed.

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian and journalist. He is the author of forty books, including Washington Bullets, Red Star Over the Third World, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South, and How the International Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, written with Grieve Chelwa. He is the executive director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, the chief correspondent for Globetrotter, and the chief editor of LeftWord Books (New Delhi). He also appeared in the films Shadow World (2016) and Two Meetings (2017).

This article was produced by Globetrotter.

A statue of Donald Trump, naked from head to toe and covered in 23-karat gold leaf, has appeared in one of the busiest corridors of the European Parliament building in Strasbourg. The work, created by a Danish artist, does not pull any punches. It depicts the American president naked, with a sizable belly, sitting on the neck of a much smaller, tormented figure.

As left-wing members of Parliament call it “brilliant” satire, the right decries it as tasteless political provocation.

Anyone recently walking the corridors of the European Parliament in Strasbourg stands a good chance of stumbling upon one of the strangest artistic creations of recent years. The bizarre work of art stands at the busy junction connecting members’ offices and the plenary chamber: a 2.5-meter-tall (8 feet tall), glittering golden statue depicting President Donald Trump completely naked.

TRUMP NU, AU PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN. À Strasbourg, une statue de Donald Trump entièrement nu trône dans l’un des lieux les plus fréquentés du Parlement européen. Son nom ? « La peste orange ». 23 carats d’or Un immense club de golf 2,5 mètres de haut Signée par l’artiste danois Jens Galschiøt, l’œuvre restera exposée jusqu’à jeudi. Le message envoyé à Washington est difficile à rater.

— Camille Moscow (@camille_moscow) October 8, 2026

The work is titled “The Orange Plague,” and its creator is Danish artist Jens Galschiot, known for his provocative public sculptures. The statue, a reference to Trump’s alleged adoration of luxury and the style of his properties, was fully coated with real 23-karat gold leaf.

“Trump loves gold. In some ways, I think he would even like this statue,” the creator told the press.

The composition of the statue carries sharp political criticism. The full-bodied figure of the naked president sprawls over the shoulders of a tiny, bone-thin and visibly suffering man. Trump holds a scale in one hand — a symbol mocking justice — and clutches a golf club like a scepter in the other, while a golf ball patterned after a globe lies at his feet.

According to the Danish sculptor, Trump’s policies and his sabotage of the green transition against climate change put all of humanity at risk.

To complete the statute, the statue’s pedestal bears a cynical inscription addressed to the “King of Injustice”:

“I’m sitting on a person’s back. It collapses under my load. I would do anything to help him. Except get off his back.”

How was this allowed into the European Parliament?

Many immediately wondered how the strict Brussels bureaucracy could allow such a crude and provocative naked political statue through the gates of the institution. The answer lies in the European Parliament’s rules: Each elected member has the right to sponsor two cultural or artistic events per parliamentary term in designated areas of the building, subject to formal approval by the College of Quaestors, which handles administrative matters.

The naked president was brought into the building by Danish left-wing member Per Clausen, who said Europe should finally launch an open debate on how to protect itself from Trump and build a policy independent of him. Clausen also lashed out at outraged deputies:

“If one has skin so thin that one cannot stand the sight of such a statue in the European Parliament, one has no place on the stage of world politics!”

The statue immediately drew sharp criticism from the parliamentary right. According to Patriots for Europe and other right-wing factions, it is outrageous, tasteless and unworthy of the European Parliament to mock the democratically elected president of an allied superpower in this form in the official corridors.

The gilded exhibition in the corridors of the Parliament will not last long; it will be removed on Thursday. The naked Trump statue is then expected to travel to Turkey, where it will appear at the next U.N. climate summit (COP31). Donald Trump — from whom a quick and angry online reaction is seldom far away — has not yet commented on the Strasbourg surprise.

The post Naked golden Trump statue erected outside EU parliament building appeared first on Remix News.

International health authorities are on alert over a possible case of plague that may not even exist. The death of a laboratory worker at a plague research facility in Russia’s Irkutsk region on October 2 sparked concerns, and the World Health Organization (WHO) on Wednesday offered technical assistance to the Russian government while requesting additional information needed to assess any potential risk.

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Trying to pin the blame for the depletion of U.S. military stockpiles on something other than the war in Iran, President Donald Trump fell back on a usual scapegoat last week: Ukraine. “The Biden administration gave far more munitions away to Ukraine, at no cost to them whatsoever, than we have used in Iran,” Trump wrote on Truth Social.

This is a familiar refrain. Trump loves to remind his audience that because of him, Americans are “not spending on Ukraine anymore” and instead, Europe is footing the bill. In truth, most people in the United States don’t think about Ukraine much these days. But since Trump himself brought it up, it’s worth asking: What exactly is going on with U.S. military support to Ukraine?

The answer might surprise you. Despite Trump’s rhetoric, the United States remains deeply embroiled in Ukraine’s ongoing conflict with Russia in ways that create national security risks and run counter to Trump’s own foreign policy goals.

It is true that Trump has reduced U.S. support to Ukraine compared to its high mark under his predecessor, Joe Biden. First, his administration has stopped the use of Presidential Drawdown Authority to transfer weapons from U.S. stocks directly to Ukraine. The Biden administration used this mechanism to give Ukraine almost $35 billion in weapons free of charge. Second, the Trump administration has not requested additional funds for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), which uses U.S. financing to purchase new weapons for Ukraine.

But Trump has not cut off all assistance to Ukraine. Several important channels remain. First, there are about $13 billion in outstanding USAI contracts as of June 2026, down from $20 billion in January 2025. These contracts, signed by Biden and now implemented by Trump, will procure weapons for Ukraine through about 2028. Weapons in the pipeline include longer-lead time systems like NASAMs, Patriot missiles and components (Ukraine is reportedly receiving at 10-20 PAC-3s per month under these contracts), counter-drone systems, artillery rockets, and ammunition.

These continuing deliveries are not new awards, but they are still taxpayer-funded military aid to Ukraine that will add up to about $20 billion in aid over the 4 years of Trump’s term. Weapons produced under these contracts come off overburdened U.S. production lines. This has a high opportunity cost given the limits of U.S. defense industrial capacity. Without obligations to Ukraine, industrial resources could shift to different weapons or systems that the United States needs more.

If the Trump administration were serious about ending U.S. spending on the Ukraine war, it could still recoup these funds and reallocate the money to support U.S. defense production needs. It has instead allowed the aid to continue.

There has also been some new funding approved since Biden left office. Congress included about $800 million of USAI funding in the 2026 and 2027 NDAAs. We can expect more in future bills as well.

And the State Department has continued to send military aid of its own. A portion of this aid goes through the Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior, including drones, armored vehicles, guns, grenade launchers, and similar equipment. Since this equipment ends up with Ukraine’s National Guard and border police it is often counted as non-military and intended for things like counterdrug operations, but today these personnel serve as combat units.

The State Department has also approved $3 billion of new arms sales to Ukraine in 2025 and 2026 that will be at least partially funded from foreign military financing (FMF), which means U.S. dollars supporting foreign government purchases of U.S. weapons. Some of these funds may come from money allocated but not spent under President Biden, but much of the funding will be new, coming from the State Department’s budget.

The bottom line is that U.S. weapons transfers to Ukraine continue under Trump, amounting to, on average, as much at $5 billion per year. But this is no longer the most important, or expensive, type of support that the United States gives to Ukraine.

For example, the United States gives Ukraine real-time targeting information, including on the movement of Russian troops and the location of key command centers. This information has been important to Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign on Russian logistics as well as its deep strikes against military and energy targets inside of Russia. In addition, U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance assets in countries on the NATO border (including routine E-3 flights) are integrated with Ukraine’s air defense network, improving the accuracy and speed of Ukraine’s response.

Beyond intelligence, the United States also provides logistical and maintenance support, including forward and remote assistance to repair American-made equipment, necessary spare parts to keep older systems running, and training. It also facilitates the expensive transfer of European purchases of U.S. weapons.

The cost of the intelligence, logistics, and other operational support the United States provides to Ukraine does not show up anywhere as an itemized bill, even as U.S. assistance increases. But we can use available public information to draw some conclusions about the expenses incurred.

The 2024 defense supplemental bill, for instance, allocated about $15 billion to “military training, intelligence sharing, increased presence, and other support activities.” In theory, these funds are intended to cover activities conducted in support of Ukraine that would not occur if the United States remained uninvolved in that conflict. Some portion of this money will go to the salaries of military personnel who would be paid no matter where they work.

Since about a third of each military service’s budget is personnel costs, we could estimate the cost of extra activities conducted for Ukraine, excluding baseline manpower, at about $10 billion over the course of a year or so. If Trump has truly expanded intelligence sharing with Ukraine, this price tag may have increased over time.

The money included in the bill is likely only a portion of the actual burden the U.S. military and intelligence community have shouldered to support Ukraine’s war. Many intelligence activities, like tasking and analyzing satellite data and collecting signals intelligence, might be covered in classified national security budgets. Starting in 2023, in fact, the classified intelligence budget increased by 10%, a large jump over the 2022 total. The increase was justified by intelligence community leaders as resulting from shifts in the national security landscape, including especially concern about China’s rise and spillover from conflict in Ukraine. Since the total increase in funding was about $10 billion, we can guess that Ukraine-related expenditures might amount to $3-$5 billion per year, or about one-third to one-half of the total increase.

All told, then, U.S. taxpayers are still spending roughly $20 billion per year on Ukraine. Today, assistance to Ukraine comes primarily in the form of direct operational support, not weapons. But the shift in type of aid increases the risk of U.S. support to Ukraine to average Americans.

First, assisting Ukraine in striking energy targets inside of Russia has a perverse effect on the Trump administration’s efforts to keep gas prices low. As Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent acknowledged, Ukraine’s strikes inside Russia push global oil prices up, imposing higher costs of living on Americans.

Second, U.S. intelligence support deepens U.S. involvement in Ukraine’s war, making it an all-but-direct combatant. Russian assistance to Iran, both in terms of weapons and intelligence sharing, is a reaction to the comparable U.S. role in Ukraine, and it leaves U.S. servicemembers in the Middle East and elsewhere less safe. Growing U.S. participation in Ukraine also increases the risk that miscalculation leads to a direct U.S.-Russia confrontation, a nightmarish possibility given the degraded state of U.S. military readiness.

Trump promised to end the war in Ukraine in 24 hours. He has instead deepened U.S. entanglement in ways that create real risks and new fiscal costs for the United States. American interests would be best served if the United States were to walk away entirely, but if Trump instead opts for the status quo, he should at least be honest about it.

Original article: responsiblestatecraft.org

When Republican Greg Abbott was re-elected governor of Texas in 2022, his margin over opponent Beto O’Rourke was nearly 11 percentage points. Less than a month before the midterm elections, however, polls no longer show him with a comfortable lead. Survey averages put Democratic candidate Gina Hinojosa just over two points behind and rapidly closing the gap, raising alarm among Democrats over the need to boost campaign funding in the final stretch.

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An analysis published on Wednesday by ABC News estimated that companies backed financially by Donald Trump Jr. and Eric Trump have so far scored more than $6 billion in contracts from the US Department of Defense. As ABC documented, many of the investments into the defense firms come through 1789 Capital, a venture capital firm […]

The post Trump sons-backed firms bank $6 billion plus in Pentagon deals appeared first on Asia Times.

With a month still to go before America’s mid-term congressional and gubernatorial elections, the prospect of a “blue wave” of Democratic success in the House of Representatives, the Senate and in many governorships is looking increasingly likely. But whether that forecast holds true or not, one important aspect has already become clear. It is that […]

The post Plainly, Trump doesn’t really care about the midterms appeared first on Asia Times.

Today marks three years since October 7th, Al-Aqsa Flood and the escalation of Israel’s campaign to eliminate Gaza into a full-blown genocide. The world watched the livestream – and while that turned public opinion on its head, US policy hasn’t budged. Layan Sima Fuleihan, education director at The People’s Forum and an editor at 1804 Books, joins Zoe Alexandra and Rania Khalek to reflect on how Israel lost the hearts and minds of American voters – and how to turn that shift in consciousness into real power.

From Occupy Wall Street to the 2020 uprising for George Floyd, Fuleihan traces the Palestine movement through more than a decade of the mass rebellions that empowered it. She lays out key lessons from the past three years: radical change happens fast, repression can’t intimidate people out of solidarity, and Americans do care what their government does abroad. And she explains how, as Washington stays shielded from public opinion, both parties are equally culpable – and warns of the stakes of letting Democrats court pro-Palestine voters ahead of the midterms while the bombs keep falling.

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