Zack Polanski is on the brink of the sack as Greens leader today after being humiliatingly beaten in the Holborn and St Pancras by-election, trailing more than 3,000 votes behind Labour's Sagal Abdi-Wali.
The Conservative Party Conference was slick and professional, says Ellie Hodges, but Reform's conference, while more chaotic, had the kind of passion that you don't get from a fancy lanyard.
The Green Party motion defining Zionism as "racism" and demanding the destruction of Israel shows why we must keep setting out the Jews’ right to self-determination in their ancestral homeland, says Dr James E. Patrick.
Pedro Sánchez has turned a parliamentary defeat over housing into a general election on 29th November.
The calculation is clear: force Spain’s political argument onto territory more favourable to the left before migration, corruption allegations and parliamentary paralysis return to the foreground. But the polls suggest that the gamble could still deliver power to the centre-right People’s Party and Vox.
Pedro Sánchez’s decision to dissolve Spain’s parliament nine months ahead of schedule is more than an admission that his minority government had reached the limits of what it could achieve in the Congress of Deputies. It is an attempt to choose the terms on which his government will be judged.
The immediate trigger was the defeat of two emergency housing decrees after the conservative People’s Party (PP), Vox and Catalan separatist Junts voted against them. Housing had already moved rapidly to the centre of Spanish politics following the eviction of 87-year-old Maricarmen Abascal from the Madrid flat where she had lived for 71 years, followed by large demonstrations across the country. EU Today has previously reported on both the housing protests across Spain and Sánchez’s subsequent decision to call the election.
The prime minister is now attempting to convert legislative weakness into electoral advantage.
In his announcement on 5 October, Sánchez presented the election as a choice between a broader progressive majority capable of advancing social legislation and an opposition that had obstructed measures on housing and other domestic priorities. The government reinforced that strategy a day later by approving revised versions of the two housing decrees, containing 21 measures including tax incentives, assistance for first-time buyers and measures intended to increase supply. They will require validation by the Diputación Permanente, the standing parliamentary body that remains after dissolution.
The political calculation is straightforward. Housing offers Sánchez an issue on which anger is directed not only at government but at landlords, property investors, regional authorities and political parties opposing stronger regulation. The eviction of Abascal gave that argument a human symbol and transformed a long-running affordability problem into an immediate political confrontation.
That does not mean the strategy will work.
Most polling continues to place the PSOE behind the PP. Surveys put the Socialists at roughly 28 per cent, while Vox has risen to around 18 per cent. A PP-Vox combination is currently the only bloc consistently projected to command an outright parliamentary majority. One Sigma Dos survey published after the election announcement projected the two parties winning 203 of the Congress’s 350 seats.
Sánchez therefore appears to be playing less for immediate dominance than for mobilisation.
His problem before the housing protests was not simply the strength of the right. The broader left had become fragmented, while the government was being damaged by disputes over migration, particularly following the crisis in Ceuta, as well as corruption investigations involving figures associated with the PSOE. At the same time, Junts had become an increasingly unreliable parliamentary partner, leaving the government unable to guarantee major legislation or a new budget.
Housing changes the subject.
It allows Sánchez to argue that the central question is not whether his coalition has governed smoothly, but whether voters want a parliament prepared to intervene more aggressively in the housing market. The PP, however, is contesting precisely that framing. Alberto Núñez Feijóo argues that the housing shortage is itself a product of Sánchez’s eight years in government and has promised to raise annual construction towards 200,000 homes while reducing taxes.
The election may therefore develop into a dispute over responsibility rather than diagnosis. Both sides accept that housing has become a major national problem; they differ sharply over whether regulation or additional supply should dominate the response.
There is also a wider European dimension. Housing affordability is increasingly politically disruptive across the EU, including in major cities where construction has failed to keep pace with household formation, migration and demand for short-term accommodation. EU Today has examined similar pressures in Berlin’s housing market. Spain could now provide a test of whether housing can become powerful enough as an electoral issue to reverse the wider European movement towards the right.
For Ukraine, however, the consequences are likely to be less dramatic than Spain’s domestic political contest might suggest.
Sánchez committed €1 billion in bilateral military support to Ukraine for 2026, with Spain putting its cumulative bilateral military assistance since Russia’s full-scale invasion at almost €4 billion. Madrid has also trained more than 9,000 Ukrainian military personnel.
Spain is also home to a considerably larger Ukrainian community than the roughly 300,000 figure frequently cited. Government data showed 353,009 Ukrainian nationals holding valid residence documentation at the end of June, including 262,782 under temporary protection.
A PP-led government would alter Madrid’s domestic priorities and potentially its approach to defence spending and migration, particularly if Vox were required to sustain a parliamentary majority. Yet there is little basis at present for assuming that a change of government would produce a reversal of Spain’s fundamental position on Russia’s invasion or membership of the European and Atlantic security structures supporting Ukraine.
The more immediate question is whether Sánchez can make housing important enough to overcome the electoral arithmetic confronting him.
Calling the election has allowed him to escape a parliament in which his legislative coalition was steadily disintegrating and to enter a campaign around an issue capable of mobilising his electorate. It has not changed the fact that the PP and Vox begin that campaign with the stronger numbers.
Sánchez has chosen the battlefield. On 29th November, Spain will decide whether that was enough.
The Green Party member behind the "Zionism is racism” motion is close friends with an al-Qaeda terrorist who plotted to bomb passengers landing at Heathrow from Israel.
Filippos Kambouris, a Trash TV presenter and president of the right-wing populist LAOS party, has been arrested over his alleged leading role in a scheme to defraud the Greek state to the tune of millions of euros. Citing police sources, media noted later on Tuesday according to preliminary findings losses to e-EFKA and the Greek […]
Jeremy Clarkson has said there is no reason to set up a business in Andy Burnham’s Britain as he made a surprise appearance at the Conservative Party conference.
Labour may be enjoying a Burnham bounce, but Mark Littlewood still thinks the smart option is to bet against the Prime Minister winning the next General Election. He explains why in the Daily Sceptic.
The Greens have been branded the UK's first openly antisemitic party after members voted for a 'Zionism is Racism' motion calling for a single Palestinian state and the abolition of Israel.
From Clause 4 to Covid lockdowns, Brexit to student fees – every major party has betrayed its own voters. The solution? As the old music-hall song puts it: dance with the one that brung you.
Nearly half of voters in the United Kingdom support rejoining the European Union, according to a survey released as Prime Minister Andy Burnham reviews the country’s options for its long-term relationship with the bloc.
The Messina Group polled 11,461 people between 12 and 24 September. It found that 49 per cent supported EU membership and 28.5 per cent opposed it. The findings were weighted by respondents’ votes in the 2016 referendum, according to the survey results.
Several other options for closer cooperation also received more support than opposition. Retaining the current relationship while removing as many trade barriers as possible was backed by 48.2 per cent, with 20.9 per cent against. A customs union was supported by 47.1 per cent and opposed by 20.7 per cent.
Joining the single market was supported by 45.1 per cent, while 45.5 per cent backed associate membership. The existing relationship without further changes received 42 per cent support. Moving further away from the EU was the least popular option tested: 27.9 per cent supported it and 41.2 per cent opposed it.
The figures show support for a range of possible arrangements, but do not establish agreement on what Britain should seek or on the terms it should accept.
On timing, 25.9 per cent said the UK should rejoin immediately, 22.9 per cent favoured doing so within three years and 8.4 per cent within the next decade. A further 23 per cent said they did not want closer relations with the EU.
Respondents were also asked whether leaving the bloc had been the right decision. Some 52.4 per cent said it was wrong, compared with 29.7 per cent who said it was right; 17.9 per cent were undecided. Asked whether Brexit had been a success or failure, 54.9 per cent called it a failure and 12.2 per cent a success. Nearly a quarter, 23.2 per cent, said neither, while 9.7 per cent did not know.
The poll tested the possible electoral effects of different Labour positions on Europe. It found that scenarios involving closer ties could increase the party’s vote share by between 4.3 and 7.4 percentage points. The largest potential rise was linked to a proposal for a referendum in which Burnham campaigned for Britain to rejoin.
Burnham has said Labour will review the choices available, including keeping current arrangements, joining a customs union, returning to the single market or seeking EU membership. He plans to set out the options around the next UK-EU summit, expected in November. In recent remarks, he said the government would assess “what is doable” and the “pros and cons” of each option.
The review marks a shift from Labour’s 2024 election manifesto, which ruled out rejoining the EU, single market or customs union. Burnham has not proposed an immediate application or referendum. A UK bid for membership would require negotiations with the EU and unanimous agreement from member states.
The question of whether a referendum should come first also remains open. Almost a third of respondents said a vote would be needed before rejoining. More than one in six thought a general-election mandate would be sufficient, with a similar proportion saying Parliament could make the decision.
French President Emmanuel Macron and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez have said the EU would welcome a British return. Their comments followed Burnham’s call for a review of Britain’s options, as EU Today reported this week. Earlier EU Today coverage also examined British and EU public support for a possible return.
Zack Polanski has repeatedly said that his family "fled the Nazis", but it's now emerged that all four of his grandparents were born in Britain, long before the war.
by Cassie B., Natural News: Germany’s governing coalition is pushing to explore banning the right-wing AfD party by year’s end AfD now leads national polls at 29.5 percent, more than double the vote share of its leading challenger Chancellor Friedrich Merz is skeptical of a ban, but a top official in his own party backs […]
Are top Democrats actually “shifting” on Israel, or is the PR simply getting more sophisticated?
After the midterms wrap up and the race for the Democratic 2028 nominition for president kicks off in earnest, this will be a central question those concerned with the US role in the genocide in Gaza must grapple with clearly, honestly, and with—it turns out—a high degree of skepticism and media literacy. That’s because the forces committed to keeping the weapons flowing to Israel quickly adjusted their tactics to meet the mood of the public, and the mood of Democrats in particular.
Last year for TRNN, I detailed the three main ways AIPAC Democrats will seek to look critical of Israel while assuring that the pro-Israel status quo remains fundamentally unchanged. Since I wrote that breakdown, a fourth talking point—and one that seems inevitable in retrospect—has emerged as a favorite of liberals who want to seem “tough on Israel,” but don’t want to upset the Israel Lobby. This line, which I documented last April, commits to “ending US aid to Israel” which, despite seeming like a meaningful break or a move left, is a policy that first emerged from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the late US Sen. Lindsey Graham. And, as I noted, it was planned out by far-right think tanks Foundation for Defence of Democracies and Heritage Foundation—specifically designed to blunt the primary argument against support for Israel. Last January, Netanyahu told the Economist that he wants to “taper off” formal US military funding. Pro-Israel lobbying organization J-Street then took this right-wing idea and proceeded to sell the “cut off aid to Israel” line to liberals as something they could take to their constituents as evidence that they are in line with Democratic voters’ overwhelming dislike of Israel, while not changing the status quo. Indeed, as IMEU documented in their critique of the plan, the effort would actually further entrench US-Israeli military alignment.
The US can “cut off aid to Israel” and still very much continue to arm them. The only thing that has changed in this scenario is that Israel pays for it rather than the US government, but from the perspective of those being starved and maimed in Gaza this distinction matters about as much as the color of the bombs.
Much like the Biden White House’s slippery and misleading rebranding of “ceasefire,” the “ending aid to Israel” line relies on popular misunderstanding of what the load-bearing word means, in this instance, “aid.” In colloquial or common usage, it’s a word for general support—military, diplomatic, and financial. In reality, it simply means subsidizing—e.g. paying for—Israel’s weapons. The US can “cut off aid to Israel” and still very much continue to arm them. The only thing that has changed in this scenario is that Israel pays for it rather than the US government, but from the perspective of those being starved and maimed in Gaza this distinction matters about as much as the color of the bombs.
As predicted, this “cut off aid” statement is fast becoming the go-to line for Democrats seeking to assure their increasingly anti-Israel base without upsetting the Israel lobby or the Democratic Senate and House leadership they are aligned with. Recently, after receiving criticism for inviting in AIPAC-linked consultants to steer his campaign, Maine Democratic Senate candidate Troy Jackson released a statement calling Gaza a “genocide” and pledging to “stop funding of Israel’s military”:
Troy Jackson’s public statement yesterday expressing his commitment to end the genocide in Gaza and stop funding Israel’s military was driven by a host of supporter letters sent directly to the campaign on those issues. pic.twitter.com/FMrMBPcU2W
This is a perfect example of a J-Street-curated statement that, to the untrained eye, seems critical of Israel and committed to justice for Palestine, but actually says little of substance. There’s a lot of window dressing and gesturing, but ultimately Jackson’s policy is consistent with that of Benjamin Netanyahu’s.
Rep. Ro Khanna, who very much appears to be running for president in 2028 and making Gaza central to his pitch for progressives, is similarly muddled in his stance. Despite supporting partial and temporary embargos here and there, Khanna told Hasan Piker in July that a full arms embargo on Israel would be “probably too far.” He has instead focused on the “cutting off aid” line that emerged out of the Israeli security apparatus and found its way into “progressive” circles via J Street.
Democratic nominee for Senate in Texas, James Talarico, likewise gave a similarly underwhelming answer when asked about his position a few weeks later. Asked about Gaza last August on The Breakfast Club Show, he refused to label it a genocide, instead deferring to the “international criminal court” (and ignoring the overwhelming consensus of human rights groups and genocide scholars). Then he promised to “condition military aid” followed by two minutes of Obama-esque vapid empathy-speak.
That isn’t to say all Democrats are simply rebranding the status quo. It seems, despite his campaigning with central defender of the genocide Kamala Harris, Abdul El-Sayed is expressing a firm commitment to an arms embargo on Israel. Obviously, this is also the case for DSA-endorsed candidates who are not splitting hairs or letting J-Street manage their Israel policy. But these firm commitments are the exceptions. Increasingly, what we’re seeing is a squishy mix of empathy-speak, vague gesturing, highly conditional pledges to “condition aid” and other such abstractions with little in the way of firm commitments.
The only actions Democrats have, at scale, taken to “break from Israel” is recent spattering of Congressional votes over the past year designed to signal disapproval but change nothing of substance. These bills vary between genuine, if partial, arms embargo and the aforementioned “end aid” framework endorsed by Netyanhau and Graham. It’s complicated, but worth dissecting, because it can help illustrate how much energy and effort is going into these pseudo “breaks,” namely those being pushed by Israel lobbying group J-Street. One House bill from last July sought to “end aid” to Israel. The bill had some merit as it isolated Israel as such. But, like all of these bills, it was effectively a “messaging vote” because it had zero chance of passing, and because it aligned with the Netyanhau-approved “ending aid” framework. Almost half of Democrats in Congress supported it, including long-time reliable Israel ally Nancy Pelosi.
A few months later, we saw the slightly more substantive, but ultimately performative, partial arms embargo bills in both the House and Senate. Though different, they both involved preventing further sales of certain weapons to Israel given certain conditions. In the House, 104 Democrats backed the measure, and in the Senate, all but seven Democrats, including major Israel supporters, backed the measure.
These votes, in effect if not intent, end up serving as little more than anti-Israel thingamajigs that liberal zionists in Congress can point to when confronted on the issue as evidence that they are not a rubber stamp for Israeli violence.
But these bills, as everyone involved in their drafting, lobbying, and counter-lobbying know, were totally DOA. They have zero chance of actually passing, much less getting a President Trump veto-proof majority. Thus—despite many activists’ best intentions—they functionally serve as little more than a mechanism for reputation laundering for liberals who’ve backed Israel’s genocide and its broader regional violence, but who can read a poll as well as anyone else. These votes, in effect if not intent, end up serving as little more than anti-Israel thingamajigs that liberal zionists in Congress can point to when confronted on the issue as evidence that they are not a rubber stamp for Israeli violence. Indeed, suspiciously enough, the Senate version last April garnered the support of staunch Israel advocate and AIPAC-money sponge Cory Booker, who grinningly met with Israeli defensive minister Yoav Gallant after Gallant was indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity. Does anyone think for a second Booker would have backed a bill to prevent weapons sales to Israel if it had a remote chance of passing? Does anyone think his vote in support is evidence he’s “breaking from Israel”? Or is it evidence of something a bit more subtle, and sinister, which is Democrats realize they need to appear as if they’re breaking from Israel without the messiness of actually doing so?
But if the above bills are largely superficial and performative, why would Hakeem Jeffries write a letter in opposition, one may ask? For the same reason Jeffries agreed to let the vote happen and not discipline those supporting it: it’s all part of an intramural scrimmage between zionist allies who disagree on how best to “rein in” Israel. On substance, nothing fundemental is permitted to change, and the idea of ending military support was never on the table. Jeffires and AIPAC both understand that this is a 80/20 issue against them and are allowing their members more latitude in rhetorical and ideological distance, so long as the weapons flow remains unabated which it, of course, securely remains.
One of the more difficult tasks for an activist of good faith is being able to tell the difference between genuine, if incremental, progress, and counterinsurgency—that which appears like incremental progress but is, in fact, a move to the right with better PR.
In his urging of support for the bill earlier this year, Rep. Greg Casar, chair of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, said that “American people are crying out for an end to US tax dollars subsidizing Israel’s military.” But American people are not so much crying out for this, and certainty Palestinians aren’t, as they are an end to the genocide and occupation. It doesn’t matter if this genocide is “subsidized” by “US tax dollars” or not—the source of military funding is mostly arbitrary and inconsequential. What activists are demanding, what Democratic voters are demanding, is not a “message” bill or limited to “defensive weapons” with 18 qualifiers and carveouts, but support for a total arms embargo in principle and as a long term strategy of ending US support for the dispossession and killing of Palestinians.
One of the more difficult tasks for an activist of good faith is being able to tell the difference between genuine, if incremental, progress, and counterinsurgency—that which appears like incremental progress but is, in fact, a move to the right with better PR. Sorting out the difference in the coming months is going to be essential to make sure we don’t just elect a whole new crop of liberals who, despite more convincing crocodile tears and more sophisticated handwringing, just go back to shipping weapons systems and scrambling the sixth fleet to defend Israel’s next “defensive war.”
As voters concerned with the full-scale destruction of Gaza analyze the statements of politicians seeking to appear “good on Gaza” in the coming months, there are two central commitments they must attempt to pin down: (1) support for a full arms embargo without any conditional statements or tortured caveats and (2) support for the Boycott Divestment and Sanction movement, which seeks to economically isolate Israel. These are the positions that would logically follow from a belief that the country in question is committing genocide—as top progressives likely seeking the White House, like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Ro Khanna—said they believe. These measures—not nickel and diming “offensive” versus “defensive,” not singling out “Netanyahu,” not making vague promises to “condition aid” if Israel meets some unknown, arbitrary benchmark of humane mass killing—are the only thing that will move the needle and compel Israel to temper its exterminationist policies and plans. Only one member of Congress, Rep. Rashida Tlaib, unequivocally supports BDS, but certainly far more are capable of committing to a full arms embargo. If they cannot do even this bare minimum, and do so clearly, then the only logical conclusion one can reach is they are simply saying nice-sounding words, and checking the rhetorical box of “genocide,” so they can get elected then go back to enforcing and maintaining the genocidal status quo.
"Mother and father" is unacceptable language, the Green Party has said, with members threatened with sanction under the party's code of conduct if they fail to use gender-neutral terminology and 'inclusive language'.
It falls to alternative parties like Germany’s AfD to push for peace.
Britain’s Labour Party is not traditionally thought of as a bastion of militarism or authoritarianism. Yet listening to some of what its top figures have been saying recently might cause one to doubt the conventional wisdom on that.
Consider what Labour Party strategist Paul Richards said in a GB News interview earlier this month. Asked how the UK might respond to an increased Russian threat, Richards—who has worked for two Labour governments—gave a disturbing answer. “We’d have to lock some people up,” he said, “some of the pro-Russian voices, people who say there isn’t a threat, [and say] ‘Don’t fight for your country, don’t go to war for Burnham.’”
His comments are not a one-off. They reflect a worrying trend among Britain’s political mainstream—the old parties, media, and think tanks—which has increasingly adopted a siege mentality informed by the far-fetched expectation of imminent war with Russia.
Nor is the trend restricted to Britain. It spans the entire Western world. And it helps explain why the centrist political forces previously seen as “reasonable” are losing ground to the supposed “fringe.” Apocalyptic millenarianism is no longer the domain of radical obscurantists, but of people like NATO’s secretary-general Mark Rutte, who in 2025 seemed to foretell with relish a conflict between Europe and Russia on the scale of the SecondWorld War. “Imagine it,” he said, “a conflict reaching every home, every workplace, destruction, mass mobilisation, millions displaced, widespread suffering and extreme losses.”
It is politicians branded as far right or far left radicals who, surprisingly, have emerged as the main opposition to this unhinged bellicosity.
What’s largely prompting this trend is the very logic of the liberals competing with the populists. Western societies display a demand for performative “toughness,” which caters both to the infantilism of their political classes and the gamification of war in faroff countries.
Things seem to have begun in earnest in 2016, when the prospect of liberals losing to rivals like Donald Trump led the former to embrace conspiracy theories like Russiagate and double down on foreign policy hawkishness as a way of evading responsibility for their own failures. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine served a similar function, providing a theater for “toughness” even as the West has gotten bogged down in what has increasingly turned into a proxy conflict.
Trying to outdo the populists along a different axis, rather than doing the hard work of opposing them with value-based positions, has led the centrists into a trap. It left a vacuum in the center, into which the populists—ever alert to political opportunities—have deftly stepped.
Here is how it plays out in Germany. When the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) suffered an embarrassing defeat in Saxony-Anhalt earlier this month, the party’s leader and premier in North Rhine-Westphalia, Hendrik Wüst, said the government should consider banning the AfD (which won the election by a landslide). Wüst is eyed as a potential replacement for the unpopular chancellor Friedrich Merz.
The CDU went on to suffer additional defeats in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and in Berlin. The former is particularly symbolic, because this is where the Nord Stream gas pipelines make landfall—a fact that makes this state a direct beneficiary of the German-Russian joint venture to supply cheap Russian gas to the German economy.
When Nord Stream 2 was blown up in September 2022, the immediate consensus in the West was that Moscow was responsible. Yet the culprits turned out not to be Russian, but Ukrainian. German police investigators eventually charged individuals associated with Ukraine’s military intelligence service for the attack. (It’s worth noting that this Ukrainian spy agency was rebuilt in 2015 with considerable assistance from America’s CIA.)
Germany’s rejection of Russian gas supplies after Putin’s all-out invasion in Ukraine can be seen as a noble gesture, perhaps, but it had dire consequences for the country’s economy, which contracted in 2023 and 2024 before showing anemic growth in 2025. Even more importantly, it hit every household in Germany with skyrocketing heating and power bills. Interestingly, Germany wasn’t receiving Russian gas at the time of the explosion, which means the attack was aimed at preventing the resumption of supplies after the end of war rather than interrupting ongoing exports.
The German government has never properly addressed the issue at the federal level. On the eve of September elections, Merz’s sharp reaction to the Leipzig drone incident, which he instantly blamed on Russia, contrasted sharply with the virtual absence of a response to the perpetrators of the Nord Stream attack.
Voters in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania slaughtered Merz’s party, excluding it entirely from the state’s legislature for the first time in nearly 80 years. The big winner was the AfD—a party unafraid to ask questions about Nord Stream and which muses about restoring gas supplies after the Ukraine War ends. Voters also largely spared the Social Democrats, under whose leadership Nord Stream was built in the first place (although they had to disown it after Russia’s invasion).
The early days of tension between post-Soviet Russia and the West, which culminated in the war in Ukraine, were marked by squabbles over pipeline projects delivering gas to Europe (remember South Stream or Nabucco?). The unyielding opposition of centrist politicians to such projects has led voters to wonder whether their political establishment is more interested in catering to armsmakers and shale gas producers than in providing for its citizens. It’s hard to think of a better illustration of NATO’s unofficial mission to “keep the Germans down and the Russians out” than the fate of Nord Stream.
The perception of abandonment is what fuels the popularity of the AfD’s sovereigntist stance. And despite accusations of extremism, it is the AfD who sounds the most moderate and reasonable on the vital issues of war and peace.
Indeed, their foreign policy stance provides AfD leaders with one bulletproof rebuttal to accusations of fascism. A defining component of the fascist ideology is aggressive militarism—a trait exhibited by the German political establishment, not its hard-right challengers. The AfD fills the shoes of the old-school left-wing peaceniks when it comes to Ukraine, while the Merz government staunchly supports further escalation while discreetly undermining Trump’s efforts to bring the conflict to a close. The AfD also condemns the war on Iran (which Merz initially supported, before making a U-turn under public pressure).
(Ex-)centrists also advocate an enormous defense spending hike Germany can ill afford, as well as compulsory military service (this latter move has sparked youth protests across the country). The way mainstream German politicians are courting the far right in Ukraine—members of Azov movement prominently featured at the prestigious Munich Security Conference this year, for example—make the charges of nazism levelled against the AfD look especially lame.
Opposing Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which the AfD does, is one thing. Supporting an endless proxy war with a nuclear-armed great power—and committing to fight this “to the last Ukrainian”—is quite another.
And the polls suggest German voters have little appetite for risking their country’s future in such a gambit.
The AfD and other insurgent parties thrive when their opponents lean into hawkishness and authoritarianism, but so far there is little evidence the establishment understands this. Indeed, European political elites are doubling down. They recently invited Zelensky’s former press secretary, Iulia Mendel, to speak in front of the European Parliament. But Mendel is a vocal critic of her former boss, and so the parliament’s centrist leadership banned her from entering after Zelensky’s government imposed sanctions on her (an extrajudicial punishment he is routinely applying to political rivals). By banning Mendel from speaking and turning a blind eye on Zelensky’s abuse of power, the center once again chooses delusion and bellicosity over a genuine commitment to democracy.
Meanwhile, alternatives like the AfD will continue to fill the vacant space left in the middle of the political spectrum.
No one would claim that the Iran War has been a political godsend for President Donald Trump and the Republican Party. But some Israel-First conservatives are willing to say—and lately have been incessantly saying—that the Iran War hasn’t been a political scourge.
Those Israel-First conservatives are wrong, even if the devil is, at least partly, hidden in the details. The Iran War has damaged Trump’s approval ratings, consumed his presidency, and darkened the GOP’s prospects in the upcoming midterm elections.
A chief proponent of the argument that Trump hasn’t suffered all that much from the Iran War is Ben Shapiro of the Daily Wire. Shapiro’s political analysis is plainly motivated by the fact that he was a loud and influential proponent of the war who promised—falsely, as it turned out—that Iran couldn’t close the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint for the global energy trade.
These days, Shapiro seems to be implicitly acknowledging the war is very unpopular while trying to argue this fact has nothing to do with the declining approval ratings of the president who launched it. We should thank Shapiro, for he has expressed his new argument in such a way as to help us uncover those devilish details that make the Iran War a not-entirely-straightforward story of political calamity.
“There’s an op right now to pretend that the real reason for President Trump’s unpopularity is foreign policy, but that is not true, by the polling data, it is not true,” said Shapiro on a recent episode of his podcast. “The reality is that Americans have affordability concerns, President Trump came into office saying he was going to alleviate the affordability concerns. He has not in fact alleviated the affordability concerns, and therefore, his polling numbers have consistently slid since Liberation Day.”
This is a bit like me saying my wife isn’t mad at me because of the drinking, but because I drunkenly crashed the car.
The Iran War, as everyone now knows, has driven up prices at the pump—prices which, unfortunately for Trump, are prominently displayed on every major street across the country. On the eve of the war, regular gasoline averaged $2.98 per gallon. Today, at the time of writing, the average price is $4.48. Americans are notoriously averse to high gasoline prices and tend to punish presidents over the issue, sometimes even when the president can’t justifiably be blamed.
But make no mistake: Virtually every sentient adult understands that 1) oil comes from the Middle East, 2) Trump started a big war in the region, and 3) gas prices shot up right afterwards. And again, even if Americans didn’t grok the connection between the war and the gas-price spike, the latter would still have hurt Trump politically, and it would still be a knock-on effect of the former.
It’s not just prices at the pump that have gone up because of the war. Groceries and other consumer goods travel across this vast land on tractor-trailers that run on diesel and get a lot fewer miles per gallon than even your Uncle Larry’s F-350. Diesel prices have smashed records and now sit at around $6.50, up from $3.76 before the war.
No wonder truckers are furious, prompting rumors of an imminent strike.
And no wonder the Iran War has contributed to general inflation in America. Anyone who has been reading the official economic reports knows the war is responsible for more than a third of recent inflation.
Before the war, inflation was trending down, only a couple ticks away from the Federal Reserve’s target of 2 percent. It seems likely that Trump, if he hadn’t started his dumb war in the Middle East, would have garnered praise for presiding over declining inflation and that the Fed would have cut interest rates, juicing economic growth. Instead, inflation now sits at 3.4 percent.
(As an aside, this weekend I traveled to Istanbul, where many Middle Easterners of various nationalities complained to me that Americans only oppose the war because of the gas prices. That’s simply not true. The war has been unpopular since day one, when all that Americans knew was the American-Israeli strikes had killed Iranian leaders including the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.)
Shapiro, ever the neoconservative, insinuated in the quote above that the decline in Trump’s approval rating owes more to his tariffs than to his war. The data doesn’t back that up, as the conservative commentator and election analyst Ryan Girdusky noted on X in response to new survey data. “The most eye opening part of this poll is that Trump’s approval rating and the strength of the economy went up right after Liberation Day,” Girdusky said. “Fell slightly afterward and then plummeted at the start of the Iran War.”
Shapiro has unwittingly helped uncover another, subtler, way in which the Iran War has indirectly damaged Trump’s approval ratings and, by extension, the Republican Party brand. Shapiro recently went on Fox News to commiserate with the host Mark Levin—another Israel-Firster and warmonger—over all those dastardly antiwar conservatives blaming the Iran War for everything.
“Iran is a 4-percent issue with the American people,” Levin said, as Shapiro nodded in agreement. Levin was referring to Fox News polling that shows not many Americans name the Iran War as their top issue. “So, whatever happens in the midterms, it doesn’t appear that Iran’s going to drive anything one way or another.”
“I think that’s exactly right,” Shapiro replied.
Part of the problem with Levin’s analysis has already been covered above. In the Fox poll, a plurality of Americans—34 percent—named the cost of living as the most important issue, and the Iran War has made living costlier.
But the subtler problem is perhaps even more illuminating. Simply put, Americans believe Trump is too focused on foreign policy at the expense of the problem they really care about, which, in fact, his Iran War has exacerbated. This is a PR disaster for the Trump administration and the GOP. Americans don’t prioritize the war that has dominated the headlines and distracted the White House, even as Trump claims to have boldly prevented Iran from unleashing nuclear apocalypse.
It may be grotesque to find silver linings in this dumb and deadly war, but here’s one: Americans no longer buy the war narratives. That is certainly not, however, a silver lining for Republican candidates in this year’s election, no matter how cynically they try to distance themselves from the war. In fact, it’s a good bet they’ll do much worse than if Trump hadn’t launched this unnecessary war, despite what Shapiro and his ilk may tell you.
The last of the US-led coalition forces are leaving Iraq. It’s a significant bonus for Iran. The withdrawal date, September 30, was also the date by which Baghdad had pledged to bring numerous powerful Iran-backed militias under state control. But this deadline looks certain to be missed. This effectively means that, at a moment when […]
Not for the first time, there is a conspiracy among members of the established parties to exclude one element of our politics and make it effectively taboo, says Prof James Alexander: they want to keep the 'stasis quo'.