© JOÃO PORFÍRIO/OBSERVADOR
© JOÃO PORFÍRIO/OBSERVADOR
Welcome to the age of nuclear clocks. They are not yet as precise as the atomic clocks that keep time (and much more) in modern society. But because they are based on the atom’s nucleus rather than its electrons, improving their performance is only a matter of time. More importantly, these devices will be far more than timekeepers: they could help answer some of the most fundamental questions in physics and open entirely new avenues of inquiry.
© Matthias Heisler, TU Wien
A team of engineers and scientists has brought a machine from the future to the Tabernas desert in Almería, Spain. In a landscape familiar to fans of Sergio Leone westerns, before the sun had truly warmed the ground, they lifted Charlie onto a small cart — the prototype rover that the European Space Agency (ESA), Airbus, and much of European industry and science have been designing for years. They took it to an area that alternated between very fine dusty soil, rocky scree and salt-encrusted ground. They wanted to test how the machine would cope in an environment as close as possible to Mars. That is the ultimate goal of the ExoMars mission to which it belongs: to reach the Martian surface in 2030 — after more than a year of space travel — with the first European rover to touch down there, and drill into it in search of past or present life on the red planet. At least in the dry Almería scrub, Charlie seems to have convinced the scientists.
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This story originally appeared in Panamerican Dispatch on Sep. 29, 2026, and is shared here with permission.
The close relationship between the Bolsonaro family and key figures in the international far right like Steve Bannon and U.S. President Donald Trump has been public knowledge for over eight years. In this article, tech specialist Miguel Manso looks at the state of that relationship, right now, just days before Brazil’s first-round presidential elections. – ed.
Just days before the first round of Brazil’s presidential election, a confidential report from the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin) warns that the United States is influencing the country’s electoral process. Titled “Threats to the 2026 Electoral Process,” the report was sent in late August to the presidency, the Superior Electoral Court and the Justice Ministry, warning that U.S. interference has reached a “critical” level.
Sen. Flávio Bolsonaro’s campaign has become the target of legal action over claims that it benefited from paid ads and mass messaging originating in the United States.
The coalitions backing Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party and Renan Santos of the Missão party asked the Superior Electoral Court and the Supreme Federal Court to investigate the senator for economic and political abuse of power and foreign interference.
The court filings allege the following:
Foreign amplification: U.S.-based right-wing profiles and influencers, including American political figures, allegedly ran paid campaign content on X in support of Flávio Bolsonaro.
Paid partnerships: The posts, labeled “paid partnership,” cited figures from the foreign betting platform Polymarket to claim that Bolsonaro was the favorite, distorting the actual state of Brazilian polling.
Prohibited financing: The parties allege that this amounts to the use of funds from outside the official campaign structure and financed from a foreign source, both of which are strictly prohibited under Brazilian electoral law.
The lawsuits ask for the immediate removal of the posts, a Federal Police investigation, and, if the irregularities are confirmed, the loss of candidacy and ineligibility for those involved.
The attempted murder of Nadia Beller has drawn investigators toward Fernando Cerimedo and a web of other connections, including drug-trafficking flights and Bolivia’s top anti-narcotics police official, who allegedly identified the hitmen. Cerimodo is known for his work with far-right political leaders in Latin America.
On August 17, 2026, two gunmen on a motorcycle shot Nadia Beller, a Bolivian lawyer and Cerimedo’s girlfriend, outside a hotel in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia. She survived but was wounded in the neck, chest and arm.
Bolivian police have identified Colombian national Aldúbar Henry Silva Peña as the lead shooter. He fled immediately after the attack, then released a video in September 2026 admitting his role in planning the crime, though he claimed the original plan was only to “scare” Beller. He led a group of five, including four other operatives — two Colombians and two Brazilians — whose identities have not been released by investigators. All four remain at large.
Police detained Víctor Hugo C.Z. and formally charged him as an accomplice who worked directly with the gunmen. They arrested Róger Aguilera on charges of supplying the .32 caliber weapon used in the attack, and arrested Paola Andrea Vargas on charges of hiding and storing it.
Bolivian authorities arrested Argentine political consultant Fernando Cerimedo, known for his work with Trump’s MAGA movement and Beller’s former partner, at Viru Viru International Airport. Bolivia’s public prosecutor’s office accuses him of masterminding the attempted femicide.
A forensic review of Cerimedo’s phone revealed real-time messages with Erik Correa González, the Bolivian government’s head of intelligence, confirming that the shooting took place at the exact moment the two were exchanging messages. Beller has said publicly that the attack was ordered to silence her before she could expose corruption, money laundering and illicit dealings involving Cerimedo and local government officials.
Investigators found two key pieces of evidence: a text note written six days before the attack that used the phrase “La Nadia” alongside an intent to “eliminate” the victim, and a message sent at 8:54 p.m. on August 17 to a contact identified as “E.C.G.,” reading, “Brother, they just shot her.”
The investigation also dug into Cerimedo’s finances. On his phone, police found a note referring to a “virtual wallet” that had moved about $66,000 over the previous 11 months across more than 320 transfers, and a larger “pass-through wallet” that had moved $1,386,997. In searches, police seized about $400,000 in cash, along with 500,000 Bolivian bolivianos, weapons, vehicles and equipment for a “bot farm” — automated accounts used to manipulate social media and elections.
Beller’s allegations against her former partner are shaking the governments of Rodrigo Paz in Bolivia, Javier Milei in Argentina, José Antonio Kast in Chile, Nasry Asfura in Honduras and Colombia’s Abelardo De La Espriella, along with their ties to the Bolsonaro family. Her account has helped expose a techno-fascist network aimed at manipulating and interfering in elections in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Colombia — and even in Mexico’s upcoming election — through bot and troll farms that Cerimedo’s team ran from Argentina and Santa Cruz de la Sierra in Bolivia.
The goal, investigators say, was to install leaders who would serve U.S. and Israeli interests, backed by the Shield of the Americas alliance, promotion from the outlet La Derecha Diario, and financing from Trump and his allies channeled through Milei. Cerimedo has been described as a CIA and Mossad asset.
Fernando Cerimedo, known as the “king of bots” for the Latin American far right, is also under investigation for money laundering and alleged ties to drug trafficking. Prosecutors are trying to determine whether he was part of a network that facilitated irregular flights carrying up to 500 kilograms of cocaine per trip and returning with large amounts of cash.
Searching properties tied to Cerimedo in Bolivia, authorities seized large sums of cash and found evidence of a technical setup built to automatically create fake online accounts — commonly known as a “bot farm.”
It was already known that a global network links Donald Trump’s MAGA movement with right-wing leaders across Latin America, funded through an international web of businesspeople and drug traffickers and operating through artificial intelligence manipulation and integrated data networks used for cyberattacks.
These groups organize at high-profile political events and forums, such as Mar-a-Lago and the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), where strategists and data operatives share methods for digital engagement and fundraising.
Cerimedo has said in interviews that no one formally introduced him to Eduardo Bolsonaro. The two say they met by chance at Harvard University in 2010. But when news outlets asked Harvard directly, the university said it had no record that either Eduardo Bolsonaro or Fernando Gabriel Cerimedo had ever been enrolled there. Confronted with this, Cerimedo later claimed he had only taken open, non-degree classes.
As part of the Federal Police investigation into the attempted coup in Brazil, investigators found that in 2022, military officers and aides brokered Cerimedo’s ties to the hardline core of the Bolsonaro movement, producing false reports attacking the integrity of Brazil’s voting machines.
Reports based on the plea-deal testimony of Mauro Cid identify Army Col. Ângelo Denicoli as the officer who contacted Cerimedo and coordinated the technical details needed to carry out broadcasts and attacks on Brazil’s electoral system.
The Federal Police obtained electronic records showing that Cerimedo’s phone number and contact information were passed directly to Denicoli. Forensic analysis of seized phones showed that Denicoli became the main point of contact with the Argentine consultant, coordinating the materials sent to him.
Cid formally confirmed in testimony that Denicoli was the direct link between the criminal organization and Cerimedo, saying Denicoli was part of the group tasked with gathering data to support claims that the electronic voting machines had failed.
Technical evidence linked Denicoli, Cerimedo and technology entrepreneur Eder Balbino. Balbino and Denicoli compiled reports containing false arguments and data based on outdated voting-machine models, then passed the files to Cerimedo, who used them as visual material for his broadcasts.
Digital cross-referencing by the Federal Police showed that the data Cerimedo presented in his broadcasts from Argentina contained the same mathematical inconsistencies and formatting as the documents manipulated by the Liberal Party’s technical committee in Brazil. Investigators concluded that Cerimedo had not discovered the material independently, but received it from the structure Denicoli managed.
Investigators also found that Denicoli was part of what they called the Disinformation and Electoral System Attack Unit. The Federal Police traced digital records linking Denicoli directly to fake ballot-audit files stored in a public Google Drive folder belonging to Cerimedo, with Denicoli listed as the folder’s original owner and editor.
Denicoli coordinated the technical compilation of false reports with Balbino. The material was passed to Cerimedo, who used it in the “fraud livestream” broadcast from Argentina in November 2022 and amplified in Brazil by Eduardo Bolsonaro.
In a trial concluded by the Supreme Court, Denicoli received the harshest sentence among the defendants in his group: 17 years in a closed prison regime, on charges of attempting a coup, seeking the violent overthrow of Brazil’s democratic order, and participating in an armed criminal organization.
The connection between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rúbio and Argentine digital strategist Fernando Cerimedo took shape starting in 2023, with lobbyist and political consultant Damián Merlo acting as the intermediary.
Merlo, who owns the Miami-based Latin America Advisory Group, serves as a link between conservative Latin American politicians and power centers within the U.S. MAGA movement. According to filings under the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act, Merlo used his relationship with Viviana Bovo, a senior adviser to Rúbio, to introduce Cerimedo and his data tools directly to the office of the then senator, who is now secretary of state.
Cerimedo founded the agency Numen and the outlet La Derecha Diario, specializing in “bot farms” and algorithm manipulation to shape social media trends. In Chile, he worked on the campaign that defeated the 2022 constitutional referendum. In Brazil, he helped the Bolsonaro family spread disinformation about voting machines after the 2022 election. And in Argentina, he led the digital strategy behind Javier Milei’s election in 2023.
Brad Parscale, the top digital strategist for Donald Trump’s U.S. presidential campaigns, became Cerimedo’s business partner at the political consulting firm Numen, based in Buenos Aires.
Through that partnership, Cerimedo took over managing the Latin American operations of tools such as Campaign Nucleus and Eyes Over — data-mining and artificial intelligence platforms created or linked to Parscale. The partnership combined Parscale’s expertise in U.S. data operations with the infrastructure Cerimedo had built across Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Bolivia.
Brad Parscale earned the trust of the Trump family and went on to design websites for their businesses, before being chosen to lead the digital strategy for Donald Trump’s 2015 presidential campaign.
In 2016, as the campaign’s digital media director, he led a data operation called Project Alamo, directing much of the budget toward highly targeted social media ads and producing as many as 60,000 different Facebook ad variations a day.
In February 2018, Trump named Parscale campaign manager for his 2020 reelection bid.
Parscale’s ties to Big Tech and to Peter Thiel’s Palantir Technologies span strategic data cooperation, political alignment and technology supply.
Thiel, a Palantir cofounder, was one of the major Silicon Valley billionaires who directly backed and funded Trump’s 2016 campaign. Palantir builds surveillance and analytical intelligence software for governments and defense agencies.
Parscale created Campaign Nucleus, a platform meant to build a communications structure and data ecosystem. The data-mining and AI model it uses mirrors the mass-processing and information-control concepts associated with Palantir.
The ecosystem functions as an integrated chain: Thiel’s Palantir develops surveillance and data-intelligence technology, which feeds into political software such as Parscale’s Campaign Nucleus, and Parscale in turn distributes that technology across Latin America through Cerimedo’s Numen.
These companies’ ties to Israel and its government center on two main areas: artificial intelligence for military targeting, and cyberwarfare and digital influence operations.
In January 2024, Palantir signed a direct strategic agreement with Israel’s Defense Ministry to supply advanced AI technology supporting “war-related missions.”
In July 2026, international journalistic investigations revealed that Parscale was registered as a foreign agent of Israel in the United States. The Israeli government hired Parscale’s main firm, Clock Tower X, through a $46.5 million contract to carry out a digital influence operation.
According to the reporting, the company built a network of pro-Israel propaganda websites and blogs while also producing search-optimized content designed to shape the databases artificial intelligence systems draw on.
Cerimedo’s Numen is described as the Latin American link in that network, applying Campaign Nucleus data concepts and bot infrastructure through La Derecha Diario.
The relationship is described as symbiotic: Israel provides public contracts, Palantir supplies data technology, Clock Tower X uses that funding for digital influence operations, and Numen carries out the messaging and bot infrastructure in Latin America.
The tactics have evolved from spreading disinformation on social media to manipulating institutional digital ecosystems.
Generative Engine Optimization, or GEO, is described as a technique meant to flood the internet with doctrinal texts and fake academic research centers, so that the crawlers used by systems such as ChatGPT, Gemini and Claude absorb that propaganda as factual information. As a result, when people ask artificial intelligence systems about geopolitical topics or elections, those systems can end up repeating narratives that this network planted beforehand.
The dismantling of Cerimedo’s structures in Bolivia also revealed the use of tens of thousands of automated phones running AI software designed to simulate human behavior, making it harder for social media platforms to detect and block them.
Trump’s MAGA strategists, working with Eduardo and Flávio Bolsonaro, continue trying to interfere in Brazil’s election despite Cerimedo’s arrest — evidence of a powerful alliance working jointly to manipulate and defraud the political landscape and bring Latin America under U.S. control. The question is: for how long?
This article was originally published in Brasil 247. It has been translated to English by Panamerican Dispatch and can be read in its original Portuguese, here.
Charles Spencer, 9th Earl Spencer, has decided to record his memories and, in some way, also preserve the public memory of his sister, Lady Diana. At 62, he has just published Swan Song: Diana, My Sister (2026), less than a year before the 30th anniversary of her tragic death in Paris.
©
An invisible web of connections links the executives and board members of Spain’s largest companies. Having spent time at certain elite consulting firms, business schools or government institutions opens more doors than any headhunter ever could. Former state attorneys sitting on the boards of major Spanish companies, ex-McKinsey executives running some of the financial sector’s most powerful firms, and alumni of leading business schools such as IESE and ICADE holding top positions in multinational companies all illustrate a network of influence, as subtle as it is enduring, that has been woven through Spain’s corporate elite.
© Daniel Diosdado (EL PAÍS)
Patrick Baty, 70, thought the greatest adventure of his life would culminate in the fight against the communist insurgency in the Dhofar region of southern Oman in the 1970s. Britain’s elite Special Air Service, the feared SAS, was involved in the covert operation, and the young Baty, then a captain in the 9th/12th Royal Lancers, had already begun learning Arabic and was preparing to emulate Lawrence of Arabia.
© Manuel Vázquez (EL PAÍS)
La Vuelta al Cole está a punto de arrancar en la Comunidad de Madrid. Los alumnos de Infantil, Primaria y Educación Especial serán los primeros en regresar a las aulas tras las vacaciones de verano. Lo harán el 7 de septiembre. Al día siguiente, los institutos recuperarán su actividad para los estudiantes de Secundaria, Formación Profesional (FP) y Bachillerato.
Las clases se desarrollarán hasta el 18 de junio para los estudiantes del Segundo Ciclo de Infantil (de 3 a 6 años), Primaria y Educación Especial. Por su parte, las aulas del Primer Ciclo de Infantil (de 0 a 3 años), abrirán hasta el 31 de julio. Además, los de Secundaria, FP y Bachillerato tendrán clases hasta el 18 de junio.
Esto no se aplicará a los jóvenes del segundo curso de Bachillerato, que dependerán de las fechas de las Pruebas de Acceso a la Universidad (PAU). La evaluación final en estas enseñanzas y en FP se ha fijado el 10 de junio. Los ocho días restantes hasta el final de curso se reservarán para realizar exámenes de recuperación, programar clases de refuerzo o agendar tutorías.
Para los centros de Educación de Personas Adultas de la Comunidad de Madrid, el inicio del curso se ha marcado para el 21 de septiembre y terminarán el 18 de junio. En los Conservatorios Profesionales de Música y Danza, las actividades lectivas se inician el 8 de septiembre de 2026 y finalizarán el 18 de junio de 2027. En las Escuelas Oficiales de Idiomas las clases arrancan el 8 de septiembre de 2026 y finalizarán el 25 de junio de 2027.
En las Escuelas de Arte, la jornada educativa comienza el 9 de septiembre de 2026 para el segundo curso de los ciclos formativos de Artes Plásticas y Diseño, y el 21 de septiembre de 2026 para el primer curso, y finalizarán de forma oficial el 18 de junio de 2027. Por último, en el caso de las Enseñanzas Artísticas Superiores, las clases se extienden desde el 9 de septiembre hasta el 18 de junio.
Para el próximo curso las vacaciones de Navidad se extenderán entre el 23 de diciembre de 2026 y el 6 de enero de 2027. Asimismo, el 7 y 8 de enero se han fijado como días no lectivos. La Semana Blanca se recuperará en el nuevo calendario escolar, programándose entre el 12 y el 15 de febrero. Por su parte, la Semana Santa se desarrollará entre el 20 y el 28 de marzo. A estos días se sumarán el 19 y 29 de marzo de 2027 que se han señalado como días sin clase. Las vacaciones de verano se inician oficialmente el 1 de julio en la mayoría de las enseñanzas, aunque la actividad académica finalizará antes.
Además de estas fechas, se han recogido otros días festivos. Durante el 2026-2027 habrá dos puentes reseñables coincidiendo con el Día de la Hispanidad y el Día de Todos los Santos. El primero se produce a consecuencia del festivo fijado el lunes 12 de octubre, y en el segundo se traslada el festivo al lunes 2 de noviembre por caer en domingo. El resto de días señalados como no lectivos son el 7 y 8 de diciembre de 2026. Junto a estos, se sumarán el resto de festividades establecidas en el calendario, incluyendo días nacionales, regionales y a nivel local.
America has long been the go-to home for emerging tech companies. With this, it has reaped economic and geopolitical benefits such as technological sovereignty, innovation culture, brain gain and standard setting, to name a few. But President Donald Trump’s rule is now eroding some of America’s most competitive assets: predictability and legal certainty. From tariff volatility and political pressure on independent agencies to restrictions on foreign researchers and the politicisation of investment decisions, doing business in America now comes with much higher risks.
For the first time in decades, Europe has a chance to compete by offering emerging companies an alternative: stable institutions, clear rules, independent regulators and a rule-of-law guarantee. To beat the US at its own game, the EU will need to take a much more continental approach.
In some ways, Europe is not too far behind. It currently competes head-to-head with the US and China in the creation of new tech companies, for example. Since 2015, it has produced more start-ups than America and has the same share of founders creating new companies with Asia. Talent costs are lower than in the Bay Area or New York, and Europe holds advanced positions in quantum technology, climate tech and biotech.
The problem arises at the scaling stage. The fragmentation of 27 member-state markets and the regulatory complexity this brings is an invisible ceiling on the continent’s start-up environment. In 2024, investment rounds above $100m totalled $120.8bn in the US compared to just $18.1bn in Europe. And in 2025, deep tech investment reached $130bn in the US compared to just $16bn in Europe, a gap that widens when looking at AI and other breakthrough technologies.
Over time, these dynamics have led to a structural decline: Europe’s share of global tech market value has plummeted from 30% in 2000 to just 7% today, even though the tech industry now accounts for 15% of Europe’s GDP, compared to 4% in 2015. The consequences for Europe’s tech sovereignty and geoeconomic sway are unquestionable.
It would be misleading to only blame regulatory fragmentation for this gap. Other factors weigh heavily on European venture capital growth too. There are few deep pockets in public equity markets able to absorb large tech IPOs; European institutional capital, like pension funds, chronically underinvests in venture capital; and the broader institutional culture prices risk more conservatively than America’s.
A lack of European money means that much capital comes from overseas. Nearly half of Europe’s growth-stage funding last year came from abroad, predominantly America. In itself this is not a problem, but it becomes one when those investors push entrepreneurs to relocate their companies once they reach scale. This creates a “high-growth forum shopping”that drains talent, high-quality jobs, innovation capacity and previously invested public funding out of Europe. This has created a familiar pattern of European-born companies ending up incorporated on the other side of the Atlantic.
To address these issues, the European Commission recently took a decisive step towards approving a European company model: EU Inc., otherwise known as the 28th regime. The idea is to create a harmonised EU-level legal framework to allow companies, especially startups and scale-ups, to operate in the single market under one set of rules rather than facing 27 different national systems. This should create European-born and -raised firms.
The first part is already on the table: a regulation establishing EU Inc. as an optional, automatically recognised and fully digital corporate entity covering commercial, tax, insolvency and labour law. In theory, this should lead to less regulatory fragmentation, more risk investment and better access to capital markets and European talent. The practice, however, is more difficult.
Achieving a broad ecosystem of innovative EU Incs will depend on whether founders choose it and whether investors trust it is consistent and usable. On the attractiveness front, the current proposal faces two big difficulties. First, the regime can only reach its full potential if the EU makes progress on other files including key items of the startup and scaleup strategy, the European Innovation Act, the capital markets union and the transformation of certain merger guidelines.
Second, in the complex institutional negotiations up until 2027, certain countries and stakeholders will likely seek to dilute the regime’s capacity to become a unified standard. This is because it will need to bypass certain domestic legal barriers to make it easier to build, invest, and scale across Europe. Germany, for example, will scrutinise any framework that bypasses its co-determination model (Mitbestimmung). France will defend the centrality of its tech national champions agenda. And the Nordics will protect the favourable tax treatment of stock options and employee share schemes. In June 2026, the Council’s own legal service already advised national delegations that the proposal may need to be downgraded from a regulation to a directive, which would undermine its harmonising ambition from the outset.
Should the 28th regime derail under pressure from national interests, it would be a macroeconomic failure of the first order
Should the 28th regime derail under pressure from national interests, it would be a macroeconomic failure of the first order. To prevent that and keep the capitals on board, the proposal must be preserved as the commission designed it, as a regulation, not a directive. That means EU Inc is optional for entrepreneurs and businesses, but not for member states: national company law stays in place, and companies simply gain a European corporate form alongside it. Capitals therefore retain their legal sovereignty while their most promising firms become less likely to move abroad. Within this, the new legislation must include tax measures to prevent huge imbalances of member states with more attractive tax laws such as Ireland, Luxembourg or the Netherlands.
Moreover, in case of an effective blockage of negotiations, parallel levers should be activated: the move away from unanimity voting suggested by Ursula von der Leyen in April together with fast-track routes such as mutual recognition mechanisms between member states. The European Competitiveness Lab is a good model to inspire this member-state coordination. The geopolitical urgency framing the debate can provide the political tailwind.
Europe has networks of academic research centres and connected clusters such as the AI factories which are already generating projects and spin-offs in critical technologies. There is still time for these spin-offs to be born as EU Incs. The combination is straightforward: AI factories and the EuroHPC joint undertaking provide the scientific infrastructure, EU Inc is the legal vehicle, and the European innovation council and investment bank work as the financing bridge between laboratory and market. This is the most scalable path available to Europe to turn its research strength into corporate strength; it just requires the alignment of institutions and laws that already exist.
The potential transformative dimension of the 28th regime has two precedents worth recalling, both of which combined a common legal framework, pooled public investment and continental scale to overcome the limits of national efforts.
In the late 1960s, Airbus emerged as a political-industrial project to equip Europe with a champion capable of competing with the US in commercial aviation. France and Germany agreed in 1970 to a single legal vehicle, joined shortly after by the UK and Spain. They then channelled public funding into a shared corporate structure, and eventually consolidated their fragmented national aerospace industries into one European company.
And in the 2000s, Galileo gave Europe its own global positioning technology based on a system that was open, civilian-controlled and compatible with GPS but more precise. It required EU member states to agree on a common legal and governance framework under EU law, to commit more than €10bn of joint EU-budget funding over two decades and to operate the system as shared European infrastructure rather than as competing national projects. Its development is widely credited as a factor that pushed Washington to end the deliberate restrictions of GPS for civilian use.
Today, both operate at a global scale. The lesson for the 28th regime is the same: a single legal framework, pooled resources and continental scale turned political ambition into industrial reality. Europe’s competitiveness in the coming decades will depend on its capacity to do this again and support companies, especially those driven by emerging technologies. With this, the EU could achieve a new strategic form of sovereignty and the greatest practical step forward for the single market in decades.
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