17h. Zelensky diz desconhecer trégua anunciada por Trump



VTM
Depois de no pretérito ano de 2025, a laureada ter sido Maria Corina Machado, com fundamento no reconhecimento pelo seu trabalho incansável na promoção dos direitos democráticos do povo da Venezuela e pela luta por uma transição justa e pacífica da ditadura para a democracia, este ano temos de adicionar o nosso Primeiro-Ministro à ‘shortlist’ de prováveis vencedores.
Neste Jardim à beira-mar plantado parece ter-se encerrado a fronteira entre governar um país e gerir um balneário, tal afirmação facilmente se sustenta na enviesada definição de urgência atribuída ao arrufo entre Cristiano e Jesus, que obrigou Luís Montenegro a realizar diversas chamadas telefónicas, designadamente para Cristiano, Jesus e Proença, na tentativa de moderar o conflito entre dois egos, que, certamente, tornam os intervenientes mais inflexíveis que muitos líderes mundiais.
Este papel intrusivo do Estado na lide da seleção nacional de futebol materializa-se numa tremenda inversão de prioridades, sendo atribuída superior relevância à prática desportiva em detrimento dos 664 horários que continuam sem professor ou do consecutivo aumento dos preços dos combustíveis que vem sufocando os portugueses.
Mas a culpa também é nossa e, sobretudo, da nossa conivência, que vem deixando que o tempo político se afaste do que é realmente pertinente para o nosso quotidiano e se esgote em reflexões a respeito de quantos minutos deve jogar Cristiano.
Neste pressuposto, talvez se mostrasse relevante aplicar a prodigiosa diplomacia do PM para zonas de conflito internacional. Ora, se um mero telefonema logra apaziguar os egos estratosféricos de Jesus e Cristiano, não se entende como ainda não se encontra o nosso PM a mediar o conflito do Médio Oriente, de Kiev ou até do Sudão.
Com o curriculum diplomático moldado a telefonemas de balneário, o nosso Chefe de Governo antevê-se mais que qualificado para contactar diretamente com os líderes em rota de colisão e ensinar-lhes como se resolvem guerras, por muito extremadas que as posições de cada lado se apresentem.
Perante o relatado, apesar de já se identificarem favoritos ao Prémio Nobel da Paz, como são exemplo Volodymyr Zelensky (pela resistência na Ucrânia), Yulia Navalnaya (pela luta da oposição russa contra o regime) e as Salas de Resposta de Emergência do Sudão (pela coragem dos voluntários a salvar vidas no terreno), a verdade é que nenhuma dessas candidaturas demonstrou a versatilidade de Montenegro, tendo agora o júri norueguês de ponderar em contrarrelógio os excecionais méritos do nosso Primeiro-Ministro.
The post Montenegro para Nobel da Paz appeared first on A Voz de Trás-os-Montes.
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Trying to pin the blame for the depletion of U.S. military stockpiles on something other than the war in Iran, President Donald Trump fell back on a usual scapegoat last week: Ukraine. “The Biden administration gave far more munitions away to Ukraine, at no cost to them whatsoever, than we have used in Iran,” Trump wrote on Truth Social.
This is a familiar refrain. Trump loves to remind his audience that because of him, Americans are “not spending on Ukraine anymore” and instead, Europe is footing the bill. In truth, most people in the United States don’t think about Ukraine much these days. But since Trump himself brought it up, it’s worth asking: What exactly is going on with U.S. military support to Ukraine?
The answer might surprise you. Despite Trump’s rhetoric, the United States remains deeply embroiled in Ukraine’s ongoing conflict with Russia in ways that create national security risks and run counter to Trump’s own foreign policy goals.
It is true that Trump has reduced U.S. support to Ukraine compared to its high mark under his predecessor, Joe Biden. First, his administration has stopped the use of Presidential Drawdown Authority to transfer weapons from U.S. stocks directly to Ukraine. The Biden administration used this mechanism to give Ukraine almost $35 billion in weapons free of charge. Second, the Trump administration has not requested additional funds for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), which uses U.S. financing to purchase new weapons for Ukraine.
But Trump has not cut off all assistance to Ukraine. Several important channels remain. First, there are about $13 billion in outstanding USAI contracts as of June 2026, down from $20 billion in January 2025. These contracts, signed by Biden and now implemented by Trump, will procure weapons for Ukraine through about 2028. Weapons in the pipeline include longer-lead time systems like NASAMs, Patriot missiles and components (Ukraine is reportedly receiving at 10-20 PAC-3s per month under these contracts), counter-drone systems, artillery rockets, and ammunition.
These continuing deliveries are not new awards, but they are still taxpayer-funded military aid to Ukraine that will add up to about $20 billion in aid over the 4 years of Trump’s term. Weapons produced under these contracts come off overburdened U.S. production lines. This has a high opportunity cost given the limits of U.S. defense industrial capacity. Without obligations to Ukraine, industrial resources could shift to different weapons or systems that the United States needs more.
If the Trump administration were serious about ending U.S. spending on the Ukraine war, it could still recoup these funds and reallocate the money to support U.S. defense production needs. It has instead allowed the aid to continue.
There has also been some new funding approved since Biden left office. Congress included about $800 million of USAI funding in the 2026 and 2027 NDAAs. We can expect more in future bills as well.
And the State Department has continued to send military aid of its own. A portion of this aid goes through the Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior, including drones, armored vehicles, guns, grenade launchers, and similar equipment. Since this equipment ends up with Ukraine’s National Guard and border police it is often counted as non-military and intended for things like counterdrug operations, but today these personnel serve as combat units.
The State Department has also approved $3 billion of new arms sales to Ukraine in 2025 and 2026 that will be at least partially funded from foreign military financing (FMF), which means U.S. dollars supporting foreign government purchases of U.S. weapons. Some of these funds may come from money allocated but not spent under President Biden, but much of the funding will be new, coming from the State Department’s budget.
The bottom line is that U.S. weapons transfers to Ukraine continue under Trump, amounting to, on average, as much at $5 billion per year. But this is no longer the most important, or expensive, type of support that the United States gives to Ukraine.
For example, the United States gives Ukraine real-time targeting information, including on the movement of Russian troops and the location of key command centers. This information has been important to Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign on Russian logistics as well as its deep strikes against military and energy targets inside of Russia. In addition, U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance assets in countries on the NATO border (including routine E-3 flights) are integrated with Ukraine’s air defense network, improving the accuracy and speed of Ukraine’s response.
Beyond intelligence, the United States also provides logistical and maintenance support, including forward and remote assistance to repair American-made equipment, necessary spare parts to keep older systems running, and training. It also facilitates the expensive transfer of European purchases of U.S. weapons.
The cost of the intelligence, logistics, and other operational support the United States provides to Ukraine does not show up anywhere as an itemized bill, even as U.S. assistance increases. But we can use available public information to draw some conclusions about the expenses incurred.
The 2024 defense supplemental bill, for instance, allocated about $15 billion to “military training, intelligence sharing, increased presence, and other support activities.” In theory, these funds are intended to cover activities conducted in support of Ukraine that would not occur if the United States remained uninvolved in that conflict. Some portion of this money will go to the salaries of military personnel who would be paid no matter where they work.
Since about a third of each military service’s budget is personnel costs, we could estimate the cost of extra activities conducted for Ukraine, excluding baseline manpower, at about $10 billion over the course of a year or so. If Trump has truly expanded intelligence sharing with Ukraine, this price tag may have increased over time.
The money included in the bill is likely only a portion of the actual burden the U.S. military and intelligence community have shouldered to support Ukraine’s war. Many intelligence activities, like tasking and analyzing satellite data and collecting signals intelligence, might be covered in classified national security budgets. Starting in 2023, in fact, the classified intelligence budget increased by 10%, a large jump over the 2022 total. The increase was justified by intelligence community leaders as resulting from shifts in the national security landscape, including especially concern about China’s rise and spillover from conflict in Ukraine. Since the total increase in funding was about $10 billion, we can guess that Ukraine-related expenditures might amount to $3-$5 billion per year, or about one-third to one-half of the total increase.
All told, then, U.S. taxpayers are still spending roughly $20 billion per year on Ukraine. Today, assistance to Ukraine comes primarily in the form of direct operational support, not weapons. But the shift in type of aid increases the risk of U.S. support to Ukraine to average Americans.
First, assisting Ukraine in striking energy targets inside of Russia has a perverse effect on the Trump administration’s efforts to keep gas prices low. As Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent acknowledged, Ukraine’s strikes inside Russia push global oil prices up, imposing higher costs of living on Americans.
Second, U.S. intelligence support deepens U.S. involvement in Ukraine’s war, making it an all-but-direct combatant. Russian assistance to Iran, both in terms of weapons and intelligence sharing, is a reaction to the comparable U.S. role in Ukraine, and it leaves U.S. servicemembers in the Middle East and elsewhere less safe. Growing U.S. participation in Ukraine also increases the risk that miscalculation leads to a direct U.S.-Russia confrontation, a nightmarish possibility given the degraded state of U.S. military readiness.
Trump promised to end the war in Ukraine in 24 hours. He has instead deepened U.S. entanglement in ways that create real risks and new fiscal costs for the United States. American interests would be best served if the United States were to walk away entirely, but if Trump instead opts for the status quo, he should at least be honest about it.
Original article: responsiblestatecraft.org

The Russians are struggling on land and at sea, and are having real difficulty protecting themselves from Ukrainian long-range attack. That has left them with one real strategic “advantage” and that is what we will see the next few months. As reports this week made clear, the Russian strategy is now to make Ukraine unlivable, […]
The post Russia’s new strategy aims to make Ukrainian cities unlivable appeared first on Asia Times.

In a recent phone call, Donald Trump urged Volodymyr Zelensky to stop Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries. Whether a request or a demand, this appears, certainly at first glance, fundamentally different from the Biden administration’s policy of restricting the use of US long-range missiles to hit targets inside Russia. The US president has justified […]
The post Trump’s bid to stop Ukraine’s Russia strikes a strategic disconnect appeared first on Asia Times.
coalition of vontiers in Paris (Flickr)
The Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine meets this Monday, August 24 — the 35th anniversary of Ukrainian independence — under the joint chairmanship of Emmanuel Macron, Friedrich Merz and Andy Burnham. The meeting comes at an urgent moment: fighting is intensifying on the ground and Moscow is preparing a new mobilization, while in Kyiv, Volodymyr Zelensky has just ruled out holding elections in wartime.

According to a statement from the Élysée Palace released Friday, August 21, the Coalition of the Willing — an international alliance supporting Ukraine formed in March 2025 at the initiative of Czech President Petr Pavel — will meet this Monday at 1 p.m. in a hybrid format, with Volodymyr Zelensky taking part. The session will be jointly chaired by Emmanuel Macron, via videoconference, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and, for the first time, new British Prime Minister Andy Burnham. About a dozen leaders, including European Council President António Costa, are expected to be in Kyiv alongside the Ukrainian head of state, while European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is not expected to attend in person.
According to a European official cited by several news agencies, talks are expected to focus primarily on strengthening Ukrainian air defenses, as the country faces a shortage of interceptors against Russian strikes. The Élysée says leaders will reaffirm “their determination to increase pressure on Russia” and continue coordinating measures aimed at drying up the resources funding Russia’s war effort, including the fight against the “shadow fleet” Moscow uses to circumvent oil sanctions. The meeting is also meant to advance work on security guarantees intended to underpin a “just, robust and lasting” peace, building on the Paris Declaration of January 6, 2026.
The meeting comes as the war enters a phase of intensification. Volodymyr Zelensky said this weekend that Russia plans to mobilize an additional 300,000 troops for the Ukrainian front after Russia’s parliamentary elections, scheduled for September 16-20, with a longer-term goal of recruiting 500,000. The Ukrainian president described a “peripheral mobilization” that would spare Russia’s major cities but, he said, would be hard to conceal. He also cited a Russian goal of producing roughly 1,300 ballistic missiles a year, while Ukraine expects to receive only 264 interceptor missiles this year, down from 364 in 2025 and 675 in 2023 — a shortfall Kyiv is trying to offset through new agreements, including delivery of at least one SAMP/T air-defense system from France and roughly 600 missiles from Germany.
These statements echo converging battlefield reports. Recent military bulletins point to intense fighting on the Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Dobropillya fronts and in Dnipropetrovsk region, along with exchanges of soldiers’ remains between the two sides. This information comes from both Ukrainian and Russian sources, whose respective figures cannot be independently verified and should be treated with caution.
Formed in March 2025 at the initiative of Czech President Petr Pavel, and later organized under French and British leadership, the Coalition of the Willing brings together roughly thirty countries supporting Kyiv. It notably held a summit in Paris on July 13, 2026, on the eve of the Bastille Day parade, building on the G7 summit in Évian and the Paris Declaration of January 6, 2026.
On the domestic front, Volodymyr Zelensky responded for the first time to the call for elections made last week by his former defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, who was dismissed in late July amid vocal protests. In remarks made Saturday and released Sunday, the Ukrainian president said holding a wartime vote, absent a major cessation of hostilities, would “destroy the country by splitting society,” calling the prospect a “tsunami.” Ukrainian law bars elections under martial law, in effect since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022; Mr. Zelensky’s presidential term technically expired in May 2024.
Mr. Zelensky pointed to the practical hurdles such a vote would have to overcome — including how to enable voting by mobilized troops, millions of refugees abroad, and residents of Russian-occupied territory. According to an analysis by CNN, an incomplete or contested vote would hand Moscow a propaganda win, since the Kremlin already cites the wartime ban on elections to question the Ukrainian president’s legitimacy, even as Russia’s own electoral process is not considered free by Western observers. Polling suggests former armed forces commander Valery Zaluzhny or Mr. Fedorov himself would be the frontrunners in any eventual election.
The convergence of these two issues — international military support and the debate over the democratic legitimacy of Ukraine’s leadership in wartime — casts Monday’s meeting in a particular light. For the Western leaders gathered around Emmanuel Macron, the goal is to demonstrate the durability of their commitment at a moment when Moscow is betting on wearing Kyiv down before winter, and when the question of security guarantees still has no concrete bearing on any ceasefire.
L’article Ukraine : Macron, Merz and Burnham Close Ranks as Russia Steps Up the War est apparu en premier sur FrenchDailyNews.