Le elezioni legislative marocchine hanno ridisegnato gli equilibri tra i partiti: il PAM conquista il primato, l’RNI arretra e il PJD torna protagonista. Ma l’astensione e il ruolo della monarchia mostrano i limiti dell’alternanza, mentre il Sahara Occidentale resta escluso da ogni processo decisionale.

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Le elezioni legislative marocchine del 23 settembre hanno prodotto una significativa ricomposizione degli equilibri parlamentari senza mettere in discussione l’architettura fondamentale del sistema politico del Regno. Il Partito Autenticità e Modernità (Parti Authenticité et Modernité, PAM) è diventato la prima formazione della Camera dei rappresentanti con 97 seggi su 395, superando il Raggruppamento Nazionale degli Indipendenti (Rassemblement National des Indépendants, RNI), che dopo cinque anni alla guida del governo è sceso da 102 a 66 deputati. Il Partito dell’Istiqlal (Parti de l’Istiqlal) si è collocato immediatamente dietro con 65 seggi, mentre il Partito della Giustizia e dello Sviluppo (Parti de la Justice et du Développement, PJD) ha realizzato la rimonta più consistente, passando dai 13 rappresentanti del 2021 a 54.

La distribuzione dei seggi permette di individuare contemporaneamente una sconfitta dell’esperienza di governo uscente e una continuità più profonda: il PAM, infatti, aveva governato insieme all’RNI e all’Istiqlal nel corso della legislatura appena conclusa. Il suo avanzamento da 87 a 97 deputati rappresenta quindi soprattutto un riequilibrio interno all’area che ha amministrato il Paese negli ultimi cinque anni. Il cambiamento più marcato riguarda invece l’RNI dell’ormai ex capo del governo Aziz Akhannouch, che perde 36 seggi, mentre l’Istiqlal ne perde sedici.

Il risultato ha portato Muhammad VI, il 29 settembre, a nominare Fatima Ezzahra El Mansouri capo del governo incaricato, in applicazione dell’articolo 47 della Costituzione, che impone al sovrano di scegliere il capo dell’esecutivo all’interno del partito arrivato primo alle elezioni della Camera dei rappresentanti. El Mansouri, coordinatrice della direzione collegiale del PAM, già ministra dell’Assetto territoriale e sindaca di Marrakech, è la prima donna nella storia marocchina a ricevere l’incarico di guidare il governo.

Il PAM conquista il primato, ma non produce una rottura

La vittoria relativa del PAM deve essere interpretata all’interno delle caratteristiche specifiche del sistema politico marocchino. Fondato nel 2008 da Fouad Ali El Himma, stretto collaboratore e consigliere di Mohammed VI, il partito è stato fin dall’origine una componente importante dello spazio politico vicino alla monarchia. La sua affermazione non corrisponde dunque a un’alternanza paragonabile a quella che avviene nei sistemi parlamentari nei quali il controllo dell’esecutivo comporta anche la direzione complessiva della politica dello Stato.

Il PAM, come ricordato in precedenza, aveva partecipato direttamente anche al governo Akhannouch, e resta dunque inserito nello stesso quadro istituzionale. La differenza tra i due partiti può essere rilevante nelle politiche sociali, nell’organizzazione della spesa pubblica, nelle priorità economiche o nella distribuzione delle responsabilità ministeriali, ma è molto meno marcata sui dossier strategici che dipendono direttamente dalla monarchia.

La Costituzione del 2011 attribuisce infatti al re funzioni che vanno ben oltre quelle normalmente esercitate da un capo dello Stato parlamentare. Muhammad VI è definito capo dello Stato e garante dell’integrità territoriale; presiede il Consiglio dei ministri, nel quale vengono stabiliti gli orientamenti strategici della politica dello Stato, ed è comandante supremo delle Forze Armate Reali. Presiede inoltre il Consiglio superiore di sicurezza, competente sulle strategie di sicurezza interna ed esterna.

La differenza tra alternanza governativa e alternanza del potere risulta quindi essenziale per comprendere il voto del 23 settembre. Il PAM assume la guida dell’esecutivo, ma la politica estera, la difesa, la sicurezza e le grandi direttrici strategiche rimangono settori nei quali il Palazzo conserva un ruolo determinante.

Il ritorno del PJD

Se il PAM è la prima forza parlamentare, il cambiamento numericamente più rilevante riguarda il PJD. Nel 2021, infatti, il partito islamista aveva subito una sconfitta eccezionale, precipitando da 125 seggi ottenuti nel 2016 ad appena 13. Cinque anni dopo torna a risalire fino a quota 54 deputati, recuperando 41 seggi e ricostruendo una presenza parlamentare significativa.

Secondo gli analisti, il ritorno di Abdelilah Benkirane alla guida della formazione ha contribuito a restituire al PJD una capacità di mobilitazione che sembrava compromessa dopo il tracollo del 2021. Il risultato non porta però il partito verso una nuova partecipazione al governo: il PJD ha annunciato la propria collocazione all’opposizione e Benkirane ha anche rifiutato di partecipare alla consultazione convocata da El Mansouri presso la sede del PAM, contestando il luogo scelto per il confronto.

Il dato segnala comunque che l’esperienza del 2021 non aveva cancellato l’elettorato islamista. Una parte consistente degli elettori che aveva abbandonato il PJD dopo gli anni trascorsi al governo è tornata a sostenerlo in una fase nella quale il partito può nuovamente presentarsi come forza di opposizione.

La dinamica è particolarmente interessante perché ribalta in parte quella verificatasi cinque anni fa. Nel 2021 il crollo del PJD aveva aperto la strada all’ascesa dell’RNI; nel 2026 è l’RNI a perdere una parte considerevole della propria rappresentanza mentre il PJD recupera gran parte dello spazio perduto.

L’astensione come dato strutturale

Il risultato più significativo per comprendere il rapporto tra istituzioni e società resta tuttavia quello della partecipazione.

Secondo il ministero dell’Interno, l’affluenza ufficiale è stata del 38,02%, contro circa il 50% registrato nel 2021. Il dato assume un peso ancora maggiore se confrontato con la dimensione delle liste elettorali: a fronte di circa 27 milioni di cittadini potenzialmente aventi diritto, soltanto 15,8 milioni risultavano registrati, una cifra diminuita di circa il 12% rispetto alla precedente consultazione.

Il problema appare particolarmente marcato tra i giovani. Nelle settimane precedenti al voto, soltanto il 3% dei cittadini tra i 18 e i 24 anni risultava iscritto nelle liste elettorali. Lo stesso gruppo sociale è stato protagonista negli ultimi anni di manifestazioni legate alla disoccupazione, alla qualità dei servizi pubblici, alle difficoltà abitative e alla distribuzione delle risorse, mentre gli ingenti investimenti destinati alle infrastrutture per i Mondiali di calcio del 2030 sono diventati uno dei termini del dibattito pubblico.

Le elezioni mostrano quindi un sistema partitico capace di produrre spostamenti consistenti al proprio interno, ma solo nell’ambito di un corpo elettorale registrato e partecipante relativamente ristretto rispetto alla popolazione complessivamente in età di voto. Il problema, infatti, non riguarda soltanto quale partito governi, ma il grado di identificazione di ampi settori della società con gli stessi meccanismi della rappresentanza politica.

Anche per questo, l’incarico affidato a El Mansouri contiene due dimensioni differenti. Da una parte costituisce un cambiamento significativo nella rappresentanza di genere ai vertici dell’esecutivo; dall’altra il nuovo governo dovrà confrontarsi con la stessa distanza tra società e istituzioni che l’affluenza del 23 settembre ha reso evidente.

Una sinistra frammentata, ma con un nuovo spazio parlamentare

Il voto offre indicazioni interessanti anche sullo stato della sinistra marocchina.

L’Unione Socialista delle Forze Popolari (Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires, USFP) scende da 34 a 26 seggi, mentre il Partito del Progresso e del Socialismo (Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme, PPS) passa da 22 a 19. Il PPS, in particolare, rappresenta la forza erede del Partito Comunista Marocchino, fondato negli anni Quaranta, passando per il Partito della Liberazione e del Socialismo fino alla costituzione del PPS nel 1974.

Accanto a queste formazioni emerge però l’Alleanza della Sinistra (Alliance de la Gauche), costituita nel giugno 2026 dal Partito Socialista Unificato (Parti Socialiste Unifié, PSU) e dalla Federazione della Sinistra Democratica (Fédération de la Gauche Démocratique, FGD). La coalizione ha conquistato otto seggi, contro i due complessivi detenuti dalle due componenti nella legislatura precedente. I suoi documenti programmatici insistono sulla democratizzazione delle istituzioni, sulla giustizia sociale e sulla riduzione delle disuguaglianze.

Anche l’Alleanza ha scelto una collocazione distinta rispetto al processo di formazione del governo. Il 1° ottobre ha sospeso l’incontro previsto con El Mansouri dopo aver chiesto che le consultazioni si svolgessero in una sede istituzionale neutrale anziché nel quartier generale del PAM.

Il Sahara Occidentale resta un dossier dello Stato

Per quanto riguarda la questione del Sahara Occidentale, essa non è oggetto di una competizione sostanziale tra le principali forze marocchine paragonabile a quella che riguarda politiche fiscali, occupazione o servizi pubblici. La rivendicazione della sovranità marocchina e il piano di autonomia costituiscono un orientamento strategico dello Stato sostenuto trasversalmente dai principali partiti, comprese le formazioni collocate all’opposizione, anche della sinistra radicale.

Ciò significa che l’esito elettorale non modifica la linea seguita da Rabat nei confronti della Repubblica Araba Saharawi Democratica e del Fronte Polisario. La questione rientra infatti precisamente fra quelle nelle quali il ruolo della monarchia e delle strutture permanenti dello Stato prevale sull’alternanza parlamentare.

Il contesto internazionale rafforza questa continuità. Il 16 settembre, appena una settimana prima delle elezioni, Marocco e Israele hanno concordato di elevare le proprie rappresentanze diplomatiche al rango di ambasciate. In una dichiarazione trilaterale con Washington, Stati Uniti e Israele hanno contemporaneamente riaffermato il riconoscimento della sovranità marocchina sul Sahara Occidentale e il sostegno al piano di autonomia proposto da Rabat (con esclusione, quindi, della soluzione indipendentista). Questo conferma il legame strategico fra Rabat, Washington e Tel Aviv, che abbiamo già analizzato rispetto agli Accordi di Abramo, alla crisi di Ceuta e alla progressiva internazionalizzazione della posizione marocchina sul Sahara Occidentale.

Un voto di ricomposizione più che di trasformazione sistemica

Le elezioni del 23 settembre delineano quindi un quadro più articolato di una semplice vittoria del PAM.

L’RNI paga il logoramento di cinque anni di governo e perde oltre un terzo della propria rappresentanza parlamentare; il PAM consolida la propria posizione e conquista il diritto costituzionale di esprimere il capo del governo; il PJD recupera una parte consistente dell’elettorato perduto nel 2021; la sinistra tradizionale arretra mentre una nuova alleanza alla sua sinistra amplia la propria presenza. Soprattutto, l’affluenza del 38,02% segnala che la competizione tra i partiti si svolge in presenza di una marcata distanza di una parte della popolazione dalle istituzioni elettorali.

Il voto modifica, pertanto, gli equilibri nella Camera e nella futura coalizione, ma non modifica automaticamente il centro istituzionale nel quale vengono definite le principali strategie dello Stato marocchino. La Costituzione del 2011, da un lato, ha ampliato il ruolo del capo del governo e del Parlamento rispetto al passato, ma dall’altro mantiene nelle mani del sovrano prerogative decisive sulle grandi direttrici politiche, sulla sicurezza, sulla difesa e sull’integrità territoriale.

Tirando le somme, il nascente governo El Mansouri dovrà confrontarsi con disoccupazione giovanile, disuguaglianze territoriali, servizi pubblici e investimenti legati ai Mondiali del 2030; sul Sahara Occidentale, sui rapporti strategici con gli Stati Uniti e sulla progressiva normalizzazione con Israele, invece, il quadro appare caratterizzato da una continuità molto più marcata.

Just over two years after the U.S. Air Force retired the last of its KC-10A Extender aerial refueling tankers, four of those aircraft may be bound for a new career in North Africa for a mysterious end user.

The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) put out a contracting notice yesterday “solely for information and planning purposes” with the express intent “to identify potential industry sources that possess the capability, expertise, and facilities to execute the regeneration, one-time flight clearance, depot-level return to service, worldwide ferry delivery, in-country Contractor Logistics Support (CLS), and operational/maintenance training for up to four (4) KC-10 Extender aircraft.”

The KC-10s could be “transferred via Excess Defense Articles (EDA) to a partner nation in North Africa,” the notice adds, without naming the country in question.

The Air Force operated KC-10s between 1981 and 2024. TWZ has reached out to the U.S. Air Force, as well as the U.S. State Department, for more information. The State Department directed us to contact the Pentagon.

The EDA program allows for materiel deemed extraneous to U.S. military needs to be transferred to allies and partners either at a reduced cost or as a grant. The foreign nation in question has to pay for those assets to be delivered, as well as refurbishment, if applicable.

It is important to note here that the Extender, as designed, is capable of refueling receivers using either the boom or the probe-and-drogue method. Tankers equipped for the probe-and-drogue method are, by far, more common internationally. We will come back to this later on.

While we don’t know what the North African country might be in line now to receive the quartet of KC-10s, Egypt and Morocco would seem to be the most likely candidates based on their current and planned aircraft inventories. They are also both major U.S. allies.

The Egyptian Air Force currently does not operate any dedicated aerial refueling tankers. The country is in the process of acquiring two new C-130J-30 Hercules aircraft for use as airlifters, as well as tankers, using the probe-and-drogue method. It does already fly C-130s, but none explicitly configured for aerial refueling duties. Egypt also has a very diverse array of fighters that includes U.S.-made F-16 Vipers that can only be refueled in mid-air via boom.

Morocco’s Air Force also flies F-16s and is in the process of acquiring more. The first new-production Block 72 F-16D for the Moroccan Air Force just flew for the first time earlier this week. Morocco does have an organic aerial refueling capability now, but in the form of C-130s equipped to dispense fuel via probe-and-drogue.

As mentioned, the KC-10 was designed to connect with receivers via probe-and-drogue, as well as boom, and could be used to refuel other tactical jets in Egyptian or Moroccan service. As an aside, fighters belonging to both regularly receive foreign tanker support during exercises, as already seen earlier in this story. Just last month, Chinese YY-20 tankers (also sometimes referred to as Y-20Us) notably did just this in an exercise in Egypt.

Whichever country may be in line to receive the four KC-10s, there is a question about the current state of those aircraft. Earlier in this story, we talked about the Extender’s capabilities as designed.

McDonnell Douglas (since absorbed into Boeing) delivered a total of 60 KC-10s to the U.S. Air Force between 1979 and 1987. The Extender was derived from the three-engine DC-10 airliner, the last of which was produced in 1989. The Air Force lost one of its KC-10s in an accident in 1987.

Of the remaining 59 KC-10s, 10 were put up for auction in a non-flyable state last year. For reasons that remain unclear, a single engine had been removed from under one of the wings of each of those aircraft. These Extenders were also among the first to be retired, and their booms had been stripped to be used as spares for the examples that remained in service until 2024. Private aerial refueling contractor Omega Air looks to have subsequently won those auctions. Omega also operates two ex-Dutch KDC-10 tankers, which are broadly similar to the KC-10, as well as another DC-10 converted into a probe-and-drogue-only tanker. The company has several Boeing 707-based tankers, as well.

The condition of the remaining 49 Extenders is unclear. Congress included a provision in the annual defense policy bill, or National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), for the 2026 Fiscal Year that required the Air Force to preserve remaining retired KC-10s, but only stipulated they be maintained “in the same storage condition” they were in as of September 30, 2025. The bill, which was signed into law in December 2025, also made clear that the Air Force could still “dispose” of the aircraft in accordance with existing property management statutes.

Regenerating military aircraft, especially larger ones, back to service can be costly, complex, and time-consuming, even when they are kept in storage in a highly maintained state. In this particular case, acquiring KC-10s via the EDA program, with a very low up-front purchase price, could still be attractive to the right buyer, especially compared to the cost of acquiring new-production tankers.

For a country like Egypt or Morocco that has never operated a boom-equipped tanker, second-hand Extenders could be a valuable entry point to future aerial refueling capabilities, as well. In general, organic aerial refueling capability is an important force multiplier for any air arm.

There is a possibility that KC-10s could be regenerated not as tankers, but as cargo aircraft, though this seems less likely to be the case. Cargo carrying was also an important duty for the Extenders while in U.S. Air Force service, and they still could operate in this role even when returned to service as tankers.

Though the aging KC-10s were getting increasingly more difficult to operate and maintain, the Air Force’s decision to retire them was still controversial. The Extender was a highly flexible tanker that could carry more fuel than the KC-46s that supplanted them. Clearly, there are others still interested in operating them.

It should be stressed that the AFLCMC contracting notice does not present the transfer of the four KC-10s as a done deal. At the same time, it has revealed that one of America’s partners in North Africa could breathe new life into four of these retired tankers.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Retired KC-10 Extender Tankers Could Get A Second Life With North African Mystery Operator appeared first on TWZ.

Kenya wants five of its citizens captured fighting for Russia in Ukraine to be treated as victims of human trafficking rather than prisoners of war, Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi told Kenyan lawmakers on 8 October, Bloomberg reported. Botswana is also seeking a citizen's return.

In 2025, Ukrainian ambassador Ivan Kholostenko called Russia's role in Africa neocolonialism. As Africa Corps troops prop up friendly regimes, the Kremlin is carrying out "a typical colonial practice of resource extraction," taking gold, diamonds, bauxite, and uranium, according to Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence. Russia also uses the continent as a recruiting ground for its war: nearly 500 Africans have died fighting for Russia, Ukraine says.

Five Kenyans in a Ukrainian camp

Kenya is negotiating to bring the five men home, and President William Ruto has raised the matter with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Mudavadi told the Senate. One has been held since November 2025, the others since March and April. The youngest is 23, Bloomberg reported. Kenya's honorary consul found them held in humane conditions at the Zakhid-1 camp, with access to medical care, the government said. Ukraine also holds the remains of four Kenyans.

Victims or fighters for hire

African governments say some of their citizens went to Russia for promised work as drivers, security guards, or cooks and were then forced into military service. The Kenyans "report having been recruited under false promises of employment," Mudavadi said.

"The circumstances of their recruitment and conscription are consistent with trafficking in persons," he said.

Ukraine's POW authority sees most foreign recruits differently. "The main motive for most of these mercenaries is financial gain," Dmytro Usov, secretary of Ukraine's Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, said in November 2025, while stressing that many had ended up in Russia's army through fraud or coercion.

Explore further

Ghana negotiates Ukrainian drone deals as 1,780 Africans fight—and die—in Russia’s ranks

Ukraine holds that prisoners of war go home through exchanges, but Russia has never asked to trade for any foreign fighter except North Koreans, the headquarters said in May, adding it may consider other solutions if diplomats and lawyers find one.

Thousands of foreigners in Russia's ranks

Russia has recruited more than 28,000 foreigners from 135 countries, and more than 5,000 have been killed, a Ukrainian government website cited by Bloomberg says. Ukraine holds at least 213 foreign prisoners of war, not counting Russians and North Koreans, 37 of them African, according to documents Bloomberg saw. Russian dictator Vladimir Putin claimed on 3 September that people are "coming forward voluntarily and signing contracts."

Kenya's government counts 354 citizens linked to the war: 84 killed or missing, 34 hospitalized in Russia, and 62 repatriated. Petitioners told senators that 841 Kenyans remain unaccounted for. Mudavadi said his March visit to Moscow put Kenya on a Russian recruitment "stop list," with no new Kenyans enlisted since.

Some African governments take steps

In August, Botswana stopped eight citizens from joining the Russian military at airports in Botswana, South Africa, and Ethiopia, Bloomberg reported.

Ghana accused Russia of luring its citizens into the war the same month, after Kenya and South Africa. The European Parliament said in March that Russia strips African recruits of their documents. Ukraine, meanwhile, is drafting its first Africa strategy.

In a new escalation against the media, Egyptian authorities have arrested and pressed terrorism charges against six journalists who make up the editorial staff of Matsaddash, the country’s leading fact-checking platform. Since their arrest in late September, some of them have allegedly been tortured, the outlet and its legal team said. Human rights groups and press freedom advocates described the events as unprecedented and as an example of the limits on information in Egypt.

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The African Union (AU) on Wednesday launched a continental credit rating agency aimed at providing risk assessments that it says will be more credible and realistic than those produced by the major international rating agencies. The goal is to lower Africa’s borrowing costs and support the continent’s development and industrialization. To that end, the African Credit Rating Agency (AfCRA), which will be headquartered in Port Louis, the capital of Mauritius, will operate as a private and independent entity, with no ownership stake held by the AU or any government.

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John Roberts, the discreet justice who has presided over the United States Supreme Court for two decades, was upset some time ago that people believed the nation’s highest court was making “political decisions.” In several polls, Americans said they were worried not only about how much power the court had amassed but also about all the rulings that have ended up bolstering Donald Trump and his control over the federal government.

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A new war of words has broken out between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). It comes as renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia pulls the country’s long-running disputes with its neighbors back into the open.

Ethiopia’s government has blamed neighboring states for the escalating conflict in the north. The government has accused Eritrea, Sudan, and Egypt of backing armed opposition groups, raising fears that the conflict could expand regionally. Birhanu Jula, Ethiopia’s army chief, stated that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front has clearly needed outside support and supplies from Egypt, Sudan, and other foreign powers to sustain its campaign. 

Cairo rejected the claim. Foreign Ministry spokesman Nader Zaki said Egypt’s foreign policy rests on respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of other states and on staying out of their internal affairs, adding that claims to the contrary had no basis in fact. 

Tension over Ethiopia minister’s remarks

The dispute quickly returned to the Nile. On Saturday, Ethiopia’s minister of Water and Energy, Habtamu Itefa, published a social media post, later deleted, comparing the GERD to Egypt’s Aswan High Dam. “Before criticizing Ethiopia, Egypt should explain why it built the Aswan High Dam without Ethiopian consent.”

Cairo responded the same day. A source at the Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation called the post “shameful” and said it reflected political confusion.

“Responding to such nonsense and the political confusion reflected in the post would be nothing more than a waste of time,” the source said. The source called the post “a desperate attempt to divert attention from the core dispute: Ethiopia’s continued unilateral actions over its illegal dam, which violate international law.”

Habtamu made the same argument. He said it was shameful to hear Egyptian politicians demand that Ethiopia obtain their consent for dams that do no significant harm, and argued that Egypt had not consulted Ethiopia when it built Aswan. He described Cairo’s insistence on prior consent as an outdated approach rooted in colonial-era arrangements. 

The $5 billion GERD sits on the Blue Nile, about 14 kilometers from the Sudanese border. It is 1.8 kilometers wide and 145 meters tall, with a design capacity of 5,150 megawatts. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed inaugurated it on September 9, 2025. Egypt and Sudan, the downstream states, have long demanded a legally binding agreement on how it is filled and operated. The United States has also stepped back, in a January 2026 letter to President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, US President Donald Trump offered to restart US-led mediation between Egypt and Ethiopia on Nile water-sharing. 

The El Alamein declaration

The leaders of Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia met in El Alamein and issued a joint declaration covering both the Red Sea and the Nile, and among other things. On the question of the Red Sea, the four states affirmed “the principle of freedom of navigation and that the governance of the Red Sea is the exclusive responsibility of the littoral states.” 

Regarding the Nile, the declaration emphasized “the importance of respecting international law regarding transboundary rivers including the Nile River particularly the principle of ‘no harm’ and the obligation to cooperate through prior notification, consultation, and consensus.” It also categorically rejected “any unilateral measures that harm the existing water uses of the two downstream Nile states.” The four countries pledged to keep strengthening “consultation and coordination among the four countries and other sisterly African nations.”

“Realities cannot be altered by political rhetoric”

Ethiopia issued its own statement in response to the El Alamein declaration, arguing, “Ethiopia is the source of the Abay River, commonly known as the Blue Nile. Virtually all of the Blue Nile originates in the Ethiopian highlands, and the Abay contributes about 85% of the Nile River’s total flow. Any discussion concerning the utilization and management of the Abay River should be informed by these fundamental realities.”

Insisting that, “Despite changes in political boundaries over time, Ethiopia remains closely connected to the Red Sea, with its nearest border lying barely 30 miles from the coast. Accordingly, any serious discussion of regional maritime affairs and security architecture must account for Ethiopia’s legitimate interests and its enduring connection to the Red Sea.”

It added, “These geographic and historical realities cannot be altered by political rhetoric, coercive measures, or acts of destabilization. Actions taken through proxies or acts of aggression will not change the facts on the ground, nor will they diminish Ethiopia’s legitimate interests, role, and responsibilities in the region.”

Reaffirming that it “stands ready to defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and core national interests,” Ethiopia urged regional actors to pursue “constructive dialogue, partnership, and adherence to the principles of good neighborliness rather than confrontation and zero-sum approaches.”

With fighting is spreading in Ethiopia’s north and rival blocs are forming along the Red Sea, the Nile dispute could be tied into a wider regional confrontation.

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The first-ever F-16 Block 72 has taken to the air, marking a major milestone for the program and for Morocco’s long-running effort to field what Lockheed Martin describes as the most advanced version of the Viper.

The first of the jets for the Royal Moroccan Air Force (RMAF), a two-seat F-16D, completed its maiden flight at Lockheed Martin’s facility in Greenville, South Carolina, the company announced today. The aircraft will now proceed through flight testing ahead of its delivery to Morocco.

Interestingly, one of the photos of the jet published by Lockheed Martin shows the pilot in the front cockpit wearing a Digital Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (D-JHMCS). This advanced helmet is not often seen worn by F-16 pilots and it is not clear if it has been ordered by Morocco.

Regardless, Morocco was the first customer to select the Block 72 configuration when the U.S. government approved its purchase in March 2019.

At that time, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency said Morocco was seeking 25 F-16C/D Block 72 aircraft in a package estimated at $3.787 billion. The proposed aircraft were to be equipped with the AN/APG-83 Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR), an active electronically scanned array type, new mission computers, Link 16 Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems, modernized navigation systems, helmet-mounted cueing systems, and a range of air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons.

The distinction between the Block 70 and Block 72 is the engine. The Block 70 uses General Electric’s F110-GE-129, while the Block 72 uses Pratt & Whitney’s F100-PW-229, providing fractionally more power. The two configurations otherwise share the same major avionics and systems modernization package.

The F-16 began life as a Pratt & Whitney-powered fighter, with the F100 selected to power the original F-16A/B. But reliability and maintainability problems with early F100s prompted the U.S. Air Force to launch its Alternate Fighter Engine competition in the 1980s, leading General Electric to develop the F110 as an alternative. The resulting “Great Engine War” established two competing F-16 engine families, with Pratt & Whitney’s F100 and GE’s F110 ultimately becoming the principal powerplants for later F-16C/Ds. Although U.S. procurement eventually became heavily concentrated on the GE-powered F-16, Pratt & Whitney continued to supply F100-powered aircraft to international customers.

For Morocco, the choice of the Block 72 is based on ensuring as much fleet commonality as possible. The RMAF already operates F-16C/D Block 52+ aircraft powered by F100 engines, making the new aircraft a natural fit within its existing support infrastructure.

Morocco is also upgrading its existing F-16 fleet to the F-16V configuration, which is broadly similar to the new-build Block 70/72 standard.

That will eventually provide the RMAF with a larger fleet centered around a common, substantially modernized F-16 standard.

A separate notification in March 2019 covered the upgrade of Morocco’s existing 23 F-16C/D Block 52+ aircraft to the F-16V standard.

Morocco’s new and upgraded F-16s could also provide a significant boost to combined operations with its other international partners. In recent years, Moroccan F-16s participated in the campaign against ISIS, while the country has also deployed the aircraft on missions against Houthi rebels as part of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in Yemen. In 2015, a Moroccan F-16 crashed in Yemen. Although the Houthis claimed they had shot down the aircraft, Moroccan authorities attributed the loss to a technical malfunction.

Outside of combat operations, the RMAF also frequently takes part in exercises with its allies, including the African Lion series, the largest annual, multinational joint military exercise led by U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and partner nations.

Meanwhile, the new-build Moroccan aircraft also arrives at an interesting point in the F-16 program.

The Block 70/72 has attracted customers across Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere, with Bahrain, Bulgaria, Jordan, Peru, the Philippines, Slovakia, Taiwan, and Turkey also having selected the latest-generation Viper configuration. So far, only Block 70s have been ordered, although tbe Block 72 has been offered to some customers and potential customers. There is also apparent U.S. Air Force interest in a version of the Block 70 tailored for its specific needs and referred to by the manufacturer as the F-16G.

Morocco’s position as the Block 72 launch customer means the aircraft now flying is effectively the prototype-standard production aircraft for an export configuration that other countries can now buy.

The Moroccan F-16 program is also increasingly tied to a broader effort to develop the country’s military-industrial and sustainment infrastructure.

Lockheed Martin says it is working with Moroccan industry, including Maintenance Aero Maroc, on an upcoming MRO facility at Benslimane. The more than 86,000-square-foot facility is intended initially to support heavy maintenance and modernization of C-130 Hercules aircraft, with plans to expand into additional platforms, including the F-16.

That could eventually give Morocco a greater role in sustaining its own expanding fleet and potentially supporting other aircraft in the region.

The F-16 program itself is part of a much broader U.S.-Moroccan defense relationship that dates back more than five decades. The Royal Moroccan Armed Forces now operate a range of U.S.-supplied systems, while Morocco is also set to receive HIMARS and has expanded its rotary-wing capabilities with AH-64E Apache attack helicopters.

For the RMAF, however, the F-16 remains central to its combat-aircraft modernization and, once it arrives, it will be the spearhead of the country’s fighter fleet.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post First F-16 Block 72 Has Flown appeared first on TWZ.

The death of a worker at a plague research laboratory in Irkutsk, Russia, has triggered a public health emergency in the region. Authorities have imposed restrictions on hospital access and about 200 contacts are under surveillance. But much remains unknown. Firstly, whether the researcher died as a result of an infection acquired at her workplace — a claim denied by authorities but circulating on Telegram channels and in local media. This is what is known (and not known) so far.

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