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Finland’s Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen has called on the European Union to stop issuing tourist visas to Russian citizens until Russia ends its war against Ukraine, urging the bloc to adopt a unified policy. Her call comes as the EU discusses broader restrictions on Russian diplomats, tourists, and former combatants.
Russia has intensified its hybrid campaign across Europe in recent months, with suspected sabotage, arson attacks, and other covert operations targeting infrastructure and undermining security. European officials have increasingly called for a coordinated response, arguing that tighter controls on Russian diplomats, travel, and former combatants could help reduce security risks and limit opportunities for Russian intelligence operations.
In a statement published on 12 October, Finland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs said Valtonen was calling on the European Commission to introduce stricter guidelines for processing Russian visa applications and propose changes to EU legislation needed to implement a complete ban on tourist visas.
“As long as Russia continues its invasion, Russian citizens should not be issued tourist visas,” Valtonen said. “It is not right that Russians can travel to Europe to enjoy the way of life and freedoms here while their country bombs the homes of Ukrainians.”
Finland banned visas for non-essential travel by Russian citizens in 2022. Valtonen said the same restriction should now be adopted at the EU level.
The Finnish minister has invited other EU member states to join a joint letter to the European Commission. Beyond a complete ban on tourist visas, the letter proposes barring Schengen visas for people in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle, restricting visas for Russian athletes, and enforcing an EU-agreed visa ban on former Russian combatants.
We must stop issuing tourist visas for Russian citizens across the EU.
— Elina Valtonen (@elinavaltonen) October 12, 2026
I have invited other EU Member States to join a letter addressed to the European Commission. I am calling for a complete EU ban on Russian tourist visas for as long as Russia continues its war of aggression.…
The proposal comes as EU foreign ministers discuss additional measures to counter Russian hybrid threats. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said after a meeting of the bloc’s foreign ministers in Luxembourg on 12 October that the EU was considering reducing the number of tourist visas issued to Russians, restricting Russian diplomats’ movements within the bloc, and accelerating entry bans for former Russian combatants, Radio Svoboda reported.
Kallas said the EU needed a comprehensive response to Russian hybrid threats, including new sanctions, stronger enforcement of existing restrictions, action against Russia’s shadow fleet, accountability for hybrid attacks, and improved intelligence sharing.
One proposal would require Russian diplomats to obtain advance permission before traveling to other EU member states, rather than simply notifying authorities of their trips.
Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Marcin Bosacki said tighter rules were necessary because some acts of sabotage and subversion were coordinated, at least in part, through Russian diplomatic missions.
Kallas said the European External Action Service and European Commission would also prepare proposals for further isolating Russia in international sport. She argued that sport and culture should not be used to whitewash Russian aggression.
Several EU countries have pushed to reduce tourist visas for Russian citizens. In June, a group of member states jointly called for fewer visas, according to DW. The Finnish ministry said Schengen countries issued nearly 500,000 tourist visas to Russian citizens in 2025.
Estonia has also proposed measures to bar former Russian military personnel who fought against Ukraine from entering the EU. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna warned that large numbers of Russian veterans could try to enter Europe after the war, potentially with support from Russian intelligence services.
The European Commission has supported including a mechanism targeting former combatants in the EU’s 21st sanctions package, and officials are working on how to implement it.
However, EU countries remain divided over the scope of visa restrictions. France and Italy have previously opposed a blanket isolation of Russian tourists. Member states are also debating how to prevent former Russian combatants from entering the bloc without restricting entry for military deserters or opponents of the war.
No timeline has been announced for the proposed restrictions on Russian tourists and diplomats. The measures remain under discussion and have not been adopted as a bloc-wide ban.
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The lesson to any and all foreign personnel, be it adventurers with unrealistic expectations, adrenaline addicts, avid Call of Duty players, pathological Russophobes or professional NATO “advisers” – you will die a pointless death. Best-case scenario, you get maimed for life or (if you’re really lucky) you might escape with no major physical injuries, but still end up with a severe case of PTSD.
Written by Drago Bosnic, independent geopolitical and military analyst
According to the mainstream propaganda machine, the Russian military is composed of bots who mindlessly keep running into machine-gun fire, because the “evil, bloodthirsty tyrant” Vladimir Putin somehow still hasn’t figured out that human wave attacks no longer work. Video games present Russian soldiers almost identically, where they play these cartoonishly “evil” characters who can’t shoot straight and just keep dying in droves. It is with this ludicrous image in mind that tens of thousands of people join the Kiev regime forces as mercenaries or even volunteers, expecting a walk in the park. Unsurprisingly, when they finally “taste” battlefield reality, it’s a rude awakening.
Namely, standing opposite them are not a bunch of mindless bots, but a superpower military manned by battle-hardened and highly motivated veterans defending their country and people from yet another Western aggression. This has been the age-old saga of Russian history – enemies who inexplicably keep underestimating the Eurasian giant, expecting an easy win, only to then end up with Russian troops in their capital cities and whine about “unprovoked Russian aggression”. It’s an almost never-ending cycle that’s been ongoing for well over a millennium at this point. If the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results, the political West won the first prize in it long ago.
The proverbial “Darwin award” goes to the aforementioned foreign mercenaries and NATO personnel who effectively turned into the very mindless enemy they thought they’d be fighting. Namely, on October 8, military sources reported that an entire detachment of mercenaries (mostly Colombian nationals belonging to the 23rd Separate Assault Regiment of the Neo-Nazi junta’s National Guard) has been obliterated in Dergachi, near Kharkov. The unit was just transferred to the area from an assembly point in Kiev, where they were tracked by increasingly effective Russian ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) assets. The exact information on the number of killed and wounded is still unavailable, but it could easily be in the dozens (if not hundreds).
Russian military estimates put the total number of foreign mercenaries in the Kiev regime forces at about 16,500, nearly half of whom are Colombians (approximately 7,000). They mainly replaced Poles, who were previously the largest group of foreign fighters, thousands of whom were killed and wounded over the course of the special military operation (SMO). Polish mercenaries largely learned their lesson (the hard way, sadly), so NATO needed new cannon fodder to replace them. Unfortunately, Colombians emerged as the most suitable candidates. Back in March, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published an updated report on foreign mercenaries its forces eliminated in NATO-occupied Ukraine in 2025.
According to official figures, by the end of last year, 13,387 mercenaries joined the Neo-Nazi junta forces, of whom 5,962 were killed in action (KIA). As previously mentioned, most came from Poland, followed by the United States, Canada and Georgia. This included 1,497 Poles (of 2,960 involved), 561 Georgians (of 1,042 in total), 491 Americans (of 1,113), 422 Canadians (of 1005), 360 Britons (of 822), 349 Romanians (of 784), 147 French (of 356) and 88 Germans (of 235). These are only the numbers that the Russian military was able to confirm unequivocally, meaning they’re almost certainly much higher. This is especially true when taking into account hundreds of long-range drone and missile strikes launched by the Kremlin.
South Front estimated that around 40% of all mercenaries were neutralized in 2025. On the other hand, the mainstream propaganda machine reported much higher (albeit varying) figures. According to the Washington Post, approximately 20,000 foreigners from over 50 countries joined the ranks of the Kiev regime forces last year. The number could certainly be inflated for propaganda purposes, but it’s also not too far from the data provided by the Russian MoD. Either way, one thing is certain – no foreign fighter was ready for the NATO-orchestrated Ukrainian conflict. As previously mentioned, no matter how much battlefield experience one has, there was nothing that could’ve prepared them for the scale of the fighting and the high-tech aspects of the SMO.
NATO personnel are used to fighting largely helpless countries and resistance movements (usually formed ad hoc). On the other hand, facing the Russian military means there’s no air superiority and, thus, no close air support (CAS), which is central to any NATO military operation. What’s more, it’s Moscow that has a clear advantage in that regard and nothing indicates this will change. Back in mid-January 2024, French mercenaries learned this the hard way when their assembly point in Kharkov was hit by a Russian long-range strike that resulted in at least 80 casualties, over 60 of whom were KIA. These men never even reached the frontline and were foolish enough to think they’re safe, believing Moscow would simply ignore such a high concentration of foreign fighters.
And yet, the situation in the trenches is not much better either. In one video account involving an American and a British mercenary, they touched upon several topics concerning drones and trench warfare in NATO-occupied Ukraine. Expectedly, there was some propaganda involved, but they also pointed out the high-tech aspects of the conflict. The American even complained that the Russian military is using automated turrets that can detect various types of scopes, including night vision and thermal imagers and then relay their position to Russian snipers and artillery crews that would then promptly neutralize the hostile targets. Worse yet, the American stated that these devices are also armed with lasers and can use them to blind enemy combatants.
Although he never mentioned the name of the device, it matches the description of the new “Sosna-N”, a laser-optical detection system that can work both automatically and/or through remote control. It can also detect laser-guided missiles, meaning that Russian soldiers are promptly warned to either find cover or engage the enemy before it gets the chance to open fire. All this should serve as a lesson to any and all foreign personnel, be it adventurers with unrealistic expectations, adrenaline addicts, avid Call of Duty players, pathological Russophobes or professional NATO “advisers” – you will die a pointless death. Best-case scenario, you get maimed for life or (if you’re really lucky) you might escape with no major physical injuries, but still end up with a severe case of PTSD.
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As he charges head first into the Brexit debate, Andy Burnham resembles no one so much as Donald Trump, says Prof James Alexander: cause a stir via wild assertions, the better to give cover to what you really want to do.
The post Brexit Does Not Mean Brexit appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
European regions and cities are calling on the EU to give millions of displaced Ukrainians legal certainty and a genuine choice between building a future in Europe and returning home safely. Their appeal comes as Russian attacks on Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure intensify ahead of what is expected to be another harsh winter for the war-torn nation.
Temporary protection for displaced Ukrainians was set to end in March 2028. Eurostat data from July shows that almost 4,5 million non-EU citizens who fled Ukraine were benefiting from the mechanism, which was established shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.
“Temporary protection was the right emergency response, but it cannot be the long-term answer,” said Antje Grotheer, Chair of the European Committee of the Regions’ (CoR) Working Group on Ukraine. “People forced to flee Ukraine because of Russia’s war need certainty about their future,” the President of the Bremen State Parliament added.
An opinion drafted by Grotheer and adopted by CoR members on Tuesday calls for timely, accessible information on legal options beyond temporary protection so that people can make informed decisions.
It notes that decisions on legal status are taken mainly at EU and national level, while their practical consequences are managed in cities and regions. Local authorities need predictable funding and administrative capacity to keep public services running and respond to housing pressures, the CoR said.
Grotheer demanded that cities and regions are given a voice in shaping the transition after the EU’s temporary protection runs out.
The opinion sets out three parallel priorities: supporting the inclusion of displaced Ukrainians in European communities, investing in their education and skills for the benefit of host societies and Ukraine’s recovery, and enabling voluntary, informed and safe return when conditions allow.
“It’s time now to realise that we should not only treat Ukrainians as vulnerable refugees; we should treat them as our partners,” said Ylva Johansson, EU Special Envoy for Ukrainians in the EU. “Their future is part of Ukraine’s future, and that future is in the European Union,” she added.
“The millions of Ukrainians currently living outside the borders of our country are a huge human potential that Ukraine cannot afford to lose,” said Tetiana Yehorova-Lutsenko, President of the Ukrainian Association of District and Regional Councils (UAROR) and Chair of Kharkiv Regional Council.
The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) reported that 49 percent of Ukrainian refugees – down from 61 percent in 2024 – have expressed hopes or intentions to return one day, with security, housing and essential services among the key conditions.
Protecting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has been a central part of the EU’s support since 2022. In a letter to CoR members, President Kata Tüttő and Grotheer warn that the attacks risk depriving communities of basic living conditions. The letter recalls that the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had described the attacks as “a strategy of terror”.
“Cities and regions must act before the arrival of the cold further aggravates the already difficult humanitarian situation,” the letter warned. It said regions and cities can deliver support in the form of energy equipment, used municipal vehicles, medical supplies or IT equipment.
This story was produced by the European Newsroom (enr) in cooperation with the European Committee of the Regions (CoR). The editorial responsibility lies with the enr.
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The European Union is heading towards a potentially bruising institutional confrontation over its next long-term budget, after senior Members of the European Parliament rejected proposals from the Irish Presidency of the Council to reduce the European Commission’s spending plans by eight per cent.
The dispute concerns the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2028–2034, which will determine not merely how much Brussels spends, but the extent to which Europe can deliver on its increasingly ambitious political, economic and security objectives.
At stake is a fundamental question: can the European Union realistically aspire to become a more competitive, strategically independent global power while its member states resist providing the financial resources necessary to achieve those ambitions?
In a statement published on 10th October, Parliament’s principal budget negotiators, Siegfried Mureșan of the European People’s Party and Carla Tavares of the Socialists and Democrats, firmly rejected the Irish negotiating framework.
They were joined by Danuše Nerudová and Sandra Gómez López, Parliament’s co-rapporteurs responsible for developing new sources of EU revenue.
Their objections centre on the proposed reduction of approximately €141 billion from the Commission’s original spending plans.
Mureșan warned that the reductions would undermine Europe’s ability to respond to growing demands for defence, economic competitiveness and security.
He also highlighted the erosion of the EU budget’s purchasing power, which Parliament estimates has declined by approximately ten per cent because of inflation.
The implication is uncomfortable for national governments: maintaining apparently substantial expenditure figures does not necessarily translate into maintaining Europe’s capacity to act.
Ireland, currently holding the rotating Council Presidency, has attempted to reconcile two increasingly contradictory political demands.
On one side stand governments seeking greater investment in defence, technological innovation, economic resilience and geopolitical influence.
On the other are national finance ministries confronting constrained public finances, mounting borrowing costs and electorates increasingly resistant to additional expenditure.
The Irish Presidency’s proposal envisages approximately €1.62 trillion in commitments, expressed in 2025 prices, representing a substantial increase over the existing seven-year framework.
Dublin argues that its negotiating position offers an ambitious but financially realistic compromise, preserving traditional agricultural and cohesion spending while accommodating emerging priorities.
Yet the European Parliament remains unconvinced.
Particularly contentious are proposed reductions of 12.8 per cent in competitiveness expenditure and 17.4 per cent in external action compared with the Commission’s plans.
These are precisely the areas in which Brussels has repeatedly promised greater international influence.
The timing could scarcely be more awkward. Russia’s continuing aggression against Ukraine has exposed Europe’s dependence on American military capabilities, while mounting geopolitical uncertainty has reinforced demands for greater European strategic autonomy.
Meanwhile, competition from China and the United States is placing European industries under unprecedented pressure.
Brussels regularly speaks of technological sovereignty, stronger defence industries and reduced dependence on external suppliers, however, those objectives require sustained investment.
Cutting expenditure intended to strengthen competitiveness while simultaneously demanding that European companies compete more effectively internationally risks becoming an exercise in political contradiction.
Nevertheless, Parliament’s position deserves scrutiny too. Greater expenditure does not automatically produce better outcomes. Europe’s problems with fragmented defence procurement, regulatory complexity and slow implementation cannot simply be resolved by increasing budget allocations.
A credible financial settlement must therefore combine sufficient resources with demonstrably improved efficiency and accountability.
Perhaps the most consequential disagreement concerns how the Union should finance its expenditure.
Parliament has repeatedly argued that the EU must develop additional independent revenue streams rather than relying excessively on contributions from national governments.
Its proposals include levies associated with digital services, online gambling and cryptocurrency capital gains. MEPs believe these measures could generate approximately €30 billion beyond the additional revenue already envisaged by the Commission.
The Irish Presidency has advanced a revenue package that it estimates could eventually raise around €55 billion annually, but agreement among member states remains elusive.
This disagreement exposes an enduring weakness in European integration.
Governments frequently demand collective European action while remaining reluctant to surrender control over the financial mechanisms necessary to support it.
The institutional arithmetic makes Parliament’s opposition particularly significant. Although member states must unanimously approve the long-term financial framework, the European Parliament must also provide its consent by an absolute majority of MEPs. Consequently, national governments cannot simply impose a settlement over parliamentary objections.
Equally, the European Parliament cannot compel governments to finance its preferred spending programme. Both institutions therefore possess considerable negotiating leverage, raising the possibility of prolonged political deadlock.
The forthcoming European Council discussions on 15–16th October will provide an important indication of whether governments are prepared to reconsider their positions.
Ultimately, this dispute extends far beyond accounting. The European Union faces an increasingly hostile strategic environment, persistent economic challenges and growing demands for collective action.
Yet its institutional ambitions continue to outpace agreement on the financial commitments required to fulfil them.
Parliament is justified in questioning whether reducing investment in competitiveness and security represents prudent financial management or potentially damaging short-termism. National governments, however, are equally entitled to demand evidence that additional European expenditure will produce measurable benefits.
The solution cannot be unlimited spending, nor can it be indiscriminate austerity. Europe requires a budget that reflects its strategic responsibilities, backed by rigorous financial discipline and transparent political priorities.
Without such a settlement, the Union risks discovering that its greatest obstacle to becoming a serious geopolitical actor is not opposition from Washington, Moscow or Beijing, but its own inability to agree on the price of its ambitions.
Brussels (Brussels Morning Newspaper) October 12, 2026 – The European Union has formally established a new support and training mission to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces and internal security agencies. Approved by EU foreign ministers in Brussels, the … Read more
On 9 October, three weeks after signing the first major Russia oil sanctions in two years, Donald Trump agreed with Vladimir Putin to bring Russian diesel back to world markets. The US Treasury suspended its sanctions on that trade until April 2027 the same day. In the two days before, Russian strikes had killed more than 80 Ukrainian civilians.
Europe answered on 12 October with its largest sanctions package yet: nearly 1,600 new listings, almost all in Russia’s military-industrial complex. Its core, says Ukraine’s sanctions envoy Vladyslav Vlasiuk, is Russia’s missile program and the electronics inside it, from capacitors to semiconductors. Six in ten listings came from Ukrainian proposals, and Brussels adopted them within weeks.
That is the right reflex, and proof that Europe can move fast when it chooses. But the package names companies and people one by one. On the measures that cut whole sectors, the ones that would hurt Moscow most, Europe still waits for Washington.
It waits for Trump to decide whether to enforce the Graham Act he signed in September. It waits for him to decide whether to lean on Hungary and Slovakia or let them off. It waits for the G7 to rule on tanker services before touching its own ships. Europe keeps asking the Trump administration to decide things it is perfectly able to decide itself.
If the EU is serious about ending a war on its own continent, it does not need a miracle from Washington. It needs to pull the levers already in its hands. Here they are.
1. Fix export-control enforcement on dual-use goods. It is unacceptable that the newest Russian drones and missiles contain not only Chinese parts but American and European ones. The "War and Sanctions" portal logs what turns up. The EU should find and close the enforcement gaps in its own dual-use export law. Choking the supply to Russia's war industry serves Ukraine and Europe alike.
2. Force Hungary and Slovakia off Russian oil. The EU banned Russian oil imports in 2022, with temporary exemptions for landlocked states: Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary. Czechia has since diversified and dropped Russian oil entirely. Slovakia and Hungary can do the same; the Czech case proves it is a question of will, not feasibility. Ending the exemptions would also make good on REPowerEU's central promise, phasing out Russian energy. The gas-import ban is already decided. Oil is the gap that remains.
3. Close the Greek and Maltese tanker loophole. Up to 40% of Russia's seaborne oil travels on European tankers, Greek and Maltese. The EU has banned maritime services for Russian oil since 2022, with one exception: cargoes sold below the price cap. This spring the Council discussed scrapping that exception, which would have meant a full ban, then made any change conditional on coordination with the G7. Once again, Europe is asking Washington to act for it. The EU should overcome Greek and Maltese resistance and ban every maritime service for Russian oil: transport, insurance, and the rest.
4. Stop the shadow fleet in European waters. Russia ships oil to India, China, and Türkiye through a shadow fleet of aging, often uninsured tankers. Europe can check their insurance and turn away any that lack EU or G7 cover, especially in the North Sea and the Baltic, where any spill would be an ecological disaster, and an uninsured operator would not pay for it.
Patrols in territorial waters and exclusive economic zones have to be reinforced. Russia also uses these ships for espionage, sabotage, and damage to undersea infrastructure. Strengthen NATO's Baltic Sentry. Consider adding a maritime operation by the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force or the Coalition of the Willing across the North and Baltic Seas and the Skagerrak, before the Danish straits. If the Russian Baltic Fleet escalates, Europe should be ready for confrontation. Moscow should hear that it is not feared and that it will be stopped. At sea, it is weaker than even NATO's Baltic Sea states alone, never mind NATO's European members together.
5. Scrap the Lingen nuclear-fuel deal. In July, Lower Saxony approved a plan for the French state company Framatome to make nuclear fuel jointly with Rosatom, Russia's builder of nuclear weapons, at Lingen. It is dressed up as serving REPowerEU, since the venture lets Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria buy fuel from a Franco-Russian joint operation instead of straight from Rosatom.
This is nonsense. Ukraine was once wholly dependent on Russian nuclear fuel and diversified fast; Finland and Czechia have done the same. Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria can follow. Stretching the dependence out and hiding it behind a French partner is the opposite of what REPowerEU is for. Lower Saxony's own environment minister called the deal "grundfalsch," fundamentally wrong.
6. Build a Ukraine Fund from frozen Russian assets. Supporting Ukraine will cost more next year, not less, so it is time to get serious about Russia's frozen assets. Not confiscation, which European capitals still resist, and not a simple transfer to Kyiv, which amounts to the same thing, but a dedicated EU-run Ukraine Fund that could invest these assets and use them better than they are used now. ICUV has set it all out in a policy paper.
7. Adopt the Graham-bill sanctions. Sanction every Russian state company (majority or controlling state stake) and every Russian oligarch who has not taken a public anti-war stand. Forbes counts 155 Russian billionaires.
8. Cut every Russian and Belarusian bank off SWIFT. Russia still has 301 operating banks, yet only 103 Russian banks and financial institutions sit under the EU's transaction ban, and just a handful of Belarusian ones. Gazprombank, which the US Treasury says pays Russia's soldiers, is still not on the EU list. Stop listing banks one by one: disconnect the entire Russian and Belarusian banking systems and put them under a full transaction ban, with narrow exceptions for food, medicine, and humanitarian trade.
9. End land transit to and from Russia, Kaliningrad included. Stop all overland freight, rail and road, between the EU and Russia. Baltic ports should carry no Russian trade at all, not just grain. Halt the gas transit to Kaliningrad through Lithuania's pipelines, too; let it arrive by sea, where Russia already runs an LNG terminal. Winters are mild now, so the real effect is mostly higher costs, and even that is worth doing.
10. Ban visas for Russian (ex-)servicemen and their families. The EU's 21st sanctions package laid the legal basis in July and then set no start date. Bring it into force, and extend it to the families.
11. Launch the Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression and the Claims Commission. Speed up the creation of, and accession to, the tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, and the convention establishing a Claims Commission.
Europe cannot escape this burden. A Russian victory, even a partial one such as a peace on Moscow's terms, would cost it far more than helping Ukraine to a partial victory of its own, a peace along the line of contact. If Europe wants the war to end, it has to lead, alongside Ukraine, instead of waiting on a miracle from the Trump administration. The tools are already in its hands.
Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.
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Andy Burnham will say that failing to pursue a closer relationship with the EU would be a "dereliction of duty" in a major Commons address today, following his comments blaming Russia for interfering in the Brexit vote.
The post Burnham to Say it’s His “Duty” to Pursue Closer EU Ties appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
I write from Dubrovnik, a historic and heavily touristed city on Croatia’s Adriatic coast. Visiting here and other parts of Croatia and its next-door neighbor Slovenia, I’m reminded that the Balkan countries used to be part of a bigger entity called Yugoslavia. Before that, some of the Yugoslavian countries were part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, […]
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