Il 15 e 16 ottobre è in calendario la riunione del Consiglio europeo e la linea di Giorgia Meloni è manifesta: “Agire subito in modo coordinato”, in primis per calmierare i costi dell’energia al fine di dare ossigeno a famiglie e imprese.

In vista dell’appuntamento cruciale, la presidente del Consiglio aveva già parlato al Senato e alla Camera puntando su competitività dell’Unione europea, sul caro energia e sull’accordo sul gas Trump-Putin.

La piattaforma comune europea

Anche l’Italia lavora alla creazione di una piattaforma comune con gli Amici della Coesione, finalizzata ad affrontare il negoziato sul bilancio pluriennale dell’Ue.

I 17 Amici della Coesione sono i capi di Stato e di governo di un gruppo di Paesi Ue uniti per difendere i finanziamenti destinati alla Politica di coesione e all’Agricoltura nel prossimo bilancio pluriennale.

Nella piattaforma sono inseriti i punti cruciali dell’accordo: nessun nuovo taglio al bilancio, sostegno alla Pac, sostegno alla Coesione (e non solo nei finanziamenti ma anche nelle regole di applicazione) no ai rebates, inserimento di risorse proprie ed equilibrate.

Il piano di Meloni per il Consiglio europeo

Così ha scritto su X la premier Meloni, in vista del Consiglio europeo, citando nell’incipit del suo messaggio il presidente della Romania:

Insieme a Nicușor Dan ho riunito i Capi di Stato e di Governo del gruppo degli Amici della Coesione in vista dell’#EUCO. Abbiamo deciso di restare uniti nel negoziato sul prossimo bilancio UE attorno a quattro priorità:

Questi i quattro punti citati:

1. risorse sufficienti per affrontare tutte le priorità comuni;
2. salvaguardare Coesione e Agricoltura sia sul piano delle risorse sia su quello delle regole di finanziamento;
3. contribuzioni eque da parte degli Stati membri;
4. no agli sconti sui contributi nazionali.

La conclusione:

Continueremo a lavorare insieme perché queste priorità siano riflesse nell’accordo finale!

Costo dell’energia e competitività

Il giorno precedente, il primo tema affrontato da Giorgia Meloni nella comunicazione al Senato in vista del Consiglio Europeo era stato quello del costo dell’energia e del suo peso sull’economia.

Aveva spiegato che:

La questione che oggi pesa più di tutto sulla nostra economia e sulla competitività delle imprese è il costo dell’energia. Nessuno può rispondere efficacemente da solo e per questo serve una risposta coordinata e rapida.

L’annuncio:

• proposte per correggere il sistema ETS, perché il prezzo della CO2 rifletta l’economia reale e non le logiche della finanza;
• rinvio dell’ETS2, che dal 2028 scaricherebbe nuovi costi su famiglie e imprese;
• un meccanismo che consenta di contenere il prezzo del gas utilizzato per produrre energia elettrica;
• semplificazione normativa e meno oneri amministrativi con l’Agenda “One Europe, One Market”.

Nel discorso di Meloni si è puntato al decreto Bollette. Poi anche al “successo italiano” del rinvio della stretta sul metano.

Bilancio Ue

Sul bilancio Ue, ovvero il prossimo Quadro finanziario pluriennale, Meloni aveva annunciato che non firmerà l’accordo per rispettare una data, ma “quando sarà giusto per l’Italia”.

I paletti:

• no a un bilancio che ridimensioni la PAC;
• ragionare su un rimborso graduale per il Next Generation EU;
• più margine per misure come il taglio dell’Irpef.

Ucraina e Russia

Su Ucraina e Russia, la premier aveva criticato l’Europa:

Offre un’immagine di sé infantile ed è l’unico vero regalo che possiamo fare a Mosca, e di regali a Mosca di questi tempi ne abbiamo fatti abbastanza.

Per “regali” potrebbe però intendere il precedentemente citato accordo stipulato da Donald Trump con Vladimir Putin, che consente alla Russia di esportare più gasolio per far abbassare i prezzi. L’aveva definita una mossa “rischiosa” e una “legittimazione per Mosca”.

Sulla pace, aveva detto:

Il sostegno all’Ucraina non è l’alternativa alla pace, è ciò che la rende possibile […], nessuno mi convincerà del fatto che la resa di chi difende la propria libertà possa definirsi pace.

Difesa e sicurezza

Si è poi toccato il tema della difesa e della sicurezza. Sul punto, Meloni aveva dichiarato che una maggiore flessibilità per difesa e sicurezza significa risorse aggiuntive rispetto a quelle consentite dai parametri europei. Aveva quindi ribadito che:

Non sono soldi tolti alla sanità o alla scuola: se non li spendessimo per la difesa, non potremmo spenderli per altro.

Meloni aveva richiamato l’attenzione su:

• minacce ibride;
• droni;
• danneggiamento dei cavi sottomarini;
• sabotaggi delle reti ferroviarie.

Al Consiglio si discuterà anche della situazione in Iran, puntando alla libertà di navigazione. Così aveva detto Meloni in Aula:

Per questo credo che l’Europa debba impegnarsi in prima persona, a partire dal rafforzamento dell’operazione Aspides nel Mar Rosso, che l’Italia oggi guida e che si regge in larga parte sul contributo di pochissime Nazioni. Servono più navi, e servono ora.

Gaza, Libano e Israele

Restando a Est, tra i temi c’è stata la sicurezza dello Stato di Israele, ma anche la preoccupazione per le azioni del Paese in Libano e in Cisgiordania. Meloni punta, con l’avvio del nuovo governo israeliano, ad aprire un nuovo percorso di pace.

Proporranno di:

• riavviare il dialogo;
• trasferire le entrate fiscali all’Autorità Palestinese;
• bloccare gli insediamenti.

La Presidente del Consiglio aveva ribadito la necessità di inviare aiuti alla popolazione di Gaza e di compiere un primo passo (franco-italiano) per una pace duratura tra Israele e Libano.

Stato della migrazione

Per quanto riguarda i dati relativi al tema migrazione, la premier aveva rivendicato il calo di oltre il 50% in due anni degli ingressi irregolari. Come confermano i dati di Frontex:

gli attraversamenti irregolari in ingresso sono passati da circa 381 mila nel 2023 a poco meno di 178 mila nel 2025.

Il Consiglio Europeo discuterà dei flussi migratori, anche alla luce degli eventi di Ceuta. Meloni sottolinea la regolarità della scelta di reintrodurre temporaneamente i controlli alle frontiere interne aeree e marittime con la Spagna.

Focus anche sulla richiesta di maggior spazio nel prossimo bilancio europeo per:

• il Piano Mattei;
• i return hub nei Paesi terzi.

Allargamento Ue

Sul tema dell’allargamento, l’Italia porterà al Consiglio Europeo il sostegno al processo di adesione basato sul principio del merito. Aveva dichiarato:

All’Unione, però, spetta riconoscere, senza ritardi, quei risultati con avanzamenti concreti.

Da qui la priorità è l’avanzamento di Montenegro e Albania.

Il fact-checking de lavoce.info passa al setaccio le dichiarazioni di politici, imprenditori e sindacalisti per stabilire, con numeri e fatti, se hanno detto il vero o il falso. Ancora una volta tocca alla Presidente del Consiglio Giorgia Meloni: lo sa come funziona la nuova legge elettorale appena votata dal Parlamento?

L'articolo Giorgia Meloni non conosce la sua nuova legge elettorale proviene da Lavoce.info.

Satire, however over-the-top, never quite measures up to reality.

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A thought experiment

Imagine that Giorgia Meloni, as Prime Minister, launches an app for newborns through which the government credits 1,000 euros to each child. She does so in an official capacity, via a government website and under a specific name: “Conto Giorgia.” Suppose the campaign promises parents that this capital will grow based on the historical performance of the FTSE MIB – the former MIB30 – provided they invest it on the stock market. Suppose the money comes largely from Italian taxpayers’ money and that the initiative has the blessing of a public statement signed by the nation’s capitalist elite: the Del Vecchio heirs, Marina Berlusconi, Giovanni Ferrero, Francesco Gaetano Caltagirone, and company. Such an initiative would raise an institutional issue even before a political one. Article 97 of the Constitution requires the public administration to act with due diligence and impartiality, and placing a personal brand on newborns’ savings is at odds with both.

In the United States, this is not just a hypothetical scenario. The Trump Accounts, accessible at trumpaccounts.gov, have been operational since July 4, 2026 – a date chosen to mark the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. They were established by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, signed by Donald Trump in the summer of 2025: tax-advantaged savings accounts governed by Section 530A of the federal tax code. The Treasury makes an initial contribution of $1,000 for children born during the pilot program period, from 2025 to 2028, and anyone else can add money: parents, relatives, employers, states, and private individuals. By default, the funds are invested in a State Street index fund, the SPDR S&P 500 ETF; among the alternatives that can be selected at a later date, the Treasury has included funds from BlackRock and Vanguard.

The launch followed the ritual one might expect. From the Oval Office, Trump rang the opening bell for the NYSE and Nasdaq, flanked by Michael and Susan Dell, who pledged $6.25 billion: $250 each into the accounts of 25 million children under the age of ten living in areas where the median income does not exceed $150,000. The president joked that those present “aren’t doing this for that reason,” and invited everyone to buy a Dell computer. BlackRock, State Street, Visa, and Mastercard had already joined the summit organized by the Treasury, alongside Dell Technologies and the Dells; the underlying idea is attributed to financier Brad Gerstner. The $1,000 in public funds serves as the initial capital to open the account, while the private funds carry less weight than the scene surrounding them.

What’s the problem?

It’s important to distinguish between what is documented and what is interpretation. The name is documented: the sitting president lends his last name to a government product, hosted on a government domain. There are precedents for policies named after individuals, such as the Roth IRA, named after Senator William Roth, but in that case the person was a lawmaker and the name remained a colloquial label, whereas “Obamacare” began as a controversial acronym and was only later adopted. Here, the name is official. Citizens receive the benefit from a man, not from a law, and with three weeks to go before the November 3 midterm elections, the effect of this personalization is far from neutral.

The chain of interests is also well documented. BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard manage the funds from which families will have to choose; Visa and Mastercard thrive on payment flows. That they derive a commercial advantage from this is an inference and should be treated as such. The fact remains that their brands appear alongside that of the government in the promotion, and that every dollar deposited into the accounts becomes assets under management. The Treasury, for its part, makes no secret of its ambition: Scott Bessent described the measure as the “greatest merger in history between Main Street and Wall Street,” within a framework – Parallel Prosperity – in which the two grow together.

Then there is the risk, which shifts from the government to families. One thousand dollars left for eighteen years at a nominal annual return of 7% – a theoretical scenario, not a forecast – grows to about $3,400. A useful sum, but one that does not constitute a safety net. The outcome will depend on market conditions in the year the child comes of age, and the family – not the one who made the promise – will bear the responsibility. A promise based on an index’s past performance sells confidence, yet past performance guarantees nothing.

The strongest objection must be taken seriously. The Treasury presents these accounts as a way to make the American Dream accessible to every citizen, and the idea of providing every child with a starting capital is defensible: stock ownership is concentrated among already affluent families, and an account opened at birth brings even those who would never have entered the market into it. This demonstrates that starting capital is a legitimate concept. It does not prove that it must bear the president’s name, nor that the sponsors can be the same as the fund managers, nor that stock capital can replace the guarantees that a welfare state should offer regardless of market conditions.

The Corpse

What remains is the political judgment, which is mine and not based on the facts. When the state links its authority to the name of a single man, entrusts promotion to those who manage savings, and promises newborns a future through the stock market, democracy recedes into the background and ceases to be the guiding principle. To speak of desecrating a corpse is a harsh turn of phrase, but it gets the point across: democratic rhetoric continues to circulate while its bulwarks – the impersonality of institutions and the separation between public and private interests – are being dismantled one by one. Those who exported it for decades through a series of interventions, it seems, left little of it at home.

On a friend’s recommendation, last night I watched Digger, a dystopian and grotesque film starring Goodman and Cruise. You leave the theater with the same impression: the satire, however over-the-top, never quite measures up to reality, and not even two excellent actors can push beyond a caricature that has since become everyday news.

La Russia ha avviato la sua nuova campagna d’autunno contro l’Ucraina. Incapace di avanzare sul fronte, Mosca ha iniziato a colpire sempre più duramente la popolazione civile. Centrali elettriche, ospedali, persino autobus che portano le persone al lavoro come nell’orrenda strage di Kramatorsk. È una strategia con la quale la Russia prova a piegare l’Ucraina con il freddo, il terrore, il buio, semplicemente perché non è riuscito a piegarla sul campo di battaglia. I fatti smentiscono la propaganda del Cremlino e anche quella di chi la porta qui in Italia. Dall’inizio dell’anno Mosca ha guadagnato pochissimo terreno e nel solo mese di settembre ha perso buona parte di quanto aveva conquistato negli ultimi mesi.

Questo stallo non è caduto dal cielo, lo hanno costruito il coraggio degli ucraini e il sostegno dell’Occidente, Italia compresa. E continuo a ritenere che questo stallo sia l’unico strumento efficace che abbiamo per portare la Russia a un tavolo negoziale serio. So che il dibattito è acceso, anche in quest’aula, e lo rispetto, perfino lo comprendo, perché nessuno in quest’aula vogliamo la guerra, tutti vogliamo che si arrivi alla pace. La differenza è su come pensiamo che ci si arrivi. Per come la vedo io il sostegno all’Ucraina non è l’alternativa alla pace, è ciò che la rende possibile. Perché se l’aggressore può puntare la resa dell’avversario che bisogno ha di negoziare? Solo che la resa non è pace, è conquista. Se l’Ucraina domani smettesse di difendersi come in molti auspicano e propongono, noi non avremmo la pace, noi discuteremmo dell’occupazione di una nazione europea e del ritorno dell’imperialismo di stampo sovietico che l’Europa ha conosciuto per mezzo secolo.

Personalmente non rimpiango quegli anni, non rimpiango i carri armati russi che repressero le rivolte di Praga e Budapest, e non rimpiango il muro di Berlino.

Nessuno mi convincerà del fatto che la resa di chi difende la propria libertà possa definirsi pace. La pace che vogliamo e che lavoriamo per costruire, anche pagando un prezzo in termini di consenso, è una pace giusta. Perché solo una pace giusta può durare. Solo una pace giusta mette al sicuro l’Europa e i nostri interessi. Dunque la posizione del governo non cambia. Sostegno a Kyjiv, con particolare attenzione alla popolazione civile, pressione su Mosca e unità euro-atlantica rimagono i pilastri della nostra azione.

In questo contesto dobbiamo considerare anche l’intesa sul gasolio russo. Chiaramente tutti comprendiamo e condividiamo l’esigenza di contenere i prezzi dell’energia che pesano su famiglie e imprese, anche in Italia. Ma dobbiamo essere consapevoli che l’impennata dei prezzi del carburante è dovuta soprattutto alla guerra in Iran, non al conflitto in Ucraina. E quindi il risultato di questa scelta è dubbio, mentre i rischi sono chiari. Una legittimazione per Mosca mentre le sue bombe continuano a cadere sulle città ucraina, nuove entrate con cui finanziare la guerra, un implicito indebolimento della leva sanzionatoria sono elementi che non possiamo ignorare e che contraddicono quanto finora fatto dagli Stati occidentali, Stati Uniti compresi, per spingere Putin a sedersi al tavolo delle trattative.

Discorso diverso è una tregua tra le parti sulle centrali energetiche che l’Italia chiaramente sostiene. Ringraziamo il presidente Zelensky per aver immediatamente dichiarato disponibiità ucraina in questo senso. Ci aspettiamo ora che la Russia faccia altrettanto e interrompa l’attacco alle centrali elettriche ucraine.

Dopodiché, in un momento così compresso, in cui tante variabili sfuggono al nostro controllo, c’è almeno una cosa che dipende da noi. Fare in modo che l’Europa non resti a guardare. Perché le condizioni di una pace che riguarda il nostro continente, e quindi la nostra sicurezza, non possono essere scritte senza di noi, per questo continuo a chiedere che i Ventisette individuino una figura autorevole con il mandato di tutti, capace di portare al tavolo la voce dell’Europa. E se su un nome non si trova convergenza siamo pronti anche a valutare soluzioni diverse. Se ad esempio Francia, Germania e Gran Bretagna nel famoso formato E3 ritengono di poter fare da sole meglio di quanto potremmo fare tutti insieme, e finora è la scelta che hanno fatto, allora almeno lo facciano a nome di tutti e con un mandato ufficiale dato da tutti. Perché, sarò onesta, considero secondario che siede a quale tavolo, mi interessa a nome di chi si siede al tavolo e poter chiedere cosa. Mi interessa che l’Europa non proceda in ordine sparso e parli con una voce sola. Perché unEuropa che si divide sui formati offre un’immagine di sé infantile, ed è l’unico vero regalo che possiamo fare a Mosca. E di regali a Mosca di questi tempi ne abbiamo fatti abbastanza.

Il Consiglio europeo discuterà in modo specifico dell’escalation delgi attacchi ibridi russi. Ed è giusto così perché la minaccia ibrida russa è diventata il nuovo normale di questa guerra travagliata. Sono i droni che violano lo spazio aereo dei nostri partner, e che sorvolano aeroporti e basi in diverse nazioni europee, sono i cavi sottomarini nel Baltico, sono gli attacchi informatici a ospedali, porti e amministrazioni pubbliche, sono le campagne di disinformazione costruire per dividere le nostre opinioni pubbliche e per screditare esponenti politici considerati nemici, condizionare le elezioni fino a vere e proprie forme di manipolazione dello spazio cognitivo, la strumentalizzazione dei migranti spinti alle frontiere come armi di pressione. UN quadro di questo tipo richiede una risposta coordinata, e l’Italia porterà a Bruxelles alcune priorità che considera fondamentali: proteggere le nostre infrastrutture critiche, reti energetiche, dominio subacqueo, porti, aeroporti, sostenere l’industria italiana nel dare un contributo decisivo ai sistemi antidrone e antimissile, e ribadire che la sicurezza ai confini dell’Unione è indivisibile. E questo significa che nel sostenere il fianco est non possiamo perdere di vista il fianco sud. Perché difendersi oggi significa un ospedale che continua a curare sotto un attacco informatico, una centrale che nons i spegne, un aeroporto che non si ferma per un drone. Difendersi non è proteggere un’idea astratat di potenza, è proteggere la vita quotidiana dei cittadini.

L'articolo L’eccellente discorso di Meloni sull’Ucraina, e le parole che il campo largo non sa dire proviene da Linkiesta.it.

If far right nationalists gain power in four big countries simultaneously, we are in for a dramatic Trumpian tilt

When it comes to Europe’s economy or its peace and security, it is obvious that decision-making has to be done largely at the European level to be meaningful. Yet electoral politics is still conducted mostly at the national level. The silver lining of this mismatch is that from country to country in Europe we have governments with different political priorities and leanings. Unlike in the US, where one presidential election can radically change the entire country’s course, as we have seen so vividly under Donald Trump’s leadership, the same drama has not so far unfolded in Europe. This may be about to change.

Pedro Sánchez rolled the dice in Spain last week, calling a snap election for next month after an unholy alliance of the conservative People’s party (PP), the far-right Vox and Catalan pro-independence party Junts blocked his big housing reform package in parliament. If the socialist prime minister, hailed by progressives globally but demonised by Europe’s right and Trump’s US, loses his election gamble, Spain could fall into the hands of a conservative/far-right coalition, which is currently ahead in the polls.

Nathalie Tocci is a Guardian Europe columnist

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© Photograph: Benoît Tessier/Reuters

© Photograph: Benoît Tessier/Reuters

© Photograph: Benoît Tessier/Reuters

The European Commission has rejected demands from Italy and Greece for additional exemptions from EU spending rules as the Middle East energy crisis drives inflation higher, exposing renewed divisions over how much financial assistance European governments can provide.

The European Commission has rejected requests from Italy and Greece for greater freedom to increase public spending in response to the energy crisis, resisting pressure from two member states that argue existing budget restrictions are limiting their ability to protect households and businesses.

The decision, confirmed on 8 October, follows renewed appeals from Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis for measures recognising the exceptional financial burden imposed by higher energy prices.

Meloni wants Brussels to take greater account of unexpected inflation when assessing national budgets and to permit additional tax revenue generated by rising prices to be used for energy relief. Mitsotakis has sought the exclusion of temporary support measures for consumers and businesses from the expenditure limits agreed under the EU’s fiscal framework.

Economic Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis rejected the argument for further concessions, maintaining that the existing arrangements already take inflation into account and provide mechanisms for responding to exceptional circumstances.

The disagreement comes as Europe’s governments confront the economic consequences of the Middle East conflict, including higher fuel costs, inflationary pressures and increased demands for state intervention.

Italy’s increasingly difficult budget choices

For Italy, the dispute adds to a fiscal problem that has been developing throughout the year.

The government expects its budget deficit to rise to 3.4 per cent of GDP in 2027, reversing an earlier objective of reducing borrowing below the EU’s three per cent reference value.

As EU Today reported earlier this month, Rome plans to use additional fiscal room for defence and energy-related expenditure, while public debt is projected to remain close to 138 per cent of GDP.

The new request concerns the treatment of inflation and the financial support required to offset its effects.

Energy inflation creates an unusual budgetary problem. Governments can receive additional nominal tax revenue as prices rise, particularly through consumption taxes, while simultaneously facing public pressure to compensate consumers for higher living costs.

Meloni argues that such unexpected revenue should be available for targeted assistance without forcing equivalent reductions elsewhere in national expenditure.

Brussels is reluctant to accept arrangements that could turn temporary increases in tax receipts into an opportunity for permanent spending expansion.

Italy’s position also reflects the political competition between defence spending and domestic economic support. Rome has accepted the need for higher military expenditure but faces immediate pressure from households and energy-intensive industries.

That competition was already apparent when the government chose to prioritise energy relief over the full use of defence-spending flexibility.

Greece seeks different treatment for emergency support

Greece’s request is more narrowly focused on the treatment of temporary assistance under the EU’s expenditure rules.

Athens argues that measures intended to help businesses and households manage exceptional energy costs should not be counted against the normal spending limits.

The Greek government faces an economic environment in which higher imported energy prices threaten household purchasing power and business profitability, particularly in sectors dependent on transport and fuel.

Excluding temporary relief from expenditure calculations would give Athens additional room to intervene without breaching its agreed fiscal trajectory.

The Commission, however, has resisted establishing further exemptions beyond those already provided in the fiscal framework.

Its objection is institutional as well as financial. If additional categories of emergency expenditure are repeatedly excluded from fiscal calculations, the system becomes increasingly difficult to enforce consistently across the Union.

The limits of Europe’s reformed fiscal rules

The EU revised its fiscal governance framework in 2024, introducing nationally agreed expenditure paths intended to provide greater flexibility while maintaining sustainable public finances.

The Commission’s rules on exceptional circumstances permit member states to depart temporarily from normal requirements under specified conditions.

Those provisions have already been used to accommodate higher defence expenditure, while the Commission has also issued guidance on their application to energy-security investments.

Temporary financial assistance intended to reduce household energy bills, however, is not necessarily treated in the same way as investment in infrastructure that reduces Europe’s long-term dependence on imported fuel.

That distinction has become a source of friction between Brussels and national capitals.

Governments argue that the immediate economic effects of an international crisis require exceptional measures. The Commission is concerned that repeated concessions could weaken the credibility of the spending framework.

A wider dispute over Europe’s economic response

The Commission’s decision also comes as France faces increasing pressure over its debt and budget deficit.

The deterioration in French borrowing conditions has reinforced concerns about the risks associated with heavily indebted governments continuing to expand expenditure.

France, Italy and Greece have different fiscal positions, but the problems confronting them originate partly in the same combination of expensive energy, weak economic growth and competing spending commitments.

The dispute will now feed into preparations for the European Council meeting on 15–16 October, where energy prices and economic competitiveness are prominent agenda items.

EU leaders are expected to consider targeted and temporary measures to reduce the burden on businesses and consumers, alongside longer-term initiatives intended to reduce dependence on fossil fuels.

The Commission’s refusal to provide Italy and Greece with further fiscal exemptions establishes the limits within which those discussions will take place.

National governments remain free to introduce assistance, but Brussels is insisting that they account for its cost within the fiscal rules already agreed.

For Rome and Athens, the question is whether those rules provide sufficient room to respond to an energy crisis whose duration remains uncertain.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has applied to register her voice as an EU trademark, seeking an additional legal tool against artificial-intelligence systems capable of cloning politicians’ voices and producing convincing fake recordings.

Giorgia Meloni has applied to register her voice with the European Union Intellectual Property Office as governments and public figures look for new ways to counter increasingly convincing AI-generated deepfakes.

The Italian prime minister submitted a short audio recording in which she says “Io sono Giorgia Meloni” — “I am Giorgia Meloni” — to the EUIPO on Monday.

The four-second recording forms part of an application for a sound trademark intended to strengthen legal protection against unauthorised use of her voice.

The application filed with the EU intellectual-property system is currently listed as under examination. It is linked to categories including downloadable multimedia material, cultural activities and the organisation of political events.

Registration would not give Meloni ownership over every recording or imitation of her voice, nor would it automatically prevent AI systems from reproducing it.

It could, however, provide another legal basis for challenging certain commercial or misleading uses where the protected sound mark is employed without authorisation.

The distinction between a trademark and copyright is important in this case. Meloni has applied to protect a sound identifier through EU trademark law rather than to establish general copyright ownership over the natural characteristics of her voice.

Her application comes as voice-cloning technology becomes increasingly accessible.

Modern generative-AI systems can create convincing synthetic speech from relatively small samples of recorded audio. The technology is used legitimately for dubbing, accessibility and media production, but it can also be used for fraud, impersonation and political disinformation.

Meloni herself has previously been targeted by manipulated images and other deepfake material. She has also taken legal action in Italy over sexually explicit deepfake images created using her likeness.

The problem has acquired additional importance for politicians because synthetic recordings can be produced and circulated rapidly during election campaigns.

A false recording no longer requires sophisticated audio-editing equipment or extensive access to the target. Public figures provide large quantities of clean audio through speeches, television appearances, podcasts and social-media video — precisely the material needed to train voice-cloning systems.

The EU has already begun imposing specific transparency requirements on synthetic content.

EU Today reported in August that new provisions under the EU AI Act require certain AI-generated or manipulated audio, images and video to be marked in machine-readable form and impose disclosure obligations for deepfake material.

Those rules address transparency rather than ownership.

Trademark law potentially offers a different route by allowing an individual or organisation to claim rights over a specific sound used as a commercial or identifying mark.

Sound trademarks are not new. Companies have long registered jingles, tones and other distinctive audio signatures. What is unusual in Meloni’s application is the attempt by a serving head of government to use the system partly as protection against AI impersonation.

The phrase chosen for the application is itself closely associated with Meloni’s political identity.

“Io sono Giorgia” became widely recognised following a 2019 speech in which she described herself as a woman, mother, Italian and Christian. The phrase subsequently became the basis of online remixes before being adopted as the title of her autobiography.

Other performers have also sought stronger protection for their voices as generative AI improves.

Italian singer Giusy Ferreri has filed a similar application, while actors and musicians internationally have pressed governments and technology companies to prevent unauthorised voice cloning.

Meloni’s filing is unlikely on its own to settle the broader legal question of whether an individual can effectively control AI reproductions of his or her voice.

It does, however, illustrate how existing intellectual-property law is being tested against technology that can reproduce personal characteristics that were previously difficult to copy convincingly.

The EUIPO must now determine whether Meloni’s application satisfies the requirements for registration. Until that process is completed, the filing remains an application rather than an approved EU trademark.

Italy expects its budget deficit to rise above the European Union’s three per cent reference level again next year as Giorgia Meloni’s government uses new EU fiscal flexibility to finance defence and measures responding to higher energy costs.

Rome’s latest multi-year fiscal projections put the 2027 deficit at 3.4 per cent of GDP, substantially above the previous target of 2.8 per cent.

The increase follows a planned fall to 2.9 per cent this year, which would bring Italy below the EU’s three per cent threshold for the first time since 2019. The deficit stood at 3.1 per cent in 2025.

The change reflects Italy’s decision to use the EU’s national escape clause, allowing member states under specified conditions to deviate temporarily from their agreed expenditure paths.

Under the latest projections, Rome intends to use fiscal flexibility worth 0.6 per cent of GDP in both 2027 and 2028 for defence and energy-related spending. The additional expenditure amounts to roughly €29 billion across the two years, while the deficit is projected at 3.2 per cent in 2028.

The decision turns a long-running dispute over fiscal flexibility into a test of the EU’s revised budget framework.

The national escape clause was introduced in the 2024 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. It permits a member state to deviate temporarily from its fiscal path when exceptional circumstances outside its control have a major effect on public finances, provided medium-term fiscal sustainability is not endangered.

The mechanism was subsequently used to give governments greater room to increase defence spending. In 2026, the Commission also moved to broaden its application to energy-security expenditure.

Italy has been among the governments pressing hardest for such flexibility.

In August, EU Today reported that Rome intended to use the available fiscal room fully for energy measures but only partly for defence. The decision illustrated the competition between longer-term military investment and the immediate political pressure created by household and industrial energy bills.

The latest projections make that trade-off larger.

Italy’s annual inflation rate increased to 4.1 per cent in September, from 3.2 per cent a month earlier. Meloni has sought additional room from Brussels to cushion the economic effect of elevated energy costs.

At the same time, the government has improved its growth forecasts.

GDP is now expected to expand by one per cent in 2026, compared with an earlier projection of 0.6 per cent. Growth for 2027 has been revised from 0.6 to 0.8 per cent.

Those figures provide some additional room, but Italy’s debt remains the larger constraint.

Public debt is projected to rise from 138.1 per cent of GDP this year to 138.5 per cent in 2027 before edging down to 137.9 per cent in 2028. The government now expects the debt ratio to begin falling a year later than previously planned.

That leaves Rome in an unusual position. It expects formally to bring its underlying deficit below the EU threshold while headline borrowing rises above three per cent once exceptional spending is included.

Economy Minister Giancarlo Giorgetti has said Rome is discussing with the European Commission how the calculation will affect Italy’s attempt to leave the EU’s excessive deficit procedure.

The Commission will therefore have to judge not only Italy’s fiscal trajectory but how extensively exceptional expenditure can be accommodated under rules Brussels itself has made more flexible.

That question has already generated concern.

EU Today reported last month that the European Fiscal Board had warned that exceptions were beginning to weaken the clarity of the revised rules. The watchdog has been particularly critical of allowing room initially associated with higher defence spending to be extended to energy-resilience measures.

Italy provides one of the clearest examples of the problem.

Rome is trying simultaneously to increase military capacity, protect households and businesses from energy costs and demonstrate that its very high debt remains manageable.

It has also argued that European rearmament cannot proceed unless governments have sufficient room to finance it. The same tension emerged in Italy’s debate over participation in the EU’s SAFE defence loan programme.

The EU has given governments more flexibility to manage those competing demands. Italy’s 2027 budget will show how far that flexibility can stretch before the argument returns to the credibility of the fiscal rules themselves.