SACRAMENTO, Calif. (AP) — The Trump administration sued California election officials Thursday, asking a judge to bar the state from counting mail-in ballots for next month’s midterm elections from people the federal government has identified as “likely” noncitizens until their status can be confirmed.

The lawsuit comes after the Justice Department said California officials failed to meet a 48-hour deadline to review a password-protected thumb drive that contains a list of 20,000 names the federal government believes are likely noncitizens who were sent ballots to participate in the Nov. 3 election. The state mails ballots to all registered voters. A top Justice Department official had sent a letter earlier this week threatening potential legal action if California didn’t comply.

California Secretary of State Shirley Weber said in a letter to the Justice Department that the federal government hasn’t provided evidence to support its allegation that 20,000 names on the state’s voter rolls are of noncitizens. She referenced an instance in which the federal government alleged nearly 16,000 possible noncitizens were listed on Nevada’s voter rolls, but the state determined that all were, in fact, U.S. citizens.

She also noted that voting is already underway in the state. Weber, a Democrat, said the Justice Department was “demanding unprecedented measures that threaten thousands of Californians’ right to vote, based on unverifiable information or methodology that you still fail to explain or provide.”

California’s elections are in “full compliance” with federal law, she added.

Los Angeles County Registrar Dean Logan said in a statement that his office received the letter and thumb drive this week, along with a “hand written note providing a password” to access the list of alleged noncitizens on the voter rolls. He said he did not consider the thumb drive a secure device. The secretary of state’s office said the password was written “on a sticky note.”

The Justice Department’s lawsuit says the federal government sought to “work collaboratively” with California to identify noncitizens registered to vote in the state, and “California made no serious effort to do so.”

“The United States thus seeks commonplace election relief when a ballot is called into question,” the lawsuit says. “This Court should enjoin California from presently tabulating vote by-mail ballots from likely noncitizens in the upcoming federal election until the voter’s citizenship status can be determined,” the lawsuit says.

Weber, who is named in the lawsuit, suggested the federal government’s outreach had not been collaborative.

She said that over the summer, the Department of Homeland Security claimed that California had 190,000 noncitizens on its voter rolls but refused to provide the methodology or data sources when the office asked for them.

The post Trump administration sues California to block ballots from alleged noncitizens appeared first on MS NOW.

President Donald Trump and the Republican Party have desperately lobbed accusations of “socialism” and “communism” at liberals in their attempts to scare voters in this year’s midterm elections.

Conservative political leaders have instituted “anti-communist” propaganda to indoctrinate schoolchildren with anti-democratic talking points, and Trump’s regime has made a habit of railing against socialism in public — with some rather embarrassing results.

But fresh polling data suggests that a fairly large contingent of the Republican Party actually seems to like socialism. And it’s arguably all Trump’s fault.

The survey by the Economic Innovation Group and Echelon Insights shows that Republicans, at 29%, are more in favor of the government owning a stake in independent companies than independent voters and even Democrats.

Two years ago, what share of GOP voters would agree with government ownership of companies?

Now 29% of GOP voters do. More than Democrats.

This must be reversed. Those who pushed for this may come to regret it if America becomes a socialist country. pic.twitter.com/zgrZ1bjulb

— Daniel Di Martino (@DanielDiMartino) October 13, 2026

The polling suggests majorities of each group oppose the idea. But the not-insignificant number of Republicans who are in favor suggests that Trump’s trend of having the government buy stakes in independent companies — communistic behavior that has led some critics to say he’s practicing “MAGA Maoism” — has led some conservatives to welcome the practice.

So much for all that past talk among Republicans about how the government shouldn’t be in the business of “picking winners and losers.” It has taken less than 10 years of Trump-style authoritarianism to get about a third of the GOP on the record endorsing an undeniably socialist policy, if not a communist one.

So as Republicans rattle on about the supposed scourge of socialism, it sure seems like a chunk of their own party isn’t on the same page.

The socialist threat is coming from inside the house https://t.co/vZJjrG2QlD

— Scott Lincicome (@scottlincicome) October 13, 2026

Or, as Scott Lincicome, a vice president at the libertarian CATO Institute, put it: “The socialist threat is coming from inside the house.”

The post Trump’s desperate war on ‘socialism’ is failing within his own party appeared first on MS NOW.

A spike in diesel prices is hammering broad sectors of the US economy – especially agriculture and shipping – and becoming a flash point ahead of the November 2026 midterm elections. This squeeze has prompted Republicans from hard-hit farm states to call for a ban on US diesel exports, with President Donald Trump reportedly weighing […]

The post Is the world pricing the risk of a US diesel export ban? appeared first on Asia Times.

US president overrules defense secretary, who announced plan without informing White House, source says; fellow Republicans, international observers objected to live broadcast

This year, Alaska held its primary elections on August 18.

As per a 2020 ballot measure, Alaska primary voters pick among all qualified candidates for a single office, regardless of party affiliation, and the top four then advance to the general election.

In the U.S. Senate primary, Republican incumbent Dan Sullivan won 41 percent of the vote, while former Rep. Mary Peltola, a Democrat, captured nearly 50 percent.

Dan Sullivan was also the distant third-place finisher—but in this case, it was Daniel J. Sullivan Jr., a retired schoolteacher who is also running as a Republican but is not the same person as Daniel S. Sullivan, the junior U.S. senator for the 49th state.

The presence of dual Dan Sullivans is a headache for Republicans, who have fought to keep Daniel J. off the ballot, concerned he would split their votes and cost their candidate his seat.

"Mary Peltola and Chuck Schumer know they can't beat Senator Sullivan on his record, so they're resorting to deceitful political maneuvers that attempt to trick Alaskans and buy a seat," a Republican spokesman told Fox News.

"We are looking into it," President Donald Trump said this week. "It's a disgrace." In fact, NBC News reported in July that the FBI and Department of Justice had launched an investigation "looking for possible wire fraud or a conspiracy to deprive Alaskan voters of a free and fair elections process, which could be a civil rights violation."

In August, the government apparently issued subpoenas, though Daniel J. later said he had not received anything.

But is what he is doing actually illegal? For that matter, should it be?

Carol Beecher, director of the Alaska Division of Elections, barred Daniel J. from the ballot in June after concluding that he was running "with the purpose of confusing or misleading the electorate and compromising the fairness of the ballot."

But a state superior court reversed that decision. "Despite the Division's assertion that Mr. Sullivan may be excluded from the ballot because he lacks 'good-faith,' there is no statute which provides such a criterion," wrote Judge Thomas A. Matthews. "The concept of 'good-faith,' or pure motive, or bona fide intent is simply absent." The Alaska Supreme Court agreed, keeping both Sullivans on the November ballot.

Granted, it seems extremely likely that Republicans are right, and Daniel J. is running specifically to hurt Daniel S.'s prospects.

"Campaign material metadata reveals that Amber Lee, a progressive consultant, authored a press release announcing [Daniel J.'s] Senate bid," WFMD reported in May.

Daniel J. told The New York Times that he was running as a moderate Republican in an attempt to steer the party away from its MAGA wing. But he also admitted that he had voted for the Democrat in the last three presidential races and for Peltola in her races for the U.S. House.

In Beecher's original order keeping Daniel J. off the ballot, she wrote that Daniel J. had asked to be identified as "Dan S. Sullivan" on the ballot, the same name as the senator's. (Alaska reporter Dermot Cole wrote in July that this was not true: Daniel J. wrote "Dan S. Sullivan" in an email to Beecher but followed up hours later to correct it to "Dan J. Sullivan.")

If Daniel J.'s goal truly is to mislead voters, then that is indefensible. But it's not clear that it's illegal, or whether it should be.

"I am not sure exploiting voter confusion about names is any worse than exploiting their ignorance about policy issues like crime, immigration, and health care," wrote George Mason University law professor Ilya Somin. "Trying to prevent such exploitation through criminal and civil liability is likely to violate the First Amendment. In addition, it would likely end up giving incumbent political leaders broad power to curb speech and control electoral campaigns that they cannot be trusted with."

"This is a case about someone running for office with impure motives who is lucky enough to have a name that could confuse some voters," agreed election law expert Richard Hasen. "I don't see how the government could criminalize his running for office for having impure motives. And if it could do so, then it could be a crime every time that the Republican Party backs a Green Party candidate, or Democrats support a MAGA candidate in a primary in the hopes that the candidate would be weaker against a Democrat in the general election. This stuff happens all the time."

But it's entirely possible that Alaska's ranked choice voting system will solve the problem on Election Day.

After the August open primary, the top four candidates compete on a ranked choice ballot, where voters list the candidates in order of preference. If no candidate gets an outright majority, then the lowest performer is eliminated, and every ballot that picked them first is retallied and applied to their second choice.

As long as every Alaskan who wants to vote for Dan Sullivan—either one—lists both Dan Sullivans as their first and second choices, then the system will take care of any confusion. In the (highly likely) event that Daniel J. does not capture a majority on the first ballot, his votes will be retallied and applied to their second choices. The only plausible hiccup is if Peltola, the Democratic candidate, wins a majority in the first round—in which case either Sullivan would have lost anyway.

Of course, Republicans have opposed the ranked choice system since Alaska adopted it. Former Gov. Sarah Palin, who ran against Peltola twice unsuccessfully, said ranked choice was "so weird" that "it results in voter suppression."

In a post last week on Truth Social, Trump called ranked choice voting "Corrupt" and said it "shouldn't be allowed in our Country."

"I just left Alaska, where we have a real bad thing," Trump said Wednesday at a campaign rally in Arizona. "They have the ranked choice voting, where you go into I guess some kind of a test tube or something, and they pick whoever the hell they want. That's another disgrace."

As ever, it's not clear what Trump was talking about. And despite Republicans' complaints, ranked choice voting works quite well: According to the American Bar Association, recent research finds that it "is an improvement over plurality voting with clear benefits in terms of representation, campaign quality, mobilization, and turnout." It also "encourages greater consensus building as well as more civil political campaigns," and voters find it easy to understand.

In the event that a political party finds itself, for example, with two Dan Sullivans on the ballot, ranked choice voting is a perfect solution. If only the party weren't so hostile to it.

The post What Happens When 2 Dan Sullivans Run for the Same Senate Seat? appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The Orlando office of Rep. Maxwell Frost, D-Fla., was evacuated Friday after receiving a “suspicious package” that matched those received by offices of other lawmakers and state officials.

The packages, according to law enforcement, were mailed to multiple congressional and election offices nationwide. Some contained an unknown substance, authorities said.

Frost said in a statement Friday that he and his district office staff are safe, adding the office was evacuated as a precaution.

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service, FBI and U.S. Capitol Police are investigating the series of suspicious mailings, which were sent to the offices of multiple Democratic senators, including Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer of New York, as well as some Republican state officials.

Several secretaries of state and other elections offices across the country were also targets of the letters, according to Brendan Donahue, deputy chief inspector for the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

“Some of the letters have contained an unknown substance, and we’re working closely with our law enforcement partners to respond to each incident,” Donahue said, adding that authorities are working to identify the source of the letters.

Also Friday, Democratic Rep. Ritchie Torres of New York said his district office had also received an envelope containing a suspicious substance.

“We are living in a time when threats against elected officials and their staff have become the new normal. Although my team is understandably shaken by the incident, we will not be deterred from serving the people of NY-15 in the Bronx,” Torres said in a statement.

A test of the substance conducted by the New York Fire Department determined it was “non-hazardous,” and Torres did not report that he or anyone else had been harmed by the envelope.

Nebraska Secretary of State Robert Evnen, a Republican, said Thursday that his office “received a suspicious envelope matching the description of suspicious mailings sent to other state election offices across the country this week.” The envelope was not opened, according to a statement from Evnen’s office.

Republican Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose said Wednesday that his office is working with state and federal law enforcement after confirming it was the intended recipient of “a suspicious mailing that contained a powdery white substance.”

“Fortunately, delivery of the letter was preempted by investigators at the U.S. Postal Service, who are dealing with similar mailings sent to election officials in multiple states,” LaRose said in a statement, adding that “election officials should never have to fear for their personal safety while performing their duties.”

Messages sent to members of the Senate and House on Thursday morning informed lawmakers and their staff of the investigation.

The Office of the Sergeant at Arms of the House described the suspicious substance as a “white powder.”

No House offices have received the letters, according to the notice, and it was not immediately clear Thursday whether any of the mailings had reached Senate offices, nor to which offices they had been addressed.

“Law enforcement officials are working to intercept any additional letters before they are delivered, however, it is possible that some letters may reach their destinations,” the Senate message said.

The office of Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., was among those that were sent a letter with a suspicious substance, according to spokesperson Josh Sorbe, but the letter was intercepted.

A letter was also sent to the office of Sen. Alex Padilla, D-Calif., spokesman Danny Rodriguez said. Padilla’s office was notified by the FBI about the letter, which was intercepted by USPS, according to Rodriguez.

Another letter had a return address that read “DSA,” from a suite in a New York City office building in the financial district of Manhattan, according to the notice sent to Senate offices.

The Democratic Socialists of America previously occupied the address, but have not been in the suite since 2013, and moved out of the building in January, a DSA spokesperson said. The spokesperson added that the DSA was not involved.

In a statement to MS NOW, an FBI spokesperson confirmed the agency’s joint investigation with USPS, but did not confirm further details.

The suspicious letters come three weeks before Election Day. Both chambers are formally adjourned as members campaign for re-election in their districts.

CORRECTION (Oct. 15, 2026, 4:30 p.m. ET):
A previous version of this article incorrectly stated that Sen. Chris Murphy’s office received one of the letters mailed to congressional and election offices. A spokesperson for the senator’s office says one of the letters was addressed to him but was intercepted in the mail. The earlier story also incorrectly stated that another letter was sent to “DSA” at a Manhattan address. That was the return address.

The post Law enforcement investigating suspicious letters sent to Congress, elections offices appeared first on MS NOW.

President Donald Trump promised that his tariffs would usher in a "golden age" by prioritizing the interests of American workers.

Those workers, however, are now turning against Trump's tariffs.

Support for the Trump administration's tariff policies has fallen by 25 percentage points among blue-collar workers over the past year, according to new polling data from Echelon Insights and the Economic Innovation Group (EIG).

A poll conducted by the two groups in August 2025 found that blue-collar workers supported the tariffs by a narrow margin. Now, that same segment of the population has turned decisively against Trump's tariffs: 58 percent oppose them, compared to just 36 percent who support them.

Overall, support for the tariffs has declined from about 43 percent last year to only 34 percent. Opposition to the tariffs has grown from 50 percent to 59 percent. Elsewhere in the same survey, 68 percent of respondents said the tariffs have made the cost of living higher.

It's not hard to figure out why people have turned against the tariffs: They have contributed to rising prices across the economy.

The annualized inflation rate ticked upward to 3.7 percent in September, according to new data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). More BLS data released Thursday morning shows that the producer price index, which often operates as a precursor to inflation, is up 6.3 percent over the past year.

America's war with Iran has been a major factor in rising inflation, but the tariffs have played a significant role as well. In a study released last week, the New York Federal Reserve concluded that consumer prices would have declined slightly over the past year if not for the economic effects of the tariffs.

The tariffs have become so unpopular that not even partisanship can save them. "Among GOP-voting workers, only 3 percent select tariffs as their top priority," note Jordan McGillis and John Lettieri, policy experts from the EIG, in their write-up of the poll.

Other parts of Trump's economic agenda are not faring much better. The Trump administration has bought or seized shares of more than 30 private businesses over the past two years—ranging from major firms such as U.S. Steel to small mining companies with few customers. "The federal government's state corporatism is unprecedented," reports the Cato Institute in a new analysis of those deals.

Large majorities of workers across both major parties and all generations said they opposed the federal government taking equity stakes in American companies in the Echelon/EIG poll.

In short: This economic populism sure isn't very popular.

All of this is likely to be a major factor in next month's midterm elections. Regardless of how that shakes out, however, there are lessons to be drawn from this poll for both sides of the political divide.

For conservatives, these polling data should end the tariff experiment. It has proven economically damaging, and it is no longer a political winner (if it ever was).

Remember, the idea to hike tariffs and start trade wars with all of America's biggest trading partners was not some grand plan backed by careful study and thoughtful analysis. It sprung, half-baked, from the head of one man. Yes, there have been various attempts to support, in a post hoc way, Trump's desire for tariffs. All of that can, and should, be easily discarded. There is no reason to allow a lame duck president to continue to set such a politically and economically destructive path for the country.

Undoing the tariffs might also put a meaningful dent in rising prices. That should be a no-brainer after the midterms, no matter which party controls Congress.

On the left, this poll should be a reminder that Americans do not look favorably on the mixing of government and business. Democrats should promise to unwind the "equity stakes" that the federal government has taken under Trump's watch. Heading toward the 2028 presidential cycle, Democrats might want to borrow some old Republican talking points about how government shouldn't be picking winners and losers—they may find that message is still quite popular.

Yes, it's probably right to be skeptical that those things will happen. Trump's efforts to centralize economic power in the executive branch are likely to outlive his presidency—that's how these things always seem to go.

But there is a glimmer of hope here. Americans are soundly rejecting the Trump administration's big government policies.

The post Even Blue-Collar Workers Have Turned Against Trump's Unpopular Tariffs appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Contracts tied to elections in Ethiopia and Romania saw massive trading volumes after the outcomes were decided. “It’s obviously some form of volume manipulation,” one expert says.

Leo Terrell attends Detroit suburb event co-hosted by right-wing Zionist Organization of America, as Trump administration courts Jewish vote in tight swing state Senate race

A federal court imposed a 14-day restraining order over allegations that the administration misused public funds for political advertising ahead of midterm elections.

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A federal judge in New York has blocked the Trump administration from entering into, renewing or expanding contracts for a controversial advertising campaign, freezing $20 million in funding allocated through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) amid allegations that public money was being used for partisan political messaging.

RELATED: Trump Demands Leadership Change in Ukraine Amid Zelensky Rift

U.S. District Judge Jennifer Rochon of the Southern District of New York issued a 14-day temporary restraining order on Sunday, citing the risk of “irreparable harm” before publishing her full legal reasoning. The ruling came just over three weeks before the midterm elections.

The lawsuit was filed by a coalition of civic organizations, including the nonpartisan group Common Cause, represented by the legal firm Democracy Forward. The plaintiffs argued that the campaign violated federal restrictions on using funds appropriated by Congress for partisan advertising or propaganda.

“There is no legal justification or precedent for the president to use the machinery of government and public funds to influence election results,” the plaintiffs said in a statement following the ruling.

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The advertisements, which began airing in late September, feature footage from Donald Trump’s previous presidential campaign, excerpts from speeches warning of the threat of communism and references to recent military operations, including U.S. military action against Iran and the abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.

The Justice Department argued late Saturday that the court order was unnecessary because the advertising campaign was scheduled to end on Sunday. The judge nevertheless imposed the restrictions.

The White House has defended the spending, describing the advertisements as “public service and educational messages” and rejecting allegations that they constitute electoral propaganda. Trump has maintained that the campaign promotes the United States rather than himself, noting that he is not a candidate in the midterm elections.

The president has also offered to cover the cost with personal funds or money from his political campaign if authorities determine that the expenditure was improper. Government officials, however, have said there are no immediate plans for reimbursement.

The controversy has drawn criticism across party lines. Republican Senate Majority Leader John Thune has questioned the use of taxpayer money to finance the advertisements, while the Democratic National Committee has filed separate lawsuits against the administration over the same issue.

La vittoria del Parti Québécois e il referendum del 19 ottobre in Alberta riportano al centro il problema della coesione canadese. La separazione resta minoritaria, soprattutto nell’Ovest, ma il riemergere simultaneo delle spinte centrifughe rappresenta una sfida politica per Mark Carney.

Segue nostro Telegram.

A pochi mesi dal consolidamento parlamentare del governo liberale di Mark Carney, il Canada si trova ad affrontare una questione che sembrava essersi progressivamente allontanata dal centro della scena politica: quella della propria coesione interna. La vittoria del Parti Québécois (PQ) nelle elezioni provinciali del Québec del 5 ottobre e il referendum previsto per il 19 ottobre in Alberta, nel quale gli elettori saranno chiamati a pronunciarsi sull’eventuale avvio del procedimento verso un successivo referendum vincolante sulla separazione dal Canada, hanno riportato contemporaneamente alla ribalta due forme molto diverse di contestazione dell’assetto federale.

Sarebbe eccessivo sostenere che il Canada si trovi alla vigilia della disgregazione. In Alberta, soprattutto, tutti i dati disponibili indicano che l’opzione favorevole alla permanenza nella federazione dovrebbe prevalere con un margine molto ampio. Tuttavia, il fatto stesso che una delle province economicamente più importanti del Paese abbia ritenuto politicamente possibile sottoporre agli elettori una domanda di questo genere dimostra il malcontento di una parte della popolazione: una questione che fino a pochi anni fa apparteneva soprattutto alle frange più radicali del cosiddetto western alienation è entrata nella sfera della politica istituzionale.

Il caso del Québec, invece, ha radici molto più profonde. Le elezioni provinciali del 5 ottobre hanno riportato al governo, dopo oltre un decennio, il Parti Québécois guidato da Paul St-Pierre Plamondon. Il PQ ha conquistato 59 dei 127 seggi dell’Assemblée nationale, fermandosi cinque seggi sotto la maggioranza assoluta. Ottenendo circa il 28% dei voti, ha chiuso la consultazione elettorale davanti al Parti Libéral du Québec, attestatosi poco sopra il 24%, al Parti Conservateur du Québec, con circa il 21%, e a Québec Solidaire, che ha raccolto oltre il 12% conquistando nove seggi. La Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ), al governo dal 2018, è invece crollata al 13,3% senza ottenere alcun seggio.

Un tale esito impone certamente una lettura prudente, in quanto il successo del PQ non equivale a un mandato maggioritario per l’indipendenza. Il partito, infatti, ha beneficiato della frammentazione del voto e ha ottenuto la percentuale più bassa mai registrata da una formazione vincitrice nella storia elettorale del Québec, mentre i sondaggi continuano inoltre a collocare il sostegno alla separazione dal Canada intorno al 30%, ben lontano da una maggioranza sociale. Lo stesso St-Pierre Plamondon ha indicato che non intende convocare un nuovo referendum finché Donald Trump resterà alla Casa Bianca, sostenendo che la pressione tariffaria e l’instabilità derivante dai rapporti con gli Stati Uniti rendono necessario evitare, per il momento, un’ulteriore crisi costituzionale.

Ciò non riduce tuttavia la portata della vittoria del PQ. Per la prima volta dopo molti anni, il governo della seconda provincia più popolosa del Canada sarà guidato da una formazione che considera esplicitamente l’indipendenza del Québec il proprio obiettivo storico. Inoltre, sommando i 59 deputati del PQ ai nove di Québec Solidaire, anch’esso favorevole alla sovranità del Québec sebbene attraverso un percorso politico e sociale profondamente diverso, nell’Assemblée nationale esiste una maggioranza numerica di deputati eletti sotto le insegne di partiti indipendentisti. Questo non significa che PQ e Québec Solidaire formeranno automaticamente un blocco comune, né che un referendum sia imminente, ma conferma che la questione nazionale québécoise è tutt’altro che scomparsa.

La sua natura, inoltre, resta profondamente diversa dal separatismo emergente in Alberta. Il nazionalismo del Québec dispone di una propria continuità storica, linguistica e culturale, di una tradizione intellettuale e politica consolidata e di istituzioni che hanno progressivamente acquisito un grado considerevole di autonomia rispetto a Ottawa. I referendum del 1980 e del 1995, quest’ultimo perduto dagli indipendentisti per uno scarto inferiore all’1%, hanno mostrato quanto la questione possa arrivare a mettere in discussione l’esistenza stessa della federazione canadese.

La situazione dell’Alberta nasce invece prevalentemente da fattori economici, fiscali ed energetici. La provincia, cuore dell’industria petrolifera canadese, ha sviluppato da tempo un forte risentimento nei confronti del governo federale, accusato da settori rilevanti dell’opinione pubblica occidentale di utilizzare la ricchezza prodotta dalle province delle praterie per finanziare politiche redistributive decise nell’Est, imponendo contemporaneamente vincoli ambientali e normativi penalizzanti per il settore degli idrocarburi.

Sebbene tutti i sondaggi siano concordi sul fatto che il referendum non dovrebbe avere esito positivo, la trasformazione di una rivendicazione precedentemente marginale in una questione sottoposta ufficialmente all’intero corpo elettorale provinciale rappresenta un passaggio qualitativo da non sottovalutare. Significa che una parte della classe politica dell’Alberta considera ormai il ricorso alla minaccia separatista uno strumento legittimo di pressione nei confronti del governo federale. La premier Danielle Smith ha annunciato che voterà per la permanenza nel Canada e non sostiene personalmente la separazione, ma è stato il suo governo ad aggiungere la domanda al referendum provinciale (che consiste di un totale di dieci quesiti). La stessa Smith ha presentato la consultazione come uno strumento attraverso il quale permettere agli albertani di esprimere il proprio malcontento nei confronti di Ottawa.

Una vittoria del 70% o persino superiore dell’opzione federalista non cancellerebbe il fatto che circa un quinto dell’elettorato di una provincia fondamentale per l’economia canadese sia disposto a considerare almeno l’avvio di un processo di separazione. Nel gennaio 2026 Ipsos aveva addirittura registrato un sostegno iniziale alla prospettiva separatista del 28% in Alberta, praticamente identico al 31% rilevato in Québec, salvo poi constatare che il consenso si dimezzava quando agli intervistati venivano prospettati i costi concreti dell’indipendenza. In altre parole, per una parte consistente degli elettori il separatismo albertano funziona soprattutto come voto di protesta e strumento negoziale nei confronti del centro federale.

Per Mark Carney, la contemporaneità dei due fenomeni costituisce una sfida particolarmente delicata. Il primo ministro ha costruito la propria strategia economica e internazionale attorno al concetto di “autonomia strategica” canadese. Di fronte all’uso crescente delle tariffe, delle catene di approvvigionamento e delle dipendenze economiche come strumenti di pressione, soprattutto da parte dell’amministrazione Trump, Carney ha sostenuto che il Canada debba ridurre la propria vulnerabilità nei confronti degli Stati Uniti, diversificando mercati, partner e infrastrutture.

Nel suo discorso al Lowy Institute di Sydney dello scorso marzo, il premier aveva affermato esplicitamente che l’integrazione economica non deve più trasformarsi in subordinazione e che le medie potenze devono costruire capacità sovrane nei settori strategici, dall’energia ai minerali critici, dall’intelligenza artificiale ai sistemi di pagamento. La stessa impostazione è stata successivamente ripresa nei rapporti con l’Unione Europea e nell’apertura di nuovi canali economici verso l’Asia.

Particolarmente significativa, in questo senso, è stata la normalizzazione dei rapporti con la Cina. Nello scorso mese di gennaio Carney è stato il primo capo di governo canadese a recarsi ufficialmente a Pechino dal 2017, incontrando Xi Jinping e Li Qiang e inaugurando un nuovo partenariato strategico sino-canadese incentrato su energia, commercio, agroalimentare, sicurezza e multilateralismo. Ottawa ha indicato apertamente la Cina come uno dei mercati necessari per ridurre l’eccessiva dipendenza economica dagli Stati Uniti.

Questa strategia incontra però un paradosso fondamentale. Per ridurre la dipendenza dagli Stati Uniti e rivolgersi maggiormente ai mercati asiatici, il Canada ha bisogno proprio delle risorse energetiche dell’Alberta. Il nuovo oleodotto Pacific Link, che dovrebbe trasportare un milione di barili al giorno verso la costa della Columbia Britannica, è uno dei pilastri materiali di questo progetto. Il 1° ottobre Carney ha annunciato l’accelerazione dell’iter autorizzativo, definendo il progetto di interesse nazionale e collegandolo esplicitamente all’obiettivo di raddoppiare le esportazioni canadesi verso mercati diversi dagli Stati Uniti. Oltre il 90% delle esportazioni petrolifere canadesi è stato storicamente diretto verso il mercato statunitense: aprire una nuova grande direttrice verso il Pacifico significa tentare di trasformare l’Alberta da provincia dipendente dall’accesso al mercato statunitense in piattaforma energetica della proiezione canadese verso l’Asia.

Non è dunque casuale che Carney abbia scelto di presentare il progetto proprio a Fort McMurray, nel cuore delle sabbie bituminose albertane, accanto a Danielle Smith e a poche settimane dal referendum. La politica energetica diventa così contemporaneamente politica estera e politica di coesione nazionale. Offrire all’Alberta infrastrutture, accesso diretto ai mercati mondiali e un ruolo centrale nella strategia di diversificazione canadese significa rispondere alle spinte centrifughe non attraverso una semplice riaffermazione dell’autorità federale, ma cercando di modificare le condizioni economiche che le alimentano.

Una logica analoga, sebbene applicata a un contesto completamente diverso, emerge nel rapporto con il Québec. Dopo la vittoria di St-Pierre Plamondon, Carney ha evitato un confronto frontale con il nuovo governo provinciale, insistendo invece sulla necessità di un “federalismo cooperativo” fondato su infrastrutture, abitazioni, crescita economica e difesa degli interessi canadesi di fronte alle pressioni statunitensi. Il premier sa che trasformare immediatamente la questione in uno scontro tra Ottawa e Québec City potrebbe offrire agli indipendentisti esattamente il terreno politico di cui hanno bisogno per allargare un consenso alla sovranità che oggi resta minoritario.

L’atteggiamento dell’amministrazione Trump produce quindi un duplice effetto sulla politica del vicino settentrionale. Da un lato, le pressioni economiche statunitensi hanno accelerato la ricerca canadese di una maggiore autonomia e hanno reso più urgente la costruzione di un mercato interno maggiormente integrato. Dall’altro, proprio la percezione di una minaccia esterna contribuisce per il momento a frenare i separatismi: St-Pierre Plamondon ritiene troppo rischioso organizzare un referendum sull’indipendenza mentre il Canada è impegnato in uno scontro commerciale con Washington; parallelamente, in Alberta la ricerca di nuovi mercati per il petrolio può ridurre alcune delle ragioni economiche del malcontento verso Ottawa.

Il Canada non appare dunque prossimo alla dissoluzione. Ma il ritorno simultaneo della questione nazionale del Québec e del separatismo albertano indica che il modello federale sta attraversando una fase di crescente tensione. In una fase nella quale Mark Carney cerca di costruire un Canada più autonomo dagli Stati Uniti, più presente sui mercati asiatici e dotato di maggiori capacità economiche e strategiche proprie, emerge con forza una contraddizione: per conquistare maggiore autonomia all’esterno, Ottawa deve prima garantire la propria coesione all’interno. Il petrolio dell’Alberta, il peso demografico ed economico del Québec, le infrastrutture interprovinciali e il consenso delle popolazioni che compongono la federazione non sono questioni separate dalla politica internazionale canadese, ma ne costituiscono la condizione materiale.

Per Carney, la costruzione dell’“autonomia strategica” canadese passa ormai anche dalla capacità di dimostrare che il Canada possiede ancora un progetto federale sufficientemente credibile da tenere insieme le sue componenti.

The U.S. Department of Justice has threatened California with possible legal action over what it says are noncitizens believed to have received mail ballots for next month's midterm elections.

The Ukrainian government on Tuesday night said that its access to the SpaceX-owned Starlink satellite internet service was throttled, prompting critics to question the wisdom of depending on any company owned by far-right billionaire Elon Musk. According to a Wednesday report in The New York Times, Ukrainian officials suspect that orders to restrict their access […]

The post Throttling Ukraine’s Starlink access heightens concerns over Musk appeared first on Asia Times.

Democrat Ossoff stresses Israel must use US weapons legally in debate with GOP rival, who accuses senator of seeking to defund the Jewish state

No longer so red: Long a swing state, Ohio went for President Donald Trump back in 2016, in 2020, and in 2024. Now, with midterms approaching, it looks likely to vote blue again, and there are early indicators that Republicans have failed to win over Ohio's working-class voters in particular.

"After the first days of early voting in Ohio, a state that could help determine control of the Senate, there are clear signs Democrats are more enthusiastic to vote," reports CNN. "So far, affiliated Democrats make up larger shares of pre-election voters than they did two years ago, even in the most Republican parts of the state. At this point in 2024, Republicans had a 30-percentage point lead over Democrats in counties that voted for President Donald Trump by 20 points or more, according to data from the Ohio Secretary of State. This year, that's shrunk to just five points."

Take this data with a grain of salt: It is just early-voter data.

But this is all rather high-stakes because Republicans are defending a Senate seat, as well as the governor's office. Two races for House seats are considered toss-ups. The conventional wisdom has been that Ohio is now solidly red, with three cycles of presidential election data to support that. But it's possible Trump has pissed off the voters who supported him to such a degree that Ohio will be sent back into swing-state territory.

"God knows we didn't vote for this," one voter—a pastor who went for Trump, then Biden, then Trump—told Reuters, referring to inflation. Other voters wonder about the decline in manufacturing jobs and the fact that the president has paid lip service to these problems but done very little to actually improve people's circumstances.

On Monday, Trump rallied in support of Sen. Jon Husted, who hopes to retain his seat. In the Mahoning Valley, the president announced a few new, uh, incentives to voters: a Defense Department facility based in Cleveland, and promises that a heat provider for Youngstown remained open. "The Youngstown area for decades used to vote Democrat, and then you ran for office in 2016 and flipped it red forever," said Husted in his speech. "Is that right, folks?"

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OpenAI arrest: The FBI arrested a Saudi national who worked at OpenAI "and charged him with installing a hidden audio recording ‌device in an executive conference room," per the Department of Justice. Abdulrahman Alfozan had worked as an engineer at OpenAI since July 2025, in the San Francisco office. The company found the recording device "plugged into a USB port on the ⁠back of a television in an executive conference room," per Reuters. The device had a microphone and allegedly connected to a camera; the data it stored was encrypted.

"At this time, we have no indications of this individual inappropriately accessing or exfiltrating ​model weights, source code, or customer data. The employee was terminated," said OpenAI. It's not clear who Alfozan may have been working for or with; he has been a permanent resident of the U.S. since 2020, with stints at Meta and Microsoft.

"If convicted, Alfozan faces up to ⁠five years in prison, a $250,000 fine and three years of supervised release," notes Reuters.

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Scenes from New York: Mayor Zohran Mamdani has reportedly reached a deal with the City Council to ban horse carriages in the city, per Politico. I'll admit, I don't really care, but I'm intrigued by the fact that the reason this has taken so long to get through has been because the union representing the carriage-drivers has been so successful at advocating for its members' interests.

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QUICK HITS

• Pope Leo XIV was diagnosed with lung cancer, said the Vatican yesterday. He underwent a successful surgery, and there's no additional information about prognosis at this time.
• Daniel Cox's new book, Generation Uncoupled, makes the case "that problems with dating and romantic partnership are downstream from the decades-long deterioration of American social and civic life." Cox tells Derek Thompson (in a wonderful interview worth checking out): "There's a cultural dimension to all of this, as well. It's not entirely that young people have fewer social opportunities, but that they are encouraged to prioritize their own personal experiences and expression. On social media, self-optimization culture teaches young people that the most coveted rewards in life are secured through individual effort and ambition alone. There is a fear that our relational obligations can work against these goals by restricting our autonomy. It explains why more young people worry about what marriage and parenthood will require of them, rather than the benefits they offer. Not surprisingly, rates of family estrangement are at record highs, prenuptial agreements are more popular than ever, and most young people now feel that obtaining a divorce should be made easier." This obsession with self-actualization, or controlling one's circumstances, as well as risk-aversion, is something I'll be covering a bit in my book, City Without Children. This culture is shaping not only our decision to (not) couple up and get married, but also our decision to delay having kids, and how we parent them once they're here.
• "The bond-market turbulence last month seeped into results as the banks each posted weaker-than-expected revenue from their businesses trading bonds on behalf of clients, and dealmaking slowed more than they had anticipated," reports The Wall Street Journal. "In a somewhat rare occurrence, JPMorgan missed analysts' expectations."
• "The White House has asked Kimberly Guilfoyle, the ambassador to Greece, to resign, new White House press secretary Katie Zacharia told reporters on Tuesday, a day after President Donald Trump said he was considering firing her after allegations she asked a political donor for $100,000 to pay her personal American Express bill," reports The Washington Post.
• The FIRE ("financial independence, retire early") people are now saying the quiet part out loud: that living on canned lentils well into your 40s is practically the same as being imprisoned.

This is the greatest post in the history of FIRE Reddit. Perfection. pic.twitter.com/dh1tesicfi

— Conservative Dividend Investing (@CDInewsletter) October 13, 2026

• Not wrong:

"Blessed" is a useful religious concept that has no adequate secular equivalent

"I was lucky" almost wholly fails to convey the weight and sentiment of providence that comes when things go better than you had any right to hope

— Jack (@tracewoodgrains) October 13, 2026

The post Ohio's Democrat Momentum appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The European Union is entering an unusually concentrated electoral period, with major national contests in Spain, France, Italy and Poland expected to alter the political composition of the European Council over the coming year.

The elections coincide with negotiations over the EU’s 2028–2034 financial framework, increasing the uncertainty surrounding agreements on common borrowing, defence expenditure, agricultural funding and the Union’s future institutional priorities.

Spain is scheduled to hold a general election on 29th November following Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s decision to seek an early mandate. France faces a presidential election in 2027, while major electoral contests in Italy and Poland will also determine the political direction of governments central to European decision-making.

Although national elections do not directly change the composition of the European Parliament, they determine who represents member states in the European Council and influence the balance of negotiations within the Council of the EU.

Spain prepares for an early election

Spain’s election will provide the first major indication of how the electoral cycle may develop.

Sánchez’s Socialist government faces substantial pressure over domestic economic and political disputes, including housing policy, while migration has returned to the forefront of political debate following the crisis in Ceuta.

The opposition People’s Party is seeking to replace the Socialists, with the possible parliamentary role of Vox remaining an important consideration.

The outcome could alter Spain’s position on EU migration arrangements, fiscal policy and aspects of European integration.

Spain is one of the Union’s largest member states and has traditionally supported closer integration in a range of policy areas. A change of government would not necessarily reverse that position, but it could change the priorities Madrid brings to negotiations in Brussels.

Domestic political pressures may also affect the government’s willingness to accept compromises on the EU’s next budget.

France faces a more consequential political transition

France’s presidential election in 2027 carries particularly substantial implications because Emmanuel Macron cannot seek another consecutive term.

The contest will determine the leadership of a founding EU member state that remains central to European defence policy, eurozone economic governance and relations with Germany.

Raphaël Glucksmann has emerged as a prominent candidate from the moderate left following his victory in the social-democratic primary, while the political centre and conservative right are preparing competing candidacies.

The National Rally remains an important electoral force, although questions concerning Marine Le Pen’s legal position complicate predictions about its eventual presidential candidate.

The French election will take place against a difficult fiscal background.

France faces continuing pressure over its public finances, with European officials urging Paris to adopt a credible 2027 budget and provide greater reassurance to financial markets.

Any incoming president will therefore inherit constraints extending beyond domestic spending choices.

France’s position in European negotiations may be influenced by the relationship between presidential authority, parliamentary support and the country’s fiscal commitments.

Italy and Poland add further uncertainty

The contests in Italy and Poland will introduce additional questions concerning relations between national governments and EU institutions.

Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has combined a firm position on migration with support for Ukraine and participation in European defence initiatives.

Her government’s record demonstrates that parties associated with the nationalist right do not necessarily adopt identical positions on foreign policy, economic governance or defence.

Poland’s political competition similarly includes substantial disagreements over EU institutional authority and domestic reforms, while support for national security and resistance to Russian aggression extend across much of the political spectrum.

Changes in either country’s government could alter negotiating coalitions within the Council.

However, the consequences cannot be reliably inferred from broad political labels alone. Individual governments differ in their positions on agricultural support, industrial policy, common financing and enlargement.

The budget creates an immediate test

The first substantial European policy test is already under way.

Ireland’s presidency of the Council has proposed a revised seven-year EU budget of approximately €1.62 trillion, reducing the Commission’s original proposal by about eight per cent.

The negotiating framework requires agreement among all 27 member states, giving national governments considerable influence over the final settlement.

European leaders are attempting to secure an agreement before the end of 2026, partly to avoid carrying unresolved financial negotiations into a year dominated by elections.

A delayed settlement would risk leaving politically sensitive decisions to new governments that might wish to revise previous commitments.

Implications for Ukraine and EU policy

Support for Ukraine will remain a major issue, particularly as European governments consider future financing, military assistance and the consequences of any diplomatic negotiations involving Russia.

Differences between parties over the extent and financing of European assistance could become more significant if new governments form alternative coalitions within the Council.

Migration policy, the relationship with the United States and EU enlargement will also remain areas of potential disagreement.

Yet the institutional structure of the Union limits the ability of any single election to produce an immediate reversal of policy.

Legislation requires agreement through established procedures, while many foreign-policy decisions continue to depend on consensus or unanimity.

The electoral cycle may consequently produce a gradual realignment of European negotiating positions rather than a sudden institutional transformation.

For Brussels, the immediate priority is securing agreements on the financial framework and legislative programme before domestic campaigns begin to restrict the room available for compromise.

On October 25, Brazilians will return to the polls to choose between President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, who was sentenced to 27 years in prison for his role in an attempted coup. The first round gave Flávio 47% of valid votes against Lula’s 45%, revealing the enduring strength of the far right four years after its electoral defeat. The runoff takes place as Donald Trump seeks to restore US domination over Latin America, with Brazil emerging as a consequential battleground in Washington’s campaign to contain China’s growing relations with the region.

Read more: Why did Brazil’s far right win the first round?

Over the past two decades, Brazil and China have built a political partnership that has expanded the space for independent action among countries of the Global South. Under Lula and Xi Jinping, this relationship has deepened through cooperation in industrial development, infrastructure, science, and technology. The election will determine whether this project advances or Brazil’s international orientation is subordinated to Washington’s renewed Monroe Doctrine as part of the continent’s rightward shift.

Read more: Brazil’s angry tide and the struggles ahead

Since Lula’s return to the presidency in 2023, the two governments have connected Chinese cooperation with Brazil’s development programs, including Nova Indústria Brasil, the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), and the Ecological Transformation Plan. Lula’s May 2025 visit to Beijing produced 36 agreements covering infrastructure, finance, artificial intelligence, public health, and industrial cooperation. Behind these agreements is a long-standing challenge: overcoming Brazil’s dependent position in the international division of labor, where commodity exports continue to outweigh advanced industrial and technological development.

This cooperation has also reached Brazilian popular movements. Through the International Association for Popular Cooperation (Baobab), Brazil’s Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST) and other organizations have worked with Chinese institutions on agricultural mechanization, bioinputs, and digital technologies for family farming. These initiatives include the Digital Family Farming and Agroecology Laboratory and IARAA, an artificial intelligence project for agroecology and agrarian reform developed by Brazilian popular movements using Chinese open-source models. In a countryside marked by extreme concentrations of land, machinery, and capital, such cooperation offers new tools to peasant organizations fighting for agrarian reform and the production of healthy food.

Brazil’s relationship with China also reveals the different class interests at work in the country, with contradictions particularly visible in the countryside. Massive exports of soybeans, meat, and minerals have continued under both Bolsonaro and Lula, but their governments have pursued very different political relationships with Beijing. While Jair Bolsonaro attacked China and aligned himself with Washington, Lula has sought to deepen strategic cooperation, including in industrial development, technology, and agrarian reform. Flávio Bolsonaro now promises an “economically pragmatic” relationship with China while cultivating close ties with Trump. For sectors of Brazil’s ruling classes that profit from commodity exports, continuing to sell to China while embracing Washington’s political agenda presents little contradiction. For Brazil’s efforts to rebuild its industry and develop technological sovereignty, the consequences are far greater.

The return of the Monroe Doctrine

Washington’s ambitions were made explicit in its November 2025 National Security Strategy, which announced a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, seeking to restore US pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere and deny outside powers control over strategic resources and infrastructure. Five days later, China published its third Latin America policy paper, reaffirming sovereignty, non-interference, regional integration, technological cooperation, and support for the region as a Zone of Peace. The two documents reveal fundamentally different approaches to the political future of the continent.

Brazil’s position is decisive. As Latin America’s largest economy, a founding BRICS member, and a leading participant in Mercosur, it possesses industrial, scientific, and political capacities that could strengthen independent development across Latin America and beyond.

The emergence of a new technological era makes this struggle particularly consequential. Brazil is among the few countries of the Global South capable of pursuing digital and technological sovereignty that could benefit its neighbors and parts of Africa. Its roughly 23% share of global rare earth reserves is an important starting point, but control over minerals alone is insufficient. The greater challenge is developing the capacity to process them, manufacture advanced components, and build the digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence systems, and technologies that will shape future production.

Flávio has made his orientation clear. Speaking at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in the United States in March 2026, he offered Brazil as the “solution” to Washington’s dependence on China for critical minerals, explicitly linking rare earths to artificial intelligence and US military superiority. Chinese economic reporting has also described proposals from his team to exclude China from rare-earth supply chains. Rather than using Brazil’s resources to develop its own industrial and technological capacities, this agenda would place them at the service of US technological and military power.

The same political orientation extends to digital sovereignty. In July 2026, Flávio’s campaign submitted proposals to US trade authorities that included preventing Brazil’s Pix payment system from connecting to non-Western international payment networks and loosening commitments within Mercosur. These proposals converge with a wider US campaign involving tariffs, digital regulation, strategic minerals, and attempts to influence Brazil’s electoral process. Meanwhile, Washington’s January 2026 bombing on Venezuela and kidnapping of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores demonstrated how far it is prepared to go to impose its will on the continent.

BRICS and the struggle for an independent foreign policy

Brazil, particularly under Lula, has helped build institutions through which countries of the Global South can reduce their dependence on Western-dominated structures. At the July 2025 BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, the group advanced cooperation on development finance, local-currency transactions, and international institutional reform. The New Development Bank, headed by former Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, is an important expression of this effort.

The BRICS cannot automatically overcome economic dependency or guarantee sovereignty for working people. Yet its expansion offers greater room for independent development, provided that participating governments have the political commitment to use these possibilities.

Brazil’s history reveals how difficult that independence has been to defend. In 1961, vice-president João Goulart became the first high-ranking representative of a Latin American government to visit the People’s Republic of China, meeting Mao Zedong when revolutionary China remained diplomatically isolated and subjected to US sanctions. Three years later, Goulart was overthrown in a US-backed civil-military coup that inaugurated a 21-year dictatorship. The early history of China–Brazil friendship was inseparable from struggles over national sovereignty, agrarian reform, and the forces determined to suppress them.

The international material conditions for South–South cooperation are considerably more favorable today, but political direction remains decisive. Jair Bolsonaro hosted the 2019 BRICS summit in Brasília while pursuing close alignment with Washington. A government can weaken institutions from within by abandoning the commitments that give them political substance.

The far right’s resurgence also reflects the enduring power of Brazil’s own ruling classes. Bolsonarismo has a domestic base among sections of agribusiness, finance, the security apparatus, militias, conservative religious networks, and major media. These forces, whose electoral and institutional advances have continued, were strengthened by the 2016 parliamentary coup against Dilma Rousseff and the judicial persecution of Lula. They possess their own organizations, material interests, and sources of power, which do not disappear when an election is lost. Their economic dependence on Chinese markets has not prevented their support for Washington’s political agenda.

Beyond the election

Beijing has followed the Brazilian election closely, reflecting the importance of the political relationship built between Lula and Xi over years of cooperation. In July, Xi reaffirmed China’s support for Brazil against external interference during a conversation with Lula, which also covered cooperation in artificial intelligence, satellites, mineral processing, and relations between China and Mercosur. In September, Foreign Minister Wang Yi received Lula’s adviser and former foreign minister Celso Amorim in Beijing, reaffirming the bilateral strategic partnership.

China’s principle of non-interference means that the choice of Brazil’s government belongs to the Brazilian people, but Beijing’s diplomatic restraint should not be confused with an absence of political interests or an assumption that all governments would pursue the same relationship. Chinese analysts have described the possible outlook under Flávio as one of “cold politics, hot economics”: commodity trade would likely continue, but the political relationship and cooperation in strategic sectors could deteriorate. The experience of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency has already shown the limits of commercial interests in sustaining a broader political partnership.

For the Brazilian people, the consequences extend well beyond foreign policy. The election will also shape the struggles over labor rights, public services, agrarian reform, and the defence of democratic space. Brazil’s renewed role in South–South cooperation under Lula has opened possibilities for a development project that responds to the needs of its working people, but realizing those possibilities depends on the political and social forces capable of carrying it forward.

The Brazilian people have fought through dictatorship, neoliberal restructuring, parliamentary coups, and the rise of the far right to defend their political and social gains. This election is another moment in that longer struggle, now unfolding amid renewed US imperial intervention and a transformation of the world’s technological foundations. The future of China–Brazil cooperation will depend on the capacity of organized popular forces to build a sovereign national project and turn international cooperation into lasting changes in people’s lives.

Tings Chak 翟庭君 is the Asia Co-Coordinator of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Researchand an editor of the international edition of Wenhua Zongheng: A Journal of Contemporary Chinese Thought.

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has apparently started to realize that the ruling conservative New Democracy party will hardly manage to achieve the necessary 30+% of the votes in the upcoming elections and secure a majority government like in the last two parliamentary votes. Over the weekend, PM Mitsotakis made clear if the election result […]

The post Mitsotakis on elections: 25% for ND could mean serious questions for party leadership appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

Russia offers Ukraine a single day without strikes for its elections. Russian leader Vladimir Putin is ready to order a halt to strikes on Ukraine only on the day of a presidential election, if Kyiv decides to hold one, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov says, Russian state agency TASS reported.

The offer answers Ukraine’s call for a real pause: on 11 October, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated Ukraine could hold elections if Putin agreed to a full ceasefire of at least 60 days, ABC News reported. Against the backdrop of Russian strikes that killed more than 150 Ukrainian civilians in a single week, Moscow counters with a one-day truce confined to voting day.

“...If they really want to hold elections in Kyiv, the president of Russia, the supreme commander-in-chief, will be ready to give the order not to strike Ukraine on election day. Specifically on election day,” Peskov said.

His statements followed US President Donald Trump’s call on 10 October for Ukraine to choose a new president, saying a change of leadership could help reach peace with Russia, according to Suspilne.

Trump also criticized Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries amid his new agreements to supply a low volume of diesel into the US.

Moscow rejects the 60-day pause

Peskov has outright dismissed the longer truce. Ukraine needs 60 days not to hold elections but to heal its wounds and continue the war, he argues.

He has claimed Russia had been willing to resume peace talks after Russia’s own State Duma elections, but accused Ukraine of launching massive strikes on Moscow to disrupt that vote. Peskov has gone further, claiming Ukraine shelled polling stations and killed several members of district election commissions in the Russian-occupied regions it calls its own.

What Peskov left out

The accusations are Russia’s and remain unverified. Peskov offered no evidence for the claims about polling stations or election officials, which echo long-running Kremlin talking points.

He also made no mention of Russia’s own strikes on Ukrainian civilian targets over the same period, including attacks on energy sites and residential buildings.

L’approvazione definitiva della nuova legge elettorale, prontamente ribattezzata Melonellum, ha offerto al centrosinistra l’occasione per mettere in scena questo straordinario esercizio di equilibrismo: una mano alzata in difesa della democrazia, l’altra impegnata a sistemare le liste per il 2027.

Segue nostro Telegram.

C’è un momento, nella vita politica italiana, in cui le grandi questioni della democrazia finiscono curiosamente per assomigliare alle piccole questioni della sopravvivenza parlamentare. È il momento in cui i partiti cominciano a parlare di rappresentanza, pluralismo, partecipazione e diritti costituzionali, mentre, sotto il tavolo, qualcuno conta i seggi, qualcun altro le firme e quasi tutti cercano di capire come assicurarsi un posto nella prossima legislatura. L’approvazione definitiva della nuova legge elettorale, prontamente ribattezzata Melonellum, ha offerto al centrosinistra l’occasione per mettere in scena questo straordinario esercizio di equilibrismo: una mano alzata in difesa della democrazia, l’altra impegnata a sistemare le liste per il 2027.

La prima reazione è stata quella di annunciare la prosecuzione della battaglia davanti alla Corte costituzionale. Il campo largo, sconfitto sul terreno parlamentare, intende trasferire il confronto su quello giurisdizionale, affidandosi a un arsenale di contestazioni che comprenderebbe la parità di genere, le sottoscrizioni necessarie per presentare le liste e il premio previsto per il Senato. La staffetta tra parlamentari e società civile, annunciata sul modello della mobilitazione contro la riforma della giustizia, dovrebbe garantire continuità alla protesta. Del resto, quando i numeri in Parlamento non sono sufficienti, resta sempre la possibilità di cercare una maggioranza altrove: nelle piazze, nei tribunali o, più precisamente, nelle pieghe della Costituzione.

Naturalmente, il ricorso alla Consulta è uno strumento pienamente legittimo in uno Stato di diritto. Una legge elettorale deve rispettare i principi costituzionali, e nessuna maggioranza parlamentare può considerarsi immune dal controllo dei giudici. Il problema, semmai, è la facilità con cui il confronto politico italiano scivola dalla discussione sulle regole alla speranza che siano le istituzioni di garanzia a risolvere ciò che i partiti non riescono a risolvere attraverso il consenso parlamentare. La Corte costituzionale non è un secondo Parlamento, né una commissione elettorale incaricata di correggere le strategie dei partiti. È chiamata a giudicare la legittimità delle norme, non a restituire ossigeno a chi non ha trovato i voti necessari per contrastarle.

Eppure, proprio mentre si denuncia la presunta natura antidemocratica della riforma, il centrosinistra si è immediatamente dedicato a una questione assai concreta: come consentire alle forze minori di partecipare alle prossime elezioni senza dover affrontare integralmente gli oneri previsti per la raccolta delle sottoscrizioni. Qui la difesa dei principi incontra la ragion pratica, e la retorica costituzionale comincia a fare i conti con la matematica elettorale.

Il caso più emblematico è quello del Movimento 5 Stelle, che ha promosso il passaggio del senatore Luigi Nave alla componente di Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra nel gruppo misto di Palazzo Madama. L’operazione, secondo la ricostruzione riportata, dovrebbe favorire la nascita di una nuova componente collegata al Nuovo PSI di Enzo Maraio e al Progetto civico Italia di Alessandro Onorato, permettendo alla futura lista centrista di beneficiare di una soglia di raccolta delle firme più favorevole: 1.500 anziché 6.000 per circoscrizione.

La spiegazione ufficiale è edificante: Nave rimarrebbe del Movimento 5 Stelle, pur cambiando collocazione parlamentare, e il suo sarebbe un gesto al servizio della democrazia e della partecipazione. Non una manovra di palazzo, assicurano, ma un’azione contro una legge definita liberticida e antidemocratica. È una distinzione che merita di essere accolta con attenzione, perché la politica italiana ci ha abituati a scoprire che le manovre di palazzo, quando vengono compiute dagli avversari, sono il segno della degenerazione istituzionale, mentre quando servono ai propri alleati diventano improvvisamente raffinati strumenti di ingegneria democratica.

Il punto, tuttavia, non è stabilire in astratto se agevolare le forze minori sia giusto o sbagliato. Un sistema elettorale dovrebbe effettivamente evitare che gli adempimenti burocratici diventino barriere sproporzionate all’accesso alla competizione politica. Il pluralismo non può essere un privilegio riservato a chi dispone di una macchina organizzativa imponente, di risorse economiche abbondanti e di una rete capillare di militanti. Ma se si ritiene che le soglie di sottoscrizione siano eccessive, la soluzione più lineare sarebbe discuterne apertamente e promuovere una modifica generale delle regole. Costruire invece una particolare architettura parlamentare per consentire a una determinata formazione di accedere a condizioni più vantaggiose solleva inevitabilmente una domanda: si sta correggendo un ostacolo alla partecipazione oppure si sta individuando una scorciatoia per un alleato?

La differenza non è secondaria. Nel primo caso si interviene su una regola nell’interesse generale; nel secondo si sfrutta la configurazione del Parlamento per ottenere un vantaggio specifico. Anche quando un’operazione risulta formalmente legittima, resta possibile interrogarsi sulla sua coerenza con la denuncia di una legge che si vorrebbe contestare proprio in nome della trasparenza e dell’uguaglianza politica.

Il Partito Democratico, dal canto suo, si è detto disponibile ad aiutare le formazioni più piccole che intendono contribuire alla costruzione di un’alleanza di centrosinistra. Una dichiarazione comprensibile, se considerata dal punto di vista della costruzione di una coalizione; meno sorprendente se si ricorda che ogni alleanza elettorale è anche un sistema di interessi reciproci. I partiti maggiori hanno bisogno di alleati, quelli minori di condizioni che rendano possibile la loro partecipazione, mentre i gruppi centristi cercano lo spazio necessario per trasformare il proprio peso politico in una presenza parlamentare. Tutti parlano di rafforzare il progetto comune. Nessuno, naturalmente, rinuncia a fare i propri conti.

Il campo largo assomiglia così a un condominio nel quale tutti invocano la ristrutturazione dell’edificio, ma ciascuno pretende di scegliere l’amministratore, decidere la ripartizione delle spese e assicurarsi il posto migliore sul terrazzo. La casa comune è evocata continuamente; la questione di chi debba abitarne il piano attico rimane, invece, irrisolta.

Ed eccoci al secondo atto della commedia: la scelta del candidato alla guida della coalizione. La nuova legge elettorale ha reso ancora più urgente il confronto sulle primarie, ma non ha certo prodotto una soluzione alle rivalità che attraversano l’opposizione. Giuseppe Conte vorrebbe arrivare rapidamente alla consultazione, dopo aver definito un programma unitario. Il Partito Democratico procede con maggiore cautela, anche in vista dell’assemblea del 18 ottobre, appuntamento delicato per Elly Schlein e per gli equilibri interni al partito. Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra, invece, guarda con diffidenza alle primarie e preferirebbe una figura terza capace di sintetizzare le diverse anime della coalizione. Nel frattempo, il nome di Silvia Salis circola nel dibattito, mentre lei stessa invita a non attribuirle dichiarazioni che non ha fatto.

La situazione è quasi didascalica: il centrosinistra vuole presentarsi agli elettori come un’alternativa unitaria, ma non ha ancora stabilito chi debba rappresentarla, con quale programma e attraverso quale meccanismo di selezione. La discussione sulle primarie, che in teoria dovrebbe servire a dare voce agli elettori, rischia così di diventare una trattativa preventiva tra apparati, nella quale il corpo elettorale viene chiamato a ratificare equilibri che i gruppi dirigenti non sono riusciti a definire autonomamente.

Il dilemma Conte-Schlein, in fondo, è soltanto la manifestazione più visibile di una questione più profonda. Che cosa tiene insieme il campo largo, oltre alla comune opposizione al governo? Quale idea di economia, politica estera, lavoro, welfare, istituzioni e collocazione internazionale potrebbe trasformare una somma di sigle in un progetto riconoscibile? Senza risposte convincenti, le primarie rischiano di scegliere il volto di una coalizione che non ha ancora deciso quale volto mostrare al Paese.

Ecco perché il monito di Massimo D’Alema, secondo cui l’opposizione dovrebbe evitare divisioni utili a mantenere l’attuale assetto di potere, coglie un problema reale, pur senza risolverlo. L’unità non può essere soltanto un imperativo pronunciato quando incombe il rischio di perdere. Deve essere il risultato di una sintesi politica, non il nome elegante attribuito a un accordo provvisorio tra gruppi che continuano a contendersi leadership, candidature e condizioni di accesso alle liste.

In questo scenario, la battaglia contro il Melonellum rischia di diventare il contenitore simbolico nel quale far confluire tutte le difficoltà del centrosinistra: la contestazione della legge, la protezione dei piccoli alleati, la ricerca di una leadership condivisa e il tentativo di arrivare al 2027 senza che le contraddizioni interne esplodano prima del voto. La riforma elettorale può certamente presentare profili da sottoporre a un serio scrutinio costituzionale. Ma sarebbe riduttivo immaginare che la soluzione delle difficoltà dell’opposizione possa arrivare esclusivamente da una sentenza o da un aggiustamento tecnico delle regole.

La democrazia, dopotutto, non coincide con la possibilità di presentare una lista, così come la partecipazione non si esaurisce nella riduzione delle firme da raccogliere. Questi elementi sono importanti, ma la qualità di un sistema politico dipende anche dalla capacità dei partiti di offrire alternative comprensibili, programmi coerenti e una classe dirigente disposta ad assumersi responsabilità. Si può facilitare la presentazione di una lista senza rendere più credibile il progetto che quella lista rappresenta. Si può ottenere una pronuncia favorevole della Consulta senza risolvere una crisi di identità. E si può organizzare una primaria impeccabile senza riuscire a spiegare perché gli elettori dovrebbero riconoscersi nella coalizione che ne uscirà.

Il paradosso finale è proprio questo: mentre il centrosinistra denuncia una legge che considera costruita per ostacolare la propria partecipazione, si trova impegnato a costruire, al proprio interno, le condizioni minime per partecipare senza inciampare nelle sue divisioni. Da una parte si contestano le regole del campo di gioco; dall’altra si discute su chi debba indossare la fascia di capitano, quali compagni ammettere in squadra e chi debba pagare l’iscrizione al torneo.

La Consulta farà il suo lavoro, se e quando sarà chiamata a pronunciarsi. I partiti, invece, dovranno fare il proprio: spiegare agli italiani che cosa intendono cambiare, con quali strumenti e a vantaggio di chi. Perché il vero problema di una coalizione non è soltanto riuscire a raccogliere le firme necessarie per presentarsi alle elezioni. È riuscire a raccogliere, prima ancora, ragioni sufficienti per essere votata.

E su questo terreno, purtroppo per chi preferisce le alchimie parlamentari alle sintesi politiche, non esistono scorciatoie burocratiche. Nessuna componente del gruppo misto può sostituire un progetto comune, nessuna deroga alle sottoscrizioni può fabbricare una leadership condivisa e nessuna sentenza può dispensare i partiti dal compito di convincere i cittadini. La democrazia non è un modulo da compilare: è una responsabilità da assumersi. E non basta dichiararsi pronti a difenderla, se poi si trascorre metà del tempo a cercare il modo più conveniente per aggirarne gli ostacoli e l’altra metà a discutere su chi debba guidare la protesta.