The EU is preparing to curb Chinese imports of chemicals and industrial machinery, following a successful deal with Beijing that capped hybrid car exports to the bloc.
The European Commission “showed openness” to proposing safeguards, referring to an emergency brake on imports that can cover entire sectors, an EU diplomat told EUobserver on Thursday (15 October).
And there was “broad support” for the idea among member states for the commission to proceed, the diplomat said.
Last week, trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič agreed with Beijing to cap imports of Chinese hybrid cars at 350,000 next year, which was less than half the amount expected this year.
He called the deal a “blueprint” for other sectors, a view which was publicly echoed by EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, also on Thursday.
Under World Trade Organization (WTO) and EU rules, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy cases require Brussels to prove that Chinese firms sell at unfairly low prices or receive subsidies.
Safeguards do not need evidence under WTO rules, which allows them to be used as an emergency measure.
And the commission only has to show that a surge in imports is seriously harming European producers.
“We like the idea, chemicals, machinery where there’s still a lot of Chinese overproduction needs to be managed,” said another EU diplomat.
The instrument had its limits: Safeguards have to apply to all countries, not just China, and can last no more than eight years.
The EU rarely uses WTO safeguards, but did so on steel, also aimed at China, which expired in June, after reaching the eight-year limit, and which have since been replaced by a separate EU steel regime.
And the Centre for European Reform, a prominent think-tank in Brussels, previously suggested exempting the EU’s 76 free-trade partners from safeguards so that the measures fell mainly on China.
It was a legal moot point in the WTO if that was OK, but the EU has done something similar before.
Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and 10 other countries were left out of the steel safeguard, but using this tool to address Chinese imports was still seen as a temporary solution.
Before the end of the year, the EU commission aims to present diversification tools to reduce reliance on Chinese goods, as well as a mechanism to compensate companies hit by Chinese countermeasures.
And the package would include an instrument to shut Chinese companies out of the EU market if need be, in a measure first proposed in a Franco-German paper last week.
A sell-off for artificial-intelligence stocks is hitting Wall Street again after whipping around the world on worries about how much longer the AI frenzy will last.
A sell-off for artificial-intelligence stocks is hitting Wall Street again after whipping around the world on worries about how much longer the AI frenzy will last.
Calling for single education system and funding transparency, Prof. Dan Ben-David reveals benefits for Haredim outstripped funds for hospitals and higher education combined in 2024
More than half of Portuguese consumers say their purchasing power has fallen over the past year, as the rising cost of living continues to squeeze household budgets. A survey carried
Ryanair lascia 13 aeroporti europei tra il 2026 e il 2027, interrompendo progressivamente i collegamenti con diverse delle sue destinazioni più popolari. Alla base di questa decisione ci sono soprattutto i costi aeroportuali, le tasse e le condizioni economiche considerate poco vantaggiose dalla compagnia low cost irlandese.
Perché Ryanair cancella i voli
La principale ragione economica alla base delle cancellazioni è la necessità di contenere i costi. Il modello delle compagnie low cost si fonda sulla capacità di mantenere tariffe competitive attraverso un’elevata produttività degli aeromobili, una gestione efficiente delle operazioni e accordi economici favorevoli con gli aeroporti.
Le tasse sui passeggeri, i diritti aeroportuali e gli altri oneri legati all’utilizzo degli scali possono però incidere sulla convenienza di una rotta. E se a questi costi si aggiungono quelli relativi alla sicurezza, ai servizi aeroportuali e al controllo del traffico aereo in determinati scali o tratte, la conseguenze sono due, ovvero:
la riduzione dei voli;
il posizionamento degli aeromobili su basi più convenienti, fino alla completa cancellazione dei collegamenti.
La scelta, quindi, non dipende soltanto dalla domanda turistica o dal numero di persone interessate a una destinazione, ma dalle condizioni contrattuali con gli aeroporti e il margine economico ottenibile da ciascun volo.
L’elenco delle destinazioni coinvolte
Alcune delle uscite dalla rete Ryanair sono già avvenute, mentre altre sono programmate per i prossimi mesi o per la fine della stagione invernale 2026 2027.
Ecco l‘elenco degli aeroporti dai quali la compagnia ha interrotto o prevede di interrompere tutti i collegamenti. Dopo Vigo, in Spagna, a gennaio 2026, hanno chiuso a marzo 2026:
Amman, in Giordania;
Asturie, in Spagna;
Clermont Ferrand, in Francia;
Ponta Delgada e Terceira, nelle Azzorre, in Portogallo.
Ad agosto 2026 ha chiuso invece a Rodez, in Francia, mentre questo ottobre è prevista la chiusura a:
Bodrum, in Turchia;
Dalaman, in Turchia;
Kalamata, in Grecia;
Niš, in Serbia;
Volos, in Grecia.
L’ultimo stop sarà invece a marzo 2027, a Brema, in Germania.
Le date si riferiscono al periodo di interruzione dei collegamenti o alla cessazione prevista delle operazioni. Chi intende partire da o per gli aeroporti interessati dagli stop di ottobre e marzo dovrebbe quindi prima verificare la disponibilità effettiva dei voli.
Che cosa cambia per l’Italia
Tra i collegamenti interessati dalla chiusura dell’aeroporto tedesco figura anche quello con Lamezia Terme, in Calabria. Se l’interruzione prevista per il 27 marzo 2027 sarà confermata nei termini annunciati, chi utilizza questo collegamento per raggiungere Brema dovrà organizzarsi diversamente.
Tuttavia, la compagnia ha specificato che ad essere cancellati saranno i collegamenti diretti. Quindi, rimarranno comunque accessibili le tratte con scalo intermedio, permettendo ai passeggeri di raggiungere la destinazione attraverso coincidenze operative presso altri hub della rete Ryanair.
Tuttavia, nonostante l’uscita dai 13 aeroporti, Ryanair ha programmato per il 2026 una media di 3.272 movimenti giornalieri, il 4% in più rispetto al 2025. L’idea è quella di ridurre la presenza in alcuni scali ma non ridimensionare l’intera attività. Il vettore trasferirà infatti la capacità liberata verso aeroporti che offrono tariffe inferiori, incentivi più vantaggiosi o prospettive di crescita della domanda.
Il meccanismo è quello di un’allocazione selettiva delle risorse. Gli aeromobili vengono destinati ai collegamenti che, secondo le valutazioni della compagnia, possono garantire i risultati migliori.
Almost every Portuguese person wants to retain the option of paying in cash, according to a new European survey which suggests last year’s widespread blackout significantly changed attitudes towards physical
An accelerating sell-off of AI-linked shares has hit global markets, as fears over rising inflation and future interest rate hikes spooked traders already wary of the heavily indebted sector.
South Korea’s benchmark Kospi 200index, which is heavily skewed towards the companies that make memory chips, fell more than 8% overnight to a six-month closing low, triggering circuit breakers that brought trading to a halt at various points.
From the Russian wheat deals of an earlier generation to a Trump–Putin diesel bargain, energy has become the latest instrument of high-stakes political dealmaking. Diesel has suddenly moved from the fuel pump to center stage in American and European politics. With U.S. fuel prices surging and congressional midterm elections approaching on November 3, Donald Trump […]
“Turbo-Cancer” in the Lung of Pope Leo XIV, a Promoter of COVID Vaccines
On Tuesday, October 13, Pope Leo XIV underwent surgery to remove a portion of his lung due to a tumor; in previous years, he had been a leading advocate of the COVID vaccination campaign, describing it as an “act of love.” Relying on information disseminated by the medical establishment, the then-bishop did not hesitate to spread the falsehood that mRNA Covid gene serums could limit transmission, a claim refuted from all quarters, most recently by the Florida Attorney General’s lawsuit against Pfizer, and previously by the authoritative journal *Science*.
Is there a faint possibility that, following his serious illness, a Christian like the current Pontiff—innately inclined to acknowledge and repent of his errors—might be ready to question the dangerous “Vaccine God” narrative?
This narrative was upheld by the Vatican to avoid defying the New World Order—comprising friends and profiteers of Big Pharma—during the SARS-CoV pandemic, a virus treacherously engineered in a laboratory.
If, as the Gospel states, Jesus Christ is the “way, the truth, and the life” (John 14:6), how do the Pope and the cardinals have the audacity to refrain from questioning the science to which they bowed?
Unfortunately for him, the Pope had to experience firsthand a highly probable adverse reaction to the very vaccines he had so imprudently and brazenly promoted
Autoimmune Pulmonary Conditions and “Turbo-Cancer”: Typical Adverse Reactions to Covid Vaccines
Yet, the health updates regarding Pope Leo XIV’s medical conditions echo with a sense of terrible nemesis, as they evoke two pathologies long listed among the most serious side effects of mRNA gene therapies:
Having made this long and inevitable preamble, let us look at what the Holy See’s official bulletin reports regarding the health issue facing the Bishop of Rome, Robert Francis Prevost.
Pope undergoes surgery at Gemelli; lower lobe of right lung removed
“In a procedure lasting approximately 90 minutes—which was successful and free of complications, Pope Leo XIV had the lower lobe of his right lung removed; an intraoperative histological examination confirmed a diagnosis of pulmonary adenocarcinoma. The anticipated medical bulletin containing news on Pope Leo’s health arrived in the evening at 9:53 PM (Occtober, 13), just over two hours after the surgery performed this afternoon, October 13, at the Gemelli Policlinic,” writes Vatican News.
The medical bulletin
“In the bulletin released by the Holy See Press Office, Dr. Luigi Carbone—Director of the Directorate of Health and Hygiene for Vatican City State—and Professor Margaritora announced: ‘This afternoon, the Holy Father underwent the scheduled thoracic surgery. To ensure a radical resection, the lower lobe of the right lung was removed using a video-assisted technique. An intraoperative histological examination confirmed the diagnosis of pulmonary adenocarcinoma, as had been suspected based on pre-operative tests,'” the Vatican news site adds.
“The Holy Father,” the statement continues, “was in the operating room for approximately three hours; the surgery itself lasted about 90 minutes. The procedure was successful, and there were no complications.”
Following the surgery, Leo XIV “woke up normally and, after a brief period of observation, returned to his room on the tenth floor.”
Fabio Giuseppe Carlo Carisio – Founder and Director of Gospa News
With the midterm elections just three weeks away, a new inflation report shows prices rising faster than expected, putting more pressure on Americans struggling with the cost of everyday essentials. To discuss what the latest numbers mean for Americans, Amna Nawaz spoke with Heather Long, vice president and chief economist at Navy Federal Credit Union.
Mercedes-Benz chief executive Ola Källenius has warned that excluding British manufacturers from European industrial preference rules would damage automotive production on both sides of the Channel, increasing pressure on Brussels ahead of negotiations over its proposed Industrial Accelerator Act.
The head of Mercedes-Benz has warned that excluding British manufacturers from the European Union’s proposed industrial preference rules would damage the competitiveness of carmakers across Europe, challenging Brussels over legislation intended to protect European production from growing international competition.
Ola Källenius, chief executive of Mercedes-Benz and president of the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA), criticised the prospect of restricting British participation in the forthcoming “Made in Europe” framework during discussions in Brussels on Wednesday, 14 October.
His intervention comes as European governments negotiate the Industrial Accelerator Act, which would introduce European-content requirements affecting public procurement and certain forms of industrial support.
The proposed legislation is intended to strengthen manufacturing within the EU, but its treatment of production in neighbouring countries has become contentious, particularly in an automotive industry whose factories and suppliers operate across national borders.
European production extends beyond the EU
British manufacturing remains closely integrated with continental European automotive production despite the United Kingdom’s departure from the single market.
Components manufactured in Britain are incorporated into vehicles assembled in EU member states, while British factories depend on engines, batteries, electronics and other parts produced in continental Europe.
The value of this integrated manufacturing system depends on companies being able to source components across borders without unnecessary restrictions.
Källenius warned that excluding the UK from the proposed rules would weaken manufacturers operating on both sides of the Channel.
His position reflects industry concerns that a narrowly defined European-content regime could impose additional costs on companies already facing pressure from Chinese competition, slowing demand and substantial investment requirements.
As EU Today reported in September, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham has been pressing Brussels to recognise the UK as a trusted industrial partner under the emerging framework.
Germany has also supported a broader approach that would allow selected trading partners to qualify under European-content rules where reciprocal conditions are met.
France has favoured stronger preferences for production within the EU itself, reflecting differences among member states over how far European industrial policy should extend beyond the Union’s borders.
Its provisions address public procurement and industrial incentives affecting products including vehicles, steel, aluminium and clean technologies.
The Commission wants European public spending to support local industrial capacity rather than reinforce dependence on imports from major international competitors.
China has become the principal focus of those concerns because of its expanding manufacturing capacity, particularly in electric vehicles and batteries.
However, measures designed to counter Chinese industrial competition could also affect established trading partners whose manufacturers form part of European supply chains.
The United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey occupy different legal positions in their economic relations with the EU, but all maintain important industrial connections with member states.
An approach that treats their production as equivalent to imports from countries with substantially different market conditions could require European companies to reorganise existing supplier relationships.
For manufacturers, replacing a supplier may involve more than simply ordering components from another factory. Production standards, technical certification, logistics and long-term investment arrangements can make changes expensive and difficult.
Industry demands regulatory certainty
Following an ACEA board meeting on Wednesday, European manufacturers called for faster progress on the wider automotive legislative package.
In its 14 October statement, ACEA urged EU institutions to advance negotiations so that the package could be finalised early next year.
The association argues that manufacturers require a predictable regulatory framework to plan investments in electric vehicles, production facilities and new technologies.
Källenius linked the industry’s transition towards zero-emission mobility with the need to preserve employment and strengthen economic security.
European manufacturers are simultaneously investing heavily in electrification while competing against Chinese companies with established battery supply chains and significant production capacity.
The resulting financial pressures are particularly serious for manufacturers that must develop new vehicle platforms while maintaining existing factories and dealer networks.
Additional restrictions on component sourcing could complicate those decisions at a time when companies are seeking to reduce costs.
Britain refuses to follow EU tariffs automatically
The dispute has acquired a further dimension following remarks by British Business Secretary Jonathan Reynolds.
Speaking on Wednesday, Reynolds indicated that Britain would not automatically follow the European Union in imposing tariffs on Chinese vehicles.
The UK government maintains that trade measures must be determined according to British economic interests rather than adopted simply to align with Brussels.
That position complicates London’s attempt to secure favourable treatment under European industrial rules.
EU policymakers have argued that closer alignment on trade defences could support Britain’s claim to be treated as a trusted partner.
British ministers, however, must consider whether restrictions on Chinese imports would benefit domestic manufacturers and consumers.
The disagreement will form part of the broader economic relationship being discussed ahead of the next UK–EU summit, scheduled for 20 November.
The wider implications for EU–UK relations
The automotive dispute follows earlier negotiations over British participation in European defence procurement and other industrial programmes.
In both cases, London wants access to initiatives designed to strengthen European production while remaining outside the EU’s institutional framework.
Brussels must determine how far preferential treatment can extend to non-member countries without undermining the objectives of its industrial policy.
The Commission’s proposals have already revealed disagreements between governments favouring a tightly defined European manufacturing base and those seeking to preserve wider commercial partnerships.
Källenius’s intervention strengthens the argument that industrial protection cannot be considered separately from the supply chains on which European manufacturers depend.
The final legislation will influence investment decisions, procurement arrangements and the position of British suppliers within the continental automotive industry.
The outcome will also provide an indication of how far the EU is prepared to accommodate its closest trading partners as it attempts to strengthen European manufacturing against growing competition from China.
EU finance ministers have approved a compromise that would expand the European Securities and Markets Authority’s powers while exempting some major trading venues from centralised oversight. The agreement reflects continuing resistance to transferring financial supervision from national authorities to Brussels.
European Union finance ministers have reached an agreement to expand centralised supervision of financial markets, but Germany has secured provisions allowing important parts of Deutsche Börse to remain under national oversight, substantially narrowing the European Commission’s original reform proposals.
The compromise, agreed at a meeting in Luxembourg on 9 October, would transfer responsibility for supervising selected trading venues, clearing houses and securities settlement institutions to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).
However, the agreement introduces exemptions and thresholds that reduce the number of institutions automatically subject to direct European supervision.
The result is a significant political compromise between governments seeking deeper financial integration and those reluctant to surrender oversight of nationally important market operators.
Berlin secures its exemption
The most contentious element of the negotiations concerned Deutsche Börse, the German financial-market group that operates the Frankfurt stock exchange and provides trading, clearing and other financial infrastructure services.
Germany opposed arrangements that would place all major market operators under direct ESMA supervision, arguing that institutions with predominantly domestic activities should continue to be regulated nationally.
The agreed compromise refines the criteria for determining which trading venues qualify for centralised oversight.
These conditions allow certain Deutsche Börse operations to remain outside the new supervisory regime.
The exemption had already become a point of contention during negotiations among European governments.
As EU Today reported in June, Berlin had sought to protect Deutsche Börse from mandatory European supervision despite Germany’s broader support for integrating EU capital markets.
The October agreement formalises a narrower approach within the Council’s negotiating position, although the legislation remains subject to approval by the European Parliament.
Europe’s fragmented financial markets
The European Commission has repeatedly argued that fragmented national supervision weakens the EU’s ability to compete with financial markets in the United States.
Although the Union operates a single market, many financial institutions continue to face differing regulatory interpretations, procedures and supervisory relationships across member states.
These differences can increase operating costs and discourage financial businesses from expanding across borders.
The Market Integration and Supervision Package is intended to simplify those arrangements and strengthen common oversight of financial infrastructure with significant cross-border activity.
Under the Council’s position, ESMA would assume direct supervision of selected trading platforms and institutions involved in clearing and securities settlement.
Such institutions perform essential functions in financial markets, including managing transactions, transferring securities and controlling risks between counterparties.
Differences in supervisory arrangements can complicate the operation of financial services that increasingly function across national borders.
The Commission argues that greater consistency would allow European capital to move more efficiently between member states and provide businesses with improved access to investment.
Compromise reduces original ambitions
The Commission’s original approach envisaged broader centralisation of supervisory responsibilities.
The Council agreement of 9 October introduces more restrictive criteria governing the institutions that would fall under ESMA’s direct authority.
In addition to the treatment of trading venues, ministers agreed that direct supervision of crypto-asset service providers should initially concentrate on businesses with the most significant cross-border operations.
The Council also supported changes to ESMA’s governance arrangements, including the creation of a full-time executive board.
The proposed board would strengthen the authority’s ability to make supervisory decisions independently of individual national regulators, while preserving mechanisms for cooperation with those authorities.
The compromise also introduces arrangements allowing national supervisors collectively to challenge certain decisions.
These provisions reflect concerns about concentrating regulatory powers within an institution that must oversee financial businesses operating under different national legal systems.
Why capital markets matter for European investment
The supervision reforms form part of the EU’s broader Savings and Investments Union initiative.
European policymakers want to increase the availability of private capital for companies investing in technology, defence, infrastructure and industrial development.
The Union has substantial household savings, but much of that money remains in bank deposits or is invested outside the European economy.
Companies seeking capital for expansion may consequently face higher financing costs or more limited investment opportunities than comparable businesses operating in larger and more integrated markets.
Financial-market supervision represents only one element of that programme.
Differences in taxation, insolvency law, national investment products and corporate governance requirements also influence where investors allocate their money.
Nevertheless, regulators regard consistent supervision as an important condition for reducing fragmentation.
Parliament faces a political decision
The agreement reached by finance ministers does not conclude the legislative process.
The European Parliament must adopt its position before negotiations can determine the final provisions.
Parliamentary discussions could revisit the exemptions secured by Germany and the criteria determining which institutions fall under direct ESMA supervision.
The debate will expose differences over whether European financial integration should proceed through incremental reforms or a more substantial transfer of regulatory authority.
Governments supporting national exemptions argue that supervision should reflect the actual geographic scope of a company’s activities.
Supporters of broader European oversight contend that major trading businesses can influence financial markets beyond their home jurisdictions even when individual operations appear predominantly domestic.
The Deutsche Börse exemption has become a prominent example of the conflict between those positions.
Europe’s largest economies broadly support the objective of deeper capital markets, but remain divided over the institutional powers needed to achieve it.
The final legislation will determine whether the expanded responsibilities granted to ESMA are sufficient to reduce fragmentation or leave important parts of Europe’s financial infrastructure operating under substantially different national supervisory systems.
TEHRAN, Oct. 14 (MNA) – Governor of the Central Bank of Iran Abdulnasser Hemmati met with Jameel Ahmad, Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), on the sidelines of the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
“As we close the tap on Russian energy, we open the doors to a more diverse range of reliable suppliers,” EU energy commissioner Dan Jørgensen wrote in an op-ed for EUobserver this week.
“And these suppliers know that we are reliable buyers.”
One of those ‘reliable’ suppliers is the US, which provided 57 percent of the EU’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) last year and is on course to supply two-thirds this year, according to IEEFA.
Four out of five overseas gas cargoes arriving in the EU will be American by 2028, the think tank estimates. These expensive cargoes have kept coming in. But how reliable is that supply likely to remain?
US officials have already shown their willingness to use their gas dominance for strategic gain. In March, US ambassador to the EU Andrew Puzder threatened that Europe could lose its favourable access to American LNG if it tried to reopen the ‘Turnberry’ bilateral trade deal.
“In switching from Russia to the US, the EU has jumped from the frying pan into the fire,” Pascoe Sabido, a researcher at Corporate Europe Observatory, wrote in a comment under Jørgensen’s op-ed.
And recent developments prove his point.
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En 1858, Karl Marx avait prédit l’ascension de l’Asie au rang de centre du capitalisme. Aujourd’hui, la Chine confirme sa prophétie en occupant une position dominante dans l’économie mondiale (19,9% du PIB mondial en PPA) et dans le secteur industriel : elle est en tête dans 7 des 10 industries les plus avancées, dans la transition énergétique et dans la fabrication de haute technologie. Sa croissance a multiplié son économie par 54 depuis 1990 grâce à la planification et aux investissements de l’État. Bien que les États-Unis conservent la primauté du dollar et de leurs bases militaires, la Chine est le plus grand créancier mondial et la puissance décisive. L’article conclut en critiquant l’aveuglement des élites latino-américaines qui se tournent vers des puissances en déclin.
En 1858, Karl Marx s’était penché sur la marginalisation imminente de l’Europe et des États-Unis face à l’expansion du capitalisme en Asie. Dans une lettre adressée à Engels, il exprimait sa crainte qu’une future révolution européenne ne soit géographiquement réduite à un «petit coin» du monde, compte tenu de la montée de la société bourgeoise dans de vastes régions de la planète telles que la Chine, le Japon, l’Australie et la Californie (Œuvres complètes, vol. 40).
Nous étions au milieu du XIXe siècle, marqué par la domination mondiale absolue de l’Empire britannique, l’élan de la première révolution industrielle — la puissance de la vapeur, l’industrie textile — et la présence des États-Unis en tant que puissance intermédiaire fournissant du coton aux grandes usines de Manchester. Mais au-delà de tout cela, Marx voyait en Asie, et en Chine en particulier, la formation embryonnaire du nouveau cœur du capitalisme mondial.
Cent soixante-huit ans se sont écoulés, et les prédictions de Marx ont été confirmées par l’histoire. Aujourd’hui, la Chine est la plus grande économie de la planète. En mesurant le PIB en parité de pouvoir d’achat (PPA) — ce qui élimine les distorsions liées aux taux de change du marché et aux différences de coût de la vie —, le FMI estime que l’économie chinoise représente aujourd’hui 19,9% de l’économie mondiale, tandis que celle des États-Unis atteint 14,5% et celle de l’Union européenne (UE), 14%. En 1990, le PIB de la Chine ne représentait que 3% du total mondial, celui des États-Unis 19% et celui de l’Europe 23% (IMF DataMapper, 2026). Si l’on prend en compte l’ensemble de l’Asie, le PIB du continent atteint 49% du total mondial.
Cela n’a rien de surprenant. En 1700, l’économie asiatique représentait 60% de l’économie mondiale, tandis que celle de l’Europe atteignait un peu moins de 30% et celle de l’ensemble des États-Unis, 3% (Piketty, Le Capital au XXIe siècle, p. 76). À cette époque, le revenu moyen d’un Chinois était similaire à celui d’un habitant des Pays-Bas, alors leader commercial et financier de l’Europe. La colonisation européenne de l’Asie a détourné cette trajectoire pendant 200 ans, et aujourd’hui, ce continent est à nouveau à la tête de l’économie mondiale.
Mais la Chine n’est pas seulement en tête aujourd’hui en termes de taille de son PIB, mais aussi en ce qui concerne les fondements matériels sous-jacents de la puissance du pays.
En ce qui concerne la valeur ajoutée manufacturière, la Chine génère 29% du total mondial, tandis que les États-Unis et l’Union européenne y contribuent chacun à hauteur de 17% (Statista Research, 2025). On estime que d’ici 2030, cette part atteindra 45% (ONUDI, 2024). Ce leadership ne se limite pas à la fabrication de masse de jouets ou d’appareils électroménagers, mais s’étend également aux domaines des technologies de pointe et à la maîtrise de l’ensemble de la chaîne de valeur des produits. L’Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) — un groupe de réflexion américain — montre que la Chine est déjà leader dans 7 des 10 industries les plus avancées au monde : les systèmes informatiques et électroniques, les produits chimiques, les machines et équipements, les métaux de base, les véhicules à moteur, les produits métalliques transformés et les équipements électroniques. De leur côté, les États-Unis occupent la première place dans la production de technologies de l’information et de services — en particulier la conception de puces d’IA —, dans le secteur pharmaceutique et dans d’autres secteurs des transports (ITIF, 2026).
En 2024, la Chine a fabriqué 86% des panneaux solaires mondiaux, 80% des batteries électriques, 72% des voitures électriques, 64% des smartphones, 54% des robots industriels et 49% des drones (El País, 25 septembre 2026).
En matière de consommation d’électricité, l’essor de la Chine a été spectaculaire. En 1990, la Chine consommait moins de 1 000 térawattheures (TWh), tandis que les États-Unis en consommaient 3 000 TWh. En 2025, la Chine a atteint 10 300 TWh, tandis que la consommation des États-Unis stagne depuis 20 ans autour de 4200 TWh (EIA, 2026).
De plus, la Chine est le premier «État électrique» au monde, étant à la fois le plus grand investisseur et le plus grand producteur mondial d’énergies alternatives. Elle a réussi à réduire le coût de production de l’énergie solaire de 350 dollars par MWh en 2016 à 35–60 dollars par MWh d’ici 2025. Ce coût est inférieur à celui de l’électricité produite à partir du gaz en cycle combiné (60–120 dollars par MWh) ou du charbon (71–170 dollars par MWh) (Lazard, LCOE, 2026).
La Chine est un pays qui ne produit pas de pétrole et qui, au cours du siècle dernier, a été l’un des plus grands extracteurs de charbon pour la production d’énergie. Cependant, au cours de la dernière décennie, c’est le pays qui a le plus contribué à la transition énergétique mondiale. Sa capacité installée de production d’énergie solaire s’élève aujourd’hui à 1175 TWh, alors que le reste du monde ne produit à lui seul que 1600 TWh (Statista, avril 2026). Aujourd’hui, la Chine dispose d’un complexe de production dont la capacité annuelle de fabrication de panneaux solaires s’élève à 1200 TWh, de sorte qu’en moins de 10 ans, une fois les problèmes de stockage et de transport surmontés, elle pourrait fabriquer suffisamment de panneaux pour enrayer le changement climatique (Tooze, 19 septembre 2025). Aucun pays au monde ne possède aujourd’hui une telle capacité de restauration écologique à l’échelle mondiale.
Dans l’ensemble, la croissance de l’économie chinoise représente entre 25% et 30% de la croissance de l’économie mondiale. De 1990 à 2025, la croissance moyenne de son PIB a été de 8,5%, atteignant 14% certaines années, bien qu’elle se soit stabilisée ces dernières années autour de 5%. Ce développement sans précédent lui a permis de multiplier la taille de son économie par 54 depuis 1990, alors que les États-Unis l’ont multipliée par 5,1 et l’Union européenne par 2,9 au cours de la même période (Banque mondiale, données ouvertes, 2026).
Grâce à une combinaison mûrement réfléchie d’ouverture aux investissements étrangers, de transferts de technologie, de soutien à l’investissement privé national et de création d’entreprises publiques dans des secteurs stratégiques de l’économie, la Chine a atteint cette position de leader tout en maintenant un taux d’investissement annuel qui, depuis plus de deux décennies, oscille entre 35% et 45% du PIB. À titre de comparaison, ce taux s’est établi à environ 17% aux États-Unis et à 22% dans l’Union européenne.
Sur le plan commercial, de 1990 à 2025, la Chine a accumulé un excédent commercial de 9 700 milliards de dollars. Pour la seule année 2025, alors que les États-Unis avaient déclaré une guerre commerciale, cet excédent a atteint 1100 milliards de dollars (BBC, janvier 2026). De plus, comme dans toutes les économies développées, la dette publique est élevée. Pour 2025, elle est estimée à 120% du PIB, un chiffre très proche des 125% des États-Unis (FMI, 2026). À cette différence près que la totalité de la dette chinoise est contractée en yuan auprès de banques d’État chinoises, tandis que la majeure partie de la dette américaine est détenue par des investisseurs privés et des gouvernements étrangers.
Ces flux de revenus ont permis à la Chine de devenir le premier créancier bilatéral mondial, devant la Banque mondiale ou le FMI. De 1990 à 2025, la Chine a accordé des prêts commerciaux d’une valeur de 2200 milliards de dollars, notamment aux États-Unis (AidData, novembre 2025). Ce chiffre est déjà supérieur aux 1300 milliards de dollars que, sur la même période, les États-Unis ont versés à titre d’aide militaire et économique à leurs pays alliés (USAFacts, septembre 2026). Ainsi, alors que la Chine a mis en place une infrastructure mondiale pour l’approvisionnement en matières premières et la distribution de marchandises (la «Route de la soie»), les États-Unis ont maintenu des armées et des dirigeants soumis à leurs desseins politiques.
Malgré toute cette puissance économique, la Chine — contrairement à ce qu’ont fait les États-Unis au XXe siècle et, avant eux, le Royaume-Uni — n’a pas encore établi l’hégémonie mondiale de sa monnaie, n’a pas déployé de bases militaires pour garantir sa suprématie politique, et n’exporte pas non plus sa culture ou son système politique comme un modèle à imiter par le reste des pays.
Aujourd’hui, le dollar continue de remplir la fonction de monnaie de réserve mondiale pour 85% des opérations de change mondiales, représente 58% des réserves internationales des banques d’États et sert de monnaie de règlement au sein du système SWIFT pour la plupart des paiements internationaux (BRI, 25 février 2026). Mais sur le plan intérieur, la Chine a déjà créé le deuxième plus grand marché obligataire au monde, évalué à 28 000 milliards de dollars, derrière celui des États-Unis, qui représente 61 000 milliards de dollars (Deutsche Bank, juillet 2026). De même, elle compte trois des dix centres financiers les plus importants au monde (Shanghai, Hong Kong et Shenzhen) et a lancé le système CIPS comme alternative pour les paiements internationaux.
Quant aux bases militaires à l’étranger, la Chine en possède trois, contre 750 pour les États-Unis, et, pour l’instant, elle ne semble pas intéressée par l’exportation de son modèle d’organisation politique appelé «socialisme aux caractéristiques chinoises». Quant à l’expansion culturelle, elle n’en est qu’à ses débuts — jeux vidéo, esthétique asiatique, plateformes de vente en ligne rapides —, alors que le marché intérieur gagne en importance pour la croissance économique. Aux États-Unis, la consommation des ménages représente 69% du PIB ; en Chine, 40% (Banque mondiale, 2026). À titre de comparaison, il y a vingt ans, le rapport entre le revenu par habitant de la Chine et celui des États-Unis était de 1 pour 20. Aujourd’hui, ce rapport est de 1 pour 3,5. Dans moins de 50 ans, il sera de 1 pour 1 (Milanovic, 2026). Tout indique que le «Grand Renouveau du pays chinois», par lequel ses dirigeants envisagent le rétablissement de la grandeur mondiale de leur pays, ne se mesure pas à l’aune de la précipitation de quelques décennies, mais à celle de la patience obstinée de plusieurs siècles.
Il ne fait aucun doute que la Chine est déjà aujourd’hui le centre du monde. Et, face à cela, il est tout simplement pathétique de voir les élites réactionnaires d’Amérique latine chercher désespérément à obtenir un visa américain ou acheter un appartement à Madrid pour rehausser leur statut de «modernes». Elles courent dans tous les sens, hébétées, à la poursuite des mirages de pays qui ne sont désormais plus que de «petits coins» du monde.
Sem condições materiais para disputar a supremacia industrial chinesa, a União Europeia insiste em transformar suas dificuldades econômicas em justificativa para uma nova escalada de hostilidades.
A liderança europeia parece ter encontrado uma nova missão estratégica: reconstruir a capacidade industrial do continente e, simultaneamente, reduzir sua dependência da China. A iniciativa foi recentemente trazida por França e Alemanha conjuntamente e é apresentada como uma resposta à crescente participação chinesa no mercado europeu. O problema é que os dirigentes responsáveis por esse projeto continuam ignorando uma questão elementar: nenhuma reindustrialização de grande escala pode prosperar sem uma base energética estável, abundante e economicamente acessível.
A Europa possui universidades de excelência, mão de obra qualificada, centros tecnológicos avançados e uma tradição industrial que ainda lhe confere vantagens consideráveis. Entretanto, essas capacidades não funcionam isoladamente. Fábricas de produtos químicos, siderúrgicas, instalações metalúrgicas e numerosas outras atividades dependem de fornecimento energético contínuo e competitivo. A existência de capital, conhecimento científico e trabalhadores especializados não compensa indefinidamente os custos elevados de produção. É justamente nesse ponto que a estratégia europeia entra em contradição com seus próprios objetivos.
Durante décadas, a integração econômica entre a Europa Ocidental e a Rússia proporcionou condições favoráveis ao desenvolvimento de importantes segmentos industriais. O fornecimento de gás natural russo, em particular, contribuiu para sustentar atividades que exigem grandes quantidades de energia. Essa relação atendia a interesses econômicos concretos de ambas as partes: Moscou encontrava um mercado importante para suas exportações, enquanto as economias europeias obtinham um insumo fundamental para sua competitividade.
O começo do regime de sanções em 2022 alterou profundamente esse cenário. As medidas coercitivas ilegais cortaram a parceria russo-europeia de longa data, tornando o lado ocidental do continente economicamente fraco e dependente de energia externa mais cara e menos segura. A Europa, que já vinha progressivamente se desindustrializando antes disso, entrou então no total caos energético, com todas as suas consequências, desde contas de energia mais altas até empresas falindo por incapacidade produtiva.
Seria razoável esperar que uma estratégia de recuperação industrial começasse pela revisão dessas vulnerabilidades. O que se observa, porém, é a tentativa de construir uma nova base produtiva sem resolver adequadamente o problema energético. Os responsáveis pela política europeia parecem acreditar que subsídios, incentivos fiscais e programas de investimento serão suficientes para restaurar a competitividade. Tais instrumentos podem contribuir para o desenvolvimento industrial, mas seus resultados serão limitados enquanto persistirem desvantagens estruturais nos custos de energia.
É nesse contexto que a China passa a ocupar uma posição cada vez mais importante na lista de preocupações de Bruxelas. A capacidade chinesa de produzir em grande escala, abastecer cadeias industriais complexas e oferecer equipamentos a preços competitivos representa um desafio para uma Europa que procura recuperar sua autonomia produtiva. Em vez de reconhecer a dimensão do atraso acumulado e elaborar uma estratégia coerente para superá-lo, setores da liderança europeia preferem recorrer a barreiras comerciais, investigações punitivas e mecanismos de contenção econômica.
Essa orientação revela uma compreensão bastante superficial da competição industrial. Restringir as importações chinesas não cria automaticamente fábricas europeias, tampouco reduz o custo da eletricidade ou garante o fornecimento de gás às instalações industriais. Pelo contrário, empresas que dependem de equipamentos, componentes e matérias-primas chinesas poderão enfrentar despesas maiores justamente quando precisam investir para recuperar sua posição no mercado internacional.
A questão russa torna esse quadro ainda mais delicado. Recuperar a cooperação energética com Moscou seria o passo inicial de qualquer plano de recuperação industrial. Com energia russo e parcerias comerciais amplas com a China, a Europa reencontraria o caminho do desenvolvimento – da mesma maneira que países africanos e asiáticos, em parceria com Rússia e China, estão agora encontrando pela primeira vez.
Mas Bruxelas, Paris e Berlim fazem o contrário. Os estrategistas europeus parecem determinados a enfrentar simultaneamente dois dos maiores polos industriais e energéticos do mundo, sem demonstrar que possuem os recursos necessários para sustentar essa ambição. Primeiro, comprometeram uma relação energética fundamental com a Rússia. Agora, arriscam transformar a China em um adversário comercial permanente.
No fim, o que os falcões europeus querem não é o desenvolvimento da própria Europa, mas a instrumentalização de pautas como indústria e comércio para avançar seus próprios planos autodestrutivos – nos quais os cidadãos europeus, já sem energia russa e possivelmente sem produtos chineses em breve, são sempre as primeiras vítimas.
This story originally appeared in Jacobin on Oct. 12, 2026. It is shared here with permission.
Speaking with members of the newly formed AutoZone Workers Union, you would never guess that one of them had just been fired — and that another would be the next morning. That’s what happened to Nathan DuCongé and then David Valencia after they won their union election. On a Zoom call with Jacobin, though, their joy was contagious. DuCongé and his coworkers were all smiles and banter as they talked about their union campaign, how it feels to win, and the unexpected boost they received from filmmaker Boots Riley.
On Friday, September 25, an AutoZone store in White Plains, New York, became the first of the company’s nearly seven thousand American retail locations to unionize. DuCongé and his coworkers, now members of United Auto Workers (UAW) Local 259, said they hadn’t been sure which way the vote would go.
“The deck was really stacked against these workers trying to organize here,” said Brian Murray, an experienced organizer brought on in August by UAW Local 259 Vice President Mike DiGuiseppe. “It was because of their sticking together, the amount of fun they have, and their camaraderie, their solidarity for each other, [that] they were able to overcome a lot of union busting.” He added, “I would have expected [them] to not have succeeded in winning that vote, but they did.”
“We Were Already a Union”
DuCongé moved to New York City two years ago and soon started working for AutoZone as a part-time employee. A year later, he became a parts sales manager. He said he decided to start organizing his store after he was removed from the schedule one Saturday in April, and instead went to a joint meeting of the Emergency Workplace Organizing Committee (EWOC) and the New York City Democratic Socialists of America (NYC-DSA). There he was connected with UAW members who encouraged him to unionize.
By then, DuCongé and Valencia, who was hired several months after him, had already discussed the possibility of a union. Valencia’s turning point came in 2025, when he worked a Fourth of July shift and found out from his paycheck that he wasn’t getting holiday pay. “I went in and I told my manager that day . . . I’m going to make a union.”
“I know this isn’t always the case, but for us, it was already there,’ said Valencia. ‘We were already a union.“
Valencia said he already knew DuCongé’s political orientation when he approached him about unionizing. “We got to talking about it, and it took a long time because we didn’t have the institutional knowledge on where to even begin, until by chance Nate met someone at a DSA meeting. They hooked us up with the UAW, and the rest is history.”
Given the store’s small size, the workers’ specific grievances, and the tight-knit relationships among several key employees, DuCongé and Valencia felt it would be a good place to test whether AutoZone could be organized.
“I know this isn’t always the case, but for us, it was already there,” said Valencia. “We were already a union.”
Do the Job Right
Juan Accostupa, a full-time sales associate who has worked at AutoZone for ten years and trained many of the organizers, described the extra responsibilities workers take on. “We’re not just a retail place. We do a lot of work,” he said. “We unload the trucks, we do installations — batteries, headlights, brake lights, wiper blades, whatever the case might be — and we’re just not getting paid properly.”
“You’re expected to do a lot for so little,” said DuCongé. “These are the kind of things that mechanics are paid to do, right?”
Accostupa said he has made minimum wage throughout his tenure at the store. “Some people think this is, like, a revolution thing. It’s not. We’re just asking for what should be done: better pay and better benefits. That’s it.”
Jess Omelia, a part-time commercial driver who previously worked for a Pepperidge Farm warehouse in Florida with “really great benefits,” said working for minimum wage with little to no benefits was a huge adjustment. “It was a job that I needed at the time, so I took it.”
“Some people think this is, like, a revolution thing. It’s not. We’re just asking for what should be done: better pay and better benefits.“
Omelia said the lack of holiday pay for part-time employees came as a shock. She recalled being put on the schedule for Mother’s Day even though she was the only one among her coworkers with a toddler. “I was the only one there working on Mother’s Day,” she said. “It was only my store manager there. He had given everyone the day off or people had called out to be with their families.”
Workers also cited other reasons for unionizing: inconsistent and last-minute scheduling, inadequate equipment, no say in how they handle their routine responsibilities or in disciplinary procedures, and a push to upsell customers known as “WITTDTJR” — short for the AutoZone slogan “What It Takes To Do the Job Right.”
“We would literally come in and underneath the [sales] numbers every day, there would be a threatening note underneath that you need to get these numbers up,” said Omelia. “You would be punished and your hours would be taken away if you weren’t upselling.”
What Makes a Supervisor?
Workers said their card drive proceeded with little incident until July, when corporate got wind of it. After the workers sent their demand letter and submitted their cards in late July, AutoZone promptly rejected them, saying DuCongé’s involvement as a parts sales manager — a position the company says is supervisory — nullified them.
DuCongé disputes that categorization. Under the National Labor Relations Act, a supervisor must have the authority, using independent judgment, to make or effectively recommend decisions like hiring, firing, disciplining, or promoting other workers — authority DuCongé said he did not have. Rather than fight the issue, which could have delayed an election, the workers resubmitted the cards without him.
“I just felt like it would be selfish if I tried to fight for my eligibility,” said DuCongé. “I never wanted to stand in the way of these people. They’re my friends, my coworkers. It was a good feeling to be able to just help.” He added, “As a member of DSA as well, I felt that as a responsibility. It was kind of like, hey, look, I’m in this organization, I might as well do something that lives up to the organization and the reason why I’m in it.”
Workers said that at a prehearing meeting in late August, AutoZone made clear that it intended to challenge the election not before the National Labor Relations Board but in federal court in Tennessee, where the company is based. At the same meeting, the workers and AutoZone signed an agreement that locked in the list of eligible voters to prevent challenges to votes on election day.
Yet other employees who hold the same position as DuCongé were allowed to vote. Two workers who were transferred to the store in mid-August were also deemed eligible.
“We Will Accept Your Invitation to Fire You”
In the lead-up to the vote, workers reported being subjected to heavy surveillance, multiple antiunion meetings per week, and threats of disciplinary action against the organizers.
“We were having three meetings a week. It was constant . . . and they were really just reading off of a script every time,” said Omelia. “It was just all anti-union. They were extremely against it, said that they would do everything in their power to fight it. If we didn’t like the conditions, [they said] that we could quit and go to another store.”
Valencia said the anti-union messaging relied on half-truths and accusations, including misleading claims about union dues and employees’ ability to communicate with their manager. Organizers, he said, were accused of misleading or threatening workers into voting yes, and were portrayed as using the campaign to land union jobs paid for by workers’ dues.
Workers said AutoZone brought in managers from locations around the country to surveil the store. “There were up to eight, nine people in the store a day, and even the customers were like, ‘What’s going on?’” said Omelia. “There would be times where they’re literally just standing at the back of the store with their arms crossed, just watching us.”
DuCongé said that after the workers submitted their demand letter on July 24, an account under the name of AutoZone CEO Philip Daniele showed up among the viewers of one of his Instagram stories.
In a September 4 recording shared with Jacobin, management threatened to fire DuCongé for union activity on the grounds that he was a supervisor: “If you continue to involve [yourself] in unionization activity, we will accept your invitation to fire you.”
LaborLab, a workers’ rights watchdog group, estimates that AutoZone spent around $200,000 trying to defeat the union. “They do everything except pay you more,” said Murray.
AutoZone in Six
Despite the onslaught of anti-union activity, the workers said the solidarity they felt with one another kept them moving forward. When Omelia’s mother died, her coworkers took up a collection. “I came into work, and they had a little envelope, and they all pitched in to help with my mom’s funeral costs. That’s how close we are.” Accostupa was quick to point out that every manager declined to contribute.
Support also came from outside the store. DuCongé, a filmmaker himself, had posted on social media about how inspiring he found Boots Riley’s new film, I Love Boosters. To his surprise, Riley started reposting updates on their organizing efforts. His first feature, Sorry to Bother You, follows a group of telemarketers who organize and go on strike.
“Boots has been massively influential on my personal life, my filmmaking efforts, but also really, really influential for this campaign,” he told Jacobin. “The solidarity is going beyond the movies and TV shows that he makes.” He added, “I just can’t thank him enough, truly, for helping us out.”
Workers said management kept talking to employees about the election in the twenty-four hours before the vote — and even during it. “On the day of voting, during voting happening, managers were pulling some of those people out of the store, and trying to sway those votes,” said Omelia.
Barred from voting and, he said, from entering the store, DuCongé stayed nearby. He recounted the moment:
I didn’t know what to do with myself, so I just stand on this hill that’s looking down at the store . . . I felt locked onto the ground, and there’s this groundhog sitting right next to me, just also looking out there too. I’m looking at the groundhog, and then eventually it just looks at me, like, “What are you looking at?” It turns out we’re both just looking down at the store. There’s this beautiful sunset and all these crows and everything, and that’s when Mike [DiGuiseppe] texted us the news, and said, “You won.” I just collapsed.
The final tally was 6–4 in favor of the union. Despite the prehearing agreement, and despite his serving as the union’s election observer, Valencia’s vote was challenged during voting, but, in the end, every eligible vote was counted.
After the Win
The day after the vote, AutoZone fired DuCongé. In a recording provided to Jacobin, management tells him: “Effective immediately, AutoZone is terminating your employment as a result of the failure to act appropriately as a manager by engaging in and/or facilitating union activity.”
The following day, another worker was fired for, in DuCongé and Valencia’s words, “not stopping the union.”
Valencia says he was fired too, on October 3, the morning after the Zoom call. Asked on the call whether he was worried about his job, he had said, “If I get fired, I get fired. They’re going to have to come up with a good reason, because I’m in the bargaining unit. It won’t be so easy.”
“If I get fired, I get fired. They’re going to have to come up with a good reason, because I’m in the bargaining unit.“
That same day, AutoZone filed three objections to the election with the National Labor Relations Board, a move the union sees as a delay tactic. The workers seem undeterred.
“We fought for this and we did it. It’s funny, I was telling the staff and everybody else, we were like the Knicks. Knicks in six,” said Accostupa. “The thing about it was we won six and four, 6–4. That was the key.”
Next they intend to help workers at other AutoZone stores organize. “I deliver to other stores, so I see the things that they go through,” said Omelia. “They were watching this election and waiting to see what happened with us to see if they could move forward.”
Valencia says AutoZone runs on the work of people like him and his coworkers. “People come into AutoZone frantic,” he says. “You help them out, you send them on their way with a smile on their face. It’s a good thing. We’re not saving the world, but one person at a time, we’re making their day better.”
“The workers on the ground are really providing all the value to the companies that eat up all the value,” Valencia says, “and all the people at the top that take all the profits that we create. And we just want some kind of compensation that looks closer to the value that we provide.”
Ola Källenius says it will ‘weaken the industry on both sides’ ahead of act intended to counter non-EU competition
Locking the UK out of the EU’s flagship industrial “Made in Europe” legislation would amount to a “deliberate choice” by EU leaders to “hurt” the car industry across the bloc, the head of Mercedes-Benz has said.
Speaking in his capacity as president of the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA), Ola Källenius said such a move would “weaken the industry on both sides”.
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