Convergenze parallele e, per certi versi, anche fisiologiche. Ieri in Senato si è assistito ad un fenomeno che, in quattro anni, non si era quasi mai visto. Ovvero gli applausi a Meloni di Calenda e mezzo Pd. Come se la geopolitica, prima che politica, avesse avuto il sopravvento su contrapposizioni, insulti, contestazioni. Come se il clima pre-elettorale fosse stato messo da parte sull’altare delle cose giuste da fare e da rivendicare a Bruxelles. Il paniere di temi in questione è noto e riguarda il futuro non solo dell’Italia, ma anche della stessa Europa.
Quando la presidente del Consiglio ha spiegato che alcune dinamiche non hanno molto a che fare con la tutela dell’ambiente, ovvero il prezzo degli Ets che sale e che quindi fa salire anche il costo di produzione per l’acciaieria, la cartiera, il cementificio, la ceramica, ha posto un tema su cui nessuna parte sana può non essere d’accordo, perché riguarda la salvaguardia delle imprese.
Che non hanno colore politico, ma rispondono a logiche semplicissime: se regole sbagliate le strozzano, allora rischiano la chiusura, con conseguente perdita di posti di lavoro.
Quando Meloni ha chiesto una sospensione temporanea di alcuni obblighi sul Regolamento europeo del metano ha posto un altro tema nevralgico: ovvero che se una norma, nel passaggio dalla teoria alla pratica, produce danni o mancati benefici, semplicemente va corretta.
Infine quando ha avvertito che non è più possibile per l’Europa importare cobalto, grafite, terre rare imprescindibili per transizione energetica, transizione digitale e difesa, non fa solo una diagnosi arci nota (su cui però dei “bravi” nessuno ha dato un’accelerata fino ad oggi) ma indica la cura, proponendo Porto Marghera come uno dei primi siti europei di stoccaggio strategico di queste materie, iniziativa che potrebbe diventare un progetto pilota europeo.
“Il filo che lega tutte queste iniziative, insomma, è semplice: l’Europa deve tornare a mettere la capacità di produrre al centro delle proprie scelte”, ha detto la premier. In quel momento gli applausi di democratici e calendiani sono stati la spia che l’interesse nazionale è sentito dalle cosiddette forze responsabili presenti in Parlamento, dove l’epiteto responsabili non è il titolo di una squadra buono per un discorso carico di demagogia.
Ma la pragmatica conseguenza di scelte strutturali e lungimiranti che devono essere fatte per il bene futuro (e presente) della collettività. Che si fanno solo in un modo.
L’Europa forte che ha bisogno di Nazioni forti, parafrasando Meloni in chiusura, fa il paio con l’esigenza di un’Europa più solida e credibile all’interno di un metodo di amministrare il paese che difenda l’interesse italiano (come fanno anche tutti gli altri paesi membri).
Solo una parte delle opposizioni lo ha ben compreso.
Official guidance says ammonia in animal urine should be watered down to stop it corroding bark
A neighbourhood in Vienna has introduced guidelines for dog walking, including the use of bottled tap water to rinse away urine and protect vulnerable trees.
Neubau, an up-and-coming, densely populated district dotted with cafes and galleries, rolled out the Schönes Gassi (nice dog walk) campaign this week.
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© Photograph: Georg Hochmuth/APA/AFP/Getty Images
© Photograph: Georg Hochmuth/APA/AFP/Getty Images
© Photograph: Georg Hochmuth/APA/AFP/Getty Images
Spanish supermarket giant Mercadona has officially arrived in the Algarve, opening its first store in the region today (October 15) at Nova Vila Retail Park in Portimão. The much-anticipated opening
The post Mercadona finally arrives in Algarve with Portimão opening appeared first on Portugal Resident.
Chip makers and tech investors such as Samsung and SoftBank plunge as potential interest rate hikes spook markets
An accelerating sell-off of AI-linked shares has hit global markets, as fears over rising inflation and future interest rate hikes spooked traders already wary of the heavily indebted sector.
South Korea’s benchmark Kospi 200 index, which is heavily skewed towards the companies that make memory chips, fell more than 8% overnight to a six-month closing low, triggering circuit breakers that brought trading to a halt at various points.
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© Photograph: Lee Jin-man/AP
© Photograph: Lee Jin-man/AP
© Photograph: Lee Jin-man/AP
Ukraine will resume strikes on Russian oil refineries, ending a three-day pause it held at Washington’s request, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the Financial Times in an interview published on 15 October. Russia kept bombing Ukraine’s energy system throughout the pause, while Kyiv lost US missile warnings and its Starlink service slowed. Zelenskyy said Ukraine would halt energy strikes again only in exchange for more US air defense.
Ukraine's deep-strike campaign targets the Russian oil industry, which fuels Russia's army in Ukraine and earns the export revenue funding the war. Striking the plants that turn Russian crude into fuel, 12 of them hit in September alone, is one of the few levers Kyiv controls on Moscow’s war income. US President Donald Trump has blamed those strikes for higher US fuel prices, which most analysts attribute to the Iran war, and Washington has threatened to withhold intelligence, and reportedly weapons, unless Kyiv gives it up. Each step Washington takes toward Moscow, from fuel waivers to talk of frozen assets, widens the gap Europe and Ukraine must fill, while Russia gains revenue and time to keep striking.
Zelenskyy said he stopped the refinery strikes for three days to meet US wishes, but Russia kept hitting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and killing civilians. During the pause, Ukraine received no US warnings of ballistic missile launches, he said. Starlink also slowed across the country, hampering front-line operations and mid-range strikes on Russian military targets, he added.
Russia used those days to fire 39 ballistic missiles and more than 120 drones at Ukraine’s grid overnight into 14 October, leaving at least 600,000 people without power. “We hold energy ceasefire from our side,” Zelenskyy told Piers Morgan on 14 October. Of the Starlink slowdown, he added: “I’m sure that they knew what they did.”
Ukraine could again stop hitting Russian energy only if it receives more US interceptors for its Patriot systems, Zelenskyy told the FT. He warned that a halt could simply invite more US-Russia deals that feed Russia’s war machine, and predicted the next one would involve gas.
US intelligence officials had warned Ukraine’s embassy in Washington that a new strike on Russia’s energy facilities would end all intelligence sharing at once, The Washington Post reported, citing a person familiar with the matter. Washington has not fully cut it off, but the threat stands, the person said. Trump said on 13 October that the US was still sharing intelligence.
A senior US official told Axios the administration had nothing to do with the Starlink limits, which Elon Musk had blamed on the US military. The administration is also considering easing sanctions on shadow fleet tankers, which have carried oil from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, so the blacklisted vessels could haul non-sanctioned cargo, a US official told Reuters. The US Energy Department said the move would not help Russia ship its oil or fuel.
Washington eased sanctions on Russian oil this spring, after which Russia’s oil income jumped $890 million in a week, and it extended that waiver despite telling allies it would not. US envoys also proposed unfreezing part of Russia’s frozen assets to lure Moscow back to talks, an idea European officials rejected, the Financial Times reported.
Endless illegal immigration, unaffordable energy, draconian speech policing – we're being conditioned to accept outrageous things as normal, says Nick Rendell. Now add to that economic crashes.
The post This Shouldn’t Be Normal appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
European Union finance ministers have reached an agreement to expand centralised supervision of financial markets, but Germany has secured provisions allowing important parts of Deutsche Börse to remain under national oversight, substantially narrowing the European Commission’s original reform proposals.
The compromise, agreed at a meeting in Luxembourg on 9 October, would transfer responsibility for supervising selected trading venues, clearing houses and securities settlement institutions to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).
However, the agreement introduces exemptions and thresholds that reduce the number of institutions automatically subject to direct European supervision.
The result is a significant political compromise between governments seeking deeper financial integration and those reluctant to surrender oversight of nationally important market operators.
The most contentious element of the negotiations concerned Deutsche Börse, the German financial-market group that operates the Frankfurt stock exchange and provides trading, clearing and other financial infrastructure services.
Germany opposed arrangements that would place all major market operators under direct ESMA supervision, arguing that institutions with predominantly domestic activities should continue to be regulated nationally.
The agreed compromise refines the criteria for determining which trading venues qualify for centralised oversight.
These conditions allow certain Deutsche Börse operations to remain outside the new supervisory regime.
The exemption had already become a point of contention during negotiations among European governments.
As EU Today reported in June, Berlin had sought to protect Deutsche Börse from mandatory European supervision despite Germany’s broader support for integrating EU capital markets.
The October agreement formalises a narrower approach within the Council’s negotiating position, although the legislation remains subject to approval by the European Parliament.
The European Commission has repeatedly argued that fragmented national supervision weakens the EU’s ability to compete with financial markets in the United States.
Although the Union operates a single market, many financial institutions continue to face differing regulatory interpretations, procedures and supervisory relationships across member states.
These differences can increase operating costs and discourage financial businesses from expanding across borders.
The Market Integration and Supervision Package is intended to simplify those arrangements and strengthen common oversight of financial infrastructure with significant cross-border activity.
Under the Council’s position, ESMA would assume direct supervision of selected trading platforms and institutions involved in clearing and securities settlement.
Such institutions perform essential functions in financial markets, including managing transactions, transferring securities and controlling risks between counterparties.
Differences in supervisory arrangements can complicate the operation of financial services that increasingly function across national borders.
The Commission argues that greater consistency would allow European capital to move more efficiently between member states and provide businesses with improved access to investment.
The Commission’s original approach envisaged broader centralisation of supervisory responsibilities.
The Council agreement of 9 October introduces more restrictive criteria governing the institutions that would fall under ESMA’s direct authority.
In addition to the treatment of trading venues, ministers agreed that direct supervision of crypto-asset service providers should initially concentrate on businesses with the most significant cross-border operations.
The Council also supported changes to ESMA’s governance arrangements, including the creation of a full-time executive board.
The proposed board would strengthen the authority’s ability to make supervisory decisions independently of individual national regulators, while preserving mechanisms for cooperation with those authorities.
The compromise also introduces arrangements allowing national supervisors collectively to challenge certain decisions.
These provisions reflect concerns about concentrating regulatory powers within an institution that must oversee financial businesses operating under different national legal systems.
The supervision reforms form part of the EU’s broader Savings and Investments Union initiative.
European policymakers want to increase the availability of private capital for companies investing in technology, defence, infrastructure and industrial development.
The Union has substantial household savings, but much of that money remains in bank deposits or is invested outside the European economy.
Companies seeking capital for expansion may consequently face higher financing costs or more limited investment opportunities than comparable businesses operating in larger and more integrated markets.
The Commission’s Savings and Investments Union programme seeks to improve access to finance and make cross-border investment more attractive.
Financial-market supervision represents only one element of that programme.
Differences in taxation, insolvency law, national investment products and corporate governance requirements also influence where investors allocate their money.
Nevertheless, regulators regard consistent supervision as an important condition for reducing fragmentation.
The agreement reached by finance ministers does not conclude the legislative process.
The European Parliament must adopt its position before negotiations can determine the final provisions.
Parliamentary discussions could revisit the exemptions secured by Germany and the criteria determining which institutions fall under direct ESMA supervision.
The debate will expose differences over whether European financial integration should proceed through incremental reforms or a more substantial transfer of regulatory authority.
Governments supporting national exemptions argue that supervision should reflect the actual geographic scope of a company’s activities.
Supporters of broader European oversight contend that major trading businesses can influence financial markets beyond their home jurisdictions even when individual operations appear predominantly domestic.
The Deutsche Börse exemption has become a prominent example of the conflict between those positions.
Europe’s largest economies broadly support the objective of deeper capital markets, but remain divided over the institutional powers needed to achieve it.
The final legislation will determine whether the expanded responsibilities granted to ESMA are sufficient to reduce fragmentation or leave important parts of Europe’s financial infrastructure operating under substantially different national supervisory systems.
Russian forces attacked Epicentr’s hub in Khmelnytskyi, a city in western Ukraine, 10 times on 13 October, starting five large fires that destroyed about 85% of the goods stored inside, the company said.
Epicentr is a Ukrainian chain of home-improvement and household-goods stores. The attack adds pressure to Ukraine’s logistics network, already damaged by Russian strikes. On 10 September, Ukrainian entrepreneur Ruslan Shostak, co-owner of the popular retail chains Eva and Varus, said that 2.1 million square meters of Ukraine’s modern warehouse space had been destroyed since Russia’s full-scale invasion began. He put the country’s total modern warehouse space at approximately 5 million square meters. The strike on the hub came the same day Russia opened a barrage of 39 ballistic missiles on Ukraine’s power grid.
About 30 drones in the sky kept the fire from being put out, and the hub burned down completely overnight, Epicentr said. None of its people were hurt, the company said.
“The most important thing is that all our people are alive,” Epicentr wrote.
Russia had earlier completely destroyed Epicentr’s two largest logistics complexes, in Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast, the company said. The Khmelnytskyi hub had remained effectively its only surviving large warehouse complex. Goods were sent from there to the company’s shopping centers, and people worked there every day “so that millions of Ukrainians could buy what they need,” it wrote. Epicentr described every such attack as a blow to Ukrainian businesses’ ability to operate, pay wages, preserve jobs, and support the country’s economy.
Epicentr said in August that 10 of its shopping centers had been completely destroyed since February 2022. Another 13 retail sites had been damaged, and one in Melitopol remained under Russian occupation, it said. At the time, the company operated 70 shopping centers, down from 80 at the end of 2021.
Earlier, during a Russian missile attack overnight on 5 August, Epicentr’s logistics center in Kyiv burned down completely, Epicentr’s Yulia Chudnovets said. The company’s ceramic tile plant in Kalynivka, one of the largest in Ukraine, was effectively lost, she said. One employee was killed and three were injured, she added.
On 25 May 2024, Russian airstrikes on an Epicentr hypermarket in Kharkiv killed 19 people, Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko said.
Fires broke out at enterprises in Khmelnytskyi and Shepetivka districts on 13 October, Serhii Tiurin, head of the Khmelnytskyi Oblast Military Administration, reported. He did not name the enterprises. On 14 October, Tiurin said one of the fires had been put out, and crews were still fighting the other. Khmelnytskyi Mayor Oleksandr Symchyshyn said six people were injured in Khmelnytskyi district that day, where Russian strikes damaged private enterprises, a gas station, and a medical facility.
As causas envolvem apostas ganhas e não pagas, alteração das “odds” (cotações sobre valores a receber em caso de acerto), bloqueios de contas e saques, além de cláusulas consideradas abusivas.
As empresas com o maior número de ações na Justiça do Rio são a Kaizen Gaming Brasil LTDA, HS do Brasil LTDA e Ana Gaming Brasil, detentoras das marcas Betano, Bet365 e 7K Bet, respectivamente. Contra essas instituições, apostadores cobram mais de R$ 20 milhões, no total. A Agência Brasil tenta contato com as empresas citadas e deixa o espaço aberto para manifestações.
Em resposta, a Ana Gaming explica que o volume de ações judiciais está atrelado ao porte de sua operação e à sua base ativa de usuários, não representando o mérito ou o resultado desses processos, nos quais a companhia apresenta sua defesa e cumpre todas as decisões judiciais.
Dados recentes da terceira edição do Boletim Fiscal dos Estados Brasileiros indicam que as famílias brasileiras perderam R$ 62,5 bilhões com bets em 2025.
O desembargador Peterson Barroso Simão, integrante da Segunda Câmara Criminal do TJRJ, afirma que quando uma atividade passa a absorver recursos nessa dimensão, é natural que seus reflexos cheguem aos tribunais.
“Temos que reconhecer que determinadas práticas podem produzir riscos que exigem informação, limites de publicidade, mecanismos de proteção e fiscalização mais rigorosa. Foi assim em diversos momentos da história.”
Para o magistrado, prevenir o problema continua sendo mais eficiente – e menos oneroso para o Estado e para a sociedade – do que esperar que o tema se transforme em milhares de processos.
“A pessoa que desenvolveu uma relação compulsiva com o jogo não precisa apenas de uma decisão judicial, precisa de tratamento, apoio psicológico, acompanhamento familiar e condições concretas para reconstruir a vida.”
Segundo o desembargador, é difícil estabelecer, juridicamente, a relação entre a atividade da plataforma e as consequências que se desenvolvem ao longo do tempo, como o endividamento progressivo, o rompimento de relações familiares ou o agravamento de problemas psicológicos.
“O futuro dessa relação dependerá menos da tecnologia das plataformas e muito mais da capacidade do Estado e da sociedade de estabelecer limites antes que os custos sociais se tornem ainda maiores.”
Matéria alterada às 11h09 para acrescentar posicionamento da empresa Ana Gaming.
Quello che accade fuori dai confini nazionali incide sempre di più sulla vita quotidiana di popoli e Paesi, mettendo a dura prova la capacità italiana di difendere la propria prosperità e la propria sicurezza. Parte da questa premessa la presidente del Consiglio Giorgia Meloni in occasione delle comunicazioni al Senato in vista del Consiglio europeo del 15 e 16 ottobre, per disegnare il perimetro geopolitico di Italia ed Europa.
Le criticità sono molteplici: la guerra che si allarga a macchia d’olio ad altre aree, la competizione economica globale sempre più serrata, le tensioni geopolitiche che impattano sulla sicurezza delle catene di approvvigionamento, come anche sul costo del carburante e della vita, il tema della competitività legato alle minacce ibride e alle pressioni migratorie. C’è tutto questo nell’intervento della premier, che abbraccia a 360 gradi (ma forse anche di più) lo scenario attuale. Elementi che vanno letti intrecciandoli e non scomponendoli. Per questa ragione, rivendica, il “Governo ha scelto di essere presente e attivo sulla scena internazionale, con continuità e con una linea chiara, perché l’interesse nazionale si difende contribuendo a orientare le scelte che ci riguardano, e non limitandosi a subirne le conseguenze”.
Si parte dall’agenda “One Europe, One Market” e dai progressi compiuti per approfondire il mercato unico, obiettivi sui quali l’Italia insiste da tempo. Ma oggi c’è un elemento che scompagina analisi e riflessioni: il costo dell’energia. Meloni sostiene che non si possa chiedere alle imprese europee di competere con i grandi attori globali e, allo stesso tempo, accettare che paghino strutturalmente l’energia molto più dei loro concorrenti. “Né possiamo perseguire la transizione ambientale al prezzo della nostra base industriale”.
Per questa ragione la risposta non può risiedere nelle scelte di un singolo Stato, ma servono coordinamento e rapidità. In questo senso rivendica l’accordo in ambito G7, che ha previsto il rilascio sui mercati di un quantitativo significativo di carburante, anche per prevenire il rischio di un blocco delle esportazioni americane, che avrebbe pesato duramente sulle nostre economie. Ma non basta: Meloni chiede apertamente “il coraggio di guardare a ciò che possiamo fare noi, in Europa. A partire dalla cosa più scontata: evitare che regole pensate in un contesto completamente diverso da quello che viviamo finiscano oggi per aggravare gli effetti delle crisi che stiamo attraversando”.
Ricorda che pochi giorni fa, con alcuni capi di Stato e di governo più impegnati sul fronte della competitività, ha individuato tre priorità (energia, semplificazione, commercio internazionale), inviando a Bruxelles una proposta di merito articolata in tre mosse: corsie prioritarie per i progetti strategici, un vero freno all’eccesso di burocrazia e una riduzione drastica degli obblighi di reporting, soprattutto per le piccole e medie imprese. Il tutto senza dimenticare il tema Ets. L’obiettivo? Meloni non punta “ad una riga in più nelle conclusioni di un vertice, ma una bolletta più leggera per una famiglia, un costo in meno per un’impresa”.
In questa direzione va la sua rivendicazione sul tema delle regole: “Non siamo qui per difendere le regole dalla realtà, noi siamo qui per difendere i cittadini dalle regole sbagliate e si può fare, grazie all’Italia è accaduto diverse volte”. Come nel caso della clausola di salvaguardia nazionale, con la flessibilità prevista per difesa e sicurezza da utilizzare anche per la crisi energetica. A queste “proposte di buon senso” Meloni lega il tema delle materie prime critiche, ossigeno per difesa e transizione.
Come è noto, l’Ue le importa in larga parte dall’estero, ma “se noi non affrontiamo questo nodo, rischiamo di uscire da una dipendenza solo per entrare in un’altra e questa è anche la ragione per cui l’Italia si è candidata a ospitare a Porto Marghera uno dei primi siti europei di stoccaggio strategico di queste materie, iniziativa che potrebbe diventare un progetto pilota europeo. Il filo che lega tutte queste iniziative, insomma, è semplice: l’Europa deve tornare a mettere la capacità di produrre al centro delle proprie scelte”.
In secondo luogo il tema bellico, su cui la premier chiede all’Ue di non andare in ordine sparso, dal momento che la strategia con cui la Russia punta a piegare il popolo ucraino è quella del “terrore, del freddo e del buio, semplicemente perché non è riuscita a piegarlo sul campo di battaglia”. Dunque, al netto del dibattito “acceso, anche in quest’Aula, anche all’interno degli schieramenti, lo rispetto e lo comprendo perfino, perché nessuno in quest’Aula vuole la guerra”, chiede punti fermi.
Il primo è arrivare alla pace attraverso il sostegno all’Ucraina, “perché se l’aggressore può puntare alla resa dell’avversario, che bisogno ha di negoziare? Solo che la resa non è pace, è conquista”. La posizione del governo, quindi, non cambia: sostegno a Kyiv, con particolare attenzione alla popolazione civile, pressione su Mosca e unità euro-atlantica “rimangono i pilastri della nostra azione”. In questo contesto, l’intesa sul gasolio russo annunciata venerdì scorso dal presidente degli Stati Uniti Donald Trump è una scelta “che io considero molto rischiosa”.
Sul nome dell’inviato Ue per l’Ucraina, Meloni è schietta: “Se su un nome non si trova convergenza, siamo pronti anche a valutare soluzioni diverse. Se, ad esempio, Francia, Germania e Gran Bretagna, nel famoso formato E3, ritengono di poter fare da sole meglio di quanto potremmo fare tutti insieme, e finora è questa la scelta che hanno fatto, allora almeno lo facciano a nome di tutti e con un mandato ufficiale dato da tutti. Perché sarò onesta: considero secondario il tema di chi siede a quale tavolo. Mi interessa a nome di chi si siede al tavolo, e per dire cosa. Mi interessa che l’Europa non vada in ordine sparso, non offra il fianco a chi ha interesse ad alimentare le divisioni e parli con una voce sola. Perché un’Europa che si divide sui formati offre un’immagine di sé infantile, ed è l’unico vero regalo che possiamo fare a Mosca. E di regali a Mosca, in questi giorni, ne abbiamo fatti abbastanza”.
Meloni cerchia in rosso, inoltre, alcune priorità: proteggere le infrastrutture critiche come reti energetiche, cavi sottomarini, porti e aeroporti, sostenere l’industria italiana nel dare un contributo decisivo ai sistemi anti-drone e antimissile e, infine, ribadire che la sicurezza dei confini dell’Unione è indivisibile. Il ragionamento della premier è tarato su un nuovo concetto di difesa, che non si esaurisce più nei carri armati ma abbraccia altri ambiti e altri mezzi.
Difendersi vuol dire anche un ospedale che continua a curare sotto un attacco informatico, una centrale che non si spegne, un aeroporto che non chiude le piste per colpa di un drone. Difendersi non è proteggere un’idea astratta di potenza, ma la vita quotidiana dei cittadini. Quindi, spiega, “senza sicurezza, l’energia costa di più. E senza energia, potrebbe non rimanere nulla da difendere. Per questo abbiamo chiesto, e ottenuto, che la clausola di salvaguardia nazionale potesse essere utilizzata non soltanto per le spese di difesa, ma anche per le misure necessarie ad affrontare la crisi energetica”.
Non manca una stoccata: chi racconta che più sicurezza significa meno ospedali, e risorse sottratte ai servizi essenziali da un governo di guerrafondai, mente sapendo di farlo. “Tanto più se gli stessi che oggi ci accusano dall’opposizione, quando erano al governo approvavano, in piena pandemia, un aumento delle spese militari da 15 miliardi di euro. E allora non c’era neanche la guerra in Ucraina. Ma voglio dirlo a chi ci ascolta, riprendendo un ragionamento del ministro Crosetto, che ringrazio. Ogni 100 euro che lo Stato spende per la Difesa, circa 60 pagano gli stipendi di chi difende la nostra sicurezza, quasi 280 mila donne e uomini in divisa. Circa 10 euro servono a far funzionare le strutture ogni giorno. Circa 30 vanno in investimenti, in un comparto industriale che dà lavoro a oltre 300 mila persone, spesso altamente qualificate, in migliaia di piccole e medie imprese diffuse in tutta Italia. Chi parla di spreco dovrebbe anche spiegare a quelle famiglie che il loro lavoro è inutile. E quando compriamo, cosa compriamo? Prevalentemente strumenti per difenderci. Difesa aerea, sistemi anti-drone, cyber-sicurezza, protezione delle infrastrutture. Compriamo scudi”.
Meloni definisce il 7 ottobre 2023 un attacco barbaro, che ha gettato l’intera regione nel caos. “Credo che sia importante ricordarlo anche oggi, perché qualsiasi legittimo approccio critico verso le azioni del Governo israeliano nei tre anni successivi non può e non deve mai farci dimenticare quello che è stato il più orrendo pogrom dai tempi della Shoah, pianificato ed eseguito da Hamas”. Se da un lato la sicurezza dello Stato di Israele non può essere messa in discussione, dall’altro preoccupa il perdurare della presenza israeliana nel sud del Libano, in Siria e a Gaza. La premier ribadisce inoltre che gli insediamenti israeliani in Cisgiordania sono illegali e si oppone con forza a chi sostiene l’annessione e lo spostamento forzato della popolazione palestinese.
Cosa può fare l’Europa in questo frangente? “Riprendersi lo spazio che può occupare. E la finestra per farlo si aprirà, inevitabilmente, con l’insediamento del nuovo Governo israeliano, chiunque dovesse vincere le elezioni. Sarà quello il momento per chiedere gesti capaci di invertire la spirale negativa da troppo tempo in atto e di riaprire, in prospettiva, un percorso politico di pace”. La sua proposta all’Ue è lavorare al trasferimento all’Autorità palestinese delle entrate fiscali che Israele oggi trattiene, al congelamento dell’insediamento E1, a più aiuti per Gaza (senza che vengano drenati da Hamas) e a un’iniziativa politica per verificare se Hamas sia davvero disposta a deporre le armi.
Sul tema Meloni rivendica che l’approccio europeo è cambiato in modo significativo in questi anni, grazie al contributo decisivo dell’Italia, che “sta producendo risultati concreti”, come dimostrano i dati di Frontex: in due anni gli attraversamenti irregolari delle frontiere esterne dell’Unione si sono più che dimezzati. A proposito di Ceuta, ricorda poi che il Codice Schengen prevede espressamente la possibilità di reintrodurre temporaneamente i controlli alle frontiere interne per esigenze di ordine pubblico o di sicurezza. Si tratta, di fatto, di uno strumento utilizzato regolarmente dal 2006 a oggi.
Ma Ceuta ha insegnato anche un’altra cosa: “Una crisi alle frontiere non sempre nasce da sola, a volte viene costruita. I trafficanti la organizzano, i social la amplificano, la disinformazione la alimenta. Chi usa persone disperate come arma di pressione sui nostri confini non sta solo forzando una frontiera. Sta attaccando l’Europa e l’Europa deve dotarsi degli strumenti per rispondere”.
E ancora: “Se passa il messaggio che un ingresso irregolare può trasformarsi successivamente in una permanenza legale il rischio è alimentare nuove partenze, rafforzare il modello di affari dei trafficanti e vanificare parte degli sforzi che stiamo facendo per ridurre gli arrivi irregolari. E non ce lo possiamo permettere”. In questa direzione vanno gli sforzi del governo su progetti concreti come il Piano Mattei per l’Africa (“nato dalla convinzione che il rapporto tra Europa e Africa debba fondarsi su partenariati paritari, investimenti e crescita condivisa”) e su soluzioni innovative come i centri in Albania e i “return hubs” nei Paesi terzi, esplicitamente previsti dalle norme europee.
Infine, un passaggio di prospettiva. La premier tocca un nervo scoperto, il futuro dell’Europa, su cui sono stati scritti paper, studi e analisi. Meloni dice la sua e sottolinea che l’Europa deve decidere cosa fare da grande, “se continuare a scrivere regole come se nulla fosse cambiato, oppure può guardare la realtà per quello che è, e dotarsi degli strumenti per difendere la propria economia, la propria sicurezza, la propria libertà”.
È a questa seconda prospettiva che lavora Palazzo Chigi: un’Europa capace di tenere insieme transizione e industria, politiche tradizionali e nuove priorità, cooperazione con i partner e difesa dei propri confini. “Un’Europa pragmatica, che non ha paura di correggere le proprie scelte quando la realtà cambia. Un’Europa che concentra la sua forza sulle grandi sfide che nessuna Nazione può affrontare da sola, e sa farsi da parte dove le Nazioni fanno meglio da sole. Un’Europa grande sulle grandi questioni, e discreta su tutto il resto”.
E conclude: “Per anni ci hanno detto che, per contare in Europa, l’Italia doveva rinunciare a difendere i propri interessi. Abbiamo dimostrato il contrario. Perché un’Europa forte ha bisogno di Nazioni forti. E si può lavorare per un’Europa più solida e credibile senza smettere, neanche per un minuto, di difendere l’Italia con orgoglio”.
A restituição, que começou na última sexta-feira (9), deve beneficiar aproximadamente 26,5 milhões de apostadores.
As empresas de apostas tiveram até a última quinta-feira (8) para encaminhar às instituições financeiras os dados dos saldos vinculados aos CPFs e às contas bancárias utilizadas nos depósitos.
>> Mais de R$ 1 bilhão foi devolvido a apostadores até sábado
A devolução está sendo realizada pelas instituições financeiras, conforme o cronograma estabelecido pelo governo. Os apostadores devem acompanhar as movimentações da conta bancária utilizada para depositar dinheiro nas plataformas.
Veja as principais datas:
Se a devolução não for concluída por dificuldades operacionais, os valores remanescentes serão encaminhados à Caixa Econômica Federal a partir desta quarta-feira. O banco ficará responsável por intermediar os pagamentos pendentes.
Segundo o Ministério da Fazenda, as orientações para os apostadores nessa etapa serão divulgadas pelos canais oficiais. Por isso, é importante acompanhar os comunicados do governo e da instituição financeira.
Parte significativa dos recursos está distribuída em contas com valores muito baixos. Segundo o governo, 86,2 milhões de contas mantinham saldos entre R$ 0,01 e R$ 0,99, que somavam R$ 15,5 milhões.
O número de contas é superior ao de apostadores porque uma mesma pessoa pode ter cadastro em diferentes plataformas.
O governo também acompanha os saldos elevados que permaneceram nas plataformas. Segundo o ministro da Fazenda, Dario Durigan, cerca de 40 CPFs estão sob análise devido aos montantes mantidos nas contas, para apurar possíveis irregularidades, incluindo suspeitas de lavagem de dinheiro.
A medida provisória que determinou o encerramento das operações abrangidas pela decisão foi publicada em 25 de setembro e ainda precisa ser aprovada pelo Congresso Nacional dentro do prazo legal para continuar em vigor.
Para evitar fraudes durante a devolução dos recursos, os apostadores devem:
A restituição deve seguir o cronograma oficial. Não há necessidade de pagar quaisquer valores antecipados para receber o saldo.
Ukraine wants the EU to force Moscow into a ceasefire with frozen Russian assets, trade and transit embargoes, maritime bans, and entry bans, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha wrote on X after the EU Foreign Affairs Council in Luxembourg on 12 October 2026. He also welcomed new EU sanctions listings adopted that day and progress in Ukraine’s EU accession talks.
Kyiv has spent this month laying out truce formats it would accept while awaiting Russia’s position on talks, and the levers it is pressing the EU to use include frozen Russian assets that EU leaders failed to agree on tapping last December.
Sybiha called it “devastating pressure.” He also wants Russian combatants and their families barred from the EU, maximum visa restrictions, and Russia’s isolation in culture and sports.
I was pleased to attend the EU Foreign Affairs Council today.
— Andrii Sybiha
It is time for Europe to define its strong role. Our future and our security are in our hands.
Now is the time for real European pressure on Moscow. Not half-measures, but devastating pressure: frozen assets, trade… pic.twitter.com/AnI8h6HXbs
His post named three types of ceasefire—energy, food security, and a full ceasefire—without saying whether Kyiv would accept them separately. Earlier this month, he told journalists Ukraine was ready for an energy and Black Sea ceasefire “but only in such a combination.”
The minister welcomed the EU’s 12 October adoption of new sanctions listings against Russia—the largest single expansion of the bloc’s blacklist. EU ambassadors agreed on the 1,646 names on 7 October. They include 1,569 tied to Russia’s military industry and 77 to its so-called State Duma elections. The listings are separate from the EU’s 22nd sanctions package, which the EU has yet to adopt.
He also welcomed the EU’s “green light” for opening two more clusters in Ukraine’s EU accession talks: Internal Market, and Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth. The formal opening was scheduled for an intergovernmental conference on 13 October.
Sybiha said he briefed European colleagues on the front-line situation, Russia’s plans, and ways to deprive it of its advantages, and that he passed partners specific requests for aid. He reaffirmed Ukraine’s commitment to reforms.
Germany is preparing a new meeting of the Coalition of the Willing to coordinate further support for Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 12 October following a conversation with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz.
Russia continues to strike Ukraine’s energy infrastructure despite US President Donald Trump’s claim that Moscow has agreed to an energy truce. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is initiating a meeting of European leaders to discuss assistance to Ukraine in this situation.
Kyiv and Berlin have also agreed to hold a meeting of national security advisers in the E3 format, with Ukraine participating, according to the statement. The format involves an informal grouping of three leading European countries: the United Kingdom, France and Germany.
During the conversation, the two sides also discussed US President Donald Trump’s proposal for an energy truce and Russia’s subsequent actions. Russian forces continue to attack Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, Zelenskyy noted.
“This is exactly how the Russians behave when pressure eases. It is very important that Europe continue to act on principle,” Zelenskyy stressed.
Germany is coordinating preparations for a meeting of the Coalition of the Willing, the Ukrainian president noted. The two sides also discussed support for Ukraine’s financial stability. Further steps are to be coordinated in greater detail during a meeting scheduled for this week, Zelenskyy said.
The Coalition of the Willing was initiated by the United Kingdom and France, which held talks with representatives of 37 countries in March 2025 on supporting Ukraine in the event of a peace agreement. The initiative envisaged financial assistance and the deployment of troops, air forces or naval forces to protect Ukraine against renewed Russian aggression, Bloomberg reported.
The latest meeting of the Coalition of the Willing took place on 24 August and was the 16th meeting, according to a statement on the website of the President of Ukraine. Zelenskyy called on partners to strengthen Ukraine’s air defense and provide at least 300 missiles for Patriot systems for the winter, the statement said.
The president also proposed bringing forward part of the European loan financing planned for 2027 so that Ukraine could receive the funds this year. He separately stressed the need to find a mechanism for using frozen Russian assets to defend Ukraine and to unblock the maritime corridor in the Black Sea.
“We value this format—the Coalition of the Willing. It brings together countries that are ready not only to talk about security but also to act. We need this—to act and build real security together,” Zelenskyy stressed.
Ukraine and Russia had allegedly agreed to an immediate energy ceasefire, US President Donald Trump said on Truth Social on 11 October. However, at the time of publication, neither Kyiv nor Moscow had confirmed such an agreement, Ukrainska Pravda reported.
Ukraine supports the ceasefire and is awaiting details from the US side, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in a post on X the same day. Russia must also agree to halt the strikes, he stressed.
Ukrainian forces had received the relevant orders, and Kyiv was ready to refrain from striking Russian energy infrastructure provided Russia reciprocated, Zelenskyy said in his evening address on 11 October.
Russia continued attacking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure after the ceasefire was announced, including striking a gas production facility and a petrol station, Zelenskyy said on his official Telegram channel on 12 October. Moscow had shown no willingness to abide by the ceasefire, the president added.
The European Union is heading towards a potentially bruising institutional confrontation over its next long-term budget, after senior Members of the European Parliament rejected proposals from the Irish Presidency of the Council to reduce the European Commission’s spending plans by eight per cent.
The dispute concerns the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2028–2034, which will determine not merely how much Brussels spends, but the extent to which Europe can deliver on its increasingly ambitious political, economic and security objectives.
At stake is a fundamental question: can the European Union realistically aspire to become a more competitive, strategically independent global power while its member states resist providing the financial resources necessary to achieve those ambitions?
In a statement published on 10th October, Parliament’s principal budget negotiators, Siegfried Mureșan of the European People’s Party and Carla Tavares of the Socialists and Democrats, firmly rejected the Irish negotiating framework.
They were joined by Danuše Nerudová and Sandra Gómez López, Parliament’s co-rapporteurs responsible for developing new sources of EU revenue.
Their objections centre on the proposed reduction of approximately €141 billion from the Commission’s original spending plans.
Mureșan warned that the reductions would undermine Europe’s ability to respond to growing demands for defence, economic competitiveness and security.
He also highlighted the erosion of the EU budget’s purchasing power, which Parliament estimates has declined by approximately ten per cent because of inflation.
The implication is uncomfortable for national governments: maintaining apparently substantial expenditure figures does not necessarily translate into maintaining Europe’s capacity to act.
Ireland, currently holding the rotating Council Presidency, has attempted to reconcile two increasingly contradictory political demands.
On one side stand governments seeking greater investment in defence, technological innovation, economic resilience and geopolitical influence.
On the other are national finance ministries confronting constrained public finances, mounting borrowing costs and electorates increasingly resistant to additional expenditure.
The Irish Presidency’s proposal envisages approximately €1.62 trillion in commitments, expressed in 2025 prices, representing a substantial increase over the existing seven-year framework.
Dublin argues that its negotiating position offers an ambitious but financially realistic compromise, preserving traditional agricultural and cohesion spending while accommodating emerging priorities.
Yet the European Parliament remains unconvinced.
Particularly contentious are proposed reductions of 12.8 per cent in competitiveness expenditure and 17.4 per cent in external action compared with the Commission’s plans.
These are precisely the areas in which Brussels has repeatedly promised greater international influence.
The timing could scarcely be more awkward. Russia’s continuing aggression against Ukraine has exposed Europe’s dependence on American military capabilities, while mounting geopolitical uncertainty has reinforced demands for greater European strategic autonomy.
Meanwhile, competition from China and the United States is placing European industries under unprecedented pressure.
Brussels regularly speaks of technological sovereignty, stronger defence industries and reduced dependence on external suppliers, however, those objectives require sustained investment.
Cutting expenditure intended to strengthen competitiveness while simultaneously demanding that European companies compete more effectively internationally risks becoming an exercise in political contradiction.
Nevertheless, Parliament’s position deserves scrutiny too. Greater expenditure does not automatically produce better outcomes. Europe’s problems with fragmented defence procurement, regulatory complexity and slow implementation cannot simply be resolved by increasing budget allocations.
A credible financial settlement must therefore combine sufficient resources with demonstrably improved efficiency and accountability.
Perhaps the most consequential disagreement concerns how the Union should finance its expenditure.
Parliament has repeatedly argued that the EU must develop additional independent revenue streams rather than relying excessively on contributions from national governments.
Its proposals include levies associated with digital services, online gambling and cryptocurrency capital gains. MEPs believe these measures could generate approximately €30 billion beyond the additional revenue already envisaged by the Commission.
The Irish Presidency has advanced a revenue package that it estimates could eventually raise around €55 billion annually, but agreement among member states remains elusive.
This disagreement exposes an enduring weakness in European integration.
Governments frequently demand collective European action while remaining reluctant to surrender control over the financial mechanisms necessary to support it.
The institutional arithmetic makes Parliament’s opposition particularly significant. Although member states must unanimously approve the long-term financial framework, the European Parliament must also provide its consent by an absolute majority of MEPs. Consequently, national governments cannot simply impose a settlement over parliamentary objections.
Equally, the European Parliament cannot compel governments to finance its preferred spending programme. Both institutions therefore possess considerable negotiating leverage, raising the possibility of prolonged political deadlock.
The forthcoming European Council discussions on 15–16th October will provide an important indication of whether governments are prepared to reconsider their positions.
Ultimately, this dispute extends far beyond accounting. The European Union faces an increasingly hostile strategic environment, persistent economic challenges and growing demands for collective action.
Yet its institutional ambitions continue to outpace agreement on the financial commitments required to fulfil them.
Parliament is justified in questioning whether reducing investment in competitiveness and security represents prudent financial management or potentially damaging short-termism. National governments, however, are equally entitled to demand evidence that additional European expenditure will produce measurable benefits.
The solution cannot be unlimited spending, nor can it be indiscriminate austerity. Europe requires a budget that reflects its strategic responsibilities, backed by rigorous financial discipline and transparent political priorities.
Without such a settlement, the Union risks discovering that its greatest obstacle to becoming a serious geopolitical actor is not opposition from Washington, Moscow or Beijing, but its own inability to agree on the price of its ambitions.
France is coming under increasingly direct pressure from its eurozone partners to resolve the political dispute surrounding its 2027 budget, with European finance ministers warning that continued uncertainty threatens confidence in the country’s public finances.
The warning follows a sharp increase in French government borrowing costs. Yields on ten-year sovereign bonds have risen by nearly 80 basis points since September, reaching levels last recorded in 2002. Investors are demanding higher returns to finance a government whose debt continues to increase while its capacity to impose spending restraint remains constrained by parliamentary divisions.
At the Eurogroup’s October discussions, finance ministers and European Central Bank officials pressed Paris to demonstrate that it can adopt a credible budget and comply with its commitments under the EU’s fiscal framework.
France’s difficulties have implications beyond its domestic politics. As the eurozone’s second-largest economy, France occupies a position fundamentally different from smaller countries that experienced sovereign debt crises during the previous decade.
The French government expects to borrow approximately €340 billion in 2027, making continued access to financial markets at sustainable rates an essential element of its fiscal strategy.
That financing requirement reflects both the need to cover the annual deficit and to refinance existing debt as government securities mature.
France’s public debt is already approaching 120 per cent of gross domestic product. As EU Today previously reported, official projections indicated that the debt ratio could reach 121.7 per cent in 2027, up from 115.7 per cent at the end of 2025.
The latest increase in yields adds another complication. Higher interest costs do not affect the entire stock of debt immediately because much of it was issued at earlier rates. They do, however, increase the cost of new borrowing and refinancing, progressively reducing the money available for other government commitments.
France also faces a difficult political timetable. With the presidential election approaching in 2027, parties are reluctant to accept measures involving spending reductions, higher taxation or changes to public services.
Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu’s government has been attempting to reduce the deficit from an estimated 5.4 per cent of GDP in 2026 towards five per cent. Even that objective remains substantially above the EU’s three per cent reference value.
Economic Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis has emphasised the importance of predictable fiscal policy and credible deficit reduction.
France is already subject to the EU’s excessive deficit procedure, under which member states must demonstrate progress towards agreed fiscal objectives.
The reformed European fiscal framework permits certain deviations from expenditure commitments in exceptional circumstances, but it does not provide an unrestricted exemption from debt sustainability requirements.
Paris therefore faces a double constraint. It must convince domestic political forces to support a budget while demonstrating to Brussels that its spending plans are sufficiently credible.
The danger is not necessarily an immediate financing crisis. France retains a large, diversified economy, deep financial markets and substantial tax-raising capacity.
The more immediate risk is that prolonged political deadlock produces progressively higher borrowing costs, making future fiscal adjustments more expensive.
The European Central Bank has instruments designed to counter destabilising market conditions, but these are not intended to finance governments that are unwilling or unable to implement sustainable fiscal policies.
Bank of France Governor Emmanuel Moulin said on 7 October that France did not currently require ECB assistance. He argued that the solution lay in adopting a credible budget rather than expecting monetary intervention.
His position follows increasing speculation about whether the ECB could intervene if French bond yields continue rising.
Such intervention would raise difficult questions about the relationship between monetary policy and national fiscal responsibility. The ECB must consider financial stability across the entire eurozone, but it cannot remove the political obligations of individual governments.
France’s existing excessive deficit procedure also complicates its eligibility for certain forms of exceptional support.
France’s problems are developing at a particularly difficult moment for European public finances.
Governments are confronting higher defence commitments, expensive measures to protect households against energy inflation and demands for greater investment in industrial competitiveness.
Italy, another heavily indebted eurozone economy, is facing related pressures. The combination places additional importance on the credibility of the EU’s fiscal rules.
The political consequences within France are already visible. Marine Le Pen has presented a programme proposing €140 billion in spending reductions, while other parties have advanced sharply different approaches to taxation, debt and public expenditure.
Those competing programmes illustrate the difficulty of securing a parliamentary consensus capable of reassuring markets.
The approaching presidential election reduces the likelihood of a durable settlement before voters choose France’s next head of state.
Eurozone partners cannot resolve that impasse from Brussels or Frankfurt. They can insist on fiscal commitments and provide a framework for adjustment, but the political decisions remain with Paris.
France’s immediate challenge is to prevent its budget dispute from becoming a broader loss of confidence in the government’s capacity to manage its finances.
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