❌

Normal view

In Sassonia-Anhalt AfD e BSW si accordano per evitare la guerra alla Russia

By: A A
19 October 2026 at 22:05

Nel Landtag della Sassonia-Anhalt in Germania si è verificato un passaggio politico fondamentale che potrebbe segnare una svolta duratura per l’intero panorama politico tedesco e che, forse, potrebbe insegnare qualcosa anche nel resto d’Europa

Segue nostro Telegram.

Con l’approvazione di una mozione presentata dal BSW insieme all’AfD – rispettivamente il partito della sinistra patriottica fondato da Sahra Wagenknecht e il partito nazionalista di destra accusato di “fascismo” – il parlamento regionale ha formalmente impegnato il governo del Land a farsi promotore nel Bundesrat di una netta svolta strategica: lo stop all’invio di armi al regime golpista di Kiev, la fine delle sanzioni economiche alla Russia e l’avvio immediato di trattative diplomatiche.

SPD, Verdi e CDU per la guerra, contro il buon senso

L’iniziativa ha scatenato la reazione indignata dei partiti tradizionali, soprattutto i socialdemocratici di SPD, i Verdi e i democristiani di CDU, pronti a denunciare la presunta violazione del cosiddetto “Brandmauer”, il cordone sanitario istituzionale eretto verso la destra giudicata “fascista”. Tuttavia, la linea argomentata dalla marxista Sahra Wagenknecht dimostra come questa scelta non rappresenti una provocazione, bensì un atto di responsabilità democratica e di pragmatismo politico. AfD avrà al suo interno anche degli estremisti di destra, ma è un partito di massa votato perlopiù dalla classe operaia, e pur di fermare l’entrata in guerra della Germania contro la Russia, BSW è disposta a tutto.

Le sanzioni anti-russe distruggono l’industria tedesca

Come evidenziato dalla leader del BSW, le decisioni di politica estera prese a Berlino non sono astrazioni teoriche, ma incidono direttamente sulla vita quotidiana dei cittadini e sulla tenuta del tessuto produttivo locale. La Sassonia-Anhalt ospita poli industriali di prim’ordine, come il distretto chimico di Leuna, oggi messi a dura prova dall’esplosione dei costi energetici e dall’interruzione dei rapporti commerciali con l’Est. Le sanzioni contro la Russia hanno già provocato molti fallimenti aziendali, ma non in Russia, bensì in Germania, mettendo a rischio migliaia di posti di lavoro qualificati. A ciò si aggiunge l’invio continuo di ingenti risorse, fra soldi e armi, in Ucraina, a fronte di dolorosi tagli alla sanità, alla scuola, alle pensioni e ai servizi sociali, che rendono i lavoratori tedeschi sempre più insofferenti.

L’anti-fascismo usato come scusa per giustificare la NATO e la guerra

In questo scenario, BSW rifiuta la logica difensiva dell’establishment borghese, appoggiato dalla sinistra egemone, tanto nella sua versione moderata di SPD quanto in quella liberal più massimalista della LINKE. Questi partiti insistono che il pericolo principale non è la guerra voluta dalla NATO, ma i “fascisti” di AfD, che occorre isolare, benché votati democraticamente, impedendo qualsiasi accordo o alleanza. L’analisi di Wagenknecht, retta dal metodo del materialismo dialettico tipicamente marxista, individua invece una profonda frattura nella società tedesca: da un lato il campo di chi intende conservare il potere (“Machterhaltendes Lager”), rappresentato dai partiti di governo e dai ceti più benestanti che difendono la linea dell’escalation militare agli ordini della NATO e dell’UE contro la Russia e domani contro la Cina; dall’altro il campo del dissenso (“Lager der Unzufriedenen”), formato da lavoratori, pensionati e famiglie schiacciate dall’inflazione e preoccupate dal pericolo di un coinvolgimento diretto dei loro figli nel conflitto attraverso il nuovo servizio militare obbligatorio, contro cui i liceali tedeschi continuano regolarmente a scioperare. Per troppo tempo la retorica del “Brandmauer” (il muro anti-fuoco che dovrebbe isolare AfD dal dibattito politico) è servita alle forze governative tedesche per squalificare il dissenso e isolare le proteste popolari sotto l’etichetta dell’estremismo. Per il BSW, il dovere prioritario di una forza politica d’opposizione è rispettare la volontà degli elettori, dialogare nell’alveo delle regole parlamentari e sfruttare ogni maggioranza utile per raggiungere obiettivi concreti: fermare la spirale bellica, proteggere l’industria nazionale e tutelare i redditi dei lavoratori. E per fare questo Wagenknecht vuole superare i veti incrociati e la politica dei blocchi: il BSW dimostra che la vera priorità deve tornare a essere la difesa della pace, della neutralità militare, del lavoro e della sovranità popolare.

La fase storica impone il coraggio di rompere gli schemi

Di fronte all’accusa di agire come gregari del “fascismo”, l’antifascista Wagenknecht risponde che la strategia del “Brandmauer” è fallita nei fatti e ha ottenuto l’effetto opposto, alimentando la rabbia popolare e rafforzando proprio l’AfD. Al contrario BSW vuole dialogare con tutte le forze parlamentari e sfruttare le maggioranze d’azione per mantenere le promesse elettorali (come la pace e la calmierazione dei prezzi). La Wagenknecht spiega che i partiti del sistema, siano essi di destra o di sinistra, usano la retorica dell’antifascismo solo per delegittimare il dissenso, sospendere le regole democratiche e conservare il potere nonostante politiche fallimentari. Questo atteggiamento, secondo la leader del BSW, banalizza in modo irresponsabile la reale tragedia della dittatura nazista. Wagenknecht sottolinea infatti come i diritti democratici fondamentali e la libertà di stampa siano stati compressi negli ultimi anni non dall’AfD, ma dai partiti liberali, democristiani e socialdemocratici al governo, gli stessi che inviano decine di miliardi di euro a un regime ucraino che ha messo al bando i partiti d’opposizione e tollera la glorificazione di collaboratori nazisti.

Basta guerra alla Russia: questa è la sola priorità oggi!

Rispetto alla tesi secondo cui negoziare con Mosca sia impossibile perché l’ultra-demonizzato Vladimir Putin rifiuterebbe il dialogo, Wagenknecht non concorda: il Cremlino si era mostrato disponibile a discutere, ma i tentativi di trattativa sono stati chiusi dalla leadership ucraina e dai governi europei spinti dalla NATO e dall’industria delle armi a continuare la guerra. La narrazione, poi, secondo cui l’invio continuo di armi porterebbe alla vittoria dell’Ucraina è una finzione a cui per BSW “non crede più nessuno” e anzi l’escalation bellica – comprese le incursioni su Mosca condotte con tecnologia e droni tedeschi – è una strategia che rasenta la follia, rischiando di trascinare direttamente la Germania in un conflitto nucleare. Su questo aspetto anche il Partito Comunista Tedesco (DKP) denuncia l’ipocrisia dei partiti di governo (SPD, Verdi, CDU), che sfruttano la retorica del “cordone sanitario” antifascista con la scusa di frenare l’estrema destra eversiva, quando il vero obbiettivo è delegittimare qualsiasi mozione pacifista, indipendentemente da chi la voti in aula, contro l’escalation della NATO e contro le sanzioni.

Articolo originale  politicanuova.ch

Albania on fire: who’s behind the riots?

By: aletho
19 October 2026 at 20:03
RT | October 19, 2026

Anti-government rioters have torched Albania’s education ministry and supreme court, as protests spread across the Balkan nation. Prime Minister Edi Rama is refusing to step down and blames the unrest on Russia. What’s really going on?

As of October 19, the Albanian capital of Tirana has been rocked by seven consecutive days and nights of rioting, while protests and clashes between demonstrators and police have been reported in the cities of Lezhe, Vlore, Elbasan, and Shkoder. A large group of rioters breached the perimeter of the education ministry in Tirana on October 14, setting the building on fire.

Running battles between demonstrators and police have broken out around the ministry on several occasions since. On October 19, hundreds of demonstrators pelted rocks at riot police, who responded with tear gas and rubber bullets. The previous night, offices of the Albanian Supreme Court were set on fire, and arson attacks on several police stations in the city were reported.

Some 500 demonstrators had been detained and 167 of them formally arrested as of October 17, according to Reuters. 295 people had been injured, including 196 police officers, as of October 19, according to Interior Minister Ervin Demo.

What do the protesters want?

The protests follow more than a year of unrest in Albania, which began when Rama banned TikTok in the runup to last March’s parliamentary elections, following similar measures inposed by the EU during every major election across the bloc since 2024. The ban was lifted in February of this year, but demonstrations broke out again in May after Rama’s government authorized the sale of protected wetlands to a development company operated by US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner.
WATCH smashed storefronts, burned buildings as Europe faces aftermath of latest violent protests READ MORE: WATCH smashed storefronts, burned buildings as Europe faces aftermath of latest violent protests

The protesters demanded the resignation of Rama and his entire cabinet, and the cancellation of a planned twin-phase resort project on the wetlands and on nearby Sazan Island.

The protesters’ core demand – that Rama resign – remains unchanged. However, the movement is now calling for a root-and-branch reform of the entire Albanian establishment, with demonstrators accusing both Rama and opposition leader Sali Berisha of corruption. Unemployment, underfunding of schools, and declining living standards have also been cited by protesters as grievances.

What did Rama say about the protests?

Despite the repeated chants of “Rama resign” heard at the protests, Rama has claimed that the demonstrators do not oppose his government, but Albania’s “mission” of joining the EU.

“I am not being challenged,” he said in a video address on October 18. “The government is not being challenged, a government majority or a winning party in the elections is not being challenged but a path is being challenged, a mission is being challenged”

“Albanians need to think ​very clearly,” he continued. “Do they want this, do they want that, or do they want the EU?”

Rama has refused to resign, and blamed the protests on “foreign hands that do not wish for Albania to be at peace.” Back in June, Rama accused “the enemies of Albania and of Israel” of waging a “hybrid war” to stop the wetlands development. In two separate speeches on October 18 and 19, the embattled PM blamed the unrest on Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin and a “wave of Russian influence in the entire social media system,” and on “the Khomeiniist republic of Iran, the pinnacle of disinformation.”
Was Russia involved?

In short, no. Rama has not backed up any of his accusations, and they are being treated with skepticism and ridicule by demonstrators and opposition media. Albania’s Publik Media news outlet criticised Rama for “eturn[ing[ to the Berisha, Russia and Iran alibi,” while Pamfleti, an investigative outlet, dismissed his claims as an “ignorant reaction to those protesting his misgovernance”

Even the US-run Radio Free Europe noted that Rama “did not present public evidence” to back up his allegations.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova has rejected Rama’s accusations. “No, Edi Rama,” she said on October 18, “it is the citizens of your country who have taken to the streets in protest.”

“This has all the hallmarks of the ‘highly likely’ British approach,” Serbian journalist Nebojsa Malic told RT on October 19, referring to British Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s failed attempts to blame the 2016 Brexit vote on Russia and a recent ‘terror plot’ at a US airbase on Iran. “We’ll just make an accusation and provide no evidence but say ‘oh it’s highly likely that Russia’s behind this’, and everybody is going to take it for granted.”

Rama is “doing this because he’s hoping it will stick,” Malic said. “He has nothing to lose. He’s seen plenty of leaders in western Europe essentially getting away scot free with covering for their malice and incompetence by blaming Russia.”

“Rama is just as opportunistic as [French President Emmanuel] Macron or any British prime minister in the last ten years,” Malic concluded. “They will say or do whatever, because they think that Russia is not able to defend itself.”

Why did Rama mention Israel?

Rama’s claim that “enemies of Albania and Israel” were behind this summer’s environmental protests stems from the involvement of Kushner in the wetlands project. A close associate of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Kushner has extensive family and financial ties to Israel. His investment firm, Affinity Partners, has funneled Emirati, Saudi, and Qatari cash into multiple Israeli businesses, including five arms manufacturers.

However, all available information suggests that the funding for Kushner’s Albanian projects comes from Albanian, American, and Qatari individuals and entities. Affinity Partners is leading the €1.4 billion Sazan Island project, while Kushner himself is a minority partner in the wetlands development.

Rama visited Israel and addressed the Knesset in January. Less than 24 hours later, Israel’s Channel 12 claimed that the Albanian PM had struck a deal with Netanyahu to accept up to 100,000 Palestinian refugees from Gaza. As speculation spread that the Palestinians would be resettled on land developed by Kushner, Rama clarified that no such deal had been, or would be, made.

Regardless, Rama’s close relations with Netanyahu are at odds with public opinion in Albania, where a 2024 poll found that 73% of the population believe that Israel should be sanctioned over its war on Gaza. Kushner is widely seen in Albania as representing Israeli interests, and Rama’s decision to amend environmental laws and grant “strategic investor” status to Affinity Partners has fueled accusations that the PM is placing Washington and West Jerusalem’s interests above Tirana’s.

Will there be an Albanian Maidan?

Some images emerging from Tirana – burning barricades, police officers set on fire with Molotov cocktails, and smouldering government buildings – are reminiscent of the scenes that played out during the 2014 ‘Maidan’ coup in Ukraine. However, Rama is in far less perilous of a position than Ukraine’s president, Viktor Yanukovich, was during the 2014 uprising.

Unlike the present unrest in Albania, the Maidan coup was planned and directed by foreign actors, namely the US State Department and the British embassy in Kiev. Rama, on the other hand, is a close partner of the EU and US, and neither Washington nor Brussels have backed the protesters. Instead, Rama has apparently been given carte blanche to squash the demonstrations, with columns of military vehicles seen entering Tirana between October 15 and 19.

The EU has condemned the use of violence by protesters, with the European Commission criticizing them for “arson, attacks on State institutions and the destruction of public and private property.” In a statement on October 18, the commission praised Rama’s progress toward EU membership and welcomed his “commitment that the right to protest will be protected.”

One week earlier, an EU delegation in Tirana said that Brussels was “aware of allegations of excessive use of force by the police against protesters and journalists,” adding that the government’s response to protests and riots “must remain within the law.”

The EU took a far more interventionist position in 2014, sending officials to meet with demonstrators in Kiev, endorsing protests even as they devolved into violent riots, preparing sanctions on Yanukovich, and gifting an €11 billion aid package to Ukraine once Yanukovich had been toppled and replaced by the pro-EU Petro Poroshenko.

The West is still firmly on Rama’s side, and he is unlikely to face any calls for resignation from abroad. However, he is still facing the most sustained public pressure campaign of his 13-year stint in power, and if the protests continue and more buildings burn, he may be left with no choice but to admit defeat and step down.

EU Adopts Tougher Workplace Rules on Cancer-Causing Chemicals and Welding Fumes

19 October 2026 at 18:31

The Council of the European Union has formally adopted revised workplace safety legislation introducing stricter limits on workers’ exposure to potentially dangerous chemicals, including substances used in battery manufacturing, metal production and the chemical industry.

The decision, announced on Monday, 19th October, completes the Council’s approval of the sixth revision of the EU’s Carcinogens, Mutagens and Reprotoxic Substances Directive. The legislation introduces or updates exposure limits for cobalt compounds, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, 1,4-dioxane and isoprene, while extending specific protections to work involving hazardous welding fumes.

According to the Council’s announcement, the measures could prevent approximately 1,700 cases of lung cancer and 19,000 other work-related illnesses across the European Union over 40 years.

New exposure limits for industrial substances

The legislation addresses chemicals encountered in industries that remain important to European manufacturing and industrial employment.

Cobalt and its inorganic compounds are used in several industrial applications, including certain battery technologies, metal processing and specialist manufacturing.

Exposure to cobalt-containing dust and fumes can occur during production processes, particularly where workers handle powders or undertake activities that generate airborne particles.

Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, commonly known as PAHs, can arise during industrial processes involving combustion or the processing of carbon-containing materials. Workers in parts of the steel, aluminium and carbon industries may encounter these compounds.

The new legislation also covers 1,4-dioxane, a chemical used in industrial production processes, including applications connected with chemical and textile manufacturing.

Isoprene was added to the revised framework during negotiations between the Council and European Parliament. The substance is used in the manufacture of synthetic rubber and other industrial products.

Exposure limits establish the maximum permissible concentration of specified hazardous substances in workplace air, subject to the measurement methods and averaging periods laid down in the legislation.

Employers must also apply wider preventive measures, which can include replacing hazardous substances where technically possible, improving ventilation, containing industrial processes and monitoring workplace exposure.

Welding fumes brought within revised framework

One of the significant changes concerns welding fumes, which can contain hazardous substances depending on the materials and processes involved.

Welding is used extensively in construction, automotive production, shipbuilding, infrastructure maintenance and the manufacture of industrial equipment.

Workers may be exposed to mixtures of particles and gases produced when metals are heated, melted or joined.

The revised directive adds relevant welding fumes to the list of substances, mixtures and industrial processes subject to specific requirements under EU occupational safety legislation.

This is particularly relevant where the fumes contain substances classified as carcinogenic, mutagenic or harmful to reproduction.

The legislation does not prohibit welding. Instead, it establishes a clearer legal framework for assessing and reducing occupational exposure.

European institutions have also recognised the need for additional practical guidance to assist employers in applying the new provisions across industries using different welding technologies and materials.

The agreement reached by Parliament and Council in June included provisions addressing protective equipment and the conditions under which it should be used.

Industry granted transition periods

The legislation was negotiated against concerns that some manufacturers would require substantial investment to comply with the revised exposure limits.

Industrial employers may need to install extraction systems, improve ventilation, adapt production equipment or introduce additional monitoring arrangements.

For certain substances, the final compromise therefore includes transitional periods intended to give affected sectors time to make the necessary changes.

The agreed period for the application of new limits on polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons extends to seven years, with provisions covering carbon and graphite manufacturers.

This was one of the modifications introduced during negotiations to balance occupational health requirements with the technical constraints facing individual industries.

The agreement also provides for regular breaks for workers required to wear personal protective equipment and clarifies how those measures interact with existing EU legislation.

Protective equipment remains part of the safety framework, although the directive also recognises the importance of preventing exposure through engineering controls and improved working practices.

Health and economic implications

The European Commission estimates that more than 2.5 million workers could be exposed to the substances or processes covered by the revision.

Occupational illnesses can produce substantial costs for workers, employers and public health systems, including treatment expenses, sickness absence, reduced productivity and long-term disability.

The Commission previously estimated that the updated legislation could generate up to €1.16 billion in healthcare savings over the coming decades.

These figures are projections derived from assessments of expected exposure reductions rather than outcomes already achieved.

Their accuracy will depend on how effectively Member States implement the legislation and how consistently employers comply with the new requirements.

The measures also form part of the EU’s broader programme to reduce workplace exposure to substances associated with cancer and other serious illnesses.

Two years for national implementation

The directive will enter into force following publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. Member States will then have two years to transpose its provisions into national law.

National authorities will remain responsible for inspections and enforcement, while employers will need to assess which new requirements apply to their operations.

For businesses operating across several EU countries, the revised framework is intended to provide more consistent standards, although national enforcement arrangements may differ.

The practical effects will be most apparent in industrial workplaces where airborne chemical exposure remains a routine occupational risk. Compliance will require manufacturers to examine their production processes before the new requirements become enforceable.

We need to stop disinformation in UK political adverts. Here’s a chance to do so | Letter

19 October 2026 at 18:17

Alex Tait on a proposed amendment to the representation of the people bill, and Dr Joseph Mullen on Russian interference in the Brexit referendum

Andy Burnham’s comments about Russian interference in Brexit (Report, 11 October) and the warning by the MI5 chief, Ken McCallum, against exaggerating its impact (Report, 13 October) risk overlooking another serious threat to electoral integrity: disinformation from our own political parties and campaigners.

Foreign interference deserves scrutiny, but misleading factual claims in electoral advertising are unregulated, unlike in commercial advertising. We have four sets of rules to ensure an advert for a packet of sausages is accurate, but none for the most important advertising of all – ads that influence how we vote.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Tuomas A Lehtinen/Getty Images

© Photograph: Tuomas A Lehtinen/Getty Images

© Photograph: Tuomas A Lehtinen/Getty Images

Cyberattack on 700 French Supermarkets Exposes Gaps in Europe’s Infrastructure Security

19 October 2026 at 17:29

A cyberattack affecting approximately 700 supermarkets in France has exposed serious weaknesses in the digital systems used to control commercial refrigeration, raising concerns about the vulnerability of European food distribution networks and other essential infrastructure.

The attack began overnight on 11–12th October, when intruders gained access to remotely managed refrigeration equipment and altered operating settings, causing refrigerators and freezers to overheat.

Stores belonging to several major supermarket chains were affected, including Intermarché, Netto, Coopérative U, Carrefour and Monoprix. Some were forced to discard substantial quantities of fresh and frozen food.

French Finance Minister Roland Lescure confirmed that approximately 700 of the country’s 10,000 supermarkets had been affected, although the severity of the disruption varied between locations.

The Paris prosecutor’s office has opened an investigation into the attack, including the damage caused by destroyed merchandise and reported fires.

The incident has drawn attention to industrial control systems that are routinely connected to the internet but may receive less cybersecurity protection than corporate networks and customer databases.

Refrigeration systems remotely manipulated

Investigators have established that refrigeration equipment was targeted through vulnerabilities associated with remote monitoring and control systems.

The French cybersecurity authorities identified compromises involving products supplied by Danish manufacturer Danfoss and American company Copeland.

Some of the affected systems used older equipment that no longer received regular security updates.

According to information released by the companies and cybersecurity specialists, certain industrial controllers had been accessible through public internet connections, creating opportunities for unauthorised access.

Hackers reportedly manipulated defrost cycles and increased temperature settings, preventing equipment from maintaining the cold conditions required to preserve food.

The attack affected approximately 300 Intermarché and Netto stores, while Coopérative U reported disruption at around 80 outlets.

Several retailers managed to contain the damage, but others lost substantial quantities of stock.

The consequences extended beyond malfunctioning equipment. Businesses faced the cost of replacing spoiled food, repairing refrigeration systems and restoring normal operations.

The precise financial damage is still being assessed, although estimates from the retail sector indicate that losses across France could amount to tens of millions of euros.

Vulnerabilities in connected equipment

The incident illustrates the security problems created by the growing use of internet-connected industrial equipment.

Modern refrigeration installations allow contractors and maintenance specialists to monitor temperatures, adjust settings and diagnose faults remotely.

These arrangements can reduce operating costs and improve efficiency, but they also create additional access points that attackers may exploit.

Cybersecurity specialists have identified vulnerabilities in commercial refrigeration platforms manufactured by Danfoss and Copeland.

The manufacturers subsequently addressed identified flaws, although older or unsupported equipment remained a concern.

A critical problem for businesses is that industrial machinery often remains operational for many years after its original software has become obsolete.

Replacing entire refrigeration installations can involve substantial expense and operational disruption, encouraging operators to retain equipment that may no longer meet contemporary cybersecurity standards.

The risks are particularly difficult to manage when responsibility for maintenance, software updates and network security is divided between retailers, equipment suppliers and external contractors.

France’s delayed cybersecurity legislation

The attack has renewed scrutiny of France’s implementation of the European Union’s NIS2 Directive, which is intended to strengthen cybersecurity across sectors providing important economic and public services.

The directive establishes common requirements covering risk management, incident reporting, organisational responsibility and protection against cyber threats.

Its scope extends beyond traditional critical infrastructure such as energy, telecommunications and transport to include certain businesses involved in food production, processing and distribution.

EU member states were required to incorporate the directive into national legislation by 17 October 2024.

France was among the countries that received a formal warning from the European Commission in May 2025 over incomplete implementation.

French cybersecurity specialists have since warned that delays have complicated efforts to establish consistent obligations for organisations operating industrial and commercial systems.

However, NIS2 does not automatically cover every supermarket. Its application depends on the nature and size of an organisation and the provisions of national implementing legislation.

The incident therefore raises questions not only about the pace of legislative implementation but also about the practical protection of equipment already in use.

Wider implications for European infrastructure

The disruption demonstrates how a cyberattack can cause physical damage without directly targeting a conventional industrial facility.

Unlike breaches intended to steal customer information, the French incident interfered with machinery responsible for preserving essential products.

The distinction is important for European policymakers, who increasingly face threats to infrastructure that combines digital controls with physical operations.

The European Union’s cybersecurity agency ENISA has organised cross-border exercises to test how authorities and companies would respond to disruption affecting essential services.

The attack itself has been established, but responsibility for it has not been publicly attributed.

French authorities have said there is no immediate threat to national food supplies. Nevertheless, the destruction of merchandise and interruption of ordinary retail operations have demonstrated the potential economic consequences of weaknesses in relatively commonplace equipment.

The continuing investigation must establish how access was obtained, which systems were compromised and whether the vulnerabilities were known to operators before the attack.

For Brussels and national regulators, the case provides a practical test of whether European cybersecurity legislation can translate into effective protection for the connected equipment on which ordinary commercial activities increasingly depend.

Shall we have another EU referendum? Maybe – but not yet | Polly Toynbee

19 October 2026 at 16:17

We saw last time what reckless reliance on close polling led to. The omertà on rejoining has now been broken, but it would be folly to move too soon

When I hear that word again, a shudder runs down my spine. I want to groan, hold my head in my hands and wail. The horror! No, never again, not another referendum. But the idea is back in play as Andy Burnham looks for ways to reverse a decade of economic stagnation.

As the prime minister dared to unlock the door to a Brussels reunion, you could hear Ode to Joy burst out from all remainers. But the prospect of a re-run of the most self-destructive vote in our history is dismaying.

Polly Toynbee is a Guardian columnist

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Justin Tallis/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Justin Tallis/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Justin Tallis/AFP/Getty Images

Recycling could halve EU need for lithium, nickel by 2040 – study

19 October 2026 at 16:10

The European Union (EU) can reduce the need for new minerals for batteries, with recycling set to halve the demand for lithium and nickel by 2040, according to a study

The post Recycling could halve EU need for lithium, nickel by 2040 – study appeared first on Portugal Resident.

Un appel citoyen pour sortir l’Abkhazie de l’isolement

By: A A
19 October 2026 at 16:54

Frédéric DELORCA

Avec son climat subtropical qui permet d’avoir plusieurs récoltes de fruits par an et ses plages de sable fin sur les bords de la Mer Noire, et ses chemins de randonnée à travers les forêts profondes et les sommets enneigés du Caucase, l’Abkhazie, ancien lieu de villégiature de la nomenklatura soviétique, pourrait être un paradis touristique inscrit au catalogue de toutes les agences de voyage comme la Thaïlande et Acapulco.

Elle l’est chaque année pour plus d’un million de touristes russes (surtout depuis que la guerre d’Ukraine complique leurs voyages à travers le monde). Mais pour les médias mainstreams d’Europe occidentale, ce petit pays de 250 000 habitants, qui a fait sécession de la Géorgie en 1993 au terme d’une guerre de libération de David contre Goliath, n’est qu’une enclave qui serait purement et simplement annexée par les Russes et vouée à l’isolement et à l’embargo, jusqu’à ce qu’il ait retrouvé le giron de ses anciens maîtres à Tbilissi.

Pourtant l’hypothèse d’une réunification relève de la pure politique fiction. Ni les 50 % d’abkhazes ethniques qui ont payé le prix du sang pour s’opposer à la politique assimilationniste des Géorgiens, ni les autres communautés (Arméniens, Russes, Grecs, Mingréliens) n’aspirent au retour de la Géorgie. Plus de trente ans de séparation entre les deux pays, l’Abkhazie s’est habituée à vivre loin de Tbilissi. Et les fièvres anti-russes attisées par l’Union Européenne et l’Amérique qui périodiquement enflamment Tbilissi (comme lorsqu’en 2008 le nationaliste Saakachvili, l’ex-patron de Raphaël Glucksman, avec le soutien de Washington, avait lancé ses troupes contre l’Ossétie du Sud, une autre entité qui s’était séparée de son pays) ne sont pas de nature à combler le fossé.

La question aujourd’hui pour le peuple abkhaze est de savoir comment construire un avenir pour soi-même quand on n’est reconnu que par quatre Etats : la Russie, le Nicaragua, le Vénézuéla et la Syrie… Si Taiwan n’est pas membre de l’ONU, cela n’empêche pas les Taiwanais de voyager à travers le monde, de même les Kosovars dont le pays n’est pas reconnu par l’Espagne ou par la Roumanie peuvent quand même se rendre dans l’Union européenne. Les Abkhazes ne bénéficient pas de ce genre de facilité. Car à l’absence de reconnaissance de leur Etat au niveau international s’ajoute une double peine liée au fait qu’ils sont assimilés par la propagande occidentale à une sorte d’axe du mal pro-russe. Du coup, non seulement leurs passeports ne sont pas reconnus (à tel point qu’ils ne peuvent même pas se rendre dans la Turquie voisine), mais ils subissent de plein fouet les sanctions économiques ciblées vers leur grand frère du Nord.

L’équation sommaire « Abkhazes = alliés des Russes », est pourtant plus complexe qu’il n’y paraît. En 1996 Eltsine avait placé l’Abkhazie sous embargo, et si Poutine se pose plutôt en protecteur, les Abkhazes veillent à ce que cela ne se fasse pas au détriment de leur souveraineté. En novembre 2024 par exemple, les manifestants à Soukhoumi étaient parvenus, en mode « gilets jaunes » à renverser le gouvernement jugé trop pro-Russe en envahissant le siège de ses institutions. Dans ce pays où tout le monde est prêt à défendre sa liberté avec les armes, l’achat des terres reste interdit aux étrangers, ce qui le préserve aussi de la spéculation et des excès du capitalisme cynique qu’il soit russe ou globalisé.

Avant de définir quel degré de proximité les Abkhazes doivent entretenir avec leur protecteur russe et avec les autres pays de la région, l’urgence première pour ce peuple est de desserrer sur un plan strictement humanitaire l’étau qui les étrangle, et qui fait que, par exemple, même le fait d’aller se faire soigner à l’étranger pour des soins médicaux (quand le système sanitaire local est largement défaillant) peut relever du casse-tête (car même la détention d’un passeport russe ne vous garantit pas un droit d’être soigné gratuitement à Sotchi).

D’une façon très significative, l’initiative pour desserrer cet étau a été prise par un collectif citoyen ancré dans la diaspora abkhaze en Turquie, une communauté issue de l’exil d’Abkhazes qui ont fui au XIXe siècle les massacres tsaristes. Cette communauté, qui compte environ 500 000 membres a progressivement repris conscience de ses racines caucasiennes dans les années 1990. En son sein l’avocat communiste Anit Baba a lancé en juin dernier une pétition pour convaincre le gouvernement turc d’autoriser les ressortissants d’Abkhazie à venir dans ce pays, et en vue du rétablissement de la liaison maritime entre Soukhoumi et les ports turcs.

Cette campagne a connu un succès immédiat dans les partis de gauche turcs, et même au sein de mouvements de droite, ainsi que dans les diverses communautés ethniques minoritaires comme les Kurdes et les Arméniens. Même la parti kémaliste qui dirigeait le pays dans les années 1990 a signé son soutien, sans oublier des organisations professionnelles comme l’union des barreaux de Turquie (les avocats), divers intellectuels et artistes etc.

Le succès de cette campagne est tel que le collectif « Fin de l’Isolement de l’Abkhazie » souhaite aujourd’hui étendre sa dynamique au monde entier en lançant un appel international contre l’enclavement de l’Abkhazie. Des comités en ce sens se constituent en Europe, en Asie, en Afrique, aux Etats-Unis. Le soutien à la pétition Ouvrez les portes verrouillées de la Mer Noire – mettez fin à l’isolement ! doit être l’occasion à la fois de tendre la main à ce courageux petit peuple qui depuis des siècles a résisté à toutes les tentatives d’asservissement et d’assimilation, et un moyen de dénoncer la politique occidentale qui applique un deux poids deux mesures entre les peuples « alliés » et les peuples « ennemis », en condamnant sans état d’âme ces derniers à l’oubli et à l’étranglement. Plutôt que de servir de supplétif à l’impérialisme de l’Union européenne en Géorgie, la France et les autres pays francophones s’honoreraient de plutôt choisir dans le Caucase le non-alignement et aider les Abkhazes à sortir du blocus économique et administratif. C’est ce que les citoyens doivent demander en signant cette pétition.

Lien pour la pétition (en français) : https://atlasalternatif.over-blog.com/2026/10/petition-pour-la-fin-de-l-isolement-de-l-abkhazie.html

Publié à l’origine par  Le Grand Soir

Albania accused of rushing through Trump-linked resort in formerly protected landscape

19 October 2026 at 14:53

Dutch MEP says government is trying to avoid EU environmental rules as protests over luxury development turn violent

MEPs have accused Albania of deploying “sneaky” practices to fast-track a proposed Trump-linked luxury resort in the country amid protests that have turned increasingly violent.

As the prime minister, Edi Rama, pledged to “listen to the voices of young people” taking to the streets, there was mounting criticism of his failure to address demonstrators who had long opposed the controversial project peacefully.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Adnan Beci/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Adnan Beci/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Adnan Beci/AFP/Getty Images

Dopo la Russia, la Cina è il prossimo obiettivo dei falchi europei?

By: A A
19 October 2026 at 10:30

Non disponendo delle condizioni materiali necessarie per sfidare la supremazia industriale cinese, l’Unione Europea continua a trasformare le proprie difficoltà economiche in una giustificazione per una nuova escalation delle ostilità.

Segue nostro Telegram.

I leader europei sembrano aver individuato una nuova missione strategica: ricostruire la capacità industriale del continente riducendo al contempo la sua dipendenza dalla Cina. L’iniziativa è stata recentemente avanzata congiuntamente da Francia e Germania e viene presentata come una risposta alla crescente presenza della Cina sul mercato europeo. Il problema è che i leader responsabili di questo progetto continuano a ignorare una questione fondamentale: nessuna reindustrializzazione su larga scala può avere successo senza un approvvigionamento energetico stabile, abbondante e a prezzi accessibili.

L’Europa dispone di eccellenti università, di una forza lavoro qualificata, di centri tecnologici all’avanguardia e di una tradizione industriale che le conferisce ancora notevoli vantaggi. Tuttavia, queste risorse non possono funzionare in modo isolato. Gli impianti chimici, le acciaierie, gli stabilimenti metallurgici e numerose altre industrie dipendono da un approvvigionamento energetico continuo e competitivo. Il capitale, le conoscenze scientifiche e i lavoratori specializzati non possono compensare all’infinito i costi di produzione elevati. È proprio su questo punto che la strategia dell’Europa contraddice i propri stessi obiettivi.

Per decenni, l’integrazione economica tra l’Europa occidentale e la Russia ha fornito condizioni favorevoli allo sviluppo di importanti settori industriali. Le forniture di gas naturale russo, in particolare, hanno contribuito a sostenere attività ad alto consumo energetico. Questo rapporto ha soddisfatto gli interessi economici concreti di entrambe le parti: Mosca disponeva di un importante mercato per le proprie esportazioni, mentre le economie europee ottenevano una risorsa essenziale per la loro competitività.

L’introduzione delle sanzioni nel 2022 ha profondamente alterato questa situazione. Le misure coercitive illegali hanno reciso un partenariato di lunga data tra Russia ed Europa, lasciando la parte occidentale del continente economicamente indebolita e dipendente da approvvigionamenti energetici esterni più costosi e meno sicuri. L’Europa, che già prima di allora stava subendo una graduale deindustrializzazione, è successivamente precipitata in una crisi energetica, con conseguenze che vanno dall’aumento delle bollette energetiche ai fallimenti aziendali causati dall’incapacità di mantenere una produzione competitiva.

Sarebbe ragionevole aspettarsi che una strategia di ripresa industriale iniziasse affrontando queste vulnerabilità. Invece, i leader europei stanno tentando di costruire una nuova base produttiva senza risolvere adeguatamente il problema energetico. I responsabili della politica economica europea sembrano ritenere che sussidi, incentivi fiscali e programmi di investimento siano sufficienti a ripristinare la competitività. Tali strumenti possono contribuire allo sviluppo industriale, ma la loro efficacia rimarrà limitata fintantoché persisteranno gli svantaggi strutturali nei costi energetici.

È in questo contesto che la Cina sta assumendo una posizione sempre più di rilievo nella «lista delle preoccupazioni» di Bruxelles. La capacità della Cina di produrre su vasta scala, rifornire catene industriali complesse e offrire attrezzature a prezzi competitivi rappresenta una sfida per un’Europa che cerca di recuperare la propria autonomia produttiva. Anziché riconoscere la portata del declino accumulato e sviluppare una strategia coerente per invertire la tendenza, alcuni settori della leadership europea preferiscono ricorrere a barriere commerciali, indagini punitive e meccanismi di contenimento economico.

Tale approccio rivela una comprensione piuttosto superficiale della concorrenza industriale. Limitare le importazioni cinesi non comporta automaticamente la creazione di stabilimenti europei, né riduce i costi dell’elettricità, né garantisce l’approvvigionamento di gas agli impianti industriali. Al contrario, le aziende che dipendono da attrezzature, componenti e materie prime cinesi potrebbero trovarsi a dover sostenere spese più elevate proprio nel momento in cui hanno bisogno di investire per recuperare la propria posizione sui mercati internazionali.

La questione russa rende questa situazione ancora più delicata. Il ripristino della cooperazione energetica con Mosca costituirebbe il primo passo di qualsiasi serio piano di ripresa industriale. Grazie alle forniture energetiche russe e ad ampie partnership commerciali con la Cina, l’Europa potrebbe ritrovare una nuova strada verso lo sviluppo, proprio come stanno ora iniziando a fare i paesi africani e asiatici attraverso le loro partnership con la Russia e la Cina.

Bruxelles, Parigi e Berlino, tuttavia, si stanno muovendo nella direzione opposta. Gli strateghi europei sembrano determinati a confrontarsi contemporaneamente con due delle maggiori potenze industriali ed energetiche del mondo, senza dimostrare di possedere le risorse necessarie per sostenere tale ambizione. In primo luogo, hanno compromesso un rapporto energetico fondamentale con la Russia. Ora rischiano di trasformare la Cina in un avversario commerciale permanente.

In definitiva, ciò che i falchi europei perseguono non è lo sviluppo dell’Europa, bensì la strumentalizzazione di questioni quali l’industria e il commercio per portare avanti la propria agenda autodistruttiva. In base a questa strategia, i cittadini europei – già privati dell’energia russa e potenzialmente destinati a un accesso ridotto ai prodotti cinesi nel prossimo futuro – saranno ancora una volta i primi a subirne le conseguenze.

France hit by debt sell-off as violent protests unnerve investors

19 October 2026 at 16:23

Difference between French and German borrowing costs widens after public buildings burned and shops looted

France has been hit by a fresh wave of selling in its bond and stock markets after violent protests over the weekend led to thousands of arrests and left public buildings burned and hundreds of shops looted across the country.

The chaos has spooked investors as analysts worried that it would undermine Paris’s efforts to cut spending and reduce its debt.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: SDIS 87/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: SDIS 87/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: SDIS 87/AFP/Getty Images

Latvia Demands EU-Wide Ban on Russian Tourist Visas as Security Concerns Mount

19 October 2026 at 07:19

Latvia has called for a European Union-wide ban on tourist visas for Russian citizens, reopening a dispute between member states over border security, freedom of movement and the treatment of Russian nationals during Moscow’s continuing war against Ukraine.

Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs is pressing Brussels and other European capitals to adopt a common approach, arguing that continued visa issuance by some Schengen countries weakens restrictions imposed by states bordering Russia.

His intervention comes amid growing concerns over suspected Russian sabotage, espionage and other hostile activities across Europe. The Latvian government regards restrictions on non-essential travel as an additional measure to reduce potential security risks.

According to details of the Latvian proposal, Kulbergs has criticised the continued issuance of tourist visas by countries including France, Italy and Spain, maintaining that the consequences extend beyond the states granting entry.

The proposal would go considerably further than the restrictions already introduced by the EU since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

A divided European visa policy

The European Union suspended its visa facilitation agreement with Russia in September 2022, ending the preferential conditions previously available to Russian applicants.

The Council’s original decision introduced more demanding documentation requirements, higher application fees and stricter scrutiny, but it did not prohibit Russian citizens from obtaining short-stay visas.

National authorities therefore retained considerable discretion when assessing applications, subject to common Schengen rules.

In November 2025, the Commission introduced additional restrictions on multiple-entry visas, requiring Russian travellers covered by the new rules to apply again for subsequent visits.

The EU has also agreed a legal basis for restrictions targeting Russian military personnel and former combatants involved in the invasion of Ukraine, although implementation requires further measures.

Latvia argues that these steps remain insufficient because ordinary tourist visas continue to be available through some European consulates.

Once admitted to the Schengen area, a visitor can generally travel between participating countries without routine internal border checks. This creates difficulties for governments seeking to enforce stricter national entry policies.

Security concerns on the eastern border

Latvia shares borders with Russia and Belarus and has repeatedly warned that Moscow’s activities present risks extending beyond conventional military threats.

European governments have investigated incidents involving suspected sabotage, cyber operations, intelligence gathering and interference with transport infrastructure.

Such concerns have intensified following drone incursions and security alerts affecting NATO’s eastern members.

These concerns were also evident in EU Today’s reporting on suspected security breaches in Europe, although the circumstances of individual incidents must be investigated rather than assumed to involve foreign intelligence services.

The distinction is relevant to the Latvian proposal. European intelligence agencies have identified Russian-linked activities, but this does not establish that ordinary Russian tourists are collectively involved in intelligence operations.

Supporters of tighter visa restrictions argue that limiting discretionary entry could reduce opportunities for hostile activity and simplify security screening.

Opponents question whether a nationality-based prohibition would be proportionate or effective, particularly when intelligence operations may involve individuals travelling under other nationalities or using established residency arrangements.

Political and legal complications

A comprehensive tourist visa ban would require agreement on its precise scope, legal basis and implementation.

European governments would need to determine how the restrictions apply to Russian citizens with family members in the EU, people travelling for humanitarian purposes and individuals seeking protection from the Russian authorities.

The EU Visa Code already permits refusals where applicants present security risks, but a general prohibition based on nationality would involve a different policy decision.

Humanitarian exceptions would be particularly important for Russian dissidents, independent journalists and other individuals facing political persecution.

France has supported restrictions on entry by Russian combatants, while other member states are considering further measures. That does not necessarily mean they support Latvia’s broader proposal covering ordinary tourists.

Kulbergs is also seeking greater European financial assistance for countries facing the economic and security consequences of their proximity to Russia and Belarus.

Sanctions and Schengen controls

The renewed visa debate coincides with disagreements between Washington and Brussels over economic restrictions on Moscow.

EU leaders have maintained that sanctions should remain in place until Russia ends its aggression against Ukraine. Visa policy, however, requires separate legal and political consideration from economic sanctions.

Latvia’s proposal has not been adopted as an EU-wide rule. The immediate question is whether enough member states are prepared to move from tighter individual screening towards a general restriction on Russian leisure travel.

Until that agreement is reached, European countries will continue to apply different policies within a shared Schengen system, leaving the security concerns raised by Riga unresolved.

Five Arrested in €114 Million Smartphone VAT Fraud Investigation Across Europe

19 October 2026 at 07:13

Five people have been arrested in Cyprus, Germany and Italy as part of a European investigation into an alleged €114 million VAT fraud operation involving the cross-border smartphone trade.

The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) announced on 16th October that three suspects had been detained in Cyprus, one in Germany and one in Italy following an investigation coordinated by its Munich office.

Investigators believe the suspects established and controlled a network of companies designed to exploit the tax treatment of goods traded between EU member states.

The alleged operation involved smartphone transactions through businesses and so-called missing traders operating in Germany, Albania and Sweden. Prosecutors estimate that the activities caused VAT losses of approximately €80 million in Sweden and €34 million in Germany.

According to the official announcement of the arrests, the operation forms part of a wider investigation known as Midas, which is examining organised cross-border tax fraud.

Searches across several countries

The arrests were accompanied by searches and seizures in Cyprus, Greece and Italy, conducted with the assistance of national police, financial investigators and tax authorities.

Prosecutors said 12 searches had been carried out at premises connected with the suspects and companies under investigation.

Assets of up to €80,000 were frozen, while investigators also seized or took action against bank accounts, vehicles and property.

The operation involved cooperation between Germany’s tax authorities, Cyprus’s financial intelligence and cybercrime units, the Greek financial police and Italy’s Guardia di Finanza.

The suspects are believed to have played leading roles in organising and controlling the alleged scheme, although prosecutors have not publicly established their individual criminal responsibility.

The investigation remains subject to proceedings before the competent German courts. All suspects are presumed innocent unless proven guilty.

How the alleged fraud operated

The case concerns a form of tax evasion known as missing-trader intra-community fraud, commonly described as carousel VAT fraud.

Under the EU’s VAT system, qualifying business-to-business transactions involving goods transported between member states are generally exempt from VAT in the country of dispatch.

The purchaser accounts for VAT under the rules applicable in the destination country, while subsequent domestic sales normally involve VAT being charged to the buyer.

Fraudsters can exploit those arrangements by establishing companies that purchase goods through cross-border transactions before reselling them domestically.

A missing trader collects VAT from the purchaser but fails to remit it to the relevant tax authority. Other companies in the transaction chain may then seek deductions or refunds.

The same goods can pass through several businesses and, in some arrangements, move repeatedly between countries, allowing the fraud to be repeated.

Smartphones and electronic equipment are particularly attractive because they are relatively expensive, easily transported and can be traded in large volumes.

The complexity of the arrangements makes investigations difficult when businesses are established in several jurisdictions and transactions move rapidly between companies.

A wider European problem

The latest arrests follow another substantial VAT fraud operation announced earlier this month.

On 7th October, the EPPO reported that 62 suspects had been detained in a separate investigation involving alleged losses of at least €410 million.

That operation, known as Hermes, involved searches across eight countries and allegations concerning the sale of mobile phones and other electronic devices.

Although separate from Midas, the investigation illustrates the scale and organisation of suspected VAT fraud involving internationally traded consumer electronics.

According to the EPPO‘s 2025 annual report, prosecutors were handling 3,602 active investigations at the end of last year, with estimated potential damage exceeding €67 billion.

Of that amount, more than €45 billion related to suspected VAT and customs fraud.

Those figures concern estimated losses under investigation, rather than sums established by final court judgments or amounts that have already been recovered.

Protecting European tax revenues

The financial consequences extend beyond the immediate losses attributed to individual schemes.

VAT is a major source of revenue for national governments and forms part of the system used to calculate certain contributions to the EU budget.

Fraudulent transactions can also distort competition by allowing dishonest operators to offer prices that legitimate businesses cannot match.

The Commission’s 2025 VAT gap report estimated that EU countries failed to collect approximately €128 billion in expected VAT revenue in 2023.

That broader figure includes losses arising from several causes, including administrative errors and insolvency, and cannot be attributed entirely to criminal fraud.

The latest arrests also demonstrate the importance of cross-border investigative cooperation when suspected financial offences involve companies, transactions and assets located in different countries.

In the Midas investigation, prosecutors must now establish the precise roles of the suspects, prove the alleged transactions and determine whether criminal proceedings can result in convictions and financial recovery.

The arrests represent another stage in the investigation, not a judicial finding that the alleged €114 million fraud has been proved.

EU and Turkey Plan Cyprus Talks as New Dispute Threatens Diplomatic Opening

19 October 2026 at 07:09

The European Union and Turkey are preparing high-level talks before the end of October in an attempt to revive negotiations over Cyprus, following an initiative by United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres.

Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides announced the planned meeting on 16 October during the European Council summit in Brussels, saying discussions would address both the resumption of negotiations over the island’s division and the possibility of improving relations between Ankara and the EU.

The initiative follows diplomatic contacts in New York involving Guterres, European institutional leaders and the Cypriot government. However, renewed differences over the conditions for negotiations have already cast doubt on whether the process can produce substantial progress.

On Sunday, 18 October, Christodoulides accused Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman of imposing preconditions before formal negotiations could resume, particularly concerning arrangements for a rotating presidency in a reunited Cyprus.

The disagreement underlines the difficulties facing an initiative intended to reconnect the UN peace process with the EU’s broader relationship with Turkey.

Brussels seeks a negotiating role

Christodoulides said the planned meeting between the EU and Turkey would examine how to establish the necessary conditions for negotiations to restart within the previously agreed UN framework.

He indicated that any improvement in EU–Turkey relations would be linked to progress over Cyprus.

The president’s announcement in Brussels follows months of diplomatic consultations involving the Commission, European Council and UN.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa have urged Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to support the renewed peace initiative.

Turkey’s relationship with the EU encompasses trade, customs cooperation, migration and regional security. Ankara remains an EU candidate country, although accession negotiations have been effectively stalled for years.

Cyprus remains one of the principal obstacles to any substantial improvement in that relationship.

The island has been divided since Turkey’s military intervention in 1974. The internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus joined the EU in 2004, but EU law remains suspended in areas where its government does not exercise effective control.

The self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is recognised only by Turkey.

Disagreement over political equality

The UN has traditionally sought a settlement based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Negotiations collapsed at Crans-Montana in Switzerland in 2017 amid unresolved disputes over security guarantees, political representation, territory and the presence of Turkish troops.

Erhürman, who became Turkish Cypriot leader in 2025, has expressed support for renewed negotiations within a federal framework. However, he wants assurances about political equality and the structure of future talks.

The latest dispute concerns whether the principle of a rotating presidency between the two communities should be accepted before negotiations resume.

Christodoulides rejected that demand on 18 October, arguing that substantive questions should be negotiated together rather than settled in advance.

The Turkish Cypriot leadership regards rotating executive power as an essential element of political equality, while the Greek Cypriot side objects to making agreement on that arrangement a prerequisite for restarting discussions.

The disagreement has emerged despite recent efforts by the United Nations to improve relations between the communities.

In a statement issued on 13 October, the UN confirmed that Christodoulides and Erhürman had met in Nicosia and agreed to continue discussions, including participation in bicommunal initiatives.

The two leaders subsequently attended a joint event in Pyla, although their public differences persisted.

Turkey’s position remains decisive

A Cyprus settlement would require agreement not only between the island’s communities but also on Turkey’s military presence and the system of security guarantees established at independence.

Ankara has long maintained that Turkish Cypriots require effective political equality and credible security arrangements.

Greek Cypriot leaders argue that the continuation of foreign intervention rights and Turkish military deployments would be incompatible with a fully sovereign and reunited state.

The EU cannot resolve those differences independently of the UN process, but it can influence the economic and institutional framework within which a settlement might operate.

A comprehensive agreement would affect property ownership, trade, customs arrangements, border administration and the application of European law throughout the island.

The European Commission has sought a greater role in supporting the UN-led peace process, reflecting Brussels’ interest in progress towards a settlement.

Negotiations face immediate test

The UN Secretary-General’s personal envoy, María Ángela Holguín, has warned that the opportunity for renewed negotiations may be narrowing.

Disagreements over diplomatic representation, contacts with foreign missions and the status of Turkish Cypriot institutions have complicated relations between the two communities.

Christodoulides has also referred to a series of proposals intended to advance discussions, including the future of the fenced-off area of Varosha. Their full contents have not been publicly disclosed.

The proposed EU–Turkey meeting offers a separate diplomatic channel through which Brussels can assess Ankara’s willingness to support renewed negotiations.

No final date, detailed agenda or list of participants had been publicly confirmed by 18 October.

The immediate test will be whether the parties can agree on the basis for formal talks without attempting to settle disputed constitutional questions before negotiations begin.

Washington Threatens Retaliation Over EU Plans to Restrict American Satellite Operators

19 October 2026 at 05:57

The United States has warned the European Union that proposed restrictions on American satellite operators could provoke commercial retaliation against European businesses, escalating a dispute over the future of satellite communications and Europe’s efforts to reduce its dependence on foreign technology.

US Ambassador to the EU Andrew Puzder has criticised plans under consideration in Brussels that would reserve parts of the radio spectrum for European operators, potentially restricting services provided by Elon Musk’s SpaceX and its Starlink satellite network.

According to details of Washington’s objections, the American administration believes the proposed arrangements would discriminate against US companies and undermine competition. Puzder has warned that European businesses could face substantial consequences if the restrictions proceed.

The disagreement comes as Brussels pursues a broader strategy intended to strengthen Europe’s technological independence in satellite communications, cloud computing and artificial intelligence. Washington has increasingly challenged European regulations that it considers detrimental to American technology companies.

A dispute over access to satellite frequencies

At the centre of the disagreement is the allocation of radio frequencies used by satellite communications systems. Access to suitable spectrum is essential for providing reliable services, particularly as operators deploy increasingly large constellations in low Earth orbit.

SpaceX has established a substantial commercial and technological advantage through Starlink, which operates thousands of satellites and provides broadband services to residential, commercial and government customers across numerous countries.

European operators argue that the expansion of American satellite networks could make it difficult for European competitors to secure sufficient spectrum and develop commercially viable services.

Washington takes a different position, warning that preferential treatment for European operators could restrict competition rather than strengthen it.

The precise legal form of the proposed EU restrictions, and whether they will proceed, remain unsettled. No final European prohibition on American satellite services has been announced.

Nevertheless, the dispute raises a question for Brussels: whether measures intended to protect European industrial capacity can be introduced without exposing European exporters and investors to American retaliation.

Europe’s satellite ambitions

The European Commission is investing heavily in IRIS², its secure satellite communications programme, which is intended to provide independent communications capabilities for governments, defence organisations and commercial customers.

Under arrangements confirmed in August, the programme’s principal constellation is planned to comprise 348 satellites operating in low and medium Earth orbit, with initial launches scheduled for 2029.

The system is designed to reduce Europe’s reliance on communications infrastructure controlled by companies or governments outside the EU, particularly during military emergencies, cyber incidents and interruptions to terrestrial networks.

The Commission’s technical programme envisages communications services supporting border management, crisis response, defence and other sensitive government activities.

However, IRIS² is not yet operational, and European commercial operators face significant competition from SpaceX.

Eutelsat, which operates the OneWeb satellite network, is among the European companies positioned to benefit from increased demand for alternatives to Starlink.

Its shares rose sharply on 14 October following reports of restrictions affecting Ukrainian access to certain Starlink services. The market reaction reflected renewed interest in European-controlled satellite communications.

OneWeb cannot simply replace Starlink across all applications. Differences in network architecture, terminal equipment and available capacity complicate any rapid transition.

Ukraine adds a security dimension

The dispute is particularly sensitive because Starlink has become an important part of Ukraine’s communications infrastructure during Russia’s invasion.

Ukrainian forces have relied on satellite connectivity for communications in areas where conventional telecommunications infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed.

The strategic consequences of relying on a commercial provider became more prominent following reports that access to certain Starlink capabilities had been restricted.

For European governments, the episode has reinforced concerns about whether defence communications should depend on technology controlled by a company subject to political and commercial pressures outside Europe.

Yet restricting American participation before European alternatives are fully available could produce its own operational difficulties.

The Commission must therefore distinguish between developing independent European capabilities and limiting access to services that governments, businesses and military organisations currently require.

Another transatlantic regulatory confrontation

The satellite dispute follows disagreements over European regulation of American digital companies, including competition enforcement and restrictions on online platforms.

As EU Today reported in May, the European Commission had already proposed reserving much of the future mobile satellite spectrum for European operators.

Washington’s opposition introduces a different dimension because spectrum allocation affects market access directly.

The American administration is also linking the dispute to broader commercial relations, raising the possibility that measures affecting satellite companies could produce consequences for unrelated European industries.

Brussels has not announced a final decision on the disputed spectrum arrangements, while the United States has not specified which retaliatory measures it would impose.

The immediate issue is therefore regulatory rather than an enacted trade restriction. Whether it develops into a wider confrontation will depend on the Commission’s final proposals and Washington’s willingness to pursue its warning through commercial measures.

Britain cannot deal effectively with geopolitical crises without rejoining EU, says thinktank

19 October 2026 at 05:00

‘Sovereignty without the ability to act on it is not autonomy,’ paper by Institute for Public Policy Research says

Britain cannot deal effectively with geopolitical crises such as Russian aggression and political turmoil in the US without rejoining the EU, according to an influential thinktank.

The Institute for Public Policy Research has become the latest organisation close to the Labour party to call for the UK to re-enter the bloc, after Andy Burnham said he wanted to examine all possible options.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Vuk Valcic/ZUMA Press Wire/Shutterstock

© Photograph: Vuk Valcic/ZUMA Press Wire/Shutterstock

© Photograph: Vuk Valcic/ZUMA Press Wire/Shutterstock

Electricity costs put UK steelmakers in worst position in three years against EU rivals

19 October 2026 at 00:01

Premium paid over French counterparts has risen to almost £30 a megawatt hour, analysis by lobby group finds

British steelmakers have been pushed further behind European rivals on electricity costs after the US-Israeli war on Iran caused a surge in global gas prices.

The premium paid by the British industry over its French counterpart has risen to almost £30 a megawatt hour (MWh), its highest level in three years, according to analysis by the lobby group UK Steel.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Ian Forsyth/Getty Images

© Photograph: Ian Forsyth/Getty Images

© Photograph: Ian Forsyth/Getty Images

Bosnia-Erzegovina: la Republika Srpska rafforza il proprio peso mentre cresce la pressione euro-atlantica

By: A A
18 October 2026 at 23:29

Le elezioni generali del 4 ottobre hanno confermato la centralità dello SNSD nella Republika Srpska e il peso politico del campo legato a Milorad Dodik. Il risultato complica ulteriormente i progetti di centralizzazione della Bosnia-Erzegovina e soprattutto l’avvicinamento alla NATO contro la volontà della componente serba.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Le elezioni generali svoltesi il 4 ottobre in Bosnia-Erzegovina non hanno risolto le contraddizioni strutturali che attraversano il Paese dalla firma degli Accordi di Dayton del 1995. Al contrario, le hanno rese ancora più evidenti. Con lo scrutinio ormai quasi completato, pur in attesa della certificazione definitiva di tutti i risultati, il voto ha confermato la forza dello schieramento dominante nella Republika Srpska e, soprattutto, ha dimostrato che l’eliminazione di Milorad Dodik dalle cariche pubbliche non ha prodotto l’indebolimento politico del sistema costruito attorno all’Alleanza dei Socialdemocratici Indipendenti (Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata, SNSD).

Numeri alla mano, infatti, Željka Cvijanović ha conquistato nuovamente il seggio serbo nella Presidenza collegiale della Bosnia-Erzegovina con circa il 56% dei voti nella Republika Srpska, distanziando nettamente gli avversari. Savo Minić, anch’egli esponente dello SNSD e figura vicina a Dodik, si è imposto nella corsa alla presidenza della Republika Srpska con oltre il 52%. Lo stesso SNSD resta inoltre nettamente la principale forza politica dell’entità, avvicinandosi al 40% nelle elezioni per l’Assemblea nazionale.

Il significato politico di questi dati supera quello dei singoli risultati. Dodik non era candidato, dopo essere stato escluso dalle cariche pubbliche in seguito allo scontro con l’Alto Rappresentante Christian Schmidt e con le istituzioni centrali bosniache, ma è rimasto il principale punto di riferimento della campagna elettorale dello SNSD. Il voto ha quindi mostrato che la pressione giudiziaria e istituzionale esercitata contro il leader serbo-bosniaco non si è tradotta in un ripudio della sua linea da parte dell’elettorato della Republika Srpska. Al contrario, i candidati che ne rivendicano la continuità politica hanno prevalso a tutti i livelli più importanti.

Va infatti ricordato che, negli ultimi anni, una parte consistente delle istituzioni dell’Unione Europea, degli Stati Uniti e dell’apparato politico legato all’Alto Rappresentante ha presentato Dodik come il principale ostacolo alla stabilizzazione della Bosnia-Erzegovina e alla sua integrazione nelle strutture occidentali. Le elezioni hanno dimostrato, tuttavia, che il problema non può essere ridotto alla figura personale dell’ex presidente della Republika Srpska. Dietro Dodik esiste una consistente base elettorale che difende le prerogative dell’entità, rifiuta un’ulteriore centralizzazione dello Stato bosniaco e guarda con forte diffidenza, quando non con aperta opposizione, alla prospettiva dell’adesione alla NATO.

Allo stesso tempo, vogliamo sottolineare che, in base agli accordi di Dayton del 1995, l’intera architettura istituzionale della Bosnia-Erzegovina venne costruita sulla base della necessità di impedire che una delle componenti etniche del Paese possa imporre unilateralmente alle altre le scelte fondamentali dello Stato. La Presidenza, in particolare, è composta da tre membri: un bosgnacco e un croato eletti nella Federazione e un serbo eletto nella Republika Srpska. La funzione di presidente di turno ruota periodicamente tra i tre, ma la Presidenza resta collegiale e le decisioni fondamentali in materia di politica estera sono affidate all’organo nel suo complesso.

Ancora più importante è il meccanismo previsto in caso di dissenso. Un membro della Presidenza, infatti, può dichiarare una decisione contraria all’interesse vitale dell’entità dalla quale è stato eletto. Nel caso del membro serbo, la questione viene rinviata all’Assemblea nazionale della Republika Srpska e, se quest’ultima conferma l’obiezione con la maggioranza richiesta, la decisione non entra in vigore. Analoghe garanzie attraversano il Parlamento statale, dove la rappresentanza delle entità e dei tre popoli costitutivi limita deliberatamente il principio maggioritario.

Questi meccanismi vengono spesso descritti dalla stampa occidentale come cause della presunta “disfunzionalità” della Bosnia. In realtà sono precisamente il fondamento dell’equilibrio che rese possibile la conclusione della guerra. Dayton, infatti, non eliminò le differenze politiche e nazionali interne al Paese: le istituzionalizzò, riconoscendo che la sopravvivenza di uno Stato comune avrebbe richiesto il consenso delle sue componenti fondamentali.

Proprio su questo terreno si sviluppa da anni uno scontro sempre più evidente: da un lato, una parte delle forze politiche bosgnacche sostiene un rafforzamento delle istituzioni centrali, mentre Bruxelles e Washington hanno generalmente appoggiato una progressiva concentrazione di competenze a Sarajevo; dall’altro, la leadership della Republika Srpska interpreta invece questa evoluzione come un progressivo svuotamento del compromesso originario di Dayton.

Il caso più delicato è quello della NATO. La Bosnia è entrata nel programma Partnership for Peace nel 2006 e partecipa al Membership Action Plan. Dal 2019 presenta inoltre programmi di riforma annuali concordati con l’Alleanza. Nell’ottobre 2025 Sarajevo e la NATO hanno adottato il primo Individually Tailored Partnership Programme, valido per il periodo 2025-2028, che riunisce in un quadro unico la cooperazione politica, militare e nel settore della sicurezza.

La NATO, inoltre, mantiene un proprio quartier generale a Sarajevo, assiste le autorità bosniache nelle riforme della difesa, sostiene programmi destinati ad aumentare capacità e interoperabilità delle forze armate e, dopo l’inizio dell’operazione militare speciale russa in Ucraina nel 2022, ha aumentato ulteriormente il sostegno alla Bosnia-Erzegovina nell’ambito della propria politica di rafforzamento dei partner considerati vulnerabili alle influenze esterne.

Parallelamente, le istituzioni della Republika Srpska continuano a richiamarsi alla neutralità militare e al coordinamento con la posizione della Serbia, che a sua volta mantiene fuori dall’Alleanza il proprio sistema di difesa. Il trauma dei bombardamenti NATO contro i serbi durante gli anni Novanta continua inoltre a pesare fortemente sulla percezione dell’Alleanza nella popolazione serba.

Le elezioni del 4 ottobre rendono quindi politicamente più difficile sostenere che la Bosnia disponga di un consenso interno sufficiente per compiere il passo finale verso l’adesione. Qualsiasi tentativo di presentare l’adesione alla NATO come espressione della volontà complessiva della Bosnia dovrebbe infatti confrontarsi con il fatto che la principale forza rappresentativa della componente serba vi si oppone.

Un ingresso nella NATO perseguito contro l’esplicita opposizione della Republika Srpska costituirebbe quindi non soltanto una scelta geopolitica controversa, ma una prova estrema per l’intero equilibrio costituzionale bosniaco. Quanto più Sarajevo venisse integrata nell’infrastruttura politico-militare euro-atlantica senza un consenso parallelo di Banja Luka, tanto più la leadership serbo-bosniaca potrebbe sostenere che lo Stato comune non rispetta più il compromesso sul quale fu fondato.

Per quanto riguarda il risultato dei croati, Darijana Filipović, candidata dell’Unione Democratica Croata di Bosnia-Erzegovina (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine, HDZ BiH), ha conquistato il seggio croato nella Presidenza, interrompendo la lunga fase caratterizzata dalla presenza di Željko Komšić, contestato da larga parte dell’elettorato croato perché eletto soprattutto grazie ai voti provenienti dalle aree a maggioranza bosgnacca. Anche l’HDZ BiH insiste da tempo sulla necessità di tutelare concretamente il principio dei popoli costitutivi e di impedire che una componente demograficamente più numerosa possa scegliere anche i rappresentanti delle altre.

Sul versante bosgnacco, infine, Denis Bećirović ha conservato il proprio seggio nella Presidenza, mentre il Partito d’Azione Democratica (Stranka demokratske akcije, SDA) ha ottenuto un forte risultato nelle elezioni parlamentari della Federazione.

Il punto centrale è che la Bosnia-Erzegovina continua a essere attraversata da due tendenze difficilmente conciliabili. Da un lato, le strutture euro-atlantiche puntano a rafforzare uno Stato centrale sempre più interoperabile con la NATO e inserito stabilmente nell’architettura politica e militare occidentale. Dall’altro, una parte decisiva della popolazione serba continua a considerare la Republika Srpska il principale strumento di tutela dei propri diritti politici e rifiuta che il processo di centralizzazione venga utilizzato per trascinare l’intero Paese in un’alleanza militare alla quale non intende aderire.

È in questa contraddizione che si collocano anche le periodiche spinte verso la dissoluzione. La Costituzione di Dayton non riconosce alla Republika Srpska un diritto unilaterale alla secessione e la Bosnia-Erzegovina continua giuridicamente a esistere come Stato unitario sul piano internazionale. Ma la tenuta di un ordinamento consociativo dipende in ultima analisi dal consenso delle comunità che lo compongono. Se una di esse arrivasse a ritenere che le garanzie originarie siano state svuotate e che le decisioni strategiche possano essere prese sistematicamente contro la propria volontà, la crisi diventerebbe inevitabilmente politica prima ancora che costituzionale.

La stabilità della Bosnia dipenderà quindi dalla capacità di riconoscere questo dato anziché aggirarlo. Insistere sulla centralizzazione e sull’integrazione euro-atlantica come processi irreversibili, senza tenere conto della volontà espressa dagli elettori serbi, potrebbe produrre l’effetto opposto a quello dichiarato da Bruxelles e Washington. Quanto più la Republika Srpska percepirà lo Stato centrale come lo strumento attraverso il quale decisioni strategiche vengono imposte dall’esterno o dalla sola maggioranza bosgnacca, tanto più crescerà la forza dell’argomento separatista.

Shabana Mahmood to hold talks with EU over law enforcement cooperation

UK home secretary’s meeting comes after PM said he wanted to rejoin European law enforcement databases

The UK home secretary, Shabana Mahmood, will meet the EU’s home affairs commissioner on Monday for further talks just days after Andy Burnham said he wanted to rejoin European law enforcement databases from which the UK has been locked out of since Brexit.

According to the European Commission, they will discuss “migration, border management, law enforcement cooperation and counter-terrorism”, with the latest Frontex data published on Monday showing a 43% decline in small boats crossing the Channel.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Marcin Nowak/Anadolu/Getty Images

© Photograph: Marcin Nowak/Anadolu/Getty Images

© Photograph: Marcin Nowak/Anadolu/Getty Images

❌