Al Mayadeen | October 20, 2026

Ukraine has deployed drone personnel and thousands of microdrones across countries surrounding Iran, including Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, an Iranian security source told Tasnim News Agency, highlighting the deployments as part of a broader network of hostile activities directed against Tehran.

According to the security source, Kiev had established an operational microdrone network across the region, with thousands of drones deployed in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region.

The source withheld the names of the countries hosting Ukrainian personnel and equipment, stating that the information remained confidential and would be disclosed in due course.

Tehran preparing appropriate response

The Iranian security source further said Tehran considers Ukraine’s activities part of the broader hostile actions pursued by Europe and NATO against Iran, adding that Iranian authorities are fully aware of Kiev’s operations.

Tehran, according to the source, is considering an appropriate response to the deployments, which it stressed as a security threat.

Describing the operation as a “failed attempt and an embarrassment” for Ukraine, the source stressed that Iran remains aware of Kiev’s activities and their implications for regional security.

The bigger picture

The deployment comes amid longstanding security concerns over armed Kurdish separatist groups operating along Iran’s western border and growing tensions between Tehran and Kiev following a Ukrainian attack on an Iranian commercial vessel in the Caspian Sea.

Baghdad, Tehran, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) signed a security agreement in March 2023 requiring Iranian Kurdish separatist groups to disarm and relocate away from the Iraq-Iran border.

The agreement also obliges Iraqi authorities to prevent the groups from using Iraqi territory to launch military operations against Iran. While Baghdad and the KRG have fulfilled their obligations, sources told Al Mayadeen that four or five Iranian separatist groups continue to defy the agreement and carry out provocations along the border.

The remaining groups have continued their activities despite guarantees offered by the KRG, with Al Mayadeen Plus reporting in September that they had refused to leave their positions.

Tehran has responded to the separatist groups with missile and drone strikes, as well as ground operations targeting positions in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. In July, Iranian strikes martyred nine members of the Komala Party. Iran is also building a security wall extending more than 250 kilometers along its border with the Kurdistan Region.

These security concerns have unfolded alongside a deterioration in relations between Iran and Ukraine. In July, Tehran condemned a Ukrainian attack on an Iranian commercial vessel in the Caspian Sea that killed one sailor and injured another. Iran’s Foreign Ministry characterized the strike as an act of aggression and a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, warning that it could widen the scope of the war.

NATO member Finland is preparing to reintroduce anti-personnel landmines into its military arsenal, with a contract for around one million examples due to be signed soon, following the country’s withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention that aims to eliminate these weapons. The move comes as Helsinki looks to strengthen its territorial defenses against a longstanding Russian threat and the prospect of a larger Russian military presence along its eastern border in the years ahead.

Finland’s withdrawal from the treaty, which prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines, took effect on January 10 of this year. Reflecting growing concern among NATO’s eastern-flank members about Russia’s military posture and the lessons of the war in Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have also moved to leave the convention.

Mines have, for many centuries, been used to complicate an attacker’s movement, slow operations, and force troops to devote time and resources to clearing obstacles. Anti-personnel mines, in particular, have long been employed in defensive campaigns, but they come with significant humanitarian risks. They can kill or maim civilians long after hostilities end, which has seen them fall foul of international humanitarian law in many countries — at least when those nations don’t see a realistic risk of invasion.

It is a measure of how badly the European security environment has deteriorated that anti-personnel mines are back on the agenda.

The Finnish Defense Forces previously said that discussions with the domestic defense industry and preparations to train military personnel would begin early this year. It has now announced that the project seeks two different types of anti-personnel mines, of Finnish manufacture.

The two weapons will comprise a modern tube mine activated by a tripwire trigger, and a pressure-activated step mine. In the future, more technically advanced mines may also be procured, including cluster-type mines of the kind deployed by Russia in Ukraine. In general, anti-personnel mines have been very widely used by both sides in that conflict, with Kyiv notably receiving them as part of U.S. air packages, as you can read about here. Neither the United States nor Russia are signatories of the Ottawa Convention.

“The aim is for production of the new anti-personnel mines to begin in Finland in 2028,” said Col. Riku Mikkonen, inspector of engineers for the Finnish Army Command.

“We have a materials procurement project underway, which is currently in the preparatory and market review phase. At the same time, we are drawing up the technical specifications for the mines,” Mikkonen added. “We will soon move on to the stage where we issue requests for tenders, so that we can eventually proceed to a competitive tendering process and conclude contracts.”

At this point, no contracts have been signed. However, once the procurement effort is underway, the Finnish Defense Forces are set to return their anti-personnel mine stockpile to what it was before acceding to the Ottawa Convention in 2012.

The first new mines and associated training equipment are expected to become available during 2027. Ultimately, all conscripts will be trained to employ anti-personnel mines. The total cost of the project is around $110 million, with the last of the mines scheduled to be delivered in the 2030s.

Helsinki has stressed that it does not intend to lay anti-personnel mines during peacetime. Mikkonen said the weapons would be used only under emergency conditions.

Finland’s decision reflects a national defense philosophy that has long been shaped by direct experience with Soviet aggression. The Soviet Union invaded Finland in 1939, beginning the Winter War, and fought another conflict with the country from 1941 to 1944. Finland lost territory but preserved its independence, subsequently maintaining conscription, a large trained reserve, and a defense strategy built around making any invasion costly.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reinforced Finnish concerns that major conventional warfare in Europe remained a realistic possibility. Finland joined NATO in April 2023, and the country shares a little over 800 miles of border with Russia.

Finland’s defensive approach traditionally emphasizes rapid mobilization to defend national territory and delay a much larger attacking force until reinforcements can arrive. The role of anti-personnel mines in that scenario is clear, being sown to slow down infantry movements and hamper advances through vulnerable areas. Their disproportionate effect, at least in theory, is especially relevant for a country with a relatively tiny population compared to the length of its border.

At the same time, anti-personnel mines would form only one part of a much broader defensive system incorporating artillery, airstrikes, engineering obstacles, fortifications, and reserve forces. It should be noted that Finland also has a considerable armory of anti-tank and anti-vehicle mines, most of which are of local manufacture.

In general, Moscow has been restructuring its military command arrangements and starting to establish the foundations for a larger conventional presence across northern Europe.

In 2024, Russia reestablished the Leningrad Military District, an apparent response to Finland’s and Sweden’s subsequent entry into NATO.

The Leningrad Military District is responsible for a strategically important region that covers the approaches to St. Petersburg, areas bordering Finland, and territory extending toward the Arctic. Its reestablishment gives Russia a dedicated command structure for managing forces facing NATO across this northern sector.

While significant, the creation of a military district does not necessarily generate additional combat power.

Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to drain resources in terms of personnel, equipment, logistics, and more.

Nevertheless, Moscow’s longer-term plans point toward a substantial expansion of its ground forces and military infrastructure in areas facing Finland and the wider NATO alliance.

A central element of Russia’s reorganization is the formation of the 44th Army Corps in the Republic of Karelia, near Finland’s eastern border. The corps was established in 2024 as part of the wider effort to strengthen Russia’s military presence in the northwest.

Russia’s wider military development also encompasses the Kola Peninsula and approaches to the Arctic, where facilities support the Northern Fleet and its strategic nuclear submarine force.

Satellite imagery last year showed construction at the Lupche-Savino garrison near Kandalaksha, including facilities intended to accommodate an artillery brigade and at least part of an engineering brigade. The location is approximately 70 miles east of Finland’s border.

Earlier this year, a separate report by the Finnish Yle media outlet found that the Russian military was expanding a base in the town of Novaya Vilga to hold as many as 6,000 Russian troops. It is located about 100 miles from the Finnish border.

Breaking News: Where exactly is Russia building its massive new military garrison?

For the first time, a completely new base is going up behind Finland's eastern border, set to hold up to 6,000 soldiers. Take a look at the first satellite data: https://t.co/IuZerZRyeQ #russia pic.twitter.com/2UvQXheaAP

— Mika Mäkeläinen (@Mikareport) June 10, 2026

For Finland, the situation could change dramatically if the war in Ukraine winds down, and the Russian military assembles in greater strength closer to its borders.

Finland’s Military Intelligence Review 2026 assesses that Russia’s military reforms have not yet significantly increased its capabilities in its immediate vicinity. But it still anticipates a substantial increase in Russian military capabilities as circumstances permit and identifies Finland as a major direction for future force development after the war.

A ceasefire or settlement in Ukraine would not automatically enable Russia to launch a major offensive against Finland. A ceasefire could ease the immediate military pressure on Russia while still creating a serious economic and political challenge for the Kremlin. Russia’s wartime spending has sustained defense-sector production and employment, but winding that spending down risks exposing structural weaknesses.

With a ceasefire or settlement, Moscow would still need to rebuild units, replace equipment, replenish personnel, and establish the logistical capacity to sustain large-scale operations. However, there are indications that this is already happening, at least to a degree.

Recent imagery analysis indicates, for example, a significant buildup of newly delivered Russian armor, including new T-90M tanks, at the 22nd Central Tank Reserve Base, located around 450 miles from the Finnish border.

Mind you, the 22nd with T-90Ms, BTR-82As and BMP-3ms (and maybe BREMs) is just the latest storage depot beign refilled. There's also the 80th mainly with 2S19s and the 374th near the Finnish border with 2S43s and 2S44s since 2025…

— Jompy (@Jonpy99) October 15, 2026

Finland’s planned acquisition of anti-personnel mines fits into a broader effort to prepare for a potential future conflict. Prominent in the minds of Finnish — and other Nordic — defense planners is the fact that Russia is rebuilding the command structures and infrastructure needed to support a larger military presence near NATO’s northern frontier, even as the war in Ukraine limits its immediate ability to do so.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Finland To Build A Million Landmines As Russian Threat Looms appeared first on TWZ.

Mounting anxiety as Russia’s war on Ukraine reaches Nato’s borders with targeting of vessels transporting agricultural cargo

Nato is deploying additional military assets to the Black Sea amid the recent deadly escalation of Russian attacks on merchant shipping, as five more vessels were attacked on Tuesday.

Russia’s military said it ⁠struck ​three cargo vessels in Ukraine’s ⁠port of Reni and two ⁠other cargo vessels en ​route ‌to ‌Odesa.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: MAPN/Romanian Defence Ministry/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: MAPN/Romanian Defence Ministry/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: MAPN/Romanian Defence Ministry/AFP/Getty Images

Mounting anxiety as Russia’s war on Ukraine reaches Nato’s borders with targeting of vessels transporting agricultural cargo

Nato is deploying additional military assets to the Black Sea amid the recent deadly escalation of Russian attacks on merchant shipping, as five more vessels were attacked on Tuesday.

Russia’s military said it ⁠struck ​three cargo vessels in Ukraine’s ⁠port of Reni and two ⁠other cargo vessels en ​route ‌to ‌Odesa.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: MAPN/Romanian Defence Ministry/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: MAPN/Romanian Defence Ministry/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: MAPN/Romanian Defence Ministry/AFP/Getty Images

par Guan Jianbin

La réunion annuelle du Club de discussion de Valdai constitue depuis longtemps une tribune importante permettant au président russe Vladimir Poutine d’expliquer la logique qui sous-tend la politique étrangère de la Russie et de faire connaître les intentions stratégiques du pays. Le «discours de Valdai» de cette année s’est révélé moins passionné et plus mesuré, alliant un récit historique de grande envergure à des limites stratégiques clairement définies.

En lisant entre les lignes des remarques soigneusement calibrées de Poutine, on peut discerner son évaluation stratégique de l’avenir des relations de la Russie avec l’Occident et de l’évolution de l’ordre géopolitique mondial — un équilibre entre la dissuasion par la force et une ambiguïté diplomatique délibérée.

Depuis la création du Club de discussion de Valdai en 2004, Poutine y a participé presque chaque année, que ce soit pour prononcer un discours, assister à un déjeuner, prendre part à une séance de questions-réponses ou participer à des tables rondes. Ses interventions sont devenues une tradition importante de la diplomatie russe et une fenêtre essentielle permettant au monde extérieur de mieux cerner sa pensée stratégique. Un examen des différents «discours de Valdai» prononcés par Poutine révèle l’évolution de la stratégie de politique étrangère de la Russie sur plus de deux décennies, retrace les contours changeants de son analyse des affaires étrangères et met en lumière la trajectoire de l’évolution de sa perception de «l’Occident».

De «l’Occident unique» aux «deux Occidents»

L’un des messages importants véhiculés par le discours de Poutine en 2026 a été la définition d’une ligne rouge claire face à la volonté de l’Occident de parvenir à la «défaite stratégique» de la Russie. Il a averti que la poursuite d’une telle défaite serait extrêmement dangereuse et pourrait faire basculer le conflit russo-ukrainien dans une phase encore plus brutale et incontrôlable. Il ne s’agissait pas simplement d’une intimidation verbale ; cela représentait la ligne rouge que Poutine a fixée pour la survie du pays.

Selon la logique des dirigeants russes, l’usure sur le champ de bataille, les sanctions prolongées et la pression géopolitique sont des coûts qu’une grande puissance peut supporter dans un affrontement stratégique. Mais la «défaite stratégique» — c’est-à-dire un changement de régime, la désintégration de l’État ou la perte de la position géopolitique de la Russie — constitue une ligne rouge intangible. En tant que puissance nucléaire, une fois que la Russie sera acculée, il n’y aura plus aucune marge de manœuvre pour faire reculer une nouvelle escalade. La position exprimée par Poutine était claire : la Russie peut accepter une impasse prolongée et supporter les sanctions et l’endiguement occidentaux, mais elle n’acceptera jamais d’être vaincue de manière totale ni contrainte à la soumission. Si l’Occident insiste pour franchir cette ligne rouge, il portera la responsabilité de toutes les conséquences catastrophiques qui s’ensuivront.

Le recours continu de Poutine au concept des «deux Occidents», qu’il avait pour la première fois mis en avant en 2022, revêt une importance particulière : il distingue les forces de l’élite néolibérale, qui poursuivent une nouvelle forme de colonialisme, de la sphère civilisationnelle occidentale traditionnelle. Lors de la réunion de Valdai en 2022, il avait affirmé qu’«il existe au moins deux Occidents différents : l’un est traditionnel, doté d’un patrimoine culturel très riche ; l’autre est agressif et néocolonial». En réitérant cette distinction, Poutine a cherché à préciser que la Russie n’est pas en guerre contre la civilisation occidentale dans son ensemble. Son opposition vise plutôt les forces qui mènent des politiques d’endiguement, d’encerclement et de coercition hégémonique. De cette manière, Moscou tente de se créer un espace diplomatique et de préserver une marge de manœuvre stratégique.

Cette déclaration visait également à contester le discours, cultivé en Occident depuis de nombreuses années, selon lequel la Russie serait «en guerre contre le monde entier». La Russie identifie soigneusement ses adversaires et limite sa confrontation aux forces hégémoniques occidentales qui prônent l’unilatéralisme et le monopole géopolitique — et non aux citoyens occidentaux ordinaires. D’une part, cette stratégie vise à diviser le camp occidental et à affaiblir le consensus interne contre la Russie. D’autre part, elle laisse la porte ouverte à un futur dialogue entre la Russie et l’Europe ainsi qu’à un éventuel apaisement des tensions russo-américaines, offrant ainsi à Moscou une plus grande souplesse dans ses calculs diplomatiques.

De «l’intégration à l’Occident» à «l’équilibre face à l’Occident»

Un examen des discours successifs de Poutine à Valdai montre clairement que, durant les premières années de son règne, la Russie a activement envoyé des signaux de coopération aux États-Unis et à l’Europe et cherché à s’intégrer au système occidental. Elle n’a pas reçu la réponse qu’elle attendait. Au contraire, elle a été confrontée à des pressions géopolitiques persistantes, à des confrontations militaires, à des sanctions économiques et à ce qu’elle percevait comme une infiltration idéologique. À mesure que les attentes russes restaient les unes après les autres insatisfaites, sa perception de l’Occident a évolué, passant de l’espoir et de la confiance à la déception, puis finalement vers un équilibre stratégique et la confrontation.

De 2004 à 2012, Poutine a accepté l’ordre international existant et a activement recherché la coopération avec l’Occident, tout en défendant la souveraineté de la Russie et son statut de grande puissance. Il s’est opposé à l’élargissement de l’OTAN, à l’ingérence de forces extérieures dans les affaires intérieures de la Russie et à la propagation des «révolutions de couleur». Il a présenté la Russie comme une puissance eurasienne, soulignant qu’elle ne souhaitait ni dépendre de l’Occident ni s’y opposer. Il cherchait plutôt à établir une relation de partenariat entre égaux, fondée sur le respect mutuel.

Dans le même temps, Poutine a insisté sur le fait que l’Europe de l’Est et les anciennes républiques soviétiques constituaient la sphère d’intérêts principale de la Russie. Il a averti que l’élargissement effréné de l’OTAN vers l’Est saperait l’architecture de sécurité européenne, a critiqué l’unilatéralisme et les deux poids deux mesures, et a remis en question la légitimité d’un système de règles dominé par l’Occident. Pour autant, la Russie n’avait nullement l’intention de servir de fer de lance à un mouvement «anti-occidental». Poutine a présenté des propositions visant à créer un espace européen commun et à développer un partenariat modernisé avec l’Occident.

De 2013 à 2017, dans un contexte de troubles en Ukraine et d’annexion de la Crimée par la Russie, l’opposition de Moscou à l’élargissement de l’OTAN est passée de la dénonciation verbale à la confrontation géopolitique. Lors du Forum de Valdai de 2013, Poutine a attribué le désordre des affaires internationales à l’arrogance institutionnelle des vainqueurs de la Guerre froide et a critiqué ce qu’il a qualifié de déclin moral de certains pays occidentaux. Dans son discours de 2016, il a réaffirmé que la Russie n’avait aucune intention de rivaliser pour l’hégémonie mondiale et a appelé à une sécurité égale et indivisible pour tous les pays. En 2017, Poutine a tiré les leçons des relations entre la Russie et l’Occident, affirmant que la plus grande erreur de la Russie avait été sa «confiance excessive» envers l’Occident, qui avait interprété cette confiance comme une faiblesse et en avait tiré parti.

De 2018 à 2021, l’ordre du jour du Forum de Valdai s’est élargi, passant du «désordre de l’Occident» à la «montée de l’Orient» et à la «transformation mondiale». Il ne s’agissait pas simplement d’un déplacement du centre de gravité géographique du monde. Cela reflétait également la tendance croissante de la Russie à considérer l’Orient comme un centre de pouvoir et un point de référence civilisationnel, tout en affirmant son identité en tant que civilisation indépendante.

À mesure que les contradictions entre la Russie et l’Occident s’intensifiaient, le ton des discours de Poutine est passé de la «recherche de la coopération» à la «reconnaissance de la confrontation et à l’établissement de lignes rouges». En 2021, il a fait valoir qu’après la fin de la Guerre froide, certains pays avaient tenté d’exclure complètement la Russie, alors même que sa puissance nationale globale n’avait pas décliné. La Russie ne se contentait plus d’accepter passivement les arrangements imposés par l’ordre international ; elle souhaitait participer à l’élaboration des règles. Poutine a déclaré sans détour que le monde unipolaire dominé par l’Occident avait pris fin, et que des notions telles que les «valeurs universelles» et un «ordre fondé sur des règles» étaient des instruments d’hégémonie. Il a proposé un «système eurasien de sécurité égalitaire et indivisible» et a souligné que la Russie ne se faisait plus d’illusions quant à son intégration à l’Occident.

Le thème de la réunion annuelle de Valdai de 2022 était «Un monde post-hégémonique : justice et sécurité pour tous». Poutine a déclaré que l’humanité traversait la décennie la plus dangereuse, la plus imprévisible et la plus lourde de conséquences depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, et que le monde se trouvait à un tournant historique, dans la transition d’un ordre à un autre. Il a dénoncé l’«ordre fondé sur des règles» comme un prolongement de la pensée coloniale, arguant que l’Occident lui-même était une entité complexe et diversifiée en son sein et que le système néolibéral était entré dans une crise théorique et systémique profonde. Dans le même temps, il a réaffirmé que la Russie ne remettait pas en cause la civilisation occidentale légitime et ne cherchait pas la confrontation avec l’Occident pour elle-même. Toutes les actions de la Russie, a-t-il soutenu, étaient motivées par la nécessité de défendre son droit à la survie et au développement.

De 2023 à 2024, Poutine a déclaré que la Russie avait définitivement rompu avec sa dépendance vis-à-vis de l’Europe, accéléré son recentrage vers l’Est, reconstruit des chaînes d’approvisionnement industrielles autonomes et élargi son réseau géopolitique de partenaires. Selon l’évaluation de Moscou, la puissance globale de l’Europe était en déclin et son autonomie stratégique restait insuffisante. La Russie devait donc se tourner de plus en plus vers des plateformes de coopération émergentes telles que les BRICS et l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai.

En 2023, puis à nouveau en 2024, Poutine a systématiquement exposé six principes régissant le nouveau type de relations internationales prôné par la Russie : la coopération ouverte ; la diversité des civilisations ; une large représentation dans la gouvernance mondiale ; une sécurité égale pour tous ; l’équité et la justice internationales ; et le respect du droit de chaque pays à choisir sa propre voie de développement. Il a également fait valoir que les sanctions, l’isolement et l’endiguement ne pourraient pas freiner le développement de la Russie et que les instruments traditionnels de l’hégémonie occidentale perdaient progressivement de leur efficacité.

Lors de la réunion de 2025, le ton de Poutine est devenu plus rationnel et plus modéré, mettant davantage l’accent sur la gestion des risques et la désescalade. Il a déclaré que la normalisation des relations entre les États-Unis et la Russie servirait les intérêts nationaux de cette dernière et que Moscou n’avait pas complètement fermé la porte au dialogue. Dans le même temps, il a averti que les livraisons européennes de missiles à longue portée à l’Ukraine ne feraient qu’accroître les risques d’escalade et ne changeraient en rien la situation sur le champ de bataille. Il a appelé l’Europe à renoncer à la confrontation entre blocs et à rétablir un équilibre sécuritaire sur l’ensemble du continent eurasien.

De «se tourner vers l’Ouest» à «se tourner vers l’Est»

Dans l’ordre international, l’Orient s’oppose à l’Occident. Depuis des siècles, la Russie est engagée dans un débat de longue haleine sur son identité civilisationnelle : est-elle occidentale ou orientale ? La Russie occupe une position géopolitique et civilisationnelle particulière. Du point de vue occidental, elle appartient à l’Orient ; du point de vue oriental, elle appartient à l’Occident. Pendant la majeure partie de son histoire, elle a oscillé entre ces deux sphères civilisationnelles.

Comme l’a écrit Surkov, ancien conseiller principal de Poutine et penseur conservateur, dans Les cent ans de solitude de la Russie :

«La Russie a passé quatre siècles à se diriger vers l’Est et quatre siècles à se diriger vers l’Ouest. Elle n’a jamais pris racine ni à l’Est ni à l’Ouest. Ces deux voies ont désormais été parcourues. La Russie doit explorer une troisième voie, une troisième civilisation, un troisième monde, une troisième Rome…»

L’attirance de la Russie pour l’Occident a constitué un projet identitaire poursuivi à travers les générations successives. L’intégration à l’Occident fut autrefois une aspiration historique chère aux Russes. Des efforts de Pierre le Grand pour «apprendre de l’Europe occidentale» aux premières tentatives de Poutine pour «se rapprocher de l’Occident», l’occidentalisation est restée un fil conducteur central du développement de la Russie. Pourtant, l’histoire a montré à maintes reprises qu’un ralliement total à l’Occident a peu de chances d’aboutir à une véritable égalité ou acceptation. À l’époque d’Eltsine, la Russie a adopté les modèles occidentaux presque dans leur intégralité, pour finalement voir son espace géopolitique progressivement restreint par l’expansion continue de l’OTAN vers l’Est.

Au cours de son premier mandat présidentiel, Poutine considérait la Russie comme faisant partie de la civilisation européenne et avait fait de «l’intégration à l’Occident» une priorité de sa politique étrangère. Il a toutefois systématiquement rejeté l’idée de remodeler le système politique russe selon les normes occidentales. Les attentes diplomatiques ayant été déçues à maintes reprises, la perception que la Russie avait de l’Occident est devenue de plus en plus négative.

Lors du Forum de Valdai de cette année, on a demandé à Poutine si l’Union européenne devait être démantelée. Sur un ton taquin, il a répondu : «Ce n’est pas nécessaire. Elle s’effondrera d’elle-même». Cette remarque reflétait l’analyse russe selon laquelle les difficultés actuelles de l’Occident n’étaient pas simplement des crises locales ou temporaires, mais la preuve d’un déclin systémique au niveau institutionnel. L’angle d’analyse de Moscou s’est élargi, passant du «déclin de la puissance américaine» au «déclin du camp occidental dans son ensemble».

Depuis le déclenchement de la crise ukrainienne, les relations entre la Russie et l’Occident sont plongées dans une atmosphère de «nouvelle guerre froide». Les deux parties se considèrent de plus en plus comme des menaces pour leur sécurité, tandis que leurs liens économiques traditionnels continuent de s’affaiblir. La Russie en est venue à reconnaître que la possibilité réaliste de s’intégrer à l’Occident a pratiquement disparu. Des termes tels que «non-occidental» et «post-occidental» ont par conséquent pris une place de plus en plus importante dans le vocabulaire politique russe.

Aujourd’hui, une réorientation stratégique globale est devenue une caractéristique déterminante de la politique étrangère russe. Dans un contexte de tensions persistantes dans les relations de la Russie avec les États-Unis et l’Europe, Moscou développe vigoureusement sa coopération avec la région Asie-Pacifique et les pays émergents. Concrètement, elle a choisi de se tourner vers l’Est après s’être heurtée à des obstacles en Occident, dans l’espoir de parvenir à un résultat diplomatique où «lorsque l’Occident n’offre pas de lumière, l’Orient le fait».

Cependant, même si le centre de gravité stratégique de la Russie se déplace vers l’Est, l’Occident reste une question que Moscou ne peut éviter. Se tourner vers l’Est ne signifie pas abandonner complètement l’Occident. Les liens géopolitiques, énergétiques et historiques entre la Russie et l’Europe continuent d’exister en tant que réalités objectives.

Les discours successifs de Poutine à Valdai donnent un aperçu de l’incertitude et des questionnements de longue date du pays quant à son identité nationale. De la «recherche d’une intégration avec l’Occident» à «l’équilibre stratégique face à l’Occident», et du «non-occidental» au «post-occidental», la quête d’identité du pays entre l’Orient et l’Occident continuera d’influencer l’évolution de l’ordre mondial.

Dans les années à venir, la stratégie hybride de la Russie en matière de politique étrangère — alliant dissuasion vis-à-vis de l’Occident et expansion vers l’Est — ainsi que sa diplomatie flexible orientée simultanément dans ces deux directions, continueront de façonner les arrangements de sécurité eurasiens et l’avènement d’un monde davantage multipolaire.

Publié à l’origine par China Beyond the Wall.
Traduction: Reseau International

Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store and Finnish President Alexander Stubb are also taking part in the talks.

Manifestazione nazionale “Fuori l’Italia dalla guerra” – Roma, sabato 24 ottobre 2026
COMUNICATO STAMPA

Il Comitato promotore della manifestazione nazionale “Fuori l’Italia dalla guerra”, in
programma a Roma sabato 24 ottobre, ribadisce con forza il carattere pacifico e
nonviolento dell’iniziativa.
Scendiamo in piazza per chiedere pace, il ripudio della guerra sancito dall’articolo 11 della
Costituzione, la fine del coinvolgimento del nostro Paese nei conflitti armati, la solidarietà
con i popoli che resistono all’imperialismo e al sionismo. Chi aderisce alla manifestazione lo
fa condividendone pienamente lo spirito: volti scoperti, mani libere, parole chiare.
Il Comitato respinge in modo netto ogni tentativo di strumentalizzazione violenta da parte
di elementi estranei alla manifestazione, ai suoi contenuti, alle realtà che l’hanno
promossa ed a quelle che hanno aderito. Chiunque intenda servirsi del corteo per
compiere atti di violenza, danneggiamenti o scontri si pone fuori dalla manifestazione e
contro di essa.
Di questo tutti devono essere consapevoli, dai manifestanti agli organi di informazione.
Nessuno provi a screditare il movimento per la pace e a spostare l’attenzione dalle ragioni
della protesta.
Invitiamo tutti i partecipanti a seguire le indicazioni del servizio d’ordine, a non raccogliere
alcuna provocazione, a isolare immediatamente eventuali comportamenti violenti e a
segnalarli agli organizzatori.
Il 24 ottobre Roma vedrà una piazza ampia, plurale, determinata e pacifica. Perché la pace
si costruisce con la pace.
Il Comitato promotore della manifestazione “Fuori l’Italia dalla guerra”

20 ottobre 2026
www.fuorilitaliadallaguerra.org

L'articolo 24 ottobre: “Fuori l’Italia dalla guerra” – Comunicato Stampa proviene da Casa del Sole TV.

Ukraine is counting on buying part of Lockheed Martin’s growing output of ballistic missile interceptors, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said. He met the US company’s team in Kyiv on 19 October and also raised servicing and repairing F-16 fighter jets inside Ukraine.

Russia keeps striking Ukraine’s power grid with ballistic missiles, and interceptor supplies fall short of that threat. Kyiv is working every route to more Patriot missiles, from US deliveries to allies’ stocks, and some have stalled. Greece, for one, has not confirmed it will hand any over, citing its own defense needs. A purchase from the missiles’ maker would add one more route.

Growing output, F-16 repairs in Ukraine

Lockheed Martin builds the PAC-3 MSE interceptors fired by Patriot air defense systems, as well as the F-16. Zelenskyy said both matter against Russian ballistic missiles and jet-powered Shahed drones. Neither area is easy right now, he added.

“We count on the opportunity to purchase some of them to protect more lives,” he wrote.

On 28 July, Zelenskyy met the company in Washington to discuss joint production. That came weeks after US President Donald Trump pledged Ukraine a license to manufacture Patriots.

A batch reportedly stuck in Washington

Meanwhile, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has not signed off on a “significant” batch of Patriot missiles, Ukrainian officials told the Kyiv Independent. One official said allies had already paid for them. A US government official called the claims untrue, and the Pentagon did not respond. A NATO official said allied-funded deliveries, including air defense, continue. A second NATO official said some shipments could be delayed, but likely not for political reasons.

Zelenskyy told Bloomberg on 18 October that the US delivers only 12 Patriot interceptors a month. On 20 October, interceptors topped his list in a call with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

No purchase was announced, so new interceptors from this route remain a prospect. Meanwhile, partners’ early warnings of Russian ballistic launches have gone missing three times recently, Zelenskyy wrote. Those warnings give air defenses extra minutes to prepare.

NATO’s threat to blockade the Gulf of Finland could backfire by disrupting regional trade, triggering Russian military retaliation, and escalating tensions in the Baltic Sea. Rather than weakening Moscow, such a move could expose NATO’s logistical vulnerabilities and undermine its own military readiness. “We are able within a few hours to form a force of […]

Dass die Drohnen, die seit Jahren den Nordwesten Russlands angreifen, dazu die Lufträume Polens, der baltischen Staaten und auch Finnlands benutzen, ohne dass diese Staaten etwas dagegen tun oder dagegen protestieren würden, ist in Expertenkreisen seit Beginn der Angriffe ein offenes Geheimnis, über das öffentlich jedoch lange nicht gesprochen wurde. Da die EU-Staaten das aber […]

Nato, Rutte incontra a Bruxelles il ministro degli esteri turco

Il segretario generale della Nato, Mark Rutte, ha incontrato a Bruxelles il ministro degli Esteri turco Hakan Fidan. Lo rende noto su X la portavoce della Nato, Allison Hart. “Hanno discusso dell’attuale situazione della sicurezza, anche nel Mar Nero, nonché dell’eccellente contributo della Turchia alla deterrenza e alla difesa della Nato”, si legge nel messaggio della portavoce dell’Alleanza Atlantica.

CLICCA QUI PER ALTRE NOTIZIE DALL’ESTERO

L'articolo Nato, Rutte incontra a Bruxelles il ministro degli esteri turco: focus sulla sicurezza anche nel Mar Nero proviene da Affaritaliani.it.

Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski made an unusually confident assessment of a hypothetical war between NATO and Russia during the Yalta European Strategy conference in Kiev on September 12. “If Russia attacked us, and we took our gloves off, I think we would defeat Russia quite quickly,” Sikorski said. “We have overwhelming superiority over Russia […]

US envoy Steve Witkoff is joining negotiations in Norway before an expected visit to Moscow, but American pressure on Ukraine, uncertainty over military assistance and renewed economic dealings with Russia raise questions about Washington’s approach to ending the war.

The latest American diplomatic initiative on Ukraine comes at a particularly difficult moment in relations between Washington and Kyiv. President Donald Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, is taking part in talks in Oslo on Tuesday, 20 October, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European leaders, before an anticipated visit to Moscow for discussions with Vladimir Putin.

The Norwegian government has confirmed that the meetings will include Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Finnish President Alexander Stubb. Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, will participate remotely. The meeting was requested by Zelenskyy, with Norway and Finland providing the diplomatic setting.

Yet the significance of the Oslo discussions lies less in the gathering itself than in the political circumstances surrounding it. Washington is seeking an agreement with Moscow while simultaneously becoming more confrontational towards Kyiv. Recent American decisions affecting military assistance, intelligence cooperation and Russian energy exports have introduced serious doubts about how the administration intends to use its considerable negotiating leverage.

Washington’s pressure on Kyiv

The immediate difficulty concerns the growing discrepancy between American diplomatic assurances and the practical conditions under which Ukraine is expected to negotiate.

Zelenskyy has accused Washington of delaying military deliveries, restricting intelligence sharing and limiting access to the Starshield satellite communications system. The Ukrainian president suggested that these developments reflected a political decision to reduce support at a particularly sensitive stage of the war. American officials have disputed allegations that assistance is being deliberately restricted.

Among the disputed deliveries are Patriot air-defence interceptors purchased by European NATO members through the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List programme. Zelenskyy has indicated that shipments remain subject to authorisation by US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth.

These are operational matters with immediate consequences. Ukraine relies on American intelligence, communications infrastructure and air-defence equipment to counter Russian missile attacks. Any interruption affects Kyiv’s military calculations, irrespective of whether Washington formally acknowledges a change in policy.

The political message is equally consequential. Trump has publicly questioned Zelenskyy’s willingness to negotiate and suggested that Ukraine might need somebody else to conduct talks with Russia. Such remarks place additional pressure on the Ukrainian leadership while leaving Moscow’s territorial demands largely untouched.

Russia’s incentives remain unchanged

The central weakness in the American diplomatic approach is the assumption that renewed engagement with Putin will necessarily produce meaningful Russian concessions.

Moscow has repeatedly treated negotiations as an opportunity to pursue political objectives that its armed forces have not achieved on the battlefield. Russian demands concerning Ukrainian territory and restrictions on Kyiv’s future security arrangements remain incompatible with Ukraine’s sovereignty.

An agreement reached under these conditions could suspend hostilities without resolving the underlying conflict. Russia would retain the capacity to rebuild its forces, while Ukraine could find its military options constrained by commitments made in exchange for an uncertain ceasefire.

The Trump administration’s recent economic dealings with Moscow further complicate the negotiations. Washington’s arrangements concerning Russian diesel have attracted criticism from Kyiv and European governments, particularly because Russian energy revenues remain an important source of financing for the war.

Trump has also pressed Ukraine to curtail attacks on Russian oil infrastructure, reflecting American concerns about fuel prices. For Moscow, relief from attacks on refineries would preserve economically important facilities that Ukraine has demonstrated an increasing ability to reach.

Any arrangement limiting such operations without corresponding Russian concessions would alter the military and economic balance in Moscow’s favour.

The broader American proposals reportedly include possible post-war economic cooperation with Russia. Their implications extend beyond Ukraine: commercial normalisation could offer the Kremlin substantial benefits before the conditions for a stable European security settlement have been established.

Europe’s influence depends on its willingness to use it

European participation in the Oslo process is therefore more substantial than a question of diplomatic representation.

Britain, France, Germany and Poland, alongside the European Union and NATO, are expected to be involved in the wider discussions. European governments would almost certainly bear much of the financial and military responsibility for implementing any settlement, including Ukraine’s reconstruction and long-term security.

They also possess considerable economic leverage through sanctions, financial restrictions and decisions concerning frozen Russian assets. Those instruments would form part of any serious negotiation over Moscow’s future relations with Europe.

However, European influence remains constrained by continuing dependence on American military technology and equipment. The controversy surrounding Patriot deliveries illustrates the problem: European governments can finance weapons for Ukraine without necessarily controlling when those weapons are released.

As EU Today previously examined, Washington’s negotiations with Moscow have consequences for European security that cannot be separated from the future of Ukraine.

European governments consequently face a difficult calculation. They wish to preserve American involvement, but excessive accommodation of Washington’s demands could leave them financing security arrangements over which they exercise limited control.

Norway and Finland have helped bring the Ukrainian and American delegations together at a moment when their relationship is deteriorating. Whether that produces progress will depend partly on Moscow’s response, but also on whether Washington is prepared to maintain the military and economic pressure necessary to make Russian concessions possible.

Witkoff’s anticipated journey from Oslo to Moscow will offer an early indication of the administration’s priorities. Putin will be assessing the terms Washington is prepared to offer, while Kyiv remains concerned about restrictions affecting equipment it needs to defend its cities.

For the Ukrainian leadership, the danger is that negotiations intended to end Russia’s invasion could become a process in which the country resisting that invasion is asked to make the most immediate concessions.

Nel Landtag della Sassonia-Anhalt in Germania si è verificato un passaggio politico fondamentale che potrebbe segnare una svolta duratura per l’intero panorama politico tedesco e che, forse, potrebbe insegnare qualcosa anche nel resto d’Europa

Segue nostro Telegram.

Con l’approvazione di una mozione presentata dal BSW insieme all’AfD – rispettivamente il partito della sinistra patriottica fondato da Sahra Wagenknecht e il partito nazionalista di destra accusato di “fascismo” – il parlamento regionale ha formalmente impegnato il governo del Land a farsi promotore nel Bundesrat di una netta svolta strategica: lo stop all’invio di armi al regime golpista di Kiev, la fine delle sanzioni economiche alla Russia e l’avvio immediato di trattative diplomatiche.

SPD, Verdi e CDU per la guerra, contro il buon senso

L’iniziativa ha scatenato la reazione indignata dei partiti tradizionali, soprattutto i socialdemocratici di SPD, i Verdi e i democristiani di CDU, pronti a denunciare la presunta violazione del cosiddetto “Brandmauer”, il cordone sanitario istituzionale eretto verso la destra giudicata “fascista”. Tuttavia, la linea argomentata dalla marxista Sahra Wagenknecht dimostra come questa scelta non rappresenti una provocazione, bensì un atto di responsabilità democratica e di pragmatismo politico. AfD avrà al suo interno anche degli estremisti di destra, ma è un partito di massa votato perlopiù dalla classe operaia, e pur di fermare l’entrata in guerra della Germania contro la Russia, BSW è disposta a tutto.

Le sanzioni anti-russe distruggono l’industria tedesca

Come evidenziato dalla leader del BSW, le decisioni di politica estera prese a Berlino non sono astrazioni teoriche, ma incidono direttamente sulla vita quotidiana dei cittadini e sulla tenuta del tessuto produttivo locale. La Sassonia-Anhalt ospita poli industriali di prim’ordine, come il distretto chimico di Leuna, oggi messi a dura prova dall’esplosione dei costi energetici e dall’interruzione dei rapporti commerciali con l’Est. Le sanzioni contro la Russia hanno già provocato molti fallimenti aziendali, ma non in Russia, bensì in Germania, mettendo a rischio migliaia di posti di lavoro qualificati. A ciò si aggiunge l’invio continuo di ingenti risorse, fra soldi e armi, in Ucraina, a fronte di dolorosi tagli alla sanità, alla scuola, alle pensioni e ai servizi sociali, che rendono i lavoratori tedeschi sempre più insofferenti.

L’anti-fascismo usato come scusa per giustificare la NATO e la guerra

In questo scenario, BSW rifiuta la logica difensiva dell’establishment borghese, appoggiato dalla sinistra egemone, tanto nella sua versione moderata di SPD quanto in quella liberal più massimalista della LINKE. Questi partiti insistono che il pericolo principale non è la guerra voluta dalla NATO, ma i “fascisti” di AfD, che occorre isolare, benché votati democraticamente, impedendo qualsiasi accordo o alleanza. L’analisi di Wagenknecht, retta dal metodo del materialismo dialettico tipicamente marxista, individua invece una profonda frattura nella società tedesca: da un lato il campo di chi intende conservare il potere (“Machterhaltendes Lager”), rappresentato dai partiti di governo e dai ceti più benestanti che difendono la linea dell’escalation militare agli ordini della NATO e dell’UE contro la Russia e domani contro la Cina; dall’altro il campo del dissenso (“Lager der Unzufriedenen”), formato da lavoratori, pensionati e famiglie schiacciate dall’inflazione e preoccupate dal pericolo di un coinvolgimento diretto dei loro figli nel conflitto attraverso il nuovo servizio militare obbligatorio, contro cui i liceali tedeschi continuano regolarmente a scioperare. Per troppo tempo la retorica del “Brandmauer” (il muro anti-fuoco che dovrebbe isolare AfD dal dibattito politico) è servita alle forze governative tedesche per squalificare il dissenso e isolare le proteste popolari sotto l’etichetta dell’estremismo. Per il BSW, il dovere prioritario di una forza politica d’opposizione è rispettare la volontà degli elettori, dialogare nell’alveo delle regole parlamentari e sfruttare ogni maggioranza utile per raggiungere obiettivi concreti: fermare la spirale bellica, proteggere l’industria nazionale e tutelare i redditi dei lavoratori. E per fare questo Wagenknecht vuole superare i veti incrociati e la politica dei blocchi: il BSW dimostra che la vera priorità deve tornare a essere la difesa della pace, della neutralità militare, del lavoro e della sovranità popolare.

La fase storica impone il coraggio di rompere gli schemi

Di fronte all’accusa di agire come gregari del “fascismo”, l’antifascista Wagenknecht risponde che la strategia del “Brandmauer” è fallita nei fatti e ha ottenuto l’effetto opposto, alimentando la rabbia popolare e rafforzando proprio l’AfD. Al contrario BSW vuole dialogare con tutte le forze parlamentari e sfruttare le maggioranze d’azione per mantenere le promesse elettorali (come la pace e la calmierazione dei prezzi). La Wagenknecht spiega che i partiti del sistema, siano essi di destra o di sinistra, usano la retorica dell’antifascismo solo per delegittimare il dissenso, sospendere le regole democratiche e conservare il potere nonostante politiche fallimentari. Questo atteggiamento, secondo la leader del BSW, banalizza in modo irresponsabile la reale tragedia della dittatura nazista. Wagenknecht sottolinea infatti come i diritti democratici fondamentali e la libertà di stampa siano stati compressi negli ultimi anni non dall’AfD, ma dai partiti liberali, democristiani e socialdemocratici al governo, gli stessi che inviano decine di miliardi di euro a un regime ucraino che ha messo al bando i partiti d’opposizione e tollera la glorificazione di collaboratori nazisti.

Basta guerra alla Russia: questa è la sola priorità oggi!

Rispetto alla tesi secondo cui negoziare con Mosca sia impossibile perché l’ultra-demonizzato Vladimir Putin rifiuterebbe il dialogo, Wagenknecht non concorda: il Cremlino si era mostrato disponibile a discutere, ma i tentativi di trattativa sono stati chiusi dalla leadership ucraina e dai governi europei spinti dalla NATO e dall’industria delle armi a continuare la guerra. La narrazione, poi, secondo cui l’invio continuo di armi porterebbe alla vittoria dell’Ucraina è una finzione a cui per BSW “non crede più nessuno” e anzi l’escalation bellica – comprese le incursioni su Mosca condotte con tecnologia e droni tedeschi – è una strategia che rasenta la follia, rischiando di trascinare direttamente la Germania in un conflitto nucleare. Su questo aspetto anche il Partito Comunista Tedesco (DKP) denuncia l’ipocrisia dei partiti di governo (SPD, Verdi, CDU), che sfruttano la retorica del “cordone sanitario” antifascista con la scusa di frenare l’estrema destra eversiva, quando il vero obbiettivo è delegittimare qualsiasi mozione pacifista, indipendentemente da chi la voti in aula, contro l’escalation della NATO e contro le sanzioni.

Articolo originale  politicanuova.ch

A “Mostra de Artesanato Cidade de Lagos”, realiza-se em Lagos, no Mercado do Levante, dia 24 das 17h00 às 20h00 e dia 25 das 14h00 às 20h00 Outubro 2026. Esta iniciativa pretende promover e valorizar o artesanato, a criatividade e a diversidade cultural, proporcionando ao público a oportunidade de conhecer e adquirir trabalhos artesanais de diferentes […]

Russia wants America and China to decide Ukraine’s future without Kyiv. Europe must challenge this dangerous return to diplomacy of the strong for the strong

Does Vladimir Putin know exactly how to play Donald Trump? The history of chummy phone calls, high-profile meetings and attempts to bring Russia in from the cold certainly suggests that Moscow’s thuggish ruler has a hold on this American president. If Mr Trump agrees to negotiate Ukraine’s future with Mr Putin and China’s Xi Jinping without Ukraine at the table, he will have handed the Russian leader a victory before talks begin. The message will be that strongmen are ruling the world and determining the fate of weaker nations.

Ukraine has the right to determine its future. That right cannot be waved away by a self-serving Russian proposal, however much it indulges Mr Trump’s belief that world affairs should be settled by powerful men. The scales are falling from European eyes. Trumpian America is raising doubts about whether it will help deter aggression or even honour its Nato commitments. If Washington now rewards Moscow and pressures Ukraine to accept a raw deal, it would be a betrayal. European governments would wonder where America might be in the future when their own security is threatened.

Do you have an opinion on the issues raised in this article? If you would like to submit a response of up to 300 words by email to be considered for publication in our letters section, please click here.

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© Photograph: José Luis Magaña/AP

© Photograph: José Luis Magaña/AP

© Photograph: José Luis Magaña/AP

Downing Street emphasises sacrifices of UK troops and reasserts ‘unwavering’ support for Ukraine amid softening US policy towards Russia

• UK politics live – latest updates

Downing Street has criticised Pete Hegseth for downplaying the role of Nato allies in helping the US with combat operations in Afghanistan, saying Donald Trump’s defence secretary had been wrong to do so.

The direct condemnation came as No 10 more carefully distanced itself from Trump’s increasing willingness to engage with Russia, saying the UK’s backing for Ukraine was “unwavering”.

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© Photograph: Alex Wroblewski/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Alex Wroblewski/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Alex Wroblewski/AFP/Getty Images

O mestre Fernando Gonçalves orienta o curso de 50 horas no Palácio Gama Lobo, entre 29 de outubro e 21 de novembro.

O conteúdo Loulé Criativo ensina a fazer sapatos de ourelo em formação gratuita e certificada aparece primeiro em Barlavento.

U.S. lawmakers are growing concerned with ongoing violence gripping the small NATO nation of Albania as police clashed with protesters in the capital Tirana.

The violence continued for a sixth straight day on Sunday as the lawmakers issued warnings on social media to Albanian authorities. 

"The Albanian people deserve freedom, rule of law, and institutional accountability. The government must refrain from all violence against protestors. Young people deserve a voice in the future of their country," Republican South Carolina Representative Joe Wilson posted on X. 

Rep. Robert Aderholt, R-Ala., posted on X that: "All parties must reject violence, and the government must respect the rights of peaceful protesters. Albania’s young people deserve a voice in shaping their nation’s future." Aderholt and Wilson were joined by Rep. Keith Self, R-Texas, who stated on X: "The protests in Albania are a culmination of the people’s distrust of corrupt politicians and fatigue over the total disregard for the rule of law."

Police said 388 people had been charged with criminal offenses during the demonstrations, and an unspecified number of protesters and police have been injured, according to Reuters.

The U.S. Embassy in Albania called on all demonstrators to exercise their right to protest peacefully with no violent rioting, urging restraint and calm on all sides.

EUROPEAN CAPITAL ROCKED BY VIOLENT PROTESTS AS GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION PROBE FUELS UNREST

Tens of thousands have protested amid allegations of government corruption, inadequate education, unemployment and a lack of opportunity. The growing nationwide protest movement is driven by students and citizens also demanding accountability, an end to corruption and what they say is the restoration of democratic institutions and the rule of law.

The student-led demonstrations in Tirana, which have turned violent, have quickly spread to other parts of the country. Protesters have hurled rocks at police, burned government buildings, smashed shop windows and destroyed private property. They are demanding the resignation of Rama and have been met with a heavy-handed police presence, including rubber bullets, water cannons, and tear gas.

Prime Minister Edi Rama is portraying the demonstrations as a threat to Albania's European future, with the country on the unsteady path to European Union membership.

On Monday, Rama blamed outside forces for the violence, according to Reuters. "They are young men and women who have been ideologized and radicalized under the pressure or inspiration of that dark and new force that has emerged in Europe and the United States, which the President of the United States has designated a terrorist organization: ANTIFA."

In a post on Facebook translated by Reuters on Friday, Rama said, "These are also foreign hands that do not wish for Albania to be at peace; they do not want Albania to see clearly, to move forward, or to focus daily on addressing its own challenges for the sake of improvement. They do not want Albania to be part of the united European family — a place where it could finally, once and for all, escape these hands and the yoke of a forced choice."

FORMER ALBANIAN PRESIDENT ARRESTED ON CORRUPTION CHARGES, OPPOSITION CLAIMS CHARGES ARE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED

"Rama's attempt to equate the unrest in Albania with the protests taking place in France, Italy and elsewhere in Europe overlooks the specific political grievances driving Albania's demonstrations," Agim Nesho, former Albanian ambassador to the U.S. and the United Nations, told Fox News Digital.

Nesho said Albania's European future must not be confused with the political survival of Edi Rama or any government.

"European integration is supposed to reinforce democracy, judicial independence, transparent governance, and fundamental freedoms — not provide political protection from public accountability. Brussels has a responsibility to examine allegations of police abuses independently, uphold the rights of peaceful demonstrators, and take seriously the grievances behind this national movement," Nesho added.

The European Commission Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighborhood condemned the violence gripping Albania.

"We condemn the use of violence in Tirana and other cities in Albania, including arson, attacks on State institutions and the destruction of public and private property. Violence has no place in a democratic society, and the response to it must remain within the law and proportionate," the Commission said.

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The Commission noted the important gains Albania has made toward EU membership, reminded Albanians that grievances should be handled through constructive dialogue and in a peaceful manner.

The turmoil in Albania comes as the country has long sought European Union membership, which began in 2014 when it became an official candidate for accession. While the 2025 annual European Commission report stated that Albania made significant strides in judicial reforms and combating organized crime, the continued allegations of corruption in the Rama government and the current violence taking place will complicate its path to EU membership.

Reuters contributed to this report.

Come ogni anno l’appuntamento promosso dalla Niaf con la floridissima comunità italoamericana, nell’ambito delle celebrazioni del Columbus Day, rappresenta anche l’occasione per fare il punto sulle relazioni bilaterali tra Italia e Stati Uniti. Relazioni che rimangono solidissime, nonostante le recenti divergenze tra Trump e Meloni. Lo dice a Formiche.net il capodelegazione di FdI al Parlamento europeo Carlo Fidanza.

Qual è lo stato delle relazioni Italia-Usa dopo le recenti polemiche?

Il lavoro sulle cose concrete non si è mai fermato, anche grazie all’ottimo contributo dell’ambasciata italiana negli Usa guidata dall’ambasciatore Marco Peronaci e dell’ambasciatore americano a Roma Tillman Fertitta, così come dell’impegno di realtà consolidate come l’American Chamber of Commerce italiana. Continua il flusso di investimenti da un lato e dall’altro. E i due governi hanno positivamente concluso l’accordo sulla Pax Silica, con l’adesione dell’Italia a questa alleanza strategica sui minerali critici che è davvero decisiva se vogliamo realizzare le transizioni senza aumentare la nostra dipendenza dalla Cina.

Quale può essere ruolo geopolitico dell’ Italia?

L’Italia continua a credere nella Nato che oggi più che mai deve trasformarsi da alleanza militare ad alleanza geopolitica, coinvolgendo i Paesi likeminded che sono ancora fuori dall’orbita cinese. L’Italia porta in dote la sua proiezione nel Mediterraneo, la straordinaria intuizione del Piano Mattei per l’Africa, la solidità dei rapporti con i Paesi del Golfo, un protagonismo crescente in America Latina grazie all’allineamento politico con i nuovi governi conservatori del continente, in attesa di ulteriori buone notizie dal Brasile. Questo è il frutto della stabilità del nostro governo e della straordinaria abilità di Giorgia Meloni.

Qual è lo stato di salute del nostro export verso gli Usa?

I dati del nostro export sono eccezionali e crescono anche negli Usa nonostante i dazi. Soffriamo un po’ sul food and wine ma cresciamo grazie alla straordinaria capacità di adattamento della nostra manifattura e grazie ai risultati del settore farmaceutico. Su quest’ultimo, però, bisogna intervenire per limitare i danni derivanti dall’applicazione da parte americana del principio della Most Favoured Nation, che rischia di compromettere competitività e ricerca.

Quali i settori più promettenti?

Oltre alla farmaceutica e alle scienze della vita, ovviamente rimaniamo fortissimi nella meccanica. Abbiamo possibilità di sviluppo importanti nella difesa, estendendo questo concetto allo spazio e al dominio sottomarino, senza dimenticare la cantieristica navale su cui Fincantieri vanta ormai una presenza consolidata negli Usa. E poi abbiamo la grande opportunità di ritagliarci un ruolo nella super-intelligenza fisica, a partire dalla robotica umanoide, che è il luogo dove la super-intelligenza generativa incrocia la manifattura in cui siamo maestri. Senza dimenticare la primogenitura che Giorgia Meloni ha avuto nel porre il tema della governance globale dell’AI, a cui ha dedicato parte importante del G7 italiano, e che ora si arricchisce di una nuova opportunità promossa da AmCham Italy: fare di Milano non soltanto l’hub italiano dell’AI ma la sede di una nuova agenzia mondiale per la governance etica della super-intelligenza.

Cosa deve fare l’Ue?

Il consolidamento degli accordi di Turnberry è fondamentale. Abbiamo sempre sostenuto, a ragione, che un accordo anche non perfetto sarebbe stato meglio di un non accordo e di una conseguente guerra commerciale. L’Ue si è dotata di salvaguardie aggiuntive. Bisogna continuare a lavorare su settori come acciaio e alluminio e anche sulla lista dei prodotti alimentari esclusi dai dazi al 15%. E dobbiamo maneggiare con cura il grande elefante nella stanza, quello della tassazione digitale e delle multe alle Big Tech. Regole chiare e semplificazione sono la risposta. Infine, non dobbiamo sottovalutare l’impatto potenziale che le nuove norme doganali varate dall’amministrazione Usa a fine settembre possono avere sui nostri esportatori, soprattutto sulle Pmi.

L’autonomia strategica europea come va perseguita?

L’Ue fa bene a provare a costruire filiere con una percentuale maggiore di Made in Europe, ma l’autonomia strategica deve rimanere aperta, differenziata per settori in base alla nostra possibilità di costruire catene del valore realmente europee e non soltanto francesi, come vorrebbe qualcuno. Di più, l’autonomia strategica europea non deve essere una ripicca quotidiana contro un alleato ritenuto non più affidabile ma una politica industriale intelligente. Il contrario di quello che l’Ue ha fatto con il Green Deal, che ha massacrato le nostre imprese consegnandoci alla Cina. Da qui la coraggiosa battaglia di Giorgia Meloni contro il sistema Ets. Ecco, sulla transizione green qualche schiaffone arrivato da Trump credo debba aiutare l’Europa ad aprire gli occhi.

Ucraina e Iran: il contributo italiano e le mosse di Bruxelles.

Meloni ha espresso chiaramente il nostro giudizio su questo accordo e il sostegno alla tregua reciproca sulle infrastrutture energetiche. Mi auguro che, superate le midterm, si possa tornare a ragionare di una spinta forte alla pace in Ucraina senza umiliare Kyiv. E poi si deve trovare un modo dignitoso per chiudere questa avventura in Iran mettendo il regime di Teheran nelle condizioni di non nuocere. Il peso della doppia crisi geopolitica si sta rivelando troppo elevato, per l’Europa e per l’Italia in particolare.